Eliade and History

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Eliade and HistoryAuthor(s): Douglas AllenSource: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), pp. 545-565Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1202518 .

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Eliade and

History

Douglas

Allen

I

University

of

Maine at Orono

Mircea

Eliade,

who died

in

April

1986 at

the

age

of

seventy-nine,

had a

remarkable career, first as a major literary figure in his native Romania

and then as a

historian

and

phenomenologist

of

religion.

Romanian was

his

literary language,

but

his

major

scholarly

works,

from Traite

d'histoire

des

religions

and Le

mythe

de

l'eternel

retour

in

1949

through

the third vol-

ume of Histoire des

croyances

et

des idees

religieuses

(1983)

and Briser

le

toit

de

la maison

(1986),

were written

in

French.

Approximately thirty-five

of

Eliade's books have been

published

in

English.'

Although

Eliade

may

have been the most

popular

and

influential con-

temporary historian of religion, he was extremely controversial and not

without

his

critics.

Indeed,

many,

if

not

most,

specialists

in

anthropology,

sociology,

and even

history

of

religions

have either

ignored

or

quickly

dis-

missed

the

works of

Mircea

Eliade.2

Probably

the most

frequent general

criticism made

by specialists

of

religion

has been that Eliade is methodo-

logically

uncritical,

arbitrary,

and

subjective.

Critics assert that his works

are

highly

normative,

departing

from the

descriptive

domain

of

Religions-

wissenschaft

and

other

empirical

and

scientific

approaches.

1

Works

by

and

about

Mircea Eliade

through

1978

appear

in

Douglas

Allen

and Dennis

Doeing,

Mircea

Eliade: An Annotated

Bibliography

(New

York:

Garland,

1980).

During

the

1980s,

even

though

he

suffered

from

fading

vision and

especially

from

painful

and

debilitating

arthritis,

Mircea

Eliade

continued to be

extremely

prolific.

Major

works

appearing

in

English

include

Autobiography,

vol.

1,

1907-1937

(New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1981),

A

History

of

Religious

Ideas,

vol.

2,

From

Gautama Buddha to the

Triumph of

Christianity,

trans. Willard

R.

Trask,

and

vol.

3,

From

Muhammad

to the

Ageof Reforms,

rans.

Alf

Hiltebeitel and Diane

Apostolos-Cappadona

Chicago: University

of

Chicago

Press,

1982,

1985),

Ordeal

by Labyrinth:

Conversations

with

Claude-Henri

Rocquet,

trans.

Derek

Coltman

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1982),

and

Symbolism,

he

Sacred,

and

the

Arts,

ed.

Diane

Apostolos-Cappadona

New

York:

Crossroad,

1986).

Special

note

may

be made

of

the fact that Eliade served as editor-in-chiefof the sixteen-volume TheEncyclopediafReligion New

York:

Macmillan,

1987),

which

appeared

in

print eight

months after

his death.

2

This is discussed in

some detail

in

chap.

1 of

Douglas

Allen,

MirceaEliade et le

phenomene

religieux

(Paris:

Payot,

1982).

In an

article

sympathetic

to

Eliade,

loan Culianu describes how

Eliade has been

criticized

by

both classical

the established )

anthropologists

and

by

new-

wave

( anarchist )

anthropologists,

neither

of whom

understand,

e.g.,

the broad

range

of his

treatment

of

symbols

(see

loan P.

Culianu,

Mircea Eliade at

the

Crossroad of

Anthropology,

Neue

Zeitschrift

fiir

systematische

Theologie

und

Religionsphilosophie

27

[1985]:

123-31).

?

1988

by

The

University

of

Chicago.

All

rights

reserved.

0022-4189/88/6804-0004$01.00

545







The

Journal

of

Religion

Many

critics,

and even

a number of

supporters,

have

frequently

observed that Eliade

has little concern

for

consistency

and lacks

a

coher-

ent

methodological

framework. For

some

supporters,

this lack

of

consis-

tency

and

coherency

becomes a

virtue,

showing

that Eliade

is not

limited

by

the

provincial

self-imposed

boundaries

of the

history

of

religions,

is

willing

to

take

risks,

and does

many

different

things

simultaneously.

For

most

critics,

this

lack of

consistency

and

coherency

becomes

a

fatal weak-

ness,

showing

that Eliade is

hopelessly

uncritical and

subjective

and need

not

be

taken

very seriously

by

the modern

history

of

religions.

In

this

study

of Eliade and

History,

I in

no

way

wish

to claim

that

Eliade has a

coherent overall

methodological

framework

that allows him

to overcome all appearances of inconsistency in his works. Eliade does

indeed do

many

different

things

simultaneously,

and he was

never

as

bothered

by

charges

of

inconsistency

as his

critics

assumed he

should

have been.

In

earlier

studies,

especially

Structure and

Creativity

in

Religion

and

Mircea

Eliade et le

phenomene

religieux,

I

maintained

that Mircea

Eliade

has

a

sophisticated

phenomenological

approach,

and

I

attempted

to recon-

struct his

comprehensive

hermeneutical

framework.3

Critics,

who

quickly

dismissed

Eliade,

were

often

not

taking seriously

the

complexity

and

depth

of his

history

and

phenomenology

of

religion.

But in

formulating

such

an overall

methodological

framework, I

in

no

way

maintained

that

this

eliminated Eliade's

ontological

moves,

meta-

physical assumptions,

normative

judgments,

and

clear

inconsistencies;

indeed,

I

argued

for

the exact

opposite

interpretation,

showing

that such

crucial

aspects

of

Eliade's

works

took him

beyond

or

outside the

perspectival

limitations

of

most

historians and

phenomenologists

of reli-

gion

and of

his

critics.

Therefore, in what follows, I focus on issues regarding Eliade and his-

tory,

but

I

in

no

way

assume

that

he was

only

a

historian

and

phenome-

nologist

of

religion

or

that

his

methodological

framework

could or

should

eliminate

all

inconsistencies

found

throughout

his

works.

A

specific

expression

of

the

general

criticism

that Mircea

Eliade

is

methodologically

uncritical,

arbitrary,

and

subjective

takes

the

form

of

arguing

that he

is

antihistorical. As

Eliade

has

written,

Almost

without

noticing

it,

the

historian of

religions

found

himself in

a

cultural

milieu

dif-

ferent from that of Max Muller and Tylor, or even that of Frazer and

Marett. It

was

a new

environment

nourished

by

Nietzsche

and

Marx,

Dilthey,

Croce,

and

Ortega;

an

environment

in

which

the

fashionable

3

Douglas

Allen,

Structure

and

Creativity

n

Religion

(The

Hague:

Mouton,

1978).

546







Eliade

and

History

cliche

was

not

Nature but

History. 4

Twentieth-century

scholars,

in

contrast-

ing

their

approaches

with

Frazer,

Tylor,

and

other earlier

investigators,

often

emphasize

the

irreducibly

historical

dimension of their

documents;

religious

data

are

historical

data;

to understand

religion

one

must do

justice

to

the

specific

conditionings

of

any

historical

manifestation.

Therefore,

the attack

upon

Eliade

for

being

methodologically

uncriti-

cal

and

subjective

often takes the form of

arguing

that he does

not

dojus-

tice

to

the

concrete,

particular,

historical

nature of the data. What

may

seem

surprising

is that

a

number

of Eliade's

supporters appear

to

agree

with

his severe critics that he is

indeed antihistorical.

While

demonstrating

the

primacy

of the nonhistorical

in

Eliade's

his-

tory and phenomenology of religion, even showing that his approach

does indeed have an

antihistorical

normative

basis,

I

shall

argue

that

sim-

ply

to

dismiss or

praise

Eliade as antihistorical

is

to

neglect

what is essen-

tially

historical

in his

method and

theory

of

religion.

I

shall

argue,

in

other

words,

for

the need to

recognize

a

complex, dynamic,

historical-

nonhistorical,

dialectical interaction

if

one is

to do

justice

to Eliade's

hermeneutical

approach.

MOST CRITICS: ELIADE IS ANTIHISTORICAL

Most

scholars who have

emphasized

the

antihistorical nature

of Eliade's

approach

have been critics:

historically

minded

historians of

religion,

such

as scholars of the

European comparative-historical

school,

various

special-

ists

who

are critical

of

universal structures and

sweeping generalizations,

and several

contemporary

American

critics;

a

few

Christian

theologians;

and

many

anthropologists,

such as

Wallace,

Raglan,

Lessa, Leach,

and

Saliba.5

According to the historically oriented empiricist Robert D. Baird,

Eliade assumes an ahistoric archaic model for all

religious experience;

his

method,

with its search

for

structures,

is not

historically

falsifiable and

becomes a

barrier

to

the attainment

of authentic

religio-historical

under-

standing ;

his

phenomenology

is as normative as

theology

because it is

4

Mircea

Eliade,

The

Quest

for

the

'Origins'

of

Religion,

History

of

Religions

4

(1964):

166,

which

appears

as

chap.

3 in his The

Quest

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1969).

5 Seymour Cain, MirceaEliade, InternationalEncyclopaedia f theSocialSciencesBiographical

Supplement

New

York:

Macmillan,

Free

Press,

1979),

18:166-72,

provides

a delineation

of

vari-

ous

critiques;

Guilford

Dudley

III,

Religion

on Trial: Mircea

Eliade and His Critics

Philadelphia:

Temple

University

Press,

1977);

and

John

A.

Saliba,

Homo

Religiosus

n Mircea Eliade:

An

Anthropological

Evaluation

(Leiden:

Brill,

1976),

summarize

many

of

the

attacks;

Mac Linscott

Ricketts,

In

Defense

of

Eliade:

Toward

Bridging

the

Communications

Gap

between

Anthropol-

ogy

and

the

History

of

Religions,

Religion:Journalof

Religion

and

Religions

3

(1973):

13-34,

pre-

sents

many

critiques

by anthropologists.

See

pt.

2,

Works

about Mircea

Eliade,

pp.

95-157,

in

Allen and

Doeing.

547







The

Journal

of

Religion

based

on

an assumed

ontology

which is neither

historically

derived

nor

descriptively

verifiable. 6

Several

scholars, primarily theologians

such as Kenneth

Hamilton,

have

assumed

that Eliade's

approach

is

theological. They

submit that

his theol-

ogy,

while it

may

do

justice

to much of archaic

religion,

is

inadequate

for

understanding Christianity

and other

historical

religions. According

to

Thomas

Altizer,

Eliade's

method is

mystical

and

romantic,

not

rational and scientific.

His

interpretations

of archaic

religion

may

have

great

merit,

but his

phenomenology

is insufficient for

interpreting

the

higher

religions

and

religious

phenomena

in

the modern Western

world.

Altizer submits that Eliade's

approach,

which

has

nothing

to

do

with historical Christianity, favors a return to some archaic mode of being

and

is

therefore inconsistent with

his

Christian

ground. 7

One

can

easily

demonstrate

that

Eliade's

approach

is not based

on a

Christian

theological

or

normative

position,

but the

question

remains

whether

his

history

of

religions

does

justice

to

Christianity

and other his-

torical

religions.8

Has Eliade

universalized a nonhistorical archaic

ontol-

ogy

as

the

norm

for all

religion,

thus

providing

an

interpretation

of,

say,

Christianity,

which

favors

cosmic,

nonhistorical,

pre-Christian,

and

pos-

sibly

non-Christian

roots, influences,

and structures?

According

to Ivan

Strenski,

the numerous statements

by

Eliade

giving

an

impression

that

the

history

of

religions

is

an inductive

study,

which

grounds

its conclusions on

historical

fact,

are rendered

nugatory.

Eliade's

history

of

religions

is based on a

priori

truths,

which stand

in

an a

priori

relation to the

historical data both

logically

and

chronologically.

These

truths

may

sometimes be

confirmed

in

historical

materials,

but

falsification from these

materials seems ruled

out. 9

6

Robert D.

Baird,

Category

ormation nd

the

Historyof

Religions

The

Hague:

Mouton,

1971),

pp.

86-87, 152-53,

and

passim.

One could

counter that

Baird's

notion of

empirical

and historical

verification is too narrow and even

outdated.

7

See

Kenneth

Hamilton,

Homo

Religiosus

and Historical

Faith, Journal

of

Bibleand

Religion

33

(1965):

213-22;

ThomasJ.

J.

Altizer,

Mircea

Eliade

and the

Dialectic

of

the

Sacred

(Philadelphia:

Westminster

Press,

1963).

Altizer's

interpretation

has

been

criticized

by

Eliade,

Notes

for

a Dia-

logue,

in

The

Theology

f

Altizer:

Critique

nd

Response,

d.

J.

B.

Cobb

(Philadelphia:

Westminster

Press,

1970),

pp.

234-41;

by

Mac

Linscott

Ricketts,

Eliade

and

Altizer:

Very

Different Out-

looks,

ChristianAdvocate

October

1967),

pp.

11-12,

and Mircea

Eliade and the

Death

of

God,

Religion n Life(Spring 1967), pp. 40-52; and by Douglas Allen, Structure nd Creativityn Religion.

8

On

the

former

point,

see,

e.g.,

the

section

entitled

Eliade

et

le

christianisme,

pp.

240-43,

in

Allen,

Mircea Eliade

et

le

phenomene

eligieux.

On

the latter

point,

e.g.,

Robert

A.

Segal,

in

Eliade's

Theory

of

Millenarianism,

Religious

Studies

14

(1978):

159-73,

submits

that

Eliade has

a

general

theory

that

given

the

meaninglessness

which man

qua

man

finds

in

history

and the

meaning

which

he

finds

in

primordial

time,

he seeks

instinctively

to abolish

history

and return to

primordial

time

(p.

159).

This

theory

of

such an

innate

or

natural

yearning

forces Eliade to

deny

the

specific

Israelite

sense

of

history

and

to

misinterpret

Jewish

eschatology.

9

Ivan

Strenski,

MirceaEliade:

Some

Theoretical

Problems,

in The

Theory

f

Myth:

Six Stud-

548







Eliade and

History

In

his

well-argued

and

extensively

documented

attack,

Strenski

main-

tains that

Eliade

first reduces

history

to

false, limited,

and

impoverished

senses

of

history ;

then,

having

formulated such an

easy

and

vulnerable

target

to

attack,

Eliade can

argue

for

the

need of

investigators

to

go

beyond

such

a

history

of the sacred.10

Eliade uses

and criticizes three senses of

history.

First,

there is

history

as

nothing

more than a

chronicle,

as

if

the task of the historian was

merely

to

piece

together

events

or

series

of

events.

Second,

there is

positivist

his-

tory,

which

neglects

human intentions

and internal

meanings,

thus

lead-

ing

to Eliade's false

dichotomy

of

giving

a

historical account versus

interpreting

meaning.

Third,

and most

interesting,

there is

plenary

his-

tory, which is an explanatory and meaning-giving sense of history, but

which has limited value

since

it can

only

help

us

to

grasp

the

particular

his-

torical

meaning

of

the sacred

as

it was

understood

and

lived

in

a

specific

culture. Such a

plenary history

is

insufficient since it

does

not allow the

his-

torian

of

religions

to

decipher

the

primary

transhistorical

meanings

of

the

sacred;

it

falls

short

of

the

transcendent

prehistoric meanings

that

condition the lower or

historical

meanings.

Challenging

Eliade's antihistorical

position,

Strenski

argues

that he

repeatedly

forces

on his

readers various false dilemmas

and

then

pro-

poses

false solutions for

escaping

from

them.

Though positivist

history

or chronicle do

not

suffice

to

explain

religious

phenomena,

and

though

the

scrappiness

of historical evidence in

certain areas

(especially

the areas

in

which Eliade

specializes) prevents

extensive

cross-cultural

generaliza-

tion,

a

rejection

of a

proper

historical view is not

thereby

entailed. The

nature

of the

issue

of

explaining

and

determining

the

meanings

of reli-

gious

phenomena, myths

and

symbols, respectively,

does not

change

from

a

historic to

a

nonhistoric one

because we in

fact

have

insufficient means of

dealing with the historical problems. For example, it may be true that

we

are unable to

explain

certain cross-cultural

resemblances

among

vari-

ous

myths

by

reference to a common

historical or

geographical

origin;

but

this dilemma

does not

legitimize

our

positing

some

origin

and

explana-

tion

outside

history,

some

ontologically

transcendent

condition

(nonhis-

torical

archetypes)

of such

historically inexplicable

similarities.

Eliade is

not

justified

in

assuming

such an

antihistorical

normative

position

of

self-

authenticating

intuitions of

nonhistorical

structures

that are

historically

unverifiable and unfalsifiable.'2

ies,

ed.

Adrian

Cunningham

(London:

Sheed &

Ward,

1973),

pp.

51-52.

10

See

Strenski's

section

on

Eliade and

the

Study

of

Religion: Against

History,

ibid.,

pp.

43-52.

I

Strenski,

Mircea

Eliade: Some

Theoretical

Problems,

pp.

58-59.

12

Ibid.,

pp.

53-54,

58-59,

60-61. Criticisms of

Strenski's

interpretation

are

presented

in

Allen,

Mircea

Eliade et le

phenomene

religieux, pp.

198,

244-45.

549







The

Journal

of

Religion

MANY SUPPORTERS:

ELIADE

IS

ANTIHISTORICAL

Many

interpreters

who have

praised

Eliade

have

granted

that

he

is

antihistorical. Some of these have been scholars critical of historical and

empirical

approaches

to

religious phenomena;

many

of these have

been

literary figures

or

others with an

interest

in

the

mythical

and

fantastic

dimensions

of Eliade's

literary

works and with

little

concern

for the histor-

ical dimensions

of

experience;

and

several of these have

attempted

to view

Eliade

as an

antihistorical

or

transhistorical

shaman or

mystic.

It

must be

admitted that the vast

majority

of

scholars

sympathetic

to

Eliade's

history

of

religions,

such

as

Matei

Calinescu,

Adriana

Berger,

or

Mac

Linscott

Ricketts,

either do

not

regard

him

as antihistorical

or,

more

often,

do

not

focus on

this

question.

Thomas Altizer now

extolls Eliade as

an

atheistic Christian

theologian,

whose dialectic and

theology

are

ade-

quate

for

understanding

modern,

godless

history

and

for

grasping

the

camouflaged

transcendent

that,

since

the

Christian

Incarnation

(equiva-

lent to

the

death

of

God),

can

only

be

made

fully

present

and real

through

radically

profane

history.13

Guilford

Dudley's

interpretation

is

unusual in

being

one of

the few

scientific studies

that both

concludes

that

Eliade's

history

of

religions

is

based on an antihistorical normative position and then suggests that such

an

antihistory

be viewed

sympathetically.

Indeed,

Dudley,

who

ana-

lyzes

contemporary

history

of

religions

as

being

in

a

state of severe

crisis

and

confusion,

proposes

Eliade's

antihistory

theory

of

religion

as

the

leading

candidate to

bring

some

sense

of

unity

and

future

development

to

the

discipline.

After

noting

Eliade's

frequent

claims

to be

using

an

empirical

and his-

torical

approach,

Dudley

shows

that Eliade

has been

continually

criticized

and dismissed

by empiricists; and he agrees with the critics that Eliade can-

not meet

their minimal

empirical,

historical,

inductive

criteria for a

sci-

entific

approach,

such

as

criteria

for

empirical

verification or

falsifica-

tion.14

Dudley

goes

on

to

argue

that

Eliade's

history

of

religions

is

highly

nor-

mative

since it rests on

a

privileged

ontological

status

granted

to

the

antihistorical

archaic

ontology.

Eliade's

polemic

favors

this

archaic

ontology,

which

he

takes as

constituting

the

basis of all

religions

and

which

has

its

clearest and

most

developed

roots

in

Indian

religion

and,

more

par-

13

ThomasJ.J.

Altizer,

Mircea

Eliade and

the Death

of

God,

CrossCurrents

29

(1979):

257-

69.

As

can

be seen in

Eliade's criticisms in

Notes

for a

Dialogue

and

my

refutation

in

Structure

and

Creativity

n

Religion

(n.

3

above),

Altizer

continues to

misinterpret

Eliade's

dialectic

of

the

sacred and

other

aspects

of

his

history

of

religions.

14

See

chap.

1 of

Dudley's Religion

on

Trial.

550







Eliade and

History

ticularly,

in

Patanfjali's

Yoga.'5

In

the

final

chapter

of

Religion

on

Trial,

Dudley argues

that

the

empiri-

cist

approach

does not

provide

an

adequate

model for

being

rational

or

scientific since

sophisticated

thinkers have

totally

undermined its

meth-

odological

criteria.

Using

the

terminology

and

formulations of

Imre

Lakatos,

Dudley

submits that Eliade

and his

followers must now

clarify

his

comprehensive

theoretical

system

so

that we can examine its

potential

as a

viable

research

program.

Dudley

concludes that

Mircea

Eliade

is

really

an

antihistorian of reli-

gions,

who should be

placed

within the

tradition of

French,

deductive,

synchronic, systematic approaches,

sharing many

similarities

with such

scholars as Foucault and Dumezil. Eliade should avoid the ambivalence,

confusion,

and

contradictions

in

his own

writings

arising

from

his insis-

tence that he is

using

an

empirical

and

historical method.

There

may

be

many problems

with

this

sympathetic

simple

identifica-

tion

of

Eliade's

approach

as

antihistorical.

There can be

little doubt

of

the

centrality

of

structural

analysis

and

synchronicity

in

his

systematic

approach.

But

to

accept Dudley's

interpretation,

one would have to

throw

out

important

assertions

found

throughout

Eliade's

writings

in

which

he

has insisted that his approach is in some sense empirical and historical.

More

important,

as we

shall

see,

Eliade has

often insisted

that the

very

ambivalence

Dudley

wants to eliminate is

essential to an

adequate

inter-

pretation

of

religious

phenomena.

Thus

he

submits that the

tension,

as

expressed

in

the

often

conflicting methodological

claims of

historical and

phenomenological

approaches,

is

in

fact a

creative and

necessary

ten-

sion for

any adequate

comprehensive

hermeneutics.'6

THE PRIMACY OF NONHISTORICAL STRUCTURES

The

Historical

Nature

of

Our

Data

According

to Mircea

Eliade,

the

historian of

religions

uses an

empirical

method

of

approach

and

begins

by collecting

religious

documents

that

need to

be

interpreted.

Unlike

Miiller,

Tylor,

Frazer,

and

other

early

investigators,

one

realizes that

she

or

he

works

exclusively

with

historical

15

In

chap.

3,

Dudley

(n.

5

above)

attempts

to

establish

that this

antihistorical

archaic

ontol-

ogy

serves as the

normative

foundation of

Eliade's

theory

of

religion;

in

chap.

4,

he

argues

for

the

Indian

roots of

this

ontology.

16

There

may

be

other

difficulties

with such

an

interpretation

of Eliade's

antihistory.

For

example,

one

may

question

Dudley's

easy

acceptance

of

the

epistemological

dichotomy:

empiricist-inductive-historical

versus

rationalist-deductive-antihistorical.

Much

recent

philoso-

phy

has been

directed

not

only

at

criticizing

classical

empiricism

but

also at

undermining

this

sharp dichotomy.

551







The

Journal

of

Religion

documents. '7

Repeatedly

Eliade states

that his

point

of

departure

is

the

historical

data,

and

he

acknowledges

their

irreducibly

historical

nature.

To affirm that all

religious

phenomena

are historical is to

acknowledge

that all

religious

data

are

conditioned. The sacred

is

always

manifested

in

history; particular temporal, spatial,

cultural,

and other factors

always

condition the

religious

manifestation.18

A

religious

phenomenon

cannot

be understood outside

of

its

'history,'

that

is,

outside

of

its cultural

and

socioeconomic contexts. There is

no

such

thing

outside

of

history

as a

'pure'

religious

datum. For there is no

such

thing

as a

human

datum that is

not at the same time a

historical datum.

Every

religious experience

is

expressed and transmitted in a particular historical context. 19

Thus without

taking

into

consideration the

particular

historical

condi-

tions,

Eliade could not

analyze

the

paradoxical

relation

in

the

dialectic

of

the sacred and the

profane:

that which is

finite and

historical,

while

remaining

a natural

thing,

can manifest

something

infinite

and

transhis-

torical;

that which is

transcendent and

transhistorical

limits and his-

toricizes itself

by

manifesting

itself

in

some finite historical

thing.20

The Transhistorical Structures

Recognizing

the

necessity

for

interpreting

the

unique,

specific

conditionings

of

religious

data,

most scholars have

not been

impressed

by

Mircea Eliade's

sensitivity

to the

particular

historical

qualities

of

experi-

ence.

What stands out is

the

primary

methodological

emphasis

he

places

on,

and

the

lofty

status he

grants

to,

nontemporal

and

nonhistorical uni-

versal

structures.

Historical

research

may

be

necessary,

but it is

necessary

primarily

as a

means of grasping transhistorical meanings. Throughout his writings

Eliade

maintains

that

fundamental

religious

structures

are nonhis-

17

Eliade,

Methodological

Remarks on the

Study

of

Religious

Symbolism,

in The

Historyof

Religions:

Essays

n

Methodology,

d. Mircea

Eliade

andJoseph

M.

Kitagawa

Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1959),

p.

88,

The

Quest

for

the

'Origins'

of

Religion

(n.

4

above),

p.

169.

See

Eliade,

The

Myth

of

the Eternal

Return,

trans. Willard

R.

Trask

(New

York:

Pantheon,

1954),

pp.

5-6,

Patterns in

Comparative

Religion,

trans.

Rosemary

Sheed

(Cleveland:

World

Publishing,

Meridian

Books,

1963),

pp.

xiv-xvi,

2-3.

18

See Eliade's

formulation in

Images

and

Symbols,

rans.

by Philip Mairet(New York:Sheed &

Ward,

1961),

pp.

30-32.

19

Eliade,

Comparative

Religion:

Its

Past

and

Future,

in

Knowledge

nd theFuture

ofMan,

ed.

WalterJ.

Ong,

S.J.

(New

York:

Holt,

Rinehart &

Winston,

1968),

p.

250.

Eliade

continues:

But

admitting

the

historicity

of

religious experiences

does

not

imply

that

they

are reducible

to

nonreligious

forms of

behavior.

See Patterns

n

Comparative

eligion,

p.

xiii,

and

History

of

Reli-

gions

and

a

New

Humanism,

History f

Religions

1

(1961):

6

(which

appears

as

chap.

1

in

The

Quest

[n.

4

above]).

20

See Patterns in

Comparative

Religion, pp.

26,

29-30,

Images

and

Symbols,

pp.

84,

178.

552







Eliade and

History

torical.21

We

cannot demonstrate that essential

religious

structures

are

created

by

certain

societies

or at certain historical moments. We can

only

establish that

particular

historical conditions

provide

the

opportunity

for

the manifestation

or

predominance

of a

specific nontemporal

and

nonhistorical structure.

History

does not

basically modify

the structure of

an

archetypal

structure.

History

does add new

meanings;

new

valorizations

of

a

symbolism

are

occasioned

by

particular

historical situa-

tions. But the new valorizations

are

conditioned

by

the essential

transhistorical structure

of

the

symbolism.22

Not

only

is Eliade's

primary

task to

interpret

transhistorical

meanings,

but he

also often

argues

for

the

ahistoricity

of

religious

life,

as

when he

points to the spontaneity and the reversibility of religious positions. Cer-

tain coherent

mystical experiences,

for

example,

are

possible

at

any

and

every

degree

of civilization

and

of

religious

situation. 23

As we

shall soon

see,

not

only

does Eliade

interpret

transhistorical

meanings

by

means of a

hermeneutics

grounded

in

nonhistorical

struc-

tures,

but

he

also maintains that

primordial religious experiences,

such as

those

of

ecstasy

or

mystical

ascension,

are

nonhistorical; indeed,

human

nature and our basic human mode

of

being

in

the world

are nonhistorical.

Little wonder that

Seymour

Cain writes

that historical

actuality

and

the

living

context of

religious

phenomena,

which had

been

emphasized

by

Eliade,

appear

to be dismissed as

banally

meaningless,

a

mere

naught

besides

the 'transhistorical'

intentionality

of

the

specific

manifestations of

the

sacred

in

symbols,

rites,

myths,

etc.

For

Eliade,

it

appears

that the

systematic precedes

the

historical,

structure comes before

history,

metho-

dologically-if

not also

metaphysically-speaking. 24

Beyond

Historical

Explanation

In

the

methodologically

important

foreword

to

Shamanism,

in

Myths,

Dreams

and

Mysteries,

in

Images

and

Symbols,

and

in

other

works,

Mircea

Eliade is

determined

to

differentiate

what he

is

doing

from

historical

(psy-

21

See,

e.g.,

Eliade,

Myths,

Dreams

and

Mysteries,

rans.

Philip

Mairet

(New

York:

Harper,

1960),

pp.

107-8,

110,

178,

The

Sacred and the

Profane,

trans.

Willard R. Trask

(New

York:

Harper,

1961),

p.

137,

Images

and

Symbols,

pp.

159-61,

and

Mythologie

et histoire des reli-

gions,

Diogene

9

(1955):

99-116.

22 In Structure nd Creativityn Religionand MirceaEliade et lephenomeneeligieux n. 2 above), I

have

maintained

that it is

these

essential, nonhistorical,

symbolic

structures,

when

integrated

with the universal

transhistorical

structure

of

the dialectic of the

sacred,

that

primarily

constitute

Eliade's

hermeneutical framework

and serve as

the

foundation

for

his

phenomenological

approach.

23

Eliade,

Shamanism:Archaic

Techniques f

Ecstasy,

rans. Willard R.

Trask

(New

York:

Pan-

theon,

1958),

pp.

xvi-xix,

esp.

p.

xix.

24

Seymour

Cain,

MirceaEliade:

Attitudes toward

History,

Religious

Studies

Review6

(Janu-

ary 1980):

14,

15.

553







The

Journal

of

Religion

chological,

causal,

etc.)

explanation.

One

may explain

the

origin

of the

dif-

fusion of a

particular

religious

manifestation in terms

of various

historical,

cultural,

and

temporal conditionings,

but Eliade

continually

maintains

that the task of the

phenomenologist

is not

completed

by

his or her

histori-

cal research: one must still

interpret

the

meaning

of

the

data. So at

some

point

the historian

of

religion

must

become a

phenomenologist

of

reli-

gion,

because

he tries to find

meaning.

Without

hermeneutics,

the

history

of

religion isjust

another

history-bare

facts,

special

classifications,

and

so

on. 25

At the

minimum,

Eliade is

making

a claim

common

to

phenomenology:

giving

a historical

(causal,

psychological,

etc.)

explanation

does not

exhaust the meaning of one's data. Phenomenology, it is often stated, is

concerned

not with

giving explanations

but

with

finding

meanings.

In

this

sense,

interpreting

meaning

is

not

tantamount to

uncovering

histori-

cal

conditions.

But Eliade

intends

something

far more

controversial

than this in his

move

beyond

historical

explanation.

He is

making

definite

nonhistorical

ontological

claims

about human

nature,

the human

mode of

being

in

the

world,

and the

human

condition as such.26

Eliade

submits,

for

example,

that as

an

experience, ecstasy

is a

nonhistorical

phenomenon;

it

is

a

primordial

phenomenon

in

the sense

that it

is

coextensive

with human

nature.

Only

the

religious

interpretation

given

to

ecstasy

and

the

techniques

designed

to

prepare

it or

facilitate it

are

historical

data.

He often

writes of

the

nonhistorical

portion

of

every

human

being

and

of how

primordial

phenomena

exhibit

dimensions

that

are

metacultural and

transhistorical.

Thus a

primordial

phenome-

non

revealing

an essential

structure of

celestial ascent

belongs

to man as

such,

not to man as

a

historical

being;

witness

the

dreams,

hallucinations,

and images of ascent found everywhere in the world, apart from any his-

torical or

other

'conditions. '27

Particular

historical and

cultural

conditionings

cannot

account for

these

primordial

existential

experiences,

for

these

primordial

phenomena

that

are

constitutive of

the human

condition as

such. The

historian

of

reli-

gion

must

consider the

particular

historical

conditions,

but

not all

reli-

gious

experiences

are

historically

determined.

Sometimes

human

beings

25

Eliade, The Sacred in the Secular World, Cultural Hermeneutics1 (1973): 101, 103,

106-7.

26

In

many

sections of

Structureand

Creativity

n

Religion

(n.

3

above)

and Mircea

Eliade et

le

phenomene

eligieux,

I

provide

numerous

illustrations of

this. Here

there is

space

for

only

a

few

examples.

27

Eliade,

Recent

Works on

Shamanism:A

Review

Article,

History

of

Religions

1

(1962):

154,

Shamanism,

p.

xiv.

See

the foreword

to

Images

and

Symbols

n.

18

above),

Myths,

Dreams

and

Mys-

teries,

p.

106,

Rites and

Symbolsof

Initiation,

trans. Willard R.

Trask

(New

York:

Harper

Torchbooks,

1965),

pp.

130-31,

The

Quest

for

the

'Origins'

of

Religion

(n.

4

above),

p.

169.

554







Eliade and

History

transcend

their

specific

historical context and have certain

nonhistorical

primordial

experiences simply by

virtue of their

human

mode

of

existence.

It

seems

clear that

Eliade,

in

moving

beyond

the

historical,

is

often

asserting

something

more

than

the noncontroversial claim

that

homo

religiosus

experiences

religious phenomena

as

revealing

transhistorical

meanings,

and

something

more than the claim that

interpreting meaning

is

not the same

as

giving

a historical

explanation. By

means of

the basic

nontemporal

and nonhistorical

religious

structures,

Eliade is

making sig-

nificant

ontological

claims

about

the true human mode of

being

in

the

world and the human condition as such.

Eliade's

Personal

Attitudes

Eliade's

personal

attitudes toward

history

and

historical time are often

expressed

not

only

in

those works

in

which he

goes

beyond

the evaluations

of homo

religiosus,

makes

various

ontological

moves,

and formulates

gen-

eral

normative

judgments

but

also,

and most

clearly,

in

journal

entries.

For

example,

he

writes:

My

essential

preoccupation

is

precisely

the

means of

escaping History,

of

saving myself through symbol, myth, rites,

archetypes. 28

Entries

in

Memoire

I,

1907-1937,

Fragments

d'un

journal,

1945-1969,

and

Fragments

d'un

journal

II,

1970-1978

clearly

reveal

that

just

as

Mircea Eliade identifies with

certain Indian

religious

traditions,

he

feels

a

close

personal

relationship

with Romanian

peasant

cosmic

Christianity. 29

He

expresses

his

alienation

from the

spirit

of

Western his-

torical

Christianity.

What

most interests

him

are those Western

manifesta-

tions outside the mainstream

of

the

Western historical

religions:

mysticism, alchemy, cosmic religion of East European peasants, and so

on.

In

short,

those

manifestations that

have

devalued or

totally ignored

the historical dimension

of

the so-called historical

religions.

In

general,

Eliade is

very

critical

of

a

Judeo-Christian

tradition that

attacked cosmic

religiosity

and

emptied

nature

of the

sacred. He sees the roots of

many

of

our

contemporary

crises

in

terms of such

a

historical

development

and

often

expresses

a

hope

that

Christianity

and the

modern West can renew

themselves

by regaining

this

cosmic dimension of

reality.

One

could easily show the extent to which Eliade's personal attitude has

28

Eliade,

Fragmente

de

Journal,

Caetede Dor 8

(1954):

27.

This and

other

personal

state-

ments

by

Eliade are

quoted

by Virgil

Ierunca,

The

Literary

Work of Mircea

Eliade,

in

Myths

and

Symbols:

tudies n Honor

ofMircea

Eliade,

ed.

Joseph

M.

Kitagawa

and Charles H.

Long

(Chi-

cago:

University

of

Chicago Press, 1969), pp.

343-63.

9

English

editions of

Eliade's

journals

are

Autobiography,

ol.

1

1907-1937

(n.

I

above),

and

No Souvenirs:

ournal,

1957-1969

(New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1977).

555







The

Journal

of

Religion

influenced

his

generally unsympathetic

formulations

of

nonreligious

his-

torical

approaches,

which,

as Ricketts

correctly

describes,

he

tends

to

lump together, ignoring

their differences and

vaguely

labels as

positiv-

ism, historicism,

existentialism,

and materialism. 30 The

reader

cannot

fail

to notice

the

contrast between Eliade's

sensitive and

generous

attitude

toward

archaic

religious

phenomena,

to the

extent of

interpreting pro-

found

spiritual meanings

even when

they

are

not understood

by

homo

religiosus,

and the

many oversimplified

and

unsympathetic

formulations

attributed to

nonreligious positions.31

There is

certainly

room

for

debate

concerning

the extent to

which

Mircea

Eliade's

personal

attitudes,

reflecting

his

antihistorical

and

nonhistorical views, influence his interpretations. There can be no doubt

that

A

History

of

Religious

Ideas is

often

a

very personal

historical

study

with

the

selectivity

of

religious

documents,

the

integration

and

interpreta-

tion

of

diverse

data,

the structural

comparisons

and bold

syntheses

reflect-

ing many

of Eliade's

personal

nonhistorical

assumptions,

sympathies,

and

evaluations.32

For

example, although

seven

of the nine

chapters

of

the third

volume,

From Muhammad

to

the

Age

of

Reforms,

are

on the

historical

religions

of

Judaism, especially Christianity,

and

Islam,

Eliade's

presentation

of their

historical nature

and

historical

theologies

is

rather minimal

and his

inter-

pretations

are

far

from

original.33

One feels

that with such

dominant,

Western,

historical

religious phenomena,

Eliade is

not

especially

at

home.34

To Saint

Thomas

Aquinas,

for

example,

is

devoted

less than

two

30

Ricketts,

In

Defense of Eliade

(n.

5

above),

p.

28.

One can

understand

Eliade's

strong

reaction

against

such

nonreligious

historical

approaches,

which he

views as

narrow-minded and

intolerant toward

religious

phenomena

and which he

describes

as

inhuman or

antihuman,

inane, neurotic,

and

leading humanity

to

mass suicide or

obliteration.

31

For

example,

to take one of

Eliade's

formulations,

he

is

correct

in

that there have

been vul-

gar

or

mechanistic

materialists

who

have

attempted

to

explain

the total

meaning

and

signifi-

cance of

Madame

Bovary

and

other

literary

creations in terms

of the

specific

historical and

economic

conditionings

of

the

author;

just

as there

have been

religious persons

who

have

explained

the

meaning

and

significance

of

their

myths

and

rituals-not to

mention

their

for-

mulations of

nonreligious phenomena-in

crude mechanical

terms. But

certainly

one

could cite

sensitive and

sophisticated

materialists,

even

historical

materialists,

who

attempt

to inter-

pret

meaning

and know

that this consists of

more

than

simply

uncovering

economic

conditionings.

32

Eliade,

A

History

of

Religious deas,

3 vols.: vol.

1,

From he

Stone

Age

to

theEleusinian

Mysteries,

trans.

Willard

R.

Trask

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1979),

vol.

2

(n.

1

above),

and vol.

3 (n. 1 above).

33

As

Eliade

writes

in his

preface

toA

History

of

Religious

deas,

vol.

3,

I

have

concentrated less

on

the

familiar creations of

Occidental

thought

(e.g.,

Scholasticism,

Reformation)

than on cer-

tain

phenomena

which

have

largely

passed

into silence or

been

minimized

in

the

manuals:

hetero-

doxies,

heresies,

mythologies,

and

popular practices

such as

sorcery, alchemy,

and

esotericism

(3:xi).

34

In

Ordeal

by

Labyrinth

n.

1

above),

after

telling

us that

certain

primordial

revelations can

never

disappear

and

that we still

assume that

(primordial)

human

condition here-here in

this

556







Eliade and

History

pages;

the

popular

Eastern

European

ritual

songs

of Christmas

and

cathartic

dances

(both

revealing

pre-Christian,

largely

nonhistorical

or

antihistorical, survivals ), by

contrast,

are

presented

in

considerable

detail and

with brilliant

insights.

In

discussing

Marsilio

Ficino,

Pico della

Mirandola,

Giordano

Bruno,

and

Hermeticism,

Eliade writes of the

profound

dissatisfaction left

by

scholasticism

and the

medieval

conceptions

of

man and

the

universe. It

was

a reaction

against

what

one could call

a

'provincial' Christianity,

that

is,

one

that

was

purely

western,

as well as an

aspiration

to a

universal,

transhistorical,

and

'primordial'

religion. 35

Mircea

Eliade

might

have

been

describing

himself.

Matei Calinescu quotes a most revealing passage from the second vol-

ume

of A

History of

Religious

Ideas

in

which Eliade

presents

the

orientation

of

the

Bhagavad

Gita

toward

history:

By

the fact

that it

puts

the

emphasis

on

the

historicity

of

man,

the solution that

the

Gita offers is

certainly

the

most

comprehensive

one

and,

it

is

important

to

add,

the

one

best

suited to modern

India,

already

ntegrated

into the circuit

of

history.

For,

translated nto terms

familiar

to

Westerners,

the

problem

faced in

the Gita

is as follows:

how is

it

possible

to

resolve the

paradoxical

situation

cre-

atedbythe twofold fact thatman,on the one hand,finds himselfexistingin time,

condemnedo

history,

nd,

on the other

hand,

knows

that

he will be

damned

f

he

allows

himself

to

be

exhausted

by temporality

and

by

his

own

historicity

and

that,

consequently,

he

must

at

all

costs

find in

the

world a

way

that

leads

into

a

transhistorical

and

atemporal plane?36

This

complex, dynamic

orientation

of

the Gita

toward

history recog-

nizes one's

specific,

conditioned,

historical situation with its

correspond-

ing

historical

obligations

but views

one's

historical situation

in

terms of

ultimate transhistorical

values;

yes,

we must act

historically,

but we should

adopt

an attitude of nonattachment to the results of our actions while

striving

to

realize the ultimate transhistorical and

atemporal

reality.

Mircea

Eliade,

I

would

submit,

finds such

an

approach

to

history person-

ally

attractive,

and this

personal

attitude

is

reflected

in

his

methodology

and his

history

of

religions.

cosmos,

whose

rhythms

and

cycles

are

ineluctably

given,

Eliade concludes

with

his

prediction

that what

I

am sure of is

that

any

future

forms of

religious

experience

will

be

quite

different

from

those

we

are familiar

with in

Christianity,

Judaism,

or

Islam,

all of which are

fossilized,

out-

moded,

drained

of

meaning (pp.

116-17).

35

Eliade,

A

Historyof

Religious

deas,

3:253.

Mircea Eliade wrote his

master's thesis

in

philoso-

phy

in

Italy

in

1928

on

Italian Renaissance

philosophy

from

Marsilio Ficino to Giordano Bruno.

6

Eliade,

A

History

of Religious

deas,

2:242-43.

See Matei

Calinescu,

Creation

as

Duty, Jour-

nal

of

Religion

65

(April

1985):

253.

557







The

Journal

of

Religion

Normative

Antihistorical

Judgments

What

Mircea Eliade wishes

to claim

is

that it

is more

authentically

human

to live one's life in terms of transcendent exemplary models, nontemporal

and

nonhistorical

structures,

than to

identify

oneself

fully

with the

tem-

poral

and historical dimension of

existence;

and

that

the

modern histori-

cal

person,

who

refuses

any religious

solution,

cannot solve

his

or

her

most

fundamental existential crises.37

In

many

of his

works,

Eliade is

extremely

critical of

various

approaches

to

which

he refers

by

such terms as

positivist,

historicist,

existentialist,

Marxist,

materialist,

and

reductionist.

In

most

contexts,

he

attacks their

interpretations

of

religious phenomena,

but

he

also

is

severely

critical

of

their

general

assumptions,

treatments

of

history,

and

judgments

about

the

human

mode

of

being

and the

nature of

reality.

One recalls

Eliade's

analysis

of

the sacred as a

permanent

structure

of

consciousness and as

expressing

a

structure

of

transcendence. One

also

recalls that the

study

of homo

religiosus

is the

study

of

the total

person.

Therefore,

Mircea

Eliade would evaluate

the

interpretations

of

exis-

tentialists,

historicists,

materialists,

and

others who

identify

what is

truly

human

with the

temporal

and

historical dimension of

existence as

denying an essential structure of consciousness of transcendence, as

denying

the total

person,

and

hence as

denying

what is

fully

and

authentically

human.

Without

developing

my

earlier

illustrations

of

ecstasy,

ascension,

or

other

primordial phenomena

or

citing

numerous other

normative claims

found

throughout

Eliade's

works,

I

shall

simply

focus on

several

judg-

ments

regarding

the

analysis

of

the terror

of

history

in

The

Myth of

the

Eternal Return.

Whatever

be

the truth

in

respect

to the freedom and

the

creative virtualities

of

historical

man,

it is

certain that none of

the

historicistic

philosophies

is able to defend him from

the terror of

history.

When

the modern

person

experiences

existential crises and

historical

tragedies,

the

terror of

history

must lead to nihilism

or

despair

if

the

person

completely

makes oneself

through

one's

historical situations.

The

man

who

has left

the horizon of

archetypes

and

repetition

can

no

longer

defend himself

against

that

terror

except through

the idea of

God.

Only

such a

freedom,

grounded

in

the

Judeo-Christian

category

of

faith

for

God

everything

is

possible -can

defend

the modern

Western

per-

37

Representative

of

many

formulations found

throughout

Eliade's

writings

is

the

following

assertion

from

The

Sacred

in

the Secular

World

(n.

25

above):

I

cannot limit his

[the

modern

person

who

claims

not to be

religious]

universe

to that

purely

self-conscious,

rationalistic

uni-

verse

which he

pretends

to

inhabit,

since

that universe is not human

(p.

104).

As Ricketts has

written

in

Mircea Eliade

and the

Death

of

God

(n.

7

above),

instead

of

choosing

historicism,

Eliade chooses

the

transhistorical or the

religious

mode of

being

as

the more

truly

human

(p.

43).

558







Eliade

and

History

son

from the terror

of

history.

Every

other modern

freedom

...

is

pow-

erless to

justify history. 38

What

concerns us

is not the

adequacy

of

Eliade's

particular interpreta-

tion

but,

rather,

the

fact that Mircea Eliade is

no

longer defining

his anal-

ysis

simply

in

terms

of

the

perspective

of

homo

religiosus.

He seems to

have

moved to

a

level

of

generality beyond

such

perspectival

limitations.

In

other

words,

Eliade is

not

claiming

the

following:

from a

religious per-

spective,

no historicistic

solution

can defend us from the terror of his-

tory ;

but

from

some

nonreligious perspective,

there

may

be a

solution

that

can

justify history

and

overcome nihilism and

despair.

He

is

mak-

ing general

judgments

about

the human mode

of

being

in the world

and

the human condition as such; and, on the basis of such judgments, he is

claiming

that the historicistic

philosophies

of

Hegel,

Marx,

Dilthey,

and others

cannot defend the

modern Western human

being

from the

terror

of

history.

Now

such

a

procedure

clearly

involves an

ontological

stance. It would

appear

from

these

and numerous other

illustrations that Eliade assumes

that

the structures

of

religious

experience,

as seen

in

the refusal

to

iden-

tify

oneself with the historical

dimension

of

existence,

reveal

fundamental

structures

of

the

human

mode

of

being generally. According

to

Eliade,

such

a level of

ontological analysis

reveals that

only

by

experiencing

the

essential, nonhistorical,

symbolic

structures

of

the sacred can modern

Western

persons

overcome their terror

of

history

and their

existential

anxiety

and live a

truly

meaningful

and authentic human existence.

THE HISTORICAL-NONHISTORICAL

INTERACTION

In

several

of his

works,

Mircea

Eliade

accepts

the

historical-phenom-

enological tension, so clearly formulated by Raffaele Pettazzoni, as

defining

the

history

of

religions

(Religionswissenschaft).39

The tension

between historical

and

phenomenological approaches

is both

necessary

and

creative.

Although

Eliade affirms that one must do

justice

to both the

historical

particular

and

the universal

structure,

there can be little doubt

that

his

approach

emphasizes

the nonhistorical

universal

structure rather

38

Eliade,

The

Myth

of

theEternal

Return

n.

17

above),

pp.

141, 150,

159-62.

Compare

Eliade's

similar level of analysis in Religious Symbolism and the Modern Man's Anxiety, in Myths,

Dreamsand

Mysteries

n.

21

above),

pp.

231-45. See

Eliade's comments on the terror

of

history,

in

Ordeal

by

Labyrinth,

pp.

126-28.

39

See,

e.g.,

Eliade,

History

of

Religions

and a New Humanism

(n.

19

above),

pp.

7-8,

His-

torical Events and

Structural

Meaning

in

Tension,

Criterion6

(1967):

29-31,

Methodological

Remarks on

the

Study

of

Religious Symbolism

(n.

17

above),

p.

88. See Raffaele

Pettazzoni,

The

Supreme Being:

Phenomenological

Structure and Historical

Development,

in

Eliade and

Kitagawa,

eds.

(n.

17

above),

pp.

59-66,

and

History

and

Phenomenology

in

the Science of Reli-

gion,

in

his

Essays

on the

Historyof Religions,

rans.

H.J.

Rose

(Leiden:

Brill,

1954),

pp.

215-19.

559







The

Journal

of

Religion

than the

concrete historical

particular

and

that he conceives

of his

primary

task as the

interpretation

of

transhistorical

religious meanings.

Eliade

certainly emphasizes

the

universal

permanent

structure of

the

dialectic of the sacred

by

means of which he

is able to

distinguish

religious

phenomena;

but it

is

impossible

to

grasp

fully

this dialectic of

hierophanies

in

all

of

its

complexity

without

taking

into account

the

historical

particular

nature

of one's

data.40

We

previously

observed the

paradoxical

coexistence revealed

by

the

dialectic

of

the sacred: some

ordinary

historical

thing,

while

remaining

a

natural

thing,

can

at

the same time

manifest

something

that

is

not histori-

cal or

natural;

something

transcendent

and

transhistorical limits itself

by

manifesting itself in some relative, finite, historical thing. This paradoxi-

cal

coexistence of the sacred and

the

profane

is not a static

relation;

it

expresses

itself as

a

dialectical tension and

movement.

The

dialectic of

the

sacred

reveals the

dynamic

tension

and

movement

of two

contrary

but

interacting

processes.

On

the one

hand,

there

is

the

movement from the

sacred

(essential

nonhistorical

structure,

atemporal

model,

etc.)

to the

particular,

historical,

conditioned

manifestation. The

sacred

is

not

expressed

in

some unmediated

perfect

form. In

every

hierophany,

the sacred

undergoes

this

process

of

radical

conditioning.

The sacred is

fragmented

and

particularized;

it is

embodied

in

new

objects

and takes

new forms.

If

this

incarnational movement

totally

dominates its

dialectical corre-

late,

the

sacred structure

may collapse,

the

transhistorical

may

be over-

whelmed

by

the historical

object,

and one

may

lose all

awareness of

the

sacred

or

transcendent

meaning.

Eliade seems

to evaluate

those

hierophanies

that

are most

conditioned,

limited,

and

relativized as

lower or

less

spiritual

phenomena.

On the other hand, the movement from the sacred to an incarnate

form-that

is,

the

movement from an

archetype

to a

particular

manifes-

tation-is

a

movement that

has its dialectical

correlate

in

the

tendency

of

the

incarnate

form,

the new

object,

to realize

its

archetypal,

universal

meaning. 41

Eliade

formulates this

reverse

incarnational

movement

in

many

passages.

When once

it

is

'realized'-'historicised'-the

religious

form

tends to

disengage

itself from

its

conditions

in

time and

space

and to

become

universal,

to return

to the

archetype. 42

There

is

no

religious

form

that does

not

try

to

get

as

close as possible to its true archetype, in

other

words,

to rid

itself of

'historical'

accretions and

deposits.

Every

god-

40

For

a

comprehensive

analysis

of

the universal

structure of the

dialectic,

see

chap.

3,

La

dialectique

du

sacre,

n

Allen,

MirceaEliade

et

le

phenomene eligieux

n.

2

above),

pp.

93-109.

41

Dudley

(n.

5

above),

p.

54.

42

Eliade,

Images

and

Symbols

n.

18

above),

p.

121.

560







Eliade and

History

dess

tends

to become a Great

Goddess,

taking

to herself all the

attributes

and functions that

belong

to the

archetypal

Great

Goddess. 43

If

this second

dialectical

movement

totally

dominates

its

dialectical

correlate,

the transhistorical sacred structure

or

exemplary

form

may

become

disengaged

or freed from the

particular

historical and existential

situation

within

which

it

was

incarnated.

If

the sacred becomes

so

dis-

tant,

so

transcendent,

that

it no

longer

is

experienced

as

historically

imminent,

then the

hierophany

will cease to be

experienced

as relevant to

the

specific

existential crises

of

religious persons.

An

excellent illustration

of this

incarnational tension and

movement,

clearly

revealing

the

essential historical-nonhistorical

relation,

is

seen

in

Eliade's studies of the oral literature and folklore of archaic and other tra-

ditional societies. Eliade

formulates the dialectical

process

of

these

collec-

tive creations as

moving

in

two

contrary

directions: on the one

hand,

there

is the

localization,

ethnicization,

historicization,

and

degradation

of the

nonhistorical, universal,

mythical

structures

into more

special

historical

and

personal

events;

on

the

other

hand,

there

is

the

remythization

or

assimilation

of

the historical

individuals and events into their

transhistorical

exemplary

forms or

universal models.44

From the above analysis it should be evident that without a recognition

of the

historical dimension

of the

data,

there

would be

no

appreciation

of

the

contrary

historicizing

movement;

there would be no

understanding

of

the

structurally necessary

dialectical

tension

existing

between

the con-

trary

but

interacting

dialectical

movements.

In

short,

without the

dynamic

historical-nonhistorical

interaction,

there would

be

no

process

of

sacralization as

the universal

structure

of

religious experience.

One

could

easily

demonstrate the

impossibility

of

comprehending

other

structures

of

the

dialectic of the

sacred without

emphasizing

the

historical-nonhistorical relation. For

example,

without

developing

Eliade's

analysis,

we

may

simply

cite his

frequent

assertion

that

in

mani-

festing

itself,

the

sacred

conceals

and

camouflages

itself.45 Eliade

writes:

43

Eliade,

Patterns in

Comparative

Religion

(n.

17

above),

p.

462.

This

second

dialectical

movement

is

crucial for

Eliade's

methodology.

It is this

same

tendency

towards the

archetype,

towards the

restoration of the

perfect

form ...

that

makes

the

history

of

religions possible

(Eliade,

Images

and

Symbols,

p.

121).

See

Eliade,

Shamanism

(n.

23

above),

p.

xvii.

These

nonhistorical essential structures

or

perfect

forms are

at the foundation of

Eliade's

phenomenological method.

44

See

Eliade,

Les livres

populaires

dans

la

litterature

roumaine,

Zalmoxis

2

(1939):

63-78,

Litterature

orale,

in Histoire

des

Litteratures,

vol.

1,

Litteratures

anciennes

orientaleset

orales,

Encyclopedie

de la

Pleiade,

ed. R.

Queneau (Paris:

Gallimard,

1956),

1:3-26. See

Allen

and

Doeing

(n.

1

above),

sec. B.

Compare

Eliade,

Zalmoxis:The

Vanishing

God:

Comparative

tudies n

the

Religions

and

Folklore

ofDacia

and Eastern

Europe,

rans.

Willard

R.

Trask

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1972),

Fragments

d'un

journal,

1945-69,

trans.

L. Badesco

(Paris:

Gallimard,

1973),

pp.

323-24

and

passim.

45

This structure

of

concealment

and

camouflage

is

most

evident

in

Eliade'sjournals

and

lit-

561







The

Journal

of

Religion

Lorsque

quelque

chose de 'sacre' se manifeste

(hierophanie),

en

meme

temps quelque

chose

's'occulte,'

devient

cryptique.

La est la

vraie

dialectique

du sacre:

par

le seul fait de se

montrer,

le sacre

se

cache.

He

asserts that his

scholarly

and

literary

works

lead to the same

problem:

the

unrecognizability

of

the transcendent or transhistorical sacred

that cam-

ouflages

itself in

history. 46

Therefore,

without

a careful

analysis

of

the

historical and the historical-nonhistorical

relation,

one would

not be

able

to

identify

the

religious phenomenon,

much less

interpret

its transhis-

torical

meaning.

Even

with

regard

to the

nonhistorical, universal,

symbolic

structures,

which

enjoy

such

a

privileged ontological

status

in

Eliade's

phenome-

nology of religion, one could show the impossibility of fully understand-

ing

Eliade's

interpretation

of

religious

symbolism

without

taking

seriously

the historical dimension of

existence.

Nontemporal

and

nonhistorical reli-

gious

structures do not

by

themselves constitute

religious

experience.

Actual

religious

experience

consists of

just

what

religious

persons

do

with these

symbolic

structures. These universal

structures function

as

an

inexhaustible

source of

religious

meaning

and offer

virtually

infinite

possi-

bilities for

actualization. Actual

revalorization

of

a

religious

symbolism

is

the particular way religious persons relate to the symbolism in structuring

and

making

sense of

their world.

And

just

what

religious

persons

do with

these nonhistorical

structures must

be seen

in

terms of

their

concrete,

spe-

cific,

historical

situations.

What transhistorical

structures we

become

aware

of,

how we

respond

to

our

discovery,

what

meaning

they

have

for

us,

how we

use them to

structure our

world,

and so

on,

depend

largely

on

our

historical,

cultural,

and other

particular

conditions. Once

again,

for

Mircea

Eliade,

actual

religious

experience

and

creativity always

entail the

dynamic

interaction

between

the historical

particular

and

the

nonhis-

torical universal structure.

Even with

regard

to

archaic

religion,

in

which homo

religiosus

strives

to

abolish

profane

time

and

history,

Eliade

offers

many

interpretations

of dif-

ferent senses

in

which

these

antihistorical societies

are

indeed

histori-

cal.

In

Australian

Religions:

An

Introduction and

other

works,

he

stresses

that archaic

persons

do

live

in

history,

are

influenced

by

the

historical,

and

are

indeed

historical

beings.

He

sometimes shows

that

it

is

precisely

the

erary

works

and in

several

studies of

myth,

such

as

Survivals and

Camouflages

of

Myths,

Diogenes

41

(1963):

1-25

(reprinted

as

chap.

9 in

Myth

and

Reality,

rans.

Willard R.

Trask

[New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1963]).

Those

interpreters

most aware of

this

structure have

been

Calinescu,

Ierunca,

and other

Romanians

familiar with

Eliade's

literary

works. See

Matei

Calinescu,

Imagination

et sens:

Attitudes

'esthetiques, '

in

Mircea

Eliade,

Cahiers de

l'Herne,

no.

33,

ed.

Constantin

Tacou

(Paris:

L'Herne,

1978),

pp.

364-74

(which

first

appeared

inJournal

of

Religion

57

[1977]: 1-15).

46

Eliade,

Fragments

d'un

journal,

pp.

263, 427, 506,

and

passim.

562







Eliade and

History

appeal

to some

transhistorical sacred

history

that enables the

archaic

society

to

live

historically

and even to make

history.47

CONCLUDING

OBSERVATIONS:

IS ELIADE

ANTIHISTORICAL;

Histoire des

croyances

et des idees

religieuses

represents

one

of

Eliade's

most

ambitious

scholarly

projects.

As one notes in his conversations

with

Rocquet

(Ordeal

byLabyrinth),

his

memoirs,

and other

writings,

Eliade has

repeatedly

been

willing

to take

risks,

whether

in

terms of his own

personal

life

(such

as

his

youthful

initiations into new

worlds of

experience

in

India)

or

his

focus on

controversial

subject

matter

(tantrism,

shamanism,

alchemy, cosmic religiosity of peasant life, etc.). How many contemporary

scholars

would

dare

to

attempt

a

historical

work

of such

monumental

scope,

necessitating

a

herculean

synthesis

of

data

from the

entire

history

of

humanity,

from

the

earliest

prehistory

to the

present?48

Many

of

the attacks

charging

that Eliade was

antihistorical,

especially

the criticisms

by

anthropologists,

were

initially

in

response

to

Traite

d'histoire des

religions

(translated

as

Patterns in

Comparative

Religion),

the

work

that

probably

established

Eliade's

international

reputation

as a

histo-

rian of

religions.

Critics noted

that this

synchronic, morphological study

was not

historical;

religious

structures were

detached from their

historical

and cultural

contexts.

In

Traite Eliade

wrote of

a

forthcoming,

more

historical

companion

volume,

and over

the next

thirty years,

he

occasionally

referred

to

this

historical

companion,

even

describing

it

as

the

culmination

of

his

career

and as his

opus

magnum.

Will

the

three volumes of

A

History of

Religious

Ideas

satisfy

Eliade's critics?

What

this

history

adds

to

previous

structural

and

morphological

stud-

ies is a greater emphasis on historical change and development, on the

inexhaustible

newness of

religious

expressions

and the

irreducible

differ-

ences in

religious

forms;

there is a

greater

sense

of

structures

in

process,

as

47

See,

e.g.,

Eliade,

The

Dragon

and the

Shaman:

Notes on

a South

American

Mythology,

in

Man and

His

Salvation:Studies n

Memory

f

S.

G.

F.

Brandon,

ed. E.

J.

Sharpe

andJ.

R.

Hinnells

(Manchester:

Manchester

University

Press,

1973),

pp.

99-105.

Illustrations of

how

archaic,

largely

nonhistorical,

rural

European

peasants

have

made

history

and

how

historians

have

gen-

erally

overlooked their

historical

contributions

are

formulated

in

Eliade's

History

of

Religions

and 'Popular' Cultures, Historyof Religions20 (1980): 1-26.

48

Eliade's

project

was to

write

a

three-volume A

History

of

Religious

deas from

the

Stone

Age

...

to

contemporary

atheistic

theologies.

Because of

reasons of

Eliade's

health,

the

third

volume

was

delayed

and

finally

abbreviated to include

religious phenomena

between the

fourth and sev-

enteenth

centuries. An

uncompleted

fourth volume

was to have

included

not

only

religious

developments

from

the seventeenth

century

to the

present,

culminating

with

the

religious

crea-

tivity

of

modern

(largely

secular)

societies,

but also Eliade's

presentation

of

the archaic

and

tradi-

tional

religions

of

America, Africa,

and

Oceania,

as well

as

chapters

on

the

expansion

of

Hinduism,

medieval

China,

and

Japanese

religions.

563







The

Journal

of

Religion

part

of

an

everchanging dynamic,

creative,

spiritual history.

Although

Eliade reveals

a

greater

sense of historical differences

and

historical

change,

he

certainly

remains

the

generalist, comparativist,

and

synthe-

sizer,

emphasizing

similarities,

general

structures and

patterns,

and

his

belief in

the

fundamental

unity

of

history

and

of

the

human

mind

and

spirit. 49

What must be

emphasized

is

that

in

this

historical

study,

Eliade has

not

renounced his

previous

nonhistorical

assumptions

and

principles.

Indeed,

Eliade could not

have

written such a

history

of

religions

without his

nonhistorical

assumptions

and

principles,

allowing

for his

hermeneutical

framework of the

dialectic of

the sacred and structural

systems

of

symbols

and myths. In short, this historical study of existential crises and religious

creativity

is

guided by

Eliade's

morphological

analysis

of

essential

nonhistorical

religious

structures.

Therefore,

most

of

those

cultural

historians,

anthropologists,

and

other scholars who

have

severely

criticized

Eliade

for his antihis-

torical

approach,

for his

sweeping generalizations

and

lack of

sensitiv-

ity

to

specific

historicocultural

dimensions of the

data,

will

probably

not

be

satisfied with this

history.

In

terms of

the

methodological

orienta-

tions of

most of Eliade's

critics,

this

three-volume

study

will

be

viewed

as

a

pseudohistory.

As we have

seen,

Eliade's

approach

does

indeed have

an

antihistorical

normative basis.

Not

only

is he

primarily

concerned with

interpreting

transhistorical

religious

meaning,

but

there is also

something

essentially

nonhistorical

about his

hermeneutics: the

methodological

primacy

of

nonhistorical and

nontemporal

universal

structures,

as

seen

in

the

perma-

nent

transhistorical

structure of

the dialectic of

the

sacred

and

in

the

sys-

tems of

essential

symbolic

structures

at the

foundation

of

his

interpreta-

tions; the ontological moves beyond the historical involving all sorts of

antihistorical

normative

judgments,

and

so

forth.

What

must be

emphasized

is

that the

issue of

whether

Eliade

is

antihistorical raises

many

varied

questions,

most

of which

are

not

resolved

by

the

simple

identification

of,

or

attack

on,

his

position

as

antihistorical.

Such

interpretations

usually

fail to

grasp

the

seriousness with which

Eliade

regards

the

particular

historical

document and

the

complexity

of

his

phenomenological

method and

hermeneutical

project.

Indeed,

as we

have

seen,

one

cannot

understand

Eliade's

approach

without

appreciating

the

essential

interaction of

the

historical

and

nonhistorical.

To establish

that

Mircea

Eliade

interprets

the

ontology

of

homo

49

Eliade,

Ordeal

by Labyrinth

n.

1

above),

p.

137. See

Adriana

Berger,

Cultural

Hermen-

eutics:

The

Concept

of

Imagination

in

the

Phenomenological Approaches

of

Henry

Corbin and

Mircea

Eliade,

Journal

of

Religion

66

(April

1986):

141-56.

564







Eliade and

History

religiosus

to be

antihistorical,

or

even to establish

that

Eliade's

normative

position

tends

to

be

antihistorical,

does not

necessarily

mean

that his

phenomenological

method

is

entirely

antihistorical.

As we

have

seen,

his

phenomenological

approach

and hermeneutics are

dependent

on

grant-

ing

considerable

importance

to the historical dimension

of

the

religious

data.

Any interpretation

of

religious meaning

that

does

not

comprehend

the

particular

historical context of the sacred

manifestation

is

doomed to

failure.

Interpreters

who have

simply

classified,

and

usually

dismissed,

Eliade's

approach

as

antihistorical have not taken

seriously

enough

his

hermeneutical

struggle

over

the

historical

particular,

his fascination

not only with nonhistorical universal structures but also with histori-

cal

variations,

and

the

complexity

of his

phenomenological

method.

None

of which is

meant

to

deny

that

compared

with

most

other

schol-

ars

in

the

history

of

religions,

Mircea Eliade does

indeed

emphasize

the nonhistorical.

565

Documents

Eliade and History