Encrypted D3.5 SYNER-G Fragility functions for water … of past earthquake damages on water and waste-water ... of seismic response of pile foundation ... failures in the water network

D 3.5

DELIVERABLE

PROJECT INFORMATION

Project Title: Systemic Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, Lifeline Networks and Infrastructures Safety Gain

Acronym: SYNER-G

Project N°: 244061

Call N°: FP7-ENV-2009-1

Project start: 01 November 2009

Project end: 31 October 2012

DELIVERABLE INFORMATION

Deliverable Title: D3.5 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements

Date of issue: 31 October 2010

Work Package: WP3 – Fragility functions of elements at risk

Deliverable/Task Leader: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTH)

Reviewer: Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI)

REVISION: Final

Project Coordinator:

Institution:

e-mail:

fax:

telephone:

Prof. Kyriazis Pitilakis

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

[email protected]

+ 30 2310 995619

+ 30 2310 995693

i

Abstract

This deliverable provides the technical report on the assessment of fragility functions for

water and waste-water system elements. This deliverable comprises four main parts. A short

review of past earthquake damages on water and waste-water system elements is provided

in the first part, including the description of physical damages, the identification of main

causes of damage and the classification of failure modes. The following two parts deal with

the identification of the main typologies of water and waste-water system components and

the general description of existing methodologies, damage states definitions, intensity

indexes and performance indicators of the elements. In the next part the validation of the

available vulnerability functions for pipes is provided based on damage data from recent

European earthquakes (Düzce and Lefkas). Finally, improved vulnerability functions for the

individual components are proposed along with the coding and digital description of fragility

functions.

Keywords: fragility functions, vulnerability, water system, waste-water system

iii

Acknowledgments

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's

Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n° 244061.

v

Deliverable Contributors

[AUTH] Alexoudi Maria, Dr. Civil Engineer, MSc

Kyriazis Pitilakis, Professor

Argyro Souli, Civil Engineer, MSc

vii

Table of Contents

1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 1

2 Damages from past ear thquakes ...................................................................................................... 3

2.1 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WATER SYSTEM

ELEMENTS.................................................................................................................. 3

2.1.1 Tanks ............................................................................................................... 6

2.1.2 Water Treatment Plant..................................................................................... 7

2.1.3 Canals.............................................................................................................. 7

2.1.4 Tunnels ............................................................................................................ 8

2.1.5 Pipes................................................................................................................ 9

2.1.6 Pumping Stations............................................................................................. 9

2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURE MODES / DIRECT LOSSES OF WATER

SYSTEM ELEMENTS.................................................................................................. 9

2.2.1 Pipes................................................................................................................ 9

2.3 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WASTE-WATER

SYSTEM ELEMENTS................................................................................................ 13

2.3.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant ....................................................................... 15

2.3.2 Tunnels .......................................................................................................... 15

2.3.3 Pipes.............................................................................................................. 15

2.3.4 Lift Station...................................................................................................... 15

3 Methodology for the vulnerability assessment of water and waste-water system elements...... 16

3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM

ELEMENTS................................................................................................................ 16

3.1.1 Water Source................................................................................................. 17

3.1.2 Water Treatment Plant................................................................................... 17

3.1.3 Pumping Station ............................................................................................ 18

3.1.4 Storage .......................................................................................................... 19

3.1.5 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) ..................................... 20

3.1.6 Conduits......................................................................................................... 21

3.2 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS .................................. 26

3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM

ELEMENTS................................................................................................................ 28

3.3.1 Conduits......................................................................................................... 29

viii

3.3.2 Waste-water Treatment Plant ........................................................................ 30

3.3.3 Lift station ...................................................................................................... 31

3.3.4 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) ..................................... 32

3.4 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS .................... 33

3.5 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES................................ 34

3.6 DAMAGE STATES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS ............................................ 34

3.6.1 Water Source................................................................................................. 34

3.6.2 Water Treatment Plant................................................................................... 35

3.6.3 Pumping Station ............................................................................................ 35

3.6.4 Storage tanks................................................................................................. 35

3.6.5 Canal ............................................................................................................. 35

3.6.6 Pipes.............................................................................................................. 35

3.6.7 Tunnels .......................................................................................................... 36

3.7 DAMAGE STATES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS .............................. 36

3.7.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant ....................................................................... 36

3.7.2 Conduits......................................................................................................... 36

3.7.3 Lift station ...................................................................................................... 36

3.8 INTENSITY INDEXES ............................................................................................... 36

3.8.1 Water System Elements ................................................................................ 37

3.8.2 Waste-Water System Elements..................................................................... 39

3.9 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS................................................................................ 39

3.9.1 Water System/ component performance indicators ....................................... 40

3.9.2 Waste-Water System/ component performance indicators............................ 45

4 Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements.................................................. 49

4.1 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WATER

SYSTEM .................................................................................................................... 49

4.2 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WASTE-

WATER SYSTEM ...................................................................................................... 61

4.3 VALIDATION / ADAPTATION / IMPROVEMENT...................................................... 63

4.3.1 Validation of vulnerability models for pipes.................................................... 64

4.4 FINAL PROPOSAL .................................................................................................... 77

4.4.1 WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS...................................................................... 77

4.4.2 WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS........................................................ 91

5 Coding and digital descr iption of fragility functions.................................................................... 98

ix

List of Figures

Fig. 2-1 Tank failure in Izmit (Kocaeli 《arthquake,1999). ....................................................... 5

Fig. 2-2 Water pipe failure of north part of Anatolian fault (3.7 m- Kocaeli 《arthquake, 1999).

............................................................................................................................. 5

Fig. 2-3 Failure of Rinconada Water Treatment Plant (Loma Prieta, 1989)............................ 5

Fig. 2-4 Total collapse of 750,000-gallon tank near Castaic Junction (Northridge, 1994) ...... 5

Fig. 2-5 Different types of seismic response of pile foundation tanks (ASCE, 1997).............. 6

Fig. 2-6 Failure modes of segment pipes for wave propagation (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999).. 10

Fig. 2-7 Basic failure modes for ductile pipes ....................................................................... 11

Fig. 2-8 Failures modes of pipelines as result of liquefaction (O’Rourke and Palmer, 1996) 12

Fig. 2-9 Failures modes of pipelines as result of landslide (O’Rourke et al., 1998) .............. 12

Fig. 2-10 Failures modes of pipelines as result of fault crossing (O’ Rourke et al., 1998) .... 13

Fig. 2-11 Plenary view of waste-water treatment plant of Lefkas (Greece) .......................... 14

Fig. 2-12 No damage observed in waste-water lift station during the 2003 Lefkas earthquake

in Greece (from in-situ inspection Alexoudi and Argyroudis 2003).................... 15

Fig. 3-1 Breakdown of potable water system components ................................................... 16

Fig. 3-2 Breakdown of potable water conduits...................................................................... 22

Fig. 3-3 Breakdown of waste-water system. ......................................................................... 29

Fig. 3-4 Breakdown of waste-water conduits. ....................................................................... 29

Fig. 4-1 Location of Düzce and Lefkas island ....................................................................... 63

Fig. 4-2 Düzce. Analyzed method: 1D linear equivalent, Local Soil Condition: Based on Soil

Profiles, a) Earthquake: Kocaeli, 1999, PGA (g) [a(1)], PGV (m/sec) [a(2)], b)

Earthquake: Düzce, 1999, PGA (g) [b(1)], PGV (m/sec) [b(2)].......................... 65

Fig. 4-3 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Kocaeli

earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999)

(b) relationships. The points represent the well documented damages shown

earlier. Earthquake: Kocaeli 1999, Microzonation study (Alexoudi et al. , 2007)

........................................................................................................................... 67

Fig. 4-4 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Düzce

earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999)

(b) relationships. The failures collected are illustrated with points. For each

mahalla, ID is corresponded. Earthquake: Düzce 1999, Microzonation study.

(Alexoudi et al., 2007)........................................................................................ 67

Fig. 4-5 Mahallas that presents low, moderate and extensive failures (a) before the two

earthquakes, (b) after Kocaeli earthquake, (c) after Düzce earthquake (d)

x

present research as result of both earthquakes. Points illustrate the failures

collected while the ID corresponds to each mahalla. ........................................ 68

Fig. 4-6 Digitized Waste- Water network (left) in Düzce and distribution of waste-water pipe/

conduits diameters (up) ..................................................................................... 69

Fig. 4-7 Estimated damages of waste-water network as percentage of the total length of the

network for Kocaeli (a) and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008) ........ 69

Fig. 4-8 Spatial distribution of waste-water pipe damages in Düzce network for Kocaeli (a)

and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008) ............................................. 70

Fig. 4-9 Estimated waste-water pipe damages per mahalla for Kocaeli earthquake (a), for

Düzce earthquake (c) and recorded water pipe damages per mahalla after

Kocaeli earthquake (b) and Düzce earthquake (d) - (Alexoudi et al., 2008)...... 71

Fig. 4-10 Water distribution network of old city of Lefkas and the location of main water

system failures and secondary connections (p-primary network, sec-secondary

network-connections with customers................................................................. 72

Fig. 4-11 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: O’ Rourke and

Ayala, 1993, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003) ............................................................ 75

Fig. 4-12 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Eidinger and

Avila, 1999, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003).............................................................. 75

Fig. 4-13 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Isoyama et al.,

1998, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003) ....................................................................... 76

Fig. 4-14 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: ]LA, 2001,

Earthquake: Lefkas 2003) ................................................................................. 76

Fig. 4-15 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with low

seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking ........................................... 78

Fig. 4-16 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with

advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking .......................... 79

Fig. 4-17 Fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to

ground shaking.................................................................................................. 82

Fig. 4-18 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building

with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking ............................. 84

Fig. 4-19 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low -rise R/C building

with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking ................... 85

Fig. 4-20 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation) .......................... 88

Fig. 4-21 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (permanent ground deformations) ... 88

Fig. 4-22 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components)

subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code

design)............................................................................................................... 92

Fig. 4-23 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components)

subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code

design)............................................................................................................... 93

xi

Fig. 4-24 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with

low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking..................................... 95

Fig. 4-25 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with

advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking .......................... 96

xii

List of Tables

Table 2-1 Brief presentation of water system damages as result of Loma Prieta, Northridge

and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake.......................................................... 3

Table 2-2 Restoration time of water system and number of customers influenced [1989

Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge, 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquakes].... 6

Table 2-3 Main failure modes of water treatment plants (ASCE, 1987).................................. 7

Table 2-4 Tunnel failures for different earthquakes ................................................................ 8

Table 2-5 Possible failure modes for pipes as result of wave propagation........................... 10

Table 2-6 Brief presentation of waste-water system damages as result of Loma Prieta,

Northridge and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake ...................................... 14

Table 3-1 Typology of water storage tanks........................................................................... 20

Table 3-2 Typology of tunnels (ALA 2001a). ........................................................................ 25

Table 3-3 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in NIBS 2004,

ALA 2001a,b and SYNER-G ............................................................................. 27

Table 3-4 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in HAZUS

(NIBS, 2004) and SYNER-G ............................................................................. 33

Table 3-5 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment potable water system

elements ............................................................................................................ 38

Table 3-6 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment waste- water system elements

........................................................................................................................... 39

Table 3-7 Summary of Water Component Performance Indicators (WCPIs)........................ 41

Table 3-8 Summary of Water System Performance Indicators (WSPIs) .............................. 42

Table 3-9 Summary of Waste-Water Component Performance Indicators (PPIs)................ 47

Table 3-10 Summary of Waste-Water System Performance Indicators (WWSPIs) – ALA

(2004) ................................................................................................................ 47

Table 4-1 Review of existing fragility functions for potable water elements......................... 51

Table 4-2 Review of existing fragility functions for waste-water system elements................ 61

Table 4-3 Computed water pipe failures in the water network of Düzce due to ground

shaking for different fragility expressions, and input motions (Alexoudi et al.,

2010) ................................................................................................................. 66

Table 4-4 Estimated number of repairs for Lefkas earthquake using different fragility curves

........................................................................................................................... 73

Table 4-5 Comparison of Repair Rate/km (wave propagation) with the recorded damages of

water network of Lefkas..................................................................................... 74

Table 4-6 Comparison of the number of failures (wave propagation) for water system of

Lefkas................................................................................................................ 74

xiii

Table 4-7 Description of damage states for water source subject to ground shaking........... 77

Table 4-8 Parameters of fragility curves for water source (wells) ........................................ 78

Table 4-9 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Wells with Anchored Components (SRM-

LIFE, 2003-2007)............................................................................................... 79

Table 4-10 Description of damage states for Water Treatment Plant subjected to ground

shaking .............................................................................................................. 80

Table 4-11 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant ................................... 81

Table 4-12 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored

Components ...................................................................................................... 81

Table 4-13 Description of damage states for Pumping Station subjected to ground shaking83

Table 4-14 Parameters of fragility curves for pumping station.............................................. 83

Table 4-15 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored

Components ...................................................................................................... 85

Table 4-16 Fragility curves for anchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA

(2001a,b) ........................................................................................................... 86

Table 4-17 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA

(2001a,b) ........................................................................................................... 86

Table 4-18 Fragility curves for Open reservoirs with or without seismic design code (wave

propagation) ALA (2001a,b) .............................................................................. 87

Table 4-19 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (permanent deformations)-

ALA (2001a,b) ................................................................................................... 87

Table 4-20 Fragility curves for at-grade R/C tanks (wave propagation)- (HAZUS; NIBS,

2004) ................................................................................................................. 87

Table 4-21 Fragility curves for buried R/C tanks (permanent ground deformation)- (HAZUS;

NIBS, 2004) ....................................................................................................... 87

Table 4-22 Description of damage states for Canals (ALA, 2001a,b)................................... 89

Table 4-23 Vulnerability of canals (wave propagation, ALA, 2001a, b) ................................ 90

Table 4-24 Vulnerability of canals (permanent deformations, ALA, 2001a, b)...................... 90

Table 4-25 Description of damage states for Waste-Water Treatment Plant subjected to

ground shaking.................................................................................................. 91

Table 4-26 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant ................................... 92

Table 4-27 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Waste- Water Treatment Plants with

Anchored Components...................................................................................... 93

Table 4-28 Description of damage states for Lift Station subjected to ground shaking ........ 94

Table 4-29 Parameters of fragility curves for lift station........................................................ 95

Table 4-30 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Lift Station with Anchored Components96

D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements

1

1 Introduction

The present report reviews the damages sustained by water and waste-water system

elements during past earthquakes, with special emphasis to European earthquakes.

Different failure modes are identified and classified respectively. The following components

are proposed to be studied within SYNER-G:

For Water System

o Water source

o Treatment plant

o Pumping station

o Storage

o Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

o Conduits (pipes, tunnel, canals)

For Waste-Water System

o Conduits (pipes, tunnels)

o Treatment plant

o Lift station


The description of the European typology for the different components is performed. A

review of existing methodologies for the vulnerability assessment of water and waste-water

system elements is followed by the definition, for each component, of some key parameters:

o Damage states scales.

o Intensity index (indices) (intensity-measure parameter).

o Performance indicators that can help specify the link between the damage state

of the component and its serviceability / functionality.

Finally, based on the review of state-of-the-art fragility curves for each component, and the

validation of some methods based on damage data from recent European earthquakes,

improved fragility functions for the individual components are proposed along with their

coding and digital description. For the proposed vulnerability functions, the following

parameters are provided:

o Typology classification of each component.

o Damage scale definition.

o Intensity index used.

o Fragility curve parameters, for each damage state and each typology.


3

2 Damages from past earthquakes

Water and waste-water systems are prone to damage from earthquakes, not only under

severe levels of shaking but under moderate levels as well. Furthermore, as shown by the

experience during past earthquakes, seismic damage to water system elements can cause

extended direct and indirect economic losses, while environmental pollution is the main result

of waste-water failure.

2.1 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

The main damages in water network were observed in water pipes (Table 2-1); secondarily

in pumping stations, tanks and water treatment plants. The pipeline damages can be mainly

attributed to permanent ground deformation and less to wave propagation. Rigid pipe body,

connections, age and corrosion are some of the factors that influence the seismic response

of water network.

Table 2-1 Brief presentation of water system damages as result of Loma Prieta, Northridge and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake

Earthquake/ System

Loma Prieta, 1989,

Mw=6.9, max. MMI=IX

Northridge, 1994,

Mw=6.7, max. MMI=IX

Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), 1995, Mw=6.9, max. JMA=VII

Water System

The 350 repairs in water

system mains of San

Francisco, Oakland and

Berkeley were observed in

cast iron and in asbestos-

cement pipe with

diameters 100-200mm. In

Santa Cruz area, 240

failures in the water

network were observed,

mainly concentrated in

areas with large

permanent deformations.

The electric power loss

had a great impact in

water distribution system

of San Francisco.

Moreover, the pipes that

were damaged influenced

the reliability of fire-

fighting system.

More than 1400 damages

were observed in Los

Angeles water network.

The most of the damages,

100 were observed in

water transmission pipes.

The three transmission

systems of San Fernando

were broken. The seismic

response of dams, water

drills, pumping station

was very good although

the electric power was

disrupted. Minor damages

were observed in water

treatment plants while

extensive damages were

recorded in above ground

tanks with no code

design.

86 reservoirs that give

water to Kobe were

empty in 24 hours. The

damages in water

network influence the

operability of fire-fighting

system. 1.610 repairs of

the main water system

and 71.235 repairs in

customer’s connection

as result of building

damages and permanent

ground deformation were

recorded. Electric Power

losses were responsible

for the malfunction of 3

emergency valves in

reservoirs and several

pumping stations

References EERI (1990), NRC (1994) EERI (1995), TCLEE

(1995), NIST (1994)

NIST (1996), NCEER

(1995) Shrestha (2001)

D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements

4

Europe and especially Balkan and Mediterranean countries have experienced several large

earthquakes, although limited records are available. In Bucharest earthquake (1977), water

system experienced extensive damages both in transmission and distribution system. In the

water treatment plant, the pumps in the pumping station were dislocated, causing

immediately the periodical stop of the treatment process. In three locations, transmission

pipes (diameter: 1200-2200mm, total length: 200km) were severely damaged with extensive

breaks in water supply. Moreover, water blow as result of water failures and extensive

electric power losses provoke the break of 120 connections in water distribution system.

Approximately 10% of 120 connections were steel pipes, while the remaining 90% were

concrete pipes. Asbestos-cement and cast iron pipes experienced no damages (Aldea et al.,

2002).

In Kocaeli (1999) earthquake, minor damages were recorded in the water treatment plant

and in the dam while 2 buried tanks of R/C were cracked, 70% of water distribution system in

Adapazari (500km) was destroyed while the rest had extensive leaks. Moreover, in the same

earthquake, water transmission system had experienced important damages especially in

areas close to the surface trace of the fault (Izmit). Extensive damages were occurred in

Golcuk area in the water distribution system. About 45% of the water network was destroyed

while the rest experienced important leaks. It is important to mention that Turkey’s water

systems are very old with extensive water loss even before the earthquake.

Greek experience is also limited in lifeline system damages. No major damages have been

observed in Greece. Although, failures were observed in pipes in Thessaloniki earthquake

(1978, Mw=6.4, R=29km, PGA= 0.15g, PGV= 16.7cm/sec, PGD=3.4cm). For a few days,

water supply in Thessaloniki stopped when the main pumping station was out of order. Water

was polluted with oil as a result of an oil pipe break nearby. In Kozani- Grevena earthquake

(1995, Mw= 6.6, R= 19km, PGA= 0.21g, PGV= 8.8cm/sec, PGD=1.5cm), the damages were

limited and localized. Water supply stopped in the majority of villages, the cause of the

supply interruption was never confirmed. Several assumptions were made that include

pipeline break and electric power failure. No important damages were occurred in the water

system after Kalamata earthquake (1986, Mw= 6.0, R= 12km, PGA= 0.27g, PGV=

32.3cm/sec, PGD=7.2cm). Many times, due to lack of experience, the results of earthquakes

are noticed later. The recording of water pipeline failures was performed after the Lefkas

earthquake (2003, ‒w=6.4, PGAtrans=0,42g, PGAlong= 0.34g, PGAvert=0.19g). In particular,

more than 30 failures in water customer’s connection were recorded and 10 failures in water

mains (Alexoudi, 2005).

Water system failures were observed in 1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge and 1999

Kocaeli earthquakes (Fig. 2-1 - Fig. 2-4)

The water failures are closely connected with restoration times and number of customers. An

important factor of restoration time is the interactions between the systems and the available

personnel after the earthquake. After the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake,

restoration lasted 14 days. The restoration and design personnel were 450 people. About

1757 failures of main water system were fixed; in the secondary network the fixed repairs

were about 62.300. Restoration time of water system and number of customers influenced as

result of 1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge and 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe),

earthquakes are illustrated in Table 2-2.


5

Fig. 2-1 Tank failure in Izmit (Kocaeli 《arthquake,1999).

Fig. 2-2 Water pipe failure of north part of Anatolian fault (3.7 m- Kocaeli

《arthquake, 1999).

Fig. 2-3 Failure of Rinconada Water Treatment Plant (Loma Prieta, 1989)

Fig. 2-4 Total collapse of 750,000-gallon tank near Castaic Junction (Northridge,

1994)


6

Table 2-2 Restoration time of water system and number of customers influenced [1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge, 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquakes].

Earthquake/ Water system

Loma Prieta, 1989

References: NIST GCR 97-719

Northridge, 1994.

References: NIST 871 (1994), NISTIR 539 (1994), NCEER (1994)

Hyogo-ken Nanbu Kobe, 1995

References: NCEER (1995), NIST 901 (1996)

Restoration days

Immediate Max … 7 days 14 days

N.b of customers influenced

- 50.000 people 1.300.000 people

According to international experience, for the repair of a point failure of the main potable

water pipes, 3- 6 people are needed for total recovery, while for the rest water system

failures about 1.5 people are needed.

2.1.1 Tanks

According to ]SCE (1997) there are six main failure modes for tanks: shell buckling mode,

roof and miscellaneous steel damage, anchorage failure, foundation failure, support system

failure, hydrodynamic pressure failure, connecting pipe failure and manhole failure.

The basic failure modes for tanks under seismic loads are presented in Error ! Not a valid link..

Fig. 2-5 Different types of seismic response of pile foundation tanks (ASCE, 1997)


7

2.1.2 Water Treatment Plant

The main failure modes of water treatment plants and its elements are described briefly in

Table 2-3.

Table 2-3 Main failure modes of water treatment plants (ASCE, 1987)

2.1.3 Canals

Canal failure is often closely connected to the increased friction between the water and the

liner, as the result of debris residue that is lowering hydraulic capacity. Debris may have

entered into the canal causing higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the

liner or earthen embankments. Damage to overcrossings may have also occurred.

Overcrossing damage could include the collapse of highway bridges and leakage of non-

potable material pipelines such as oil, gas, etc. Damage to bridge abutments could cause

constriction of the canal's cross-section to such an extent leading to significant flow

restriction which warrants immediate shutdown and repair (ALA, 2001a).


8

2.1.4 Tunnels

Ground shaking will induce stresses in the liner system of tunnels. If the level of shaking is

high, the liner can crack, which can result in tunnel collapse. For water tunnels, the impact of

liner failure may or may not be immediate. Small cracks in liners will not generally directly

impact the flow of water through the tunnel, although there may be some minor increases in

head loss. Over time, small cracks will allow water from the tunnel to enter the native

materials behind the liner, which could cause erosion of the materials and ultimately could

lead to more damage to the liner. For the most part, the factors that lead to the major

damage state are fault offset through the tunnel itself or landslide at the tunnel portals. Table

2 4 provides tunnel failures depending on the different coating for 10 different earthquakes.

Table 2-4 Tunnel failures for different earthquakes

Coating

Earthquake

(after Power et al., 1998)

‒w Unknown Without

Timber

Or Masonry

Liner

Concrete

Liner

Reinforced

Concrete

or Steel Pipe Liner

Total

San Francisco, CA (1906)

7.8 - 1 7 - - 8

Kanto, Japan (1923)

7.9 - 7 4 2 - 13

Kern Country, CA (1952)

7.4 - 4 - - - 4

Alaska (1964) 8.4 - 8 - - - 8

San Fernando, CA (1971)

6.6 - 8 - - 1 9

Loma Prieta, CA (1989)

7.1 3 - 2 11 6 22

Petrolia, CA (1992)

6.9 - - - 11 - 11

Hokkaido, Japan (1993)

7.8 - - - 1 1

Northridge, CA (1994)

6.7 6 - - 5 20 31

Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), Japan (1995)

6.9 3 - 1 87 6 97

Sum 204


9

2.1.5 Pipes

Damage to segmented pipes (e.g., cast iron pipe having caulked bell-and-spigot joints) will

be heavy when crossing surface ruptured faults according to ALA (2001). Moreover, pipe

breaks occur due to relative vertical (differential) settlements at transition zones from fill to

better soil, and in areas of alluvial soils prone to localized liquefaction. Breaks can also occur

where pipes enter tanks or buildings. Landslides may also produce localized, severe damage

to buried pipe. Experience has also shown that welded pipelines with bends, elbows and

local eccentricities will concentrate deformation at these features, especially if permanent

ground deformations develop compression strains. Segmented pipe with somewhat rigid

caulking cannot tolerate much movement before leakage occurs. Pipeline damage tends to

concentrate at discontinuities such as pipe elbows, tees, in-line valves, reaction blocks and

service connections. Such features create anchor points or rigid locations that promote

force/stress concentrations. Locally high stresses can also occur at pipeline connections to

adjacent structures (e.g., tanks, buildings and bridges). Age and corrosion will accentuate

damage, especially in segmented steel, threaded steel and cast iron pipes. Age effects are

possibly strongly correlated with corrosion effects caused by the increasing impact of

corrosion over time. Corrosion weakens pipe by decreasing the material’s thickness and by

creating stress concentrations.

2.1.6 Pumping Stations

Pumping stations are complex components. Damages in pumping stations are closely

connected with the failure modes of their sub-components. The major subcomponents are

presented in the next section of this report.

2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURE MODES / DIRECT LOSSES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

In general, water system failure may include damages in all water system components.

According to the redundancy and the importance of water elements, the failure of some

components has more impact than others. The definition of water system failures is defined

according to the operation period of the system (normal, crisis and recovery). Specifically,

water system failure can include disability:

o To supply the available water and pressure for fire-fighting purposes in the end-

point node.

o To serve customers’ needs in summer days with maximum daily consumption.

o To supply water to all customers independent of the region and the floor.

2.2.1 Pipes

The basic failure modes of pipes are presented in Table 2-5 and in Fig. 2-6 and Fig. 2-7 for

the case of wave propagation.


10

Table 2-5 Possible failure modes for pipes as result of wave propagation

Continuous pipes

(O’Rourke and Liu, 1999)

Segmented pipes (Singhal, 1984, O’Rourke and Liu, 1999)

ALA (2001a)

- Tensile failure

- Wrinkling

- Beam buckling

- Welded slip joint

- Axial pull-out

- Crushing of bell and

spigot joints

- Joint rotation

- Round flexural cracks

- Axial pull-out

- Joint rotation

- Tensile and bending

deformations of the pipe

barrel.

Fig. 2-6 Failure modes of segment pipes for wave propagation (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999)


11

Fig. 2-7 Basic failure modes for ductile pipes


12

For liquefaction, landslides and fault crossing the pipeline failure modes are illustrated in Fig.

2-8 to Fig. 2-10, respectively.

Fig. 2-8 Failures modes of pipelines as result of liquefaction (O’Rourke and Palmer, 1996)

Fig. 2-9 Failures modes of pipelines as result of landslide (O’Rourke et al., 1998)


13

Fig. 2-10 Failures modes of pipelines as result of fault crossing (O’ Rourke et al., 1998)

2.3 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

The main damages in waste-water network were observed in waste-water pipes (Table 2-6);

secondarily in lift stations and waste-water treatment plants. The pipeline damages can be

attributed mainly to permanent ground deformation and less to wave propagation. Rigid pipe

body, connections, age and corrosion are some of the factors that influence the seismic

response of waste-water network.

In Europe, very limited data are available. In Bucharest earthquake (1977), no damages

were observed in waste-water pipeline network (total length: 1400km)- (Aldea et al., 2002).

No damages occurred in waste-water treatment plant as a result of Lefkas earthquake (2003)

in Greece. Two damages were recorded in the main waste-water system in the coastline of

Lefkas as a result of permanent deformations, although in several areas of the city a smell of

wastes was intense. Moreover, it must be mentioned that no damage was induced to the

pumping station despite the occurrence of 11cm settlement (Alexoudi, 2005).


14

Table 2-6 Brief presentation of waste-water system damages as result of Loma Prieta, Northridge and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake

Earthquake/ System

Loma Prieta, 1989,

Mw=6.9, max. MMI=IX

Northridge, 1994,

Mw=6.7, max. MMI=IX

Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), 1995,

Mw=6.9, max. JMA=VII

Waste-Water System

As result of electric

power loss

(commercial and

back-up power if any)

in lift stations, lead

wastes to San

Francisco area and

polluted Monterey

Bays. Moreover,

extensive damages

were occurred in the

main waste-water

system of San

Francisco Bay and in

Watsonville. Minor to

moderate damages

were observed in

waste-water treatment

plant in the area of

San Francisco.

Minor to moderate

damages were

observed in waste-

water treatment plant

as result of wave

propagation and cracks

in the tanks. Moreover,

waste-water process

was also interrupted by

electric power loss. All

lift stations lost their

connection with electric

power system in LA

region. The waste-

water network was

destroyed by

permanent ground

deformations.

3 of the 8 waste-water

treatment plant were totally

destroyed. Extensive

damages were observed in

Higashi-mada Plant in

Kobe area as result of

permanent deformations.

The direct impact of the

Higashi-mada Plant failure

was the dismissal of wastes

without any treatment to

Osaka Bay. Waste-water

system mains, presented

total failure in areas with

large permanent

deformations. The loss of

electric power influence the

operability of pumping

stations.

References EERI (1990), NRC

(1994)

EERI (1995), TCLEE

(1995), NIST (1994)

NIST (1996), NCEER

(1995) Shrestha (2001)

Fig. 2-11 Plenary view of waste-water treatment plant of Lefkas (Greece)


15

Fig. 2-12 No damage observed in waste-water

lift station during the 2003 Lefkas earthquake in Greece (from in-situ

inspection Alexoudi and Argyroudis 2003)

2.3.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant

The main failure modes of waste-water treatment plants are the same as the potable water

treatment plants.

2.3.2 Tunnels

The main failure modes of tunnels are the same as in potable water system.

2.3.3 Pipes

The main failure modes of pipes are the same as in potable water system.

2.3.4 Lift Station

The main failure modes of lift stations are the same as in potable water system.


16

3 Methodology for the vulnerability assessment of water and waste-water system elements

3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

A potable water supply is necessary for drinking, food preparation, sanitation, fire-

extinguishing etc. Water (which may be non-potable) is also required for cooling equipment.

A potable water system consists of transmission and distribution systems:

o Transmission system stores “raw” water and delivers it to treatment plants. Such a

system is made up of canals, tunnels, elevated aqueducts and buried pipelines,

pumping plant and reservoirs.

o Distribution system delivers treated water to customers.

Various components comprise potable water system according to ALA (2001a); RISK-UE

(2001-2004) and LESSLOSS (2004-2007). The same components are also proposed in

SYNER-G (Fig. 3-1) as listed below:

o Water source

o Treatment plant

o Pumping station

o Storage


o Conduits (pipes, tunnel, canals)

Fig. 3-1 Breakdown of potable water system components

POTABLE WATER SYSTEM

Water Source

- Springs

- Wells

- Rivers

- Lakes

- Impounding

reservoirs

Water Treatment Plant

Pumping station Building facilities

- System control

- Storage

- Administrative, customer

service

Storage

Pipes

Tunnels

Canals


17

3.1.1 Water Source

The typical water sources are springs, shallow or deep wells, rivers, natural lakes, and

impounding reservoirs. Wells are used in many cities as both a primary and supplementary

source of water. Wells include a pump to bring the water up to the surface, various

electromechanical equipments and a building to enclose the well and the equipment.

Typology

Wells, springs or river catchments are different types of water sources.

Wells are described according to HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) with respect to:

o Anchored / Unanchored;

o The subcomponent.

The subcomponents of wells that are considered in SYNER-G are the same as in HAZUS

(NIBS, 2004):

o Electric power (commercial power)

o Well pump

o Building

o Electric equipment.


Water treatment plants are complex facilities, generally composed of a number of connected

physical and chemical unit processes, whose purpose is to improve the water quality.

Treatment processes used depend on the raw-water source and the quality of finished water

desired. A conventional water treatment plant consists of a coagulation process, followed by

a sedimentation process, and finally a filtration process. Components in the treatment

process include pre-sedimentation basins, aerators detention tanks, flocculators, clarifiers,

backwash tanks, conduit and channels, coal sand or sand filters, mixing tanks, settling tanks,

clear wells, and chemical tanks.

Alternatively, a water treatment plant can be regarded as a system of interconnected pipes,

basins, and channels through which the water moves, and where the flow is governed by

hydraulic principles.

Typology

Water Treatment Plant may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:

o Its size (small, medium or large);


o The subcomponent (equipment and backup power) considered.

The size of the water treatment plant may be considered as a typological parameter, due to

its increasing redundancy and importance factor for design (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004).


18

Small water treatment plants (~50 M Gallons å 189.500 m3/day), are assumed to consist of

a filter gallery with flocculation tanks (composed of paddles and baffles) and settling (or

sedimentation) basins as main components, chemical tanks (needed in the coagulation and

other destabilization processes), chlorination tanks, electrical and mechanical equipment,

and elevated pipes.

Medium water treatment plants are simulated by adding more redundancy to small treatment

plants (i.e. twice as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical and chlorination tanks) and

large water treatment plants (i.e., three times as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical

and chlorination tanks/basins) – (between or ‡200 M Gallons å 758.000 m3/day).

In SYNER-G, in order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the

different European practices used for Water Treatment Plants of different sizes and the semi-

anchorage of the subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Water Treatment Plant is

proposed independently of the size. It is also assumed that there is no back-up power in

case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).

The following subcomponents that may be considered in SYNER-G for water treatment plant

are the same as in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) except for the back-up power.

o Electric Power (commercial power);

o Chlorination equipment;

o Sediment floculation;

o Basins;

o Baffles, Paddles, Scrapers;

o Chemical Tanks;

o Electric equipment;

o Elevated pipe;

o Filter Gallery.

3.1.3 Pumping Station

A Pumping station is a facility that boosts water pressure in both transmission and

distribution systems. In general, pumping stations include larger stations adjacent to

reservoirs and rivers, and smaller stations distributed throughout the water system intended

to raise head.

Pumping stations typically comprise buildings, intake structures, pump and motor units,

pipes, valves, and associated electrical and control equipment (ATC-25, ALA 2001a).

Typology

Pumping Station may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:





19

A small pumping station boost less than 10 M Gallons (37.900 m3/day) to transmission and

distribution systems, according to HAZUS (NIBS 2004).

In SYNER-G, in order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the

different European practices used for Pumping Station of different sizes and the semi-

anchorage of the subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Pumping Station is proposed

independently of the size for different building categories. It is also assumed that there is no

back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).

The following subcomponents that may be considered in SYNER-G for a pumping station are

the same as in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) except for the back-up power.

o Electric Power (backup, commercial power);

o Vertical/ Horizontal Pump;

o Building;

o Equipment.

Comment: See also D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe” and D3.2 “Fragility functions for masonry buildings in Europe”.

3.1.4 Storage

Storage tanks can be located at the start, along the length or at the end of a water

transmission/distribution system. Their function may be to hold water for operational storage,

provide surge relief volumes, provide detention times for disinfection, and other uses.

Most water systems include various types of storage reservoirs in their transmission/

distribution systems. Storage reservoirs can be either tanks or open cut reservoirs.

Open Cut Reservoir simply means that the reservoir is built by creating a reservoir in the

natural lie of the land, often with one side of the reservoir made up of an earthen

embankment dam. Many open cut reservoirs are enclosed by adding a roof so that treated

water inside is protected from contamination from outside sources.

A tank is a vessel that holds water. Water tanks are usually built of steel, concrete or wood

(most often redwood). Tanks can be elevated by columns, built “at-grade” to rest directly on

the ground or on a foundation on the ground, or buried. Also, in some smaller parts of

distribution systems, water can be stored in pressure tanks, which are small horizontal

pressure vessels on supports, at grade.

Typology

Storage typology parameters may be the following:

o Material (wood, steel or concrete);

o Size;

o Anchorage;

o Position (at grade or elevated);

o Type of roof;


20

o Seismic design.

o foundation type

o Construction technique

Table 3-1 Typology of water storage tanks.

Element Tanks

Steel

Elevated tanks have capacities ranging between 750-53000m3, they are

generally from steel or concrete and founded on piles or with surface

foundations. They are usually located in small cities or rural areas. Elevated steel

tanks typically have lateral load resistant capacity for wind or earthquakes. In

many cases they do not have any seismic design. The roofs of steel tanks are

either made of steel or wood. It is also possible, to have steel tanks without roofs.

Concrete

In general, tanks in Europe and in Greece are reinforced concrete (R/C) with roof

from concrete. Concrete tanks can be either at-grade or buried, anchored or un-

anchored. Many reinforced concrete tanks are post-tensioned. In urban areas in

Greece, tanks are reinforced concrete or post-tensioned, with surface foundation

or supported on piles.

Wood

Wood tanks are generally at-grade, they have limited capacity less than 1500m3

and they are not anchored. Elevated tanks are rarely used and they are usually

constructed from sekou wood. In Greece, we do not find any, in contrast to e.g.

Scandinavian countries where they are still in use.

Masonry There are only masonry and masonry with reinforced concrete structures. This

kind of tanks is still in use in some parts of the water system.

Open cut

reservoirs

An open cut reservoir is made by cutting into the ground. They usually not

include roof structures. In rare cases, a roof structure is installed to protect water

from external pollution.

3.1.5 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

Various types of in-line components exist along water transmission pipelines, including

portions of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system located along the

conveyance system and various flow control mechanisms (e.g., valves and gates).

In-line SCADA hardware includes a variety of components, including:

o Instrumentation;

o Power Supply (normal, backup);

o Communication components (normal, backup);

o Weather enclosures (electrical cabinets and vaults).


21

SCADA system components in water transmission systems are the followings.

o Instruments attached to the pipeline may include flow and pressure devices that

are sometimes installed in a venturi section of pipeline.

o Instruments attached to a canal may include various types of float instruments,

which are used to assess the water level in the canal.

o Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are

most commonly solid state devices. An RTU device picks up the analog signals

from one or more channels of SCADA system devices at one location. The RTU

converts these signals into a suitable format for transmission to a central SCADA

computer, often at a location remote from the devices. A PLC can control when

pumps are turned on or off, based on real time data or pre-programmed logic.

o Most water systems have used manual recorders to track pressures, flows and

gradient information. These recorders are still in use in many water systems. The

recorders sometimes report on the same information as the automated SCADA

system, often using the same instruments. Also, since the installation of

automated SCADA system hardware is often relegated to a few locations in the

water system, the manual recorder may be the only recording device at a location.

o SCADA Cabinet is a metal enclosure that is mounted to a floor or bolted to a wall.

o Most SCADA systems include battery backups.

o Communication Links. The remote SCADA system is connected in some manner

to the central location SCADA computer system. The most common links are

radio, leased landlines and, to a lesser extent, microwaves; the use of public

switched landlines is rare.

o Canal gate structures.

Typology

The location of the valves is often important when deciding how a pipeline system performs

as a whole; damage to a pipeline between two valves will need to be isolated by closing the

valves. Thus, typology depends on the following parameters:

o Intervals between valves on conduits;

o Anchorage of SCADA cabinet and inside equipments;

o Number and type of communication links.

3.1.6 Conduits

Transmission conduits are typically large size pipes (more than 400mm in diameter) or

channels (canals) that convey water from its source (reservoirs, lakes, rivers) to the

treatment plant.

Transmission pipelines are commonly made of concrete, ductile iron, cast iron, or steel.

These could be elevated/at grade or buried. Elevated or at grade pipes are typically made of

steel (welded or riveted), and they can run in single or multiple lines.


22

Canals are typically lined with concrete, mainly to avoid excessive loss of water by seepage

and to control erosion. In addition to concrete lining, expansion joints are usually used to

account for swelling and shrinkage under varying temperature and moisture conditions.

Distribution of water through conduits can be accomplished by gravity, or by pumps in

conjunction with on-line storage. Except for storage reservoirs located at a much higher

altitude than the area being served, distribution of water would necessitate, at least, some

pumping along the way. Typically, water is pumped at a relatively constant rate, with flow in

excess of consumption being stored in elevated storage tanks. The stored water provides a

reserve for fire flow and may be used for general-purpose flow should the electric power fail,

or in case of pumping capacity loss.

Conduits are artificial channels made for the conveyance of fluids (Fig. 3-2). They fall into

two categories:

o Free-flow conduits guide the fluid as it flows down a sloping surface.

o Pressure conduits confine and guide fluid movement under pressure.

Free-flow conduits may be simple open channels or ditches, or pipes or tunnels flowing

partially full. A pressurized conduit can be a pipeline or tunnel flowing under internal

pressure.

Fig. 3-2 Breakdown of potable water conduits.

Typology

Beyond the nature of the conduits (see suitable sections), typology depends mainly on the

flowing (gravity or pumped systems) and secondarily to the appurtenances along the

aqueduct.

o Gravity system aqueducts deliver the flow from higher elevations to lower

elevations, and do not need any pumping to move the water.

o Pumped-system aqueducts require pumps along the length of the aqueduct to

keep the water moving.

Appurtenances along the length of the aqueduct includes various turnouts, gates, valves, etc.

Often ignored for a simplified earthquake loss estimate, these may be important if there are

particular component vulnerabilities, or if a system model that includes connectivity is to be

used.


23

3.1.6.1 Pipes (Common to potable water and waste-water systems)

Pipes can be free-flow or pressure conduits, buried or elevated. Several materials can be

used. In order to avoid contamination of treated water, potable water pipes are most of the

time pressurized.

Typology

Pipe typology depends on the following parameters:

o Location (buried or elevated);

o Material (type, strength);

o Geometry (diameter, wall thickness);

o Type of joints, continuous or segmented pipes;

o Appurtenances and branches;

o Corrosiveness (age and soil conditions).

The selection of material type and pipe size are based on the desired carrying capacity,

availability of material, durability and cost.

Location: Elevated pipes are large-diameter pipes supported on bents. They are often used

in areas that traverse poor soils, and the bents are often supported on piles that extend to

competent materials. Pile supports can be made of wood, concrete or concrete-encased

steel. Buried pipes are buried 1 to 5 m or deeper in the ground.

Material: For detailed diagnostics of pipe failure, mechanical characteristics of material will

be required. Otherwise, pipeline material allows simplified assessment. Pipes are commonly

made of:

o Asbestos Cement (AC),

o Concrete (C),

o Cast Iron (CI),

o Ductile Iron (DI),

o Welded Steel (S),

o PolyVinyl Chloride (PVC),

o High Density PolyEthylene (HDPE).

o Vitrified Clay;

o Brick;

o Bituminised fibre;


24

Geometry: The diameter of distribution pipe is important both in terms of pipe damage

algorithms and post-earthquake performance of the entire water system. For more detailed

study, wall thickness is also required. Pipe diameters are generally greater than 4 inches and

one should consider the following classes:

o Small diameter means 4 to 12 inches (…100 to 300 mm);

o Large diameter mean 16 inches and more (@400 mm).

Type of joints: A jointed pipeline consists of pipe segments coupled by relatively flexible (or

weak) connections (e.g., a bell-and-spigot cast iron piping system). Continuous pipelines are

those having rigid joints, such as continuous welded steel pipelines.

Appurtenances and branches: Pipeline damage tends to concentrate at discontinuities such

as pipe elbows, tees, in-line valves, reaction blocks and service connections. Such features

create anchor points or rigid locations that promote force/stress concentrations. Locally high

stresses can also occur at pipeline connections to adjacent structures (e.g., tanks, buildings

and bridges), especially if there is insufficient flexibility to accommodate relative

displacements between the pipe and the structure.

Corrosiveness: Corrosion will accentuate damage, especially in segmented steel, threaded

steel and cast iron pipes. Older pipes appear to have a higher incidence of failure than newer

pipes. Age effects are possibly strongly correlated with corrosion effects caused by the

increasing impact of corrosion over time. Soil conditions can also influence corrosion.

Experience has also shown that continuous pipelines with bends, elbows and local

eccentricities will concentrate deformation at these features, especially if permanent ground

deformations develop compression strains. Other pipe attributes that may be developed

when collecting inventory data include: leak history, encasement, corrosion protection

systems, location of air valve and blow-offs, etc. These attributes may yield some extra

information as to the pipeline's fragility, but they may not be available to the analyst in all

cases.

Functionality: Distribution pipes represent the network that delivers water to consumption

areas. Distribution pipes may be further subdivided into primary lines, secondary lines and

small distribution mains. The primary mains carry flow from the pumping station to and from

elevated storage tanks, and to the consumption areas, whether residential, industrial,

commercial, or public. These lines are typically laid out in interlocking loops. Secondary lines

have smaller loops within the primary mains and run from one primary line to another. They

serve primarily to provide a large amount of water for fire fighting without excessive pressure

loss. Small distribution lines represent the mains that supply water to the user and to the fire

hydrants.


25

3.1.6.2 Tunnels (common to roadway, railway, potable water and waste-water

systems)

Whatever the content (potable or waste-water, road or railway), tunnels are confined

structures. They are often not redundant, and major disruption to the utility or transportation

system is likely to occur should a tunnel become non-functional.

Typology

Tunnels may be described according to (Table 3-2):

o Construction technique,

o Liner system

o Geologic conditions.

For a more detailed assessment, the shape of the section, the depth, the length and the

diameter of the tunnel, the liner thickness might be a useful information.

Table 3-2 Typology of tunnels (ALA 2001a).

Typology Poor-to-average construction Good construction

Rock

conditions

Tunnels in average or poor rock,

either unsupported masonry or

timber liners, or unreinforced

concrete with frequent voids

behind lining and/or weak

concrete.

Tunnels in very sound rock and designed

for geologic conditions (e.g., special

support such as rock bolts or stronger

liners in weak zones); unreinforced, strong

concrete liners with contact grouting to

assure continuous contact with rock;

average rock; or tunnels with reinforced

concrete or steel liners with contact

grouting.

Alluvial

soil or

Cut and

Cover

conditions

Tunnels that are bored or cut and

cover box-type tunnels and include

tunnels with masonry, timber or

unreinforced concrete liners, or any

liner in poor contact with the soil.

These also include cut and cover

box tunnels not designed for

racking mode of deformation.

Tunnels designed for seismic loading,

including racking mode of deformation for

cut and cover box tunnels. These also

include tunnels with reinforced strong

concrete or steel liners in bored tunnels in

good contact with soil.

A more detailed description can be found in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system

elements” where it presents the final proposal for SYNER-G.


26

3.1.6.3 Canals

Canals are free-flowing conduits, usually open to the atmosphere, and usually at grade. They

tend to be larger than pipelines operated under pressure. The advantages of using a canal

include the possibility of construction with locally available materials, longer life than metal

pipelines, and lower loss of hydraulic capacity with age. The disadvantages include the need

to provide the ultimate flow capacity initially and the likelihood of interference with local

drainage. Flumes are open-channel sections that carry water in elevated structures.

Typology

Canals can be formed by cutting a ditch into the ground, building up levees, or a combination

of the two. Most often, canals are concrete-lined to reduce water losses. Canals can traverse

both stable and unstable geologic conditions. Thus, canal typology may consider whether the

canal is:

o Open cut or built up using levees;

o Reinforced, unreinforced liners or unlined embankments.

Flumes sections are commonly made of wood or metal. The support systems can be built of

wood, concrete or steel. The support structures might be a few feet high where the flume

runs along a contour, or very tall where the flume crosses a creek or river. Flumes are

specialized structures and are not specifically addressed here.

3.2 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

In summary, Table 3-3 provides a comparison of the typologies of potable water elements

provided by HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and ALA (2001a,b). The third column provides SYNER-G

proposal for potable water elements.

In Greece, the typology of potable water systems’ elements is based on international

practice, although some features do not exist. In particular, components’ anchorage is not

based on any specifications, despite the fact that some measures are taken for their seismic

support. Usually, it depends on the workers’ expertise and the local experience from

earthquakes. Thus, there is not a standard level of anchorage and the water system

components cannot be considered as anchored. Regarding potable water treatment in

Greece, there are some treatment facilities in water sources or even in central pumping

stations. Transmission conduits from water sources are in general closed-type, but there are

also some open parts. The reason for this, except from the cost, is because these canals

were initially used for irrigation. In general, distribution systems are comprised from pipes

with different materials, connection types and diameters. Construction codes for water

systems do not exist in Greece until nowadays; although, at the end of the 70’s,

specifications for the pipelines’ materials started to be applied, while special references are

made to technical reports for the best construction practices. Nevertheless, large parts of the

water systems in Greece have not been constructed using specific studies, resulting in lack

of data for their characteristics. Storage tanks are usually constructed from concrete with

concrete roof. They are half-full and not anchored. In big urban centres, they are anchored


27

with surface foundation or sited on piles according to the soil type. Pumping stations are

reinforced concrete buildings, designed according to the current seismic codes. They usually

have one part elevated, with the largest part being below ground where the tank and electric

and mechanical equipment are located. In Greece (Thessaloniki), SCADAs exist in about

40% of the water pumping stations and in 3 points in water transmission pipeline in

Thessaloniki.

Table 3-3 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in NIBS 2004, ALA 2001a,b and SYNER-G

Element ｠』〈S, 2003 ALA (2001a,b) SYNER-G

Water

Sources

(wells)

Components’

anchorage -

Components’

anchorage

Water

Treatment

Plant

Size

Components’

anchorage

-

Size

Components’

anchorage

Tunnels

-

Soil type

Quality of

construction

See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”

Canals -

Material of

construction

Amount of debris that

may enter the canal

after an earthquake

Material of

construction

Amount of debris that

may enter the canal

after an earthquake

Pipes

Material

Type of joints/

connection

Material

Diameter

Type of joints/

connection

Soil type

Material

Type of joints/

connection

Tanks

Material

Foundation type

Anchorage

Size

Material

Anchorage

Foundation type

Seismic design

Size

Material

Anchorage

Foundation type

Seismic design

Pumping

station

Size

Components’

anchorage

-

Size

Components’

anchorage


28

In France water is managed through dedicated plans called SDAGE (Schéma Directeur

d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux). These plans enable the protection of water

resources from natural hazards. Up to now water management is very local and involves a

great number of actors (more than 36.000 municipalities and 30 000 services). This explains

the lack of harmonized national database. However a national observatory for water and

waste-water systems was launched in 2009 (according to the new law on water, 30/12/2008).

This observatory has defined a number of descriptive and performance indicators and aims

at harmonizing data formats on the territory. These data should become available in the

following years (www.services.eaufrance.fr) and should enable a targeted improvement of

the systems. In France the sources of drinking water are mainly underground water tables

(2/3) and surface water (1/3). The distribution network for drinking water represents about

878.000 km. The leaks are assumed to represent about 20% and to be due to corrosion,

ground modification, old joints and individual connexion. The priority concerning the

replacement of pipes is the following: grey cast-iron/steel (<1960) and cement-asbestos,

PVC (<1975), grey cast-iron/steel (>1960), PVC (>1975), ductile cast-iron. In 2002 there

were about 27.514 distribution units, but there are few standardised information at national

level on drinking water units.

A typology of potable water systems in Austria has not been available. Instead of that a brief

description of water system of Vienna is given here. The potable water system in Vienna can

principally be divided into two main water lines. These are the first and second

Hochquellenleitung. The capacity of the first conduit is 220.000 m3/day and that of the

second conduit is 217.000 m3/day. The first conduit is mostly made out of brickwork and

concrete canals. The down-grade is sufficient enough, so that there are no pumping stations

needed. The second conduit has a total length of about 200 km and the down grade is so

high that there are no pumping stations needed. There are about 30 high-level tanks in

Vienna.

3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

Waste-water system can alternatively be called sewer network. Sewer network is comprised

of components that work together to:

o Collect

o Transmit

o Treat

o Dispose of sewage

Various components comprise waste-water system according to RISK-UE (2001-2004) and

LESSLOSS (2004-2007). The same components were also proposed in SYNER-G (Fig. 3-3).

o Conduits (pipes, tunnels)

o Treatment plant

o Lift station



29

Fig. 3-3 Breakdown of waste-water system.

3.3.1 Conduits

Conduits are artificial channels made for the conveyance of fluids. Mainly free-flow conduits

that guide the fluid as it flows down a sloping surface are present in waste-water system.

Free-flow conduits may be pipes or tunnels flowing partially full. Collection sewers are

generally closed conduits that carry normally sewage with a partial flow. They could be

sanitary sewers, storm sewers, or combined sewers. Interceptors are large diameter sewer

mains, usually located at the lowest elevation areas.

Fig. 3-4 Breakdown of waste-water conduits.

Typology

In general, mains in the sanitary sewer system are underground conduits that normally follow

valleys or natural streambeds. Waste-water conduits are usually designed as free flow

channels except where lift stations are required to overcome topographic barriers.

Sometimes the sanitary sewer system flow is combined with the storm water system prior to

treatment.

3.3.1.1 Pipes (Common to potable water and waste-water systems)

Waste-water pipes are most of the time free flow conduits.

WASTE WATER SYSTEM

Waste-Water Treatment

Plant

Lift station Building Facilities

- System control

- Storage

- Administration/

customer service

Conduits


30

Typology

The typology of waste-water pipes is the same as in potable water pipes. More specific pipe

materials used for collection sewers and interceptor sewers are similar to those for potable

water. The most commonly used sewer material is clay pipe manufactured with integral bell

and spigot end. Concrete pipes are mostly used for storm drains and for sanitary sewers

carrying non corrosive sewage (i.e. with organic materials). For the smaller diameter range,

plastic pipes are also used.

3.3.1.2 Tunnels

The typology of waste-water tunnels is the same as in potable water tunnels. A more detailed

description can be found in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”.

3.3.2 Waste-water Treatment Plant

Waste-water treatment plants in the sanitary sewer system are complex facilities which

include a number of buildings and underground or on ground reinforced concrete tank and

basins. Common components at a treatment plant include trickling filter, clarifiers, chlorine

tanks, recirculation and waste-water pumping stations, chlorine storage and handling, tanks,

and pipelines. Concrete channels are frequently used to convey the waste-water from one

location to another within the complex. Within the buildings there are mechanical, electrical,

and control equipment, as well as piping and valves. Conventional waste-water treatment

consists of:

o preliminary processes (pumping, screening, and grit removal),

o primary settling to remove heavy solids and floatable materials,

o secondary biological aeration to metabolise and flocculate colloidal and dissolved

organics.

Preliminary treatment units vary but generally include screens to protect pumps and prevent

solids from fouling grit-removal units and flumes. Additional preliminary treatments (flotation,

flocculation, and chemical treatment) may be required for industrial wastes.

Primary treatment typically comprises sedimentation, which removes up to half the

suspended solids.

Secondary treatment removes remaining organic matter using activated-sludge processes,

trickling filters or biological towers. Chlorination of effluents is commonly required.”

Waste sludge may be stored in a tank and concentrated in a thickener. Raw sludge can be

disposed of by anaerobic digestion and vacuum filtration, with centrifugation and wet

combustion also currently used.


31

Typology

Waste-Water Treatment Plant may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:



o The subcomponent (equipment and back-up power) considered.

The size of the waste-water treatment plant may be considered as a typological parameter,

due to its increasing redundancy (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) and importance factor for design.

Small treatment plants (~50 M Gallons å 189.500 m3/day) are assumed to consist of a filter

gallery with flocculation tanks (composed of paddles and baffles) and settling (or

sedimentation) basins as main components, chemical tanks (needed in the coagulation and

other destabilization processes), chlorination tanks, electrical and mechanical equipment,

and elevated pipes.

Medium treatment plants (50 < x <200M Gallons) are simulated by adding more redundancy

to small treatment plants (i.e. twice as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical and

chlorination tanks).

Large treatment plants (‡200 M Gallons å 758 000 m3/day) are simulated by adding even

more redundancy to small treatment plants (i.e., three times as many flocculation,

sedimentation, chemical and chlorination tanks/basins).

Whether the subcomponents (equipment and back-up power) are anchored or not is another

typological parameter. In order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as result

of the different European practices used for Waste-Water Treatment Plants of different sizes

and the semi-anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Waste-Water

Treatment Plant is proposed independently of the size. It is also assumed that there is no

back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).

The following subcomponents that may be considered in SYNER-G for waste-water

treatment plant are the same as in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) except for the back-up power:


o Chlorination equipment;

o Sediment floculation;

o Chemical Tanks;

o Electric equipment;

o Elevated pipe.

o Building

Also, the treatment level could be considered (primary, secondary, tertiary).

3.3.3 Lift station

Lift or pumping stations serve to raise sewage over topographical rises or to boost the

disposals. They are typically used to transport accumulated waste-water from a low point in


32

the collection system to a treatment plant. If the lift station is out of service for more than a

short time, untreated sewage will either spill out near the lift station, or back up into the

collection sewer system. Pumping stations consist primarily of a wet well, which intercepts

incoming flows and permit equalization of pump loadings and a bank of pumps, which lift the

waste-water from the wet well. The centrifugal pump finds widest use at pumping stations.

Thus, a plant is usually composed of a building, one or more pumps, electrical equipment,

and, in some cases, back-up power systems. Lift stations are often at least partially

underground.

Typology

Lift station may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:




Small lift stations transport less than 10 M Gallons (37 900 m3/day) of disposal according to

HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) while medium/large lift station transfer more than 10 M Gallons.

In SYNER-G in order to account or for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the

different European practices used for lift stations of different sizes and the semi- anchorage

of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Pumping Stations is proposed independently

of the size for different building types. It is also assumed that there is no back-up power in

case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).

The following subcomponents may be considered in a pumping station (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004)

expect for the back-up power:


o Vertical/ Horizontal Pump;

o Building;

o Equipment.

3.3.4 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)

Various types of in-line components exist along waste-water transmission pipelines, including

portions of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system located along the

conveyance system and various flow control mechanisms (e.g., valves and gates).

In-line SCADA the hardware includes a variety of components, including:

o Instrumentation;

o Power Supply (normal, backup);

o Communication components (normal, backup);

o Weather enclosures (electrical cabinets and vaults).


33

SCADA system components in waste-water transmission systems are the following:

o Instruments attached to the pipeline may include flow devices that are sometimes

installed in a venturi section of pipeline.

o Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are

most commonly solid state devices. An RTU device picks up the analog signals

from one or more channels of SCADA system devices at one location. The RTU

converts these signals into a suitable format for transmission to a central SCADA

computer, often at a location remote from the devices. A PLC can control when

pumps are turned on or off, based on real time data or pre-programmed logic.

o SCADA Cabinet is a metal enclosure that is mounted to a floor or bolted to a wall.

o Most SCADA systems include battery backups.

o Communication Links. The remote SCADA system is connected in some manner to the central location SCADA computer system. The most common links are radio, leased landlines and, to a lesser extent, microwaves; the use of public switched landlines is rare.

Typology

The location of the valves is often important when deciding how a pipeline system performs

as a whole; damage to a pipeline between two valves will need to be isolated by closing the

valves. Thus, typology depends on the following parameters:

o Intervals between valves on conduits;

o Anchorage of SCADA cabinet and inside equipments;

o Number and type of communication links.

3.4 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

In summary, Table 3-4 provides a comparison of the typologies of waste-water elements

provided by HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and the proposal within SYNER-G.

Table 3-4 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and SYNER-G

Element ｠』〈S, 2003 SYNER-G

Waste-Water Treatment Plant

Size

Components’ anchorage

Size


Tunnels

-


Pipes Material

Type of joints/ connection

Material

Type of joints/ connection

Lift station Size


Size



34

In Greece, collection sewers (sanitary, storm or combined sewers) are usually closed

conduits. The older storm sewers are constructed from clay, while the newer ones are made

of concrete. Sanitary sewers carrying non-organic materials are also constructed from

concrete; they usually are large-diameter, gravity pipes. Smaller conduits are constructed

from PVC. Pressure (usually steel) pipes are used for the conveyance of sewage from

pumping stations of Central Sewage Conduits to areas of higher elevation. Central Sewage

Conduits have diameters >1.000mm and constructed from reinforced concrete (sometimes

pre-stressed). In Greece (Thessaloniki), SCADA exists in all lift stations.

In France the waste-water collection system represents about 280.000 km of pipes. Among

these pipes 10% were assumed to be older than 60 years in 2002, and some pipes were not

installed correctly in the 70s, which makes replacement necessary. These pipes feed about

17.300 waste-water treatment plants with a total capacity of 76 millions Equivalent-Human

(75% of these plants were built after 1990). Plants with capacity >100.000 EH represent only

about 113 plants, whereas plants with capacity < 500 EH are numerous (about 6.225). The

most used technique is the activated sludge process for waste-water treatment.

In Austria, collection sewers (sanitary, storm or combined sewers) are closed conduits.

Older sewers can be constructed from clay or brickwork. The younger ones are constructed

from concrete or PVC. The waste-water system in Vienna is roughly 2.400 km long and

takes all sewage in Vienna to one main sewage treatment plant.

3.5 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES

Fragility relationships are a critical component of seismic impact assessment. The fragility, or

vulnerability, functions relate the severity of shaking to the probability of reaching a level of

damage (e.g. light, medium, extensive, near-collapse) to various infrastructure items. The

level of shaking can be quantified using numerous shaking parameters, including peak

ground acceleration, velocity, displacement, spectral acceleration, spectral velocity or

spectral displacement. Each infrastructure item requires a corresponding set of fragilities to

determine damage level likelihoods (probability).

In general, fragility functions relate a level of shaking, or system demand, to the conditional

probability of a specific system reaching or exceeding a limit state response. A deterministic

response, or the vertical line, indicates a lack of uncertainty in the system response. Fragility

curves close to vertical indicate a low level of uncertainty, while those with a much higher

uncertainty are spread over a much wider range of shaking values.

3.6 DAMAGE STATES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

3.6.1 Water Source

Parameters defining damage states of water sources are:

o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004).

o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004).


35


Parameters defining damage states of water treatment plant are:

o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE,

2003-2007).

o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007)

o Functionality level (Ballantyne et al., 2009)

o Restoration Cost (% of replacement cost) - (Ballantyne et al., 2009)

3.6.3 Pumping Station

Parameters defining damage states of pumping station are:


2003-2007).

o Serviceability state (HAZUS, NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007).

o Reliability index (Scawthorn, 1996)

3.6.4 Storage tanks

Parameters defining damage states of storage tanks are:

o Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS,

2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007; O’Rourke and So, 1999).

o Loss of context (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007; ALA, 2001;

O’Rourke and So, 1999)

3.6.5 Canal

Parameters defining damage states of canals are:

o Hydraulic performance of a canal

3.6.6 Pipes

Parameters defining damage states of pipes are:

o Repair rate per km (Katayama et al., 1975; ATC-13,1985; Isoyama and

Katayama, 1982; Memphis, Tennessee, 1985; O’ Rourke and Ayala, 1993;

Eidinger et al., 1995; Eidinger, 1998; Isoyama, 1998; O’Rourke et al.,1998;

O’Rourke and Leon, 1999; Eidinger and Avila, 1999; Isoyama et al., 2000; Toprak,

1998; Hung, 2001; Honegger and Eguchi, 1992; Heubach, 1995; Eidinger et

al.,1999; ]LA, 2001a,b; Yeh et al., 2006)

o Break/ 1000 feet (Eguchi , 1983; Wang et al., 1991; O’Rourke and Deyoe, 2004)

o Vulnerability class (Ballantyne and Heubach, 1996)


36

3.6.7 Tunnels


3.7 DAMAGE STATES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

3.7.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant

Parameters defining damage states of waste-water treatment plant are:


2003-2007).

o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007)

3.7.2 Conduits

Parameters defining damage states of conduits are:

o Level of ground strain (Mataki et al., 1996)

Moreover, for the case of waste-water pipes, the parameters defining damage states are the

same as in potable water system while for the case of tunnels are the same as for roadway system elements

3.7.3 Lift station

Parameters defining damage states of lift station are:


2003-2007).

o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007).

3.8 INTENSITY INDEXES

The characteristics of ground motions that influence the seismic performance and integrity of

lifelines are intensity, frequency content and duration of the motions. Each of these

characteristics of ground motion at a given site is influenced by the nature of the fault rupture

process, the travel path followed by the resulting seismic waves as they propagate from the

ruptured fault to the site, the “site effects” including the effects of local soil conditions, the

basin effects and topography. The intensity of the shaking has been typically represented

using the parameter given below:

o Peak Ground Horizontal Acceleration (PGAH).

o Peak Ground Vertical Acceleration (PGAV).

o Acceleration time history (ies) a(t).


37

o Peak Ground Horizontal Velocity (PGVH).

o Peak Ground Vertical Velocity (PGVV).

o Peak Ground Displacement (PGD).

o Acceleration, Velocity and Displacement Response Spectrum SA(T, つ) for a

suitable range of periods. (normally <10 Hz but recently up to 20 Hz as well

especially for the displacement spectra)

o Transient ground strains

o Arias Intensity

o Fourier Spectrum

o Fundamental period of the ground motion (it is related to the site effects as well)

o Duration (Bracketed Duration, Significant Duration).

o Equivalent number of uniform cycles, Neq.

o In case of slope movement, fault crossing and liquefaction induced phenomena

(lateral spreading and subsidence), the Permanent Ground Deformations

(displacements, PGD) - total and differential - are the key parameters.

The main issue is to define the appropriate ground motion intensity parameter that best

captures the response of each element, minimizes the dispersion of that response and is

related to the approach that is followed for the derivation of fragility curves. As a general

apposition, the empirical fragility curves relate the observed damages with the seismic

intensity and so PGA and PGVs are the more suitable parameters with lower uncertainties.

For linear lifeline systems like pipelines it has been proved that peak ground velocity is better

correlated to the observed damages, and thus the vulnerability assessment should be based

on ground velocity estimates. An alternative approach may be the use of ground strains

(longitudinal and transversal) or/and differential ground displacements, which are directly

correlated to the ground velocity. For other lifeline components it may be peak ground

acceleration (i.e. buildings, tanks, water treatment plant). Of course permanent ground

deformations are also a key parameter.

3.8.1 Water System Elements

The following is a comprehensive list of the different descriptors used for the components in

potable water system (Table 3-5).


38

Table 3-5 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment potable water system elements

Element at risk

Reference Intensity Measure

Comments

Wells

NIBS (2004)

SRMLIFE (2003-2007)

PGA

Complex components including several subcomponents. The overall performance of the component is based on the subcomponents. Fragility curves based on PGA are given for each subcomponent.

Water Treatment Plants

NIBS (2004)

SRMLIFE (2003-2007)

PGA


Pumping Stations

NIBS (2004)

SRMLIFE (2003-2007)

PGA


NIBS (2004) PGA Water Storage Tanks ALA (2001a,b)

PGA, PGD*

Barenberg (1988) PGV Empirical fragility curve

Eguchi (1991) MMI Mercalli Intensity

O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993)

PGV

Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation. Good correlation with damages (Alexoudi , 2005; Alexoudi et al., 2007; Pitilakis et al., 2005) for Düzce (Turkey), Lefkas island (Greece) earthquake.

Eidinger and Avila (1999)

PGV, PGD*

Empirical fragility curves for wave propagation and for permanent ground deformation.

Hwang and Lin (1997)

PGA Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation

Isoyama et al. (1998) PGV Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation

O’Rourke and Jeon (1999)

Vscaled Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation

ALA (2001a,b) PGA, PGD*

Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation and for permanent deformation

Porter et al. (1991) PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation

Honegger and Eguchi (1992)

PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation

Heubach (1995) PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation

Pipes

Terzi et al. (2006) PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation

PGD*: Permanent Ground Displacements


39

3.8.2 Waste-Water System Elements

The following is a comprehensive list of the different descriptors used for the components in

potable water system (Table 3-6).

Table 3-6 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment waste- water system elements

Element at risk Reference Intensity Measure

Comments

Waste-Water Treatment Plants

NIBS (2004)

SRMLIFE (2003-2007)

PGA


Lift Stations NIBS (2004)

SRMLIFE (2003-2007)

PGA


Tunnel (Interceptors)

as tunnels in Roads

Pipes (Sewer) as potable water pipes

3.9 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

In general, the performance measures used to assess the performance of water, waste-

water system can be defined by:

o Inventory Functions: physical characteristics, numbers of facilities.

o Engineering: structural integrity, deterioration.

o Operational Reliability: Connectivity/ Serviceability/ Operability/ Functionality.

o Direct/ Indirect consequences in economy (e.g Cost/Benefit Analysis, capital and

financial resources).

o Demand: e.g. pressure and flow (for water system).

o Safety and Security.

Water system and waste-water system are very complex systems comprised by several

individual components (e.g Water System å water source, water treatment plants, pipelines,

tunnels, canals, storage tanks, pumping stations and SCADA; Waste-Water System å

waste-water treatment plants, lift stations, pipelines and tunnels). The overall performance of

a system depends on the individual performance of its components. For that reason, some

specific performance measures can be defined for each component and for the whole

system.


40

3.9.1 Water System/ component performance indicators

ALA (2002) proposes some performance metrics for water system that are related to:

o Percent (%) served (in total or by sector) within a specific number of days with raw

water with adequate fire flow pressures, and/or

o Percent (%) served (in total or by sector) within a specific number of days with

fully treated water

These metrics could be measured alternatively in terms of number of service connections,

populations served, or volume of water served (i.e., cubic feet or gallons) for the whole water

system.

Each water component, according to ALA (2002), can have different importance with respect

to a set of performance objectives. Their importance can be accounted according to

Component Criticality Rating (CCR), that is:

LSR = Life Safety Rating (based on fraction of time occupied)

FFR = Fire Flow Rating (significance to fire fighting)

DWR = Drinking Water Rating (significance to drinking water supply)

DPR = Damage Potential Rating (potential for causing damage to adjacent facilities)

Essential to the evaluation of water system performance is a system vulnerability model. In

such a system vulnerability model, the basic issues to be addressed are if the final nodes

(service zones, service connections, fire hydrants) have (a) flows with adequate fire flow and

pressures or (b) potable water supply that meets stringent safe drinking water health

standards.

Simpler, water system performance indicators can be described by water flow [m3/h],

discharge / pressure [bar] / number of people supplied [people/km2 supplied] (or ratio of

zones [%]) / drinkability / ratio of critical facilities supplied [%].

In a case of water system components:

o Water source: water flow [m3/h] and drinkability, reserve [m3]

o Treatment plant: treatment capacity (qualitative and quantitative [m3/h])

o Pumping station: flow capacity [m3/h]

o Storage tanks: reserve [m3]

o Tunnels: water flow [m3/h],

o Pipes: water flow [m3/h], repair rates [repair per km]

o Canals: water flow [m3/h]

o SCADA

A summary of water component performance indicators is given in Table 3-7. Furthermore, a

summary of water system performance indicators is provided in Table 3-8.


41

Table 3-7 Summary of Water Component Performance Indicators (WCPIs).

A/A Approach Component Description Reference

1 Functionality analysis

Pipeline Certain critical pipelines serving critical facilities remain operational during and following an earthquake ALA (2005)

2 Acceptable damage rate evaluation

Pipeline An acceptable damage rate should be about 0.03 to 0.06 breaks per 1,000 feet of equivalent 6-inch diameter pipe, in order to confirm with the service restoration target.

ALA (2005)

3 Redundancy analysis

Pipeline Especially for transmission pipelines (Function Class II – pipes)

ALA (2005)

4 Operability Pipelines, Storage facilities, Pumping station

Estimation of the performance of pipelines after the comparison of the condition of existing pipeline with the ideal pipe with appropriate design and construction practice. Water storage facilities and pump structures needed to supply water pressure to rest network.

ASCE 7-02 provisions

5 Acceptable damage states

All components JWWA defines important facilities and for them defines the damage state that complies with the acceptable performance criterion

1997 JWWA Guidelines


42

Table 3-8 Summary of Water System Performance Indicators (WSPIs)

A/A Analysis Type Description Comments Reference

1a Connectivity

Examines:

- “Damage ratio”: the degree of physical damage to the system (defined as the expected number of failures per unit length or per link)

- “Service ratio: indicates the ratio of normally supplied houses to the total number in the system. This value increases as restoration proceeds

Propose a diagram between damage ratio (km) and Service ratio (%).

Application for the restoration process of water transmission system in the City of Tokyo

Kawakami (1990)

1b Connectivity

Uses:

Formal graph theoretic notions to define characteristic measures of the network, such as an importance ordering of the vertices, the characteristic path length and redundancy

Dueñas-Osorio et al. (2007a) examine the loss of connectivity of a water distribution system

Dueñas-Osorio et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2009)

1c Connectivity

Examines:

- The “Reachability” of water to certain key nodes

- The probability that a certain amount of water flow would reach key locations

Application for the water distribution system in the East of San Francisco.

Moghtaderi-Zadeh et al. (1982)

1d Connectivity

Estimate:

- Connectivity matrix

- Reachability matrix

For simplified evaluations, a graphical portrayal of the system is adequate.

ALA (2002)

2a Serviceability

Examines:

Probability distribution of the percentage of customers who would lose their service after an earthquake

Application for the water distribution system in Shelby County, TN

Adachi and Ellingwood (2008)


43

A/A Analysis Type Description Comments Reference

2b Serviceability

Evaluate:

Their particular systems ability to meet hydraulic requirements including existing and future water needs (i.e. fire flow, maximum day or MD and maximum hour or MH domestic needs, storage needs, etc) and to properly size future facilities

The water system operating conditions are defined below:

Pre-Natural Hazard Water System Condition

Post Natural Hazard Water System Condition

Water System Restoration

Water System Start Up Condition

ALA (2002)

3

Investment cost for upgraded

Examines:

- Life cycle cost minimum criterion (minimum expected costs on seismic investment)

- Cost benefit ratio criterion

- Positive value balance criterion.

Application for water supply lifeline network located in the metropolitan area of Japan

Imai and Koike (2010)

4 Performance level criterion

Accounts:

Restoration process after the physical damage of the network

Considers 90 % of customers restored within 3-days following an earthquake having a 10% chance of exceedance in 50-years

A typical water utility will be able to isolate most of the leaking and broken pipes within 1 day or so

Propose a diagram between equivalent damage ratio (km) and Percentage (%) of customers with water

ALA (2005)


45

3.9.2 Waste-Water System/ component performance indicators

For waste-water system, ALA (2004) propose as performance indicators, capacity measures

(e.g. flow of waste-water at selected points); measures of reliability (such as frequency and

magnitude of sanitary or combined sewer overflows (SSOs, CSOs), and the frequency and

magnitude of discharge of inadequately treated sewage, percentage treated, etc.); measures

of safety and health (similar to reliability examples as they impact water quality); and

financial measures. The Environmental Protection Agency National Pollution Discharge

Elimination System (EPA NPDES) permit requirements incorporate relevant performance

measures such as discharge volume and water quality. Potential metrics recommended for

the performance of waste-water system according to ALA (2004), are:

1) Public health/backup of raw sewage: This accounts for the probability of achieving

performance objective (e.g. – 90% probability of achieving), the probabilities of occurrence

(e.g. 50% in 50 years) and different criteria as a function of method of contact (backup into

buildings, overflow onto city streets).

2) Discharge of raw/inadequately treated sewage: Metrics commonly used quantify the

impact on public health and the environment (e.g. flow associated with biochemical oxygen

demand, dissolved oxygen of the receiving water).

3) Direct damage/financial impact: Direct damage to waste-water system components can

include cleanup and repair costs associated with flood inundation of a treatment plant or

repair cost of the collection system (pipelines, tunnels etc) while secondary damage

(economical cost) can be occurred to commercial or industrial facilities (e.g., factories shut

down) due to loss of waste-water service.

4) Security system performance: The performance objective is stated in terms of probability

of limiting raw sewage discharge when subjected to a design basis threat.

Moreover, performance indexes for waste-water system can account “Societal Factors”

(ALA, 2004):

o Fines and/or jail time - resulting from illegal discharges.

o Loss of public confidence – resulting from release of raw sewage, back-up of raw

sewage into households, or discharging partially treated sewage into the

receiving body.

o Political – resulting from peer pressure from other regional waste-water

organizations, or local politicians concerned about discharge of raw or partially

treated sewage in their area.

o Public health and safety – injury or death to utility staff or the public due to

exposure to raw or partially treated sewage, chemical release, or building

collapse

In addition, several other factors (economic factors) can describe waste-water performance

(ALA, 2004) such as:

o Substantial fines levied by regulating authorities.

o Direct loss - repair costs of facilities damaged in hazard events.

o Capital improvement plan – identify and prioritize projects to optimize a capital

improvement plan.


46

o Project design – define capacity, reliability or other parameters to optimize a new

project.

o Level of service (outage time) – define expected service outage times associated

with various events with associated probabilities of occurrence.

Simpler, waste-water system performance indicators can be described by waste-water flow [m3/h], discharge / number of people supplied / km2 treated (or ratio per zones [%]) / ratio of critical facilities supplied [%].


47

Table 3-9 Summary of Waste-Water Component Performance Indicators (PPIs).

A/A Approach Component Description Reference

1 Operability Collection* and treatment systems Achieving performance objective (% probability of achieving)

2 Functionality Collection and treatment systems Estimation of violation maximum duration e.g. 7 days, 30 days ALA (2005)

*The collection and conveyance system is the system of pipes that collects the sewage from the sources and conveys it to a central point for treatment and/or disposal.

Table 3-10 Summary of Waste-Water System Performance Indicators (WWSPIs) – ALA (2004)

Performance Objective Category 100-Year Return Event (40% in 50 years)

500-Year Return Event (10% in 50 years)

Reference

Public Health

Backup of any raw sewage into buildings Not acceptable (less than 1% probability of occurrence)

Not acceptable (less than 5% probability of occurrence)

Overflow of raw sewage into streets Acceptable in localized areas;

less than 24 hrs

Acceptable (treatment plant is inundated) less than 72 hrs

Environmental

Discharge of raw sewage to stormwater

system, ditch or stream

Acceptable in localized areas;

less than 72 hrs

Acceptable

less than 7 days

Discharge of raw sewage to lake or river Acceptable in accordance with

CSO/NPDES

Acceptable

less than 30 days

Discharge of raw sewage to salt water Acceptable in accordance with

CSO/NPDES

Acceptable

less than 90 days

Discharge of disinfected primary effluent Acceptable

less than 30 days

Acceptable

less than 180 days

Discharge of disinfected secondary effluent

(meet NPDES permit requirements Acceptable Acceptable

ALA (2004)


49

4 Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements

4.1 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WATER SYSTEM

Table 4-1 presents a brief review of existing fragility functions for water source, water

treatment plant, pumping station, storage tanks, pipes, tunnels, canals and conduits


51

Table 4-1 Review of existing fragility functions for potable water elements

* Anchored equipment in general refers to equipment designed with special seismic tiedowns or tiebacks, while unanchored equipment refers

to equipment designed with no special considerations other than the manufacturer's normal requirements.

Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor

Damage States and Index

Water Source

NIBS, 2004

HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.

Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.

Complex component.

A distinction is made according to:

- Subcomponents (anchored or unanchored)

Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)

Five damage states:

None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).

Index:

Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.


NIBS, 2004



Complex component.


- Subcomponents (anchored or unanchored)*

- Size (small, medium or large)


Five damage states:


Index:



SRM-LIFE 2003- 2007



Complex component.

- anchored subcomponents independently from the size


Five damage states:


Index:



52




Ballantyne et al., 2009

TCLEE 2009

There are no fragility curves given

Complex component.

Each of the WTP’s system components were evaluated using:

ASCE Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings (ASCE 31.03)

American Concrete Institute Code Requirements for Environmental Engineering Concrete Structures (ACI- 350- 06).

Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)

Three damage states:

Light, Moderate, Severe

According to:

Functionality and Restoration Cost (% of replacement cost)

Pumping Station

NIBS, 2004



Anchored or unanchored subcomponents


Five damage states:


Index:


Pumping Station

SRM-LIFE 2003- 2007

Empirical fragility functions.

Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions. Adapted to SRM-LIFE BTM (Kappos et al., 2006)

Anchored or unanchored subcomponents


Five damage states:


Index:



53



Pumping Station

Scawthorn, 1996

No fragility functions

Pumping station fault tree diagram.

There are no fragility curves given for subcomponents.

- Reliability index:

Low, Moderate, High

Storage tanks

NIBS, 2004



Above ground RC tanks Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)

None, Slight, Moderate, Extensive, Complete

Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and loss of context

Storage tanks

O’Rourke and So, 1999

Empirical fragility functions.

On-grade steel tanks

Height to diameter ratio, amount of stored content


Four damage states:

None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), extensive (ds3) and complete (ds4).

Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage in the roof and loss of context


54



Storage tanks

ALA, 2001a, b

Empirical fragility functions


- Anchorage

- Material (redwood, steel, post-tensioned circular concrete tank, R/C)

- Size (according to gallons)

- Seismic design (no, nominal)

- Roof (integral shell roof, wood roof, over open cut reservoir)

Types:

- Unanchored redwood tank (50,000 - 500,000 gall)

- Unanchored post-tensioned circular concrete tank (1,000,000+ gallons)

- Unanchored steel tank with integral shell roof (100,000 - 2,000,000 gallons)

- Unanchored steel tank with wood roof (100,000 - 2,000,000 gallons)

- Anchored steel tank with integral steel roof (100,000 - 2,000,000 gallons)

- Unanchored steel tank with integral steel roof (2,000,000+ gallons)

- Anchored steel tank with wood roof (2,000,000+ gallons)

- Anchored reinforced (or prestressed) concrete tank (50,000 - 1,000,000 gallons)

- Elevated steel tank with no seismic design

- Elevated steel tank with nominal seismic design

- Roof over open cut reservoir

Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) &

Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)

Four damage states according to:

- Roof damage

- Anchor bolts

damage

- Overflow pipe

damage

- Elephant foot buckle

- Inlet pipe leak

- Wall uplift

- Elephant foot buckle

- Hoop Overstress


55



Katayama et al., 1975

Empirical relation

log(R.R/km)= A+6,39*log(PGA)

According to the soil conditions and pipeline age

(A- coefficient)

Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (g)

Repair rate per km

Eguchi, 1983

Empirical numbers

Y= 1.5 ( Asbestos Cement (AC)

Y= 1.0 (Cast- iron (CI)

Y= 0.8 ( Welded steel with Caulked joints (WSCJ)

Y= 0.7 ( Welded steel with Gas- welded joints

(WSGWJ)

Y= 0.1 ( Welded steel with Arc-welded joints (WSAWJ)

According to material - Y: break/ 1000 feet

ATC-13,1985

- Buried pipelines - None, Slight, Light, Moderate, Heavy, Major, Destroyed

(based on RR/km)

Isoyama and Katayama, 1982

Empirical relation (RR/km)= 1.698*10-16*PGA6.06

For Cast iron pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)

Repair rate per km

Pipe

Memphis, Tennessee, 1985

Empirical relation

ÕÖÔÄ

ÅÃ /

?くMMIg

gCdCn 10

According to soil conditions and diameter

』mm: Mercalli Intensity

N: Repair rate per km


56



Wang et al., 1991

Empirical relation

Poor soil conditions:

Log Y= 1.837*(I) -14.065

Average soil conditions:

Log Y=1.717*(I)-14.221

Good soil conditions:

Log Y=1.522*(I)-14.045

According to soil conditions 』mm: MSK intensity

Y: Breaks/ km

O’ Rourke and Ayala, 1993

Empirical relation RR/km=

K*(0.0001*PGV2.25)

According to pipe material (flexible, rigid)

Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (cm/sec)

Repair rate per km

Eidinger et al., 1995; Eidinger, 1998

Empirical relation (RR/km)

0.0012*PGV0.7677

0.0006*PGV1.5542

6*10-5 * PGV2.2949

According to pipe material (asbestos-cement, cast –iron, steel)


Repair rate per km

Isoyama, 1998

Empirical relation

RR/km =

Cp*Cd*3.11*10-3* (PGV-15)1.3

According to pipe material and diameter


Repair rate per km

O’Rourke et al., 1998

Empirical relation

RR/km =

101.25log10(PGA-0.63)

Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (cm/sec2)

Repair rate per km

O’Rourke and Leon, 1999

Empirical relation

RR/km =

0.050*(vscaled)0.865 ,

vscaled = PGV/ Do1.138

According to diameter Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (cm/sec)

Repair rate per km


57



Eidinger and Avila, 1999

Empirical relation

RR/km =

K1*1.512*(PGV1.98)

According to pipe material, diameter, joint type and soil

Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (m/sec)

Repair rate per km

Isoyama et al., 2000

Empirical relation

R.R(ゅ) = 2.88*10-6*(PGA-100)1.97

R.R(ゅ) = 3.11*10-3*(PGV-15)1.3

For Cast – iron pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (cm/sec2)

Repair rate per km

]LA, 2001 Empirical relation

R.R/km =K1* 0.241*PGV

According to pipe material Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (m/sec)

Repair rate per km

Toprak, 1998

Empirical relation

Log(RR)=1.36*log(PGA)-0.61

For all buried pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)

Repair rate per km

Hung, 2001 Empirical relation

RR/km=26.58*PGA4.29

For all buried pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (cm/sec2)

Repair rate per km

O’Rourke and Deyoe, 2004

Empirical relation

(rigid pipes)

R.R./km =k1*513* i0.89

(wave propagation)

R.R./km =k1*724* i0.89

(wave propagation & permanent deformation)

Buried pipelines

Brittle pipes, R or S waves

Peak Ground Velocity (PGV), strain

Repair rate per km

Pipe

Porter et al., 1991

Empirical relation

According to pipe material Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) (inches)


58



Honegger and Eguchi, 1992

Empirical relation

R.R/km =【*(7.821*PGD0.56)

According to pipe material Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)

Repair rate per km

Heubach,

1995

Empirical relation

100*[1-exp[(0.283*PGD)1.33]]

100*[1-exp[(0.899*PGD)1.11]]

100*[1-exp[(0.578*PGD)1.55]]

100*[1-exp[(1.120*PGD)1.69]]

100*[1-exp[(0.743*PGD)0.71]]

100*[1-exp[-(1.120*PGD)0.761]]

100*[1-exp[-(0.644*PGD)1.37]]

100*[1-exp[-(1.530*PGD)1.62]]

100*[1-exp[-(0.961*PGD)1.64]]

100*[1-exp[-(1.830*PGD)1.83]]

According to pipe material and joint type

Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) (m)

Repair rate per km

Eidinger et al.,1999

Empirical relation

R.R./km =K2*23.674*(PGD)0.53



Repair rate per km

]LA, 2001a,b Empirical relation

R.R./km = K2*11.223*PGD0.319



Repair rate per km

Pipe

Yeh et al., 2006

Empirical relation

RR = 1.028ゅ10-3* PGA0.9735 (R2= 0.9388)

Ji – Ji earthquake Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)

Repair rate per km


59



Ballantyne and Heubach, 1996

Empirical figure

According to material (welded steel, old steel and cast iron, locked converse, asbestos cement, cast iron post 1955)

Permanent Ground Displacement (PGD)

Five Vulnerability Class (High, Moderate- High, Moderate, Low- Moderate, Low) according to Damage Rate

Tunnel As in Roadline System

Canal ALA, 2001a,b

Empirical Minor damage:

0.1 repairs/ km

(PGV = 20 - 35 inches/sec)

0.01 repairs/ km

(PGV = 5 - 15 inches/sec)

0 below PGV < 5 inches/sec

Moderate damage: for PGD= 1-5 inches

Major damage: for PGDs > 6 inches

Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) and Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)

Four Vulnerability Class (No, Minor, Moderate, Major)

Index: according to hydraulic performance of a canal


61

4.2 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM

Table 4-2 presents a brief review of existing fragility functions for waste landfill, waste-water treatment plant, lift station, pipes, tunnels and

conduits

Table 4-2 Review of existing fragility functions for waste-water system elements

Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor Damage States and

Index

Solid Waste Landfill

Matasovic et al., 1998

According to the real damage observations

- - Five damage categories:

V: Major damage, IV: Significant damage, III: Moderate damage, II: Minor damage, I: Little or No damage

Index: According to restoration process (need time to repair)

Waste- water Treatment Plant

NIBS, 2004 HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.


Complex component.


- Subcomponents

(anchored or unanchored)*

- Size

(small, medium or large)


Five damage states:


Index:



62

Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor Damage States and

Index

Waste- water Treatment Plant

SRM-LIFE, 2003- 2007

SRM-LIFE based on HAZUS empirical fragility functions.


Complex component with

anchored subcomponents independently from the size but according to the building type


Five damage states:


Index:


Conduits Mataki et al., 1996

Design Code

Compression strain:

ic = 35*te/ Dm (%)

Tensile strain: it = 3%

According to “Earthquake Resistant Design code for Gas Pipeline (High-Pressure)” and

“Earthquake Resistant Design Code for Gas Pipeline (Medium & Low Pressure)

Strain

Lift Station As in potable water system

Pipes As in potable water system

Tunnel / As in roadline system

Buildings

See Task 3.1

See also Task 3.2


63

4.3 VALIDATION / ADAPTATION / IMPROVEMENT

Recent destructive earthquakes (Kocaeli, Ms=7.8, 17-08-1999 & Düzce, Ms= 7.3, 12-11-

1999 in Turkey and Lefkas, Ms=6.4, 14/8/2003 in Greece) provoked important damages to

lifelines due to ground shaking or/and permanent ground deformations.

Fig. 4-1 Location of Düzce and Lefkas island

Few hundreds of damages to buried pipelines of the water supply systems and waste-water

network were reported in Düzce while in Lefkas (Fig. 4-1) the reported damages were much

lower but equally important. The aim of this section is to compare the estimated damages

with the observed and reported ones in the two cities, in order to validate existing fragility

curves. This comparative study is one of the first well-documented cases in the whole

Mediterranean region, where we have an important lack of data regarding lifeline damages

during earthquakes. The methodology applied is based on a detailed inventory of the

observed damages and a site-specific ground response analysis to simulate the spatial

variability of ground motions during the two severe earthquakes occurred in Düzce and

Lefkas.

Several studies were performed in Düzce (Alexoudi, 2005; Pitilakis et al., 2005; Alexoudi et

al., 2007, 2008, 2010) for water and waste-water system aiming to record the observed

damages and to compare with the computed ones obtained when several commonly used

fragility curves are applied.


64

4.3.1 Validation of vulnerability models for pipes

4.3.1.1 Düzce

Düzce is situated between Ankara and Istanbul and is located nearby the North Anatolian

Fault (NAF) and next to Düzce fault that is small branch of NAF. Two major earthquakes

Kocaeli (17/8/1999, 40.702 N, 29.987 E, Mw= 7.4) and Düzce (12/11/1999, 31.15E, 40.77N,

Mw= 7.2, h=10km) earthquakes occurred in the area provoking important damages in

Düzce.

DÜZCE POTABLE WATER SYSTEM

The water supply system in Düzce dates back to 1940’s. The pre-existing network is thought

to be about 500 km in length, although no maps exist to confirm this (Tadday and Sahin,

2001). This old network was still in use at the time of Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. The

new network is connected to the old one with a series of bypasses. The old network is

mainly CI (cast iron), with some AC (Asbestos cement) pipes. The whole distribution network

is therefore made up of pipes normally classified as brittle. A 600mm diameter AC pipe

conveys raw water from the main source, the River Ugur, to the water treatment plant which

lies to the south of the town. A 1m diameter steel pipe then carries the treated water to the

distribution network, joining the town in the Azmimilli District. Twin CI pipes, of diameter

125mm, transport water from a well-field and reservoir to supplement the main river water

supply; these pipes join the town in the north-east. The digitized network is a mixed system

as is comprised by some old water branches and the new network. The total length is 298km

and the average depth of the water pipes of Düzce water system is 1.50m.

A site-response study was conducted for the city of Düzce using as input the deconvoluted

time history of the 17/8/1999 Kocaeli and 12/11/1999 Düzce main-shock that was recorded

in the Meteorological Station. The geotechnical map for Düzce derived from the existing

geological and geotechnical data, numerous very shallow, 10-20m, boreholes and few (10)

well documented deep (40-100m) boreholes which were collected in the framework of a

research project (SRM-DGC, 2006-2008). Bedrock’s depth (B120m) was defined using both

geological and seismic data (compilation of a large number of aftershocks at the

Meteorological Station and estimation of the H/V spectral ratio). The above result was also

validated with data from topographic maps of the area as well as microtremor measurements

(Kudo et al., 2000; Rosenblad et al., 2001). Using the aforementioned geotechnical and

geological data, numerous 2D cross-sections were constructed along the city of Düzce.

Based on the 2D cross-sections, approximately thirty typical soil profiles were proposed in

specific sites along the city in order to perform a set of 1D equivalent linear analysis. The

spatial distribution of the computed mean values of the peak ground acceleration and peak

ground velocities combined with the digitized water system is presented in Fig. 4-2 for both

Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes respectively.


65

a(1) a(2)

b(1) b(2)

Fig. 4-2 Düzce. Analyzed method: 1D linear equivalent, Local Soil Condition: Based on Soil Profiles, a) Earthquake: Kocaeli, 1999, PGA (g) [a(1)], PGV (m/sec) [a(2)], b)

Earthquake: Düzce, 1999, PGA (g) [b(1)], PGV (m/sec) [b(2)]

In order to validate the available fragility curves for water pipes, different vulnerability

functions were selected in order to compare the estimated damages in Düzce (Turkey) water

pipeline network with the observed ones after Düzce and Kocaeli earthquakes. Table 4-3

gives the computed water pipe failures due to ground shaking for four different fragility

expressions and the two input motion for the digitized network of 298.81km.

For 2 months after Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes, about 298 and 238 potable water pipe

failures respectively were recording by Tromans (2004) in a water network of 433.60km in 29

mahallas. After the available transforming of the two lengths (298.81/433.60) in order to

compare the results, the recorded water pipe damages are 200 and 164 for Kocaeli and


66

Düzce earthquake respectively. The average monthly repairs before the earthquakes were

95 and the real water losses were calculated to 80% of the initial supply.

Table 4-3 Computed water pipe failures in the water network of Düzce due to ground shaking for different fragility expressions, and input motions (Alexoudi et al., 2010)

Fragility curves/ Earthquake DÜZCE KOCAELI

O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) 147 116

Isoyama et al. (1998) 80 66

Eidinger and Avila (1999) 104 84

]LA (2001) 28 25

Recorded 164 200

Comparing the computed (Table 4-3) and the recorded damages, after excluding the

average pre-earthquake monthly repairs, it derives that the O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993)

relation describes better the real event given the inherent uncertainties in the pipes individual

characteristics and the recorded damages from Kocaeli earthquake. ALA (2001) fragility

curve, underestimates the failures induced by wave propagation compared with other

relations, while the failures that Eidinger and Avila (1999) predicts is 20 - 30 % lower

compared to the recorded ones from the two earthquakes. The estimated failures by

Isoyama et al. (1998) relation, are about the half of the ones that are obtained when the O’

Rourke and Ayala (1993) relation is applied. It is noticed that the recorded failures from

Kocaeli earthquake is unjustified larger compared with the ones from Düzce earthquake,

although the parameters of input motion and Aries Intensity connected with Düzce

earthquake is 2 times larger than the Kocaeli earthquake. Also, Düzce earthquake had larger

duration compared with Kocaeli earthquake.

Moreover, for Eidinger and Avila (1999) and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) fragility relations, a

spatial distribution of the computed damages in each mahalla is presented in Fig. 4-3 and

Fig. 4-4 for the two earthquakes. Analyzing the results, it is shown that the spatial distribution

of damages of the O’Rourke and Ayala relation is generally well correlated with the Tromans

(2004) and Alexoudi (2005) recorded data (Fig. 4-5).


67

a)

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,100 2,200 3,300 4,400550km

pipe_failure

REHAZKOC

Low

Moderate

High

¯

b)

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,100 2,200 3,300 4,400550km

pipe_failure

REEIDKOC

Low

Moderate

High

¯

Fig. 4-3 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Kocaeli earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999) (b) relationships. The points represent the well documented damages shown earlier.

Earthquake: Kocaeli 1999, Microzonation study (Alexoudi et al. , 2007)

a)

[

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km

Legend

waterfailure

REHAZDUZ

Low

Moderate

High

¯

b)

[

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km

Legend

waterfailure

REEIDDUZ

Low

Moderate

High

¯

Fig. 4-4 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Düzce earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999) (b)

relationships. The failures collected are illustrated with points. For each mahalla, ID is corresponded. Earthquake: Düzce 1999, Microzonation study. (Alexoudi et al., 2007)


68

a)

[

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km

Legend

waterfailure

REPRESEISM

Low

Moderate

High

¯

b)

[

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km

Legend

waterfailure

REKOCAEL

Low

Moderate

High

¯

c)

[

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km

Legend

waterfailure

REDUZCE

Low

Moderate

High

¯

d)

[

1

8

3

6

2

7

5

4

17

14

15

28 29

1916

9

10

26

12

23

18

1311

22

25

20

2427

21

0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km

Legend

waterfailure

REEBRU

Low

Moderate

High

¯

Fig. 4-5 Mahallas that presents low, moderate and extensive failures (a) before the two earthquakes, (b) after Kocaeli earthquake, (c) after Düzce earthquake (d) present

research as result of both earthquakes. Points illustrate the failures collected while the ID corresponds to each mahalla.

DÜZCE WASTE-WATER SYSTEM

The waste-water supply system in Düzce is a gravity network that dates back to the 1940’s

although several parts of the system are dating back to the early 1900’s. The pre-existing

network is estimated to be about 300 km in length, although no maps exist to confirm this.

Both old and new networks were in use at the time of Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. The

parts of the network that was digitized consist of 50.60km pipes-conduits with circular shape

while the rest (3.44km) has different shapes (rectangular, oval, and orthogonal. The material


69

of waste-water pipes is concrete and the distribution of their diameters is illustrated in Fig.

4-6. Information about the dimension, the shapes and the material for the rest network is not

available. Taking into account the 93% of the material type of waste-water pipes, whole

network can be characterized as a brittle network (Alexoudi, 2005).

0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00 20,00

Length (km)

200mm

400mm

800mm

1000mm

4000mm

Dia

met

er (

mm

)

Waste-Water pipes/ tunnel (diameter)

4000mm

1200mm

1000mm

900mm

800mm

600mm

400mm

300mm

200mm

Fig. 4-6 Digitized Waste- Water network (left) in Düzce and distribution of waste-water pipe/ conduits

diameters (up)

Applying, O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) fragility function we estimate a total number of 52

damages (10 breaks, 42 leaks) and 44 damages (9 breaks, 35 leaks) as a result of ground

shaking for Düzce and Kocaeli earthquake respectively (Fig. 4-7).

a)86%

10%

4%

Break

Leak

No- damage

b) 84%

11%

5%

Break

Leak

No- damage

Fig. 4-7 Estimated damages of waste-water network as percentage of the total length of the network for Kocaeli (a) and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008)

The spatial distribution of the damages of waste-water network as result of Düzce and

Kocaeli earthquake is illustrated in Fig. 4-8.

Tromans (2004) database for water pipes was used for the validation of the estimated

damages of waste-water system resulted from the conducted vulnerability assessment of

Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. It is assumed that the failures of water system of Düzce are

quite similar to the damages of waste-water system, an estimation that is made by the


70

Waste - Water Company of Düzce, although, some individual characteristics of the two

networks can enlarge the different seismic response of the two networks. In particular, the

material, the oldness of the network and the construction practice can alter greatly the

response of a pipe.

a) b)

Fig. 4-8 Spatial distribution of waste-water pipe damages in Düzce network for Kocaeli (a) and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008)

A comparison between the recorded water pipe damages derived from Tromans (2004)

database and the estimated damages of waste-water system as result of Kocaeli earthquake

are illustrated in Fig. 4-9 a,b. It can be noticed that the expected damages from the two

earthquakes are located in the southern part of the city in almost the same mahallas that

important damages in potable water system were observed and high PGV values were

calculated. For the Düzce earthquake the corresponding damages (Fig. 4-9 c,d) have some

minor differences, mainly due to the limited time for recovery between the two earthquakes.

Moreover, the damages in waste-water system are very hard to recognize as they are not

related with the reduction of pressure or even flow and there were no available records

before and after the earthquakes.


71

a) b)

c) d)

Fig. 4-9 Estimated waste-water pipe damages per mahalla for Kocaeli earthquake (a), for Düzce earthquake (c) and recorded water pipe damages per mahalla after Kocaeli

earthquake (b) and Düzce earthquake (d) - (Alexoudi et al., 2008)

4.3.1.2 LEFKAS

LEFKAS POTABLE WATER SYSTEM

Lefkas water supply system was constructed in 1978 for daily design consumption of

5400m3. It was designed to provide water for drinking and fire protection. Nowadays, in

winter time, it serves about 9.000 people (old city and new parts of the city) and more than

12.000 people in touristic period (May-October). 29.114 km of pipes are in the old city and

more than 20 km in the new city. The main water source is river Louros at the main land, but

in touristic period the city uses also ground water supply from 2 shallow wells (150m3/ day/

well). Moreover, an R/C tank with a capacity of 1000m3 serves distribution network, as an

external reservoir in order to cover the increased summer daily demands. Lefkas potable

water distribution network is composed by 86% PVC pipes (internal pressure: 10atm) with

special couplings in the joints and about 14% asbestos-cement pipes (older than 1978). The


72

system was in very good condition with a very small number of pre-earthquake reported

leaks.

After the August 2003 seismic event (14/08/2003, Ms=6.4) the main water network of the city

of Lefkas suffered 10 failures in water mains (old city), 5 in the marina area and more than

80 damages in service connections in both parts of the city. The location of the failures is

illustrated in Fig. 4-10.

Fig. 4-10 Water distribution network of old city of Lefkas and the location of main water system failures and secondary connections (p-primary network, sec-secondary

network-connections with customers.

In general, the damages observed along the coastline (3 damages- 1 double damage) and in

“Gyra” (3 damages), resulted from permanent ground deformation due to soil liquefaction.

The rest 4 damages can be attributed to wave propagation and material failures. The failure

modes that were observed for PVC and asbestos cement pipes in Lefkas earthquake were

direct failures of the pipe body and a slip-out of joints. The failures in Marina and in coastline

are attributed to the large vertical and horizontal displacements due to liquefaction.

The basic geotechnical-geological formations in the city of Lefkas are constituted from recent

deposits (present at depths varying from 10.6 to 16.0m) overlying to a stiff to hard marl layer

extended to the bedrock surface. Top deposits include an upper layer of soft to medium

cohesive soils (shear wave velocities Vs=180-250m/sec2) with locally situated layers of loose

saturated sandy-silty soils, quite susceptible to liquefaction, mostly present at the coastal

parts of the examined region, underlying a layer of debris 1.0-5.7m deep. The lower layer of

the deposits, are medium clays and silts in the central part of the city, while in the coastal

region medium to dense layers of silty sands prevail. The soil classification and simplified

geotechnical characterization of the area was based on several cross sections along with the

information from laboratory and in-situ tests (mostly NSPT). Shear wave velocities were

estimated using both existing cross-hole data and empirical correlations with NSPT, which

seemed to be in reasonable agreement with the available cross-hole data.

The geotechnical information is based on 17 geotechnical boreholes with SPT and in few

cases with cross-hole Vs measurements. The dynamic properties (G-け-D curves) are rather

well known from RC tests. The available record of the main shock (PGA-0.45g) is recorded


73

in a site where the soil profile of 60m is very well known with all the necessary data. This

was particularly important to conduct the deconvolution analyses. In order to account for the

effect of liquefaction phenomena on the ground motion characteristics, several elastoplastic

analyses (using the 1D-Cyclic program, 2001) were performed for selected profiles along the

coastal part of the city and the marina area, where liquefaction induced phenomena were

observed after the earthquake. The latter were conducted using the same input motions with

the equivalent linear elastic analyses for wave propagation. The recorded PGV is

39.6cm/sec (EW component) while the computed PGV values vary from 30cm/sec to

46.60cm/sec.

The estimated number of repairs based on different fragility curves is presented in Table 4-4

both for wave propagation and permanent ground deformation. A comparison between the

number of repairs, the repair rate/km and the observed damages for the potable water

network of Lefkas is given in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 (Alexoudi, 2005; Pitilakis et al., 2005).

Table 4-4 Estimated number of repairs for Lefkas earthquake using different fragility curves

Vulnerability relations

Wave propagation PGVew=30-46.60cm/sec

Permanent deformation PGD= 1.0- 40.42cm

Combination

RR/kmPGV RR/kmPGD RR/kmPGVPGD O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) &

Honegger and Eguchi (1992)

(NIBS, 2004)

RR/km=

0.137

4 repairs

(3 leaks,

1 break) RR/km=

0.137

4 repairs

(1 leak,

3 breaks) RR/km=

0.206

6 repairs

(2 leaks,

4 breaks)

Eidinger and Avila (1999)

RR/km=

0.103

3 repairs

(2 leaks,

1 break)

RR/km=

0.893

26 repairs

(5 leaks,

21 breaks)

RR/km=

0.859

25 repairs (3 leaks,

22 breaks)

ALA (2001) RR/km=0.034

1 repairs

(1 leaks,

0 break) RR/km=0.756

22 repairs

(4 leaks,

18 breaks)

RR/km=

0.721

21 repairs (3 leaks,

18 breaks)

Isoyama et al. (1998) RR/km=

0.103

3 repairs

(2 leaks,

1 break)

Heubach (1995)

RR/km=0.309

9 repairs

(2 leaks,

7 breaks)


74

Table 4-5 Comparison of Repair Rate/km (wave propagation) with the recorded damages of water network of Lefkas

RR/ km O’ Rourke and Ayala

(1993)

Eidinger and

Avila (1999)

Isoyama (1998)

]LA (2001a.b)

Recorded damages

RRPGV/km 0.137 0.103 0.103 0.034 0.137

Table 4-6 Comparison of the number of failures (wave propagation) for water system of Lefkas

Vulnerability relations No. of failures Recorded damages

O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) 4

Eidinger and Avila (1999) 3

Isoyama et al. (1998) 3

]LA (2001) 1

4

Applying O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) fragility relation four damages were estimated for

water system in Lefkas for the seismic scenario of 2003 Lefkas earthquake. ALA (2001)

underestimates the damages for wave propagation as it predicts only one. For the case of

permanent deformation, Honegger and Eguchi (1992) relation estimates 4 damages, while

ALA (2001) 22 damages. In general, NIBS (2004) gives very close to the observed failures

comparing to ALA (2001) which overestimates the damages for permanent ground

deformation. The spatial distribution of estimated damages (lines with red- breaks, with

orange- leaks) of potable water system via the recorded ones (points) is given for 4 different

fragility curves in Fig. 4-11 to Fig. 4-14 (for the case of wave propagation).


75

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Legend

waterfsecond

! waterfailures

Waterpipes(PGVHAZREP)

break

leak

full-function

PGV_EW (cm/sec)

High : 46.60cm/sec

Medium : 38.30cm/sec

Low : 30.00cm/sec

260 0 260130 m

Fig. 4-11 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: O’ Rourke and Ayala, 1993, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Legend

waterfsecond

! waterfailures

Waterpipes(PGVEIDREP)

break

leak

full-function

PGV_EW (cm/sec)

High : 46.60cm/sec


Low : 30.00cm/sec

260 0 260130 m

Fig. 4-12 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Eidinger and Avila, 1999, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)


76

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Legend

waterfsecond

! waterfailures

Waterpipes(PGVISOY)

break

leak

full-function

PGV_EW (cm/sec)

High : 46.60cm/sec


Low : 30.00cm/sec

260 0 260130 m

Fig. 4-13 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Isoyama et al., 1998, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)

!!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

Legend

waterfsecond

! waterfailures

Waterpipes(PGVALA)

leak

full-function

PGV_EW (cm/sec)

High : 46.60cm/sec


Low : 30.00cm/sec

260 0 260130 m

Fig. 4-14 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: ]LA, 2001, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)


77

4.4 FINAL PROPOSAL

4.4.1 WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

4.4.1.1 Water Source

Wells are complex components that include several subcomponents. HAZUS (NIBS, 2004)

gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents. Although, there are

no specific guidelines in Europe, all subcomponent are anchored. In order to account the

uncertainty in their final response, a semi- anchorage of subcomponents can be defined.

The description of damage states for water source is provided in Table 4-7 while the

corresponding fragility curves due to peak ground acceleration are given in Table 4-8.

Table 4-7 Description of damage states for water source subject to ground shaking

Damage state

Description Restoration cost

(%) Serviceability

Minor

Malfunction of well pump and motor for a short time (less than three days) due

to loss of electric power and backup power if any, or light

damage to buildings

10-30 Normal flow and water pressure

Operational after limited

repairs

Moderate

Malfunction of well pump and motor for about a week due to loss of electric power

and backup power if any, considerable damage to

mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate

damage to buildings

30-50 Operational after repairs

Extensive

The building being extensively damaged or the well pump and vertical shaft

being badly distorted and non-functional

50-75

Reduce flow and water pressure

Partially operational

after extensive repairs

Complete Building collapsing

75-100 Not water available

Not repairable


78

Table 4-8 Parameters of fragility curves for water source (wells)


Description Damage state

Median (g) く

(log-standard deviation)

Minor 0.16 0.70

Moderate 0.18 0.65

Extensive 0.30 0.65

Anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic

code design) Complete 0.40 0.75

Minor 0.25 0.55

Moderate 0.45 0.50

Extensive 0.85 0.55

Anchored components (low

height R/C building with advanced seismic code

design) Complete

2.10 0.70

Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with low seismic code design

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

bab

ilit

y D

s> d

s /

PG

A]

Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages

Fig. 4-15 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking


79

Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with advange seismic code design

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

bab

ility

Ds>

ds

/ PG

A]


Fig. 4-16 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking

Table 4-9 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Wells with Anchored Components (SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007)

Peak Ground Acceleration

Subcomponents Damage

State Median

(g)

Electric Power (Backup) minor

moderate

0.50

0.70

0.60

0.80

Loss of commercial Power minor

moderate

0.15

0.30

0.40

0.40

Well Pump extensive 1.00 0.60

Electric Equipment moderate 0.80 0.60

Building (low-rise R/C building with low seismic

code design)

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.18

0.23

0.30

0.41

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73

Building (low height R/C building with advanced seismic code design)

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.28

0.72

1.66

2.17

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73


80

Comment: For the buildings sub-component, the typology and fragility curves proposed in

SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used. The upgrade of fragility curves will be made after the

finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe” and the

proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.

4.4.1.2 Water Treatment Plant

Water Treatment Plants are complex components that include several subcomponents.

HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents

for different sizes of Water Treatment Plants. There are no specific guidelines in the

anchorage of the subcomponents in Europe for Water Treatment Plants. In order to account

for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the different European practices used

for Water Treatment Plants of different sizes and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents,

only one fragility curve for Water Treatment Plant is proposed independently of the size. It is

also assumed that there is no back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case

scenario). The description of damage states for Water Treatment Plant is provided in Table

4-10 while the corresponding fragility curves are given in Table 4-11.

Table 4-10 Description of damage states for Water Treatment Plant subjected to ground shaking

Damage state

Description Restoration

cost (%) Serviceability

Minor

Malfunction of plant for a short time (<3 days) due to loss of electric power,

considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to

sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality

may occur.



repairs

Moderate

Malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup

power if any, extensive damage to various equipments, considerable damage to sedimentation basins,

considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or

considerable damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality is imminent


Extensive

The pipes connecting the different basins and chemical units being extensively

damaged. This type of damage will likely result in the shutdown of the plant.

50-75



after extensive

repairs

Complete The complete failure of all pipings or extensive damage to the filter gallery

75-100 Not water available

Not repairable


81

Table 4-11 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant


Description Damage state Median (g)

く


Minor 0.15 0.30

Moderate 0.30 0.25

Extensive 0.55 0.60

Water Treatment Plants with anchored

components Complete 0.90 0.55

Table 4-12 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored Components


Subcomponents Damage State Median (g)


moderate

0.15

0.30

0.40

0.40

Chlorination

Equipment

minor

moderate

0.50

0.85

0.60

0.70

Sediment Flocculation minor

moderate

0.36

0.60

0.50

0.50

Chemical

Tanks

minor

moderate

0.35

0.55

0.70

0.70

Electric Equipment moderate 0.80 0.60

Elevated Pipe extensive

complete

0.53

1.00

0.60

0.60

Filter Gallery complete 2.00 1.00


82

Water Treatment Plant (anchored components, without back-up power)

0,000

0,200

0,400

0,600

0,800

1,000

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

bab

ilit

y D

s> d

s /

PG

A]


Fig. 4-17 Fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to ground shaking

4.4.1.3 Pumping Station

Pumping Stations are complex components that include several subcomponents. HAZUS

(NIBS, 2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents for

different sizes of Pumping Stations. There are no specific guidelines in the anchorage of the

subcomponents in Europe for pumping stations. In order to account for the uncertainty in

their final response as a result of the different European practices used for Pumping Stations

of different sizes and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for

Pumping Stations is proposed independently of the size for different building categories. It is

also assumed that there is no back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case

scenario).The description of damage states for pumping station is provided in Table 4-13

while the corresponding fragility curves are given in Table 4-14.


83

Table 4-13 Description of damage states for Pumping Station subjected to ground shaking

Damage state


(%) Serviceability

Minor

Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to

loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings



repairs

Moderate

The loss of electric power for about a week,

considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate

damage to buildings.


Extensive

The building being extensively damaged or the

pumps being badly damaged beyond repair

50-75




Complete The building collapsing. 75-100 Not water available

Not repairable

Table 4-14 Parameters of fragility curves for pumping station



Median (g) く


Minor 0.10 0.55

Moderate 0.15 0.55

Extensive 0.30 0.70



Minor 0.15 0.30

Moderate 0.30 0.35

Extensive 1.1 0.55

Anchored components (low- rise R/C building with advanced seismic code

design) Complete 2.1 0.70


84

Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code

design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Fig. 4-18 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking


85

Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic

code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Fig. 4-19 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low -rise R/C building with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking

Table 4-15 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored Components




moderate

0.15

0.30

0.40

0.40

Electric and Mechanical Equipment

moderate 0.80 0.60

Vertical/ Horizontal Pump* extensive 1.25/1.60 0.60

Low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.18

0.23

0.30

0.41

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73

Low height R/C building with advanced seismic

code design

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.28

0.72

1.66

2.17

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73


86

Comment: For the buildings sub-components, the typology and fragility curves proposed in

SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used (Kappos et al., 2006). The upgrade of fragility curves will

be made after the finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in

Europe” and the proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.

4.4.1.4 Storage tanks

Different fragility curves are illustrated (Table 4-16 - Table 4-19) by ALA (2001a,b) and

HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) for wave propagation (PGA) and for permanent ground deformation

(PGD)- (Table 4-20, Table 4-21). In Europe, the more common typology is R/C tanks without

anchorage.

Table 4-16 Fragility curves for anchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA (2001a,b)

Failure Type Serviceability Median PGA (g)

Uplift of wall– Crush concrete

1.30 0.50

Cracking or shearing of tank

wall 1.60 0.50

Sliding

No operational

1.10 0.50

Hoop overstress Operational 4.10 0.50

Table 4-17 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA (2001a,b)

Failure Type Serviceability Median PGA

(g)

Cracking or shearing of tank wall

Loss of context

No operational 1.05 0.45

Roof damage No loss of

context 2.60 0.45

Uplift of wall– Crush concrete

Small leak 2.00 0.45

Sliding Small leak

Operational

0.25 0.45

Loss of context

No operational 0.75 0.45 Hoop overstress

Small leak Operational 0.45 0.45


87

Table 4-18 Fragility curves for Open reservoirs with or without seismic design code (wave propagation) ALA (2001a,b)

Failure Type Serviceability Median PGA (g)

Extensive 1.00 0.55 Roof damage Minor

Operational 0.60 0.55

Table 4-19 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (permanent deformations)- ALA (2001a,b)

Typology Serviceability Median PGD (m)

Anchored R/C

Un-anchored 0.06 0.50

At columns 0.06 Steel

At grade

No operational

0.09 0.50

Wooden No operational 0.09 0.50

Without roof Operational 0.20 0.50

Table 4-20 Fragility curves for at-grade R/C tanks (wave propagation)- (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004)

Typology Damage states Median PGA (g)

Anchored at-grade R/C tank

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.25

0.52

0.95

1.64

0.55

0.70

0.60

0.70

Unanchored

at-grade R/C tank

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.18

0.42

0.70

1.04

0.60

0.70

0.55

0.60

Table 4-21 Fragility curves for buried R/C tanks (permanent ground deformation)- (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004)

Typology Damage states Median PGA (g)

Buried R/C tanks

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.05

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.50

A comparison between the different R/C tanks based on ALA (2001) and HAZUS (NIBS,

2004) is illustrated in Fig. 4-20 and in Fig. 4-21. In Europe, there is no available studies, as

far as we know, that evaluate the two different fragility curves. In SYNER-G, ALA (2001)

fragility curves are proposed for the estimation of the vulnerability through the operability of

the tanks.


88

Above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


ALA_Operative ALA_No- operative

Fig. 4-20 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation)

Above ground R/C tanks (permanent deformation)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGD (m)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]

Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages

Complete damages ALA_PGD_no_operate

Fig. 4-21 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (permanent ground deformations)


89

4.4.1.5 Canal

Failures in canals can be produced by landslides and by the damage of other infrastructures

that can influence the flow.

Table 4-22 Description of damage states for Canals (ALA, 2001a,b)

Damage state

Description Damage Rate

No damage The canal has the same hydraulic performance after the earthquake

Minor

Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner may occur, causing increased friction between the water and the liner and lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causing higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated at up to 90% of capacity without having to be shut down for make repairs.

Minor damage to unreinforced liners or unlined embankments may be expected at Repair Rate/km 0.1 for ground shaking velocities of PGV = 20 to 35 inches/ sec. The minor damage rate drops to 0.01 repairs per kilometer for ground shaking velocities of PGV = 5 to 15 inches/ sec and 0 below that. Damage to reinforced liners is one quarter of these rates. Bounds on the damage estimate can be estimated assuming plus 100% to minus 50% at the plus or minus one standard deviation level, respectively.

Moderate

Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner has occurred, causing increased friction between water and the liner, lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causes higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated in the short term at up to 50% to 90% of capacity; however, a shutdown of the canal soon after the earthquake will be required to make repairs. Damage to canal overcrossings may have occurred, and temporary shutdown of the canal is needed to make repairs. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal’s cross-section to such an extent that it causes a significant flow restriction.

Moderate damage is expected if lateral or vertical movements of the embankments due to liquefaction or landslide are in the range of 1 to 5 inches. Moderate damage occurs due to fault offset across the canal of 1 to 5 inches. Moderate damage is expected if small debris flows into the canal from adjacent landslides


90

Damage state

Description Damage Rate

Major damage

The canal is damaged to such an extent that immediate shutdown is required. The damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered the canal and caused excessive sediment transport, or may block the canal’s cross-section to such a degree that the flow of water is disrupted, overflowing over the canal’s banks and causing subsequent flooding. Damage to overcrossings may have occurred, requiring immediate shutdown of the canal. Overcrossing damage could include the collapse of highway bridges and leakage of non-potable material pipelines such as oil, gas, etc. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal's cross-section to such an extent that a significant flow restriction which warrants immediate shutdown and repair.

Major damage is expected if PGDs of the embankments are predicted to be six inches or greater. Major damage occurs due to fault offset across the canal of six inches or more. Major damage is expected if a significant amount of debris is predicted to flow into the canal from adjacent landslides. The differentiation of moderate or major damage states for debris flows into the canal should factor in hydraulic constraints caused by the size of the debris flow, the potential for scour due to the type of debris and water quality

requirement

Table 4-23 Vulnerability of canals (wave propagation, ALA, 2001a, b)

Typology PGV 0.5 m/s PGV>0.5 m/s (R.R=0.1 repair/km)

Unreinforced liners or unlined No Minor

Reinforced liners No No

Table 4-24 Vulnerability of canals (permanent deformations, ALA, 2001a, b)

Typology PGD 0.025 m PGD 0.025 m PGD 0.15 m

Unreinforced liners or unlined

Reinforced liners No/minor Moderate Major damages

4.4.1.6 Pipes

The proposed vulnerability curves for pipes, based on the validation provided before (§4.3)

are the empirical fragility curves of O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) for the case of wave

propagation and Honneger and Eguchi (1992) for the case of permanent ground

deformation.

4.4.1.7 Tunnels

As proposed in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”


91

4.4.2 WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS

4.4.2.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant

Waste-Water Treatment Plants are complex components that include several

subcomponents. HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for

unanchored subcomponents for different size of Waste-Water Treatment Plants. There are

no specific guidelines referring to the anchorage of the subcomponents in Europe for Waste-

Water Treatment Plants. In order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as a

result of the different European practices used for Waste-Water Treatment Plants of different

sizes and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Waste-Water

Treatment Plant is proposed independently of the size. It is also assumed that there is no

back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario). The description of

damage states for Waste-Water Treatment Plant is provided in Table 4-25 while the

corresponding vulnerability curves are given in Table 4-26.

Table 4-25 Description of damage states for Waste-Water Treatment Plant subjected to ground shaking

Damage state

Description Restoration

cost (%) Serviceability

Minor

Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power, considerable

damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation

basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light

damage to chemical tanks.

10-30 Normal flow

and pressure


repairs

Moderate

Malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power, extensive damage to

various equipment, considerable damage to sedimentation basins,

considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or considerable damage to chemical tanks.


Extensive

The pipes connecting the different basins and chemical

units being extensively damaged.

50-75

Reduce flow and pressure


after extensive

repairs

Complete

The complete failure of all pipings or extensive damages

of the buildings that with various equipment.

75-100 No available Not

repairable


92

Table 4-26 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant



Median (g) く


Minor 0.15 0.35

Moderate 0.30 0.20

Extensive 0.45 0.50

Waste-Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C

building with low seismic code design)

Complete 0.50 0.50

Minor 0.15 0.35

Moderate 0.30 0.20

Extensive 0.45 0.50

Waste-Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code


Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Fig. 4-22 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design)


93

Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Fig. 4-23 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code

design)

Table 4-27 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Waste- Water Treatment Plants with Anchored Components




moderate

0.15

0.30

0.40

0.40

Chlorination

Equipment

minor

moderate

0.65

1.00

0.60

0.70

Sediment Flocculation

minor

moderate

extensive

0.36

0.60

1.20

0.50

0.50

0.60

Chemical

Tanks

minor

moderate

0.40

0.65

0.70

0.70

Electrical/ Mechanical Equipment moderate 1.00 0.60

Elevated Pipe extensive

complete

0.53

1.00

0.60

0.60

Building (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design)

complete 2.17 0.73

Building (low height R/C building with advanced seismic code design)

complete 0.41 0.73


94


SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used (Kappos et al., 2006). The upgrade of fragility curves will

be made after the finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in

Europe” and the proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.

4.4.2.2 Lift station

Lift Stations are complex components that include several subcomponents. HAZUS (NIBS,

2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents for different

sizes of lift stations. There are no specific guidelines referring the anchorage of the

subcomponents in Europe for lift station. In order to account for the uncertainty in their final

response as a result of the different European practices used for lift stations of different sizes

and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Pumping Station is

proposed independently of the size for different building types. It is also assumed that there

is no back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario). The description

of damage states for lift station is provided in Table 4-28 while the corresponding

vulnerability curves are given in Table 4 29.


95

Table 4-28 Description of damage states for Lift Station subjected to ground shaking

Damage state


(%) Serviceability

Minor

Malfunction of lift station for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings

10-30 Normal flow Operational after limited

repairs

Moderate

The loss of electric power for about a week,

considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate

damage to buildings.


Extensive

The building being extensively damaged, or the

pumps being badly damaged beyond repair

50-75

Reduce flow



Complete The building collapsing. 75-100 Not water Not repairable


96

Table 4-29 Parameters of fragility curves for lift station



Median (g) く


Minor 0.10 0.55

Moderate 0.15 0.55

Extensive 0.30 0.70



Minor 0.15 0.30

Moderate 0.30 0.35

Extensive 1.1 0.55

Anchored components (low- rise R/C building with advanced seismic code


Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Fig. 4-24 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking


97

Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Fig. 4-25 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking

Table 4-30 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Lift Station with Anchored Components



Loss of commercial Power

minor

moderate

0.15

0.30

0.40

0.40

Electric and Mechanical Equipment

moderate 0.80 0.60

Vertical/ Horizontal Pump*

extensive 1.25/1.60 0.60

Building (low-rise R/C building with low

seismic code design)

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.18

0.23

0.30

0.41

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73

Building (low-rise R/C building with advance seismic code design)

minor

moderate

extensive

complete

0.28

0.72

1.66

2.17

0.73

0.73

0.73

0.73


98


SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used. The upgrade of fragility curves will be made after the

finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe” and the

proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.

4.4.2.3 Conduits

For tunnels as proposed in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”

For pipes as proposed for potable water system: O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) for the case of

wave propagation and Honneger and Eguchi (1992) for the case of permanent ground

deformation.


99

5 Coding and digital description of fragility functions

System Water System

Element at risk Well Code PWSW

Reference NIBS, 2004

Method Empirical

Function Lognormal

Typology Component anchorage, according to building typology

None Minor Moderate Extensive Complete Damage states

-

Malfunction of well pump and motor for a short time (less than three days) due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, or light damage to buildings

Malfunction of well pump and motor for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate damage to buildings

The building being extensively damaged or the well pump and vertical shaft being badly distorted and non-functional

Building collapsing.

Functionality states

Usable Operational after limited repairs

Operational after repairs

Partially operational after extensive repairs

Not repairable

Seismic intensity parameter

Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)

Figures Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with low seismic code design

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

bab

ilit

y D

s> d

s /

PG

A]


Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with advange seismic code design

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

bab

ility

Ds>

ds

/ PG

A]

Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages Parameters (median values, く values)

Comments Distinction according to building typology.


100

System Water System

Element at risk Tunnels Code

Comments See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”

System Water System

Element at risk Pipes Code PWSPIPES


Method Empirical

Function O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) – wave propagation

Honneger and Eguchi (1992) - permanent ground deformation.

Typology Pipe material (flexible, rigid)

Damage states No damage Leak Break


- Reduced supply and pressure

No water supply is available


Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g) – wave propagation

Permanent Ground Deformation PGD (m)

Parameters RR/km= K*(0.0001*PGV2.25) å Wave Propagation

RR/km =【*(7.821*PGD0.56) å Permanent Ground Deformation

Comments -


101

System Water System

Element at risk Water Treatment Plant Code PWSWTP

Reference SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007

Method Empirical

Function Lognormal

Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power)


-

Malfunction of plant for a short time (<3 days) due to loss of electric power, considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality may occur.

Malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, extensive damage to various equipments, considerable damage to sedimentation basins, considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or considerable damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality is imminent

The pipes connecting the different basins and chemical units being extensively damaged. This type of damage will likely result in the shutdown of the plant.

The complete failure of all pipings or extensive damage to the filter gallery





Not repairable



Figures Water Treatment Plant (anchored components, without back-up power)

0,000

0,200

0,400

0,600

0,800

1,000

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

bab

ilit

y D

s> d

s /

PG

A]


Comments -


102

System Water System

Element at risk Pumping Station Code PWSP


Method Empirical

Function Lognormal

Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power) according to building typology


-

Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings

The loss of electric power for about a week, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment or moderate damage to buildings.

The building

being

extensively

damaged or

the pumps

being badly

damaged

beyond repair

The building

collapsing





Not repairable



Figures Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code

design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic

code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]




103

System Water System

Element at risk Canals Code PWSC

Reference ALA, 2001

Method Empirical

Function -

Typology -

Damage states None Minor Moderate Major damage

Functionality states The canal has the same hydraulic performance after the earthquake

Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner may occur, causing increased friction between the water and the liner and lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causing higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated at up to 90% of capacity without having to be shut down for make repairs.

Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner has occurred, causing increased friction between water and the liner, lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causes higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated in the short term at up to 50% to 90% of capacity; however, a shutdown of the canal soon after the earthquake will be required to make repairs. Damage to canal overcrossings may have occurred, and temporary shutdown of the canal is needed to make repairs. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal’s cross-section to such an extent that it causes a significant flow restriction.

The canal is damaged to such an extent that immediate shutdown is required. The damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered the canal and caused excessive sediment transport, or may block the canal’s cross-section to such a degree that the flow of water is disrupted, overflowing over the canal’s banks and causing subsequent flooding. Damage to overcrossings may have occurred, requiring immediate shutdown of the canal. Overcrossing damage could include the collapse of highway bridges and leakage of non-potable material pipelines such as oil, gas, etc. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal's cross-section to such an extent that a significant flow restriction which warrants immediate shutdown and repair


Peak Ground Velocity PGV (g) – wave propagation


Parameters

Comments -


104

System Water System

Element at risk Storage Tank Code PWSST

Reference ALA (2001a,b)

Method Empirical

Function Lognormal

Typology According to material, anchorage,

According to different material and type the damage states alters Damage states

- Uplift of wall– Crush concrete, Cracking or shearing of tank wall, Sliding, Hoop overstress, Roof damage

- Minor, moderate, extensive, complete


- No loss of context, Small leak, Loss of context

- No operational, Operational




Figures Above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


ALA_Operative ALA_No- operative

Above ground R/C tanks (permanent deformation)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGD (m)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds /

PG

A]

Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages

Complete damages ALA_PGD_no_operate Anchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)

Unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)

Open reservoirs with or without seismic design code (wave propagation)

Parameters (median values, く values)

Unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (permanent deformations)

Comments -


105

System Waste-Water System

Element at risk Waste-Water Treatment Plant Code WWSWWTP


Method Empirical

Function Lognormal

Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power) based on building typology


-

Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power, considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks.

Malfunction of plant

for about a week due

to loss of electric

power, extensive

damage to various

equipment,

considerable damage

to sedimentation

basins, considerable

damage to

chlorination tanks

with no loss of

contents, or

considerable damage

to chemical tanks

The pipes

connecting

the

different

basins and

chemical

units being

extensively

damaged.

The

complete

failure of all

pipings or

extensive

damages of

the

buildings

that with

various

equipment.


- Operational after limited repairs



Not repairable



Figures Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,20

0,40

0,60

0,80

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Comments -


106


Element at risk Pipes Code WWSPIPES


Method Empirical

Function O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) – wave propagation

Honneger and Eguchi (1992) - permanent ground deformation.

Typology Pipe material (flexible, rigid)

Damage states No damage Leak Break


- Reduced supply and pressure

No water supply is available


Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g) – wave propagation


Parameters RR/km= K*(0.0001*PGV2.25) å Wave Propagation

RR/km =【*(7.821*PGD0.56) å Permanent Ground Deformation

Comments The same vulnerability functions as in potable water system


Element at risk Tunnels Code

Comments See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”


107


Element at risk Lift Station Code WWSLS


Method Empirical

Function Lognormal

Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power) according to building typology


-

Malfunction of lift station for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings

The loss of electric power for about a week, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate damage to buildings.

The building

being

extensively

damaged, or

the pumps

being badly

damaged

beyond repair

The building

collapsing





Not repairable



Figures Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]


Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)

0,00

0,25

0,50

0,75

1,00

0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00

PGA (g)

[Pro

ba

bili

ty D

s>

ds

/ P

GA

]




109

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Drainage Division, July 28-30, Editor Darell D. Zimbelman, 391pp

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