Electoral fraud

Electoral fraud or vote rigging is illegal interferencewith the process of an election. Acts of fraud affect votecounts to bring about an election result, whether by in-creasing the vote share of the favored candidate, depress-ing the vote share of the rival candidates, or both. Whatconstitutes electoral fraud under law varies from countryto country.Many kinds of election fraud are outlawed in electorallegislation, but others are in violation of general laws,such as those banning assault, harassment or libel. Al-though technically the term 'electoral fraud' covers onlythose acts which are illegal, the term is sometimes usedto describe acts which are legal but nevertheless consid-ered morally unacceptable, outside the spirit of electorallaws, or in violation of the principles of democracy.[1]Show elections, in which only one candidate can win, aresometimes considered to be electoral fraud, although theymay comply with the law.In national elections, successful electoral fraud can havethe effect of a coup d'état or corruption of democracy. Ina narrow election a small amount of fraud may be enoughto change the result. Even if the outcome is not affected,fraud can still have a damaging effect if not punished, asit can reduce voters’ confidence in democracy. Even theperception of fraud can be damaging as it makes peopleless inclined to accept election results. Fraudulent elec-tions can lead to the breakdown of democracy and theestablishment or ratification of a dictatorship.Fraud in elections is not limited to those for public of-fice (and also shades even into castings of votes whereonly an honorary role is at stake) so long as a cheater per-ceives a potential gain as worth the risk. Thus electionsfor a corporation’s directors, labor union officials, studentcouncils, etc. are subject to similar fraud, as are sportsjudging, and the awarding of merit to works of art andliterature.

1 Specific methods

Electoral fraud can occur at any stage in the democraticprocess, but most commonly it occurs during electioncampaigns, voter registration or during vote-counting.The two main types of electoral fraud are (1) prevent-ing eligible voters from casting their vote freely (or fromvoting at all), and (2) altering the results. A list of threatsto voting systems, or electoral fraud methods, is kept bythe National Institute of Standards and Technology.[2]

1.1 Electorate manipulation

Most electoral fraud takes place during or immediatelyafter election campaigns, by interfering with the votingprocess or the counting of votes. However, it can alsooccur far in advance, by altering the composition of theelectorate. In many cases this is not illegal and thus tech-nically not electoral fraud, although it is a violation of theprinciples of democracy.[3]

1.1.1 Manipulation of demography

In many cases it is possible for authorities to artificiallycontrol the composition of an electorate in order to pro-duce a foregone result. A famous example is Kuwait inthe 1980s. One way of doing this is to move a large num-ber of voters into the electorate prior to an election, forexample by temporarily assigning them land or lodgingthem in flophouses.[4][5] Many countries prevent this withrules stipulating that a voter must have lived in an elec-torate for a minimum period (for example, six months)in order to be eligible to vote there. However, such lawscan themselves be used for demographic manipulation asthey tend to disenfranchise those with no fixed address,such as the homeless, travellers, Roma, students (study-ing full-time away from home) and some casual workers.Another strategy is to permanently move people into anelectorate, usually through public housing. If people eli-gible for public housing are likely to vote for a particularparty, then they can either be concentrated into one elec-torate, thus making their votes count for less, or movedinto marginal electorates, where they may tip the balancetowards their preferred party. One notable example ofthis occurred in the City of Westminster under ShirleyPorter.[6] In this case the electoral fraud relied on gamingthe United Kingdom's first past the post electoral system,as in such a system it does not matter how much a partywins or loses by. The fraudsters calculated which wardsthey had no hope of winning, which they were almostsure of winning and which wards were marginal. By ma-nipulating Westminster Council’s public housing stock,the fraudsters were able to move voters more likely tovote for their electoral rivals from marginal wards to thewards that they were going to lose anyway. In the ensuingelections the Labour opposition could only win their safeseats, with the small Conservative leads in the marginalwards being enough for that party to win these wards,and therefore maintain their majority position and con-trol of the council. In her defense, Porter raised the his-

1

2 1 SPECIFIC METHODS

tory of the provision of public housing in London andHerbert Morrison's supposed boast to "...build the Con-servatives out of London” by building new public housingin marginal Conservative seats.Immigration law may also be used to manipulate elec-toral demography. An example of this happened inMalaysia when immigrants from neighboring Philippinesand Indonesia were given citizenship, together with vot-ing rights, in order for a political party to “dominate” thestate of Sabah in a controversial process referred to asProject IC.[7]

A method of manipulating primary contests and otherelections of party leaders is related to this. People whosupport one party may temporarily join another party inorder to help elect a weak candidate for that party’s lead-ership, in the hope that they will be defeated by the leaderof the party that they secretly support.

1.1.2 Disenfranchisement

The composition of an electorate may also be altered bydisenfranchising some types of people, rendering themunable to vote. In some cases, this may be done at alegislative level, for example by passing a law banningprison inmates (or even former prison inmates), recentimmigrants or members of a particular ethnic or religiousgroup from voting, or by instituting a literacy or othertest which members of some groups are more likely tofail. Since this is done by lawmakers, it cannot be elec-tion fraud, but may subvert the purposes of democracy.This is especially so if members of the disenfranchisedgroup were particularly likely to vote a certain way.In some cases voters may be invalidly disenfranchised,which is true electoral fraud. For example a legitimatevoter may be 'accidentally' removed from the electoralroll, making it difficult or impossible for the person tovote. Corrupt election officials may misuse voting reg-ulations such as a literacy test or requirement for proofof identity or address in such a way as to make it diffi-cult or impossible for their targets to cast a vote. If suchpractices discriminate against a religious or ethnic group,they may so distort the political process that the politicalorder becomes grossly unrepresentative, as in the post-Reconstruction or Jim Crow era until the Voting RightsAct of 1965.Groups may also be disenfranchised by rules which makeit impractical or impossible for them to cast a vote. Forexample, requiring people to vote within their electoratemay disenfranchise serving military personnel, prison in-mates, students, hospital patients or anyone else who can-not return to their homes. Polling can be set for inconve-nient days such as midweek or on Holy Days (example:Sabbath or other holy days of a religious group whoseteachings determine that voting is a prohibited on sucha day) in order to make voting difficult for those study-ing or working away from home. Communities may also

be effectively disenfranchised if polling places are notprovided within reasonable proximity (rural communitiesare especially vulnerable to this) or situated in areas per-ceived by some voters as unsafe.A particular example of this strategy is the Canadianfederal election of 1917, where the Union governmentpassed theMilitary Voters Act and theWartime ElectionsAct. The Military Voters Act permitted any active mili-tary personnel to vote by party only and allow that party todecide in which electoral district to place that vote. It alsoenfranchised womenwhowere directly related ormarriedto an active soldier. These groups were widely assumed tobe disproportionately in favor of the Union government,as that party was campaigning in favor of conscription.The Wartime Elections Act, conversely, disenfranchisedparticular ethnic groups assumed to be disproportionatelyin favor of the opposition Liberal Party.In 2012, 10 American states passed laws requiring photoID at the ballot box, citing protection against electoralfraud. However, a study by the Brennan Center for Jus-tice at the New York University Law School concludedthat minorities, the poor and the elderly are less likely tohave photo ID, and that such groups were more likely tolive long distances from ID-issuing offices.[8] Addition-ally, partisan politics has been exposed as a major factorin the introduction of voter ID legislation, as such leg-islation would disenfranchise many people who vote forDemocratic Party nominees, benefiting the RepublicanParty in elections.

1.2 Intimidation

Voter intimidation involves putting undue pressure on avoter or group of voters so that they will vote a particularway, or not at all. Absentee and other remote voting canbe more open to some forms of intimidation as the voterdoes not have the protection and privacy of the pollinglocation. Intimidation can take a range of forms.

• Violence or the threat of violence: In its sim-plest form, voters from a particular demographic orknown to support a particular party or candidate aredirectly threatened by supporters of another party orcandidate or by those hired by them. In other cases,supporters of a particular party make it known thatif a particular village or neighborhood is found tohave voted the 'wrong' way, reprisals will be madeagainst that community. Another method is to makea general threat of violence, for example a bombthreat which has the effect of closing a particularpolling place, thus making it difficult for people inthat area to vote.[9] One notable example of outrightviolence was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack,where followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh delib-erately contaminated salad bars in The Dalles, Ore-gon, in an attempt to weaken political oppositionduring county elections.

1.4 Misinformation 3

• Attacks on polling places: Polling places in anarea known to support a particular party or candi-date may be targeted for vandalism, destruction orthreats, thus making it difficult or impossible forpeople in that area to vote.

• Legal threats: In this case voters will be madeto believe, accurately or otherwise, that they arenot legally entitled to vote, or that they are legallyobliged to vote a particular way. Voters who are notconfident about their entitlement to vote may also beintimidated by real or implied authority figures whosuggest that those who vote when they are not en-titled to will be imprisoned, deported or otherwisepunished.[10][11] For example in 2004, in Wisconsinand elsewhere voters allegedly received flyers thatsaid, “If you already voted in any election this year,you can’t vote in the Presidential Election”, imply-ing that those who had voted in earlier primary elec-tions were ineligible to vote. Also, “If anybody inyour family has ever been found guilty of anythingyou can’t vote in the Presidential Election.” Finally,“If you violate any of these laws, you can get 10years in prison and your children will be taken awayfrom you.”[12][13] Another method, allegedly used inCook County, Illinois in 2004, is to falsely tell par-ticular people that they are not eligible to vote.[11]

• Economic threats: In company towns in which onecompany employs most of the working population,the companymay threaten workers with disciplinaryaction if they do not vote the way their employer dic-tates. One method of doing this is the 'shoe polishmethod'. This method entails coating the voting ma-chine's lever or button of the opposing candidate(s)with shoe polish. This method works when an em-ployee of a company that orders him to vote a certainway votes contrary to those orders. After the voterexits the voting booth, a conspirator to the fraud(a precinct captain or other local person in collu-sion with the employee’s management) handshakesthe voter. The conspirator, then, subtly checks thevoter’s hands for any shoe polish or notes. If theconspirator finds shoe polish or notes in the voter’shands, then that unfortunate voter gets fired or facesother unpleasant consequences.

1.3 Vote buying

The most famous episodes of vote buying came in18th century England, when two or more rich aristo-crats spent whatever money it took to win. The notori-ous “Spendthrift election” came in Northamptonshire in1768, when three earls spent over ₤100,000 each to wina seat.[14]

Voters may be given money or other rewards for voting ina particular way, or not voting. In some jurisdictions, the

offer or giving of other rewards is referred to as “electoraltreating”.[15] Vote buying may also be done indirectly, forexample by paying clergymen to tell their parishionersto vote for a particular party or candidate. Vote buyingis generally avoided by not providing a “receipt” for thecounted vote, even if it’s technically possible to do so.Electoral treating remains legal in some jurisdictions,such as in the Seneca Nation of Indians.[16]

1.4 Misinformation

People may distribute false or misleading information inorder to affect the outcome of an election.[1] For example,in the Chilean Presidential election of 1970 the CentralIntelligence Agency used “black propaganda”—materialspurporting to be from various political parties—to sowdiscord between members of a coalition between social-ists and communists.[17]

Another way in which misinformation can be used is togive voters incorrect information about the time or placeof polling, thus causing them to miss their chance tovote. The Democratic Party of Wisconsin alleged thatAmericans for Prosperity engaged in this when a flierprinted in August 2011 gave an incorrect return datefor absentee ballots - Americans for Prosperity allegedit was a misprint.[18][19][20] As part of the 2011 Cana-dian federal election voter suppression scandal, ElectionsCanada traced fraudulent phone calls telling voters thattheir polling stations had been moved to a telecommu-nications company which worked for the ConservativeParty.[21] More recently in 2014, Americans for Prosper-ity were again accused of distributing voter misinforma-tion, by mailing out incorrect or misleading informationto hundreds of thousands of mailers which included thewrong deadline for voter registration and other inaccurateinformation.[22] Americans for Prosperity Deputy Direc-tor Donald Bryson claimed the mailings were a mistakeand that they had not paid enough attention to detail.[23]

1.5 Misleading or confusing ballot papers

Ballot papers may be used to discourage votes for a par-ticular party or candidate, using design or other featureswhich confuse voters into voting for a different candi-date. For example, in the 2000 U.S. presidential election,Florida’s butterfly ballot paper was criticized as confusingsome voters into giving their vote to the wrong candidate.Ironically, however, the ballot was designed by a Demo-crat, the party most harmed by this design.[24] Poor ormisleading design is not usually illegal and therefore nottechnically election fraud, but can subvert the principlesof democracy.A similar approach has been used in Sweden, where asystem with separate ballots for each party is used. Bal-lots from Sweden Democrats have there been mixed with

4 1 SPECIFIC METHODS

ballots from the bigger Swedish Social Democratic Party,which used a very similar font for the party name writtenon the top of the ballot.Another method of confusing people into voting for a dif-ferent candidate than they intended is to run candidatesor create political parties with similar names or symbolsas an existing candidate or party. The aim is that enoughvoters will be misled into voting for the false candidate orparty to influence the results.[25] Such tactics may be par-ticularly effective when a large proportion of voters havelimited literacy in the language used on the ballot paper.Again, such tactics are usually not illegal but often workagainst the principles of democracy.Another way of possible electoral confusion, is multiplevariations of voting by different electoral systems. Thisis unwittingly cause ballot papers to be invalid, if thewrong system is employed such as putting a first-past-the-post cross in a numbered single transferable vote bal-lot paper. For example in Scotland, there are four dif-ferent voting systems employed. They are single trans-ferable vote for local elections, additional member sys-tem for Scottish parliamentary elections, first-past-the-post for national elections & party list system in Europeanelections.

1.6 Ballot stuffing

Transparent ballot box used in Russia to prevent election officialsfrom pre-stuffing box with fake ballots.

Ballot stuffing is when one person submits multipleballots during a vote in which only one ballot per personis permitted. The name originates from the earliest days

A specialized ballot box used to assist ballot stuffing, featured inFrank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper in 1856.

of this practice in which people literally did stuff morethan one ballot in a ballot box at the same time.Detecting ballot-stuffing depends a great deal on howgood the record-keeping is. Most election systems matchthe number of persons showing up to vote with the num-ber of ballots cast, and/or preparing the forms so thatthey are difficult to fake. A common method still usedin small village elections throughout the USA uses twoballot boxes and a single sheet of paper for a ballot. Af-ter marking the ballot, the sheet is folded in half, thentorn with each part dropped in the corresponding ballotbox. The number of marked ballots in one box will equalthe number of ballot sheet headers in the other ballot box,thus preventing ballot stuffing. In short, successful ballot-stuffing usually requires the misconduct of genuine regis-tered voters and/or elections personnel.Ballot-stuffing can be accomplished in a number of ways.Often, a ballot-stuffer casts votes on the behalf of peoplewho did not show up to the polls (known as telegraphing);sometimes, votes are even cast by those who are long deador fictitious characters in TV shows, books, and movies(known as padding). Both practices are also referred toas personation. In earlier societies with little paperwork,dead people were kept “alive” on paper for the purpose ofballot-stuffing. The family of the deceased often helpedalong, either to assist their party or for money.Ballot stuffing is possible with one version of the Sequoiatouchscreen voting machine. It has a yellow button on theback side which when pressed allows repeated vote stuff-ing. By design, pressing the button triggers the emanationof two audible beeps.[26]

1.7 Misrecording of votes

Many elections feature multiple opportunities for un-scrupulous officials or 'helpers’ to record an elector’s votedifferently from their intentions. Voters who require as-

1.10 Tampering with electronic voting machines 5

sistance to cast their votes are particularly vulnerable tohaving their votes stolen in this way. For example, a blindperson or one who cannot read the language of the bal-lot paper may be told that they have voted for one partywhen in fact they have been led to vote for another. Thisis similar to the misuse of proxy votes; however in thiscase the voter will be under the impression that they havevoted with the assistance of the other person, rather thanhaving the other person voting on their behalf.Where votes are recorded through electronic or mechan-ical means, the voting machinery may be altered so that avote intended for one candidate is recorded for another.

1.8 Misuse of proxy votes

Proxy voting is particularly vulnerable to election fraud,due to the amount of trust placed in the person who caststhe vote. In several countries there have been allegationsof retirement home residents being asked to fill out 'ab-sentee voter' forms. When the forms are signed and gath-ered, they are then secretly rewritten as applications forproxy votes, naming party activists or their friends andrelatives as the proxies. These people, unknown to thevoter, then cast the vote for the party of their choice. Thistrick relies on elderly care home residents typically be-ing absent-minded, or suffering from dementia. In theUnited Kingdom, this is known as 'granny farming' andhas been restricted in recent years by a change in the lawwhich prevents a single voter acting as a proxy for morethan two non-family members therefore requiring morepeople to be involved in any fraud.

1.9 Destruction or invalidation of ballots

One of the simplest methods of electoral fraud is to sim-ply destroy ballots for the 'wrong' candidate or party. Thisis unusual in functioning democracies, as it is difficult todo without attracting attention. However in a very closeelection it might be possible to destroy a very small num-ber of ballot papers without detection, thereby changingthe overall result. Blatant destruction of ballot papers canrender an election invalid and force it to be re-run. If aparty can improve its vote on the re-run election, it canbenefit from such destruction as long as it is not linked toit.A more subtle, and easily achieved, method is to make itappear that the voter has spoiled his or her ballot, thusrendering it invalid. Typically this would be done byadding another mark to the paper, making it appear thatthe voter has voted for more candidates than they wereentitled to. It would be difficult to do this to a large num-ber of papers without detection, but in a close electionmay prove decisive.

1.10 Tampering with electronic votingma-chines

All voting systems face threats of some form of electoralfraud. The types of threats that affect voting machinescan vary from other forms of voting systems, some threatsmay be prevented and others introduced.“Threat Analy-ses & Papers”. National Institute of Standards and Tech-nology. October 7, 2005. Retrieved 5 March 2011.Some forms of electoral fraud specific to electronic vot-ing machines are listed below. Recent research at Ar-gonne National Laboratories demonstrates that if a ma-licious actor is able to gain physical access to a votingmachine, it can be a simple process to manipulate certainelectronic voting machines, such as the Diebold AccuvoteTS, by inserting inexpensive, readily available electroniccomponents inside the machine.[27][28]

• Tampering with the software of a voting machine toadd malicious code altering vote totals or favor anycandidate.

• Multiple groups have demonstrated thispossibility.[29][30][31]

• Private companies manufacture these ma-chines. Many companies will not allow publicaccess or review of the machines source code,claiming fear of exposing trade secrets.[32]

• Tampering with the hardware of the voting machineto alter vote totals or favor any candidate.[30]

• Some of these machines require a smartcardto activate the machine and vote. However,a fraudulent smart card could attempt to gainaccess to vote multiple times.[33]

• Abusing the administrative access to the machine byelection officials might also allow individuals to votemultiple times.

• Election results that are sent directly over the inter-net from a county count center to the state count cen-ter can be vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack,where they are diverted to an intermediate web sitewhere the man in the middle flips the votes in fa-vor of a certain candidate and then immediately for-wards them on to the state count center. All votessent over the internet violate chain of custody andhence should be avoided by driving or flyingmemorycards in locked metal containers from county countcenters to the state count center. For purposes ofgetting quick preliminary statewide results on elec-tion night, encrypted votes can be sent over the inter-net, but final official results should be tabulated thenext day only after the actual memory cards arrivein secure metal containers and are counted.[34]

6 3 PREVENTION

2 Vote fraud in legislature

Vote fraud can also take place in legislatures. Some of theforms used in national elections can also be used in par-liaments, particularly intimidation and vote-buying. Be-cause of the much smaller number of voters, however,election fraud in legislatures is qualitatively different inmany ways. Fewer people are needed to 'swing' the elec-tion, and therefore specific people can be targeted in waysimpractical on a larger scale. For example, Adolf Hitlerachieved his dictatorial powers due to the Enabling Actof 1933, and achieved the necessary two-thirds majorityto pass the Act by arresting members of the opposition.Later, the Reichstag was packed with Nazi party mem-bers who voted for the Act’s renewal.In many legislatures, voting is public, in contrast to thesecret ballot used in most modern public elections. Thismay make their elections more vulnerable to some formsof fraud, since a politician can be pressured by otherswho will know how he or she has voted. However, it mayalso protect against bribery and blackmail since the publicand media will be aware if a politician votes in an unex-pected way. Since voters and parties are entitled to pres-sure politicians to vote a particular way, the line betweenlegitimate and fraudulent pressure is not always clear.As in public elections, proxy votes are particularly proneto fraud. In some systems, parties may vote on behalf ofany member who is not present in parliament. This pro-tects those people from missing out on voting if they areprevented from attending parliament, but also allows theirparty to prevent them from voting against its wishes. Insome legislatures, proxy voting is not allowed, but politi-cians may rig voting buttons or otherwise illegally cast'ghost votes’ while absent.[35]

3 Prevention

The two main strategies for the prevention of electoralfraud in society are: 1) deterrence through consistent andeffective prosecution; 2) Cultivation of mores that dis-courage corruption. The two main fraud prevention tac-tics, ironically, can be summarized as secrecy and open-ness. The secret ballot prevents many kinds of intimida-tion and vote selling, while transparency at all other levelsof the electoral process prevents and detects most inter-ference.

3.1 Mores

The patterns of conventional behavior in a society ormores are an effective means for preventing electoralfraud and corruption in general. A good example isSweden, where the culture has a strong tendency towardpositive values, resulting in a low incidence of politi-cal corruption.[36] Until recently Canada had a similar

reputation, but the In and Out scandal of 2008 and theRobocall scandal of 2011 has tarnished Canada’s elec-toral integrity.An advantage of cultivating positive mores as a preven-tion strategy is that it is effective across all electoral sys-tems and devices. A disadvantage is that it makes otherprevention and detection efforts more difficult to imple-ment because members of society generally have moretrust and less of a sense for fraudulent methods.

3.2 Secret ballot

Main article: Secret ballot

The secret ballot, in which only the voter knows how in-dividuals have voted, is a crucial part of ensuring free andfair elections through preventing voter intimidation or ret-ribution. Although it was sometimes practiced in ancientGreece andwas a part of the French Constitution of 1795,it only became common in the nineteenth century. Se-cret balloting appears to have been first implemented inthe former British colony—now an Australian state—ofTasmania on 7 February 1856. By the turn of the cen-tury the practice had spread to most Western democra-cies. Before this, it was common for candidates to intim-idate or bribe voters, as they would always know who hadvoted which way.

3.3 Transparency

Most methods of preventing electoral fraud involve mak-ing the election process completely transparent to all vot-ers, from nomination of candidates through casting of thevotes and tabulation.[37] A key feature in ensuring the in-tegrity of any part of the electoral process is a strict chainof custody.To prevent fraud in central tabulation, there has to be apublic list of the results from every single polling place.This is the only way for voters to prove that the resultsthey witnessed in their election office are correctly incor-porated into the totals.End-to-end auditable voting systems provide voters witha receipt to allow them to verify their vote was cast cor-rectly, and an audit mechanism to verify that the resultswere tabulated correctly and all votes were cast by validvoters. However, the ballot receipt does not permit vot-ers to prove to others how they voted, since this wouldopen the door towards forced voting and blackmail. End-to-end systems include Punchscan and Scantegrity, thelatter being an add-on to optical scan systems instead ofa replacement.In many cases, election observers are used to help pre-vent fraud and assure voters that the election is fair. In-ternational observers (bilateral and multilateral) may be

3.5 Prosecution 7

invited to observe the elections (examples include elec-tion observation by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union electionobservation missions, observation missions of the Com-monwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as inter-national observation organized by NGOs, such as CIS-EMO, European Network of Election Monitoring Orga-nizations (ENEMO), etc.). Some countries also inviteforeign observers (i.e. bi-lateral observation, as opposedto multi-lateral observation by international observers).In addition, national legislatures of countries often per-mit domestic observation. Domestic election observerscan be either partisan (i.e. representing interests of oneor a group of election contestants) or non-partisan (usu-ally done by civil society groups). Legislations of differ-ent countries permit various forms and extents of inter-national and domestic election observation.Election observation is also prescribed by various in-ternational legal instruments. For example, paragraph8 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document states that “The[OSCE] participating States consider that the presenceof observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance theelectoral process for States in which elections are takingplace. They therefore invite observers from any otherCSCE participating States and any appropriate private in-stitutions and organizations who may wish to do so to ob-serve the course of their national election proceedings, tothe extent permitted by law. They will also endeavor tofacilitate similar access for election proceedings held be-low the national level. Such observers will undertake notto interfere in the electoral proceedings”.Critics note that observers cannot spot certain types ofelection fraud like targeted voter suppression or manipu-lated software of voting machines.

3.4 Statistical indicators

Various forms of statistics can be indicators for electionfraud e.g. exit polls which diverge from the final results.Well-conducted exit polls serve as a deterrent to electoralfraud. However, exit polls are still notoriously impre-cise. For instance, in the Czech Republic, some votersare afraid or ashamed to admit that they voted for theCommunist Party (exit polls in 2002 gave the Communistparty 2-3 percentage points less than the actual result).When elections are marred by ballot-box stuffing (e.g.,the Armenian presidential elections of 1996 and 1998),the affected polling stations will show abnormally highvoter turnouts with results favoring a single candidate. Bygraphing the number of votes against turnout percentage(i.e., aggregating polling stations results within a giventurnout range), the divergence from bell-curve distribu-tion gives an indication of the extent of the fraud. Stuff-ing votes in favor of a single candidate affects votes vs.turnout distributions for that candidate and other candi-dates differently; this difference could be used to quan-

titatively assess the amount of votes stuffed. Also, thesedistributions sometimes exhibit spikes at round-numberturnout percentage values.[38][39][40] High numbers of in-valid ballots, overvoting or undervoting are other poten-tial indicators.

3.5 Prosecution

In countries with strong laws and effective legal systems,lawsuits can be brought against those who have allegedlycommitted fraud; but the deterrent of legal prosecutionwould not be enough. Although the penalties for get-ting caught may be severe, the rewards for succeedingare likely to be worth the risk. The rewards range frombenefits in contracting to total control of a country.In Germany there are currently calls for reform of theselaws because lawsuits can be and are usually prolonged bythe newly elected Bundestag.In the United States one such case was in Pennsylvaniawhere Bill Stinson won an election based on fraudulentabsentee ballots. The courts ruled that his opponent beseated in the state Senate as a result.[41]

In the Philippines, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was arrested in 2011 following the filing of crim-inal charges against her for electoral sabotage, in con-nection with the Philippine general election, 2007. Shewas accused of conspiring with election officials to en-sure the victory of her party’s senatorial slate in theprovince ofMaguindanao, through the tampering of elec-tion returns.[42]

3.6 Voting machine integrity

Further information: Certification of voting machines

One method for verifying voting machine accuracy isParallel Testing, the process of using an independent setof results compared against the original machine results.Parallel testing can be done prior to or during an elec-tion. During an election, one form of parallel testing isthe VVPAT. This method is only effective if statisticallysignificant numbers of voters verify that their intendedvote matches both the electronic and paper votes.On election day, a statistically significant number of vot-ing machines can be randomly selected from polling loca-tions and used for testing. This can be used to detect po-tential fraud or malfunction unless manipulated softwarewould only start to cheat after a certain event like a voterpressing a special key combination (Or a machine mightcheat only if someone doesn't perform the combination,which requires more insider access but fewer voters).Another form of testing is Logic & Accuracy Testing(L&A), pre-election testing of voting machines using testvotes to determine if they are functioning correctly.

8 4 NOTABLE LEGISLATION

Another method to insure the integrity of electronic vot-ing machines is independent software verification andcertification.[37] Once software is certified, code signingcan insure the software certified is identical to that whichis used on election day. Some argue certification wouldbe more effective if voting machine software was publiclyavailable or open source.Certification and testing processes conducted publicly andwith oversight from interested parties can promote trans-parency in the election process. The integrity of thoseconducting testing can be questioned.Testing and certification can prevent voting machinesfrom being a black box where voters can not be sure thatcounting inside is done as intended.[37]

One method that people have argued would help preventthese machines from being tampered with would be forthe companies that produce the machines to share thesource code, which displays and captures the ballots, withcomputer scientists. This would allow external sources tomake sure that the machines are working correctly.[32]

4 Notable legislation

4.1 Help America Vote Act

Main article: Help America Vote Act

The Help America Vote Act (Pub.L. 107–252), orHAVA, is a United States federal law enacted on October29, 2002.[43] It was drafted (at least in part) in reaction tothe controversy surrounding the 2000 U.S. presidentialelection, the goals of HAVA are:[44] to replace punchcardand lever-based voting systems; create the Election Assis-tance Commission to assist in the administration of Fed-eral elections; and establish minimum election adminis-tration standards.

4.2 Civil Rights Act of 1964

Main article: Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88–352, 78 Stat.241, enacted July 2, 1964) was a landmark piece of legis-lation in the United States[45] that outlawed major formsof discrimination against African Americans and women,including racial segregation and unequal application ofvoter registration requirements.

4.3 List of controversial and electorialydubious elections

• Argentine presidential election, 1937[46]

• New York gubernatorial election, 1792

• Bleeding Kansas election, March 30, 1855

• United States presidential election, 1876

• New York State Senate election 1891 in DutchessCounty

• Romanian general election, 1946

• Bulgarian plebiscite on monarchy, 1946

• United States presidential election, 1960

• Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Elec-tion, 1951-Legislature elected by this election rati-fied Indian rule in Kashmir, providing India with le-gitimacy, but no pro-Pakistan parties contested thepolls, and pro-India candidates were elected unop-posed.

• Greek legislative election, 1961

• Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly election,1987-The insurgecy in the Indian state of Jammuand Kashmir has been linked to the allegations thatthe election was rigged in favour of the NationalConference Party of Farooq Abdullah.

• Mexican general election, 1988[47]

• Serbian parliamentary election, 1992

• Serbian presidential election, 1992

• Serbian parliamentary election, 1993

• Serbian presidential election, September–October1997

• Serbian presidential election, December 1997

• Serbian parliamentary election, 1997

• Chadian presidential election, 1996

• Chadian parliamentary election, 1997

• Peruvian national election, 2000 [48] and [49]

• Russian presidential election, 1996[50]

• Sri Lankan parliamentary election, 2000

• 2000 United States election, controversy in Florida

• 2002 New Hampshire Senate election phone jam-ming scandal

• Georgian legislative election, 2003, Fraud allega-tions

• 2004 United States election voting controversies

• Romanian legislative election, 2004

9

• Philippine presidential election, 1986 (see alsoPeople Power Revolution)

• Philippine general election, 2004 (see also HelloGarci scandal)

• Ukrainian presidential election, 2004

• United Kingdom general election, 2001 [51]

• United Kingdom general election, 2005 [51]

[52][53] [54] [55] [56]

• Washington gubernatorial election, 2004

• Egyptian presidential election, 2005

• Ethiopian general election, 2005

• Belarusian presidential election, 2006

• Mexican general election 2006 controversies

• Italian general election, 2006

• Morocco elections, 2006

• Nigerian general election, 2007

• Kenyan presidential election, 2007

• Russian legislative election, 2007

• Zimbabwean presidential election, 2008

• Tower Hamlets mayoral election, 2015 [57][58][59][60]

• United Kingdom general election,2015[61][62][63][63][64][65][66][67][68][69]

[70][71][72][73][74][74][75][73][75][75][76][73][73][76][77][75][77][73][78][79][79][57][60][58][59][60][80][81][82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89]

5 See also• Administrative resource

• American Center for Voting Rights

• Branch stacking

• Caging list

• Cooping

• Electoral integrity

• Florida Central Voter File (purging controversy)

• Gerrymandering

• List of controversial elections

• List of UK Parliamentary election petitions

• Political corruption

• Postal voting

• Show election

• Smear campaign

• Electoral integrity

6 Further reading

6.1 General

• Lehoucq, Fabrice. “Electoral fraud: Causes, types,and consequences.” Annual review of political sci-ence (2003) 6#1 pp 233–256.

• Schaffer, Frederic Charles. The hidden costs ofclean election reform (Cornell University Press,2008)

6.2 Australia

• McGrath, Amy. The Forging of Votes, Tower HousePublications, Kensington, NSW (1994)

• McGrath, Amy. Frauding of Elections, TowerHouse Publications and H.S. Chapman Society,Brighton-le Sands, NSW (2003)

• McGrath, Amy. (The Frauding of Votes, TowerHouse Publications, Kensington, NSW 1996)

• Perry, Peter John. Political Corruption in Australia:A VeryWicked Place? (Ashgate Pub Limited, 2001)

6.3 Canada

• Atkinson, Michael M., and Gerald Bierling. “Politi-cians, the public and political ethics: Worlds apart.”Canadian Journal of Political Science (2005) 38#4pp 1003.

6.4 France

• Ebhardt, Christian. “In Search of a Political Of-fice: Railway Directors and Electoral Corruption inBritain and France, 1820-1870.” Journal of ModernEuropean History (2013) 11#1 pp 72–87.

6.5 Germany

• Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. Practicing Democ-racy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Ger-many (2000)[90]

10 7 REFERENCES

• Ziblatt, Daniel. “Shaping Democratic Practiceand the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case ofNineteenth-Century Germany.” American PoliticalScience Review (2009) 103#1 pp 1–21.

6.6 Great Britain

• Gash, Norman. Politics in the Age of Peel: A Studyin the Technique of Parliamentary Representation1830-1850 (1953)

• O'Gorman, Frank. Voters, Patrons and Parties: TheUnreformed Electoral System of Hanoverian Eng-land, 1734-1832 (Oxford, 1989).

• Harling, Philip. “Rethinking “Old Corruption,” Past& Present (1995) No. 147 pp. 127–158[91]

• Namier, Lewis Bernstein. The structure of politicsat the accession of George III (London: Macmillan,1957)

• O'Leary, Cornelius. The elimination of corruptpractices in British elections, 1868-1911 (ClarendonPress, 1962)

6.7 Latin America

• Hartlyn, Jonathan, and Arturo Valenzuela, “Democ-racy in Latin America since 1930,” in Leslie Bethell,ed. Latin America: Politics and Society since 1930(1998), 3-66.

• Molina, Iván and Fabrice Lehoucq. “Political Com-petition and Electoral Fraud: A Latin AmericanCase Study,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History(1999) 30#2 pp 199–234[92]

• Posada-Carbó, Eduardo. “Electoral Juggling: AComparative History of the Corruption of Suffragein Latin America, 1830-1930.” Journal of LatinAmerican Studies (2000): 611-644.

• Ricci, Paolo. "‘Beheading’, Rule Manipulation andFraud: The Approval of Election Results in Brazil,1894–1930.” Journal of Latin American Studies(2012) 44#3 pp 495-521.

• Silva, Marcos Fernandes da. “The political economyof corruption in Brazil.”Revista de Administração deEmpresas (1999) 39#3 pp 26–41.

6.8 Turkey

• Meyersson, Erik. “Is Something Rotten In Ankara’sMayoral Election? A Very Preliminary StatisticalAnalysis” (2014)[93]

• Meyersson, Erik. “Trouble in Turkey’s Elections”(2014)[94]

• Meyersson, Erik. “Capital Fraud in Turkey? Evi-dence from Citizen Initiatives” (2014)[95]

6.9 United States

• Argersinger, Peter H. “New perspectives on electionfraud in the Gilded Age.” Political Science Quarterly(1985) 100#4 pp 669–687[96]

• Campbell, Tracy. Deliver the Vote: A History ofElection Fraud, An American Political Tradition,1742-2004 (Basic Books, 2005)

• Fackler, Tim, and Tse-min Lin. “Political corrup-tion and presidential elections, 1929-1992.” Journalof Politics 57 (1995): 971-993.[97]

• Mayfield, Loomis. “Voting Fraud in EarlyTwentieth-Century Pittsburgh,” Journal of Interdis-ciplinary History (1993) 29#1 59-84[98]

• Morris Jr., Roy. Fraud of the Century: RutherfordB. Hayes, Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of1876 (2007)[99]

• Summers, Mark Wahlgren. Party Games: Getting,Keeping, and Using Power in Gilded Age Politics(2003)[100]

• Summers, Mark Wahlgren. The Era of Good Steal-ings (1993), covers corruption 1868-1877

• Sydnor, Charles. Gentlemen Freeholders: PoliticalPractices in Washington’s Virginia (1952), 18th cen-tury

7 References

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[42] Jeannette I. Andrade (2011-11-18). “Electoral sabotagecase filed vs Arroyo, Ampatuan, Bedol”. Philippine DailyInquirer.

[43] United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Divi-sionVoting Section Home Page,Help America Vote Actof 2002

[44] 107th U.S. Congress (October 29, 2002). “Help AmericaVote Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-252)". U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. Retrieved 2008-10-10.

[45] Wright, Susan (2005), The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Land-mark Antidiscrimination Legislation, The Rosen Publish-ing Group, ISBN 1-4042-0455-5

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[46] “2015: Cronista (in spanish)".

[47] “1988: The fall of the system (in spanish)".

[48] “Peru’s corruption runs deep (Chicago Tribune - 18 April2001)". Freelori.org. 2001-04-18. Retrieved 2015-06-13.

[49] “TALKING POINT | Peru: Does the election have anycredibility?". News.bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2015-06-13.

[50] “Rewriting Russian History: Did Boris Yeltsin Steal the1996 Presidential Election?".

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[52] Andrew Sparrow. “Voting open to 'childishly simple'fraud, says watchdog”. the Guardian.

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[54] “BBC NEWS - UK - England - West Midlands - Judgeupholds vote-rigging claims”. Bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2015-05-29.

[55] “Login”. timesonline.co.uk.

[56] “BBC NEWS - UK - Voting scandal mars UK election”.Bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2015-05-29.

[57] Rajeev Syal. “Met considers criminal inquiry into TowerHamlets mayor Lutfur Rahman”. the Guardian.

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[62] “Election 2015: Lancashire politicians warn of postal votefraud”. BBC.co.uk. Retrieved 2015-05-29.

[63] Rowena Mason. “Labour likens Ukip to BNP as SouthThanet election fight gets bitter”. the Guardian.

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[67] “Daily Echo - Southampton news, sport & leisure forHampshire plus jobs & homes”. Dailyecho.co.uk. Re-trieved 2015-05-29.

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[69] Press Association 2014. “Galloway opens poll legal chal-lenge”. Dorset Echo. Retrieved 2015-05-29.

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[71] “Ukip’s David Hodgson Left Off Darlington GeneralElection Ballot Papers And Demands Answers”. Huffin-gtonpost.co.uk. Retrieved 2015-05-29.

[72] “Election day glitches see Ukip candidate David Hodg-son missed off ballot papers”. Westerndailypress.co.uk.2015-05-07. Retrieved 2015-05-29.

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8 External links• Voter Fraud - an article from the ACE Project

• Independent Verification: Essential Action to As-sure Integrity in the Voting Process, Roy G. Salt-man, August 22, 2006

• Legal provisions to prevent Electoral Fraud - an ar-ticle from the ACE Project

• Was the 2004 Election Stolen? byRobert F. KennedyJr., June 1, 2006.

• Article referencing “four-legged voting”

14 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1 Text• Electoral fraud Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_fraud?oldid=686366747 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Scipius, Roadrunner,Shii, Edward, Nealmcb, Infrogmation, DopefishJustin, Pnm, Dcljr, Docu, GCarty, Dcoetzee, Przepla, Morwen, Jerzy, Denelson83, As-tronautics~enwiki, Goethean, TMLutas, Hcheney, Mattflaschen, Fennec, Average Earthman, Everyking, Avala, PulpSpy, Stevietheman,159753, Beland, Mzajac, Tomruen, Morgan695, Trilobite, Mtnerd, Mennonot, Bender235, NeilTarrant, Jnestorius, Pedant, MBisanz,Ascorbic, Art LaPella, Devil Master, Idleguy, Pearle, A2Kafir, Brainheart, Tra, Duffman~enwiki, Hipocrite, Andrewpmk, Musicand-comedy, Wikidea, Gblaz, Max rspct, Lemmie~enwiki, SteinbDJ, Nicklott, Woohookitty, Robert K S, Kgrr, Tabletop, Plrk, Deltabeignet,Zzedar, Electionworld, Josh Parris, Rjwilmsi, NatusRoma, Amire80, Fish and karate, SchuminWeb, Ground Zero, Jayann, Correon, Bg-white, RobotE, Sceptre, RussBot, Hauskalainen, Noypi380, Chensiyuan, Rsrikanth05, Welsh, Rjensen, Barberio, MartinRudat, Kgwo1972,Lele, Petri Krohn, Knoepfle, Mais oui!, Kungfuadam, Yvwv, A13ean, SmackBot, McGeddon, WilyD, Alksub, Quidam65, Anwar saadat,JRSP, Chris the speller, ZyMOS, RoysonBobson, Tamfang, Addshore, Buddy-Rey, EVula, Yulia Romero, Akriasas, Derek R Bullamore,Jan.Kamenicek, Howard the Duck, Crd721, Will Beback, Deepred6502, Aviper2k7, ArglebargleIV, Harryboyles, Vgy7ujm, Neil Hunt,Davydog, Casg, Keith-264, Levineps, Renebeto, Joseph Solis in Australia, PippaN, Green caterpillar, Keithh, Cydebot, Two hundred per-cent, Dudeman5685, Hebrides, Sulpicius, Christian75, DumbBOT, Casliber, CieloEstrellado, Anyo Niminus, PureLogic, EdJohnston, TheLegendary Ranger, Spastas, Paul from Michigan, Farosdaughter, Ben w, LegitimateAndEvenCompelling, Falconleaf, InternationalIDEA,Turgidson, Midnightdreary, SteveSims, Magioladitis, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Jmorrison230582, Manderiko, Bobby D. DS., Objectivesea,Indon, Animum, 28421u2232nfenfcenc, Kawaputra, Ours18, Efgn, Bobby H. Heffley, JMyrleFuller, Davidwiz, Kraxler, Jny2cornell, Elec-tiontechnology, Ganoidyn, Anne97432, Hilltoppers, KTo288, J.delanoy, Cajun67, Euku, USN1977, Maurice Carbonaro, Laurusnobilis,J.A.McCoy, Apostle12, Cannibalicious!, Taintain, Wisepiglet, Low Sea, Flatterworld, Student7, Railwayfan2005, Gingerbreadmen, SamBlacketer, UnicornTapestry, TreasuryTag, HughD, Helenalex, Liamoliver, THC Loadee, Enviroboy, Aec is away, MitchKliev, Monty845,Cindamuse, Doc James, Bluedenim, Elicious13, StAnselm, Winchelsea, UnderstandingApples, Sahar Tomer, Flyer22, BjörnEF, Light-mouse, Mk32, Swace, Anchor Link Bot, Mohummy, Ainlina, Daryush Mehrjuba, EoGuy, Wickifrank, Hadrianheugh, Richrakh, Mild BillHiccup, LizardJr8, John J. Bulten, Wildspell, Nymf, Bonewah, Aprock, Thingg, Nebula2357, Carola56, J1.grammar natz, DumZiBoT,Choraw, Anticipation of a New Lover’s Arrival, The, Addbot, DOI bot, Queenmomcat, SpellingBot, Favonian, Tassedethe, DinoBot2,Bwrs, Lightbot, OC Ripper, James Tusk George, Parent55, Legobot, Yobot, Legobot II, A Stop at Willoughby, AnomieBOT, Kingpin13,Abercrombiegrl113, TIGTAG, Citation bot, GB fan, Quebec99, LilHelpa, Sionus, Jackbrgs, DixieKaren, TobiasMar, ,همان Whitember,FrescoBot, Pinethicket, Birchman2, Jschnur, Tahir mq, Didactik, Lotje, Pbrower2a, RjwilmsiBot, Rami radwan, Dewritech, Nquinn91,H3llBot, KarikaSlayer, Philoso4King, Chepe Limon, Electionwatchdog, ClueBot NG, This lousy T-shirt, Hans Eo, Bucoli, Hazhk, AlKol-wicz, Widr, Lelmets, MerlIwBot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Wbm1058, J991, 4thaugust1932, Threethinker, Johanna1990, Sparkie82, Youreal-lycan, KeesKnoest, BattyBot, Mollskman, Cyberbot II, GoShow, Myxomatosis57, Khazar2, K7L, Lugia2453, ComfyKem, Sriharsh1234,Sephichan125, PresidentialVote, Zmflavius, Jodosma, Old Naval Rooftops, YiFeiBot, Ginsuloft, Saturn872, Monkbot, Plokmijnuhbygvt-fcdxeszwaq, Ballotact1872, Turkeytrotbro192, Newt1986 and Anonymous: 224

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