EMC for European · PDF fileEMC for European Railways Study to collect and document rules, ... (EMC) of railway vehicles in Member States of the European Rail Area for European Railway

Reference: 67575_ERA_EMC_Final_Report Issue: 05

EMC for European Railways Study to collect and document rules, processes and procedures to verify the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) of railway vehicles in Member States of the European Rail Area

for European Railway Agency

November 2010

EMC for European Railways

Document History and Authorisation

Issue Date Changes

01 May 2010 Initial Report

02 June 2010 Updates from ERA comments to include reference numerical data

03 September 2010 Updates from Country feedback and additional data from recent changes to

operations within member states

04 October 2010 Updates from Country feedback and additional data from recent changes to

operations within member states

05 November 2010 Updates with final comments from ERA

Compiled by: John Molyneux

Signed: Esig: 10/JMO/017 ............................ Date:5th November 2010............

Verified by: David Jamieson

Signed: Esig: 10/DJA/022 ...................... Date: 5th November 2010...........

Approved by: Phil Bebbington

Signed: ESig: 10/PBB/044................ Date: 5th November 2010...........

Distribution List

Name Organisation From (Issue)

To (Issue)

Peter Mihm ERA 01 Current

Benoit Debusschere ERA 01 Current

This document was prepared for European Railway Agency. The information herein is confidential and shall not be divulged to a third party without the prior permission of Peter Mihm.

Lloyd’s Register Rail, its affiliates and subsidiaries and their respective officers, employees or agents are, individually and collectively, referred to in this clause as the ‘Lloyd’s Register Group’. The Lloyd’s Register Group assumes no responsibility and shall not be liable to any person for any loss, damage or expense caused by reliance on the information or advice in this document or howsoever provided, unless that person has signed a contract with the relevant Lloyd’s Register Group entity for the provision of this information or advice and in that case any responsibility or liability is exclusively on the terms and conditions set out in that contract.

© European Railway Agency 2010

Page 1



Contents

1 Introduction........................................................................................................ 4 1.1 Scope of the Study ..............................................................................................4 1.2 Electromagnetic Compatibility ..............................................................................5 1.3 Status .................................................................................................................6

2 Project ............................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Preparatory Stage ................................................................................................7 2.2 Interim Stage.......................................................................................................8 2.3 Final stage.........................................................................................................10

3 Common Standards for Electromagnetic Compatibility in Member States.................... 11

4 Scope of the EMC Systems in the European Railway Area......................................... 12 4.1 Internal Electromagnetic Compatibility ................................................................12 4.2 Corrosion..........................................................................................................12 4.3 Touch Potential..................................................................................................12 4.4 Electromechanical Systems .................................................................................12 4.5 Train Position/Orientation/Consist Sensors...........................................................13 4.6 Telematics .........................................................................................................13 4.7 Automatic Train Protection.................................................................................13 4.8 Train Radio Systems ...........................................................................................13

5 Country Specific Demonstrations of Electromagnetic Compatibility ............................ 14 5.1 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Austria............................14 5.2 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Belgium ..........................18 5.3 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Bulgaria ..........................24 5.4 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the Czech Republic..........25 5.5 The demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Denmark .........................29 5.6 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Estonia............................32 5.7 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Finland ...........................34 5.8 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in France ............................37 5.9 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Germany.........................40 5.10 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Greece............................46 5.11 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Hungary..........................48 5.12 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Ireland ............................52 5.13 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Italy ................................58 5.14 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Latvia..............................62 5.15 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Lithuania.........................65 5.16 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Luxembourg....................68 5.17 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the Netherlands...............71 5.18 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Norway...........................79 5.19 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Poland ............................82 5.20 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Portugal..........................86 5.21 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Romania .........................90 5.22 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the Slovak Republic .........91 5.23 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Slovenia ..........................91 5.24 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Spain ..............................91 5.25 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Sweden ..........................91

Page 2



5.26 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Switzerland.....................91 5.27 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the United Kingdom........91

6 Analysis............................................................................................................ 91 6.1 Overview...........................................................................................................91 6.2 Processes...........................................................................................................91 6.3 Train Detection..................................................................................................91 6.4 Lineside Systems................................................................................................91 6.5 Energy Supply....................................................................................................91 6.6 Radio Frequency Systems ...................................................................................91 6.7 Other Systems ...................................................................................................91

7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 91

8 References........................................................................................................ 91

Appendix A UIC Leaflets pertaining to Electromagnetic Interactions on the Railways within Europe.................................................................................................... 91

Appendix B Electromagnetic Interactions With Rolling Stock As The Primary Source...... 91

Table of Figures

Figure 1 - Austrian Interactions for Type EMC Approvals...............................................................14 Figure 2 – Traction Return Current Limits ...........................................................................................15 Figure 3 – Austrian Radio Frequency Usage.....................................................................................17 Figure 4 - Belgian EMC Approval Interactions for Part B................................................................19 Figure 5 - Susceptibilities for Belgian Train Detection .....................................................................20 Figure 6 - Audio Frequency Limits.......................................................................................................21 Figure 7 - Psophometric Limits.............................................................................................................22 Figure 8 - Czech Interactions for EMC Approvals ...........................................................................25 Figure 9 – Track Circuit Frequencies ..................................................................................................26 Figure 10 - Limits on the Traction Power Supply...............................................................................27 Figure 11 - Danish Interactions for EMC Approvals.........................................................................29 Figure 12 – Track Circuit Frequencies ................................................................................................30 Figure 13 – Harmonic Current Limits...................................................................................................31 Figure 14 - Estonian Interaction for EMC...........................................................................................32 Figure 15 - Finnish Interactions for EMC.............................................................................................34 Figure 16 – Track Circuit Current Limits ..............................................................................................35 Figure 17 – Permitted Inrush Current Limits .......................................................................................36 Figure 18 – Field Limits ...........................................................................................................................36 Figure 19 - French Interactions for EMC Approvals.........................................................................37 Figure 20 – Frequency / Interference Current Gabarits.................................................................38 Figure 21 - German interactions for EMC Approvals......................................................................41 Figure 22 - German Technical Documentation Changes.............................................................42 Figure 23 – Track Circuit Current Limits ..............................................................................................43 Figure 24 - Greek EMC Approval Interactions .................................................................................46 Figure 25 - Hungarian Interactions for EMC Approvals ..................................................................48 Figure 26 - Train detection systems for the Hungarian Railway....................................................50 Figure 27 - Interactions in Irish EMC Approvals ................................................................................53 Figure 28 - DC Track Circuit Evaluation.............................................................................................54

Page 3



Figure 29 - Track Circuit Parameters ..................................................................................................54 Figure 30 - CAWS Location ..................................................................................................................55 Figure 31 - Lineside Communications Systems.................................................................................56 Figure 32 – Organisational Process from Convocation Data .......................................................58 Figure 33 - ALSTOM Digicode Circuits................................................................................................59 Figure 34 – 50Hz and 83Hz on Italian Railway ..................................................................................60 Figure 35 - Permissible Probabilities ....................................................................................................60 Figure 36 - Interactions in Latvian EMC Approvals..........................................................................63 Figure 37 - Lithuanian Interactions in EMC Approval Process.......................................................66 Figure 38 - EMC Approval Interactions in Luxembourg .................................................................68 Figure 39 – Track Circuit Limits.............................................................................................................69 Figure 40 – Train Detection under 1500V DC: GRS 75Hz (50Hz to 100Hz, t > 0.2s) .....................73 Figure 41 – Applied Track Circuits in the Netherlands ....................................................................74 Figure 42 - Dutch Current Limits at Low Voltage.............................................................................76 Figure 43 - Dutch Regeneration Limits...............................................................................................76 Figure 44 - Norwegian Interactions for EMC Approvals.................................................................79 Figure 45 - Line Current Measurement Method ..............................................................................80 Figure 46 – Permissible Harmonic Voltages ......................................................................................81 Figure 47 - Polish Interactions for EMC Approvals ...........................................................................83 Figure 48 Table of Approved Bodies in Polish process. ..................................................................83 Figure 49 – Portuguese Acceptance Procedure............................................................................87 Figure 50 – Measurement Filter Characteristics...............................................................................88 Figure 51 - Romanian Interactions for EMC Approvals ..................................................................90 Figure 52 - Slovakian Interactions for EMC Approvals....................................................................91 Figure 53 - Spanish Interactions for EMC Approvals .......................................................................91 Figure 54 - Swedish Interactions for EMC Approvals.......................................................................91 Figure 55 - Swiss Access Process.........................................................................................................91 Figure 56 – Swiss Track Circuit Limits covered by document J78 .................................................91 Figure 57 - Input Impedance Requirements ....................................................................................91 Figure 58 - Frequency/Power Limits ...................................................................................................91 Figure 59 - Speed/Power/Frequency Curves...................................................................................91 Figure 60 - Approvals Interactions in the UK.....................................................................................91 Figure 61 – List of Infrastructure Manager Standards .....................................................................91 Figure 62 – Conducted Limits for UK Train Detection .....................................................................91 Figure 63 - EN Standards Quoted by Respondents as used in EMC Compatibility

Demonstration................................................................................................................................91 Figure 64 - Universal Train Detection Gabarit...................................................................................91 Figure 65 - Measurement Points for differing Infrastructures .........................................................91 Figure 66 – List of UIC Standards .........................................................................................................91 Figure 67 - Potential Interactions between Rolling Stock and other parts of the Railway......91

Page 4



1 Introduction

This study is required to examine the processes, procedures and methods of ensuring Electromagnetic Compatibility between rolling stock and infrastructure in the 27 members of the European Railway Area. The 27 include the 25 member states of the EU which have railway links to others; Cyprus and Malta, being islands, are excluded. Norway and Switzerland are also members as they have direct rail links with neighbouring EU states. The channel tunnel railway authority is included as it operates this link independent of either the British or French national authorities.

1.1 Scope of the Study

The European Railway Agency requires an overview of the different requirements, current regulations, practice and criteria applied by each one of the Member State Authorities of the European Rail Area to verify the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) of a railway vehicle to the network.

The study attempts to provide a picture of the current processes and procedures for granting the authorisation for putting into service of railway vehicles which are in place as of December 2009. Aspects of Electromagnetic compatibility necessarily change over time as new techniques/ standards are created and new equipment is introduced onto the railway. Where possible this information is included in the study. The aim is to use the information as input to TSI’s.

This document encompasses, where information has been made available to the study, the procedural methods used, the roles of participants in the process and technical evaluation criteria relevant to each aspect of compatibility. All aspects of the process are needed to give a clear understanding of how the relevant bodies in each member state are involved.

Information in this study comes from data that has been made available to the study by the member states or where such information is in the public domain. Some aspects of the information remain proprietary to the individual member states.

In general, the study assesses:

• The current rules, processes and procedures to be applied for the verification of the EMC of the railway vehicle to the network .This includes, if applicable, instances where approvals in one member state may reduce the effort needed to prove compatibility in another.

• The technical range of interactions: by reference to the processes/tests and technical criteria needed to establish compatibility with conducted, (e.g. traction return), induced (magnetic fields) and radiated (radio frequency) phenomena.

• The participants and their roles/degree of involvement in the process: legislative bodies, manufacturers, third parties, experts, infrastructure managers, owners and operators.

• The documentation delivered; its reporting methods and the technical standards used in the assessment.

• Whether acceptance criteria are to International, European or local standards.

• An estimation, where information is available, on costs and timescales of the process.

It is a requirement of the Interoperability Directive 2008/57/EC that EMC criteria be examined for their impact on safety and operation of the system. Interactions between equipment is also the subject of the EMC directive 2004/108/EC. In practice, this latter directive is often used in parallel with the Interoperability Directive to assess compatibility and hence it is logical to include reference to the EMC directive within this scope.

Page 5



This study focuses on the technical methodologies which underlie the requirement for compatibility demonstration contained in the second part. In particular, it focuses on the demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility of rolling stock with the requirements of the operating infrastructure.

.

1.2 Electromagnetic Compatibility

Directive 2008/57/EC on the interoperability of the railway system within the Community defines the railway as a series of subsystems:

• infrastructure

• control command and signalling

• energy

• rolling stock

• operation and traffic management

• maintenance

• telematics.

However, the national railway system in every country consists of two physical parts; the mobile part (rolling stock, telematics) and the static part (infrastructure, control command and signalling and energy).

The mobile part can be further sub-divided into two categories defined by its power source; electric or non-electric. The electrically powered mobile part must comply with all the physical requirements of the non-electric mobile part e.g. gauge, loadings, platform height etc. but must also be compatible with electrical systems. Unlike the physical aspects, the electrical aspects do not have an easily defined or constrained1 interface with the rest of the world and hence these are potentially more difficult to assess.

There are three potential modes of interaction between all electrical systems; these are conduction, induction2 and radiation. Although, in theory, all three modes take some (albeit negligible) part in every interaction most interactions are dominated by a single mechanism. However it would not be practical to define compatibility in terms of the pure interactions by asking general questions e.g. “How are induced effects considered in your safety management system?”. Rather the compatibility demonstration is specified between defined parts of the system e.g. between train return current and corrosion of bridge supports. This reduction to specific systems, subsystems and interactions makes a

1 Electric effects can leak into ground paths causing corrosion, magnetic fields can induce current into nearby non-railway

systems and electromagnetic radiation can cause interference to non-railway systems at a considerable distance; see “The particle

now leaving platform 4 … “ New Scientist 02 December 1995 which showed that the CERN facility was disturbed by TGV traffic

a kilometre away.

2 Capacitive: induced by time varying electric fields and Inductive: induced by time varying magnetic fields. Both couple energy in

the ‘near’ field.

Page 6



generic definition for cross acceptance extremely problematic even if limited, as in this case, to compatibility between rolling stock and infrastructure (or neighbouring systems). Indeed, during this study, it has been found that some nations consider some electromagnetic interactions irrelevant to rolling stock compatibility whereas others consider them important.

It is the aim of this study’s sponsors to try to explore any common consensus between the individual country requirements and the wider generic phenomena which cause similar interactions throughout the member states: Existing assessments may be narrowly defined or even specific to a single train or infrastructure component. In order to achieve this goal the first step is to assess what methods and interactions are considered significant in each member state.

1.3 Status

This document forms the final report for this EMC Study. It details the activities performed in the Preparatory and Interim Stages of the project. It collates and details the responses given by each member state of the European Railway Area to the questionnaire distributed to them during the interim stage of the project and indirect information from the internet, other sources and the responses from the delegates to the seminar meeting of 24th March 2010. From this information set, it examines the processes methods and standards reported in this questionnaire and highlights areas of difference and agreement which can be used as a basis of future discussion on achieving a commonly agreed standard TSI for the various categories of interaction.

Page 7



2 Project

This work was undertaken by Lloyds Register Rail on behalf of the Cross Acceptance Unit of the European Railway Agency. It consisted of three stages, a preparatory phase, a preliminary assessment of data gathered from the NSAs and a final follow up and assessment phase.

2.1 Preparatory Stage

The Preparatory stage of the project encompassed the spring of 2009. The project was initiated with a start-up meeting held between Lloyds Register and ERA representatives at Lloyds Register Rail premises in Preston UK on 11th February 2009 during which the background to the study, initial concepts and implementation was discussed.

First ideas were developed from reviews of relevant existing standards and prior work in this area e.g. “Railway applications - Interference limits of existing track circuits used on European railways” (PD CLC/TR 50507:2007) and Safety Regulations and Standards for European Railways (NERA 2000). This enabled the development of a set of questions which, if put to the member states, would create a knowledge base of the procedures, processes and standards used in EMC compliance demonstration across Europe.

Subsequent to comments from ERA, the draft questions for member states and project plan were presented to the UNIFE meeting at ERA Lille on 12th March 2009. At the meeting in Lille it was agreed that the authorities to be contacted in the first instance should be the National Safety Authorities (NSA) of each member state. This gave a single contact point within each state who had the authority to ask other bodies; those underrating the tasks involved in EM compatibility assessment and review to assist with the study. Active participation in the study by both national safety agencies and national approvals bodies was considered essential to a proper outcome.

At this time it was agreed with ERA that the best means of kick-starting the project would be for the ERA to organise a launch seminar to which representatives of all the NSAs concerned with EMC would be invited. This was initially planned for April 2009, and then postponed at ERA’s request. This meeting did not take place until March 2010.

In lieu of the meeting, Lloyds Register Rail continued to refine the questionnaire and guidance documentation to be sent with it. This outlined the aims and objectives of the study and the likely information requirements that would be needed to complete both the questionnaire and the structured interviews. It also included outline project timescales and in particular, the response timescales required for the information.

The questionnaire and guidance note were completed in May 2009.

Since generic interactions could not be targeted the initial questionnaire sought information on specific interactions which would demonstrate the member states requirements for compliance. These covered the basic interaction phenomena indirectly.

The questionnaire took the form of an interactive spreadsheet containing seven sheets. Each sheet covered a different aspect of the compatibility process and included a section to gather other information such as the timescales and costs of the activity.

The sheets were:

Processes; this sheet asks about the procedures and process required for the submission of evidence to the authorizing body and how the authorizing body assesses the evidence presented. It included questions designed to explore the interactions at levels below those of the general safety directive in

Page 8



particular which organisations were responsible for generating, assessing and approving the technical and documentary evidence.

[1] Train detection; this sheet asks about the general demonstration of compatibility with train detection systems, track circuits, balises, and axle counters, which are peculiar to each member state. This is intended to give sources for information on both conductive and (locally) induced interactions. It requests references to local technical standards and explores the various technical methods used to assess and comply with them.

[2] Lineside; this sheet asks about the general demonstration of compatibility with lineside systems; telecommunications, signal transmission and control, points etc, which may be use different technologies (and hence different levels of immunity) in each member state. This is intended to give sources for information on what (long section) induced effects are considered in the process. It also requests references to local technical standards and explores the various technical methods used to comply with them.

[3] Energy; this sheet asks about the general demonstration of compatibility with the energy supply system, AC overhead and DC overhead or third rail, which are used in each member state. This is intended to give sources for generic information on conduction effects and limitations/ configurations and interactions of supply systems. It requests references to local technical standards and explores the various technical methods used to comply with them and estimate their timescales and costs.

[4] Radio; this sheet asks about the general demonstration of compatibility with the radio systems on the member state railway and the general compatibility with neighbouring radio frequency systems. This is intended to give sources for information on radiated interactions and interference considered in the process. It requests references to local technical standards and explores the various technical methods used to comply with them.

[5] Other; this sheet asks about the demonstration of compatibility with the two general European directives; The Physical Agents Directive (electromagnetic fields) 2004/40/EC and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive 2004/108/EC which applies to all electrical equipment. These two directives include requirements and standards that explore conducted, induced and radiated phenomena. Some synergy between any compatibility demonstration to these directives and the technical aspects of demonstrating compliance on the railway would be expected. Hence, this may be an area where common approaches to the basic phenomena may be established. The sheet explores the various technical methods used to comply with them.

[6] EN 50238; the final sheet in the series asks the simple question whether the member state uses the technical appendix TR 50507 to EN 50238 as a method to demonstrate compatibility. EN 50238 defines the general compatibility with railway train detection systems and is an attempt to create a common approach to the individual methods of assessment used to demonstrate compatibility across a wide variety of particular components. Such a common, consensus, approach is essential for the adoption of cross acceptance.

2.2 Interim Stage

Initial data to evaluate the various compatibility systems in each country was to be obtained from the questionnaire whose content is outlined in Section 2.1.

Page 9



Since the European Directives mandate that the responsibility of compatibility within each member state now lies with the National Safety Authority of that state, initial versions of the questionnaire were distributed on 16/06/2009 by e-mail to all NSA participants in the study. The initial distribution was in English, French and Polish with German added on 8/07/2009. Countries who required versions in different languages were asked to request these from the author. Further versions were produced, over the following months to include Dutch and Czech.

The study invited all members of the European Railway Area to participate. This includes all members of the EU with the addition of Switzerland and Norway who have direct rail links with neighbouring countries. Ireland is included in the list of participants as it has strong railway ties to the UK and a technical land link to the UK railway through Northern Ireland even though there are no direct land bridges to the UK mainland. Malta and Cyprus with no land bridges were excluded from the study.

Over the period June-August 2009, several contacts were made with participants, by e-mail and telephone to assess the status of their input. Several of these communications stated that the relevant agency could not operate the spreadsheet as it contained macros. Alternative methods of working around this problem were suggested to the respondents culminating in a broadcast e-mail to all participants on 8/07/2009 with general advice on the work-around and alternate methods.

One respondent declined to participate in the study:

• The channel tunnel authorities are responsible for the technical compatibility with trains and so form a separate logical entity within the European Railway Area. However, in practice they fulfil this responsibility, as far as rolling stock compatibility is concerned, by accepting the compatibility studies performed by the UK and French authorities.

In general, initial responses to the questionnaire were disappointing with many responses containing ‘cut and paste’ responses to the individual sheets. Only a third of the participants returned completed questionnaires by the end of October 2009 despite frequent telephone and e-mail reminders. This poor response was felt to be due to a general disinclination of the relevant agencies to participate due to several main factors;

• This questionnaire was one of many requests for information from various bodies and hence did not have any particular priority.

• The questionnaire contained both procedural and technical aspects and hence needed the active participation of the NSAs in seeking information from technical experts.

• There was little or no incentive to participate in the study; possibly due to the lack of the general kick-off meeting which could have engendered some degree of ‘buy in’ to the project.

In this phase, detailed information was obtained from 17 member states. To supplement this, data was sought from the internet and other sources. This was necessarily diffuse and complicated by the language barrier as much of the information was in the native language of the member states. Some information on the technical aspects and applicable methodologies was obtained from a further five countries, however, no procedural or verification information could be obtained by this route.

Hence, at the end of the interim stage of the study some information for the study was available from 23 of the 27 member countries for further analysis and evaluation. Where responses in the questionnaire needed clarification this was sought by writing to the country’s representative asking specific questions referencing their statements. Although clarification was sought from fourteen states

Page 10



only two direct responses were received. This is consistent with the general reaction to the initial questionnaire.

2.3 Final stage

Since the data available after the interim stage was incomplete it was decided that the best way of obtaining more data was to gather the NSAs and EM experts from each member state together at an expert convocation. This meeting also fulfilled the initial desire of the project to have a face to face kick-off meeting to establish personal contacts. The meeting took place in Lille on the 24th March 2010. Prior to the meeting potential participants were given briefing notes and information packs to inform them of the aims and activities that would take place.

The meeting was organised so that, after initial presentations by ERA on the “EMC road map” and Lloyds Register on the project progress and aims for the convocation, the attendees were split into two groups. One group attended further presentations on EMC whilst the second divided into smaller groups organised by country who participated in detailed interviews with Lloyds Register staff on the process and practice of EMC acceptance in their country. These interviews centred around eight posters that graphically represented Documentation, Participation and EMC phenomena in the process. Participants were encouraged to add notes to these posters detailing the various aspects of the process pertaining to electromagnetic compatibility demonstration in their country. After the lunch break the two groups swapped activities with the first group participating in the interview process and the second group attending the EMC presentations.

The format of having the interviews around the posters was deliberately chosen to invite open responses from the participant stressing that they should highlight the parts of electromagnetic compatibility demonstration that were important to their own understanding of the process. This format, although not as prescriptive as requiring answers to closed questions, elicited more discussion and brought out some interesting observations that were used later in the study: for example, the fact that some states did not consider compatibility with the supply to be part of EMC.

There were 62 attendees at the convocation including 5 from Lloyds Register Rail and 8 from the ERA. The remaining 49 attendees represented 17 countries and many of these were countries where there had been no direct response to the questionnaire. In addition, many of the attendees were EMC experts and hence had a greater knowledge of the technical aspects of the acceptance process.

The information gained at the convocation, and the subsequent communications with several of the participants gave a much greater coverage of the information needed for the project. Hence, at the end of this stage only two countries had given no details of their processes. These were Bulgaria and Slovenia.

Page 11



3 Common Standards for Electromagnetic Compatibility in Member States

At the time of writing only two technical standards are directly mentioned in the EU directives in relation to the demonstration of electromagnetic compliance of rolling stock as it applies in this study. These are EN 50121 and EN 502383. Two other standards, EN 50388 and EN 50122, have consequential effects in relation to emissions.

EN 50121 applies to radiated and conducted emissions and immunities between the rolling stock and itself and between the rolling stock and other parts of the railway. It does not give technical details which are applicable to demonstration of compatibility with specific equipment neither is it a comprehensive document in terms of the full coverage of the electromagnetic spectrum. In particular, it does not deal with safety and offers no assurance of safe operation.

It also does not deal with interactions between interference and several items of safety critical equipment and controls on the railway. These include train detection (of all types), signalling systems, warning and automatic train control systems, telecommunications (both land and air based) or any equipment operated on or near to the rails.

Currently interactions with train detection are tentatively covered by EN 50238 and local national standards. EN 50238 is currently under revision/expansion however, the only part which is officially published in the journal (and hence universally applicable) is Part 1. Part 1 deals with general procedural aspects responsibilities and techniques but contains no specific engineering data that may be used in a demonstration of compatibility. All other aspects of interaction are presently covered by national standards.

Many electromagnetic interactions are dependent upon the electrical supply to the rolling stock. The energy TSI deals with the power supply and specifies a standard that has an indirect effect on electromagnetic compatibility demonstration. This is EN 50388 which includes aspects of line resonance effects. Whilst not specifically applicable to the demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility the resonances in the system may alter the emissions from the rolling stock in a potentially deleterious way.

EN 50122 concerns the protection of systems and personnel by correct application of earthing and bonding. Again, this does not have a direct relationship to EMC but does have implications in EMC effects on other systems.

Sections relating to train detection and EMC of EN 50215 are not cited in any TSI.

Many of the local standards quoted by the respondents in the study refer to UIC leaflets. These leaflets contain technical specifications and limits concerning various parts of the railway. Many of the leaflets have sections that potential deal with electromagnetic interactions between components. A list of UIC leaflets that contain potential requirements for electromagnetic compatibility is given in Appendix A.

3 It is noted that EN 50238 Part 2 Compatibility Between Rolling Stock and Track Circuits and EN 50238 Part 3 Compatibility

Between Rolling Stock and Axle Counters are due to be published in the near future. However, at the current time they cannot

be considered for inclusion into this report as they have not yet been published.

Page 12



4 Scope of the EMC Systems in the European Railway Area

The rolling stock TSIs refer to electromagnetic compatibility in several sections. In many of these sections electromagnetic compatibility is deferred to the corresponding control-command and signalling subsystem TSI. Here there are many open points and it is difficult to define the exact technical scope of the systems which are defined for electromagnetic compatibility.

Electromagnetics is the study of electrical and magnetic interactions and it is commonly understood to be governed by Maxwell’s Equations. These describe electromagnetic phenomena at all frequencies and by all modes of interaction from conduction through to the propagation of electromagnetic travelling waves. Hence, strictly, any investigation of electromagnetic compatibility should encompass all modes and all frequencies. However the scope of EMC:- Electromagnetic Compatibility as understood by the technical participants in the study is often restricted to a fairly narrow range of interactions and in many cases it is limited to interactions from radio frequency interference.

This study initially considered any electrical or electromagnetic interaction that is documented as a significant phenomenon within the scope of a safety assessment on the railway as being included in its scope. However there are some interactions that, although involving rolling stock and without which the interaction would not occur, are only peripherally considered as belonging to a rolling stock assessment4. A list of potential electromagnetic interactions on the railway is given in Appendix B

Therefore, these interactions are considered in this section but are not generally documented in the country specific sections.

4.1 Internal Electromagnetic Compatibility

Electric trains are covered by the general directive for Electromagnetic Compatibility (2004/108/EC) as are all other items of electrical equipment offered for sale within the EU. In addition to the elements of external electromagnetic compatibility considered in the country descriptions it also requires internal electromagnetic compatibility to be demonstrated between components on the train itself. This internal electromagnetic compatibility demonstration is considered to be outside the scope of this study.

4.2 Corrosion

Electrically induced corrosion is not generally considered as part of rolling stock compatibility. It only occurs on DC systems and it is normally controlled by the correct design of earthing and bonding.

4.3 Touch Potential

Induction into lineside structures that are not part of the railway operation e.g. fences and third party cabling and which can create significant voltages are not generally considered analytically in any assessment. Touch potentials are normally controlled by the correct design of isolation, segregation, earthing and bonding of structures. Similar controls are used on the train to control shock hazards to passengers.

4.4 Electromechanical Systems

Signal lights, point machines and other electromechanical systems generally use high-power simple on/off drives. Since they are not directly connected (electrically) to the running rails, they are substantially immune to induced effects. Compatibility with these is assured by correct design of the insulation/isolation systems of the infrastructure. 4 A list of potential interactions was given to the participants in the convocation to stimulate areas for discussion. See Appendix B

Page 13



4.5 Train Position/Orientation/Consist Sensors

These systems include correct side door control, platform position loops etc. They are generally considered to be part of the infrastructure rather than the rolling stock system. Since the orientation, spacing and mode of operation of these systems is variable and undefined with respect to the general rolling stock they are usually assessed separately on a case by case basis.

4.6 Telematics

Telematics predominantly concerns the tracking and logistics associated with freight, particularly containerised freight. Cargo is identified by passive or active radio-frequency tags similar to those used to prevent theft from shops. These are considered to be a separate component of the railway and are assessed by a separate TSI. (Commission Regulation (EC) No 62/2006 December 2005)

4.7 Automatic Train Protection

Automatic Train Protection systems are normally considered to be part of the control-command and signalling subsystem of the infrastructure and are assessed accordingly. Often these systems are not intrinsically fail-safe and hence are not considered to form part of the safety system. Some electromagnetic compatibility studies include these systems as part of the rolling stock assessment and many are documented in the TSI. Where the particular system is considered directly in the rolling stock assessment a note has been included in the relevant country description. ETCS will, in the future, replace many of these individual systems and this is assessed as part of the control-command and signalling subsystem TSI.

4.8 Train Radio Systems

Although train radio systems are obviously part of the radio-frequency assessment of any railway each state has notified these to the agency and they are included in the TSI. Hence, only a general reference to the TSI is made in the relevant country descriptions.

Page 14



5 Country Specific Demonstrations of Electromagnetic Compatibility

5.1 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Austria

Austria returned a completed questionnaire. The compatibility and procedural assessment is derived from the questionnaire responses, feedback from interview at the convocation of experts and from other indirect sources. Austria belongs to a group of countries who have certain common requirements for international inter-operation These are documented in the International Requirements List available from www.irl-rail.eu

5.1.1 Processes

The responsibility for rolling stock acceptance in Austria lies with the Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (Bmvit). There is a procedure for acceptance Eisenbahngesetz 1957 available from www.bmvit.gv.at and also an international requirements list This organisation interacts in a tripartite form with two other organisational groups within the approvals process. These are OBB (Österreichische Bundesbahnen) SAB Rolling-stock Homologation (which are the approval group) and OBB with a NoBo (PR) which constitute the inspection/evaluation and measuring group (Figure 1).

CertificationAnalysis

/Approval

EvidenceMeasurementInspectionEvaluation

Bmvit OBB

SAB

OBB

+ NOBO

Figure 1 - Austrian Interactions for Type EMC Approvals

The process for acceptance involves any railway undertaking applying to BMVit for a licence to operate. It must demonstrate that it has a suitable SMS (Safety Management System) in accordance with the directives and within this management system is a requirement for the demonstration of technical compatibility to the TSI. It must also have a certificate of vehicle inspection and type approval. Type approval is granted if the rolling stock has been accepted in another EU state and can demonstrate compatibility with local Austrian technical requirements. Responsibility for type approval lies with BMVIT. There is also a requirement for a Network compatibility check to be made. This is the responsibility of the infrastructure arm of Österreichische Bundesbahnen. In addition to the general requirements of the TSI, electromagnetic compatibility is part of this network compatibility requirement and it is documented on the OBB website (infrastructure manager) (www.oebb.at/infrastruktur) under the Anforderungskatalog (requirements catalogue). Access requirements (Netzzugang) documents are available in German on the same website.

Evidence in the process is given from internal and third party testing, expert opinion (approved under the Eisenbahngesetz 1957 rules), examination of design documentation for electrical electronic and software systems. It was stated that the overall cost could not be given however an estimate for the

Page 15



overall timescale was between 1 and 24 months: a test campaign for a new vehicle would cost approximately €60,000 and take two weeks to complete.

5.1.2 Train Detection

It is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to incorporate compatibility demonstration with the TSIs in his safety management system. This is performed in conjunction with the measurement group of ÖBB Traction GmbH and NoBos/ competent bodies from accredited agencies within and outside Austria. Evidence is by measurement testing and the assessment is performed by comparison with limits and reported in a detailed technical submission. The TSI refers to EN 50238. Austria is working towards the implementation of ERTMS and GSM-R.

For other lines, the requirements catalogue gives limits for traction return current. These follow several frequency bands, some of which correspond to known axle counter frequency bands limits are shown in Figure 2. Evidence is collected via testing and evaluated by the OBB/NoBo.

Frequency Bandwidth Limit

96-110 Hz of Inclusive 2 A over 2 s *)

4.15 kHz +/-0.15 kHz 100 mA

5.06 kHz +/-0.15 kHz 100 mA

9.85 kHz +/-0.25 kHz 60 mA

28-30 kHz 300 mA

36 kHz +/-2 kHz 10 mA

43 kHz +/- 1.5 kHz 60 mA

56 kHz +/2 kHz 10 mA

Figure 2 – Traction Return Current Limits

The ATP system used in Austria is called INDUSI/PZB (Induktive Zugsicherung/ Punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung). This system uses magnetically resonant track-side circuits operating at 500Hz, 1000Hz and 2000Hz.

Austria also uses LZB (Linienförmige Zugbeeinflussing). The system uses 36kHz (to the train), 56kHz (from the train).

Page 16



5.1.3 Lineside Systems

It is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to incorporate compatibility demonstration with lineside systems. This may be performed in conjunction with OBB and NoBos. Assessment is by third party testing to standards, simulation, test data and expert opinion to various standards including CENELEC 50126, 50128, 50129; 50238. Evidence is provided by certificates of conformance or by detailed technical reports. The requirements catalogue gives a limit of 1.5A for psophometric current with measurement to the guidance provided in EN 50121. Evidence is collected via testing and evaluated by the OBB/NoBo.

5.1.4 Energy Supply

It is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to incorporate compatibility demonstration with the supply systems. Demonstration of compatibility is to the requirements of EN50388 and the ÖBB requirements catalogue for locomotives operating in the network of the ÖBB. Evidence is by testing and reported in a detailed technical report. The requirements catalogue gives limits for permissible current during dynamic braking to less than 500A and shows permissible load currents of 600A for system voltages above 15kV. From 15kV to 9kV current must be limited to a ramp of slope 100A/kV. In addition in recognition of the line resonance phenomena, there is a requirement that the input impedance of the rolling stock is passive above 120Hz. (The real component must be greater than zero and the phase between -90 and +90 degrees). Evidence is collected via testing and evaluated by the OBB/NoBo.

5.1.5 Radio Frequency Systems

It is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to incorporate compatibility demonstration with radio frequency systems. The requirements of EN 50121-3-1 are followed and are accepted by a manufacturer’s declaration of conformity to the standard. Other requirements are placed on local emissions with a limit value for the radio disturbance field strength of 4dBµV/m at 10m in the frequency ranges shown in Figure 3.

Frequency range [MHz] Notes

79.800 - 81.025

80.000 MHz excluded

shunting radio 4 m band

165.600 - 171.375 technical services 2 m band

410.000 - 470.000 70cm-Band including, speech, data and train radio

876.000 - 880.000 GSM-R Upl

921.000 - 925.000 GSM-R DnL

880.200 - 914.800 GSM 900 UpL

925.200 - 959.800 GSM 900 DNL

1710.200 - 1748.800 GSM 1800 UpL

Page 17



Frequency range [MHz] Notes

1805.200 – 1879.800 GSM 1800 DnL

Figure 3 – Austrian Radio Frequency Usage

This may be performed in conjunction with OBB and NoBos. The requirements catalogue gives limits for psophometric traction return current with measurement to the guidance provided in EN 50121. Evidence is collected via testing and evaluated by the OBB/NoBo. Austria uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 for ground to train radio (UIC leaflet 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.1.6 Other Systems

Austria does use information from the assessment of conformity to the requirements for Human exposure to EM radiation and the general EMC directive in its overall assessment of railway systems.

5.1.7 EN 50238

The technical appendix to EN 50238 is employed in the assessment.

Page 18



5.2 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Belgium

The Belgian NSA declined to fill in the questionnaire but gave a response in an e-mail. The e-mail gives some generic information but directs the project to examine a website and the associated crown legislation. Additional information was obtained at the convocation of experts. The following information is derived from these sources.

5.2.1 Processes

The Belgian NSA is the DRSI (Department of Railway Safety and Interoperability) part of the Federal Government Department of Mobility and Transport Directorate-General for Land Transport (Mobilit)

From an examination of the website it is possible to answer some of the questions posed by the procedural aspects of the questionnaire and hence complete part of the input to the database. Railway undertakings in Belgium are limited to those holding a railway undertaking licence. This is granted to companies that provide passenger or freight services or those providing rolling stock. A separate provision of the licence is that the railway undertaking must have its activity based in Belgium thus this would exclude any company solely based in another country from operating within Belgium. Licences are obtained from the Federal Government Department of Mobility and Transport.

Actual safety certification, which may only be issued to undertakings with a licence, consists of two parts Part A and Part B.

Part A of the Belgian process follows the European directive in that it requires any railway undertaking to demonstrate that it has a suitable safety management process in place. This process must have been approved by the Belgian Safety Authority or by an equivalent safety authority in another EU Member State. It proves that the organisation and the arrangements put in place by the railway undertaking are sufficient to ensure that any activity performed by the undertaking is conducted in a safe manner.

Part B of the certificate requires that the railway undertaking has demonstrated conformity to the specific requirements of the Belgian railway to the safety authority. These may include conformity to Belgian national technical requirements and Belgian-specific safety requirements for personnel and rolling stock. In Belgium there is a separation between the admission of a Railway Undertaking and the technical admission of Rolling stock. For technical acceptance the rolling stock manufacturer, not the undertaking is responsible for preparing a technical file which is analysed /approved by the Infrastructure manager and Belgorail acting as technical assessor.

Belgorail issues a certificate of Compliance to the applicant (manufacturer). The applicant then issues a declaration of conformity to the NSA. Certification is valid for a period of three years or before this time if a substantial change to the operations or technical implementation of the undertaking takes place. After three years the certificate must be renewed.

Page 19



Certification Approval Analysis

EvidenceMeasurementInspectionEvaluation

Manufacturer DEBO

Infrastructure manager(Infrabel)

Belgorail(Interoperabilityand Conventional Components)

DRSI

Duplicate or minor case

Certificate of Compliance

Declaration of Conformity

Figure 4 - Belgian EMC Approval Interactions for Part B

Application for a certificate must be submitted with a supporting dossier in either French or Dutch; authenticated submissions validated in another EU member state are accepted but must be accompanied by a certified translation. The dossier must contain a detailed safety management system the safety management will be scrutinised and audited by the safety authority to ensure its validity and that it is applied correctly. Much of this dossier provides assurance of systems and processes unaffected by EMC, e.g. operations, personnel, access rules, accident and near-miss reporting, change procedures and risk assessment etc.

Application for a TSI compliant line may also be given if the rolling stock already has an EU inspection declaration of fitness for use on interoperable lines or the EU inspection procedure is being carried out by Belgorail.

Where rolling stock does not comply with the TSIs it must have a Declaration of Compliance with the technical specifications and norms in force, issued by Belgorail (Figure 4). The technical compliance documentation is generated by the manufacturer and this is examined and the results are collated by a Designated Body which then issues a report to the Safety Authority. The designated body may require further tests/simulation etc. from the Railway Undertaking and can appoint a third party to carry out testing.

However, there are some specific requirements for technical conformity of the rolling stock which necessarily includes EMC. For these, applicability of the technical rules depends upon whether the rolling stock is TSI compliant. If it is then the rolling stock must be shown to meet all the conditions within the TSIs or, where these are absent, under the conditions of ARGSI-RGUIF 2.1.1.These include assessments for compatibility with the railway infrastructure, the power distribution, the driving of the train, the signalling, the train traffic control and telecommunications and telematics.

In addition to these technical considerations, which must be provided in the dossier, technical advice on the suitability for operation will be sought from NMBS Holding will also be taken into account. NMBS is an umbrella organisation consisting of Infrabel, the Belgian Infrastructure Manager, the Société

Page 20



Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges and the Fonds de l’Infrastructure Ferroviaire which are now separate entities created under the terms of the directive.


It is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to show that compliance with train detection for interoperable lines follows the TSI requirement EN 50238. Belgium is working towards the implementation of ERTMS: the regulations also reference RSEIF 3.2, RSEIF 3.5 and RSEIF 3.6 which relate to in cab signalling and train protection systems for ETCS operation.

For other lines, details of compliance with the infrastructure are given in the document RGUIF2.2.1 and the accompanying EMC document MI.01-EMC-75.2.0. These documents give details of permissible current levels within certain frequency bands for both AC and DC traction systems (Figure 5 and Figure 6). In addition, the documents mandate the permissible levels of the shorting effect of the wheels with reference to UIC512

Type Low frequency 50Hz Audio frequencies

Infrastructure 3kvDC 3kvDC 3kvDC 3kvDC 25kvAC

Frequency >35Hz <3kHz

35-65Hz 50Hz See Figure 6 See Figure 6

Limit 50 A 20A 4A

Max duration 1s

Notes Cumulative Cumulative Arithmetic addition

Arithmetic or RSS addition dependent upon source

Arithmetic or RSS addition dependent upon source

Figure 5 - Susceptibilities for Belgian Train Detection

3Kv DC 25kV AC

From (Hz) To (Hz) Limit (A) From (Hz) To (Hz) Limit (A)

1500 1555 3 1500 1540 0.5

1555 1745 0.5 1540 1560 3

1745 1855 3 1560 1640 0.5

1855 2045 0.5 1640 1660 3

2045 2155 3 1660 1740 0.5

2155 2345 0.5 1740 1760 3

2345 2455 3 1760 1840 0.5

2455 2645 0.5 1840 1860 3

2645 2755 3 1860 1940 0.5

2755 2945 0.5 1940 1960 3

2945 3000 3 1960 2040 0.5

Page 21



3Kv DC 25kV AC

2040 2060 3

2060 2140 0.5

2140 2160 3

2160 2240 0.5

2240 2260 3

2260 2340 0.5

2340 2360 3

2360 2440 0.5

2440 2460 2.2

2460 2540 0.5

2540 2560 2.2

2560 2640 0.5

2640 2660 2.2

2660 2740 0.5

2740 2760 2.2

2760 2840 0.5

2840 2860 2.2

2860 2940 0.5

2940 2960 2.2

2960 3000 0.5

Figure 6 - Audio Frequency Limits

The documents also specify input impedance, permissible rate of change of current and protection systems that must be applied at certain frequencies: e.g. there is a requirement for an instrument to monitor 50Hz current flowing through the catenary/return current path. The method of evaluation is by testing of a target train and the production of a detailed technical report. The reader is referred to the document for more details.


It is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to show that compliance with lineside systems for interoperable lines follows the TSI requirement EN 50121.

For other lines, details of compliance with the infrastructure are given in the document RGUIF2.2.1 the accompanying EMC document MI.01-EMC-75.2.0. The phenomena include:

• Electromagnetic compatibility with the transmission in cables and signalling

• Compatibility with telecommunications equipment

Page 22



• Prohibition/limiting of emissions from Eddy current braking

• Magnetic emissions into the track.

Compatibility with transmission cables/telecommunications is via measurement of psophometric current (Figure 7).The methodology is in accordance to EN 50121-3-1. Limits are prescribed for differing levels of traction current operation with some variability for transient behaviour (events below 10 seconds). Compatibility with magnetic emissions into the track is via direct measurement of induced voltage into a track loop. The measurement technique is described in MI.01-EMC-75.2.0. Other magnetic emissions are assessed qualitatively.

Permissible Psophometric Currents for train

Ratio of total captured power to total rated power of the whole

train

Classic Lines LGV

<40% 6 A 17 A

Between 40% and 70% 9 A 26 A

>70% 12 A 34 A

Figure 7 - Psophometric Limits

5.2.4 Energy Supply

Demonstration of compatibility with the supply is the responsibility of the RU. This is normally undertaken in conjunction with the infrastructure manager. (Infrabel). Compatibility is referenced to various EN standards and to local regulations. The EN standards include EN50163, EN50388, EN 50364 and EN50119 although some parts of these relate to mechanical issues.

The website states that RSEIF 2.1 gives technical information on the fixed infrastructure and power supply the electrical limits for the supply are contained in RGUIF2.2.1 with some reference to MI.01-EMC-75.2.0. The basic standard refers to EN50163 and to UIC 600. The Belgian railway comprises two systems DC operating at 3kV and AC operating at 25kV. Different limits apply to each system regarding permissible current draw, voltage control etc. For the 3kV systems current is limited to 2400A and power draw/return is limited to 4MW. Voltage limits are specified as a maximum of 3.9kV for the DC system. Ripple on the DC system is also constrained: between 35Hz and 60Hz it is limited to 20A. The modulus input impedance of the train on DC is limited at 50Hz to be greater than 1.3 ohms with a phase of between 0 and π/2.There is also a limit on permissible harmonic current draw of 4A at 50Hz.

The AC system applies current limits according to UIC 660 which also contains limits on acceptable phase variation. There is also a prescription on permissible harmonic content at multiples of the mains frequency applied in MI.01-EMC-75.2.0.

Limits are also applied to limit rate of change of current to protect supply protection. These are referenced in UIC 797. It should be noted that UIC leaflets are gradually being replaced by EN standards.

Demonstration of compatibility is via testing with reporting against the various limits in a detailed technical report.

Page 23




Demonstration of compatibility with the supply is the responsibility of the RU usually in conjunction with the train manufacturer. The general compatibility with radio frequency systems is assured by EN 50121 however, RGUIF2.2.1 also includes references to UIC 751. Further information on frequency allocation/ permissible parameters for automatic vehicle identification in the 2.4 GHZ range are given in Annex B13 Radio Interface for AVI for railways on the website of the Belgian Institute for postal and telecommunications services (BIPT). Demonstration of compatibility is by measurement and detailed technical report. Belgium uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 for ground to train radio (UIC code 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B. From 1 Jan 2011 all trains will be equipped with GSM-R and the UIC radio systems will come out of service.

5.2.6 Other Systems

No information is given on compliance with or synergy from other European directives concerning EMC.

5.2.7 EN 50238

The technical appendix to EN 50238 is employed in the assessment.

Page 24



5.3 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Bulgaria

A short e-mail response was received from the Bulgarian representative. No representatives from Bulgaria attended the convocation. Various researches on the internet were hampered by the difficulty in translation of the Cyrillic form of the Bulgarian Language.

The Bulgarian National Safety Authority is the Изпълнителна Агенция "Железопътна Администрация (Executive Agency :"Railway Administration") of the Ministry of Transport and Communication.

The internet research determined that the technical organization responsible for ensuring electromagnetic compatibility between rolling stock and infrastructure is the Bulgarian State Railway Български държавни железници (BDZ). The Bulgarian State Railways National Company was split into two separate companies by the “Railway Transport Act” in 2002: a railway operator (BDZ EAD) and an infrastructure company (Railway Infrastructure National Company).

The operating company website details a set of operating/technical standards for rolling stock operation among these are several ordinances (Наредба) which pertain to the process of acceptance, safety of operation and the electrical supply.

• Ordinance 41 of 27.06.2001 for access and use of railway infrastructure - issued by the Minister of Transport and Communication

• Ordinance 47 of 28.12.2001 for equipment and security systems equipment, communication, electrical power and rail - issued by the Minister of Transport and Communication.

• Ordinance 57 of 09.06.2004 years the essential requirements for rail infrastructure and rolling stock to provide the necessary parameters of interaction, efficiency and compatibility with the trans-European railway - issued by the Minister of Transport and Communication,

Examination of these documents from internet sources does not show any significant numerical data and hence it is assumed that such technical data is proprietary to the railway company.

Feedback from the representative of the Bulgarian NSA states that electromagnetic compatibility on the Bulgarian railway is demonstrated by testing, There are four main types of electrical/electronic safety systems used. Any electromagnetic interactions with these is demonstrated by operating a train adjacent to each system and then recording the induced disturbance voltage at the system. There are no details available how the evaluation is performed other than by detecting an incorrect response from the system during the test.

Page 25



5.4 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the Czech Republic

The Czech participant returned a completed questionnaire. The directives have been implemented in this country and all interoperable routes are stated to be governed solely by the requirements of the TSIs.

5.4.1 Processes

The Czech acceptance body is the Drá�ní úřad (DU ; National Railway Authority). The regulations that control acceptance are Regulation 352/94 which references Regulation 266/94 Code which in turn references Regulation 173/95 Code, Regulation100/95 Code, Regulation177/95 Code and Directive DU No: 1-890/06-DU which are available from the DU website www.du-praha.cz, the Ministry of the interior website www.mvcr.cz or the Czech office of standards organisation www.unmz.cz The standards are in Czech with some English translations.

FinalCertificate

Infrastructure

Manufacture

Analysis ofthe trialoperation

Test Procedure Definition

Test Result Analysis

Technical Report

Evaluation

National Safety AuthorityDrazni UrfadRail Authority

Ministry of TransportApplicant

(Manufac turer,Owner,Operator)

Issues dec isionClause 43 or Clause 43b of “the railway law“ No 265/1995

Dedicated juristic bodyPoverena pravnicka osoba

Appointed by the Ministry of transport

Operator

Trial OperationCertificate

Trial Operation

&

inte

rnal

Exte

rna

l

CC

S

ENE

RST

Test Labs

Experts

inte

rnal

Exte

rna

l

inte

rnal

Exte

rna

l

CC

S

ENE

RST

Figure 8 - Czech Interactions for EMC Approvals

Acceptance requires the Certification of trains from third parties appointed/approved by the authority. The third parties are registered with the ministry of transport to perform the assessment. The questionnaire states that the authority takes evidence from test results, third party certification, and expert opinion. The procedural flow was explained in the interview at the convocation (Figure 8). Application is made to the national railway authority by the RU (manufacturer/owner/operator). The RU then liaises/supplies information to various appointed expert organisations who deal with the separate streams of expertise e.g. control-command and signalling subsystem, energy subsystem etc. These organisations define a series of tests which are performed by various approved test laboratories. The information is fed back to the Authority who issues a certificate for trial operation. The results of the trial operation are evaluated by the authority which then either issues a full certificate or requests more

Page 26



testing/trials. The process may be iterated until a full certificate is obtained. Timescales and costs for the whole procedure are 2-2.5 years and 1.5M€ these include a 12 month test period followed by a 12 month trial running period.


Compatibility with train detection is provided from legally approved third parties appointed by the Ministry of Transport who provide expert opinion. These assessors use EN standards 50121, 50238 and a local standard •SN 34 2613 Issue 2 (in Czech and available for purchase from www.unmz.cz) as the basis of their assessment. Czech railway uses a system of broken rail detection (specified in the standard) which relaxes limits on train detection systems. In general train detection via track circuits is performed at relatively low frequencies. Both time and frequency domain analyses are performed on measurements. The frequency ranges and outline techniques are shown in Figure 9.

Frequency 25Hz Wide band FOR 50Hz 75Hz 275Hz

Supply System AC DC DC DC, AC DC, AC

Location open track , station

open track , station

open track , station

open track station

Operation Bandwidth 22-30 Hz 40Hz-300Hz 44 -54 Hz

68-80HZ 262-280 Hz

Phase Sensitive No No yes/no yes/no yes

Analysis type time domain

time domain time/frequency domain

time/frequency domain

time/frequency domain

Integration time 330ms 120ms 120ms 120ms 120ms

Broken rail detection Yes yes yes yes yes

Symmetry detection No no No no no

Current limit (1A) 14A 260mA 110mA (1A*)

130mA (1A*)

Floating comparator time window

No no yes yes yes

Note residual (approx 100pc)

Old system Old system

perspective perspective

* these limits, which apply to newer systems, are still subject to internal Czech review.

Figure 9 – Track Circuit Frequencies

The process results in detailed technical reports based on testing and comparison with limits. The compatibility measurements are based on type tests which are estimated to take two days test time and 6 weeks analysis/reporting at a cost of €25000.

The in-cab signalling system in the Czech Republic is called LS. The track-side part of the system uses coded track circuits at one carrier frequency (75Hz).

Page 27




Compatibility with lineside systems is provided from legally approved third parties appointed by the Ministry of Transport who provide expert opinion. The assessor uses EN standards 50129 and 50124 and local standards CSN 332160, Regulation 177/95 Code and Regulation 100/95 Code. EN 50129 is a process document detailing methodologies for design and safety assurance and therefore does not directly involve EMC assessment however it is used in assessment to provide statistical methodologies.

The assessment includes a measurement/calculation of the induced voltage in relation to ATC equipment created by local magnetic fields. Disturbance voltage is measured in a resistor connected in series with the ATC equipment. The nominal signal current through this resistor is 2A and compliance is demonstrated by calculating a signal to noise ratio between this signal and the disturbance voltage. The minimum requirement is that the signal to noise ratio is > 10 dB.

CSN 332160 provides methodologies for calculating mutual inductance between overhead line and signalling equipment cabling.

All assessments result in detailed technical reports based on the criteria in each document. No timescales for the process are given.

5.4.4 Energy Supply

Compatibility with the energy supply is provided from legally approved third parties appointed by the Ministry of Transport who provide expert opinion. The opinion is based on the results of third party tests and other test data. Basic conformance to EN standards 50153 (protective systems), 50163 (supply voltages) and 50388 (coordination between power supply and rolling stock) is required as well as a local standard •SN 34 2613 which gives limits for DC electric heating requirements on non-electrified lines.

The general limits applied to the DC 3kV and AC 25kV systems are shown in Figure 10. It is noted that, on the Czech system resonance affects are not assessed on either DC or AC.

Traction System DC 1300V 25kV 50Hz AC

Max voltage (5 min) 3900 V 29kV

Min voltage 2000 V 17.5kV

Power Factor >2MVA <6MVA → 0.93 >6MVA → 0.95

Harmonics 1% ripple 3rd <5% 5th <6%

Regeneration <3600 V No

Current/power Limit 1600A/rectifier 10MW

Figure 10 - Limits on the Traction Power Supply


Compatibility with radio frequency systems supply is provided from legally approved third parties appointed by the Ministry of Transport who provide expert opinion. The opinion is based on the results of tests to EN 50121-3-1, EN 50121-3-2 & EN 50121-4. Evaluations result in a detailed technical report based on measurements to the limits in the standards. The Czech Republic uses its own railway radio

Page 28



communication system (compatible with UIC 751-3. Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.4.6 Other Systems

The Czech Republic assesses corrosion on DC systems to EN 50122 -2.

The Czech Republic assesses exposure to EM radiation by analysis from legally approved third party assessments appointed by the Ministry of Transport according to §43 of the Regulation 266/1994 Code. The analysis is based on measurements to EN50500 and results in a detailed technical report. Assessment is estimated to take approximately 1 month at a cost of approximately 15000€.

The Czech Republic does not use general compatibility with the EMC directive in its assessment of rolling stock.

5.4.7 EN 50238

The Czech Republic does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 29



5.5 The demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Denmark

The Danish participant returned a completed questionnaire.

5.5.1 Processes

Compatibility demonstration in Denmark is controlled by the National Rail Authority (Trafikstyrelsen) however, Banedanmark performs the compatibility process on its behalf. The regulation that controls acceptance BJ-1-5_2009 DTR is available on the web in Danish:

http://www.trafikstyrelsen.dk/~/media/Files/Databaser/Lovstof/BJ%205-1-2009%20DTR-endelig.ashx

A flowchart for the general approvals process is available in English on http://uk.bane.dk/visArtikel_eng.asp?artikelID=1132.

Approval is in three sequential stages; application for a operating licence, obtaining a safety certificate and type approval. All applications require an certificate of conformity from Banedanmark. Technical requirements for general rolling stock acceptance is to the requirements of the Banedanmark drawing QN 903 Q no 0779 with the technical rules concerning EMC related issues contained in BN2-74-1. A summary of the main points of BN2-74-1; BN 00 00 06 01 is available in English on http://uk.bane.dk/db/filarkiv/415/BN0000060100UK.pdf .

This document references various other standards including UIC and EN. General compatibility is by testing and performing calculations and simulations which are assessed by expert opinion. In the case of EMC, this is performed by the EMC system manager of Banedanmark (Figure 11).

Danish National Rail Transport

National Rail AuthorityTrafikstyrelsen

Operating Licence

Safety Certificate

Type Approval

Application for Capac ity

Declaration of Conform ity

Authorisation forputting into servic e

Manufacturer Test Information

BanedanmarkExpert Analysis

Banedanmark

EMC

Figure 11 - Danish Interactions for EMC Approvals

Page 30




Compatibility with train detection is provided from test information from the train manufacturer. This is assessed by Banedanmark who provide assessment and certification. The manufacturer provides the results of the measurements and simulations and calculations based on the tests. Evaluation is based on the Banedanmark specification for the declaration of conformity QN 903 Q no 0779 and EN50238. EN50238 is available from normal EN standards websites or from Banedanmark directly. Results are reviewed by Banedanmark to limits within these standards. The Danish system incorporates two types of ATC. Compatibility with the system ATC ZUB 123 is one of the requirements. For the HKT system and track circuits a summary of the conditions is shown in Figure 12.

Track Circuit DC 77Hz FTGS 46

FTGS 917 100kHz HKT ( ATC)

centre frequency - 77Hz, 170Hz, 231Hz

4.75, 5.25,5.75,6.25 kHz

9.5-16.5kHz in 1kHz steps

100kHz Interharmonics 350-650Hz*

Bandwidth 0-2.5Hz 70-85Hz 300Hz 500Hz +/- 40kHz +/- 5Hz

Analysis time domain

time domain

Freq domain

Freq Domain

- -

Interference limit <4A continuous <15A after 1.5 s inrush

<4A 2A 4A

1.4A 0.7A 0.028A 1A

Time >1.5 s >1s - - - -

* Interharmonics are summations over the frequencies between 50Hz harmonics with a 5Hz exclusion e.g. 355-395Hz for the 350 to 400Hz frequency range. Limits at the 50Hz harmonics are shown in Figure 13

Figure 12 – Track Circuit Frequencies

Evaluation is carried out at all stages of the process and these leads to a declaration of conformity at the end of the testing. The process is stated to take from 2 to 3 months and the costs (excluding the manufacturers costs for testing) are approximately €15000.


Compatibility with Lineside systems is provided from test information from the train manufacturer. This is assessed by Banedanmark who provide assessment and certification. The manufacturer provides the results of the measurements and simulations and calculations based on tests. Evaluation is based on limits within the Banedanmark specification QN 903 Q no 0779 and EN 50121-3-1.

Simulations and calculations are to be performed by the manufacturer to the requirements of EN50388. Hence, it is implied that compatibility is assured by demonstration of compatibility with the power supply maxima (see section 5.5.4) as in many other countries. In addition, general broadband limits on currents for interference to information systems are given over broad bands up to 5kHz.

Compatibility with voice telecommunications is by calculation of psophometric current to CCITT (ITU) standards. Psophometric currents are defined for the train alone in normal - 2.1A >2s, 3.5A<2s and

Page 31



degraded modes:- 3.5 <2s, 5.7 >2s and for the general lineside environment (5.7A). Results are reviewed by Banedanmark who issue a certificate of conformance. The conformance demonstration is a single process. No timescales or costs are available

5.5.4 Energy Supply

Compatibility with the energy supply is provided by the train manufacturer and Banedanmark. The manufacturer provides the results of the measurements and simulations to the requirements of EN50163, EN50388 and CCITT Directives. In addition, there are a series of permissible harmonic current levels at multiples of the supply frequency. These are shown in Figure 13.

Frequency Permissible Current

fundamental 50Hz 500 A

100Hz 25 A

150 Hz 50 A

200 Hz 12 A

250 Hz 50 A

350-650* Hz 10 A

* cumulative harmonic levels for 50Hz multiples in range (see Figure 12)

Figure 13 – Harmonic Current Limits

The EN and CCITT standards are available in various languages throughout the member states. Evaluation is by comparison with limits within these standards and those in Figure 13 and it is reported by issuing a conformance certificate.


Compatibility with radio frequency systems is assessed by the manufacturer. Compatibility is demonstrated by measurement to the requirements of EN 50121-3 and EN 50121-4. Testing is carried out by the manufacturer who issues a certificate of conformance. Denmark uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 for ground to train radio (UIC code 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.5.6 Other Systems

Denmark does not include assessment for compatibility with human exposure to EMF radiation in its rolling stock evaluation. Denmark does not include assessment for compatibility with the EMC directive in its rolling stock evaluation.

5.5.7 EN 50238

Denmark does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 32



5.6 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Estonia

The Estonian participant returned a completed questionnaire. This state has an established railway which used to be part of the common Soviet republic infrastructure. As such its systems were internally compatible with each other and, since much of the gauge differs from the European one, interoperability over the local systems will only come over time. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that, like its neighbours, Estonia will convert to generic European standards over time (TSIs of the Conventional and High speed directives), hence compatibility requirements for these states are stated to be largely to generic European norms.

5.6.1 Processes

The Estonian route to compatibility demonstration is controlled by the Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet (TJA) the Estonian technical surveillance authority. Individual assessments for each item appear to be assessed by departments within this organisation. The regulation that controls acceptance is given on a web page https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=13217505 in Estonian. A full translation of this page is presently unavailable however it is apparent that the process requires the registration of vehicle types and these require proof of conformity from the technical surveillance authority. The questionnaire states that such proof is evaluated internally by the technical authority by means of a panel within the authority who take evidence from test results, third party certification, simulation and expert opinion. The panel consists of members of the authority with support from an independent assessor if required. Acceptance of a rolling stock type is signified by a letter of no objection from the panel. Timescales and costs for the procedure are variable depending upon the level of assessment required. It is remarked that very few such processes have been carried out to date. A further comment has been added to the questionnaire that the flowchart of the procedure may be obtained from the TJA by direct application.

Tehnilise Järelevalve AmetAssessment Panel

Approved Third PartyVehic le Test Operation

ApplicationRailway Undertaking

Authorisation Tehnilise Järelevalve AmetIndustrial Safety Division

Lineside

Tehnilise Järelevalve AmetElec tronic Communications Division (Radio)

Certificate of conformity

Results

Figure 14 - Estonian Interaction for EMC


Compatibility with train detection is provided from independent third parties who provide certification, measurements against standards, test results and expert opinion. Certificates are reviewed by independent assessors. It is stated that these assessors do not belong to a specific organisation but are appointed depending upon the actual circumstance of the assessment. These assessors use EN standards 50121 and 50238 as the basis of their assessment. The compatibility process has three stages; Design, Testing in normal operation and in degraded modes. These lead to a declaration of

Page 33



conformity. Again no timescales or costs for the process are available as these are dependent upon the actual tests required.

Estonia uses ALSN (GOST). This is a system of in-cab signalling and train auto-stop. This system uses coded track circuits at 50 Hz with a minimum coding current in the rails of 1.2A. The data transmission between coded track circuits and on-board equipment is via inductive coil pickup above the rails.


Compatibility with lineside systems is assessed by the Industrial safety division of the TJA from information provided by third parties operating under instruction from the applicant (operator) or the TJA. The TJA assess it using certificates of inspection, third party measurements and expert opinion. The assessment is based on EN 50121-4 and compares test results to the limits contained in that document.

5.6.4 Energy Supply

Compatibility with the energy supply is from third part assessments using inspection, conformance to standards and expert opinion. The basic standard used is EN 50121-5. Measurements are performed by third party accredited (in Estonia) organisations and their results compared to the requirements of the standard. The documentation supplied to the TJA is a detailed technical report.


Compatibility with radio frequency systems is assessed by the Electronic Communication Division of the TJA from information provided by third parties operating under instruction from the applicant (operator) or the TJA. The organisation reviews evidence provided from third party tests, inspection certificates and expert opinion. The basic standard for evaluation is stated as EN 50121-4. Testing is carried out by accredited test agencies who issue a certificate of conformance. Estonia operates track to train radio communication and area (regional – stations). Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.6.6 Other Systems

Estonia does not assess for compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects.

General compatibility with the EMC directive is assessed by both the Industrial safety and Electronic Communications Division of the TJA from information provided by third parties operating under instruction from the applicant (operator) or the TJA. The basic standards for assessment depend upon the actual equipment under examination. Responsibility for compliance is with the manufacturer however, the assessment includes a detailed technical report from an expert at each stage of the design, model test, product test and certification. Basic assessment is to the EN 50121 series of standards and the test organisation provides a conformance certificate as evidence. Again no estimates of the timescales or costs associated with conformance to the EMC directive were given.

5.6.7 EN 50238

Estonia does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 34



5.7 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Finland

This questionnaire was returned from the ERA XG working group member from Finland.

5.7.1 Processes

The Finnish acceptance body is the National Safety Authority of Finland Rautatievirasto Järnvägsverket (The Finnish Rail Agency). Licences to operate are issued by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Legislative documentation for the directives is available on the Finlex website (http://www.finlex.fi/ in Finnish). For acceptance of new rolling stock a safety certificate must be obtained. Certificates issued in other EU countries must be subject to validation by the Finnish Railway Agency. A leaflet on the general application process (not EMC specific) is available on the RHK website (http://www.rhk.fi/in_english/traffic_and_network_access/access_guide_for_railway_underta/) in English.

The organisation requesting acceptance of their product has responsibility for presenting the evidence to the NSA who issues a safety certificate for the equipment. This covers all aspects of the equipment and has no separate provisions for EMC. Acceptance tests are based on IEC 61133/EN50215 and documents EN 50121 and EN 50500. EMC is measured according to EN 50121 and EMF according to EN50500. Evidence is assessed by a panel within the NSA consisting of representatives from the NSA, the applicant, and the manufacturer of the equipment. A statement of compatibility from the infrastructure manager VR-Yhtymä Oy (VR) is also required for rolling stock.

The applicant supplies all necessary documentary proofs in a technical file which includes test results, simulations and expert opinion. The manufacturer is present to give support to the submission as he has the detailed technical knowledge of the equipment. Many of the National standards are contained in the document LISO 1.8 (1996). This document is stated to be somewhat out of date and it is currently being revised.

Rautatievirasto Järnvägsverket (The Finnish Rail Agency)Assessment Panel+ Manufacturer and Applicant representation

ApplicationRailway Undertaking

Ministry of Transport and Communications

Licence to operate

Railway UndertakingManufacturerEvidence

Safety Certificate

VR-Yhtymä Oy (VR) infrastructure manager

Statement of Compatibility

Technical File

EMC is only part of overallassessment

Figure 15 - Finnish Interactions for EMC

Page 35




For train detection the evidence for compatibility is supplied by the applicant. The evidence consists of test results and expert opinion. Expert opinion is based on the methodologies described in EN 50238 and compares the equipment to existing types and demonstrates that test results conform to prescribed limits, both conditions are reported by a certificate of conformance. The local document for conformance is LISO1.8 which gives details of train detection limits shown in Figure 16.

Permissible Harmonic levels

Frequency DC 25Hz 75Hz 83Hz 125Hz

Bandwidth +2.8Hz +/- 2.4Hz +/- 2.4Hz +/- 2.4Hz +/- 2.4Hz

Current 3.8 A 1 A 1 A 1 A 1 A

Duration 10 s 1 s 1 s 1 s 1 s

Figure 16 – Track Circuit Current Limits

The technical requirements for the train detection systems are specified by the infrastructure manager. Analysis is performed in the time domain by integration through a band-pass filter.

Testing of the equipment is stated to be a single stage process based on a prototype. The testing is stated to take 1 to 2 days however there is no estimate of the cost of the process given.


Compatibility with lineside systems is stated to be the same as the general compliance with TSI standards and hence would defer to the EN 50121 series and EN 50238 for axle counter systems. Specific national rules are applied to psophometric currents which are scaled to the equipment power. Permissible values of psophometric current are given by the formula Ipsoph=2*√(power of train in MW). Evidence supplied is by test results. The applicant has the responsibility for testing and presentation of the results.

5.7.4 Energy Supply

Compatibility with Energy Supply systems is stated to be the same as the general compliance with TSI standards and hence would defer to EN50388 and EN50163. Specific national rules are applied to inrush current level referred to in LISO 1.8 (Figure 17) and the restriction of the total permissible harmonic distortion of the supply to less than 6% based on decaying even and odd harmonic patterns given in LISO 1.8. The inrush current is defined in terms of initial cycles and further cycles Evidence supplied is by test results. The applicant has the responsibility for testing and presentation of the results.

Inrush Current

3 MW 6 MW

Breaker opening time T<2s T>2s T<2s T>2s

Page 36



Inrush Current

first cycle t=10ms 320A 210A 500A 210A

35th cycle t = 0.69s 190A 100A 300A 100A

RMS value t =0 to 3s 40A 40A 80A 80A

Figure 17 – Permitted Inrush Current Limits


Compatibility with Radio Frequency systems is stated to be the same as the general compliance with TSI standards and hence would defer to EN 50121. National rules with limits at transmission frequencies are included in the LISO1.8 document these are shown in Figure 18. As this document is currently under review it is uncertain whether these rules are superseded however superficially they are a more severe constraint than the limits given in EN 50121. The feedback from the questionnaire suggests that currently the methodologies and limits applied are those given in EN 50121. Evidence supplied is by test results. The applicant has the responsibility for testing and presentation of the results.

Frequency Electric Field strength at 30m (dBuV/m)

80 MHz 12

160 MHz 16

450 MHz 25

900 MHz 31

Figure 18 – Field Limits

The Finnish railway ground to train radio is a tailored VHF radio system VR Train. Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.7.6 Other Systems

Finland does assess the compatibility of systems to the directive relating to Human exposure to EMF. It is stated that earlier applications were based on standards issued by the infrastructure manager which defined the permissible electric and magnetic fields measured inside the train at 1kV/m and 100uT over the frequency range 50Hz - 1kHz: however the basic test processes in the TSI are now applied. These reference EN50500 and evidence is presented in the form of a certificate of conformance based on measurements. The timescale for these measurements is given as 1 day, however, the costs are not given.

The Safety Authority does not take into account any conformance with the EMC directive in its safety assessment although testing and demonstration of conformance to the EMC directive for rolling stock is required within the Finnish legal system.

5.7.7 EN 50238

Finland does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 37



5.8 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in France

No questionnaire response was received from France. The methods, standards and levels specified in the following sections are taken from results from the internet and the interviews during the convocation. It was stated at the convocation that not all the electromagnetic interactions considered in this document form part of the EMC compatibility demonstration in France. Hence, these interactions are not available for inclusion.

5.8.1 Processes

The French acceptance body is the L’Établissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire (EPSF) (French public railway safety authority) under the supervision of the French Ministry of transport. EPSF issues authorisations, carries out audits and inspections and licences to operate. Legislative documentation for the directives is available on the EPSF website (www.securite-ferroviaire.fr in French). Authorisation for putting into service is defined in Decrit 2006 1279 Ancite du 31/12/2007 Autorisation de mise en service which is available from http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr in French. As with other countries the French system follows the issuing of a certificate in two parts. The first concerns approval for a safety management system and the second part that requires compliance with the technical requirements of the infrastructure and with the professional systems for approval of staff.

Compatibility for the EMC systems is given in the process described in SAMS 710 in 2X63 (Verification of EMC between RS and Infrastructure). Approval for infrastructure is the responsibility of Réseau Ferré de France (RFF) although almost all of the technical aspects of acceptance are devolved to SCNF as the “Delegated infrastructure manager”. Evidence for compatibility is gathered by SNCF-CIM and OQA(DeBo). Tests are performed by Eurailtest under manufacturer supervision. Evidence from subsystem tests and information from suppliers and consultants is also used in the evaluation.

L'Établissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire (EPSF)

Test Operation

Railway UndertakingMinistry of Transport

Authorisation for putting into service

Technical ApprovalsRéseau Ferré de France (RFF)

Safety ManagementSystem

OQA (DeBO)analysis

SNCFDesignatedInfrastructure manager

SNCF CIMAnalysis Expert Opinion

Eurailtest

Under Manufac turer supervision

Can a lso inc ludeevidence fromManufacturer data Subsystem dataConsultants

Figure 19 - French Interactions for EMC Approvals


In France, evidence for compatibility with train detection is supplied from the applicant/ manufacturer to the results from testing to SAMS003. Details of compatibility with track circuits are given in

Page 38



document IN2724. This document is not directly available to the public however some conditions from this and other documents available are available. These are summarised below.

Compatibility with train detection in France before normalisation is a complex process involving not only comparisons with limits but also comparisons with duration and repetitive events. Train emissions are assessed in both normal and degraded conditions. It is known that line conditions within France assume a balanced return current and do not directly consider broken rail scenarios. In addition, whilst the return current levels may be summarised in a table (Figure 20) the general shape of the frequency/interference current gabarits in the frequency domain are complex and a simple ‘square’ centre-frequency/filter characteristic is inappropriate. To activate track circuits French standards require minimum resistance of axles to UIC 512 and testing for track circuit compatibility should be to standard IN 2763. It is known that certain routes in France use HVI and DC track circuits however, no published limits are available for these.

The modulation of the TVM track circuits are also used as a means of train track-side communications for ATC.

50Hz 83Hz C UM71/TVM systems

Other UM71/TVM systems

Centre Frequencies

50Hz 83Hz 1.7,2,2.3,2.6 kHz 1.7,2,2.3,2.6 kHz

Threshold Limit

1.2A 0.6A 0.07A 0.5A

Bandwidth 0dB

+/-2 Hz +/-6 Hz +/-4 Hz +/-3 Hz

Duration <1s <1s - -

Notes 1500V DC V shaped characteristic outside susceptibility threshold :Logarithmic current to 100A linear frequency to 32Hz and 68Hz

25kV AC 6db points at +/-10 Hz 18db points at +/-12 Hz

Modulated carrier gives lower susceptibility outside fundamental region of 0.02A for fo +/ 50Hz with complex summation rules for compatibility

Modulated carrier gives lower susceptibility outside fundamental region of 0.1A for fo +/ 50Hz with complex summation rules for compatibility

Figure 20 – Frequency / Interference Current Gabarits

The ATP system in France is called KVB. This uses track balises energised at 27Mhz and 4.5Mhz to transmit to the train.


Compatibility with Lineside systems is stated to be not within the remit of electromagnetic compatibility with the rolling stock although a psophometric current level is defined in SAMS 006. Compatibility with axle counter systems is to the requirements of EN 50238 and to the SAMS 005 document. This was noted at the convocation to be in accordance with IN2724: this gives susceptible frequencies of

Page 39



39.4kHz and 50.4kHz but refers to another standard IN2726 for details. This document is currently unavailable from public sources.

5.8.4 Energy Supply

Compatibility with energy systems is stated to be not within the remit of electromagnetic compatibility with the rolling stock. There is a limit placed on input impedance at 50Hz for DC systems of 0.3 ohms (with inductive phase). However, during the convocation the delegate indicated that generic European standards EN50388, EN50153 and EN50163 would apply and that SAM - T.001 (IN 2745) Regulation of power / line voltage - T.002 (IN 2746) Power Factor - T.003 (IN 2783).


Compatibility with Radio Frequency systems is stated to be the same as the general compliance with TSI standards and hence would defer to EN 50121. No specific national rules are applied. Evidence supplied is by test results. The applicant has the responsibility for testing and presentation of the results. This implies that the methodologies and limits applied are those given in EN 50121. The French Railways use UIC radio Chapter 1-4 + 6 + 7. This is an analogue system which consists of lineside and mobile (train-borne) equipment. Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.8.6 Other Systems

Although it was not stated that the compliance with the directives relating to human exposure to EMF radiation were considered as part of electromagnetic compatibility considerations for train acceptance it was stated that compatibility with the directives is part of the general considerations for the railway. However, it was stated that compatibility to EN 50500 was also used in specific railway acceptances.

Testing and demonstration of conformance to the EMC directive for rolling stock is required within the French legal system.

5.8.7 EN 50238

It was learned during the interview at the convocation that France does use the technical documentation in EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 40



5.9 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Germany

Germany did not return an individual questionnaire. Instead the representatives on the ERA XG group indicated that the required information should be compiled from a combined document (RTI)[3] defining a common approach in a TFI (task force for interoperability). Germany belongs to a group of countries who have certain common requirements for international inter-operation These are documented in the International Requirements List available from www.irl-rail.eu giving details requirements agreed between the five member countries of the working group. The following paragraphs are therefore based on evaluations of the common technical standards, information obtained during interviews at the convocation and researches on the internet.

5.9.1 Processes

The German organisation responsible for railways is the Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung (BMVBS). Technical acceptance for railway undertakings is through the NSA Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA). In common with many other countries any new railway undertaking needs to apply to the EBA for a licence to operate. The licence is in two parts and the second part has similar conditions to the provision of safety management, personnel and vehicles. The vehicle section requires compliance with “the special requirements for the safe operation of the personnel and vehicles on the rail network or the various rail routes.” and in particular ATC, Radio and EMC compatibility. There is also an statement that additional documentation showing compatibility with the infrastructure is required. The procedural aspects follow the general requirements of the directive: application must be made by the railway undertaking and a period of 4 months is allowed for any decision to grant a certificate with reasons for any rejection given in writing. From the convocation it was stated that assessment during the process involves Designated Bodies (who provide expertise) and the EBA (who provide specific topic related expertise). The infrastructure owner (Deutsche Bahn), train manufacturer and operator provide analysis and design information/calculations with testing performed by experts and approved test laboratories operating under the German accreditation body: “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Akkreditierung mbH” It is understood that this permits testing on dedicated test tracks within Germany. The interactions between the various parties involved in the assessment process are shown in Figure 21

Page 41



Figure 21 - German interactions for EMC Approvals

Although the original documentation that was examined in this report specifies two main documents pertaining to EMC (RIC 807.0201 and 807.0205) it has become known during the revision of this report that these documents now form part of a new system of documentation pertaining to the existing infrastructure. The new series of documents are named 31_Regelung_EMV_01,02,03 and 04 which are now available on the EBA website: (http://www.eba.bund.de/cln_015/nn_309866/DE/Infothek/Fahrzeuge/Fahrzeugtechnik/EMV/) Hence, information from these documents is incorporated alongside that from the existing RIC documents. The relationship between the old and new documents for the purposes of EMC are shown in the diagram of Figure 22.

Page 42



Figure 22 - German Technical Documentation Changes


The evidence for compatibility is supplied from the applicant with support from testing laboratories and the manufacturer. The evidence consists of test results and expert opinion. Expert opinion is based on the methodologies described in RIC documents 807.0201 and 807.0205. Much of the German system uses axle counter systems however, track circuits are still in use in certain areas.

Infrastructure 15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz 15kV 16.6Hz Non-

electrified

type 42Hz* 100Hz* FTGS46*

GLS 9/15* EON 7* FTGS917* 50Hz

Centre frequencies

42Hz 100 Hz 4.75, 5.25, 5.75, 6.25 kHz

9.5, 10.5, 11.5, 12.5, 13.5, 14.5 kHz

7.0, 8.0, 10.0, 12.150, 14.6, 16.8 kHz

9.5, 10.5, 11.5, 12.5, 13.5, 14.5, 15.5, 16.5 kHz

50Hz

Bandwidth +4 -5 Hz

+ 7 -10 Hz

200,206,214,220 Hz

410, 500, 535, 635, 565, 660 Hz

195, 235, 280, 330, 375, 460Hz

360, 380, 400, 425, 445, 470, 490, 510Hz

+/- 4Hz

Limit 2.8 A 2.8 A 1 A 0.113 A, 0.104 A, 0.0 91A, 0.086A, 0.0 71A, 0.0 67A

0.0106, 0.095, 0.074, 0.059, 0.048, 0.044 A

0.330A 2A

Duration / integration time

0.5s 0.5s 0.04s 0.04s 0.04s 0.04s 0.5s

Page 43



Infrastructure 15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz

15kV 16.6Hz 15kV 16.6Hz Non-

electrified

Notes

Lower limit for a single unit of 2 A

Lower limit for a single unit of 2 A

* limits apply to Diesel traction which use 22Hz electrical heating in local mode in non-electrified areas

AB.C (strikethrough) indicates that these frequencies are no longer used on DB-Netz infrastructure in document EMV-01. No new applications of EON 7 are permitted.

Different limits on S-Bahn and other infrastructures of 0.6A,1.5A, 2.8A

Figure 23 – Track Circuit Current Limits

The susceptibilities shown in Figure 23 are taken from the RIL document. This document gives different limits for narrower (fixed) bandwidth measurements and stresses that the bandwidth of the measurement is an important factor in the analysis.

A recent document ENV03 describes limits to be applied to magnetic train detection switches. These systems use DC magnets to activate switches. The limits and methods of compatibility demonstration for the DC flux levels are described in the document. It is a complex document giving magnetic flux limits in various orientations in a volume bounded by a rounded rectangle some 250mm in dimension near the rails. The track switching sensors use DC magnetic fields but appear to be susceptible to frequencies up to 250Hz. There are several complex rules dealing with the detection of the magnetic flux densities using a coil (with a 100mm2 cross section: DIN VDE 0848 part 1) as the sensing element and the vehicle passage as generating an AC component and implied integration to derive a detected level at DC. There are also some complex addition/ evaluation requirements for multi frequency and AC fluxes superimposed on DC. However, there seems to be an overall limit of 200µT in the x direction (along the track) below which no complexity applies and hence defines a basic compatibility. Above this limit the waveform itself must be considered and an equivalent parameter combining the train speed and the fundamental frequency of the detected interference used to determine the overall limit to be used in the assessment.

Much of the German infrastructure uses axle counter systems for train detection. These are sensitive to magnetic fields. It is stated that the requirements of EN 50238 are not currently applied in Germany. However, it is also stated that EN50238 will apply to all new systems. The recent document ENV04 describes the interim methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with axle counters.

The document broadly requires that compatibility is demonstrated by operation of a test train over the relevant victim circuit (whether this be axle counter, track loop or other transient magnetic system). Evaluation is by measurement of the victim system output signal response with the train coasting (completely unpowered) over the victim. The measurement is repeated with the train operating at full power (including auxiliary loads). The two response signals are compared and analysed to assess whether any anomalous behaviour is present. Several passes over the system are required (at different speeds and powers derived from an analysis of the train design/ operating features) although no definitive number is given other than there must be at least three repetitions at each test parameter.

The description for each victim system is complex and gives details of each type of axle counter system, typical waveforms of expected signals and limits of susceptibility. It also details relevant filters and instrumentation settings that should be used to determine compatibility. The individual data fore ach system is too extensive and complex for inclusion here and the reader is referred to the relevant document for the detail. Testing is the responsibility of the railway undertaking although it is stated that this may be devolved to manufacturers or approved third parties.

Page 44



The ATP systems used in Germany are called INDUSI/PZB (Induktive Zugsicherung/ Punktförmige Zugbeeinflussung) and LZB (Linienförmige Zugbeeinflussing). This first system uses magnetically resonant track-side circuits operating at 500Hz, 1000Hz and 1500Hz. The second system uses 36kHz (to the train), 56kHz (from the train).Compatibility is demonstrated by trial operation in a similar manner to that described above.


Discussion at the convocation was that the German approvals process considered induction into lineside systems outside of the scope of EMC for vehicles and that it was the concern of the infrastructure to achieve compatibility by design and there was no psophometric requirement or local induction requirement. The RIL document does however contain a reference to psophometric current limit of <2.5A with a preferred level of <1.5A. Measurement is to the methods in the annexe to EN 50121-3-1.

5.9.4 Energy Supply

Information obtained during interviews at the convocation stated that the German approvals process considered compatibility with supply systems outside of the scope of EMC for vehicles and that it was the concern of the manufacturer and infrastructure to achieve compatibility by design.

Two of the recent EMV documents deal with interference from trailer sections of the train. They both contain methods of assessing the interference from train lines for (auxiliary) power. Both documents have the same overall limits as the RIL documents for low frequency and mains harmonic interference with different factors used in the summation used where a very long (freight) train which may consist of one or two locomotives and many freight wagons. A limit of fifteen wagons is mentioned in the documentation. The document also requires compliance to UIC leaflet 626. This details limits for the operating voltage for the train-line (nominally 1000V).

The recent EMV02 document also gives limits on impedance which must be inductive between 4 and 17kHz for limiting the return current flowing in the rail for freight systems on 16.7Hz supply infrastructure which use a train-line to supply current to wagons. This gives condition for the supply source impedance (inductance) during measurement of less than 1mH. An informational table of specific permissible levels of current is given for differing types of vehicle is given in the appendix to the document.


In general the document details compatibility demonstration with EN 501213-1 and EN 50121 3-2.

Information obtained during interviews at the convocation suggested that local conditions were used with respect to shunting radio but these were currently under review and hence did not have limits. Balises and receiving antennas are unregulated. The relevant section of the RTI also specifies local conditions particular to Munich 3à EisbG. Germany uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 for ground to train radio (UIC code 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.9.6 Other Systems

Information obtained during interviews at the convocation suggested that requirements relating to human exposure to EMF or the EMC directive are contained within the EN standard EN50500 and there is a specific VDE standard quoted in the RTI documentation: VDE 0848 with reference to implants.

Page 45



Testing and demonstration of conformance to the EMC directive for rolling stock is required within the German legal system however, this is considered separately to specific demonstration of EMC in the context of approvals.

5.9.7 EN 50238

Information obtained during interviews at the convocation stated that Germany does use the technical documentation in EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 46



5.10 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Greece

The Greek participant returned a completed questionnaire. Further details were sought by follow up. There was no participation by Greece in the convocation.

5.10.1 Processes

The Greek acceptance body is the Ministry of Transportation and Communication. Υπουργού Υποδομών Μεταφορών και Δικτύων (YME) YME.gr.

The questionnaire responded that there are written documents that define safety certification of railway undertakings and the safety authorisation of the infrastructure manager. The acceptance process is available in the Decision ΑΣ.4.2/οικ.26697/2422 (Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic B’ 986/22.05.2009). The current acceptance process uses information gathered from test results, simulations, expert opinion and third party certification. The evidence is assessed by a panel within the Ministry and an external panel consisting of members from the train owners or users. The panel supplies a letter of no objection. The process has three stages preliminary acceptance, test runs and final acceptance. It is stated that the process takes approximately 2 weeks however no costs are given.

Ministry of Transportation and Communication.

ð ð (YME)

Υ ουργού Υ οδομών Μεταφορώνκαι Δικτύων

Licence to Operate

EMC

Letter of No Objection

Railway Undertakingor ManufacturerTests and Simulation

YME Internal Panel of Experts

RU / ManufacturerExternal Panel

CertificationTechnica l reports

Infrastructure ManagerTests and Simulation

Certification

Third Party Testing


Data from Equipment Suppliers

Evaluation

Evidence

Figure 24 - Greek EMC Approval Interactions


The rolling stock manufacturer or owner is responsible for supplying evidence of compatibility with train detection. Evidence is supplied by certificates of inspection and test results. No references to standards were supplied for these. Testing was stated to take 1 week but no costs were given.

Other information suggests that one relevant standard is EN 50238, however, there is also information that other local standards are applied clarification was sought on these but no reply was received.

Page 47




The rolling stock manufacturer or owner and infrastructure manager (in collaboration with the lineside equipment manufacturer) are together responsible for supplying evidence of compatibility with lineside systems. Evidence is provided by certificates of inspection, calculations and test results generated by the rolling stock manufacturer or owner. The evidence is assessed by conformance to relevant EN and UIC standards and it consists of certificates of compliance and detailed technical reports assessment is by testing and comparison with existing types. No specific references to standards are quoted however, other information suggests that the relevant standards are EN 50121.1-5.

5.10.4 Energy Supply

The rolling stock manufacturer or owner and infrastructure manager are together responsible for supplying evidence of compatibility with the energy supply. Evidence is provided by certificates of inspection, calculations and test results generated by the rolling stock manufacturer and infrastructure owner. The evidence is assessed by conformance to relevant EN and UIC standards and it consists of certificates of compliance and detailed technical reports No specific standards are quoted.


The rolling stock manufacturer or owner and infrastructure manager are together responsible for supplying evidence of compatibility with radio frequency systems. Evidence is provided by test results generated by the rolling stock manufacturer and infrastructure owner. No specific standards are quoted although other information suggests that tests are performed to EN 50121. The ground-to-train radio system is partially compatible with UIC-751-3. Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.10.6 Other Systems

The Greek authorities do take into account an assessment of human exposure to EMF. Assessment is performed by the rolling stock manufacturer from the results of testing and is reported in a detailed technical report. No standards are quoted although reference is given to ‘relevant EN and UIC standards’ It is presumed that these include EN50500.

Compatibility with the EMC directive is not a consideration in the Greek assessment process.

5.10.7 EN 50238

Greece states that it does not use the technical information contained in TR 50507.

Page 48



5.11 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Hungary

The Hungarian acceptance body is the National Traffic Authority of Hungary (Nemzeti Közlekedési Hatóság : NKH). Licences to operate are issued by the Authority and there is a written procedure however no reference to the procedure was given. Subsequent investigation appears to comprise of an adherence to the directives with the Railway undertakings being responsible for demonstrating that they operate a safety management system and accident reporting system. From the NKH website (http://www.nkh.hu/) it is understood that the approvals are granted and reviewed on a yearly basis. The relevant implementation of the directive is 40/2006. (VI. 26.) GKM available from the NKH website. It is understood that there are different processes applied to the interoperable rail corridor and other national and local railways. Most of the documentation is available only in Hungarian. The Hungarian representative also provided sample test documentation in Hungarian. Much of the technical detail given in the following paragraphs is taken from an analysis of this documentation.

5.11.1 Processes

There are no details of the procedural aspects given; other than that the application and approval are to the National Railway Authority according to the implementation procedure 28/2003 (V.8) GKM available on the NKH website. This document is in Hungarian and a partial machine translation indicates that the process involves testing. The test methodology consists of examining the performance of systems during operation of a test train. Hence, there is little information on prescriptive limits. Most evaluation is by expert opinion on the results of the trials. Further information suggests that the process takes from between 3 to 6 months but no estimates of the costs could be obtained.

National Traffic Authority of Hungary

Nemzeti Közlekedési Hatóság (NKH)

Licence to Operate

EMC

MÁV TEBMagyar llamvasutak TEB Á(Hungarian Railways Telecom, Power Supply and Signaling Centre)

RU / ManufacturerProvides Test Vehic le

Licence to Operate


Vehic le Approval

Internal Tests over/ alongside susceptible

EquipmentEvaluation

TestResults

Figure 25 - Hungarian Interactions for EMC Approvals


Compatibility with train detection is determined by the MÁV TEB Központ (Hungarian Railways Telecom, Power Supply and Signalling Centre). There are no specific standards quoted, evaluation is by

Page 49



expert opinion/analysis of the measured response of the equipment. The sample test documentation lists several different types of train detection. These are listed in Figure 26. Examination of the documentation shows that the train is operated over a typical installation of each type of equipment. The internal signal of each equipment is measured in the time domain as the train passes. The measured response (taken from a signal internal to the system) is evaluated with the train present and absent. A typical assessment compares the ratio of signal levels with either a threshold level or with itself. Where a threshold response was indicated in the sample test data this is recorded in Figure 26 otherwise the evaluation used in the sample documentation can be ascertained from the comment provided.

Type SIEMENS 122 RSR Axle Counter

SIEMENS 180 RSR Axle Counter

GANZ QDA Axle counter

ALCATEL Axle counter

Typical output level (train absent)

2.2V 1.5V 22V 0.1V

Typical output level (train/wheel present)

<1.5V <0.75V 0V -0.1V

Threshold applied

1.75V 1.3V - 0V

Comment Digital type output

Type 13kHz

Track circuit

75Hz track circuit

400Hz track circuit

SYGTAY

Hot axle Box detector

FÜS-FELKA

Hot axle Box detector

Typical output level (train absent)

10V pp 6 to 10V pp -20dBV

Typical output level (train/wheel present)

<1V pp <1V pp -60dBV

Threshold applied

- - -

Comment Signal evaluated from chart output response no levels given

Signal evaluated from chart output response no levels given

Page 50



Note: No operating frequencies are given as the response is measured at the response output of the equipment.

Figure 26 - Train detection systems for the Hungarian Railway

The information received states that some circuits in use are of a tone detection type. There are no specific written standards for compatibility with these circuits and testing is performed in situ on the relevant circuit. The expertise for these tests is derived from the privatised company subsidiary of MÁV. The railway Centre of Standardization (http://www.mavintezet.hu/szv/en/index.htm)5. Compatibility is by a series of on-track tests lasting from 4 to 10 days. These are evaluated by expert opinion from within the technical centre and reported to NKH as a simple declaration of compatibility. Hungary uses an in-cab signalling system called EVM. This system uses 75Hz coded track circuits.


Compatibility with lineside systems is determined by the MÁV TEBK (Hungarian Railways Telecom, Power Supply and Signalling Centre). The basic standard for compatibility is quoted as EN 50121however the response mentions other tests. Examination of the sample test documentation provided shows that these tests require the measurement of induced differential voltage in core pairs of lineside cables. The typical cables quoted in the tests are 17km in length and typical induced voltage is of the order of a few mV differential psophometrically weighted) and ten volts in series mode. The tests are evaluated by expert opinion from within the technical centre.


Compatibility with the energy supply is determined by the MÁV TEBK (Hungarian Railways Telecom, Power Supply and Signalling Centre). The basic standard for compatibility is quoted as EN 50388 although test documentation provided also indicates that EN50163 is also used. Measurements include voltage, current phase power, power-factor THD and transient evaluation. Again, evaluation is by expert opinion from tests performed to assess the behaviour of the system with the train active and the opinion is reported in a detailed technical report.


Compatibility with radio frequency systems is determined by Nemzeti Hírközlési Hatóság (the National Communications Authority ) (http://webold.nhh.hu/hirszolg/szolg/). The reference standard given is to Decree No. 5/2004. (IV.13.) IHM of the Minister of Informatics and Communications on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity, MSZ ETS 300 086_1993. This standard is specific to analogue voice communication on mobile system. In Hungary this applies to 160MHz and 45MHz radios. In addition, TEBK inspect the functionality of onboard radio equipment according to specification of UIC 450 systems or MÁV, and’ in situ’ compatibility with operating line radio systems of MÁV.

Evidence is provided by a certificate of inspection provided by MÁV (Hungarian state railways company telecommunication, electrification and signalling centre). Hungary uses UIC radio Chapter 1- 4 + 6 (Irish System). Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

General compatibility with the limits ob EN50121 is also required. This is also measured by MÁV TEB on a test track.

5 Unfortunately this website is available only through subscription.

Page 51




The Hungarian assessment does not require consideration of compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects or compliance to the EMC Directive.

5.11.7 EN 50238

The Hungarian demonstration does not use the technical appendix to EN 50238 in its evaluation. Instead the response states that the evaluation requires special site conformance tests which result in certificates of inspection conforming to a technical checklist issued by MÁV .The technical requirements for inclusion in EN 50238 are being developed by Budapesti Műszaki és Gazdaságtudományi Egyetem (Technical University Budapest http://portal.bme.hu/default.aspx) and are due by the end of this year.

Page 52



5.12 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Ireland

The Irish respondent returned a completed questionnaire. No Irish representatives attended the convocation. The following information is based on the questionnaire, documentation supplied by The Irish representatives, internet researches and telephone conversations with the Irish NSA and other parties.

5.12.1 Processes

The Irish NSA is the Railway Safety Commission (RSC). Under Irish Law the RSC is responsible for assessing the acceptance of new rolling stock as part of the Railway Safety Act 2005 section 45. This requires all undertakings to submit a safety management process for audit by an independent third party. Part of this process is the presentation of a safety case which is reviewed by the RSC.

The Irish compatibility demonstration process is twofold. It consists of an initial (internal) assessment by the Railway Undertaking and a second assessment by the Safety Authority; the Railway Safety Commission (RSC). Hence, there are two procedures for acceptance:

• Conformance to Railway safety standard 56

• Conformance to RSC-G-009 and RSC-G-015

• Conformance to RSC-G-020

These latter guidance documents are available on the RSC website (www.rsc.ie)

Safety is assessed by a panel within the NSA made up of RSC experts. The assessment uses test results, calculations and simulations, expert opinion and third party certification as evidence in its evaluation. The panel provides certification to the Railway Undertaking. The Railway Undertaking is encouraged to interact with Irish Railways on technical matters during the initial stages. The process is completed in 5 stages; Specification, Procurement, Construction, Testing and Operation. The overall timescales for the process are given as 2.5 years however these include two years for the first three stages. No estimates were made of the cost of the process.

Page 53



Railway Safety Commission(RSC)

Railway Undertaking

Authorisation for putting into servic e

Technical AssessmentRSC -RST and -CCS experts


Independent Third Party

EMC is only part of overall process

Safety CaseInc ludes Testing, Simulation, Calc ulation and Design

Vehic le Approval

Initial Stage

Second Stage

Can also inc ludeevidence from/dialogue withInfrastruc ture ManagerIrish Railways ExpertsConsultants

Manufacturer

rolling stock (RSCG-015, section 18)signalling systems (RSCG-020, item 2.13)

Figure 27 - Interactions in Irish EMC Approvals


The Railway Undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with train detection. The evidence presented includes certificates of inspection, third party measurements, manufacturer tests, simulations and calculations and expert opinion all are contained within a general safety case assessment. Evidence is to European standards (EN 50121 and EN 50238) and to local rules. The local rules are available in a document ”Traction and rolling stock interference specification” available from Iarnród Éireann (IE : Irish Railways) . Assessment is by expert opinion/evaluation of test data by CCS and rolling stock experts. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report with analysis of hazards and prediction of emissions behaviour under all normal and credible fault conditions.

Several track-based systems are in operation on the 1500V dc and non-electrified network. The documentation states that, where no feasible intrinsic design alternative is available, safety-validated monitoring systems may be included in the design to prevent the generation of unacceptable harmonic levels. Transients and credible failures are included as part of the assessment. Measurements must be carried in both the time and frequency domains with time domain measurements analysed by 2nd order bandpass filtering and frequency domain measurements taken at various bandwidths (with peak hold over varying sample numbers) depending upon the track circuit type under consideration. Detailed specifications are documented in the reference document.

DC track circuits are used on the non-electrified railway. The measurement criterion for a D.C. track circuit in the time domain is second-order low-pass filter with -3 dB points at 2.4 Hz. The criterion for compatibility is by evaluation/calculation of any voltage generated by local current flow on non-electrified equipment. The principal D.C. track relays in use on IE are shown in Figure 28.

Page 54



Type QTA2 QTA2 NT2 PN150BH

Coil Resistance 9 ohm 20 ohm 9 ohm 0.5 ohm

Pick up 0.12 A 0.081 A 0.039 A 0.153 A

Drop away 0.081 A 0.055 A 0.026 A 0.125 A

Figure 28 - DC Track Circuit Evaluation

For the electrified railway the track circuit limits are shown in Figure 29. These include two other pieces of equipment susceptible to conducted interference: the CAWS/ATP system and the Insulated joint failure detection system. The CAWS compatibility is tested by operating the train directly over the system and measuring the response.

Type US&S T.C.

Sasib

(solid state)

US&S ATT20

Safetran SMTC 71010

Defetive joint

Detector CAWS CAWS

Centre frequency(ies)

83.3Hz 83.3Hz 12.28 kHz,15 kHz,20 kHz

11.5 kHz, 15.2 kHz, 20.2 kHz

18 kHz 50 Hz 83.3Hz

Bandwidth - ±0.15Hz 390 Hz modulated

± 1% of carrier FSK

120Hz, 900Hz

On/off modulated at 0.83,1.25,2,2,4.5 and 7Hz

Limit 0.86 A* 2.46 A

1.35 A 0.132, 0.131, 0.129 A

0.132, 0.131, 0.129 A

0.04 A** 0.6A

# #

Duration/integration time

5 s 4.5 s 4.5 s 4.5 s - - -

test type Band-pass

Notes *lower susceptibility applies to Westinghouse Impedance bonds

**lower level is for lower bandwidth: assumes joint is breached by 1 ohm resistor

#on-board detection through loop antennas of current shorted by leading axle. Requires 1A and 3A signal levels in differential mode. Normally evaluated by active test

Figure 29 - Track Circuit Parameters

The Irish railway also uses axle counter systems of types Alcatel AZLS (ZP30CA) and Alcatel AZLM (ZP30H) operating at 27-32 kHz: compatibility is tested by active running over axle counter system.

There is a further criterion which is applied:

“No electrical system on the train shall, even in credible fault conditions, cause a longitudinal voltage along the running rail, between any two axles of which are electrically interconnected and in contact with the running rail that exceeds 0.35 times the drop-away voltage of the track circuit receiver at its operating frequencies.”: This limitation can also apply to diesel stock

Page 55



containing on-board electrical generation. Drop away voltages are defined in the Technical Specification”.


The Railway undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with lineside systems. The evidence presented includes certificates of inspection, third party measurements, manufacturer tests, simulations and calculations and expert opinion. Evidence is to European standards (EN 50121 and EN 50238) and to local rules given in the technical specification (para 5.12.2). The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report.

Both longitudinal (series mode) and transverse (differential mode) voltage limits are specified for lineside cables these are 60V and 1mV respectively made on lineside copper cable pairs whilst the train is operating.

General compatibility with signalling and telecommunications interference is by measurement of psophometric current. Limits of 10A (20s) 12.2A (4s) and 13A (instantaneous) are given for cumulative CCITT weighted current harmonics measured in the traction supply. A table of the communications systems is shown in Figure 31. Compatibility with the higher frequency systems is by proof of operation whilst the train is running.

Interference limits from magnetic fields are also specified for compatibility with the CAWS and for rolling stock fitted with AWS magnet detection6. The limits for DC flux is 24mT and for AC flux is 24x10-6/t2 (Where t is the period of the interference if t< 10ms. The levels are measured at points on the railway corresponding to the positions of the CAWS and AWS system sensors. (An example is shown in Figure 30).

27

0mm

115m

m

800mm

1600mm 1970mm 1600mm

Figure 30 - CAWS Location

6 Although Irish Railways do not use track-mounted AWS magnets certain of the rolling stock operating on the railway is fitted

with the system.

Page 56



Lineside Communications Systems

Type Ericsson CCTV Platform Information

SSI (trackside) SSI (long) HABD

Frequency 2M bit/s base-band video

9600 baud 20k bit/s 64k bit/s 256 and 2Mbit/s

Mode Carrier - RS485 - Carrier RS485

modulation PCM - square half duplex PCM square

Type DATAC DATAC ABB Lineside Base stations

Vital FDM

Frequency 1.32 kHz 2.76 kHz 2kHz 300Hz-3.4kHz 4010 to 4160 Hz , 10 Hz intervals

Mode Carrier Carrier Carrier audio/control tones

multiplex

modulation +/- 210 Hz FSK

+/- 210 Hz FSK

+/- 400 Hz FSK

FDM

Figure 31 - Lineside Communications Systems


The Railway undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with the Energy supply system. The evidence presented includes certificates of inspection, third party measurements, manufacturer tests, simulations and calculations and expert opinion. Evidence is to European standards (EN 50121 and EN 50238) and to local rules. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report.

Specific values are given for fault currents and transient voltage on the infrastructure :

The traction equipment shall not generate an electrification fault current of peak value 44 kA for longer than 0.1 s and rate of rise of 2.82 A/μs in the vicinity of a substation.

To avoid problems to SSI signalling equipment, the T&RS operating from the electrical system shall not produce transients exceeding 1 kV peak on the rail with respect to remote earth in any credible service conditions, including pantograph up/down operations and loss of contact due to pantograph bounce.


The Railway undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with radio frequency systems. The evidence presented includes certificates of inspection, third party measurements, manufacturer tests, simulations and calculations and expert opinion. Evidence is stated to be to European standards (EN 50121 and EN 50238) and to local rules. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report. Ireland uses an analogue ground to train radio system according to UIC radio Chapter 1 - 4 + 6 (Irish system). Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B and in the technical specification (para 5.12.2).

Page 57




The Irish process includes an assessment compatibility of systems to the directive relating to human exposure to EMF effects. The Railway Undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility. The evidence presented includes certificates of inspection, third party measurements, manufacturer tests, simulations and calculations and expert opinion. Evidence is to EN45502-2-1 and Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC and Directive 2004/40/EC. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report.

In addition: “Magnetic fields in areas visited by members of the public and by railway stall in the normal course of their duties shall not exceed 10 gauss (1mT). Within the train the level shall not exceed 10 gauss (1mT) at train floor level and 5 gauss (0.5mT) at height of 2 m above floor level.”

The process also includes an assessment compatibility of systems with the EMC directive. The Railway undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility. Evidence is to the requirements of the directive. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report.

5.12.7 EN 50238

Ireland does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 58



5.13 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Italy

The Italian respondent did not return a completed questionnaire. Hence, information in the following paragraphs has been derived from the interviews at the convocation, the internet and Italy’s participation in the TFI (task force for interoperability). Italy belongs to a group of countries who have certain common requirements for international inter-operation. These are documented in the International Requirements List available from www.irl-rail.eu giving details requirements agreed between the five member countries of the working group. During the convocation feedback indicated that the Italian approach to compatibility demonstration uses a different approach to that used in other countries due to the strict requirements imposed by the Italian legal system on risk. The Italian assessments are based on probabilistic methods with adherence to specific test thresholds being only one part of the evaluation. Other factors used include risk assessments from the (local) infrastructure e.g. the probability of broken rails, number of trains permitted in section etc. The Italian representatives were insistent that this approach should be borne in mind when comparing the methodologies across Europe.

5.13.1 Processes

National Safety Authority is the Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie – (ANSF) a part of the Italian department of transport. The safety assessment is established in Legislative Decree The process follows a similar pattern to others whereby a safety certificate is issued on the basis of demonstration of a safety management system and safety reporting targets/procedures. The ANSF is now the primary contact for any Railway Undertaking which supersedes the original requirement which referred compatibility assessment to Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI: Infrastructure manager) although RFI still has a technical role in the process and must agree the technical verification.

As far as electromagnetic compatibility assurance is concerned feedback from the convocation interviews summarised the organisational process in a diagram (Figure 32):

RU/Supplier

NSA ISA/NOBO

Homologisation IM

Network Access Figure 32 – Organisational Process from Convocation Data

Evidence of compatibility is supplied from testing and technical analysis.

Concern was expressed at the convocation that any envisaged changes to the process, requirements or standards at European level should not affect current projects in progress.


The Railway undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with train detection. The evidence presented is from measurements undertaken by an approved test

Page 59



laboratory. Evidence is to European standard EN 50238 and to local rules FS. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in a probabilistic fashion given in the standards and is supported by a detailed technical report. Compatibility with conventional track circuits, high frequency track circuits and Digicode circuits are to limits provided in FS96 (Under revision: FS 2007 not yet published). Digicode circuits have a susceptibility across a wide range of frequencies with a wide bandwidth (400Hz) and these are shown in Figure 33. These are stated to be under revision although no further information is available at the time of writing.

Susceptibility of Digicode track circuit

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10 100 1000 10000 100000

Frequency Hz

Perm

issi

ble

Curr

ent A

mps

Figure 33 - ALSTOM Digicode Circuits

For the DC infrastructure both 50 Hz and 83Hz track circuits are used however, the susceptibility is defined differently. The levels for four train units are shown in Figure 34. The basic allowance for each track circuit type is 1.6A defined over -4Hz to +15Hz (+12Hz) about the centre frequency. Outside this frequency range higher and lower limits are defined according to the curves shown in Figure 34 which have a common structure outside the basic susceptibility.

Page 60



Gabarits for 50 and 83Hz on the Italian Railway

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1 10 100 1000 10000

Frequency Hz

Perm

itted

Inte

rfer

ence

Cur

rent

4 tr

ains

m

A

50 Hz 83 Hz Figure 34 – 50Hz and 83Hz on Italian Railway

The limits are defined for four trains in section and the basic susceptibility per train is the limit/4 i.e. 400mA at 50Hz or 83Hz (FFT; spectral resolution 1Hz 50% overlap). However, each train is permitted to exceed the basic limit during testing as long as the exceedance occurs with less than a certain probability. The permissible probabilities for the ‘per train’ limit scaled by a factor k is given in Figure 35.

k Permissible Probability

<=1 -

>1,<=1.5 7.77E-02

>1.5,<1.75 2.62E-03

>1.75,<2.5 3.46E-05

>2.5,<3.5 7.96E-11

Figure 35 - Permissible Probabilities

As an example, during testing a train may create a harmonic at 50Hz of 730mA for a certain amount of time. This exceeds the basic limit of 400mA by a factor of 730/400= 1.825. From Figure 35, a factor of 1.825 would lie within the range >1.75, <2.5 and hence would be permitted and be compatible as long as its probability of occurrence is less than 3.46-05. The actual calculation of the normalised probability from a series of measurements is a complex process depending upon the band of frequencies measured, the number of measurements containing an exceedance of the basic limit and the total number of measurements within the test period.

There is also a requirement (on 3kV DC) for a device which open circuits the main contactor if a current of more than 1A at 50Hz continues for more than 3 seconds.

The FS network uses the BACC in-cab signalling system. This system utilises conventional coded track circuits at 50Hz and 75Hz and uses inductive coils above the rails for pickup.

Page 61




The Railway Undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with lineside systems. No specific limits are given. Information from the convocation stated that compatibility is achieved by means of specifying the signal to noise ratio of systems with respect to the train. No psophometric disturbance limit was mentioned.


The Railway Undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with the Energy supply system. No specific limits were given. The documentation in the RTI states that at frequencies above 32Hz the input impedance of the system should be inductive.


The Railway Undertaking and Manufacturer are responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with radio frequency systems. Evidence is stated to be to European standard EN 50121. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report.

FS uses the services of the public operator on the analogue (ETACS) and the digital (GSM). Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

5.13.6 Other systems

No details were given of whether compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects was evaluated.

5.13.7 EN 50238

Italy does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 62



5.14 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Latvia

The Latvian participants returned a completed questionnaire. This state has an established railway which used to be part of the common Soviet republic infrastructure. Information received during interviews at the convocation was that the network is robust and there would be no substantial changes undertaken in the near future. Latvian systems are internally compatible with each other and substantially the same as those of neighbouring countries. Since much of the non-interoperable track gauge is different to other European gauges interoperability over the local systems will only come over time. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that, like its neighbours, Latvia will convert to generic European standards over time (TSIs of the Conventional and High Speed Directives), hence, compatibility requirements for these states are stated to be to generic European norms. At the convocation, the Latvian representative stated that the existing standards are under process of being harmonised. The harmonization process is going on ERA/OSJD working group where all standards are examined and compared with European standards.

5.14.1 Processes

The responsible body for safety assessment in Latvia is the State Railway Technical Inspectorate (Valsts dzelzceja tehnisk• inspekcija). The State Railway Technical Inspectorate is subordinate to the Ministry of Transport, which is realised in the form of supervision The Inspectorate assesses compatibility under the rules laid down in the state legislature in accordance with the railway directives [1]. These rules are available (in Latvian) on the website http://www.likumi.lv. The acceptance body requires evidence in the form of test results, calculations and simulations, expert opinion, comparison with existing trains and third party certification. For rolling stock, safety is assessed by a panel within the Inspectorate made up of representatives from the inspectorate, the manufacturer, the rolling stock keeper (railway undertaking) and the infrastructure manager. The panel uses information from a panel of external parties, conformance to a technical check list, third party recommendation and expert opinion certificate.

The manufacturer is responsible for creating a technical file for review by the panel containing test results, calculations and comparisons with existing trains according to the document Cabinet rule Nr.713 "Rules on putting into service of rolling stock" (available in Latvian from http://www.likumi.lv ). The infrastructure controller approves conformity by issuing a letter of no objection.

Page 63



Ministry of Transport (Satiksmes ministrijas).

Licence to Operate

Panel of Expertsfrom

State Railway InspectorateRailway Undertaking

Infrastructure ControllerManufacturer

RU / ManufacturerTests Design, Simulation

Infrastructure Controller

Letter of No Objection

Third Party Testing


Evaluation

Evidence in Technica l Report

State Railway Technical Inspectorate (Valsts dzelzceïa tehniskâs inspekcijas )

Figure 36 - Interactions in Latvian EMC Approvals

The conformity checklist is according to Cabinet rules Nr.148 "Technical operational rule" which assesses the contents of a technical file containing the required assessment parameters. Third party assessment is provided by an accredited certification body which assesses the evidence in accordance with Cabinet rules Nr.713 "Rules on putting into service of rolling stock" and then issues a certificate of conformance to the inspectorate. The reply also states that specialist technical advice may be sought in the compatibility demonstration to Cabinet rules Nr.713 "Rules on putting into service of rolling stock" if it is considered necessary.

For infrastructure the State Railway Inspectorate is responsible for assessing the compatibility with train detection. The evidence is supplied from tests performed by the manufacturer who issues a declaration of conformity to Cabinet rules Nr. 483 "Rule on electromagnetic compatibility of equipment". The assessment is done during issuing of building permits and putting into service of railway objects. All systems are assessed according to the Cabinet rules Nr.3 “Railway building rules”.

The evidence is supplied from tests performed by the manufacturer who issues a declaration of conformity to Cabinet rules Nr. 483 Rule on electromagnetic compatibility of equipment 20.06.2006. This rule appears to mirror the EMC directive for general component assessment.

General compatibility with the EMC directive is assessed by the consumers' rights protecting authority when the authority get the complain.. Basic assessment is to the EMC Directive 2004/108/EC from tests to EN 50121 series of standards.

The timescale for the process is stated as a minimum of one month and no estimates of cost could be made.


The State Railway Inspectorate is responsible for assessing the compatibility with train detection. Feedback during interviews at the convocation indicated that the current standards are based on the former soviet (GOST) standards and that there was a separate working group of the ERA/OSJD (under

Page 64



Interoperability Unit) undertaking the task of integration / harmonisation. Currently the recognized standard for train detection for new rolling stock approval against train detection criteria is EN 50238. Latvia uses ALSN (national). This is a system of in-cab signalling and train auto-stop. This system uses coded track circuits at 25Hz, 50Hz with a minimum coding current in the rails of 1.2A & 75Hz will be used in future. The data transmission between coded track circuits and on-board equipment is via inductive coil pickup above the rails.


The infrastructure manager (JSC Latvijas dzelzcels) is responsible for assessing the compatibility with lineside systems. The infrastructure manager issues a declaration of conformity to the inspectorate during the process of issuing of building permits.

No details of the local technical standards, evaluation or reporting method were provided from the questionnaire. Feedback from the convocation indicated that ALSN and EN 50121 (psophometric compatibility) standards are used for new rolling stock approvals.


The infrastructure manager (JSC Latvijas dzelzcejs) is responsible for assessing the compatibility with lineside systems. The infrastructure manager issues a declaration of conformity to the inspectorate during the process of issuing of building permits.

No details of the local technical standards, evaluation or reporting method were provided from the questionnaire. Feedback from the convocation indicated that the current ex-soviet system was self compatible as it had an integrated design of rolling stock and infrastructure. No major infrastructure changes were envisaged in the near future and hence there was no requirement to consider compatibility with the supply.


The Electronic Communications Office (elektronisko sakaru direkcija) of the Latvian Republic is responsible for assessing the compatibility with radio frequency systems. The office issues a certificate of conformity assessment to the applicant. No details of the local technical standards, evaluation or reporting method were provided from the questionnaire. Feedback from the convocation indicated that the TSIs (EN 50121) would be used when approving new rolling stock. Latvia uses the LDZ radio system. Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


General compatibility with the EMC directive is assessed by the consumers' rights protecting authority. Basic assessment is to the EMC Directive 2004/108/EC from tests to EN 50121 series of standards.

5.14.7 EN 50238

Latvia does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 65



5.15 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Lithuania

The Lithuanian participants returned two questionnaires on different dates. These consisted of one dealing with the procedural aspects and a second, provided by the state railway on the technical aspects. No representatives from Lithuania attended the convocation hence clarification on technical details could not be sought directly. This state has an established railway which used to be part of the common Soviet republic infrastructure. Lithuanian systems are internally compatible with each other and substantially the same as those of neighbouring countries such as Latvia. Since much of the non-interoperable track gauge is different to other European gauges interoperability over the local systems will only come over time. It is reasonable to suppose that, like its neighbours, Lithuania will convert to generic European standards over time.

5.15.1 Procedures

The responsible body for safety assessment in Lithuania is the State Railway Inspectorate under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Inspectorate assesses compatibility under the rules laid down in the state legislature in accordance with the railway directives [1]. These rules are available ( in Lithuanian) on the website http://www.lrs.lt and from Valstybinės Gele�inkelio Inspekcija (VGI: Http://www.vgi.lt) The acceptance body requires evidence in the form of test results, calculations and simulations, expert opinion, comparison with existing trains and third party certification. Safety is assessed by a panel within the Inspectorate made up of 5 experts elected from within the inspectorate. The panel examines the documentation and reports to the head of the inspectorate who then authorises the certificate.

The process is in two levels. A railway undertaking applies to the inspectorate giving details of the proposed project (e.g. the introduction of new rolling stock) the inspectorate determines whether an authorisation for putting into service is needed or not. If an authorisation is needed then a second stage is required. This involves the railway undertaking submitting a technical file and official application to the inspectorate who then assesses the information as described in the paragraph above.

Page 66



Railway UndertakingInitial Stage

Ministry of Transport

State Railway Inspectorate Valstybinës Geležinkelio Inspekcija (VGI)

Project Proposal

Railway Undertaking Simulation, Calculation and Design

Technical File

ApprovalNeeded

Panel of 5 Technical Experts from within Railway Inspectorate


Vehic le Approval

NoApprovalNeeded

Approved Testing Laboratory

TestingTest Results

Figure 37 - Lithuanian Interactions in EMC Approval Process

The timescale for the first stage of the process is approximately 30 days. The timescale for the second part of the process is 60 days. The two timescales may run consecutively or not depending upon the availability of results etc.


The State Railway Inspectorate is responsible for assessing the compatibility with train detection. The evidence is supplied from third party test laboratories that are authorised to perform such services in the EU. No standards references are given. Evaluation is by running results from track tests which are stated to take from several weeks to several months however no information on costs is available.

Lithuania uses ALSN (GOST). This is a system of in-cab signalling and train auto-stop. This system uses coded track circuits at 25Hz, 50 Hz & 75Hz with a minimum coding current in the rails of 1.2A. The data transmission between coded track circuits and on-board equipment is via inductive coil pickup above the rails.


The State Railway Inspectorate is responsible for assessing the compatibility with lineside systems. The evidence is supplied from third party test laboratories that are authorised to perform such services in the EU. No standards references are given. No details of the reporting method, timescales or costs are provided.


The State Railway Inspectorate is responsible for assessing the compatibility with Energy supply systems. The evidence is supplied from third party test laboratories that are authorised to perform such services in the EU. No standards references are given. No details of the reporting method, timescales or costs are provided.

Page 67




The Communications Regulatory Authority of the Lithuanian Republic is responsible for assessing the compatibility with Radio frequency systems. The evidence is supplied from tests performed by the regulatory authority who issue a certificate of inspection on satisfactory assessment of test results. No standards references are given. Lithuanian Railways has its own train radio system and a separate shunting radio communication system. Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


Lithuania does not assess for compatibility with human exposure to EM effects.

General compatibility with the EMC directive is assessed by the supplier of equipment. Basic assessment is to the EN 50121 series of standards and the manufacturer provides a technical evaluation of tests as evidence. The timescale of this process is estimated as 4 days and cost estimated as €500.

5.15.7 EN 50238

Lithuania does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 68



5.16 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Luxembourg

The Luxembourgian participant returned a completed questionnaire. No representatives from Luxembourg attended the convocation.

5.16.1 Processes

The responsible body for safety assessment in Luxembourg is the Administration des Chemins de Fer (ANS (NSA)). Assessment is to the requirements of IF-PE.STC-VF.01, VF.01 and VF.03 which are available in French from the NSA or their website. The NSA requires evidence in the form of test results, calculations and simulations, third party certification and expert opinion. Safety is assessed by conformance to a technical checklist given in the requirements and by expert opinion from within the ANS. Evidence is presented is by the submission of a technical file containing test results, calculations and simulations, third party certification to examinations of compatibility with EN 50388, EN 50238, series of EN 50121, IF.PE.STC-VF-01 to VF.03 or UIC 737-4 and 797. Third party evidence is received from a competent body (Notified body) in the form of a certificate of compliance. The assessment process is stated to be compliant with the directives [1] and adheres to the prescribed time limits within the directives. Costs are stated to be variable depending upon the number of tests required etc.

Administration des Chemins de Fer (ACF...........NSA)Technica l Checklist

Expert Opinion within ACF

Test Operationtra in

Département des transports - Direction des chemins de fer

Licence to operate

Notified BodyCompetent Body


Technical FileExpert OpinionCertification

Railway Undertaking

Evidence Collation

Third PartyTesting

DocumentationCertificationTest Data

Infrastructure manager

Figure 38 - EMC Approval Interactions in Luxembourg


Compatibility with train detection is assessed by a notified/competent body in conjunction with the Infrastructure manager Chemins de fer Luxembourgeois (CFL www.cfl.lu). The process involves evidence from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data, simulations/calculations and expert opinion. The assessment is based on documents UIC 541-4 annexe J, UIC 737-2, UIC 550, EN 50238, IF.PE.CEM.STI-CCS.01, IF.PE.STC-VF.01 to 03 and the annexe to the TSI for control-command and signalling subsystem. The method of assessment requires comparisons with limits and comparison with existing types. The notified/competent body issues a certificate of conformance to the ANS. The assessment process is stated to be compliant with the directives [1] and adheres to the prescribed time limits within the directives. Costs are stated to be variable depending upon the number of tests required etc.

Page 69



The method for demonstration of compatibility with track circuits is stated to be by both time and frequency domain analysis of train emissions and comparison with the gabarits appropriate to the track circuit type. Transient phenomena are not considered. For track circuits the nominal levels and bandwidths are shown in Figure 39. Train input impedance at 50Hz must be greater than 1.3 ohms.

Luxembourgian Track Circuits

Infrastructure 25kv 25kV 3kVdc 3kV

Type 83 1/3Hz 125Hz 50Hz* 83 1/3Hz

Centre frequency 83 1/3Hz 125Hz 50Hz 83 1/3Hz

Bandwidth +/-3.3Hz; 20dB 54Hz-126Hz

+/-5Hz +/-3Hz, 20dB 37Hz-58Hz

+/-3.3Hz; 20dB 54Hz-126Hz

Limit 8A 0.7A 3.75A* 8A


1s 1s 1s 1s

Notes * A hardware detector is included that detects 10 transient exceedances of the limit then isolates the supply

Figure 39 – Track Circuit Limits

Compatibility with axle counter systems is by testing whilst running on both AC and DC infrastructure. There are no specific levels or susceptibilities given however, the axle counters in use occupy frequency ranges from 27kHz to 32kHz and 43kHz. The reference documents (IF.PE.STC-VF01-03) specify that no false triggering should occur and that any false triggering should be investigated and corrected before compliance is accepted.


Compatibility with lineside systems is assessed by a notified/competent body in conjunction with the Infrastructure manager. The process involves evidence from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data and expert opinion. The assessment is based on European standards EN 50121, EN 50238 and the IF.PE.STC-VF.01 to VF.03 documents. The method of assessment requires comparisons with limits and comparison with existing types. The notified/competent body issues a certificate of conformance to the ANS.

Compatibility with lineside systems is specified for general lineside telecommunications on either infrastructure type as being by the measurement of equivalent psophometric current which should be less than 8A during any 1 second period. There is also a requirement for compatibility with inductive loops within the track bed. No limits for the radiated fields are given, however, the operating frequencies of the system (BUES2000) are stated as between 45kHz and 110kHz. Compatibility testing is by track running and any anomalies detected must be investigated and corrected before compliance is accepted.


Compatibility with the energy supply is assessed by a notified/competent body in conjunction with the Infrastructure manager. The process involves evidence from certificates of inspection, third party

Page 70



measurements to standards, test data and expert opinion. The assessment is based on European standards EN 50163, EN 50388 and the IF.PE.STC-VF.01 to VF.03 documents. The method of assessment requires comparisons with limits and comparison with existing types. The notified/competent body issues a certificate of conformance to the ANS.

General compliance with the infrastructure; voltages, currents, power factor, resonance phenomena (on both 3kV and 25kV) is taken from the EN standards. There are additional requirements placed on the systems by the IF.PE.STC-VF.01 for harmonics at fundamental, 150Hz, 250Hz and for total harmonic distortion across the harmonic range on 25kV AC systems. The requirement for the fundamental is that no harmonic at 83Hz must be present in the supply. Levels for 150Hz and 250Hz are specified at 5 amps maximum over 1 second duration and the total harmonic distortion of the system must be less than 30A over 1 second. Inrush current on the AC system is limited to 1000A peak.


Compatibility with the radio frequency systems is assessed by a notified/competent body in conjunction with the Infrastructure manager. The process involves evidence from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data and expert opinion. The assessment is based on European standards EN 50121 (and UIC 751-3). The method of assessment requires comparisons with limits and comparison with existing types. The notified/competent body issues a certificate of conformance to the ANS. Luxembourg uses an analogue ground to train communication system as per UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 (UIC Code 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


Compatibility with human exposure to EM effects or compliance to the EMC directive is covered by "Loi du 25 mars 2009 relative à la compatibilité électromagnétique".

5.16.7 EN 50238

The Luxembourgian assessment does not use the technical annexe to EN 50238 in its assessment process rather it uses compliance with the conditions of EN 50238-1 and internal compliance with the IF.PE.STC-VF.01 to VF.03 documents using third party measurements to standards and test results.

Page 71



5.17 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the Netherlands

The Dutch respondent returned a completed questionnaire in Dutch. There were Dutch representatives at the convocation. The following information is collated from all sources. Holland belongs to a group of countries who have certain common requirements for international inter-operation These are documented in the International Requirements List available from www.irl-rail.eu

5.17.1 Processes

The responsible body for the Netherlands is the Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (Ministry of Transport). Assessment is to the requirements of an admissions guide which is available in Dutch from the IVW-TER (Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat Toezichteenheid Rail), the NSA (part of the Ministry of Transport and is responsible for the supervision of the Dutch Railway sector in order to ensure safety).

The organisation and parties involved in the acceptance process of rolling stock in the Netherlands are:

• Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (Ministry of Transport)

◦ Sets the Dutch national requirements RKS (Reglement Keuring Spoorvoertuigen).

◦ Provides accreditation of Notified Bodies and Vehicle Acceptance Bodies

• Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat, Rail en Wegvervoer, IVW (the National Safety Authority)

◦ Acceptance of rolling stock

◦ Authorization to put rolling stock into service

◦ Advice to the Ministry of Transport on the requirements for the acceptance of rolling stock

◦ Supervises Notified Bodies and Vehicle Acceptance Bodies

◦ Supervises safety of the railway systems and carries out accident investigations

◦ Approves and supervises maintenance workshops for rolling stock

• ProRail (Infrastructure Manager) with respect to rolling stock acceptance:

◦ Assesses rolling stock on compliance with the infrastructure compatibility

◦ Provides means of demonstrating compliance with infrastructure compatibility requirements which are listed in ProRail guidelines

• Notified Bodies

◦ KEMA Rail Transport Certification

◦ Lloyd’s Register Nederland B.V.

◦ Luxcontrol Nederland

◦ Railcert

◦ Deltarail.

• Vehicle Acceptance Bodies (Keuringsinstanties)

◦ VAB’s assess rolling stock on compliance with Dutch national rules

Page 72



• Rolling stock operators, manufacturers or lease company

◦ Initiate acceptance process of rolling stock

◦ Obtain type acceptance certificates showing compliance with infrastructure and safety

• Rolling stock manufacturers and rolling stock engineering/ consultancy companies

◦ Usually provide evidence that the rolling stock complies with the requirements

The party that applies for the type acceptance of the particular rolling stock type is responsible for providing the required information.

The admission requires several processes to be completed:

1. Obtain a licence according to the Directive 95/18/EU for performing passenger and goods traffic.

2. The demonstration of a satisfactory safety management system to the requirements of the directive.

3. A certificate of vehicle approval of use which complies with one of :

RIC or RIV system for cross acceptance of railway vehicles in Europe

TSIs laid down by the EU

The requirements of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF).

An application guide, Toelatingsgids, for the admission and registration of Rolling Stock is available at the website. The admission and registration is a four phase process:

1. assessment of construction based on TSIs or RKS, a certificate of approval from a notified body or competent body;

2. assessment of compatibility with the specific infrastructure, usually this assessment is performed by a Dutch competent body, because of knowledge of and experience with the Dutch requirements and measurement methods;

3. registration in the Dutch Register of Rolling Stock, the Register is administered by the IVW;

4. assessment by the operator on which specific lines or even tracks the Rolling Stock is to be used.

Phase 1 focuses on safety and is assessed by a notified/competent body, when conformity with the requirements in the RKS is given no further interactions with the Infrastructure Manager are required. In case of deviancy of RKS requirements in phase 2 safety and compatibility are assessed in conjunction with the Infrastructure Manager ProRail, the use of the Guidelines (Richtlijn RLN) of the Infrastructure Manager, their technical opinion and a technical file demonstrating compliance with the origin of the requirement from the RKS.

The assessment process is stated to take approximately 1 year but no estimate of cost could be made.

Safety is assessed by notified bodies or competent bodies designated by the IVW.

The assessment takes place in two stages:

• Prototype assessment on a temporary admission basis and

• After deployment for full operations.

Evidence is presented is by the submission of a technical file containing description of behaviour of the systems, calculations, simulations and test results, third party certification to examinations of compatibility with EN 50388, EN 50238, series of EN 50121, and the RKS, and third party evidence in form of a certificate of approval from a competent body (Notified body).

At the website of IVW the concept of the new RKS (ATIV) is published already, this new RKS is stated to be compliant with the directives and fills the open points (for the Dutch situation) from the TSI.

Page 73




Approvals for train detection compatibility are provided by the notified body who assesses running tests to approved standards EN 50238 and local documentation RKS.

The detection systems and the EMC requirements are related with the Energy Supply systems. In the Netherlands applied energy supply systems are documented by ProRail.

Section 20 of the RKS documentation gives details of compatibility with interference currents. This specifies limits on conducted currents over the frequency range from 50Hz to 100Hz for compatibility with 75Hz track circuits. This is shown in Figure 40.

Frequency (Hz) Maximum permissible current (A)

50 6.9

55 4

60 3

65 1

70 0.5

75 0.5

80 0.5

85 1

90 2.5

95 3.2

100 4.7

Figure 40 – Train Detection under 1500V DC: GRS 75Hz (50Hz to 100Hz, t > 0.2s)

In RKS article 20.1.e is prescribed that the maximum AC content of the line current, of the maximum configuration, of the rolling stock should be less than 50A.

RKS article 20.1.h prescribes input impedance for a whole train at frequencies of 75Hz ± 3Hz to be greater than 0.4 ohms and inductive.

The method for demonstration of compatibility with track circuits is stated to be by both time and frequency domain analysis of train emissions and comparison with the gabarits appropriate to the track circuit type. Transient phenomena are not considered when originating from sources outside rolling stock e.g. gaps, current collector bouncing etc. For track circuits the nominal levels and bandwidths are shown in Figure 41.

Applied Track Circuits in the Netherlands

Infrastructure 1500Vdc 25kVac 3kVdc 15kVac

Type GRS Jade GRS FTGS

Centre frequency 75Hz Note 3 75Hz Note 4

Bandwidth Note 1 na Note 1 na

Limit 500mA na 500mA na

Page 74



Applied Track Circuits in the Netherlands


0,2 sec Note 2

na 0,2 sec Note 2

na

Note 1 No bandwidth is specified, see table article 20.1.g In the ATIV the bandwidth is specified. Systeem / type F0

[Hz] Δf

[Hz] I0

RMS [A]

Δf3dB [Hz]

Δf20dB [Hz]

2*N [-] T [s]

Ti [s]

GRS (ATBEG) 75 n.a. 0,5 20 40 6 0,2 1,7

Note 2 Accepted integration for measurement 1 sec

Note 3 At present there are no requirements available for compatibility with Jade. In the ATIV the bandwidth, limits and times are specified.

Systeem / type f0 [Hz]

Δf [Hz]

I0 RMS [A]

Δf3dB

[Hz]

Δf20dB

[Hz] 2*N [-]

T [s]

Ti [s]

Jade 2 / 16 1 575 40 0,87 50 500 - 0,04 0,68 Jade 2 / 19 1 874 40 0,72 60 500 - 0,04 0,68 Jade 1 & 2 / 22 2 186 40 0,62 50 400 - 0,04 0,68 Jade 1 & 2 / 25 2 480 40 0,54 60 500 - 0,04 0,68 Jade 1 (HS) / 28 2 821 40 0,56 60 350 - 0,04 0,68 Jade 1 (HS) / 31 3 137 40 0,47 80 400 - 0,04 0,68 Jade 1 (HS) / 49 49 082 400 0,20 8k 10k - 0,04 0,68 Jade 1 (HS) / 67 67 232 400 0,14 8k 10k - 0,04 0,68

Note 4 At present there are no requirements available for compatibility with FTGS.

Figure 41 – Applied Track Circuits in the Netherlands

Transient phenomena such as switching on/off of heating elements, bouncing of current collector or running through gaps normally causes exceedance of the limit that are accepted. Generally, the interference source is measured at two positions; the line current and the internal voltage after the line filter. The transfer from internal voltage towards line current is then used to demonstrate that the interference source is not the inverter voltage.

Testing is estimated to take 6 months but no estimation of costs was possible.

The Netherlands uses ATB signalling system. There are two versions of this system. The original system uses 75Hz coded track circuits. The new generation uses consists of trackside balises and on-board equipment. The transmission frequency is FSK 100kHz +/-10kHz.

Train detection under 25kV AC:

At present there are no requirements for demonstrating compatibility with Jade systems at 25kVAC.

At the BetuweRoute and Havenspoorlijn Jade type track circuits are used.

The concept of the new RKS (ATIV) contains requirements for compatibility with Jade with working frequencies from 2144-3878Hz and 48-68kHz. See Figure 41.

Page 75



Train Detection under Axle Counters:

At present the RKS defines no requirements or tests for demonstrating compatibility with axle counters.

There are axle counters used in the Netherlands both on 1500VDC and 25kVAC.

The concept of the new RKS (ATIV) contains requirements for compatibility with axle counter with working frequencies from 27-32kHz.

Type Count head

freq. [kHz]

Bandwidth [kHz]

Limit [A]

Az L90-4 Sk30C ~ 28 ~ 30,7

27,0 … 29,0 29,7 … 31,7

0.075 0,075

Az LM Sk30H ~ 28 ~ 30,7

27,0 … 29,0 29,7 … 31,7

0,165 0,180


In RKS article 20.1.a is stated that Rolling Stock should fulfil the general requirements for EMC formulated in EN 50121-1, EN 50121-3-1, EN 50121-3-2 and EN 50238.

The requirements for compatibility with line side telecommunication systems are described in RKS article 20.1.f: The psophometric content of the line current, as meant in EN 50121-3-1, of the maximum configuration of the Rolling Stock should be less than 10A.

Additional information is given in ProRail Guideline RLN00024, this guideline describes EMC, interference current and impedance considerations and can be considered as EMC requirements. ProRail Guideline RLN00018 describes the normal requirements for correct operation of the detections systems. These Guidelines are not incorporated in the law RKS.

General compatibility with lineside systems is by measurement of psophometric current (ITTU). The limit is specified in the RKS document as 10A.


Approvals for Energy systems compatibility are provided by the notified body measurements to approved standards. The Dutch require compliance with EN50163 and EN50388. for supply voltages of 25kV 50Hz and 1.5kV DC.

For 1500V DC the assessment is based on RKS article 21 and the European standards EN50163 and EN 50388. This article contains no EMC requirements.

Additional information is given in ProRail Guideline RLN00015, this guideline references to stability of the control systems onboard the Rolling Stock and can be considered an EMC requirement. These Guidelines are not incorporated in the law RKS.

The concept of the new RKS (ATIV) contains no EMC requirements for compatibility with the 1500V energy supply system.

There are specific conditions for 1500V DC supply which are given in the RKS documentation: the power is reduced automatically between 950 V and 1350 V in accordance with the graph of Figure 42.

Page 76



Current

4000

Auxiliary onlyConsumption

1350 V

amps

VoltageVolts

1000V950Vpermitted

Figure 42 - Dutch Current Limits at Low Voltage

There are also limits imposed on regeneration into the DC supply given in the RKS document. These are shown in the diagram of Figure 43.

Current

- 4000

1950 V

amps

Voltage1200Vpermitted

Figure 43 - Dutch Regeneration Limits

For 25kV AC the assessment is based on RKS article 23 and the European standards EN50163 and EN50388.

RKS article 23.1.e. prescribes the power factor to be conform with the EN50388. There are no other EMC requirements.

The ProRail Guideline RLN00016 describes a general compliance with the infrastructure; voltages, currents, power factor, resonance phenomena 25kV taken from the EN50388 standards. There are additional requirements placed on the harmonics. Inrush current on the AC system is limited to 1000A crest.


Approvals for radio frequency systems compatibility are provided by the notified body measurements to approved standards. In RKS article 20.1.a is stated that Rolling Stock should fulfil the general requirements for EMC formulated in EN 50121-1, EN 50121-3-1, EN 50121-3-2 and EN 50238.

Page 77



No timescales or costs were given.

The Netherlands uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 for ground to train radio (UIC code 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


An interference monitoring device should be installed when the 75Hz interference limits can be exceeded due to failures in the Rolling Stock.

The requirements for an interference monitoring device are described in RKS article 13.c.

13 c1 Comply with EN 50155 13 c2 Measurement of line current with given frequency characteristic:

- till turnover at 68Hz ± 1Hz: increasing with 96dB/oct ± 3dB/oct; - from 68 till 82Hz: flat ± 0.5dB; - after turnover at 82Hz ± 1Hz: decreasing with 120dB/oct ± 3dB/oct;

13 c3 If the effective value of the line current within the given frequency area exceeds the limit, the detector generates a switch-off command. The line current is to be measured with a maximum inaccuracy of 5% of the specified maximum threshold, adjustable with fixed steps;

13 c4i The range and the step size of the line current is rolling-stock dependent, and is adjustable on the basis of the following criteria: the risk of influence of the state of the track relay by interference levels is acceptably small;

13 c4ii the range and the step size of the line current is rolling-stock dependent, and is adjustable on the basis of the following criteria: the risk of adverse influence by interference currents on the correct transfer of signals from the train control system is acceptably small; .

13 c4iii the range and the step size of the line current is rolling-stock dependent, and is adjustable on the basis of the following criteria: the risk of a blockage of train functions is acceptably small;

13 c5 The detector only generates a switch-off command after a continued excess of limit during a given time; 13 c6i The duration as referred to in subcomponent 5 is adjustable in fixed steps, where the range and the step

size are rolling-stock dependent and are set according to the following criteria: the risk of influence of the state of the track relay by interference levels is acceptably small;

13 c6ii The duration as referred to in subcomponent 5 is adjustable in fixed steps, where the range and the step size are rolling-stock dependent and are set according to the following criteria: the risk of adverse influence by interference currents on the correct transfer of signals from the train control system is acceptably small;

13 c6iii The duration as referred to in subcomponent 5 is adjustable in fixed steps, where the range and the step size are rolling-stock dependent and are set according to the following criteria: the risk of a blockage of train functions is acceptably small;

13 c7 The minimum time of the switch-off command is vehicle specific;

13 c8 The switch off command is blocked or disabled in case of malfunction of the interference current monitor;

13 c9 The disable switch should be easily reached by the train driver;

13 c10 The total response time of the detector is 500ms maximum;

13 c11 The detector must be a factor 10 less sensitive to interference sources originating in the catenary system than for sources located inside the vehicle in which the detector is placed;

13 c12 Depending on the vehicle type one ore more detectors are present per train set; In the concept of the new RKS (ATIV) the requirements for an interference monitoring device are slightly different.

Ad c3: the requirement on the inaccuracy of the measurement is deleted.

Ad c10: The maximum response time is 1000ms

Page 78



The Dutch assessment does not use compatibility requirements relating to Human exposure to EMF or the EMC directive in its assessment of EMC. However the Arbowet refers to the exposure of workers as stated in the directive EC/2004/40, the values are not yet implemented in the law.

5.17.7 EN 50238

The RKS refers to the EN 50238 in article 20.1.a. In the concept of the new RKS (ATIV) parts of the FprTS50238-2 and FprTS50238-3 are cited in the annexes.

Page 79



5.18 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Norway

The Norwegian respondent did not return a questionnaire; however, Norway was represented at the convocation. The following sections are from information obtained during interviews at the convocation separate documentation supplied by Norway and from subsequent follow up.

5.18.1 Processes

The responsible body for safety assessment in Norway is Veg- og baneavdelinga (VB) the Nowegian department of Department of Public Roads and Rail Transport who devolves the responsibility of the NSA to the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate (Statens jernbanetilsyn). The inspectorate enforces the railway law and regulations and safeguards the public with respect to safety. Authorisation for putting into service of infrastructure and rolling stock is granted by the Railway Inspectorate. Authorisation of NoBo’s also falls under the Railway Inspectorate.

A new railway undertaking is required to seek approval from the NSA by submitting the results of testing from the individual rolling stock suppliers (manufacturers) together with a compatibility statement from the infrastructure manager Jernbaneverket (JBV). In practice, compatibility tests are assessed by infrastructure manager and then approved by the NSA.

Norway and Sweden have a joint document NES TS02 (Nordic Electric Power Co-operation Technical Specification 02) called “Requirements on rolling stock in Norway (JD590) and Sweden (BVS 543.19300) regarding EMC with the electrical infrastructure and co-ordination with the power supply and other vehicles”. This document also gives details on measurement and test methods.

Statens Jernbanetilsyn Norwegian Railway Inspectorate

Test Operationtrain

iVeg- og baneavdelinga (VB) Department of Public Roads

and Rail Transport

Licence to operate

Railway UndertakingEvidence Collation


Technical FileCertification

Manufacturer

Third PartyTesting

DocumentationCertificationTest Data Jernbaneverket (JBV).

Infrastructure Manager

Evaluation

Figure 44 - Norwegian Interactions for EMC Approvals


JD 590 (same document as BVS 593.19309 Sweden). On electrified lines AC track circuits are used, either double rail or jointless. Most common are 95Hz and 105Hz uncoded track signalling circuits with a 1A, 1s limit. On newer sections of line FTGS track circuits (Siemens) operating at 4.75 – 6.26kHz and

Page 80



9.5 – 16.5kHz are used with a 1A 40ms limit. DC track circuits are only used on non electrified railway stations (no specific limits). TI21 track circuits (Adtranz/ Bombardier) are also used with a nominal 100mA 1.5s limit although the 100mA is derived from BR GS/ES1914 and is probably not correct for 16.67Hz supply systems.

As well as the specific systems there are general limits placed on broadband emissions. These are general limits placed on the maximum single harmonic integrated over 1 second at each frequency step in an FFT analysis with 8.3Hz bin separation (120ms measurement interval). The broadband limit is in three steps the lower frequency limit on the first range is yet to be decided (TBA). Over the range TBA to 7kHz a maximum 1A rms harmonic is permitted; Over the range 7 – 9kHz a maximum of 0.5A rms is permitted and for frequencies >9kHz a maximum of 0.33A rms is permitted.

The method to be used to measure line current is given along with the filter requirements such as two 2nd order Butterworth filters, +/-2Hz bandwidth, moving RMS 60ms time window for electromechanical vane relays. A typical measurement setup is shown in Figure 45.

Figure 45 - Line Current Measurement Method


Psophometric current is measured in accordance with the ITU-T standard and must not exceed 1.5A.


JD 590 (BVS 543.19300 Swedish Standard) requires compliance with EN50163. Nominal voltage is 15kV 16.67Hz. Harmonic limits for fundamental frequencies and total harmonic distortion are specified. Requirements are also in accordance with EN 50388.

Limits are given for harmonic distortion. These are shown in Figure 46.

Page 81



Figure 46 – Permissible Harmonic Voltages


Basic conformance with EN 50121 is required. Deviations based on further evaluation may be acceptable based on a case by case basis.

Norway uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 (Irish system), This is an analogue ground to train radio system. Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


No restriction on vehicle for local induced interference.

5.18.7 EN 50238

The main Norwegian document JD590 is based on the requirements on EN 50238.

Page 82



5.19 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Poland

The Polish participant returned a completed questionnaire. Other information is from the Polish representatives who attended the convocation and from additional review comments supplied by the Member State.

5.19.1 Processes

The competent authority in matters of railway safety and technical supervision over the operation and maintenance of railway lines and railway vehicles is the Office for Railway Transport (UTK). In order to obtain authorisation to enter service under the national or directive mode, an application for authorisation of a railway vehicle must be submitted along with the following documents: • For the national mode: - technical conditions for manufacturing and approval - technical-operational documentation - in case of rail traffic control devices - the proof of safety or verification of that proof, - for new types of rail vehicles, equipment designed for rail operation or in case of necessity to carry

out performance tests - the agreement on the carrying out of performance tests, and their program, - for the types of railway vehicles or equipment intended for rail operation after the performance tests

have been conducted - a technical opinion issued respectively by the infrastructure manager, the rail carrier or user of the railway siding,

- technical opinions issued by other infrastructure managers, railway carriers or users of railways sidings - in the case of types of equipment and railway vehicles already in exploitation

- the opinion of designated body • For the directive mode:

- declaration of verification of the subsystem compliance - certificate of compliance of the subsystem - documentary evidence of progress of the compliance assessment - declaration of conformity of the interoperability constituents included in the subsystem - certificate of conformity of the interoperability constituents included in the subsystem The application with the full documentation attached is considered by the panel of experts, the person who leads on the case draws up a protocol that is submitted for preliminary approval to the Head of the Department, then the outcome of the application is decided by the President of the Railway Transport Office. The documentation must meet the criteria set out in the Regulations, to which references are given below. In the Polish legal system, matters related to certificates of release to service and release of subsystems to exploitation are governed by the Act of 28 March 2003 on railway transport (unified text: Journal of Laws of 2007 No. 16 pos. 94, as amended). Moreover, the procedures regulating the matters of issuing of certificates of release to service and release of subsystems to exploitation are governed by the following acts: • The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Regulation of 26 September 2003 on the list of types of buildings or

installations designed for railway traffic operation and types of railway vehicles for which licences for exploitation are issued (Journal of Laws of 2003 No. 175 pos. 1706, as amended)

• The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Regulation of 30 April 2004 on the licences for exploitation of types of buildings or installations designed for railway traffic operation and types of railway vehicles (Journal of Laws of 2004 No. 103 pos. 1090, as amended)

• The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Regulation of 12 October 2005 on the scope of necessary tests to obtain the licenses for exploitation of types of buildings or installations designed for railway traffic operation and types of railway vehicles (Journal of Laws of 2005 No. 212 pos. 1771, as amended)

• The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Regulation of 29 February 2008 on the activities performed by the President of UTK for which fees are collected, the amount of these fees and the method of their collection (Journal of Laws of 2008 No. 47 pos. 276, as amended)

Page 83



• The Ministry of Transport Regulation of 5 September 2006 on essential requirement concerning interoperability and conformity assessment procedures for trans-european conventional railway system (Journal of Laws of 2006 No. 171 pos. 1230, as amended)

The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Regulation of 29 of June 2004 on essential requirement concerning interoperability and conformity assessment procedures for trans-european high speed railway system (Journal of Laws of 2004 No. 162 pos. 1697, as amended)

Figure 47 - Polish Interactions for EMC Approvals

Notified Bodies Designated Bodies

Movares Polska Institute of Electric Engineering* Radom Technical University*

- Rail Vehicles Institute „Tabor” Movares Polska Ltd.* Silesian Technical University*

- Transport Technical Supervision „Tabor” Rail Vehicles Institute* Warsaw University of Technology*

- Railway Science and Technical Centre (Railway Institute)

Railway Scientific and Technical Centre*

Poznan Technical University

Cracow Technical University* Gdansk Technical University

* Bodies designated for train EMC approvals.

Figure 48 Table of Approved Bodies in Polish process.

The process ending with the issuance of a certificate of release to service takes up to 3 months from the date of submission of the full set of required documentation; the price of the certificate depends on the number of hours devoted to examining the application and shall not exceed EUR 25,000.


Compatibility with train detection is assessed by Centrum Naukowo-Techniczne Kolejnictwacntk CNTK (en.cntk.pl) fulfilling the role of an approved body (notified body). The process involves evidence from certificates of inspection, simulations/calculations, expert opinion and evaluation of test results and

Page 84



operations. The assessment is stated to be on the basis of EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129 however two of these standards relate to software/rams process for signalling rather than EMC directly affecting train detection. The method of assessment requires comparisons with limits and comparison with existing types with data extrapolation for failure modes and results in detailed technical reports, certificates of conformance. CNTK issues a certificate of conformance to the UTK. The costs are stated to be the costs of testing plus €6000 with a timescale of the time for CNTK to do the analysis plus approximately 3 months. EN50122 & EN 50238. Definitions of limits for track circuits on Polish Railways are given in document PD CLC/TR50507:2007.

Gabarits are given for the frequency ranges (t>200ms):

2Hz to 60Hz for the OTL, OTS, OTZ track circuits (interference limit range 2.4A to 30A);

1380Hz to 3000Hz for the SOT-1 track circuits (interference limits range 28mA to 310mA);

6200Hz to 18000Hz for the SOT-2 track circuits (interference limits range 41mA to 170mA);

24900Hz to 32700Hz for the EOC track circuits (interference limits range 78mA to 250mA).

Poland uses an AWS system call SHP (Samoczynne Hamowanie Pociagu) which uses magnetically coupled resonant circuits operating at 1000Hz.

The impact of the railway vehicle in the sphere of electromagnetic compatibility on the rail traffic control systems mounted on the railway infrastructure and onto the rail network, are tested and evaluated in the proceedings concerning the issue of a certificate of authorisation of a rail vehicle. As to the impact of the rail vehicle on lineside systems, the rail vehicle testing must show that the electromagnetic interference emitted by the vehicle does not exceed acceptable levels for the frequency range from 2Hz to 37.5kHz; also the impact and cooperation with safety systems in force in Poland, such as SHP and the dead man switch are tested. In case of the traction network, tests are carried out on cooperation with the traction network and to verify the emission of electromagnetic interference emitted by the electromagnetic device of the vehicle onto the traction network, and also tests on mechanical and electrical co-operation of the pantographs with the trolley wire of the electrical supply network.


The existing lineside/ trackside systems in Poland in the form of linear blocks and interlocking control devices, automatic crossing signaling are all tested for resistance (immunity) to electrostatic interference emitted by railway vehicles and other interferences from the rail vehicles. During the approvals, tests are conducted and a proof of safety is developed for these devices using the requirements and test methodologies of the standards EN 50126, EN 50128, EN 50129. Depending on the category of equipment in the development of the safety proof, the requirements in accordance with the SIL classification are applied. Proof of safety is developed by the manufacturer together with the Technical Conditions of Manufacturing and Approval and Technical-Operational Documentation, while testing and verification of the given proof of safety are conducted by an Authorized Testing Body, and testing and evaluation of systems and devices of rail traffic control for use in the interoperational infrastructure are carried out by the Notified laboratories. Certificates are issued by the registered certifying bodies (Figure 48).

Page 85




In the Polish national system, traction vehicles are powered from the traction contact line with voltage of 3kV and rated current of 2kA; therefore energy network tested by a competent unit is assessed on the technical requirements as set by the national standards and technical conditions of traction network issued by the railway infrastructure manager Polish Railway Lines (PLK). In addition to basic tests of the mechanical endurance of both carrying ropes, overhead traction wires and supporting structures, meeting the isolation requirements, finally also the emission of harmonics generated by railway vehicles to the energy network is tested - it is particularly necessary in the case of vehicles equipped with processing equipment (chopper) - inverters changing DC to AC voltage, as the railway vehicles constructed and operated in Poland are equipped with AC induction motors. Designated bodies involved in this process are the Institute of Electric Engineering and the Railway Scientific and Technical Centre.

The assessment is based on local regulations issued by the Infrastructure manager (PLK). The process involves evidence from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, simulations/calculations, expert opinion. Other responses suggest that EN 50388 is considered.

5.19.5 Radio frequency systems

The process involves ‘studies on compliance with national and European standards and regulations’. These are based on EN 50121. The method of assessment requires comparisons with limits.

Polish Railways uses the PKP radio system for ground to train radio communication. Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.

The resistance (immunity) of the radio equipment to interference from internal electromagnetic fields emanating from devices of a railway vehicle is also tested. Examined are the characteristics of radiotelephones in relation to undesirable emissions, channel spacing and the bandwidth of the transmitted signal. The radiotelephone must meet the requirements for operating in the RADIOSTOP system.


The Polish assessment does require consideration of compatibility with human exposure to EM effects. The criteria for compatibility are not directly stated but the methods used are testing and evaluation. Compatibility with the EMC directive is also required. This involves compliance with BS EN 50121 EN 50367 Railway applications EN 50388, BS EN 60870-2-1:2002 equipment and systems. Part 2-1: Operating conditions. Power supply and electromagnetic compatibility, PN EN 61000-4-29:2004, PN EN 61000-5-7:2005, PN EN 61000-6-3:2004, PN EN 61000-6-4:2004.

5.19.7 EN 50238

The Polish assessment does use the technical annexe to EN 50238 in its assessment process.

Page 86



5.20 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Portugal

There was no response to the questionnaire from Portugal. A document was sent through giving technical information. Since the Portuguese were not represented at the convocation and the questionnaire was not filled in there are no details available about procedural methods and evidence supplied to the compatibility process.

The following paragraph is taken from the Portuguese “IMTT” website which also has responsibility for Railways and is also the NSA for Portugal.

Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terrestres, I.P., also known by the acronym “IMTT” - the central administration body responsible for the coordination of inland transport - is an independent entity, endowed with administrative and financial autonomy and with jurisdiction over the national territory.

IMTT integrates a functionally independent rail regulatory unit in charge of the economic and technical regulation of the rail sector.

IMTT’s mission comprises the regulation, supervision, coordination and planning of inland transport. IMTT is also responsible for supervising and regulating the activities of those who operate within this sector, as well as for promoting safety and quality standards and ensuring the protection of consumer’s rights.

The following partners are involved in the acceptance process:

• REFER EPE – Infrastructure Manager (REFER EMC Lab for EMC issues)

• Public (CP) or Private Train Operators (e.g. FERTAGUS)

• Manufacturers – several

• External consulatancies to support REFER

• IMTT – Portuguese NSA

• APNCF – Recently created Notified Body.

5.20.1 Processes

For EMC purposes REFER is the accepting body on behalf of IMTT and can also carry out the EMC testing / report as well.

For some authorisation processes external consultancies are contracted (by REFER, by CP or both) to complete the compatibility demonstration. These companies include Movares (formerly HollandRail Consult), SNCF/ Eurailtest, Siemens AG and AEA Technologies.

The acceptance process in shown in Figure 49.

Page 87



Figure 49 – Portuguese Acceptance Procedure

Page 88




Compatibility with train detection is by measurement of harmonic currents in the time domain with analysis by filters specifically designed for each track circuit or axle counter type. Filter characteristics used in interference current measurements are shown in

Figure 50. These values include a safety factor of two.

For multiple units linear addition (synchronous) of interference currents is mandated unless it can be proven that independent contributing sources are asynchronous.

Figure 50 – Measurement Filter Characteristics

Page 89



Notes for Figure 50.


No limits are given in the technical documentation. Further clarification has been sought.


Portugal has a 25kV 50Hz traction supply system however, no methods of compatibility with the supply are available.


The Portuguese use EN 50121 for general compatibility with RFI systems. Portuguese railways use the TTT radio system CP_N for voice and data communications. Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


No levels are detailed for magnetic fields under and in the surrounding area of the vehicle (i.e. local induction).

5.20.7 EN 50238

The Portuguese follow EN 50238.

Page 90



5.21 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Romania

The Romanian participant returned a completed questionnaire. Romania did not send a delegate to the convocation.

5.21.1 Processes

The responsible body for safety assessment in Romania is the Autoritatea Feroviara Romana (AFER). Assessment is to the requirements of OMT 535/2008 which is available in Romanian from the AFER website (http://www.afer.ro/). The AFER is organised into two parts; ASFR and ONFR. The Romanian Safety Authority (ASFR) requires evidence in the form of expert opinion, certification from third party, evaluation reports for the locomotives, maintenance, any required technical revisions of the train, personnel assessments and declarations from personnel with specific route knowledge. Evidence is assessed by conformance to a technical check list, third party tests and expert opinion. The technical check list involves documentation concerning the operations and systems required for the issuing of the certificate but does not specifically involve EMC. The third party is the specific notified body in Romania (ONFR) who provides the registered certificate of the locomotive; the identity card of the locomotive and evaluation reports on the locomotives under the requirements of OMTCT1193/2004 which may be obtained from "Monitorul oficial" RA Parcului Street No.65 Bucharest. Expert opinion is provided by a nominated person from within the Safety Certification and Authorisation Department of the Romanian Safety Authority. The documentation process has a timescale of 30 days and it’s cost is variable depending upon the applicants’ end use: passenger operation, freight operation etc.

Autoritatea Feroviara Romana (AFER).

Romanian Railway Authority

Nominated ASFRExpert

Technical Check List

Safety Certificate

Approved Test LaboratoriesOICPE.S.A. or ICMED S.A.

Technical FileContainingCertfication

Railway Undertaking

Registered Certificate of the Locomotive

Approval Request

ASFRRomanian Railway Safety Authority

ONFRRomanian Notified Body

ANCOM

Telecomunicatii CFR SA (National Communication Authority)

(Railway telecommunication agency)

SC Electificare CFR SA(Infrastructure Controller)

Institutul National Cercetare Dezvoltare Pentru Protectia Muncii "Alexandru Darabont" National Institute for R & D for Labour Protection.

Train Detection

Radio Frequency and Lineside

Supply

Human Exposure

Third Party Testing

Figure 51 - Romanian Interactions for EMC Approvals


Compatibility with train detection is assessed by the Romanian notified body (ONFR). The process involves evidence from third party measurements to standards and test data. The assessment is performed by one of two authorised testing laboratories; OICPE.S.A. or ICMED S.A. There are no reference standards given for the tests. The assessment is documented by a detailed technical assessment and report in two stages prototype and running tests. No fixed timescales or costs are given for the process these are stated to be dependent upon the scope of testing required.

Page 91




Compatibility with lineside systems is assessed by the Romanian notified body (ONFR). The process involves evidence from third party measurements to standards, test data. The assessment is performed by ANCOM; the national authority for management regulation in communication of Romania, or Telecomunicatii CFR SA – the railway telecommunication agency There are no reference standards given for the tests. The assessment is reported by a detailed technical assessment and report.


Compatibility with the energy supply systems is assessed by the Romanian notified body (ONFR). The process involves evidence from third party measurements to standards, test data. The assessment is performed by SC Electificare CFR SA. There are no reference standards given for the tests. The assessment is reported by a detailed technical assessment and report.

5.21.5 Radio Frequency systems

Compatibility with radio frequency systems is assessed by the Romanian notified body (ONFR). The process involves evidence from third party measurements to standards and test data. The assessment is performed by ANCOM; the national authority for management regulation in communication of Romania, or Telecomunicatii CFR SA – the railway telecommunication agency. There are no reference standards given for the tests. The assessment is reported by a detailed technical assessment and report.


The Romanian process includes an assessment compatibility of systems to the directive relating to Human exposure to EM radiation. The assessment is performed by Institutul National Cercetare Dezvoltare Pentru Protectia Muncii "Alexandru Darabont" the Romanian National Institute for Research & Development on Labour Protection. The evidence presented includes test measurements and expert opinion. Evidence is to European standards SR EN60950, SR EN55022:2000, SR EN55024:2001 and SR EN61000-3-2:200. The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards supported by a detailed technical report

The process also includes an assessment compatibility of systems with the EMC directive by the Romanian notified body (ONFR). The process involves evidence from third party measurements to standards and test data which is assessed by Institutul National Cercetare Dezvoltare Pentru Protectia Muncii "Alexandru Darabont" .The evidence consists of a comparison with the limits in the standards and if conforming the issue of a certificate of compatibility.

5.21.7 EN 50238

Romania does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 92



5.22 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the Slovak Republic

The Slovakian participant has returned a completed questionnaire. The Slovakian republic did not send a representative to the convocation.

5.22.1 Processes

The Railway Regulatory Authority - Úrad pre reguláciu �elezni•nej dopravy (URZD) as a state administrative body is a safety authority for railways, special tracks, cableways and for railway vehicles. URZD is responsible for granting authorisations for placing in service of railway vehicles. Since January 1, 2010 it has been acting in accordance with a new Act No. 513/2009 Coll. on railroads and on amendments of some acts (Act on Railroads). According to this Act URZD no longer acts as an approval body for the railway vehicle type approval. Railway vehicle type approval has been taken over by the Slovak Ministry of Transport, Post and Telecommunications (MDPT SR), inconsistent with Directive 2008/57/EC, Article 26 which implies that it is a safety authority which has the responsibility (URZD is the NSA for Slovakia) approving railway vehicle type.

Implementing ordinance to the new Act on Railroads is currently subject to comments; both documents will be published in due course on www.urzd.sk and www.telecom.gov.sk.

As a first step MDPT SR approves a type of railway vehicle. According to Article 21 of the Act on Railroads, type approval must be carried out before the first authorisation for placing in service of a railway vehicle (Directive 2008/57/EC, Art. 22 and 24). Based on a certificate of type-approval issued by MDPT SR, sumbission of the documents concerning carrying out technical inspection and technical and safety test according to Article 27 (7), and documentation as stated in Annex 4 (4) of the Act on Railroads, URZD issues for an applicant an authorisation for placing in service of a railway vehicle. The documentation is assessed by the URZD panel (working group).

The timescale of the process of type approval by MDPT SR is from 4 to 12 months depending upon the complexity of the submission and the costs for the approvals certificate is €1000 (the costs are borne by the organisation submitting an application for a railway vehicle approval).

The timescale of the process for issuing/granting an authorisation for PIS by URZD is from 2 to 4 months depending upon the complexity of the submission and the costs for the certificate of authorisation is €40 (the costs are borne by the organisation submitting an application for PIS of a railway vehicle).

Page 93



Úrad pre Reguláciu Železnicnej Dopravy (URZD)

Railway Regulatory Authority

Approval ofRolling Stock

Railway Undertaking

Statement of

Compatibility

Technical FileCertification

Expert Panel

Výskumný a vývojový ústav Železníc

Výskumný ústav dopravný

Výzkumný ústav kolejových vozidel

VÚŽ)

VVÚŽ

VÚD

VÚKV

Výskumný ústav zváracský (

R & D Institute for Railways

Railways Transport Research Inc

Rolling stock/developer/tester

Slovakian Welding Research Institute

Testing

Expert Opinion NoBoPerson/ organisationapproved by the

ministry of Transport

Železnice Slovenskej Republiky (ŽSR)

Slovakian infrastructure Manager

Approval Request

Figure 52 - Slovakian Interactions for EMC Approvals


Compatibility with all EMC issues is the responsibility of the �SR (�eleznice Slovenskej Republiky) the Slovakian infrastructure manager. The ZSR uses evidence from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data, simulations/calculations and expert opinion. Inspection, measurements and testing are performed by the Research and Development Institute for Railways (VVÚ�). Any specific simulations/ calculations are performed by personnel with an approved (legal) status to review European standards, the TSIs and local standards. For historical reasons these mirror those of the Czech republic. Third party and ZSR test and measurement are assessed by comparison with limit values and existing train measurements. The analysis is reported in Slovakian by detailed technical reports from each party. Expert opinions are given by a Competent Person. The compatibility process is in four stages, namely:

• Design Specification

• Testing

• Trial operation

• Approval

The in-cab signalling system in the Slovak Republic is called LS. The track-side part of the system uses coded track circuits at one carrier frequency (75Hz).


Compatibility with lineside issues is the responsibility of the �SR (�eleznice Slovenskej Republiky) the Slovakian infrastructure manager. The ZSR uses evidence from certificates of inspection and (third party) measurements to standards performed in house. Costs and timescales are not given.

Page 94




Compatibility with the Energy Supply is the responsibility of the �SR (�eleznice Slovenskej Republiky) the Slovakian infrastructure manager. The ZSR uses evidence from certificates of inspection and (third party) measurements to standards performed in house.

Costs and timescales are not given.

5.22.5 Radio Frequency systems

Compatibility with the Radio Frequency systems is the responsibility of the �SR (�eleznice Slovenskej Republiky) the Slovakian infrastructure manager. The ZSR uses evidence from certificates of inspection and (third party) measurements to standards performed in house with input from the VVÚ�.



The Slovak Republic does not assess for compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects.

The Slovakian process includes an assessment compatibility of systems with the EMC directive. The Research and Development Institute Railways (VVÚ�) is responsible for assessing evidence for compatibility. Evidence is to the requirements of the directive. The evidence consists of certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards and expert opinion supported by a detailed technical report. The �SR are responsible for performing the measurements and producing the technical reports.


5.22.7 EN 50238

The Slovak Republic does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 95



5.23 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Slovenia

The Slovenian representative did not return a questionnaire nor attend the convocation of experts.

The NSA for Slovenia is called the a�p (Javna agencija za �elezniški promet RS – (Public Agency for Rail Transport of RS)) http://www.azp.si/www/index.php. No other direct information on Electromagnetic Compatibility is available at the time of writing.

Page 96



5.24 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Spain

The Spanish participant returned a completed questionnaire. Spain also sent a representative to the convocation.

5.24.1 Processes

The Spanish assessment of compatibility is twofold the first part is performed by Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry of Public Works, the NSA) which issues the authorisation for putting into service and the second by the Infrastructure Manager Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (ADIF) which issues the operating authorisation confirming compatibility with the network. The documentation detailing the process is also twofold. Legal processes are established by the Ministerial Orders of Material and the Technical Specifications for Approval are established by the Especificaciones Técnicas de Homologación.(ETH). These documents may be obtained from the webpage of the official state bulletin. http://www.boe.es. The assessment takes evidence from test results, calculations/simulation, comparison with existing trains and certification from third parties. The assessment is performed by an external panel consisting of certification bodies and Notified Bodies. This panel provides a certificate of certification based on the TSIs and the local standards (ETH). There are five stages to the process:

a Request

b Validation report (Issued by a Certification Body)

c EC Verification: only first level (Issued by a NoBo)

d Authorisation for PIS: first or second level (issued by NSA)

e Operating authorisation (Issued by IM)

There are no details given of the timescales or costs involved in the assessment process.

Railway Undertaking


EC Verification NoBO

Approval Request

Authorization of compatibility with the network

Administrador de Infraestruc turas Ferroviarias

(ADIF) Infrastruc ture Manager

Ministerio de Fomento (NSA)

Ministry of Public Works

Manufacturer

Third Party Testing

Certification

Test results Design

Simulation

Equipment Supply

Figure 53 - Spanish Interactions for EMC Approvals


The Manufacturer is responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with train detection. The evidence presented is from testing. The process does use the technical appendices to EN 50238 in the

Page 97



assessment. Testing is on-track type testing with detailed technical analysis and reporting. The timescale of the process is estimated as 5 days with a cost of €9500. Definitions of limits for track circuits on Spanish Railways are given in document PD CLC/TR50507:2007. The track circuit types defined include 50Hz (various manufacturers), HVI, FTGS jointless, FS2000/3000/5000 jointless, TI21, and UM71/2000 jointless. However, no detailed levels for compatibility demonstration are given.

Spain uses ASFA for in-cab signalling and ATP. This system uses magnetically coupled resonant circuits at nine frequencies from 55kHz to 115kHz.

Spain also uses LZB (Linienförmige Zugbeeinflussing). The system uses 36kHz (to the train), 56kHz (from the train).


The Equipment supplier is responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with lineside systems. The evidence presented is from third party measurements to standards, test data and certificates of conformity for LEU (Lineside electronic unit) and Eurobalise. Testing is carried out by any authorised Competent Body. No standards are quoted for the test measurements. There are no psophometric limits for the train.

A report from the convocation stated that, there are problems with ASFA balises (no specific information was given other than they were EMC related). The Germans also commented that they had problems with the detection of “ghost” balises.


Compatibility with the energy supply systems is assessed by the manufacturer who provides test data to the ADIF. There are no reference standards given for the tests. The assessment is reported by a detailed technical assessment and report and approved by the NSA. Standards apply are EN50153, EN50163 and EN50388. Two supply voltages – 3kV DC and 25kV 50Hz.


Compatibility with radio frequency systems is assessed by the manufacturer who provides test data to the ADIF. The reference standard given for the tests is EN 50121. The assessment is reported by a detailed technical assessment and report. The Spanish Railway uses UIC Radio Chapter 1 – 4 + 6 for ground to train radio (UIC code 751-3). Details of this system may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


Spain does not assess for compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects.

General compatibility with the EMC directive is assessed by the supplier of equipment. Basic assessment is to the EN 50121 series of standards and the manufacturer provides a technical evaluation of tests as evidence. The timescale of the process is estimated as 5 days with a cost of €13000.

5.24.7 EN 50238

Spain does use the technical documentation in appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment.

Page 98



5.25 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Sweden

The Swedish participant returned a completed questionnaire and representatives from Sweden were at the convocation.

5.25.1 Processes

The responsible body for acceptance in Sweden is the Transportstyrelsen (Swedish Transport Agency). Assessment is to the requirements of JVSFS2006:1which is available in Swedish from the Transportstyrelsen website. http://www.transportstyrelsen.se. The acceptance body requires evidence in the form of test results, calculations and simulations, expert opinion, comparison with existing trains and third party certification. Safety is assessed by a third party organisation and by expert opinion. The third party organisation is approved by Transportstyrelsen and the third party issues a certificate of conformance on completion of its assessment. Assessment is to the processes of JvSFS2006:1 and its accompanying guidelines which are available from the Transportstyrelsen website. Expert opinion is from competent persons within Transportstyrelsen. The process follows phases 1 to 13 of schedule V given in EN50126.The timescale for the process are stated to be between 0 and 6 years with no estimates of cost given.

Norway and Sweden have a joint document NES TS02 (Nordic Electric Power Co-operation Technical Specification 02) called “Requirements on rolling stock in Norway (JD590) and Sweden (BVS 543.19300) regarding EMC with the electrical infrastructure and co-ordination with the power supply and other vehicles”.

Banverket Swedish Rail Administration

Test Operationtra in

Transportstyrelsen Swedish Transport Agency.


Technica l FileCertification

Manufacturer

Third PartyTesting

Test ResultsSimulationCertificationDesign Data

Evaluation

Expert OpinionIndividualsappointed by Transportstyrelsen

Figure 54 - Swedish Interactions for EMC Approvals


The Manufacturer or supplier is responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with train detection. The evidence presented is from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data, simulations/calculations and expert opinion. Inspection is carried out by Banverket (Swedish Rail Administration) who reviews inspections and submitted material and passes it on to Transportstyrelsen as a basis for their decision on approval of the vehicle.

Only DC track signalling circuits exist on the whole electrified network. Sweden does not use axle counters for signalling purposes. They are used only in conjunction with hot axle box detectors. The DC track circuits are susceptible to traction currents at frequencies of between 0 and 2Hz and the magnitude is restricted to 25A. For transformer inrush the 25A limit must not exceed 1.5s.

Third party measurements are assessed to the section of BVS 543.19300 dealing with signalling and telecommunications. The document is available in English and can be obtained from Banverket or

Page 99



Transportstyrelsen. Assessment is by comparison with the limits described in the document and reported by a detailed technical report. Expert opinion is based on BVS 543.19300 which is, in turn based upon EN 50121, EN 50163, EN 50238, EN 50388 and others and is given in a detailed technical report. Evaluation is in two stages; the first is a detailed assessment of the technical information provided which then allows the process to proceed to the second stage of on-track testing. The timescale for the process is stated to be approximately 3 months and the cost consists of a basic €40,000 with variable extra costs depending upon the testing campaign. Definitions of limits for track circuits on other parts of the Swedish Railways are given in document PD CLC/TR50507:2007. Further requirements are detailed in BVS 560.1201 EMC requirements for track-bound vehicles regarding telecommunication, radio and signalling disturbances.


The Manufacturer or supplier is responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with lineside systems. The evidence presented is from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data, simulations/calculations and expert opinion. Inspection is based on the requirements of EN 50121. Third party measurements are assessed to BVS 543.19300 as is the expert opinion and any simulations and calculations. Many external parties can be involved in the assessment but evidence is collated by Banverket who then gives and overall assessment to Transportstyrelsen in a detailed technical report. Psophometric current must not exceed 1.65A.


The Manufacturer or supplier is responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with the energy supply systems. The evidence presented is from certificates of inspection, third party measurements to standards, test data, simulations/calculations and expert opinion. BVS 543.19300 contains the technical requirements for the assessment however the information is too complex for direct inclusion here. It prescribes methods of calculation for interactions with the supply for neutral sections, power factor, electrical resonance stability, ac inrush currents and simulations of dynamic vehicle behaviour. Many external parties can be involved in the assessment but evidence is collated by Banverket who then gives and overall assessment to Transportstyrelsen in a detailed technical report.


The Manufacturer or supplier is responsible for supplying evidence for compatibility with radio frequency systems. The evidence presented is from third party measurements to standards, test data and expert opinion. Assessments are performed to EN 50121. Many external parties can be involved in the assessment but evidence is collated by Banverket who then gives and overall assessment to Transportstyrelsen in a detailed technical report.

A further standard BVS 545.43501 imposes requirements on external antennas for railway vehicles (Swedish NNTR).


The Swedish assessment does not require consideration of compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects or compliance to the EMC directive. There are no restrictions for locally induced interference from the vehicle. EN 50500 is quoted.

Page 100



5.25.7 EN 50238

The Swedish assessment does not use the technical appendix TR5057 of EN 50238 in its assessment. The respondent states that this appendix refers to an outdated standard BVS 560.1201. Assessment is currently to the requirements of BVS 543.19300 however it is stated that this standard is due to be updated in the winter of 2009 to further specify detailed technical requirements for compatibility with the railway in Sweden.

Page 101



5.26 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in Switzerland

Switzerland did not return an individual questionnaire. Instead, the representatives on the ERA XG group indicated that the required information could be compiled from a combined working document which applies to all 5 countries belonging to a group of countries who have certain common requirements for international inter-operation These are documented in the International Requirements List available from www.irl-rail.eu This document (RTI)[3] represents their efforts in defining a common approach in a TFI (task force for interoperability). A reference to a document was given which contains a collection of standards/requirements. Although this has much technical detail; some of which has been extracted for the following paragraphs, it is difficult to relate to the individual items of the questionnaire. The following paragraphs are therefore based mainly on evaluations of the technical standards and interviews at the convocation and information from the internet.

Railway Undertaking

Request for Network Access licence

Federal Office of Transport Federal Office of Transport

Network access licenseSafety Certificate

Interview and Negotiation with

Infrastructure manager

Network access agreement

Request for Safety Certification

Network Access

Figure 55 - Swiss Access Process

5.26.1 Processes

There are no detailed methodologies described within the document; rather the document contains lists of standards applicable to each member of the group. Hence, no details may be given on the approach, methods or reporting requirements from these member states.

Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU it has adopted similar legislation to the Interoperability directives to maintain the cohesion of European railway system. As such the Swiss do not have a formal National Safety Authority. Publicly available information sources state that the responsibility for granting access for rolling stock lies with Département fédéral de l'Environnement, des Transports, de l'Energie et de la Communication (the Swiss Federal Office for Transport agency DETEC). The DETEC issues companies with a permit to use the Swiss rail network based on the Railways Act (EBG) and the Track Access Ordinance (NZV) dated 25 November 1998.These are available in German from Die Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (Federal Authority of the Swiss Confederation) www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c742_101.html The provisions of the railway act mandate

Page 102



compatibility with signalling and telecoms.. The process is governed by the application of EN50129 (safety processes) however there are no other standards referenced.

Under the terms of the access ordinance it is the responsibility of the Railway Undertaking to provide evidence of compatibility with the infrastructure as part of the requirement for the issuing of a safety certificate. There are several infrastructure managers within the Swiss railway network (e.g. SBB AG, BLS Netz AG). Each is responsible for reviewing compatibility information and issuing a certificate of conformity for their network.


Definitions of limits for track circuits on Swiss Railways are given in document PD CLC/TR50507:2007. This information is based on the Swiss document J78. Figure 56 shows the track circuit limits covered by J78. Currently the Swiss are installing ETCS systems across their network. These are predominantly level 2 systems however it is stated that some level 1 systems are present. The Swiss intend to have all their network converted to ERTMS/ ETCS by 2015.

Compatibility with axle counters is to Swiss document J84-01-71-2.

Page 103



Figure 56 – Swiss Track Circuit Limits covered by document J78


The document contains a reference to psophometric current given in the annexe to EN 50121-3-1. The annexe describes the mechanism and outlines the method however, no specific limits are applied in the EN but the RTI document specifies a limit of 10A.

Page 104




The Swiss system uses a 16.7Hz 15kV AC supply and requires rolling stock to have defined characteristics to ensure stability of the supply. Resonances between the supply and the traction systems harmonics can create damaging over-voltage and instabilities. There is also some noted concern that the reduction in the ability of the system to absorb power (e.g. during braking) may increase the likelihood of system instability in the future. Hence, system stability is of high concern to the Swiss railway. The criterion mandated to achieve stability is by control of the input impedance of the train.

The Swiss system requires that the input impedance of the train is passive (inductive) at all frequencies above 103Hz (see Figure 57). The detailed requirement is available in the document 47.10.001 “Anforderungen an die Eingangs-Admitanz vonUmrichtertriebfahrzeugen” which is an internal Swiss Railway document.

The existing track circuits operating at 100Hz require low emissions at this frequency and train design operating on the Swiss railway often incorporate a 100Hz filter stage. This limits the realisation of the prescriptive specification to 103Hz. It is stated that the aim of Swiss railways to remove/replace all such track circuits with others operating at different frequencies; when this process is complete the frequency threshold requirement for passive impedance will be lowered to 87Hz.

Demonstration of compatibility is by direct measurement, simulation/calculation or comparison with existing rolling stock design. Document 47.10.002 gives a methodology for the direct measurement process which involves the injection of a signal into the supply during train operation (small signal response measurement).

There are several methods outlined in the document to achieve the demonstration by comparison with other rolling stock operating on the railway. The limitation on the input impedance is not applied if the operator intends to run a system whose total fleet power is less than 25 MW. Acceptance by the comparative route can be rescinded for rolling stock which is subsequently found to be problematic. Simulation/analysis/measurement is then required before re-acceptance.

100 200 300 4000.1

1

10

0

-180

180

90

-90

Frequency

Phase

P.U. Impedance

Forbidden

Forbidden

100 200 300 400

Frequency

Example Impedance Curve

103 Hz

Figure 57 - Input Impedance Requirements

Page 105



The issue of the ability of the system to absorb/supply power is discussed in Document 47.10.003 which mandates the disconnection of the power of the vehicle if the supply frequency is changed due to train load to be outside the limits 16.1Hz and 17.3 Hz.. The response time of the disconnection is given as 500ms for a 0.1Hz step disturbance in frequency.

FullPowerRegion

ReducedPowerRegion

ReducedPowerRegion

Forbidden Region

PowerLevel%

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

16.9 Hz16.5 Hz16.1 Hz 17.3 Hz Figure 58 - Frequency/Power Limits

For frequency changes between the 16.1 and 17.3Hz limits a series of power limit curves are given (see Figure 58) in accordance with EN50163 (the system is defined as an island system). The document also gives a diagram delimiting how the power reduction requirement should be adjusted for train speed (see Figure 59). Demonstration of the compatibility is by simulation/calculation by the train manufacturer.

Speed

0

Tra

ctio

n / B

rake

Effo

rt

< 16.9 Hz

17.0 Hz

17.1 Hz

17.2Hz

16.2 Hz

16.3 Hz

16.4 Hz> 16.5Hz

Figure 59 - Speed/Power/Frequency Curves

Page 106




The Swiss require compliance with EN 50121 for general compatibility with radio frequency systems.


No details of the compatibility requirements relating to human exposure (EMF) or the EMC directive were given in the information supplied. However, the RTI document does include measurements to all the specifications required for general compliance to the EMC Directive.

5.26.7 EN 50238

The Swiss will use EN 50238 when the standard becomes fully implemented.

Page 107



5.27 The Demonstration of Electromagnetic Compatibility in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom returned a completed questionnaire and sent a representative to the convocation.

5.27.1 Processes

The general procedure for acceptance in the UK is controlled by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) which has the role of National Safety Authority (NSA). The current process is defined in a series of regulations known as the Railway and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (ROGS). ROGS mandates that any railway undertaking (RU) must demonstrate that it has a safety management system (SMS) which is appropriate to control the safety of the system. The details of the safety management system are required to be able to demonstrate that operations performed by the railway undertaking are safe. The safety management system is reviewed by the ORR which issues a safety certificate to the railway undertaking. There are no technical requirements or engineering parameters or demonstrations needed for the regulator to issue a safety certificate. The issuance of a safety certificate is governed by the demonstration of the documentation process and staff competence.

Hence demonstration of EMC compatibility is devolved to the railway undertaking which is required to assess any system introduced onto the railway. There are three levels of change that the certificate holder needs to consider when introducing a system:

These distinguish between the levels of compatibility demonstration required for different scales of change introduced into the railway. All three may potentially involve assessments with regard to rolling stock which affect or are affected by Electromagnetic factors.

A ‘New’ railway undertaking for the mainline; this must demonstrate compatibility

New or substantially modified stock; Substantial modification is defined as a significant major change in the traction system or envelope of the train.

Modifications that do not affect the technical or operational characteristics of the train.

The RU has to hold a compatibility forum with all stakeholders including the IM.

Licence to Operate

Manufacturer

Third Party Testing(RFI)

Test results Design

Simulation

Office of Rail RegulationORR


Railway UndertakingCompatibility forum

Certification

Approval RequestCertification

Technical Checklist

NotifiedBody

Network RailInfrastruc ture Manager

Certificate ofCompatibility Test

Permissions

Figure 60 - Approvals Interactions in the UK

The infrastructure manager (IM) has a suite of documents that specifies the EMC processes and limits to be applied in an Engineering Safety Case (Compatibility File). This satisfies the requirements of

Page 108



GE/RT8270 (NNTR). Additionally, GE/RT8270 calls up GE/RT8015 (NNTR) which in turn mandates BS EN 50121. The infrastructure manager (Network Rail) issues a Rolling Stock Infrastructure Certificate of Compatibility when it is satisfied with the Compatibility File.

The Engineering Safety Case (Compatibility File) should be produced in accordance with the guidelines given in Engineering Safety Management (The Yellow Book www.yellowbook-rail.org.uk) and incorporate or reference the appropriate simulations, measurements and statements of compliance with the suite of documents listed below.

The main document in the UK for Network Rail (IM) is NR/L2/SIG/30040 “EMC Strategy for Network Rail”. This document references a suite of documents that detail the limits for the demonstration of compatibility with rolling stock within 3m of the centre of the nearest railway line.

These are detailed in Figure 61.

UK Compatibility Documentation

NR/SP/SIG/50002 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with single rail Reed Track Circuits on the AC railway.

NR/SP/SIG/50003 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with Reed Track Circuits on the DC railway.

NR/SP/SIG/50004 Methodology for the demonstration of electrical compatibility with DC (AC-immune) Track Circuits.

NR/GN/SIG/50005 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with 50 Hz Single Rail Track Circuits.

NR/SP/SIG/50006 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with 50 Hz Double Rail Track Circuits.

NR/GN/SIG/50007 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with HVI Track Circuits.

NR/GN/SIG/50008 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility withTI21Track Circuits.

NR/GN/SIG/50009 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with FS2600 Track Circuits.

NR/L2/SIG/50010 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with train detection systems in use on non-electrified lines.

NR/SP/SIG/50011 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with Axle Counters.

NR/SP/SIG/50012 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with TPWS trackside equipment.

NR/GN/SIG/50013 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with Interlockings.

NR/GN/SIG/50014 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with Lineside Equipment on AC and DC Railways.

NR/SP/SIG/50015 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with Reed FDM Systems.

NR/SP/TEL/50016 Methodology for the demonstration of compatibility with Telecomms Systems.

NR/GN/SIG/50018 Methodology for the determination of interaction with Neighbouring Railways.

For radiated emissions, Network Rail operates a telecoms clearance process which reduces the risk of interference from fixed radio transmitters to sensitive lineside systems to ALARP. This document is NR/SP/TEL/30066 “Signalling and Telecommunications Telecoms Clearance for Fixed Transmitters”.

Page 109



UK Compatibility Documentation

The infrastructure can also be affected through EMI generated externally such as lightning, 3rd party transmitters and EMI from cabling sourced or routed through a non-railway third party or neighbouring railways. Their effect should be defined by individual risk assessments in accordance with NR/L2/SIG/30041 “EMC Assurance Process for Network Rail”.

Figure 61 – List of Infrastructure Manager Standards


Compatibility with train detection systems is normally demonstrated by measurement to a series of Network Rail Company Standards (Figure 61) which apply to the national railway infrastructure. The standards apply to different types of train detection systems and have a general nomenclature of NR/XX/SIG/500xx (see above). Note: these documents are sometimes referred to as the IDI documents (Industry Data Initiative). The limits are summarised in the gabarit line plotted in Figure 62. The limits cover Reed track circuits (for AC and DC railway), DC (AC Immune), 50Hz (single rail and double rail), TI21, HVI and FS2600. Limits for axle counters (steady state only) are also given (not shown in Figure 62).

Additionally, technical information from these documents for DC, FS2600, TI21 and 50Hz track circuits respectively has been reproduced in Published Document PD CLC/TR 50507:2007 Railway Applications – Interference limits of existing track circuits used on European Railways.

The information (including simulations, measurements etc.) are included in the engineering safety case (compatibility file) for agreement with the IM. Limits for axle counters are given in NR/SP/SIG/50011. In the UK, the document covers the following axle counter types:

• AxL70 – Alcatel 5060Hz heads (obsolete)

• AzL70-30 – Alcatel 28 – 31kHz heads, 2530Hz, 4150Hz and 5060Hz FDM to evaluator unit

• AzL90M – Alcatel 28 – 31kHz heads, digital Tx to evaluator unit

• AzLM – Alcatel 28 – 31kHz (non ferrite heads), digital Tx to evaluator unit

• AzSME – Siemens 43kHz heads, 3600Hz & 6250Hz for Tx to evaluator unit.

Limits for magnetic flux density in the X, Y & Z directions are given for each type of axle counter.

Limits for current in the rail (steady state) are also given ranging from 330mA for AzL70-30 to 85mA for type AzSME.

No limits are currently given for transients.

Page 110



Train Detection Harmonic Limits in the UK

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

Frequency Hz

Perm

issi

ble

Cur

rent

A R

MS

Figure 62 – Conducted Limits for UK Train Detection

In the UK, there is also the Great Western ATP system. This operates at FSK 100kHz +/-10kHz (similar to the TBL system used in Belgium).


Guidance on lineside systems is given in the document NR/GN/SIG/50014. Compatibility with the limits given in this document are required for the compatibility file to show compliance. Systems covered include AWS (Automatic Warning System), TPWS (Train Protection and Warning System),hot axle box detectors, signalling equipment, CCTV, APC (Automatic Pantograph Control) Magnets etc.


The UK mainline railway uses two methods of traction supply. These are 25kV AC overhead line and 750V DC third rail.

Compatibility demonstration of rolling stock with the supply is by initial simulation/ factory test of the design followed by practical measurements on the network and further simulation of line resonance effects. The measurements encompass regeneration. Compatibility limits for the systems are given in Document NR/GN/ELP/27010 which has recently been amended to cope with regeneration. BS EN50163 is aligned with this standard for supply voltages of traction systems with UK specific items in Annexe B. BS EN50388 Power Supply and rolling stock – Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve interoperability also applies. IM’s Standard (GN) on 50Hz multiples up to 1000Hz. EN50388 recommended for the higher frequency range.


General compatibility with radio frequency systems is demonstrated by conformance to EN 50121 by specific test on rolling stock prototypes on the railway. Specific analysis of these measurements is

Page 111



required for the various railway specific methods of communication which may be closer to the source of interference than the prescriptive distance of 10m given in the standard. In addition there are specific tests for compatibility with radio frequency systems which lie outside the frequency limits of the standard (>2GHz). For radiated emissions, Network Rail operates a telecoms clearance process which reduces the risk of interference from fixed radio transmitters to sensitive lineside systems to ALARP. This document is NR/SP/TEL/30066 “Signalling and Telecommunications Telecoms Clearance for Fixed Transmitters”.

The UK has two specific radio systems; NRN (National Radio Network) and CSR (Cab Secure Network) Details of these systems may found in the TSI CCS Annexe B.


The United Kingdom assessment does not at present require consideration of compatibility with human exposure to EMF effects. The standard BS EN50500 has however been published and it has been stated that it is considered to be good practice to apply the standard to new build trains.

5.27.7 EN 50238

The UK has a contribution to the information contained in the technical appendices to EN 50238; as such many of the requirements of the local EMC compatibility requirements have been incorporated into the standard.

Page 112



6 Analysis

6.1 Overview

Although there have been a wide variety of styles in the replies received from the questionnaire campaign and during interviews at the convocation and researches on the internet there are several observations that may be made.

In general, of the replies received, there seems to be a procedural adherence to the terms of the directives. All countries have implemented the requirements to the extent that there are now commercially separate bodies responsible for approval, infrastructure and operations. Where the country had a well established state controlled organisation the commercial separation frequently takes the form of breaking up of the existing state systems into separate components dealing with operations and infrastructure under an umbrella holding organisation.

In accordance with the directives, these organisations have to demonstrate that they operate suitable safety management systems and that risks are controlled adequately. Under this structure the actual verification of compatibility, including EMC, is frequently devolved to various other entities. Since the technical expertise needed for these evaluations requires considerable knowledge of the local systems and this local knowledge was concentrated in the original state system it is unsurprising that many of the entities carrying out the verification are the same organisations and personnel that ensured compliance before the directive became operational.

Thus, there is a continuum of devolution in the processes of evaluation of electromagnetic compatibility extending from those states that have completely delegated the technical aspects of measurement, analysis and evaluation to organisations outside the NSA to others where the NSA is the embodiment of the older state system of compliance and all technical aspects are handled in-house. However, for most of the organisations contacted, there is a considerable representation of the older state systems involved in the process.

In all the replies, there is a general awareness of and movement towards the ‘common’ standards of the TSIs: particularly as embodied in EN 50121 and EN 50238 but including other standards as outlined in Figure 63. However, since railway infrastructures and equipment have useful working lives of thirty years or more it does not necessarily make economic sense to eliminate all national requirements immediately. This is especially so in the cases where the TSIs do not give technical methodologies for compatibility demonstration with all types of existing infrastructure. Hence, the implementations of compatibility demonstration for most member states are to both TSIs and local standards in parallel.

The lifespan of systems is also a major factor in the adoption of TSI compliant systems. The equipment necessary for interoperable railways needs a good degree of integration. This integration is easier to achieve for a completely new railway (rolling stock and infrastructure) rather than as a retrofit to an existing system. Hence large step changes in technology such as the change from track circuits and visible signals to ETCS tends to be restricted to new lines or routes.

The costs and duration of the demonstration processes were a specific part of the questionnaire but have returned highly variable answers ranging from unknown to very specific amounts (which may relate to single activities or tests or even fees for certification rather than the whole process); many of the replies state that costs and timescales are variable depending upon the size of the conformance task and hence there is little concrete information to be gained from these particular questions. In particular, it is not possible to directly compare the costs from state to state.

Page 113



Although further requests for cost information were included in all follow up e-mails no other data was produced. This was considered to be due to the lack of knowledge of financial aspects by some of the respondents to the study who were mainly administrative or technical personnel. This area cannot therefore not been studied beyond the questionnaire level.

EN Number Title Description

50121 Railway applications —Electromagnetic compatibility

In 5 parts dealing with EMC aspects, limits and interactions between parts of the railway system and the outside world.

50128 Railway applications —Communications, signalling and processing systems — Software for railway control and protection systems

Deals with the software assurance requirements of railway signalling systems ; indirectly concerns EMC in its consequences

50129 Railway applications —Communication, signalling and processing systems —Safety related electronic systems for signalling

Requirement for the evidence to be presented in the Safety aspects ( hardware and software) for signalling systems; indirectly impacts on EMC with rolling stock.

50163 Railway applications — Supply voltages of traction systems

Describes and defines supply systems and variations

50238 Railway applications —Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems

In 3 parts Part 1 is generic; defining methodologies; Parts 2 and 3 are emergent standards not yet officially published ; These define test methods, limits and national applicability for track circuits and axle counter systems.

50367 Railway applications —Current collection systems — Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph and overhead line (to achieve free access)

Gives physical and electrical characteristics of pantograph systems ; Indirectly affects EMC as the sliding contact is a major source of emissions.

50388 Railway applications — Power supply and rolling stock —Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve interoperability

Technical considerations pertaining to protection, operation (demand and regeneration) and testing with appendices on resonance phenomena

50500 Measurement procedures of magnetic field levels generated by electronic and electrical apparatus in the railway environment with respect to human exposure

Technical considerations and limits to be applied to the evaluation of human exposure to magnetic fields.

Figure 63 - EN Standards Quoted by Respondents as used in EMC Compatibility Demonstration

6.2 Processes

Most states have a process that involves the National Safety Authority and one or more other parties in its assessment as described in the safety directive. These are detailed in local embodiments of the directive usually accompanied by a document describing, in general terms the process of certification. In the majority of states the documentation process consists of two parts. The first is the granting of a licence to operate an undertaking after examination of the applicants’ ability and fitness to operate a railway undertaking and a second part which is the granting of a safety certificate based on evidence of the safety processes of the undertaking; management system, accident reporting, compliance with TSIs

Page 114



etc. Compliance with electromagnetic effects is universally part of the second part. The descriptions of the ways of demonstrating compatibility are usually contained in a single reference document or guidance note which gives an overview. Sometimes these guidance notes are prominent and freely available from the web sites of the NSAs or Infrastructure managers of the country’s railway. Some guidance notes reference the basic technical documentation however most just indicate which bodies should be approached (NoBos; test labs, Infrastructure managers) for technical aspects. In most cases compliance with the TSI is the major technical consideration for the NSA and compliance with EMC is normally a minor or indirectly referenced part. The majority of the procedural standards examined in the study are concerned solely with the physical and operational aspects of assurance.

Technical documentation giving details of the actual measurement methods, limits, mechanisms and analysis methods required to demonstrate EM compliance were often difficult to access and in most cases are unavailable from (readily accessible) public sources. Furthermore, the technical documentation was often under review; several countries stated that their technical documents were undergoing a process of rationalisation in preparation for the introduction of new train control systems (ETCS).

In some countries, the process of compatibility demonstration involves the participation of technical experts within the NSA to give opinions on the evidence provided. In others, the technical analysis is devolved to a third party organisation which reviews evidence and creates a statement (certificate of conformity) which is then processed by the NSA against a checklist of requirements with no further technical analysis. This reflects the fact that the technical experts involved in the actual evidence collection and evaluation have migrated from the previous state agencies in the various countries either into the state controlled arm (the NSA) or the commercially separated entities (infrastructure managers, test laboratories, notified bodies).

6.3 Train Detection

Most states that responded have local requirements for the assessment of train detection. Compatibility is invariably demonstrated by measurements taken from a test train. Two routes are used to obtain these measurements. The first is to gather data from manufacturer tests and the second is for a third party to perform the tests on a ‘first of class’ vehicle. Various forms of expert assessment are used to assess the test evidence and this may involve representatives from the infrastructure organisations or independent bodies. Most assessments include the effects of transients and credible failure conditions by either direct measurement or simulation and calculation.

Compatibility is assessed in three main ways; by evaluation of the state railway authority, by self assessment by the manufacturer or supplier or by third party assessment from a notified or competent body. Since the subject is necessarily complex and technical it is usual to create some form of technical file of the assessment. This may be directly passed to the NSA for further evaluation or it may be simply reported within a statement of compliance. If the rolling stock is assessed against the TSIs then the assessment is commonly performed by a Notified Body. To this end, most states record lists of approved test agencies and bodies on their NSA’s web sites.

Page 115



Overall Gabarit for all train detection

0.001

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

Frequency Hz

Har

mon

ic C

urre

nt

A

mps

RM

S

Figure 64 - Universal Train Detection Gabarit

By combining the requirements of each member state It is possible to create a common gabarit for all types of train detection used in the European Railway Area (Figure 64). However conforming to this gabarit with the existing designs of electric trains would be problematic.

There are several types of electric train design in common use through Europe. These can be broadly classified into those using mechanical or pseudo mechanical controls, those using phase controls, those using chopper converters and those using four quadrant converters. The first three types tend to create harmonics which follow an exponential decay (power). To design such equipment that conforms to the gabarit would place severe limitations on the power of the system. Equally, for four quadrant converters, which produce harmonics at multiples of their design switching frequencies, the frequency coverage of the overall gabarit is such that it is impossible to find a range of basic switching frequencies whose harmonics miss every band other than a system using a very high switching frequency of some 20kHz. Currently such a high switching frequency is beyond the bounds of conventional megawatt power technologies.

Hence, it is impractical and uneconomic to create a single train design that can be simultaneously compatible with all existing member state limitations on emissions. When all systems have migrated to ECTS level 3 then the compatibility with individual state systems should be eliminated however, during the interim, it is suggested that the requirements of the proposed technical appendices to EN50238 are a way forward to a common approach.

Page 116



6.3.1 Common Methods

Two basic methodologies for demonstration of compatibility with train detection are described in the technical documentation7 that has been reviewed as part of this project.

The first is the simplistic method of operating the train next to or over the train detection circuit. If no functional disturbance is observed then the train is compatible. The method is simplistic in that it assumes that all configurations of the infrastructure that might affect the result; relative spacing, weather, section length, power drawn etc. are represented by the (necessarily) small population of susceptible equipment on the test track.

This is the approach which was almost universally adopted for compatibility with axle counter systems up to a few years ago8. Only one or two of the member states participating had existing specifications for a more systematic approach. EN 50238-3 will contain a prescriptive approach to the demonstration of compatibility with axle counters. Many countries indicated that they would adopt the methodology when it is ratified.

A corollary to this method is to compare the vehicle design (and emissions) to a similar vehicle type already operating on the member state’s railway. Both approaches require considerable knowledge and technical judgements to be made by experts as the methods are largely qualitative rather than specifically quantitative.

The second method for demonstration of compatibility with train detection is to use electrical measurements from the system to determine compatibility. In all the technical documentation examined the major method of demonstration is by measurement of the rail return current from the train operating under ‘normal and degraded’ conditions. Return current is measured on the train in two basic ways:

On DC infrastructure, current is normally measured at the supply input to the train (point A, Figure 65)

ON AC infrastructure current is normally measured on the return leg of the main transformer (point B, Figure 65)

7 The emergent standard EN50238-2 based on the previous technical appendices to the existing EN50238. In this standard test

methods and test conditions are based upon previous work by Railcom Ref.[21] which have been expanded and revised for the

emergent standard.

8 The emergent standard EN 50238-3 concerns the techniques of measurement and comparison to be used for axle counter

compatibility.

Page 117



AC Infrastructure

B

A

A

Overhead wire

Overhead wire

AC Infrastructure

DC Infrastructure

Third Rail

Figure 65 - Measurement Points for differing Infrastructures

Both methods have the advantage that they separate the interference that is propagated to the rest of the railway from that which circulates locally under the train. Conditions for local circulation are complex and are usually not considered in connection with track circuit type train detection9. All measurements are undertaken in the time domain.

Most methodologies call for the whole current of the train to be measured however the practical aspects of measurement usually mean that finding a common point in the cabling which carries the whole train current is difficult. Indeed, for the assessment of non-electric traction interference there may be no common point identifiable. Hence, various methods of summing or scaling measurements are used. Here, there are differences in the methodologies from different countries. Some use arithmetic summation; effectively ignoring phase, and others use root sum square methods; effectively assigning random phase to the individual measurements. A third method which produces results in between the other two methods is to apply a scaling factor to the summation which is dependent on the number of sources. This is used in several member states, including the UK and Germany, and there is provision for such a summation rule in the future versions of EN50238.

Various analysis techniques are applied to the time domain signal to evaluate compatibility. Basic techniques involve an initial conversion to frequency domain by means of Fourier transform or isolation of harmonic frequency content by employing band-pass filtering. Both techniques result in a measurement of a harmonic current level and duration over a specific range of frequencies10.

It is at this point the methodologies between the different countries in the study diverge. Each country has its own track circuit types, bandwidth timing and current limits, and analysis methods. However, this in itself is not a significant factor impeding interoperable compatibility demonstration. Each analysis is performed by computer and, provided that the baseline time domain information has been captured with sufficient resolution and bandwidth, then the actual analysis differences are a matter of

9 Circulating current under the train is specified in only 3 member states technical documentation. The methodology for

measurement is not given and calculation/ simulation methods are known to be used as alternatives.

10 Other analysis techniques may be employed e.g. Z transform or wavelet transform but these are only applicable to specific

analyses and are not widely used.

Page 118



software11. Although software may be complex its costs of production are one-off and may be spread over many repeated investigations.

One factor has been omitted from the consideration so-far. This is the definition of ‘normal and degraded’ conditions. Electromagnetic interactions are highly dependent on the conditions under which they occur. Even simple interactions can be complicated by attenuation, resonance and multiple path effects. A few of the technical documents examined specify the conditions that must be used in the testing: most do not. The definition of what is included in the definition of a normal condition varies widely from country to country and only general guidance is issued. However, EN 50238-2 and EN 50238-3 (which are not specifically referenced in current directives) do establish a consensus for test conditions and operations that should be examined. A notable omission from both of these documents is the precise definition of what constitutes a transient condition.

Transient conditions are not easily analysed with conventional techniques and, in many countries they are deliberately excluded from the analysis. This is despite the self-evident fact that certain types of train detection, axle counters and HVI circuits, are inherently transient in operation12.

There is also a wide diversity of what other analyses may be applied to the test results; many states require demonstration for both normal operation and credible failure conditions. Most such analyses are by design calculation and scaling of ‘normal’ measured results. No universal definition of a credible failure exists and such definitions are normally devolved to the equipment manufacturer who determines them by an analysis of the design.

However, the trend amongst the participants appears to be to adopt the requirements of EN 50238 as a baseline standard. Nearly all participants stated that they were aware of the contents of the technical annexe even if they did not specifically adopt it. In addition to limits for preferred types of train detection, the technical annexe contains details on the test methodology and assessment requirements for the demonstration of compatibility. In particular, the technical appendices to this standard regularise the methodologies across systems and give the degree of testing effort involved even if the particular limit for a particular component is not contained in the standard13. This is encouraging and may give a possible starting point for further rationalisation. Standardisation of the method and amount of testing required would be a very beneficial step in any harmonisation process.

Since the technical annexe to EN50238 may be applied to both conducted effects (track circuits) and induced effects (axle counters) there are actually two methodologies which may form a common point of technical evaluation. Some of the methods that are applicable to axle counter systems may have some synergy with methods for demonstrating compliance with lineside systems as both involve induced current created by magnetic fields generated on trains and in the current return paths.

The particular criteria for acceptance however will be more problematic, especially in the short term. No member state will consider re-signalling an existing line until it becomes technically necessary through

11 This is the approach used in EN 50238.

12 Transient analyses are not amenable to either of the common analysis functions. It is believed that newer mathematical

methods such as wavelet analysis may give a more systematic tool for the analysis of transient phenomena, however, the

methodologies to implement such analyses remain only conceptual at present.

13 The technical annexe only specifies limits and behaviour for ‘preferred’ types of train detection for each state. There will be

heritage or previously established types that do not have limits specified in the standard. For example the UK has at least nine

types of train detection based on shorting by the wheels and axles whereas only two types are recorded as ‘preferred types‘ in

the standard.

Page 119



degradation or exterior mandate. The cost involved in such ventures is too high to make economic sense for most commercial enterprises unless external funding is available. Therefore, for existing lines, there are likely to be legacy train detection systems in place for many years.

For entirely new lines there are options to apply conventional train detection in terms of the preferred track circuits established in the standard or escalate these lines to some level of ERTMS by the use of STMs. In this case, the TSIs will apply and there will be a de-facto common method for compliance demonstration.

The location for testing is normally left unspecified in the documentation. Specific test sites are inferred in some instances and it is known that some countries (e.g. France, Germany) operate separate test tracks where all vehicles are tested. Having a separate test track has advantages and disadvantages. A major advantage is that the current in the supply may now be measured at the supply as there is only one train on the track at a time. A major disadvantage is that the test track conditions are fixed and much more interpretation is needed in the results to extrapolate the measurements to the working railway. Since not all countries have test tracks it is more usual to test on the real railway.

Similarly the amount of testing required is normally not specified in the documentation. Usually, testing is undertaken under supervision of experts taken from the manufacturer, test agency or evaluation agency. These persons usually evaluate the results qualitatively as testing progresses and decide when testing is complete or sufficient for operation under a specific set of conditions (as described above). Most descriptions of tests state that testing should be undertaken until there is a reasonable confidence that the results are repeatable. Logically this requires a minimum of three tests under the same conditions although such a low number gives no real statistical confidence in the results. Several numerical methods are available to analytically determine the end of testing in scientific experiments however, none are mandated in any of the documents examined during this study.

6.4 Lineside Systems

Compatibility with lineside systems was seen, by several respondents, as a matter of infrastructure design and not part of the demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility for rolling stock.

The questionnaire recorded fewer individual standards concerned with lineside systems. The most often quoted standard in the replies from the member states is EN 50121. EN 50121 has five parts, parts 3 & 4 contain references to lineside compatibility for telecommunications. EN 50121-4 contains details of limits on immunities for the lineside equipment. However, the standard only covers frequencies over 150kHz and is only suitable for testing discrete equipment. EN 50121-3 contains some reference to the measurement of psophometric frequency weighted current14; this covers the lower frequency range up to approximately 3 to 6kHz. Several member states specify levels of psophometric current (see Section 5.3) however, these tend to be at differing levels. In addition, several responses to the project have stated that compliance with lineside systems is a matter for the infrastructure manager and is not considered in the EMC demonstration for rolling stock.

There are no general standards applicable to the intermediate frequency range which is of interest to most digital and control system signals transmitted in lineside copper cables. The technique assumes a coupling between traction current and lineside systems and is based on similar principles to those used in the ITU-T Directive “Protection of telecommunications lines against harmful effects from electrical

14 Psophometric current is also the subject of an International Telecommunications Union standard methodology for compatibility

between power systems and telecommunications. Often the ITU (ITT-U) standard is quoted interchangeably with the specific

railway application contained within EN50121.

Page 120



power and electrified railway lines“ (ITU-T O.41). This standard does not give limits; these are stated to be too dependent upon the orientation, proximity and frequency content of the signals to give a fixed figure. Standards outline the basic measurements to be taken but there are no common definitions for the measurement methodology such as distance between source and victim systems and length of exposure during testing. Instead, the relevant series of books, published by the ITU, give the mathematical methods to be used in the evaluation of specific measurements under local conditions.

6.5 Energy Supply

In contrast to the requirements for train detection, compatibility with the supply frequently involves the participation of the local Infrastructure manager who may apply specific conditions. Most of the respondents in the study defer to two EN standards EN 50388 and EN 50163 as a basis for evaluation.

Compatibility with the energy supply is determined by the type of supply. In general there are three modes of supply used DC, 50Hz AC and 16 2/3 Hz AC. Various voltages are used, the most common nominal voltages being:

• DC 750V, 1500V and 3kV

• AC 50Hz 25kV

• AC 16 2/3 Hz 15kV

General conditions for compatibility are detailed in the two international standards. However, local compatibility with the supply is usually more concerned with local protection. Since the sub station types and equipment are long term investments for the infrastructure and they must integrate with the national electricity supply, a generic compatibility with protection systems across member states has been impractical to implement retroactively. Hence, whilst member states may operate on a common voltage they may have differing requirements for permissible harmonic content, degraded operation and the degree of acceptance of regeneration. It should be noted that some variations in the supply conditions between countries are part of the informative annexes to the standards.

Where local conditions were highlighted by respondents these have been documented in Section 5.3. There are no general common limits in these standards other than the train input impedance being inductive at a certain frequency. This is normally specified for conditions of supply stability; it occasionally also has an impact on train detection where the supply can contribute to the harmonic content of the train return current.

It should be noted that, as with lineside systems, compatibility with the supply was seen, by several respondents, as a matter of train/system design and not part of the demonstration of electromagnetic compatibility.

6.6 Radio Frequency Systems

Almost all respondents deal with compatibility with radio frequency systems by conformance to EN 50121. This is therefore a de-facto common ground for the member states and it is included in both the conventional and high-speed directives. In addition, many of the specific requirements for radio operation are already contained within the TSI for control-command and signalling. Where a national requirement is documented within the TSI it has been highlighted within this report. Specific radio systems each have their own susceptibility to interference; the standard EN 50121 was designed taking conventional railway-based systems into account and hence compliance with EN 50121 is assumed to give compatibility with local radio systems on the railway. Since radio propagation is a complex subject it is not possible to apply a generic limit for compatibility with particular individual systems. However

Page 121



emissions from commercial equipment in category A are limited by CISPR 22 to 47dBuV/m up to 230 MHz and 40dbuV/m at higher frequencies. (measured under specific conditions of CISPR 22 ), hence a calculation may be made of the requirement for immunity for specific systems if the signal to noise ratio of the signal/carrier is known (typical disturbance values from CISPR 25 are 28dBuV at the antenna). This is a common approach to assessment of this type of intentional radio transmission equipment but must be performed on a system by system basis under the specific environmental and spatial conditions of the particular system. Therefore, no generic limits may be applied.

6.7 Other Systems

Assessment to the requirements to demonstrate the effects of EM fields on humans is a consideration in only about half of the respondents hence no majority common factor exists. This may be due to the postponement of the implementation of the EU directive on the subject. Since this, and the general EMC directive apply to many other industries as well as the railway there will be a future general compliance burden placed on all technical systems at some stage of their qualification. This area has therefore not been studied beyond the questionnaire level.

The demonstration of compatibility with the general EMC directive has many common demands with the individual rolling stock compatibility case and hence is often considered as contributing to the overall assessment.

Page 122



7 Conclusion

The report examines the processes, methodologies, and standards used in the various member states of the European Rail Area to ensure compatibility with Electromagnetic interactions between rolling stock and the rest of the railway.

The data used in the examination is obtained from a questionnaire circulated to 28 members of the European Railway Area.

In all, detailed information has been obtained from 25 members. One member, the Channel Tunnel Rail Authority declined to participate in the study citing the fact that its requirements were those of either Britain or France dependent upon the location and the fact that it had no internal process for EMC. Two other members did not return questionnaires or attend the convocation and there is little or no information available from other sources about rolling stock assessment in these countries.

Three methods have been used to gather the information reported: a questionnaire, face to face interviews at the convocation and research on the Internet. The study was not able to detail every aspect as some of the information is only contained within proprietary standards with no public access or historic standards that reside within the intellectual property of commercial concerns. Nevertheless, these methods have allowed a reasonable picture of the status and requirements of the electromagnetic compatibility demonstration process in each country.

There is a general acceptance of the process for safety acceptance across all the member states that mirror the requirements of the directive. To this end, electromagnetic compatibility demonstration is universally a requirement for the issuance of a safety certificate either directly or indirectly or by an approval for putting into service for any railway undertaking. All countries issue these safety certificates from the NSA. The degree of participation of the NSA in the process of analysis is very variable. Some NSAs merely require certification from third parties, others participate directly in the analysis process alongside infrastructure managers, test laboratories and notified or designated bodies.

Although not mandatory, most country’s implementation of the directives require some form of approval or certification from the infrastructure manager. The reasons for this are largely historic due to the fact that much of the detailed technical knowledge of the railway still resides within the remit of the infrastructure manager.

Many of the detailed technical interactions for EMC are open points of the TSIs and hence nearly every country has specified some local requirements. Evaluation and analysis of compatibility for each open point requires local knowledge and local expertise. Whilst there is a general move to a common approach through the development of internationally recognised standards the fact that railway equipment has an extremely long life cycle means that compatibility with specific equipment types will remain a requirement for many years. The much shorter life cycle acknowledged in the ECTS system description may allow this to change for system renewal projects.

It is clear that most technical concerns for the participants focus on train detection and radio frequency compatibility. Hence, it is unsurprising that these are the subject of the two EN standards quoted in the TSIs. Other interactions; lineside (induced), supply and human biophysical effects are often seen as outside the scope of the definition of electromagnetic compatibility for rolling stock. These interactions are enumerated in the directives and TSIs but are seen as peripheral to the safe movement of trains. There are other interactions that occur which appear to have been omitted from the concerns expressed by the members of the railway area (Appendix B). It is assumed that these considerations are either considered to be negligible or controlled in other ways than by compatibility assessments.

Page 123



Since, due to the longevity of the system, the existing modes of train detection will remain until the general adoption of ETCS level 3 it would seem that no common approach is feasible. However, this view may be challenged by considering the technical parts of the demonstration.

All analyses can be based on measurement and the most expensive part of any assessment is the gathering of the data. Hence a common approach to gathering data; conditions, bandwidth, resolution, amount would make a major contribution to the ability to determine whether any piece of equipment is operable on a given railway. The analysis portion of the task is performed by computer and only has two cost portions. The primary cost is in creating the initial software which could be, for any given country, a one-off cost shared by all stakeholders. The secondary cost for analysis is in running the analysis itself for each particular component that involves a much lower cost than any of the other tasks. Therefore, if an agreed test methodology can be generated, and this has been largely performed by the CENELEC working groups on EN 50238, and if an agreed common15 format for data can be produced then much of the cost, and hence barriers to acceptance demonstration would be removed.

It is theoretically possible to create a universal gabarit to encompass all states. However, the inherent consequences of complexity and prohibitive cost involved in designing such a compatible traction system would not be a practical proposition for any train manufacturer. Since the predominant costs in testing are not particularly sensitive to the gabarit definition, it is reasoned that the approach of using a common gabarit will not be fruitful.

In the area of radio frequency systems, a well-established common standard is already widely used. This is EN 50121. The methodologies used to determine compatibility are well defined and suit most of the equipment on the railway. Additions to the standard for specific pieces of radio equipment used on the national railways have already been published in the TSIs. Since radio technologies evolve faster and have a shorter lifespan that other railway equipment it is probable that these systems will migrate to one or two common systems (e.g. GSM-R) in the future. Again, most of the cost of the compatibility process is in performing the measurement, and, because a common measurement methodology is in place, assessment of compatibility with a local system is either straightforward or is a matter of calculation.

In summary, this project has documented the details of this process that are of most concern within each member state on the basis that items of most concern will be the most well documented. When comparing these details and their application the project has discovered that; although the details of the technical assessment of electromagnetic compatibility across the member states of the European railway area are complex and different, the underlying assessment processes, based on common physics, are similar.

The documentation, participants and degree of state involvement in the processes are also varied and much of the high level legislation (directives) involvement is common. However, it is believed that, on the basis of the respondents to this study, some further consolidation of the methods at the detail stages may be beneficial.

The authors would like to thank all those members and representatives from the member states who have contributed to this project.

15 Or an easily translatable machine-readable format.

Page 124



8 References

[1] DIRECTIVE 2004/50/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 amending Council Directive 96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail system and Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system.

[2] 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001 on the interoperability of the conventional rail system as amended by 2004/50/EC.

[3] International Requirement List and International Requirement Catalogue AEbt Angewandte Eisenbahntechnik Section 12.

[4] PD CLC/TR 50507:2007 Railway applications – Interference limits of existing track circuits used on European railways.

[5] Railway Safety Directive, 2004/49/EC.

[6] Control-command and signalling subsystem TSI 2006/679/EC as amended by 2006/860/EC.

[7] Practical Manual for obtaining the Safety Certificate for railway undertaking (Belgium), Federal Public Service Mobility and Transport..

[8] Document MI.01-EMC-75.2.0-1.2, Electromagnetic compatibility of mobile equipment with the train detection systems and transmissions by galvanic circuits, May 22 2007 (Belgium).

[9] RGUIF_2.1.1 Societe Nationale des Cjemins de fer Belges, Reglement General pour L’Utilisation des Utilisateurs de L’Infrastructure Ferroviare Belge, June 2003.

[10] Document Trafikstyrelsen, Vejledning til BJ 5-1-2009, Jan 2010 (Denmark).

[11] Document BN-00-00-06-01-00, Danish Railway Standard, Issue of Declaration of Conformity for Rolling Stock, Nov 2000.

[12] Document RSC-G-009-B Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of New Infrastructure Works & New Rooling Stock, Rev.B March 2008 (Ireland).

[13] Document RSC-G-015B Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of New Heavy Rail Rolling Stock, Rev.B March 2008 (Ireland).

[14] NES Technical Specification, Requirements on rolling stock in Norway and Sweden regarding EMC with the electrical infrastructure and coordination with the power supply and other vehicles, Jernbaneverket JD590, Banverket BVS 543.19300, Jan 2007.

[15] Network Rail Document NR/L1/SIG/30040, EMC Strategy for Network Rail, August 2008.

[16] Network Rail Document NR/L2/SIG/30041, EMC Assurance Process for Network Rail, 2008.

[17] ITU – CCITT Directive concerning the protection of telecommunication lines against harmful effects from electric power and electrified railway lines – Volume 1 – Design, Construction and Operational Principles of Telecommunication, Power and Electrified Railway Facilities, 1989.

[18] ITU – CCITT Directive concerning the protection of telecommunication lines against harmful effects from electric power and electrified railway lines – Volume 2 – Calculating Induced Voltages and Currents in Practical Cases, 1999.

Page 125



[19] ITU – CCITT Directive concerning the protection of telecommunication lines against harmful effects from electric power and electrified railway lines – Volume 3 – Capacitive, Inductive and Conductive Coupling: Physical Theory and Calculation Methods, 1989.

[20] ITU – CCITT Directive concerning the protection of telecommunication lines against harmful effects from electric power and electrified railway lines – Volume 4 – Inducing-Currents and Voltages in Electrified Railway Systems, 1989.

[21] Proposals of the unified methods for vehicles and track circuits testing as inputs for the future harmonisation process. Deliverable D2_6 Railcom project

Page 126



Appendices

Page 127



Appendix A UIC Leaflets pertaining to Electromagnetic Interactions on the Railways within Europe

Figure 66 is a list of UIC leaflets that detail electrical/ electromagnetic interactions with the rolling stock. Many participants returning questionnaires referred to ‘relevant UIC standards’ without giving specific references. This table seeks to partially compensate for the shortfall in such answers by highlighting those leaflets that potentially have an effect on EM compatibility.

It should be noted that not all member states use UIC leaflets in their approvals process. Even amongst those that do use the leaflets, considering the feedback from the convocation, some member states may consider that particular leaflets are outside the remit of EMC approval process for rolling stock and only specific considerations of train or infrastructure design.

UIC Number

issue Description

501 1 Visibility of rolling stock axle-boxes to fixed hot axle-box detection systems

512 8 Rolling stock - Conditions to be met in connection with the operation of track circuits

541-06 1 Brakes - Regulations concerning the construction of the various brake components : Magnetic brakes

550 11 Power supply installations for passenger stock

550-1 1 Electrical switch cabinets on passenger stock

550-2 1 Power supply systems for passenger coaches - Type testing

550-3 1 Power supply installations for passenger stock - Effect on electrical installations outside passenger coaches

552 10 Electrical power supply for trains - Standard technical characteristics of the train line

554-1 3 Power supply to electrical equipment on stationary railway vehicles from a local mains system or another

554-2 1 Power supply to mechanically-refrigerated wagons running in rafts - Safety measures and electric installation.

555 1 Electric lighting in passenger rolling stock

555-1 1 Transistorised inverters for supplying fluorescent lamps

556 4 Information transmission in the train (train-bus)

600 4 Electric traction with aerial contact line

605 2 Protection from corrosion - Measures to be taken on direct current catenaries to reduce the risks on adjacent piping and cables

611 6 Regulations governing acceptance of electric locomotives, power cars and multiple-unit sets for running in international services

Page 128



UIC Number

issue Description

614 3 Definition of the rated output of electric locomotives and motive power units

626 3 Production of electrical power on diesel tractive units for supplying the train cable

660 2 Measures to ensure the technical compatibility of high-speed trains

736 4 Signalling Relays

737-1 3 Combination of track circuits and treadles

737-2 3 Measures to be taken to improve track circuits shunting sensitivity

737-3 2 Application of thyristors in railway technology - Measures for the prevention of functional disturbance in signalling installations

737-4 2 Measures for limiting the disturbance of light current installations by electric traction (in particular thyristor apparatus)

751-1 4 Railway radio equipment - Fixed and mobile units - General technical considerations

751-2 4 Railway radio equipment - Technical specifications

751-3 4 Technical regulations for international ground-train radio systems

753-1 5 Technical regulations concerning international railway telephone circuits

753-2 5 General technical regulations governing establishment and development of communication capacity over the railway telecommunications network of UIC members

755-2 1 Protection of telecommunications staff and plant against a large earth potential due to a neighbouring electric traction line

794 1 Pantograph-overhead line interaction on the European high-speed network

794-1 1 Pantograph/overhead line interaction for DC - electrified railway lines

796 1 Voltage at the Pantograph

797 1 Coordination of electrical protection substations-traction units

799 1 Characteristics of A.C. overhead contact systems for high-speed lines worked at speeds of over 200 km/h

799-1 1 Characteristics of direct-current overhead contact systems for lines worked at speeds of over 160 km/h and

854 1 Technical specification for the supply of alkaline and lead-acid starter batteries

Figure 66 – List of UIC Standards

Page 129



Appendix B Electromagnetic Interactions With Rolling Stock As The Primary Source

Figure 67 details some of the potential interactions between rolling stock and other parts of the railway. The list was given to participants of the convocation as a preparation document to stimulate ideas that they might discuss in the face-to-face sessions.

Interaction/Interface Victim System Mode Condition

Track Circuits Various Track Circuit Types

Conducted Interference Steady State

Conducted Interference Transient Induced Interference Steady State Induced Interference Transient General Imported Current From Supply

Harmonics Steady State

General Transient :Transformer Inrush Transient Transient :Gaps And Neutral Sections Transient Transient :Voltage Steps Transient

Other Axle Counters Various Axle Counter Types

Conducted Interference Steady State

Conducted Interference Transient Induced Interference Steady State Induced Interference Transient

Lineside Discrete Components On The Lineside;

Balise Induced Interference Transient LEU Induced Interference Steady State Points Equipment Induced Interference Steady State Treadles Induced Interference Transient Hot Axle Box Detectors Induced Interference Transient Wheel Check Systems Induced Interference Transient Tag Readers Induced Interference Transient Automatic Pantograph

Control Induced Interference Transient

Pantograph Monitor Induced Interference Transient Signal Post

Telephones Induced Interference Steady State/

Transient Discrete Components In The Track Bed ;

Position Loops Induced Interference Steady State/ Transient

Automatic Train Controls

Induced Interference Steady State/ Transient

Automatic Warning System

Magnetic Fields (Ac Dc) Steady State/ Transient

Page 130



Automatic Train Protection


Correct Door Opening Induced Interference Steady State Level Crossing

Sensors Induced Interference Transient

Bridge Sensors Induced Interference Transient Platform Position

Sensors Transient

Distributed Components On The Lineside; Interlockings, Signalling Transmission, Wired Telecommunications

Interlockings Induced Interference Current (Differential Voltage)

Steady State/ Transient

Induced Interference Voltage (Common Mode Voltage; Longitudinal Voltage)


Signalling Systems Induced Interference Current (Differential Voltage)




Telecommunications Induced Interference Current (Differential Voltage)




Rock-Fall Detectors Induced Interference Transient Infrastructure ( Bridges, Viaducts) Corrosion Steady State Neighbouring Railway/Metro

Conducted Interference Steady State/ Transient


Power System Power Supply Current

Power Drain (Train Motoring)

Power Return (Train Braking) Power Supply Voltage

Power Drain (Train Motoring)

Power Return (Train Braking) Under voltage Over voltage Resonance

Power Supply Power Factor

Train Impedance

SCADA Conducted Interference

Radio Frequency Systems

Neighbouring Railway Systems (Passive) Radiated Interference Steady State Discrete Radio Equipment On Railway;

Hand Held Radio Radiated Interference Steady State Cab Radio Radiated Interference Steady State Shunting Radio Radiated Interference Steady State WiFi Radiated Interference Steady State/

Pulsed GSM Radiated Interference Steady State/

Page 131



Pulsed Public Installations (Active; Military, Public Transmissions)

Radiated Interference

Other Systems Passengers (ICNIRP)

Magnetic Fields Steady State

Electric Fields Steady State Staff (ICNIRP)

Magnetic Fields Steady State

Electric Fields Steady State General Arcing Transient Touch Voltage Conduction Steady State/

Transient

Figure 67 - Potential Interactions between Rolling Stock and other parts of the Railway

Lloyd’s Register Rail T +44 (0)1772 272 710 F +44 (0)1772 888 673

Unit G09 Preston Technology Centre, Marsh Lane, Preston PR1 8UQ

www.lr.org

November 2010 Services are provided by members of the Lloyd’s Register Group.

Documents

EMC for European · PDF fileEMC for European Railways Study to collect and document rules, ... (EMC) of railway vehicles in Member States of the European Rail Area for European Railway