Enduring Inefficiencies in Intelligence Systems By Reducing Errors

9th Global Conference on Business & Economics ISBN : 978-0-9742114-2-7

Enduring Inefficiencies in Intelligence Systems By Reducing Errors In Parallel

Systems To Defend Homeland Security: A Principal-Agent Approach*

Donald J. CalistaMaster of Public Administration Program

School of ManagementDyson 360

Marist CollegePoughkeepsie, NY 12601

+845.575.3345 (T)+845.575.3344 (F)

Paper PresentedAt theNinth

Global Business and Economics Conference In

Cambridge University, UK October 16-17, 2009

*© By author. Not for citation or attribution with permission.

October 16-17, 2009Cambridge University, UK

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ABSTRACT

Enduring Inefficiencies in Intelligence Systems By Reducing Errors In Parallel

Systems To Defend Homeland Security: A Principal-Agent Approach

The usual critical prescription for counterintelligence (CI) agencies is to focus on their collaborative lapses that evoke proposals to streamline their inter-agency relationships. While not disputing the benefits of such practices, they are secondary to the priority of transforming intra-agency knowledge management by responding with mirror images of terror’s basic organizational tenets. Thus, to evade detection and prevent penetration terror underwhelms communications among members by limiting their understanding of both planning and execution. As prevailing organizational paradigms cannot address these anomalies, they require an oppositional—contrarian—CI strategy. Accordingly, security agencies overwhelm their intelligence capabilities by aligning terror’s sparseness in articulating and discreteness in processing of communications, correspondingly, with exhaustiveness in gathering and robustness in sharing of intelligence. In effect, applying the theory of parallel systems, or redundancy, is the most innovative way to approach counterintelligence (CI) in that it invites sub-agencies to compete with each other. The objective is to avert Type I errors—by preventing a wanted message from disappearing—and second, by avoiding a Type II error—by permitting an unwanted message getting through. The paper employs principal-agent approach to achieve those ends and focuses on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its recent formulation offers an opening to transform its parallel sub-agencies into an atypical CI strategy and effective performance.


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Enduring Inefficiencies in Intelligence Systems By Reducing Errors In Parallel Systems To Defend Homeland Security: A Principal-Agent Approach

The governance structures of terror organizations continue to be subjects of interest and

debate. In addition to providing historical studies and presenting profiles of individuals through

various disciplines, by and large, observers have been of two minds. Some researchers

emphasize rational choice, mostly game theory, which concentrates on micro-analyses of

terrorism. It suggests terror structures stem from calculated member preferences as byproducts of

goal-setting that lead to adopting coherent strategies. Preferences occur in areas such as:

recruitment and training, communications among members, and target timing (Davis and Cragin,

2009). The other view, which is more prominent, highlights the importance of network analysis

in various iterations (Sageman, 2004).

These works range from: detailing differences between collaborative versus dark

networks, showing connections among deadly terrorist networks, and mapping their breaking

points. Common agreement is that network formulations explain terrorist governance as

centralized, but loosely-coupled, organizations. Transnational in design and internationally

financed—in the fashion of al-Qaeda (“the base”) whose members call it the “company”—its

leadership bears the markings of middle to high status individuals of varying nationalities.

Stateless, these broadly-based organizations need tacit state sponsorship to establish a secret

physical presence. Such networks address the principal-agent problem by requiring formal

member allegiances to their own messianic ideology; they look like pyramid schemes without

much scam (Elistrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008).


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New Worlds of Terrorism Uncovered

Recent research challenges both perspectives in two ways. One view holds that terror

governance is now dominated by nation-based “leaderless jihads”—in large part as a response to

the stepped-up and coordinated counterterrorist efforts pursued by numerous governments.

Transnational terror is on the defensive. Jihads are self-organizing; they are as apt to employ

training as not and depend on local (and nefarious) funding for support—in the semblance of the

2004 (3/11) Madrid bombings. A number of the 2005 London (7/7) bombers, however, received

training in Pakistan. Some experts maintain that these groupings are the main terrorist challenge

for counterintelligence (CI) into the near future (Sageman, 2008).

The second perspective employs transaction cost economics (TCE) that proposes

terrorist governance revolves around adoption of either market- or non-market structures

(Helfstein, 2009). Broadly, market-based governance tends to be akin to “leaderless jihad” types.

Congealed by hatred of the West, they are autonomous in nature whose low-status leaders and

members possess homogeneous social ties. Lacking in planning and resources, their preparations

tend to be crude, as in the intercepted 2006 London liquid explosives incident. The inner strength

of market-based terror lies in diminishing the principal-agent problems of monitoring and

shirking, as formal contracts are non-existent.

The other TCE explanation relies upon non-market strategies that are reminiscent of al

Qaeda’s 9/11 configuration. A chain of command format at the top organized around working

clusters of cells. Other experts maintain that transnational terror remains no less worrisome to CI

than before (Riedel, 2008), as in the 2008 Mumbai train station and hotel bombings. They are

selective in recruitment. Yet, because of their heterogeneity in personnel, they accept the

confounding effects of bureaucratic operations, in part to minimize CI invasion, but also to


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garner local support by providing social services. While it is unknown whether al Qaeda retains

the reach of its past transnational structure, much more is known about non-market centralized

regional terrorists, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Although fast-becoming transnational through

several alliances, they, nonetheless, counter principal-agent problems by demanding member

pledges and limiting sub-unit autonomy (Holfstein, 2009).

It would be pointless to say whether a market or a non-market type of terrorist

governance prevails. Instead, they can both inflict different, but grave, violence upon their near

and far enemies. Both forms of terror seek catastrophic ends. While market and non-market

terror approach the battlefield differently, their operations are secretive—respectively, either as

autonomous unlinked cells or linked combinations of them. The objective of this paper is to

articulate a CI theory that makes the governance structures of terrorism—their distinct

impingements—its centerpiece.

Paper Outline and Objectives

The paper first briefly points out CI definitional difficulties. It then discusses three CI

methods. The next section presents why terror organizations revoke conventional organizational

wisdom—by evading enemy detection and penetration, they constrict member communications.

The paper then proposes a contrarian solution to organizing CI, in particular, on intelligence

gathering and sharing by focusing on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It explains

why DHS’ response needs to oppositely mirror to terrorism’s anomalous organizational

dimensions by adopting a parallel systems, redundant, CI strategy; that is, to encourage its sub-

agencies to compete with each other. This strategy achieves two goals: it addresses the problem

of avoiding Type I and Type II errors and exploits terror’s self-generated vulnerabilities. The

final discussion shows how DHS’ own vulnerabilities can also impede high-level CI


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performance. The conclusions demonstrate why a turning stones strategy is a necessary evil. Of

course, the paper’s argument applies to other security agencies whose receptivity to adopting an

antithetical strategy clearly rests on DHS implementing one convincingly.

Definitional Difficulties and Three Counterintelligence Methods

It is important to ask: what is CI. Little agreement exists. In a revealing disclosure, the

Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) home page admits to lacking a definition or a theory of CI.

Instead, it presents a 20-page white paper, authored by a long-standing analyst and manager, who

isolates “seven competing [academic and non-academic] definitions of CI.” Most of the paper

focuses on working “towards” a theory of CI (Ehrman, 2009). It does, however, offer two

principal ways to distinguish between types of organizing intelligence. One is external:

“collecting secret information about the capabilities of foreign states and entities;” and the other

is internal: “identifying and countering threats to the security of the host state or entity” by

“threats within their borders.” Clearly, market and non-market terrorist organizations engender

both types of intelligence. One estimate places the number of known terrorist organizations at

154—based on U.S. Department of State statistics (Nationmaster, 2009).

To illustrate, but not exhaust intelligence-gathering methods, three main sources can be

identified. The first one lies in the following example, where the premise is double-loop learning

(Agryris and Schön, 1996). Not untypical of practices in other CI agencies, front-line workers

pass along any and all assumedly pertinent data on to its own counterterrorist unit as well as to

the agency’s partners, including certain interagency collaborative organizations, which add to

profiled information. Various software databases—ranging from dynamic modeling (Gutfraind,

2009) to visualizing (Yang and Sageman, 2009)—then sift through the new material that,

eventually, plays out multiple scenarios based on connections of interest, from indicators as well


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as counter-indicators, such as: facial recognition, sex, country of origin, aliases, age, family

status, affiliations, education and training, criminal record, associates, religion and sect, land and

cell telephone histories, prior travel and with whom, and the like. The output is interactive that

benefits from using “what if” best- and worst- case situations to sort out confirmations and

disconfirmations. The results are recycled to front-line workers. Clearly, a main issue is

information overload about which in a non-computer age would otherwise be daunting.

Compounding this intelligence method is the need for agents to follow-up on leads.

Various law-enforcement agencies have created subunits for that purpose. Some of these units

pool with their counterparts for which the FBI is in the forefront. For example, its office in Los

Angeles, Counterterrorist 6 (CT6), contains 21 people and receives about 1000 leads a year. A

long-standing veteran detective muses: “Someone has to go knock on doors” (Schmitt, 2009).

Five percent, or 50, of the tips prove credible.

Another type of intelligence is technical that can largely be gleaned from the Web and the

Internet. Most CI agencies have created cybercrime subunits concerned with felonious use of the

electronic world. Such criminals include terrorists, but these units go beyond their purview in

pursuit of other areas as: identity theft and financial fraud. Terrorists employ the electronic

medium to great advantage. The Internet provides them with a useful tool for communicating,

although fearing detection and penetration are constants. The Web not only serves terror’s public

relations needs, it also opens possibilities to post coded messages. As electronic communications

are voluminous, CI agencies now employ data mining software that renders bytes whole

(DeRosa, 2004; Kim, 2005). This software “tags” disconnected bits of data to create real-life

stories that have been helpful in thwarting a number of threats. (Gorman, 2009).


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The problem with any of these forms of intelligence is that they are largely behavioral.

That is, the foundation for formulating them stems from typologies based on various social

science models: from anthropology to criminology to psychology and sociology (Davis and

Cragin, 2009). The typologies convey well-known behavioral characteristics developed in a

particular field, say as related to financial predators or political extremists. Typologies may also

be generated by an agency as a home-grown shorthand to classify varying terrorist archetypes or

organizations. Among the persistent criticisms of the CI Community is agency unwillingness to

share information; it is unlikely that announcing archetypes occurs regularly—although

researchers do so (Gunaratna, 2002; Sageman, 2008). Terrorists are aware of this disability and

make deciphering behavioral characteristics more difficult by emitting as much disinformation as

possible.

Revoking Conventional Organizational Wisdom: Terror Avoids Detection and Prevents

Penetration

Terrorists count on these bureaucratic obstacles in CI to augment making themselves

impenetrable to insiders and outsiders (Wise & Nader, 2003). Terror—of both the market and

non-market variety—is managed unlike ordinary organizations. Operationally, they turn

rationality on its head. While non-market organizations may feature the trappings of centralized

structures, the union stops there, as terrorism accounts for its survival by meeting two related

objectives— that results in both market and non-market terrorism constraining and controlling

the flow of information. First, to avoid detection of overall planning, member communications

are sparse and to prohibit penetration of execution they are discrete—that, respectively, assures

their internal and external exclusivity. Operational cautions about execution, in particular,

obstruct what enemies can discover about terror’s clandestine moves. (The arrest and search—


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and release—of the “20th hijacker’s” laptop shortly before 9.11 produced information bounded

by his connections.) Disengaging plans from practices intensifies terror’s already obscure

nature, and, quite incongruously, instead of a closed system causing slippage in steering

information, it renders them lean and mean.

Sparseness and Discreteness Make International Terror Lean and Mean and Creates

Grounded Rationality

Leanness occurs because sparse exchanges among cell members adhere to need-to-know

rituals. Confined communications, often transmitted in make-shift codes, compound the

intelligence problem of sorting out terminologies expressed within cells. Sparseness,

additionally, discourages informal discussions and personal attachments between cell members.

In bin Laden’s now common-knowledge summary of the September 11th attacks: “Those who

were trained to fly didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the other group”

(Krebs, 2001: 46; italics original). Evasive communication, however, does not usually infringe

upon operatives acting on plans they comprehend only marginally. As planning in non-market

groups are more precisely constructed, in their furtive way, cell members talk a lot about

implementing them, compared with organizations relying upon standard operating procedures

(Elistrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008). Yet, if “chatter” compensates terror operatives for their

fuzzy familiarity with planning, unawareness of the whole story also becomes terrorism’s fringe

benefit during interrogations. Sparse awareness of planning, especially in non-market

organizations, inhibits terror operatives from conveying information about actions in once-

removed cells. Occasionally, secretiveness backfires. In the small-scale market affiliations of the

2004 Madrid (3/11) bombings, secretiveness led to suffering from communications breakdowns.


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Meanness grows out of terrorist members managing communications discretely to

camouflage how their execution will inflict mortal harm. As insiders do little personal gossiping,

discretion also deprives eavesdropping outsiders of revealing extraneous sources of information.

Straining credulity, while cell members unevenly understand what is going on in tertiary cells,

the integrity of reciprocal pursuits ensures their steadfastness. An unsettling example of this

steadfastness lies in observing certain last-minute behaviors of the about-to-die September 11th

terrorists. The mission’s liaison risked exposure by attempting to wire unspent funds to related

network members. Taken together, leanness and meanness coalesce to make dismantling

networks a very murky affair.

In effect, murkiness occurs because, ordinarily, most organizations retreat from the

confines of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), yet, terrorism welcomes them, notably in the

non-market sphere. Their members operate in a kind of a denied or grounded rationality. While

such operations non-rationally disconnect planning from executing, instead of loosening ties

among cluster members, it consolidates their interdependence. Curbing individual

communications actually seals the loyalty—the catastrophic fate—of cell members to each

another. However distant they are from “headquarters,” members bank on tightly-woven bilateral

relationships to sustain their trust in a messianic ideology. While terrorism validates members

through limited connections, this situation would normally lead to inefficiencies in resource

allocations. Inefficiencies do occur, especially in organizing member competencies to fulfill a

mission—a situation that doomed the 2006 London liquid perpetuators. This forbearance, while

inconvenient, minimally detracts from the effectiveness that terrorist organizations reap from

staying lean and mean.


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The Salience of DHS’ Contrarian Intelligence Strategy

Unlike terror operations with limited exposure to stakeholders—especially for

autonomous market types—internal and external conflicts abound for the U. S. homeland

security agency, notably, in the demands made by its myriad legislative oversight. They extend

from the unheard of reporting to 88 congressional committee and sub-committee chairs,

ostensibly serving as DHS’ shadow board of directors (Treverton, 2004). In 2007 and 2008, DHS

officials gave testimony to 108 committees (Laskow, 2009). Earlier, in 2004, the 9/11

commission report strongly recommended that Congress create one contact point for DHS, but

the agency continues to experience the opposite. Together, these highly differentiated sub-

agency environments produce major task uncertainties (Thompson, 1967). Prioritizing—

unraveling— DHS’ principal-agent connections seems unfathomable.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages twenty-two—legacy and

specifically-crafted agencies—that differ significantly in their age, budget, norms, and size.

Totaling more than 180,000 civilian and uniformed personnel, the sub-agencies range from a

small research laboratory with about 200 people to three large law enforcement and military

units, each with about 40,000 people. Since its founding in March 2003, DHS has increased is CI

associations. The agency secretary attends the daily National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)

White House briefings, the PDB, and, since 2007, legislation created an intelligence and security

secretariat, which coordinates intra-department CI activities. DHS’ larger sub-agencies engage in

intelligence gathering as well as partner with major national intelligence networks (GAO, Sept.

2004). These intelligence functions involve six sub-agencies—with about 80 percent of its

personnel—the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE), the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program, the Secret


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Service, and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA). It also houses the National Cyber

Security Center and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.

Predictably, DHS’ first administrative battle has been to drive out obvious redundancies

in as many places as possible—about which observers point out numerous hurdles hampering

creating agency-wide conformity (Demchak, 2002; Rosenthal, 2003). From the outset, DHS

started downsizing its 22 human resources management systems, which one year later decreased

to 7 (Inspector General, March 2004). It has been seeking to create a uniform pay-for-

performance program for which implementation guidelines appeared in 2005 and 2007, but

largely remain unfilled (GAO, April 2008). A major unresolved issue for DHS personnel

practices is the fact that airport screeners own the highest annual turnover rate in the federal

government—nearly 20 %.) TSA’s long sought-after collective bargaining goal now seems on

the horizon with the Obama administration (Rosenberg, 2009).

On the surface, the various integrative organizational initiatives may appear to have merit

in seeking oneness across the entire agency. In 2004 to 2005, DHS attempted to coordinate its

sub-agencies by incorporating them into four operational directorates that contain all but three of

them. They are: Border and Transportation Security— Transportation Security Administration,

U.S. Customs Service, the border security functions of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training

Center; Emergency Preparedness and Response (former Federal Emergency Management

Agency; Science and Technology (two former national science laboratories); and Information

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (Now PCII). The impulse to impose a template across

intelligence operations was proving irresistible. DHS did leave most of the former Bureau of


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Immigration and Naturalization, the United States Coast Guard, and the Secret Service intact. By

2007, all the major agencies returned to their home base.

The Role of Intelligence in DHS

CI among the sub-agencies is driven by different goals that establish their unique

intelligence focus—even for the same arena. For example, in their cyberspace missions the

Secret Service emphasizes financial transactions, while the PCII concentrates on infrastructure—

buildings and sites—operated by leading commercial enterprises and state and local authorities,

as the largest owners of the nation’s governmental properties. DHS also contributes as a unitary

agency to national intelligence networks. For the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),

which the CIA directs, DHS and the FBI are spokes, and for the Terrorist Screening Center

(TSC), which the FBI administers (watch- lists), it joins the CIA as a spoke.

Not all of DHS’ agencies are leaping to cooperate over intelligence. For example, CBP’s

prior intelligence monitored the movement of the nation’s domestic cargo, which it now shares—

competes—with TSA that built its own tracking database (Carafano & Heyman, 2004). Doesn’t

this situation beg for commonality, as a turf war is jeopardizing the nation’s security? After all, a

central tenet of organizational wisdom calls for removing redundancies by cutting costs and

reducing waste—especially to root out uncooperativeness among agencies. It is one thing to want

to reckon with the latter as a legitimate issue, but it is another to presume imposing CI

commonalties is valuable. The intelligence contradictions that DHS—and other security agencies

—face cannot be so rationally articulated and resolved—largely as a factor of the peculiarities

posed by terror’s governance structures.


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Intelligence’s Environmental Context at DHS

Understanding these impingements is central to articulating a CI theory. If terror’s

operations do not completely disconfirm the rules of the dominant organizational paradigm, they

certainly qualify as a significant “counterinstance”—an anomaly (Kuhn, 1962: 68). The rules of

organizational science come up short, however, in drawing an appropriate CI blueprint.

Terrorism’s uncommon organizational conditions will not disappear by requiring security

agencies to introduce symmetries across their CI protocols—namely, by driving redundancy

away. Instead, those conditions require an equally audacious—anomalous—intelligence

response. That is, the effectiveness of CI depends upon a strategy that directly challenges

terrorism’s underwhelming its patterns of communications. Accordingly, DHS acquires its own

exceptional strategy by accepting duplication and repetition of intelligence and, thereby, endures

inevitable redundancies. Despite its reputation as bad-theory-in-use (Machado & Burns, 1998)—

redundancy embodies the most re-constructive way for DHS to block catastrophic terror. It is

now time to explain how a redundant intelligence strategy can destabilize terrorism and shape

productive intelligence outcomes.

This strategy redresses the bonus that terrorism receives from obscuring member

communications. To reverse the effects of informational uncertainties, DHS adopts a

counterintuitive intelligence strategy. The salience of the strategy arises from the agency

oppositely mirroring terror’s sparseness in articulating and discreteness of processing member

communications first, with exhaustiveness in gathering intelligence, second, with robustness in

sharing intelligence. Its sub-agencies run parallel—but diverse—intelligence systems. The sub-

agencies submit to a “leave-no-stones-unturned” strategy and, boldly, they abide redundancy to

engulf intelligence. As Comfort (2002:4) notes: “ . . . the quality and effectiveness of the


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information exchange [among intelligence agencies] will be defined by the organizational

processes of training, receptiveness to incoming information that may be inconsistent with prior

assumptions, and willingness to share information regarding actual performance.” To correct for

inconsistency in CI, redundancy counteracts with duplication and repetition across multi-

agencies (Landau & Stout, 1979).

Undermining Terror’s Operational Vulnerabilities: an Emergent CI Theory

Type I Errors. This strategy of sub-agencies following comparable redundant protocols, but

fulfilling them singularly, creates a credible theoretical base for CI. It rests on the risk, or

readiness, to commit a Type I or Type II intelligence error (Bendor, 1985). Tolerance of risk

level hinges on what kinds of statistical error makes domestic security worse off—which

negative outcome is less acceptable for CI to make. To avoid a Type I error (α, or false positive)

involves establishing a number of parallel units engaged in related intelligence gathering. The

objective is to hedge “failing to stop an undesired event” by “blocking of an accurate or desired

message” (p. 50). To sidestep making these errors of omission means stopping tell-tale messages

from falling between the cracks. Front-line intelligence is consciously aware of avoiding Type I

errors, as an FBI anti-threat agent stated recently: “A lot of time we are chasing shadows, but it’s

better to do that than find out later you let something get by” (Schmitt, 2009). (Tragically, the

events of September 11th results from tacitly committing a Type I error—a series of disconnected

bureaucracies—with no common forum, or interest in facilitating critical intelligence—

disbelieved disjointed signals.) Designed duplication and repetition causes agencies to compete

with each other. Competition—defined as rivalry and replication—multiply decreases message

loss among parallel agencies.


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This form of competition differs from the more commonly experienced non-competitive

redundancy. As Bendor (1985) suggests: “In competitive redundancies, rivals must be

differentially rewarded for their achievements. . . . [T]hey must have discretion over which

programs to pursue” (p. 57). As in two DHS agencies inspecting domestic freight—CBP and

TSA—which is not inherently problematic, it now serves as a model of intra-agency

competition, even in pursuing the same targets differently. It is less likely for them to lose

messages under these circumstances and, thereby, to commit a Type I error. Competitiveness

serves as a springboard to insure the success of parallel systems. While the Secret Service owes

its founding in 1862 to the growth of counterfeiting in the Civil War, it now faces competition in

that domain from DHS’ secretariat of intelligence and security, although it operates on a much

smaller scale.

Type II Errors. The mirror image of competition is collaboration. Interagency coordination

intends to obviate a Type II error (β, or a false negative). Operating as a series of units, DHS’

sub-agencies have little choice but to: “guard against the transmission of an inaccurate or

unwanted message,” or, “letting a message through that doesn’t belong there by failing to effect

a desired one” (p.50). Some undeserving person gets an immigration green card. Such errors of

commission are no less lethal as intelligence puts an equal premium on hindering the unwitting

loss of accurate data, in a Type I error, as wittingly inviting an inaccurate one, for a Type II

error. Redundancy is also a natural occurrence of units in parallel systems having limited

familiarity with each other’s operations. As a by-product of agencies’ experiencing contrasting

informational uncertainties, they only have partial knowledge of how other units organize their

intelligence functions. Curtailing Type II errors then depends heavily on intelligence sharing.


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Parallel agencies are less prone to dodge information sharing because they need to find

outlets for their redundant intelligence. Simply put, sharing intelligence by parallel agencies

becomes self-serving. Nonetheless, informational risks still require attention: “one kind of

redundancy can be increased to reduce the total damage even though the total number of errors is

higher than before” (p.50; italics original). The significance of parallel systems benefiting from

the frequency of such messaging is notational—as positive externalities occur. (See Bendor,

1985, pp.61-65 for the numerical extrapolations.)

DHS’ Counterintelligence Coordination Mission

As outpourings of data from the sub-agencies appear, the question of intelligence sharing

turns uppermost for DHS—especially as the CI informational environment has become more

complex since Sept. 11—that is, with the emergence differing market and non-market terror

organizations. The result is that there is a role for pursuing certain commonalities as intelligence

moves from gathering to sharing. The learning curve still remains steep. In a thesis at the Naval

Postgraduate School, a DHS operations analyst calls for the: “Intelligence Community to move

away from a ‘need to know’ culture towards a ‘responsibility to provide’” (Werner, 2008).

DHS’ coordination mission becomes twofold: to insure that the multi-agency CI configurations

are not completely idiosyncratic and, to provide viable vehicles for agency intelligence sharing.

First, as the agencies wrestle with distinguishing fact from both fiction and disinformation,

idiosyncratic agency protocols can undermine cultivating intelligence sharing. Technology has

been helpful. Agencies are regularly transacting with corresponding internal and external

networked databases and are often searching for the same watch-list people and organizations.

Since 2007, an official 16-agency Intelligence Community (Intellipedia) Wiki, with 100,000

users has produced nearly 1 million pages of collaborative intelligence (Vogel, 2009). In


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addition, much as in other security agencies, DHS relies on translation software that makes use

of layered-type techniques to analyze and interpret redundant intelligence. Second, to generate

workable intelligence sharing, DHS opens two-way streets for agencies to cross-walk their

redundant intelligence. To that end, it screens the two worst intelligence sins: to cover up

mistakes in intelligence gathering and to fall victim to groupthink intelligence sharing (The

Economist, March 19, 2005).

Regarding covering up, as web-bloggers and Wikis quickly learn, digitally networked

participants openly keep one another honest. It is wiser to stay on the level because the aftermath

of getting caught telling an untruth is fast and furious punishment—sometimes banishment. If a

DHS agency miscalculates by thwarting an accurate message from getting through, which

produces a Type I error—and then lies about it—comparable treatment is likely—to say nothing

of an event occurring. Put differently, gathering redundant intelligence competitively makes

discovering deception easier—a situation that allows DHS to broker agencies to resist Type I

errors. In pursuing the same terrorist (watch-list) targets sub-agency CI methods differ, yet

competition dissuades agencies from encapsulating themselves, that is, avoiding becoming

completely monopolistic—exclusionist (Niskanen, 1971).

Competition also acts as a buffer against agencies lapsing into groupthink. This deterrent

is especially important in intelligence sharing that shifts agency attention to containing Type II

errors, that is, sharing is a process of cross-checking against failing to notice an undesired

message. Unlike the earlier example of tracking the same suspects, if intelligence in Border

Patrol (CBP) and Transportation Security (TSA) leads them to prosecute different illegal aliens,

their competition acts as a proxy for intelligence sharing. While it is true that by agencies going

after suspects without telling each other, their competitive redundancy is more likely to stumble


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upon related targets. Together, making arrests decreases the chance of committing a Type II

error; yet, wittingly allowing an inaccurate message to pass through—the absence of civilians in

an air strike—can produce tragedy. Redundancy is compensatory. As Bendor (1985) notes:

viewing the situation through the lenses of scarce resources, which sees interdependence of sub-

units as rivalry, “then one channel’s failure may disrupt a duplicate” (p. 55).

Uncovering the Vulnerability of Closed Communications: Trading Off of Targeting Terror

Operatives over Derailing Terror Planners

Admittedly, public sector competition has its downsides. For one, DHS’ sub-agencies try

to outdo one another to produce the silver bullet to elevate their stature in the Intelligence

Community (Grow, 2005, May 30). On balance, however, competitive redundancy yields

multiplier returns. Its cumulative effect uncovers vulnerabilities within terror’s furtive

communications. Redundancies unsettle ever-mindful cells that need to redouble their efforts to

isolate planning from executing. Provoking cell members into raising the volume of chatter

lessens the rewards of secrecy and adds to the burden of terrorists communicating sparsely and

discretely. Stepped up volume, in other words, diminishes the leanness and meanness that terror

derives from seeking impenetrability. Approaching the situation differently, Milward and Raab

(2003) make a similar inference: “The more covert networks have to invest in staying secret the

less attention and resources will be available to their activities” (p. 23). That is, turning stones

distinctively, but divergently, limits the benefits of sparse and discrete communications. Or, as

Krebs (2001) explains: the dark side of terror confining communications is that: “. . . covert

networks trade efficiency for secrecy” (p. 46). The no-stones unturned strategy reflects an

equally decisive trade-off.


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The trade-off profits from terror’s vulnerability. That is, it prioritizes the importance of

disrupting terror operatives from committing catastrophic acts as opposed to chasing after what

planners are generating. Converging on the lesser transactions of terror yields pay-offs that

outweigh the costs of recovering greater knowledge from planners. The trade-off clears the way

for intelligence to pivot on pressing cell chatter to go nowhere. Above all, it exploits the

inefficiency of terrorists rapidly locating and replacing operative competencies through liaisons.

The tangible objective is short-run disruption to draw operatives into the open, as shutting down

entire terror organizations exceeds any CI capability, particularly, well-endowed non-market

types. Eliminating them depends on the highly unlikely occurrence of U. S. foreign policy doing

an about-face, especially towards certain Arab and Muslin nations. Winning the present war

against terrorism, therefore, occurs by bearing down on the margins of terror operations—

through attrition.

Intended and Unintended Consequences of Redundancy

Nonetheless, a bothersome question lingers on: is the medicine worse than the disease?

No one knows with any confidence, however, what constructive consequences come from a

wholesale elimination of redundancy (Landau, 1969), and, certainly not, across multi-agency CI

functions. Efforts to homogenize intelligence functions across subunits, as Betts (2002:2)

counsels, disappoint:

If effective intelligence collection increases by only five percent a year, but the critical warning indicator of an attack turns up in that five percent, gaining a little information will yield a lot of protection. Streamlining intelligence operations and collection is a nice idea in principle but risky unless it is clear what is not needed. When [terror] threats are numerous and complex, it is easier to know what additional capabilities we want than to know what we can safely cut. [Italics added.]

Yet, if efficiency remains the default goal, Betts (2002: 5) again warns: “. . . in a leaner and

meaner system [conventionally understood] there will never be much [intelligence] lying


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around.” Instead, DHS finds solace in its untidy origins by nurturing a redundant intelligence

competitively to secure its effectiveness. As intelligence uniformities are easier for catastrophic

terrorists to discern and disable, holding commonalities to a minimum supports a no-stones-

unturned strategy.

Redundancy Cuts Two Ways: Dealing With DHS’ Fear of Failure

Analogously, DHS expresses its own defensiveness, in particular, quieting doubts

concerning its capabilities to unscramble terror events (Wise & Nader, 2002). Embedded in

public expectations are doubts about its intelligence accountability that point to a potential for a

failure in two major ways. First, it occurs by DHS fearing not stopping an event, and, second, by

the agency not preventing one (Shenon, 2003b). In the face of such potential failures, it is

tempting to insist on common intelligence protocols, but redundancy represents the best of both

worlds. That is, it is more likely for parallel systems, both to identify Type I errors in intelligence

gathering that mistakenly blocks out a wanted signal, and, to deter Type II errors in sharing

intelligence that fails to block an unwanted signal. Creating false commonalities undercuts these

prospects. Ignoring what a contrarian strategy can deliver, then, comes at a high cost.

Strategic and Structural Symmetry through Open-Systems

Two other tendencies may impede DHS from adopting a redundant strategy. The first is

the predictable risk-averseness of public agencies. In discussing risk-averseness, Wise

(2002:132) cautions that newly-formed agencies understandably look backwards:

Institutionalization research suggests that when organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, when the environment creates uncertainty, organizations are often modeled on other organizations. Particularly for new organizations, which could serve as sources of innovation and variation, leaders will seek to overcome the liability of newness by imitating established practices within the field.


21


Getting around these backward-looking practices means acknowledging that concerns about

DHS’ potential failures can become smokescreens. They divert attention away from

acknowledging that the uncommon operational conditions of terrorism demands unconventional

responses. Moreover, timidity also endangers the usefulness of redundancy identifying the latent

liabilities inhering in terror’s stealthy communications. Of course, it would be easy to dismiss

redundancy itself as a “backwards strategy.” Its effectiveness, however, plays a unique role for

agencies living with the persistent fear of failure—the moral equivalent of terror fearing

detection and penetration.

The second restraining tendency comes from agency evaluators. They continuously press

DHS to turn to the private sector for guidance, usually in the guise of its “best practices.”

Instead, the task uncertainties produced by terror’s anomalous operations serve as the central—

everyday— organizational combat zone for CI (Treverton, 2004; Caudle, 2005). Obviously,

agency evaluators do not recommend employing those uncertainties to invigorate CI. Essentially,

oversight agencies treat DHS’ deadly uncertainties on par with industrial firms learning customer

preferences. They also disregard the compounding effects of DHS untangling its principal-agent

relationships. In its first two years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated DHS

directly no less than 10 times (GAO, March, 2005) and then on to multiple annual reports (GAO,

April 2008). GAO offers formulaic advice: “The experience of leading organizations [public

ones are not cited] suggests that performance management systems—that define, align, and

integrate institutional, unit, and individual performance with organizational outcomes—can

provide incentives and accountability for sharing information to help facilitate this shift” (GAO,

Sept. 2004: 1). This advice regularly repeats itself.


22


The complexity of living with the agency’s profound informational uncertainties has no

equal in the private sector (Balk and Calista, 2001). Where in the private sector would a firm’s

board of directors request 260 specific documentation reports detailing aspects of the

organization’s accountability (Lipton, 2005)? In 2007 and 2008 DHS officials testified—

defended—the agency at 370 congressional hearings (Laskow, 2009). Combined, DHS’ task and

principal-agent uncertainties make stressing precision alignments, including intelligence

arrangements, in a word, seem fanciful.

Conclusions: Turning Stones as a Necessary Evil

Catastrophic terror makes itself impenetrable by operating under anomalous

organizational conditions. Proscribed terror communications defend against both leakage and

exposure of cell activities, respectively, by confining insider detection of plans and fending off

outsider penetration of execution. Particularly among non-market centralized terrorists,

decoupling planning from executing is anomalous because it lowers the threshold of bounded

rationality and forces terrorists to sanction a form of “grounded” rationality. Instead of grounded

rationality loosening loyalty among members, however, it strengthens their bilateral ties and tilts

CI in favor of terrorists.

To reverse its shortcomings, DHS takes a strategic cue from the organizational anomalies

adhered to by terrorism—essentially from both market and non-market terror underwhelming

their communications. Accordingly, the agency counters terror’s sparseness in articulating and

discreteness in processing of communications with their mirror opposites—exhaustiveness in

gathering and robustness in sharing intelligence. DHS’ acceptance of certain intelligence

redundancies is more efficacious than, belatedly, acknowledging it failed to preserve enough of

them. In these circumstances, redundancy is both a necessary evil and a rational response to


23


terrorism. In gathering intelligence DHS bets on averting a Type I error. In many instances, sub-

agencies are turning the same stones differently, each “covers” for the potential slippage of the

others; one, by preventing a wanted message from disappearing. The overall agency suffers

redundancy in order to intensify the division between terror’s sparse and discrete

communications. A trade-off occurs.

As the trade-off forsakes gaining more complete knowledge from terror planners, it

increases the susceptibility of terror operatives to exposure—and arrest—mainly among linked

liaisons and cells. That is, as DHS’ multi-agencies uniquely duplicate and replicate gathering

intelligence, they are especially pressing planners into communicating more surreptitiously,

which raises the volume of worker chatter. Greater volume wears away terror’s impenetrability.

In effect, a competitively redundant strategy capitalizes on a basic weakness residing in terror’s

obscured communications. The strategy carries the anomalies of terror organizations to their

logical conclusion—to reverse the value of underwhelming their communications. Constructing

this multi-agency solution squares with DHS’ oppositional strategy, as it combats terror’s closed

communications system by advancing an open intelligence one.

DHS reverses how agencies under one roof typically achieve efficiency and

effectiveness (O’Toole and Meier, 2004). To become effective, other networks tighten (pool)

their usage of scarce personnel resources, but suffer inefficiency by raising the costs of their

intersecting administrative functions. DHS welcomes this looseness as a vehicle for fostering

intelligence sharing. Sharing is not only a factor of causing its sub-agencies to seek outlets for

their redundant intelligence, but also because it protects against making a Type II error. That is,

no agency wants to be held accountable for letting out-of-place messages get through. In other

words, redundancy creates the necessary maneuverability for agencies to employ intelligence


24


sharing to guard against their own transactional shortcomings. While this effort is inefficient, it is

effective, which, ultimately, justifies creating the multi-agency.

What are proposals for future research? A most beneficial form begins by examining a

refutable presumption. The presumption, expectedly, draws on terror’s organizational anomalies

as the basis for exploring DHS’ redundant intelligence strategy. Shaping this vital outcome

involves learning which multi-agency solutions optimally fulfill a redundant strategy. The

immediacy of engaging in this analytical and empirical task is obvious. Ultimately, its value

centers on formulating a reliable knowledge-base that heightens the vulnerability of terror

isolating planning from implementing. As researchers broaden this knowledge-base, they may

find the prevailing organizational paradigm that dismisses redundancy as unwholesome deserves

some questioning.


25


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Enduring Inefficiencies in Intelligence Systems By Reducing Errors