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-A19? 927 BATTLEFIELD AUTOMATION: ARMY COMM ANM CONTROLSYSTEMS ACQUISITION COST.. (U) GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICEMRSNINOTON DC NATIONAL SECURITY AND.. DEC 97
UNCLASSIFIED GAO/NSIAD-B6-42F5 F/G 25/5 NEmmmnmEEmmmuiEm fmmmmmmmmmmmm.
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Uitked States General Accosuting Office
(IiA() Fact Sheet for the ChairmanSubcommittee on Defense,Committee on Appropriations, -
House of Representatives
"cc 1'"7 BATTLEFIELD
AUTOMATION
Army Command andControl SystemsAcquisition Cost andSchedule Changes -
DTICELECTE
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United StatesGAO General Accounting OfficeWashington, D.C. 20.548
National Securit) and -t 17-International Affair, [)ihiioii NTIS CPA&j
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B-223712 6 y
December 9. 1987 . ..
The Honorable Bill Chappell, Jr. .Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense "Committee on AppropriationsHouse of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As requested in your October 30, 1986, letter and subsequentdiscussions with your Office, we updated cost, schedule, andstatus issues associated with the Army Command and ControlSystem (ACCS) programs since our August 1986 report.1
Within-the ACCSumbrella, there are five major command andcontrol systems corresponding to the battlefield functionalareas of air defense, combat service support, fire support,intelligence/electronic warfare, and maneuver control. Ofthe five systems, four will use the Department of Defense(DOD) standard programming language, Ada, and ACCS common-%hardware and software (ACCS CHS). The ACCS CHS program will %%also supply computers for a separate program at the unitlevel. In addition, three communication systems will linkthe command and control systems: (1) a telephone-like,areawide communications net known as the Mobile Subscriber %Equipment program, (2) a voice radio combat net, and (3) adata distribution radio system.
The ACCS programs are estimated to cost $21.4 billion, over$7.4 billion for the command and control systems and over$13.9 billion for the communication systems. While theseArmy cost estimates increased by almost $2 billion from '...'August 1986 to August 1987, they exclude items in one programcosting about $3.2 billion. Including those items wouldincrease the total ACCS program costs from $21.4 billion to$24.6 billion.
Estimated costs increased in six of the eight programs mainlydue to quantity increases, and to a lesser extent, scheduledelays, software development and production problems. One
IBattlefield Automation: Status of the Army Command and -Control System Program (GAO/NSIAD-86-184FS, Auqust 1q86).
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program has a lower cost estimate due to reduced requirementsand quantities, and one program in the combat service supportfunctional area is a new start.
Virtually, all ACCS program schedules have slipped during theAugust 1986 through August 1987 time frame because ofproblems in software development and with reliability ofinitial production models. only the Mobile SubscriberEquipment program remains on schedule.
The Army's new Program Executive officer Concept, whichbecame effective May 1, 1987, is intended to streamline andimprove the ACCS acquisition process. The Program Executiveofficer for Command and Control Systems will oversee the fiveindividual control systems as well as the ACCS CHS program,and report directly to the Under Secretary of the Army. Thenew structure could provide better management andsynchronization of the ACCS related programs. There isanother program executive officer for communicationsprograms.
We discussed this report with DOD and Army officials andincluded their comments where appropriate. The objective,scope, and methodology of our review are described inappendix III. Appendix IV lists our other reports on ACCSrelated programs.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan nofurther distribution of this report until 10 days from itsdate. At that time we will send copies to interested partiesand make copies available to others upon request.
Sincerely yours,
Richard DavisAssociate Director
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Contents
APPENDIX Page
BACKGROUND AND COMPOSITION OF ACCS PROGRAMS 5ACCS architecture 5
II ACCS MANAGEMENT, SCHEDULE, AND COSTCHANGES IN THE PAST YEAR 11
Management structure reorganized 11Status of programs and schedule changes 12ACCS CHS 15AFATDS 15ASAS 16CSSCS 17FAAD C21 17MCS 17ADDS-EPLRS 18ADDS-JTIDS 19MSE 19SINCGARS 19Changes in cost estimates 20
III OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 24
IV OTHER REPORTS ON ACCS RELATED PROGRAMS 25
TABLES
Table II.l: ACCS programs schedule changesfrom August 1986 to August 1987 14
Table 11.2: Changes in Army estimates ofACCS acquisition costs fromAugust 1986 to August 1987 21
FIGURES
Figure I.l: ACCS architectur- and battlofiIdfunctional areas
Figure 11.1: ACCS schedule comparison,August 186 to Auqust 1987 1,
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ABBREVIATIONS
ACCS Army Command and Control System
ADDS Army Data Distribution System
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
ASAS All Source Analysis System
CHS common hardware and software
CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System
DOD Department of Defense
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
FAAD C21 Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control,and Intelligence
GAO General Accounting Office
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
MCS Maneuver Control System
MSE mobile subscriber equipment
PLRS Position Location Reporting System
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
4.
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APPENDIX I APP:NI"IX I
BACK,<FO' : ANP COtPOS I TII(r:
OF ACCS PPOCPA,,
Accordinq t o the Army Posture Statement for f iscal y ar 1Q8,command and ctntrol capabilities arc, one ( oI the Army's hiche-stpriorit ies. When the ACCS is fielded in th-e 1990s as the Ar yplan-, the Army will have spent over $20 billion for a fullyintegrated network of computers, radios, and other equipment. TheACCS and associated communications are intended to help battlefieldcommanders from the corps down to the battalion level to manaqe and . ,control their resources more effectively.
An objective of the ACCS effort is to have computer commonality forthe major control systems, and this is to be provided by the ACCSCHS program in four of the five main command and control systems.Computer commonality has been a long-time Army goal that originallyhad its roots in the defunct Military Computer Family program.FE'ssentially, its goal is to reverse the proliferation of unique %
systems.
ACCS APCHITFCTURF I v. 0
ACCS is designed to improve the coordination and control of combatforces through automated management of five key battlefield -.functional areas linked together by three communication systems.The following eightl systems comprise the ACCS architecture:
-- Maneuver Control System (MCS) for control of all combat forces;
-- Forward Ar ea Air Defenso Command, Control, and Intelligence.(FAAD -2T ) System for short-ranqe air defense weapons control) I %
-- Comt,at Servic, Support Control System (CSSCS) for combat servic .'support automat ion;
-- Al So urc, Analysis. , Sy te ,r (ASAS) for c lertion and analy si F.t i m cr " t ca I inteo]l i qen 1 'e (] 't ror i - wrfare;
-- The Advanc-d Fi li Art i l ry Tac t l Vi,- , i ta. Syst, AI'AT.) tr,j tm it , Ir f irf ,uip r t ini I ,,nninq " "'"
I n nt t ,r, t I .i t I k',, I :'(ill,.ti'r, , wll<i . (i ,i' t th ', CC ( ,.,r-c ur .r'. nt in lit q.I( .. It i- < lriin ts t, ths y'p, it er v.' .
duf.pirt (' Int r ,' <y .t . , 0ni t evel 0A I t i, t I I ,, I I th (rIi thly
(I 1(t1 in 'ur re I c "pt I t os Ii IAI
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
-- Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) for areawide switchedcommunicat ions;
-- Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)primarily for voice radio communications; and
-- Army Data Distribution System (ADDS) for data communications.ADDS consists of the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System(EPLRS) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution System(JTIDS).
Figure I.1 shows the functional areas and the corresponding systemsthat comprise the ACCS architecture.
Figure 1.1: ACCO Architecture and Battlefleld Functional Areas
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROLSYSTEM (TACTICAL)
MANEUVER
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E FIRE FAAO AIR""
SUPPORT AFATS DDSC DEFENSE
" SINCGARS
INTEL/EW SERVICESUPPORT
SOurce US Arrny
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
MCS
MCS provides computer-aided decision support for general control of
all combat forces. It enables command staff to collect and review
important battlefield information and to produce and communicate
subsequent battle plans, orders, and enemy and friendly situation
reports. To further aid commanders' decisionmaking processes, MCS
will be linked to the other four control systems.
The Army is fielding two types of computers for the near term, 4,
militarized computers and nondevelopmental item computers. In the
future, both systems will be replaced by ACCS CHS. Production
models of the militarized system are being tested and evaluated
with units in Germany. The nondevelopmental item version, to be
interoperable with the militarized system, is scheduled to be
fielded in October 1988. ACCS CHS is scheduled to replace the
militarized and nondevelopmental item computers beginning in fiscal
year 1993.
FAAD C21 -
The FAAD C21 system is being developed to automate the command and
control of short-range air defense weapons. It is being designed
to acquire, identify, process, and instantaneously disseminate
information on enemy and frienily aircraft for forward area air
defense units.
The four basic elements of FAAP C2I are in various acquisition
phases with production and dev .lopment occurring concurrently. The
basic command and control elem,'nt is in full-scale development, theground sensor element is a nondevelopmental item and has beenapproved for low-rate initial :roduction, the aerial sensor elementis in the concept definition phase, and an improved aircraft
identification friend or foe clement is in the advanced development
phase. Meanwhile, another idr itification friend or foe system
using different technology is also undergoing development to
provide a more positive way to identify enemy aircraft.
The Army plans to field the basic system in 1991-1992 before the
aerial sensor or identification friend or foe elements areavailable. The improved aircraft identification features are to befielded in 1993, and the' aerial sensor is to be fi'lded in 1995.
C(ISCS
The CSSCS program's concept definition phase started in fiscal year1)87. It is beinq d]ev]oped to automate efforts to coll(ct,summarize, and orqanize information contained in several
subordinate, supply, maintenance, ammunition, transportation, %personncl, and -,edical systms. It is also to provide information
7A
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX Ito the other functional area commanders in air defense, fire
support, intelligence, and maneuver to help them manage theircombat resources and operations.
A major sub-element of the CSSCS is the Unit Level Computer,formerly a separate program to acquire nondevelopmental itemmicrocomputers to process combat service support information at thebattalion and company level. The Army had planned to buy 13,000nondevelopmental item computers costing about $65 million. Theplan was canceled and the procurement transferred to the ACCS CHSprogram based on the Under Secretary of the Army's November 1986directive.
Current plans are to spend $178.4 million for 12,903 commercial CHSportable models, funded mostly (94 percent) by the operation andmaintenance appropriations of individual Army units. The initialoperational capability is scheduled for the fourth quarter fiscalyear 1988. As many as 65,000 Unit Level Computers may eventuallybe purchased under the proposed contract.
ASAS
ASAS is the Army's portion of the Joint Tactical Fusion Program, ajoint program with the Air Force to automate the correlation andanalysis of high volumes of time-sensitive intelligence. The
program has its roots in a 1980 directive from the House Committeeon Appropriations and the House Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence to consolidate separate Army and Air Force efforts toautomate intelligence fusion systems. Currently, the Army fundsabout 90 percent of the program.
ASAS is intended to collect and process information on the types ofenemy units, as well as their locations, movement, and projectedcapabilities and intentions. It is to automate data analysis andprovide a coherent picture of the enemy situation and disseminatethis information to commanders so that they can make timely, well-informed decisions. These functions, which can take days toperform with current systems, can be done in minutes, if ASASperforms as expected.
Full-scale engineering development began in March 1983 using anevolutionary approach that incrementally enhances system softwaroas user experience and technology increases. The system isexpected to be fielded in the 1990s.Unlike the other four command and control systems, ASAS does not--use the Ada programming language. Because ASAS is programmed in
more than 2 million lines of Fortran, program officials Llirve itis not practical to reprogram the software in Ada. fowevr,
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APPENDIX I APPENFIX I
program officials told us they would consider using Ada fcf any newsoftware features that would be added after production begins.
In addition, ASAS is exempt from using ACCS CHS mainly because ASASis too far along to switch to a new computer. Program officials
told us that changing computers would cause major disruptions tothe program.
Although ASAS will not use Ada or ACCS CHS, it will he able tocommunicate with other command and control systems through the use
of special protocols and other means.
AFATDS
AFATDS is being developed to automate efforts to plan, coordinate,and execute artillery fire, counterfire, and interdiction andsuppression of enemy fire. It ;s intended to meet fire supportrequirements of the Army during the 1990s and beyond, and becompatible with all existing and planned U.S. and allied fieldartillery systems and sensors. By being much smaller and easier touse, it is supposed to correct the deficiencies of the outmodedTactical Fire Direction System with no increase in personnel.
The program, currently in the concept evaluation phase, is verydependent on software development. Controversy exists in theCongress and in the Army over whether light divisions should waitfor the AFATDS or procure a system with imited capability that hasbeen developed and successfully tested against its limitedrequirements by the 9th Infantry Division, and thus obtain son-e %operational capability sooner. Additional information on AFATPSand the more limited system is contained in our July 1987 report. %
MSE
MSE is being acquired to provide areawide telephone-likecommunications to mobile and stationary users, including voice,data, and facsimile capability for corps and divisions. Cn c of thc "
network's features is that it will automatically r,rcutecommunications around damaged or jammed nodes.
The underlying concept of MST is that area comrrunicrat 1on. Frovih<f -at corps and below must be more mobile, less lal(.r int-,nsive, an( .
more survivable than existing area communications faci Iiti(,s tobetter support combat forces. Consisting of radio) t,,1,: h( nfs,switches, generators, trucks, and automrated cont rol c.ntorrs, th,system is designed to interoperate with the Tri-.r'rvir ,lint
2 Pattlefield Automation: Field Artillory Pata Sy', r . --ii V P
ProL loms and Budge t Impacts (C),AO/NS IAl[-87-]7 9l , Au v -
9 '
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APPENDIX I kPPFNPIX I
Tactical Communications System, con'hat net radio, coTrr(-rcial* telephone systems, and the North Atlantic Treaty C rqanization
communications networks.
The MSE production contract was awarded in 1985. Throuqh fiscalyear 1991 the Army expects to acquire enough equipment to support 2training bases, 28 divisions, and 20 corps battalions.
SINCGARS
SINCGARS is being acquired to provide the Army's next generation of-: lightweight, secure, very high frequency combat net radios. It
will be the primary means of command and control for smaller Armyunits down to the platoon level. It is to be capable oftransmitting voice and data in an electronically hostileenvironment by using an antijamming technique known as frequencyhopping. SINCGARS will be produced in backpack, vehicle, andairborne models.
A ADDS
ADDS consists of two separate proqrams--FPI,FS and JTIPS. VP! hi i.
the Army's enhancement of the Position locat ion Fport fn(: cyst -'(PLRS) which is currently tieing produced for the, Var nf C(Q rr .EPLRS is intended to satisfy low- and medium-rate Ld,
communication needs within the division such as art il,,y -indforward area air defense units. JTIDS, an Pir Force, ]-d rt(irii,is being developed for hiqh-ratfe data users, such as in ] l . ,
,-. and long-range air defense units in corps and div ii n.
- In addition, the FPI.R and JTIDS can provvide the in. ,nt .ir,.ulocations of friendly troops and naviqation aids t() v, h leI., boats, helicopters, and fixvd-winqced aircraft.
The ACCS CHS Programt..q
The ACCS CHS program consof l ilat(,s th;, d((lLi,-it ]() If 1 N, t.
hardware and to a 1,,sser (,qr.r,, softwar , fr tur -t the t iv.primary control ,stom . Th,. Arny .st i.ate. it wi l n,, ,
computers cost ing ah i)t S 09 i I I ion . (xcl ud i ni :, :t .ri lthe Pnit level Compute r ( 1 , Q comput- r. AF' 1 -I,,-
primary user and a c unt - fr 1 '-t ,f th( t( 1 . t t -', mi l ion of the, toti f st imat,'d corput r pto-Lcur,.e nt
'The program's qol i! to P. 1517' t(, r:- ir 1 . , '. .,' ' -c ( i ] put or (a nd I i m 1 t t , r u ,; 1 7'i,1 ,:, r ,n t, n, " ' ,stringt~nt condlit io n ), to ,.:pe th-, v.;sntnv)' :r 1 , ~.F.t. .e n u t on t i (I r () n - t ! - i- r1 i I, ,t h f' a c q u i -i t io)n. ,, , ,- .. ,, ! t: ,t (',,. l IT,1 lt I' r I Tl , . ] ). '." -
funct io n,- ]I ar,' .
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APPENDIX II
ACCS MANAGEMENT, SCHEDULE, 7AND ,S
CHANGES IN THE PAST YPAPP
Since our August 1986 report, 1 most ACCS progrars h. ~delays in development and production and are r,~ s~rslower pace than planned by the Army. Costs hay"v-.ACCS programs in the past year, particularly in thr. F;-.1J*program.
Of the many program changes in the past year, p'rhaps7 tl-drama~ ic is the change in the Army's managemecnt rpotential impact on command, control, and cm u~.
MANAGEMENT STPUCTUPIE rORGANIZED)
The Army established a new acquisi tion ranacermre7as the Program Fxecutive Officer Concept, efc~'The Program Executive Officer Concept is intrr'-
* improve the acquisition process in accorciano' &thN:icholIs DOD Reorgan iza t ion Ac t of 1 9F6 (Pu.1hIi7 ca'1 -4National Security Decision Directive, 219.2
The, new Prog ramr Execut ive ()f f i cr f or Command in(, r!sri-places the former Program Manager for ACC2,. 'Thefexecutive officer has full management respons>,'. ::-CIIS a nd the f ive, separatte command and co-nt ro i vr,,:rintervening review or approval. The F Pr ocir a r -x'cruvtresponsiblIe and reports directly to,- the, 7nd( r 2cr t awho) i the- Army Acquisition Exe-cutive-. This is ~~'
I imrinate, the Army Materie-l Comrmancd from proqcrr-uj :
tlthoucjh the ACCS conrcept rembodies copr-mnicat'.in-,tK%se~parate prog3ram exeicutive office(r who (vrti -mu% proqrars, inclIud-ing- thr three, ciscuss'1 in th:r'prrt
last ye~ar, we, repo'(.rted that the, Trry ha4d i ff icuTty i- F-IWCCz 'ITS pro(,,r aml for wa-ird- Ieca- us(,.-f del ys- ir I(( ~ei nc K
aut hor-I ty t(,, aivc the, procran- ranaq-r. Att r- 5'vea'f
by mrany chanqes to t he recquest for prop's-al I t he Clff 1(-( ~T* Manage~sr for CIIS wi!s ostzil I i shed- on Lint- 1,10 7 unde-r th r
'x'ciit ive, off ic r. The r, CH p rc t :~~r a au t h;r i t:
Rd t tI'f i ]e L 1 ut IMa1t i,)r. S;t ltu!s of the, , rrn Cy m n an(" Conft,
* 2in lrtrnta-t ion o)f the (- mcna o ot th' PTrf si 'nt 'sComn-is: ' nor let nns Ma n'rm n t (tr ii ,1 0 F
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
to procurement of computers and peripheral equipment for four ofthe five command and control systems and for the unit levelcomputer under CSSCS.
STATUS OF PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULE CHANGES
During the past year, the initial operational capability for eightof nine programs has slipped from 6 to 28 months. Delays weremainly due to software development problems in three programs andproduction problems in two programs. Three other programsexperienced delays because either the request for proposal wasdelayed, development started late, or the program was postponeduntil a required Army study was made for and evaluated by theCongress. only the MSE schedule remained unchanged.
Figure 11.1 and table 11.1 show the current acquisition schedulesfor selected milestones of the ACCS programs (including bothcommercial and ruggedized versions of the CHS program) compared tothe schedules reported last year. The selected milestones arefull-scale development decision (milestone II), full-scaleproduction decision (milestone IlIb) , and initial operationalcapability and subsequent fielding.
12a
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APPENDIX 11 ;PPF 'rix ii
Figure 11.1: ACCS SchclIulc. Comparison,PAucust 19P6 to Aug9ust 1
1987~ 9938 79ld ' w'
ACA 7nS
ASAS
t%@w Strt-lt't pwaoled alw86S
Mcs AD/
I or
Ing
TV f/ 4 LA-xa-zs e
a, __ _____ _____ _____
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
Mhble TI.1: AS Program Schedule (viges from Aut 1986 o Auaust 1987
Milestone II Milestone tUB IOC
Progrm 8/86 8/87 (montl) 8/86 8/87 (mnths) 8/86 8/87 (mths) Explanation
Cond & Ontrol
1S.m-rcal N/A N/A - 6/87a 4/88 10 9/87 7/88b 10 Request for proposaldelayed.
OG-ni zed N/A N/A - 6/87a
4/88 10 9/87 1/89b 16 am as above.
AFATDE 9/87 1/89 16 6/89 4/91 22 9/89 1/92 28 S/W development problems.
ASAS 3/83 3/83 - 1/90 10/91 21 7/91 4/93 21 S/W development problems.Program changes.
CSSCS N/R 1/91 - N/R 1/92 - 9/89 7 / 9 1c 22 Developmnt started late.
FAD C21 9/86 9/86 - 9/88 3/89 6 7/91 1/92 6 0IS delayed S/W development.
MCS (NDI) N/A NIA - 6/86 6/86 - 10/87 10/88 12 Fequired Army Study forOugress.
MCS (QIS) N/A N/A - N/R 10/91 10/91 10/92 12 referred by NDI above.
Cinmuications:
ArMS (EaRS) 4/85 4/85 - 7/88 6/89 11 9/88 9/90 24 Production reliabilityproblems with PIRS.
ANXS (JIt ) N/A 1/81 - %/A 4/90 - N/A 1/91 N/A Became a stand alone systemin September 1986.
MSE N/A N/A - 12/85 12/85 - 5/88 5/ 8 8c - On schedule.
SINCOARS N/A N/A - N/A 9/88 - 12/89 7/90 7 Production reliabilityproblems.
aFor CHS, milestone IIXB equates to date of production contract award.bCHS IOC reflects hardware delivery dates since C4S is not a system.CMCS uses first unit equipped In lieu of IOC.
Key:
Milestone II - Full-scale development decision N/A - Not applicableMilestone IIIB - Full-scale production decision N/R - Not reported
IOC = Initial operational capability S/W - Software
NDI - Nondevelopmental item
14
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
The following is a profile of each program's current status andschedule change from our August 1986 report.
ACCS CHS
Problems in redefining requirements caused an 11-month delay inissuing the request for proposal from June 1986 to May 1987. TheArmy expects to award a 5-year, $200 million production contractfor 4,259 computers (excluding the Unit Level Computer procurement)in April 1988, 10 months later than scheduled. If all goes asplanned, deliveries of commercial hardware are expected to begin inJuly 1988, followed by ruggedized hardware in January 1989. TheArmy is deciding on whether to award a 5-year contract or a 1-yearcontract with options.
Because development of the major command and control systems thatwill use much of the ACCS CTIS has slipped, the corresponding CHS
may not be needed in fiscal year 1988. If the Army awards aproduction contract in fiscal year 1988 as planned, it could havemillions of dollars of equipment before the four command andcontrol systems users have their applications software ready forsystems integration. For example, AFATDS, a major user of ACCSCHS, would not be ready to use large quantities of computers untilit makes its full-rate production decision. This decision is notscheduled to occur until April 1991, or almost 2 years afterruggedized models of ACCS CHS would be available in early 1989.
Army officials acknowledged that the required number of ACCS CHSfor fiscal year 1988 is unknown, but that some quantities would beneeded for development of AFATDS, FAAD C21, and CSSCS. A detailedscrub of ACCS CHS quantities for fiscal year 1988 is in process,according to the officials. With a projected requirement for 5,276computers in fiscal year 1988, the Unit Level Computer appears tobe the only us.r needing large quantities of ACCS CHS in 1988.
We are reviewing the cost effectiveness of ACCS CHS and will bereporting on it at a latpr date.
AFATDS
AFATDS continues to experince software developrent problems. Asof . uly ?1, 19R7, the Army planncd to complete its conceptevaluation phaf , in M!ay 198%, 14 months later than originallypl]annd. In Auq,.t 1087, mryy ,ff icial, statel that the contractorwaj:- anl -j(?d~tir~n~i1 rnr)nti c 'H :l~ i.
... .. . ., : -' -"", -''-;'-::: .' -"."-"".-". .. -°:-::- %::- %-- ' , :-:: '.-" -- .. -
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
In July 1987, we reported 3 that the new schedule for follow-ondevelopment and production does not allow sufficient time forappropriate tests, evaluations, and reviews. We also reported thatbased on Army estimates, the initial operational capability forlight divisions would slip about 3 years to January 1992. Althoughheavy division fielding schedules have not been revised to reflectthe latest development problems, fielding would probably not occurbefore January 1995.
Program officials are revising the schedule that will be submittedto the Under Secretary of the Army. In September 1987, the ProgramExecutive Officer for Command and Control Systems proposed anaccelerated AFATDS fielding schedule of June 1990 for light
divisions and 1991 for heavy divisions. However, this schedulewould be achieved by reducing requirements and deploying lesscapable systems than originally planned.
AFATDS' fiscal year 1988 procurement request was based on the needfor ACCS CHS to meet a third quarter, fiscal year 1990 fieldingdate. However, the projected fielding date, whether it occurs infiscal year 1990 or 1992, would eliminate the need to begin %acquiring ACCS CHS in fiscal year 1988 as planned.
ASAS
ASAS is the only major element of the ACCS architecture that is notcurrently part of the ACCS CHS procurement. After years ofsoftware development problems and program instability, the Army isrescoping the program. Since June 1984, there have been six majorrevisions to the program. Currently, requirements are beingreduced to provide more attainable capabilities.
A partial system was delivered for field testing in December 1986on schedule, and the Army considered the test to be successful.However, due to the software problems, program changes, and hiqhercost estimates, the production and initial operational capabilityschedules for the full system have slipped about 21 months sinceAugust 1986.
Program officials told us they wero revirwinq and rf-visin..acquisition costs, initial operational capability Hatc-:, and 'th-rmajor milestones while preparinq th( new aiquniion plan. Th,.plan was appreved by POD's Tr, int Cv,-r si aht -rourp on Mov, . r 2,-1987. In th- nfw p-a1in, rnilrestnn, T I pro(,ur tin is on schiul], f -rthe first quart,-r fiscal year 100 , fi u (- - -n-r n .,a ,. !ndsome capahii i ty Ky,- !-n dprfod rrP. a r, I :nn, rred ''t
3 P attl fir ld Ftut, rra?-n: ti d /rtilr', Tt , ' ts ,,,.' , tProlemes and h-'. TrI,-Ct </ ',
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
improvement program. The Army intends to produce and deliver alimited capability system in April 1989 for field testing at FortHood, Texas. Program officials told us that the new acquisitionplan is realistic and they intend to maintain it.
CSSCS
Last year, the CSSCS program was undefined, unfunded, and had noapproved operational capability requirements. In fiscal year 1987,the program entered its concept definition phase, the equivalent ofadvanced development.
Software development is to start in fiscal year 1988 and portable,commercial versions of the ACCS CHS are to be phased into thedevelopment effort during fiscal year 1989. Initial operationalcapability is scheduled for July 1991.
FAAD C21
According to program officials, delays in the availability of ACCSCHS computers will also delay the completion of the softwaredevelopment phase at least 6 months. Based on this delay, theinitial operational capability of the basic system will probablyslip from July 1991 to January 1992. A program official told usthat the integration of FAAD C21 with other systems could prove tobe a potential problem that could also delay the program'sschedule.
In addition, the start of full-scale development of aerial sensorshas slipped about a year to April 1989 because of funding cuts bythe Army.
The milestones for the nondevelopmental item ground sensor and theaircraft identification friend or foe system have remained aboutthe same as those approved in August 1986.
MCS
Militarized computers were delivered to U.S. Army, Furope inNovember 198f. Tests held in Cermany durina April 1987 identifieddeficiencies with the militarized system's effectiveness,reliability, and communications rompatitility. This led one of theparticipants in the test, the Army at,,riel Systems AnalysisAqency, to conclude that the perforr-ance of the M(US did not exhihitadequate readiness for fieldinq. Th, y roc()prn,,nded a~iainst anyfurther fipldinq of the militarized o(ciiipro.nt until i ,,ff ci,,n'iewere corrected.
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
The Army held an additional test on August 15 to 17, 1987, inGermany. Program officials considered the test to be successfulbecause the deficiencies previously noted were corrected. However,test results are still being evaluated and no report is availableyet.
The Army intended to award a nondevelopmental item contract inAugust 1986. The House Appropriations Committee questioned theappropriateness of procuring commercial, nondevelopmental itemcomputers instead of ACCS CHS. The Army responded in March 1987,obtained congressional approval in May 1987, and awarded a contractfor computers in July 1987. ACCS CHS for the MCS is to be fieldedbeginning in October 1992, and will use the same software as themilitarized and nondevelopmental item MCS systems.
The Army continues to develop additional MCS software to meetsystem requirements. Total system software is scheduled to be,.available in January 1989, about 4 months later than the Army'splan last year.
ADDS-EPLRS
The EPLRS schedule has slipped because of production andreliability problems with the PLRS program on which it is based.
The Army plans to award a low-rate production contract for EPLRS inFebruary 1988, 11 months behind schedule but 13 months before itexpects to complete the initial operational test and evaluation(March 1989). Furthermore, full-rate production is expected tobegin in June 1989, 10 months before first article testing isscheduled to be completed in April 1990.
The Army chose this accelerated acquisition schedule because(1) EPLRS needed to be fielded for use with the initial fielding ofthe FAAD C21 system and (2) the EPLRS program could he acceleratedsince its design is based on a preplanned product improvement to r% rPLRS. But those reasons seem to be less valid at this time.
First, the Army's plans to field FAAD C2T in July 1991 have slippedto January 1992. ADDS is to be fielded in September 1990, 16months earlier. Second, although EPIRS is based on the PIPSdesign, 40 percent of FPL.RS' modules are unique; therefore, th,successful resolution of problems and testing of PIP1S does notnecessarily demonstrate, that FPIPS is ready for production.
f1owever, if AI)Ds were fielded earlier, it cou Id ;uppo r t t h.intpl I iq nce/,! 1-,t ronic war far, community, th, Army' cur r,nt ly J
fielded fire sk pp) rt syst em ca Ilid the Tact ica I FP r , i rt('t i(n..System, and other del oyed sy-t,,irs.
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
ADDS-JTIDS
Delivery of the first JTIDS class 2M engineering model has slippedfrom June 1987 to December 1987 due to engineering changes toenhance the system. A request for proposal for about 18 additionalclass 2M terminals was issued on May 19, 1987, and the contract isexpected to be awarded in February 1988.
MSE
The MSE production contract was awarded in December 1985 and theprogram appears to be on track. The Army plans to operationallytest it in its final configuration during a follow-on test andevaluation scheduled for May 1988.
The follow-on test and evaluation will provide data needed for athird option production decision in September 1988 worth -,
$1.02 billion. The schedule allows 90 days to do the follow-on V,
test and evaluation and brief the results to the decisionmakers.DOD and Army test agency officials told us that although the testwould appear to be very thorough, they were concerned about whetherall of the tests can be performed as scheduled. Program officials
acknowledge that there is no margin for error if the schedule is tobe met.
Under the basic contract, the last option will be awarded in fiscalyear 1990, resulting in the completion of all MSF fielding inNovember 1993. Provisions have been made, however, to procure moreMSE equipment in fiscal year 1991 for the additional divisionscreated during the last few years.
SINCGARS
The SICGARS program has been plagued with production andreliability problems ever since the engineering development phasewas bypassed in order to start initial production in fiscal year1983. After the program experienced difficulties in first articletests in 1985 and continued to experience problems in fiscal year1986, the Army canceled proqress payments to the contractor. As aresult, the Congress deleted all but $10 million of the SINCGAPS'$209 million budget request for fiscal year IP7.
In 1986 th, Army began a market survey to explorf, alternatives thatCould fs rve as an interim r,,pla-I-m'.nt. Thf'y found that none o)f the.nine nofndv, loprr'ntal radic, !uhr, trOf d f )r ctm[-art l ,,' t,,.tin"could rnWt, all (f the requiremntl. Tbi w.- ,, Tp,, l] trur i n
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
In the spring of 1987, SINCGARS' contractor began to reportincreases in SINCGARS reliability. Contractor reports indicatethat 1,700 hours mean time between failures was achieved. As aresult of this progress, the Army agreed to resume progresspayments in May 1987 and to modify the contract by late November1987.
A key test for SINCGARS will be the Product Reliability AcceptanceTest of the ground radios scheduled for November through December1987. If successful, the Army expects deliveries of the groundradios, made under the 1985 initial production contract, to beginin January 1988. This reflects a 29-month delay from the originaldelivery date of August 1985.
Moreover, the Army plans to procure 720 aircraft radios in January
1988 under an initial production contract awarded in fiscal year1985. However, the airborne radio has not been operationally
tested. The production decision for the airborne radio will bebased on a limited production qualification test scheduled to be
completed in March 1988. A limited operational test of 2 airborneradios is scheduled for April 1988 and an operational test of 35production radios for October 1990. Production is scheduled tobegin before an operational test so that the airborne and groundrauios can be fielded at the same time.
In addition, in September 1987, the Army issued a request forproposal to award a contract in May 1988 to a second source withoptions for up to 29,000 radios having an integrated communicationssecurity feature. The second-source design is to be of the same
form, fit, and function as the radio currently being developed withthis feature. However, it could also be a unique design in termsof components and logistics burden.
CHANGES INCOST ESTIMATES
Based on Army estimates, the consolidated cost of the ACCS programsincreased from about $19.4 billion to about $21.4 billion, oralmost $2 billion in the August 1986 through August 1987 timeframe. This change includes about $153 million for a new start forCSSCS, and ahout a $1 hi] I I on decrpase i n AFATr).s, duo, to) cd, ]ot( d
requirements )r quantities. However cos-ts incroased in th, ixother programs, Drimarily hocausn of quantity incrlas2.s. Inaddition, proE',l(ms in software d#.ve,]lepmnt and pr(ducti,,n -
cont r ibutd to( i ncras, d rost,"
Table 1TI.. :hows; the. chano'cs eve.r th,. t y,.,r in Ar '-y o-, tPst iratc'-: to ,ci( ir r thE rraor k CC! 1),r r F', .
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
Table 11.2: Changes in Army Estimates of ACCS AcqUisitiona CostsFrom August 1986 to August 1987
Increase ii1986 1987 (decrease) Explanation Op I
----- in milri- ns ----- ----
AFATDS $ 2,134.4 $ 1,110.7 ($1,023.7) Reduced requirementsand inflation rates.
ASAS 2,439.4 2,600.0 160.6 Increased hardwarecosts and softwareproblems.b
CSSCS 0 153.1c 153.1 New start.
FAAD C21 1,817.5 2,640.1 822.6 Aircraft identifi- .s.
cation added. Further
increases expected %
for omitted items. '%
MCS 446.7 932.0 485.3 Adds 2,953 ACCS CHScomputers; andsoftware problems.
Total Command 6,838.0 7 ,4 3 5 .9d 597.9
and Control
ADDS 2,763.4 3,615.3 851.9 Changed requirements,
increased quantities.
MSE 4,298.0 4,654.0 356.0 Additional units.
SINCGARS 5,527.5 5,652.4 124.9 Cost, schedule, and
requirements changes;production and
reliability problems.
Total 12,588.9 13,921.7 1,332.8
Communications
To ta l $1 $ 21 . . $ 1
aAcquisition costs consist of development and procurement funds.
bCost increases were anticipated in August 1987 but were not announced
until November 1987.CIncludes $72.6 million of operation and maintenance funds for development
applications software.dincludes $730.9 million for the ACCS CHS program which is funded from the
programs above, excluding ASAS. However, these costs do not include the
$178.4 million cost of the Unit Level Computer program which was added to
the ACCS CHS consolidated acquisition. ...
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
Table 11.2 does not include about $3.2 billion for the FAAD C21program, as follows:
-- $900 million to equip reserves with the basic command andcontrol system and the ground sensor,
-- $608 million to similarly equip corps missile battalions, and
-- $1.7 billion for war reserves.
Equipment for reserve units and war reserves were included in thecost estimates of other ACCS programs.
The FAAD C21 program cost growth of more than $800 million ismainly due to (1) the $500 million aircraft identification element,a new item not included in last year's estimate and (2) costincreases on the aerial sensor element.
Another significant cost change in the past year reduced the AFATDSprogram estimate by about $1 billion, due to lower requirements,reduced quantities, and revised cost estimates using more current,lower estimates of future years' inflation.
The Army established a new program plan for ASAS in early November1987, as we were processing this report. Based on this plan, Armyestimates for ASAS amount to $2.6 billion, an increase of about$160 million for a less capable system. Cost increased due toincreased hardware costs and due to program funding instability andschedule slips caused by software development problems.
The ACCS CHS costs of $730.9 million noted in table 11.2, does notinclude the estimated cost of the Unit Level Computer of $178.4million, almost all of which, $168.1 million, involves operationand maintenance funding.
Costs more than doubled in the MCS program to $932 million because2,953 additional ACCS CHS computers are going to be acquired,including battalion terminals not included in last year's program.
Costs in the communications area increased about $1.3 billion to$13.9 billion as follows:
-- ADDS program costs increased $851.9 million to $3.6 billionbecause requirements changed and quantities increased in thppast year.
-- MSE costs increased more than $350 million to $4.6 billion, orabout 8 percent, in order to equip the four new divisions thatwere created by the Army in the past few years.
22
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II .
-- SINCGARS costs increased $124.9 million to $5.7 billion, or "
about 2 percent, due to a variety of factors such as cost 2estimate revisions, changed requirements, and schedule slips.
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APPENDIX III APPENDIX III
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
The objective of our review was to provide updated information onACCS, its communications architecture, and acquisition programs.
We reviewed current and past cost estimates, schedules, andtransition plans for nine programs: five command and controlprograms, one common hardware program, and three communicationprograms. We also reviewed the Army Command and Control MasterPlan and other pertinent DOD, Army, and contractor documents.
In addition, we interviewed key officials at '"
ACCS CHS, AFATDS, MCS, ADDS, MSE, and SINCGARS program officesin Fort Monmouth, New Jersey;
the FAAD C21 program office in Huntsville, Alabama;
the CSSCS program office in Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
the ASAS program office in McLean, Virginia;
various Army units in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Heidelberg, andWorms, Germany;
-- DOD and Army test agencies in Falls Church, Virginia, Aberdeen
Proving Grounds, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.;
-- two contractor offices in Fullerton, California, and NeedhamHeights, Massachusetts; and
-- an official from the former Office of Assistant Chief of Staff
for Information Management in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Our review was performed from November 1986 through August 1987.
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APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV % %
OTHER REPORTS ON ACCS
RELATED PROGRAMS
Evaluation of Army's Mobile Subscriber Equipment Program(GAO/NS'ISAD-85-ll7, July 1985)
Tactical Computers: Army's Maneuver Control System Procurement andDistribution Plan (GAO/IMTEC-86-21FS, May 1986)
Fire Su~port System: Army's Plans to Improve Its Fire SupportCapabilities (GAO/NSIAD-86-115BR, May 1986)
Tactical Intelligence: DOD's Joint Tactical Fusion Program(GAO/C-NSIAD-86-27, July 1986)
Battlefield Automation: Status of the Army Command and ControlSystem Program (GAO/NSIAD-86-184Fs, August 1986)
Tactical Computers: Army's Maneuver Control System AcquisitionPlan Is Not Cost-Effective (GAO/IMTEC-86-26BR, September 1986)
Fire Suport System: Army's Plans to Improve Its Fire SuRportCapabilities (GAO/NSIAD-86-116BR, September 1986)
Fire Support System: Status of the Fire Support System'sDevelopment (GAO/NSIAD-86-212FS, September 1986)
DOD Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems (GAO/NSIAD-87-128, April 1987)
Battlefield Automation: Army Efforts to Automate Combat ServiceS (GAO/NSIAD-87-178FS, July 1987)
Battlefield Automation: Field Artillery Data System's AcquisitionProblems and Budget Impacts (GAO/NSIAD-87-198BR, July 1987)
Battlefield Automation: Army Air Defense Command and ControlSystem Acquisition and Budget Issues (GAO/NSIAD-87-208, September1987)
(395064)
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