election in thailand 1957

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Institute of Pacific Relations

Elections in Thailand (II)Author(s): Albert Pickerell and Daniel E. MooreSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 26, No. 7 (Jul., 1957), pp. 103-111Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023931 .

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however, are by nature unpredictable, depending asthey do, especially in the case of Japan, upon so manyexternal factors. It will be thus difficult to plan asteady industrial expansion of the whole country onthe basis of growth in one sector which is, to a largeextent, outside the direct control of that country. Tothe extent, however, that matters are within the cap-abilities of Japanese business and government, the max?imum efforts might be exerted in the direction of ex-

panding Japan's exports. Failing in this task, or failingto be sufficiently confident of such possibilities, Japan'salternative may be to initiate an emergency publicworks program during the critical years up to 1970,especially along those lines which would contribute to-wards a greater degree of self-sufficiency in foodstuffsand industrial energy. Of course, some combination ofan export drive with a public works program is notto be excluded.

in Thailand (II)BY ALBERT PICKERELL AND DANIEL E. MOORE

The Pibul "democracy^ program, and more particu-? larly the Hyde Park movement, permitted the freeexpression of more radical sentiments for the first timesince the 1947 coup. With the release of AssemblymanThep Chotinuchit from jail (anti-communist chargeswere filed against him on his return from Red China),it became clear that the government was willing toallow the participation of leftist parties in the elec?tions. Four parties in particular arose to form the so-called "Socialist-Front": (1) the Hyde Park Move?ment Party, registered March 21, 1955; (2) the Setha-korn (Economist) Party, registered October 4, 1955(headed by Thep); (3) the Socialist Party (SangkhomNiyom), registered March 13, 1956; and (4) the SocialDemocrat Party (Sangkhom Prachatipatai), registeredNovember 23, 1955.

Rumors of government manipulation were rife inconnection with these parties even after their coali?tion, for Petthai's defection from the Hyde Park Move?ment Party to the SM party was taken as paving theway for the whole coalition to join the group of par?ties supporting the government. Having weathered thisstorm, however, this coalition went on to advocatevery strong leftist policies?collective farms, govern?ment control over the entire economy, opposition to"imperialist America," abolition of SEATO, friend-ship and trade with Red China, the Five Principles,and repeal of the anti-Communist act. As leaders of thegrowing anti-American sentiment, the coalition wasquick to extend its sympathies to Egypt's Nasser dur?ing the Suez crisis, to support the USSR on the Hun-garian issue and to endorse the policies of CommunistChina.

The coalition possessed little more than sensationalnuisance value in Bangkok and its environs but con-centrated its efforts in the Northeast (where the party

leaders ran for office) rather than in the capital city.In the North and Northeast several other leftistsplinter groups were formed, among them the UnitedFraternity (or Brotherhood) party; the Good Menparty (favoring the return of Pridi from China asPremier); and the Divine Utopia party (interestingattempts have been made in the Northeast to equateCommunism with "divine utopia," a future blissfulstate, according to Buddhist belief).

Perhaps more significant were the inroads made byleftist elements into the non-leftist opposition. As itbecame obvious that the conservative forces were gain-ing, the leftists characteristically were quick to changetheir tactics from a denunciation of the government toan even more vehement attack on the Democrats, andthis continued throughout the closing months of thecampaign.

The main opposition came from the Democrat party(Prachatipat), led by Nai Khuang Aphaiwong, aformer premier. It was a revival of Nai Khuang's oldparty and relied for support mainly on conservative butanti-government elements and old royalist factions. Theformer, of course, were considerable, but among thelatter Khuang was never able to gain outright supportof the influential editor of Siam Rath, M. R. KukritPramoj, or his brother, M. R. Seni Pramoj (onetimePremier and Free Thai ambassador to Washington at thetime of Pearl Harbor). Lacking any substantial financialbacking, the Democrat party concentrated its efforts onthe main issues at stake, notably corruption in govern?ment. It attacked the opium scandals, the case of themurder of the four ex-ministers, Pibul's "buy Thai"and Buddhist holiday (Wan Phra) programs, the pro-posed social security law, and the continuance of sec-ond-category members of parliament. On the majorpolicies of government, however, Khuang offered nodrastic changes from policies of the ruling regime. Whileadvocating a more independent foreign policy, he came

The first part of this article appeared in the June 1957issue.JULY 1957 103


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out in favor of the SEATO pact and also for Pibul's"democracy" program. The Democrat party, becauseof its failure to propose any substantial change ingovernment policies, was scored by Kukrit as upholdingpolicies "indistinguishable from those of the presentgovernment."1The party registered on September 30, 1955, andby the following January claimed some 70,000 mem?bers in the provinces. Khuang himself proved an in-defatigable campaigner, covering most of the provincialareas and holding weekly press conferences. Withoutdoubt the Democrat party proved highly attractive to alarge number of middle class intelligentsia and lowerechelon bureauerats in Bangkok and the provinces.There were several reasons for this: Khuang's personal-ity, the party's former record, and its representationas the only real but conservative opposition to thegovernment. In these circles, anti-government feelingran very high.

Another opposition party that began as a conserva?tive group was the Seri-Prachatipatai (Free Democracy),which grew out of a coalition of ten opposition as-semblymen.la Its initial tactics included attacks on thegovernment through the medium of urgent question-naires sent to various ministries on issues of the mo-ment. Answers were demanded to leading questions,and the whole affair was given prominent play in theBangkok vernacular press.A split soon developed, some Northeast assembly-men of the group apparently being subverted to themore leftist elements active in that area. Also the partywas to some extent infiltrated, leftist elements forcinga party resolution opposing SEATO.Other elements active in forming minor political par?ties included agricultural, labor, youth and minority(Muslim) groups. Among these, the only party of evenslight influence was the Thai Labor party, whose ac-tivities were aimed at influencing only the Bangkokvote. Sponsored by the Thai Labor Union, an ap-pendage of the government and more specifically ofPibul, this party was headed by Nai Prakop Talaklam,a railway employee organizer. Initially the party ad-vocated a moderate program including support of thegovernment, but by late 1956, opinion among theworkers had so changed that the party platform ofnecessity included "collective ownership," abandon-ment of SEATO, and referenda allowing workers toreject laws. If the government's backing of the ThaiLabor party seemed forgotten in the popular fermentof the "new democracy," this connection was madeclear by the last-minute withdrawal of Prakop and

three other Labor candidates in favor of Pibul.lbThough 23 parties registered for the election, onlythose noted above were at ali active. The others hadno popular basis for appeal and displayed little cam-

paign effort. They were either last-minute or crankformations (such as the Anti-Corruption party) orwere local in nature (such as the various farmers'parties and the one royalist party).

Independents (as distinguished from the Independentparty) were, of course, active, especially in the pro?vinces, eschewing party affiliation and counting ontheir individual personal followings.A gtive gampaigning began toward the end of No-** vember and grew in intensity until election day.

Early in the campaign the consensus was that a resound-ing victory would be scored by the SMP, which wasbenefiting from a bandwagon effect as a result of itsshow of organizational strength?for instance, the "cam?paign jeeps" used by its candidates, the financial allow-ances to pro-government assemblymen, and the sub-stantial campaign funds that Pibul reported had beencontributed by private business and individuals (a con-servative and published estimate was 10 million baht.)However, it appears the SMP may have committedan error in timing by launching its efforts too early.About two months before the campaign it suffered somesetbacks as the opposition began to destroy the mythof SMP invincibility. A series of events continued to dis-credit an already susceptible regime: these included asensational bank robbery, an outbreak of strikes andlabor disputes, the increasingly effective campaignagainst the government's "rigid" pro-American foreignpolicy, and especially the mounting reports from theprovinces of SMP high-handedness.

The hustings brought forth many colorful incidentsand devices. In the North, Chiengmai inhabitants werereported to have resented the hiring by the SMP ofone of their local "Miss Thailand" beauties as a cam?paign singer and attraction. The opposition counteredby painting the town's pariah dogs with SMP indicators.Meanwhile there were increasing rumors and chargesthat the SMP was engaging in dishonest election prac-tices. Tension continued to mount as new incidents ofirregularity and violence were reported. First to makecharges of organized corruption on the part of the gov?ernment was Nai Namphet of the National Democratparty, and his claim that he had actually discoveredillegal ballots received prominent play in the press.The Sarit-backed paper, Sarnseri, repeated this chargeregularly during the campaign. Many newspapers pub?lished photographs of alleged counterfeit ballots. Newpolitical terminology was added to the Thai vocabu-1 Siam Rath, November 24, 1955.la Bangkok Post, September 12 and October 1, 1955. lb Siam Nikorn, February 26, 1957.

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the emergency was declared after "it was discoveredcertain naval personnel and local Chinese were aboutto carry out provocative demonstrations."12 There wererumors that the state of emergency was, in fact, aimedat anticipated student demonstrations. There wereother stories of unrest among junior Army officers13and persistent reports that the state of emergency wasimposed to prevent pro-Communist elements from ex-ploiting the post-election crisis. There is little evidence,however, that the Communist underground was power-ful enough to present any threat to the government.On the day the state of emergency was declaredthere was much grumbling among students at Chula?longkorn University as they assembled for regular Sat-urday classes and talk of staging some sort of protestdemonstration. Many students at Chulalongkorn, assons and daughters of civil servants and members ofThailand's growing middle class, had served as pollwatchers, many students having been given assignmentsto observe various phases of the election process as partof their political science studies. They were particularlyresentful of the activities of naklengs (hoodlums) onbehalf of the SMP and the failure of the police to takeaction against them. The students were also upset bythe widespread rumors that 50,000 counterfeit ballotshad been distributed the day before the election bythe SMP to hoodlums at the police department's Pa-ruskawa Palace.14

In the morning some 2,000 students gathered in theconvocation hall of Chulalongkorn University to callupon the rector, Phra Vejjayant Rangsarit (an AirMarshal and one of the SMP victors in Bangkok), toresign from the government party. The Thai nationalflag was lowered to half mast "in memory of the deathof democracy." Appeals by the rector to raise the flagwere refused. On tree trunks on the campus wereposters carrying such messages as "We don't want airconditioning, we want Democracy!"15 Marshal Saritwas called to the scene and his frankness in dealingwith the students immediately made him the hero ofthe day. "As dirty as Hell," he was quoted as replyingto a student question as to what he thought of theelections. "If I was not in my present position as keeperof the peace," he went on, "I would march by yourside." When told that the students planned to con-tinue their protest despite the state of emergency, hewas quoted: "You have the freedom to go whereveryou want to go. To see that nothing happens I'll

walk on the other side of the street, but I'll look theother way."16On the day the emergency was declared Army tanksand troops fanned out over Bangkok, Thai Air Force

jet fighters (U.S. military aid planes) swooped low overseveral parts of the city?an event that according toone newspaper, "put terror into the hearts of the peopleand destroyed their morale."17 It was the "buzzing"of Khuang's home, located near the Chulalongkorncampus, that started the student demonstration, ac?cording to some observers.

The students first marched to the Ministry of In-terior, being joined as they crossed the city by studentsfrom other universities and technical schools. Therethey presented five demands to the Director-General ofthe Interior Department:18 (1) end the state of emer?gency and identify the foreign nation that interfereswith Thailand's affairs; (2) resignation of ali BangkokAssemblymen; (3) appointment of student inspectioncommittees at the next election; (4) punishment of alihoodlums who violated election laws; and (5) replythrough Radio Thailand within 24 hours.

When the students were told the Premier was in ameeting and would meet with their leaders Sundaymorning, they replied they had no leaders. They thenbegan marching toward Government House, beingjoined en route by a large number of non-students, in-cluding many left-wing Chinese (according to some re-ports). At the entrance they were halted by guards onMakawan bridge and for a time it appeared there mightbe trouble, but Marshal Sarit eased the tension by or-dering the gates opened. Before this could be done thesurging crowd broke through the iron gates.19At one point the Government House session wasmarked by an anti-American demonstration, which re-liable observers say was the work of left-wing non-student elements. Marshal Sarit, during his speech, wasasked to name the country that had interfered withThailand's affairs. According to the Army-backed news?paper, Sarnseri, Sarit replied that he could not givethe name of the country but that, since everyone knewabout it, there was no need to give the name. "Theaudience responded by cheering and applauding toexpress their understanding of the statement, supple-

12 New York Times, March 5, 1957; Bangkok World,March 4, 1957.13 London Times, March 4, 1957.14 See February 26 issues of Daily Mail, Phim Thai, Sarn-seri and other Thai-language dailies.15 Bangkok World, March 3, 1957.

16 Siam Rath WeeklyReview, March 14, 1957, p. 2.17 Siam Rath Weekly Review, March 21, 1957, p. 5. Seethis issue for a three-page spread of pictures of the demon-stration.18 Bangkok World, March 3, 1957; Sarnseri, Phim Thai,March 5, 1957.19 The English-language Siam Rath Weekly Review(March 21) estimated the crowd at 100,000 but this figureis excessive and appears to result from too literal a transla-tion of a Thai figureof speech.JULY 1957 107


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mented by shouting the name of a Western nation, i.e.,the United States."20"The People Break Through"?so the Siam RathWeekly Review headlined an editorial on the March2nd demonstrations. "Spiritually," the newspaper com-mented, "the Thai people have broken their ages-oldbond of submission. . . . Gone are the theory and thebelief that the Thai People are apathetic and politicallyinert."21

After 12 days the state of emergency was lifted, andMarshal Sarit's authority as supreme military com?mander was terminated. The latter move was widelyinterpreted as the result of behind-the-scenes powermanipulations by other "coup group" forces to counterSarit's phenomenal rise in public popularity. Com-mented the Siam Rath Weekly Review: "Mightier menwho were hiding behind waterfalls in time of crisis be?came somewhat frightened of Field Marshal Sarit'spopularity."22Popular Political FermentThe 1957 election would seem to indicate clearlythat profound changes are taking place in Thailand.Two somewhat paradoxical facts stand out: on the onehand, a new ferment of popular interest and participa-tion in government; on the other, the continued roleof conservatism and the old order. Contrary to oft-repeated proverbs about the Thai people's politicalapathy, this new political consciousness has not sprungfull-grown on the scene but has deep roots in the cul-ture. The lack of opportunity to translate traditionallocal civic interest into political participation and ac-tion at the national level has tended to obscure therealities of the Thai political potential. This is well il-lustrated by the sharp contrast between the apathy ofthe 1952 elections, when there were relatively fewchannels, issues or focal points, and the excitement at-tending the 1957 balloting.Vast strides have been made in formal educationand informal political education since World War IIand for the first time political feelings have been al-lowed expression by the lifting of restrictions. It isstriking to note the glibness with which "Hyde Park"orators throughout the country discussed internationalissues supposedly incomprehensible to the public. In thisconnection it is erroneous to assume that the Thai aredifferent from the other peoples of Southeast Asia be-cause they have managed to avoid colonial rule. Co-lonialism has not passed them by and they are wellcognizant of the implications of Geneva, Bandung,23

neutralism, and the proximity and growth of RedChina.From his Pandora's box Pibul let escape a spirit theThai people call "Prachatipatai" (democracy) and theyare no longer to be easily restrained. Not only did the"democracy" program open an opportunity for political

activity with some chance to make itself felt (talk ofa coalition government after the elections was real)but it also gave opportunity for the crystallization andexpression of feelings of national individuality and pop?ular participation in politics on issues on which thegovernment had demonstrated it could be influenced.Foreign policy seems to be every bit as much an issueas the perennial Thai problem of corruption. The stu?dent demonstration, without doubt a rare protest actionfor Thailand, was also part of an overall growing po?litical awareness and desire for participation.The stark reality of the dominant role of the militaryin Thai politics is still obvious. There is every indica-tion, however, that the Thai politicians are finding itincreasingly necessary to take cognizance of populardevelopments. It would appear likely that the futurewill bring increased recognition of constitutionalism asa basis of government. On the other hand there aresome signs that the government, now that it has wonthe election, will take measures to repress the increas-ing left-wing influences in the press and Chinese com-munity. Also, there will probably be at least temporaryreprisals against the non-leftist opposition as the gov?ernment attempts to consolidate its position.

Public opinion forces brought into play by Pibul's1955 move for power ironically became the wave onwhich Marshal Sarit nearly rode to the premiershipduring the state of emergency. Sarit's position has beengreatly strengthened, but it is too early to tell in whatdirection he will use his new power. General Phaoseems to have been made the scapegoat of SMP un-popularity, but he is dynamic and resourceful and isnot to be written off in the future of Thai politics. Inthe new cabinet he holds the important post of Min?ister of Interior.

It is difficult at this time to assess the victories scoredin the Northeast by anti-government forces, but this isan extremely critical area and the leftist advances therewill need to be closely watched by the government.Among those winning were not only leftist candidatesbut others who campaigned on a separatist platformand had at one time had been accused of sedition bythe government. The area is one part of Thailand thatsuffers from food shortages and drought. It has longbeen characterized by a strong spirit of regionalism,being not only geographically but also psychologicallyclose to compromised Laos. The presence of some50,000 pro-Communist Vietnamese refugees in the area

20 Sarnseri and other Bangkok dailies, March 3, 1957.21 Siam Rath Weekly Review, March 7, 1957.22 Siam Rath Weekly Review, March 21, 1957.23 Twenty-nineThai newspapermen attended the BandungConference,theirexpenses being paid by the Thai government.108 FAR EASTERN SURVEY


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increases the tendency of its inhabitants to look acrossthe Mehkong river to Laos rather than to the distantcapital of Bangkok.The "return to normalcy" represented by the "oldline" roster presented to the King for formation of thenew SMP Cabinet "after almost two weeks of behind-the-scenes maneuvering"24 emphasized that democracyin Thailand is still not the "full democracy" profferedby Premier Pibul in June 1955. The election provedthat there is much political awareness and that it is notrestricted to the capital city of Bangkok. It is also clearthat the change is limited. Ideology and issues havenot replaced charismatic leadership; traditionalism stillhas a strong appeal.Thai conservatism has been traditionally noted foranother factor: the tendency to want and to supportstrong leadership which has meant the preservation ofstrong national unity and integrity. Coupled with Thairealism this factor may be of extreme importance tothe United States and its foreign policy towards Thai?land. American prestige in Thailand has definitely,even if only temporarily, suffered a setback during thisperiod.Thailand (the only Southeast Asian member ofSEATO, with the exception of the Philippines) hasbeen widely regarded as the West's "best friend" inSoutheast Asia. In that area it is viewed as a symbolof close alliance with the United States, and Americanprestige will rise or fall in part to the extent thatThailand achieves a stable representative government.In the early period of American aid to Thailand therewas widespread criticism of the United States for lend-ing support to an undemocratic and unpopular govern?ment.

Thailand is now experiencing a ferment resultingfrom the interaction of Western ideas and the spiritof Bandung. At present, the Thai, though still closelyidentified with the West, are showing an increased sen-sitivity to another strong political force in Asia, andthis often results in ambivalence and increased anti-American sentiment. The Thai have a long traditionof diplomatic accommodation and historically haveplayed a skillful balancing role. The prospects forachieving a satisfactory adjustment to external forcesand emerging with a stable representative governmentappear reasonably hopeful.PostscriptThe three months which have elapsed since the writ-ing of this article have seen a further development ofthe trends indicated above. The first of a series ofmoves by the government intended to suppress the ex-citement following the elections was the arrest in April

of Kukrit Pramoj, editor of the Siam Rath, on chargesof libel under Section 134 of the penal code. Convictedand sentenced on June 22, Kukrit appealed the caseand is free on bail proffered by former Police GeneralPhra Pinit Chonkhadi. Other steps have been takento discourage the virulent attacks on the governmentin the press, and newspapers controlled by governmentpoliticians have become transparent in their supportof their respective sponsors. In this respect, Sathiraphab(controlled by Premier Pibul) and 2500 Daily (con?trolled by General Phao) have been the most obvious.However, the anti-American, anti-police press and theleftist press, led by Sarnseri, have withstood efforts toclamp the lid back on criticism and have made capitalof various local incidents involving Americans.

Particularly in evidence has been agitation in thepress and by "Hyde Park" speakers for recognition ofCommunist China and the abrogation of the SEATOand U.S. military aid agreements. A series of rumorsand misinterpretations of government pronouncementsled to a declaration by the Prime Minister on June 28reaffirming the government's dedication to establishedforeign policies.On the political front, most speculation has centeredon the position of Marshal Sarit. In fact, maneuverssupposedly on his behalf nearly eclipsed the more usualmanipulations which followed the elections. With re-gard to the latter, the failure of Khuang to present adynamic program, sufficiently different from govern?ment policies to hold the opposition together, addedforce to the rumors predicting the mobilization of Sarit-backed party forces. Realignment of politicians (espe?cially of independents) and even the formation of newparties have become traditional post-election phenome-na in Thailand.

The government, too, has had difficulty in achievingsolidarity. Despite the inclusion of such men as NaiLiang Jaiyakal (as Deputy Minister of Justice) andGeneral Kach Songgram (as a second category M.P.),cleavages among the elite are so deep that, at best,only a temporary show of unity can be expected. Inaddition, it has not been possible to reward most ofthe defeated SMP candidates who expected consolationin the form of appointments as second category M.P.s,deputy ministers or secretaries to ministers, for theKukrit law suit (designed to invalidate the Bangkokelections) gave rise to objections on the part of theKing to increasing the number of second categorymembers to equal that of first category members. TheKing expressed "concern over whether such a stepwould be in contradiction with provisions in the Con?stitution and over what ruling the court would makein a case (that filed by Kukrit Pramoj) for nullifica-tion of the February 26 elections on constitutional24 New York Times, March 30, 1957.

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grounds. The King, it was explained, does not wantany measure taken by him to conflict with either theConstitution or a court judgement."25 As a result, onlytwelve new second category members have been ap?pointed to replace those of the 132 second categorymembers of the former government who have died orresigned.Formation of New PartyThe discontent over these two questions joined withthe rise in enthusiasm for Marshal Sarit to result in theformation of the Sahaphum (Unionist) party. Duringthe state of emergency, popular agitation for the forma?tion of a party to back Sarit for Prime Minister, stem-ming from the popularity he had won by his handlingof the post-election crisis, was at a high pitch. Afterhis emergency powers had been withdrawn, enthusiasmwas kept alive by his half-brother, Nai Sanguan Chan-drasakha, although the Marshal himself continued todisclaim any aspirations to be Prime Minister. The ac-tual formation of the Sahaphum party depended heavilyon political maneuvering following the opening ses-sion of the new parliament, but Sarit's name is stillclosely linked with that of the party. The party leader?ship, however, went to Sukit Nimmanhemin, an oldand respected politician who in past ministries hadbridged the gap between the military junta and theopposition. After the party's registration on June 21,1957, Sukit, trying to please both sides, announced thatit would "not regard political creed" as a basis forestablishing relations with Communist China, butneither would it "recognize Red China until the U.N.has reached its decision in this respect," unless therewas "unreasonable and endless debate."26 Concerningthe party's support of Sarit, Sukit evasively stated thatit would "not support anyone as individuals."27 He alsoavoided judgments on SEATO and the anti-Communistlaw.

The Sahaphum party attracted SMP as well as in?dependent and opposition members of parliament. ThePrime Minister declared, however, that the defectionof nine SMP members had not hurt his party, but that"in fact, a greater number, 14 or 15 [supposedly drawnfrom the independents], now support us, so we haveincreased our strength."28 To this must be added thefact that in the SMP caucus following the opening ofparliament?after the formation of the Sahaphum

party?Marshal Sarit was re-elected to, and accepted,the post of SMP Deputy Leader.29A more significant development than these maneuverswas the coalescence of a solid opposition. Although itsattempt to elect parliamentary officers was unsuccess-ful, this union may be a lasting and effective meansof bringing about change in the political process. Infact, Thep Chotinuchit, leader of the new Union So?cialist Front (a regrouping of the pre-election SocialistFront), felt that: "The only chance to overthrow thepresent government is to unite the opposition and Sec?ond Category members behind Field Marshal Sarit.But there may be a chance in this session, becausethere is dissatisfaction with the Government everywhereand a very dangerous situation has developed, that theGovernment may crash?some time, and any time?we don't know."30 The coalition was joined by Thep'sEconomist party, Khuang's Democrats, the new Sa-haphum party and the Seri Prachatipatai party. Khu-ang, sure of neither the possibility of causing the fallof the present government nor of the advisability ofrelying on Sarit's leadership, stated that he was "notquite sure what Sarit is doing. According to principle,Marshal Sarit, being deputy leader of the SMP andCabinet Minister in the SMP government, should notbe supporting an opposition party. According to fact,well, I do not know the fact."31Marshal Sarit has consistently disavowed connectionswith parties other than the SMP as well as aspirationsto any higher political position. His statements havenot, however, quelled rumors of an impending coupd'etat, which might well take place within the constitu?tional framework rather than as a re-alignment ofarmed force (as foreseen by sensationalist elements ofthe Bangkok press), though the latter possibility can?not be overlooked.

The situation is complicated by the attempted resur-rection of the People's Party of the 1932 Promoters(not to be confused with Nai Liang's People's party).Organized by Chaem Promyong (of the unsuccessfulDivine Utopia party), this is an obvious attempt tocapitalize on popular sentiment for those who partici-pated in the '32 Revolution?including Chaem's formermentor, Pridi?most of whom are no longer in thepolitical mainstream. Claiming that the party will beled by an important SMP member who was also amember of the 1932 coup group, Chaem asserted thatM.P.s had also been drawn from other parties. Noneof their names, however, has been disclosed.32 Nai Ban-chong Sricharoon, Secretary- General of the revived

25 Bangkok Post, June 26, 1957. The Supreme Court sub-sequently ruled that the Premier could not lawfully increasethe number of appointed members to equal the number ofelected members in the Assembly.See New York Times, July11, 1957.26 Bangkok World, June 22, 1957.27 Ibid.28 Bangkok World, June 29, 1957.

29 Ibid.30 Bangkok World, July 2, 1957.31 Bangkok World, June 29, 1957.32 Bangkok World, June 2, 1957.110 FAR EASTERN SURVEY


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party and also a member of the original People's party,disclaimed rumored support of the party by the PrimeMinister or General Phao.33Although the political picture is still unclear, andthe ruling elite has not achieved equilibrium, one im?portant development stands out: the formation of atrue opposition within the parliament. This appearsto be a necessary concomitant of the political ferment

attending the February elections and the deepening ofthe political process in Thailand.33 Bangkok Post, June 27, 1957.

BOOKS ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey. By NobutakaIke. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1957. 300 pp. $5.50.Dr. Ike has writtennot a textbook but an interpretationof Japanese politics stressing "the way in which power isexercised . . . in termsof the historical,social, ideological, andinstitutional setting, and the dominant political forces?business, labor, and agriculture." Thus his treatmentmakesuse of other behavioral studies to enrich the analysis ofJapanese politics. Gondensation must have been exacting, buthis selection has been judicious. Examples and case studieslend interest; well-chosen statistics and the gist of numerousmonographic studies add firmnessto the content.This book, with sections on the setting, forces and pro-cesses of Japanese politics, merits reading by others besides

scholars.Especially useful are Ike's chapterson "Bureaucracy","The Electorate and Electoral Behavior", and "The MassMedia and Public Opinion". His chapter about Japanese in-tellectuals is perceptive, although he has omitted a numberof important points such as the continuing momentum ofreaction against the once-oppressiveand still suspected State,the force of intellectual traditions and of teacher-protegere-lations, the crucial period (formerlythe higher school years)in student careers, and revolt during and after adolescenceagainst patriarchy and many aspects of authority.The isola-tion of intellectuals and the Marxist tendencies of some arementioned, but it could have been explained that one otherreason why this group may be attracted to a plannedeconomy under socialism is that such a regime might offerthem more power, status and opportunity.One can think of other omissions,for instance: the grow-ing importance and political pressures of small and mediumbusiness associations, and a clearer idea as to how bills aredrafted and laws enacted. Discussion of the formal structureof governmentseems deliberatelyto have been simply sketched,but more could have been explained about Japan's executiveagencies and processes (though such informationadmittedlyis readily available elsewhere). Two welcome features of thebook are its proportionately adequate interpretationof therural background of politics and its descriptionsof informalpolitics.Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy allan b. cole

JAPAN. Edited by Dore Ogrizek. The World in Color Series.London and New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1957. 400pp. $6.50.This attractivetranslationfrom the French both transcendsand falls short of its announced function as a touristguide-book. The thirty-fiveessays by six authors are uneven?if notin quality, certainly in degree of condensation. Some of thelonger sectionsare balanced, closely-packedcontributionsbasedon intimate first-handexperience in Japan, rich in insightinto

Japanese institutionstoo often labelled esoteric. Other chap-ters, perhaps over-condensed, hold to the guidebook moodand the tradition of mysterious-exotic-cherry-blossomJapan.The solid, unobtrusivelyscholarly quality of the better essaysredeems the book. Specific guidance directions for any spe?cific locality, however, must be sought elsewhere. Paul Mous-set's chapters on "The Regions" indicate what one ought tosee, but leave the tourist to find his way for himself.Thereis a recurrent note of pessimism about finding one's ownway (e.g., p. 393) that seems strange in a guidebook.The hundreds of illustrations actually are in color. Theoriginal sketchesby various French artists are charming andconvey the atmosphere of Japan. Less fortunate are manyof the reproductions of Japanese works of art, especiallyukiyoye; the original softcolors become garish when renderedwith the inks of Occidental quantity production.Since the French original is not at hand, the translator'sskill is difficultto appraise. His apparently creditable achieve-ment is marred by unfamiliaritywith English transliterationsof Japanese and Chinese words, and with English conven-tions in translating Japanese (e.g., English-speaking scholarsrender tera by "temple" and miya by "shrine"). Occasionalblunders and unfortunatechoice of words mislead the reader;forexample: Emperor Kimmea forEmperor Kimmei (p. 25);"When Izanami was burnt to death at the birth of fire, hiswife set off in quest of him" (p. 35) misses the point, forIzanami was the goddess and her distracted husband soughther out; "spear" for "sword" as one of the Three Treasures(p. 36) ; "small log cabin" to describe the ingenious woodenconstruction of the ancient Shosoin Museum (p. 81); "Theworks of the painters Ming and Ts'ing were made knownthroughoutJapan . . ." (p. 94), which implies that Mingand Ts'ing were individual painters instead of Chinese dynas-ties. Similar blunders abound.The extensive contributions of Rene Sieffert and Jean-Pierre Hauchecorne will be read with delight. Sieffert'schap-ter on History and Hauchecorne's on Religions are undulycondensed and superficial, but both contributorswrite bril-liantly on other topics: Sieffert on Language, Literature,Theatre (bravo!), Cinema, and Trades and Crafts; Hauche?corne on Ancient Customs, Architecture,Daily Fare, Doctorsand Healers, Women and Children, Sports, and Twilight ofLife. Hauchecorne's The Japanese Character and Social Struc?ture are less satisfactory;some of the content of his Womenand Children would have enriched the Social Structure chap-ter more appropriately. Among the other writers,MadeleinePaul-David offersan excellent summaryof Art.Syracuse University douglas g. haringSOUTH ASIA SOCIAL SCIENCE ABSTRAGTS 1955. Cal?cutta: Unesco Research Centre on the Social Implicationsof Industrialization in Southern Asia. 1956. 169 pp.

This is the fourth volume of abstracts of periodical articleson subjects in the social sciences issued by the Unesco Re-JULY 1957 III

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