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End-Of Course Survey Course Instructor Opinion Survey (CIOS) Thank a Teacher Form

End-Of Course Survey

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End-Of Course Survey. Course Instructor Opinion Survey (CIOS). Thank a Teacher. Form. Thoughts on Papers. A+ = 98% A = 95% A- = 92% B+ = 88% B = 85% B- = 82% Etc. Thoughts on Papers. RTFG!. Read the Full Guidance!. If you can ’ t write …. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: End-Of Course Survey

End-Of Course Survey

Course Instructor Opinion Survey (CIOS)

Thank a Teacher

Form

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Thoughts on Papers

A+ = 98%A = 95%A- = 92%

B+ = 88%B = 85%B- = 82%

Etc.

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Thoughts on Papers

RTFG! Read the Full Guidance!

If you can’t write …and are offered the option of telegraphic format …

TAKE IT!

Capitalization: Congress president

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Vietnam: Peace With Honor

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Lesson Objectives

• Understand the goals, provisions and consequences of President Nixon's Vietnamization policy.

• Describe the efforts of President Nixon to change global strategic alignments and the implications of his initiatives.

• Describe and analyze changes in the military situation in Vietnam from 1969 to 1973.

• Describe and assess the impact of US political developments from 1969 through 1975.

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Major Issues

What was the impact of the Cambodian Incursion on the US domestic situation?

What was Vietnamization?

What was Lam Son 719?

• How did Lam Son 719 reflect on the Vietnamization effort?

• Specifically, how did Congress react to the Cambodian incursion?

What were the results of the Easter (Spring) Offensive of 1972?

What action did the US take as a result of the Easter (Spring) Offensive of 1972?

What was Linebacker II and what was its objective?

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Troop Levels

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Vietnam War Casualties

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Buildup In Vietnam

Why was our buildup in Vietnam so slow?

Gradual escalation?

Vietnam: 1964 - 1968

Gulf War: Aug 1990 - Jan-Mar 1991

Lack of infrastructure?

Probably a little of each!

Fear of Soviet or Chinese intervention?

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Strategy of Revolutionary War

1954-1965: Phase I (guerrilla warfare)

• 1961-1965: Heated Politburo debate on transition

1965-1967: Phase II (guerrilla & conventional warfare)

• Increased large unit actions (Ia Drang, Khe Sanh)

Tactical Victory

1968 (early): Phase III (Tet Offensive) (conventional warfare)

• Military disaster (VC destroyed)

• “General Uprising” did not occur• Strategic victory for the Communists none the less

, Strategic Defeat

Tet 68 for U.S

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Richard M. Nixon

January 20, 1969

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Vietnamization

During 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon pledged to have a secret plan for ending the Vietnam War

Initiated a plan to increase the size and effectiveness of South Vietnamese forces while drawing down size of US military role in that country.

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Vietnamization

President Nixon gave major speech on Vietnamization policy November 3, 1969

Text Video 32:24 Silent MajorityVietnamization begins 14:00

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Troop Levels

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Vietnam War Casualties

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Vietnam War Casualties

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Cambodian Incursion29 April - 22 July 1970

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Cambodian Incursion29 April - 22 July 1970

Results:Casualties: US: 338 KIA ARVN: 809 KIA

NVA: 12,000+ KIA (estimated)

Huge stocks of NVA weapons, ammo, food captured

US Domestic:

Widespread protest in US, particularly on college campuses

Congress took first action to limit US involvement in SEA

• Cooper-Church Amendment

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Kent State MassacreMay 4, 1970

( 1:18 )

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Congress and the WarUse of Budget to Restrict Operations in SEA

Cooper-Church Amendment (1970)

• Sponsored by Sen. John Cooper (R-KY) & Sen. Frank Church (S-ID)

• Reaction to US-led invasion of Cambodia (April 1970)

• Prohibited use of US troops in Cambodia after June 30, 1970

• Approved by Senate 58-37 on June 30, 1970, after troops US withdrew

• House approved watered-down version December 1970

Significance:

First time Congress had restricted the deployment of US troops in wartime

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US Strategy in Vietnam

JCS Proposal 1965

• Build a Korean-war style defensive line across DMZ

• Conduct operations into Laos to permanently cut supply lines (Ho Chi Minh Trail)

• Proposed by Westmoreland in 1967, again in 1968

• Never approved or rejected by LBJ, SecDef

Summers

Review

In 1971, President Nixon approved the plan

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Ho Chi Minh Trail

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Lam Son 719

Before one draws any comparisons between the Laos operations and airmobile operations conducted by the U. S. Army, it must be realized that LAMSON 719 was a very special operation in which strict rules governed U. S. military operations across the Laotian border.

Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, USAAirmobility 1961-1971, p. 236Vietnam Studies series, CMH Pub 90-4Washington: Department of the Army, 1989

8 February - 25 March 1971

Attempt to cut Ho Chi Minh Trail

While the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces could operate freely on the ground and in the air within Laos, U. S. Forces were restricted to air operations under specific rules of engagement and were prohibited from fighting on the ground.

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Lam Son 719Logistics

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Lam Son 7198 February - 25 March 1971

Objective: Tchepone & Base Area 604

Concept of Operations:

US provided:

• logistic support to border,

• air support in Laos

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Lam Son 7198 February - 25 March 1971

Results:Casualties: US: 215 KIA ARVN: 1,500-3,500 KIA *

NVA: 2,000 KIA (estimated)

Some NVA weapons, ammo, food captured

* ARVN reports vary

ARVN did not perform well in face of stiff NVA resistance

• Poor planning and execution by ARVN leadership

Generally regarded as indicating a failure of Vietnamization

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Update on Vietnam

Address - April 1971

Part 2 - 10:39

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Easter (Spring) OffensiveMarch 30 - October 22, 1972

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Easter (Spring) OffensiveMarch 30 - October 22, 1972

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Easter (Spring) OffensiveMarch 30 - October 22, 1972

ARVN performed reasonably well with US air support

DRV gained valuable space inside RVN for future offensives

Major conventional invasion on three fronts:• Across DMZ • Central Highlands

• West of Saigon

• Also gained bargaining chip in negotiations

Nixon began planning for Linebacker II

Nixon initiated Operation Linebacker (May 9 - October 23, 1972)• Bombing of North Vietnamese logistics targets

• Sustained bombing of North Vietnamese strategic targets

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Paris Peace AccordsJanuary 23, 1973

Henry Kissinger (left) and Le Duc Tho initial agreement

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Paris Peace AccordsJanuary 23, 1973

Major Provisions:

US troops would leave Vietnam by 1973

North Vietnamese troops would remain in South

South Vietnamese government would remain

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Congress and the WarUse of Budget to Restrict Operations in SEA

Case-Church Amendment (1973)

• After Paris Peace Accords (Jan 1973), Nixon hinted at US intervention if North Vietnam attacked South

• Introduced by Senators Clifford Case (R‐NJ) & Frank Church (D‐ID)

• Prohibited U.S. military activity in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia after August 15, 1973 without Congressional approval.

• Passed by Senate 64-26, House 278-124 (June 1973)

Significance:

Essentially ended US military activity in Southeast Asia

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Nixon ResignsAugust 9, 1974

President Gerald Ford

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US Drawdown

( 58:19 )

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Final Offensive

DRV planned final offensive for 1976

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Probing Attacks

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Final Offensive

DRV planned final offensive for 1976

Encouraged, DVR ordered additional probes in 1975

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The Final Days - 1975

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Final Offensive

DRV planned final offensive for 1976

Encouraged, DVR ordered additional probes in 1975

DRV politburo again astonished by speed of success

• Ordered push to Pleiku and on to coast

RVN President Thieu ordered strategic retreat• Gave up northern provinces to protect Saigon and south

ARVN retreat turned into a rout

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The Final Days - 1975

Hué FellMarch 25

Da Nang FellMarch 30

II Corps FellApril 2

Pleiku AbandonedMarch 16

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Last Flight From DanangMarch 29, 1975

( 4:59 )

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US Evacuation of Saigon

Early plans had identified:• 8,000 US and third country citizens for evacuation

• Number of potential South Vietnamese evacuees never determined

• • Estimate: 17,000 US employee + 6 family members = > ~120,000 evacuees

Late March 1975: Evacuations by commercial aircraft began

• Last fixed-wing transport (C-130) left Tan San Nhut airport 29 April

• • Later estimates went as high as 200,000!

Contingency plans always existed for evacuation of US citizens• Also included “At risk” Vietnamese citizens

• • “At Risk” = US employees and agents

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Operation Frequent WindApril 29-30, 1975

Final helicopter evacuation of US citizens and others

Pickup points at Tan San Nhut airport and US Embassy

• Air America (CIA-run airline) also committed 24 helicopters

US Marine helicopters operated from off-shore ships • USAF helicopters from Thailand shuttled to ships

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Operation Frequent WindApril 29-30, 1975

Helicopter operations from Saigon progressed smoothly

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Operation Frequent WindApril 29-30, 1975

April 30, 1975 - 7:53 AM

Last US Marine helicopter lifted off the roof of the US Embassy

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Evacuation of Saigon

Iconic image: “Evacuation from the U.S. Embassy roof”

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U.S. Embassy - Saigon

1972

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Evacuation of Saigon

Pittman Apartment building used by CIA staff

(top of elevator shaft - not a heliport)Story

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Operation Frequent WindApril 29-30, 1975

Meanwhile, as South Vietnam forces crumbled …

…scores of VNAF officers commandeered aircraft and headed to Thailand or the US fleet offshore.

Created desk space problem on aircraft carrier USS Midway

Scenes Ditching

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Operation Frequent Wind

VNAF Major Ly Buang, wife, five children arrive on USS Midway

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Operation Frequent Wind

USS Midway after stop in Thailand to retrieve fixed wing aircraft

Major Ly Buang’s O-1 aircraft

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Fall of SaigonApril 30, 1975

( 6:06 )

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What went wrong in Vietnam?

Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.

-- George Santyana (1863-1952), 1905

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Vietnam: Lessons Learned

Next:

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End-Of Course Survey

Course Instructor Opinion Survey (CIOS)

Thank a Teacher

Form

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End

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