Energy East: When the pipeline spills

Energy East: When the pipeline spills...

Previous ruptures along TransCanada’s Mainline – part of the planned Energy East pipeline project. Photos by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.

Cover photos

Top left: Aerial Photo of the Englehart Occurrence Site, from Pipeline Investigation Report P09H0074, Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Available at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2009/p09h0074/p09h0074.asp

Top right: Downstream line-break section of Line 100-2, from Pipeline Investigation Report P11H0011, Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Available at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2011/p11h0011/p11h0011.asp

Bottom: Aerial photo of the Marten River occurrence site, from Pipeline Investigation Report P09H0083, Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Available at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2009/p09h0083/p09h0083.asp

Energy East: When the pipeline spills... is published under the Creative Commons licence Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0. Images used within this document remain copyrighted by their respective owners except where specifically indicated.

Energy East: When the pipeline spills... 1

Selective memory: TransCanada’s safety record.

TransCanada repeatedly claims that state of the art technology and highly trained staff will keep Energy East from leaking and that any leaks that do happen will be shut down “immediately.” They don’t like to talk about the nine catastrophic pipeline failures on their Canadian gas lines since 1991. It is one of these pipelines, up to 40 years old, that TransCanada intends to convert to pump tar sands oil through. Using this old pipeline instead of building a new one saves TransCanada several billion dollars and puts communities at even greater risk.

But here are some other facts and figures you should know about pipelines in Canada:

» Pipeline incidents (ruptures, spills, explosions, leaks) have doubled in the last decade.1

» Cracking, equipment or component failure, and material, manufacturing or construction causes have been the most common reasons for pipeline spills of more than 1,500 litres.2

» Safety-related incidents – from fires to spills – rose from one for every 1,000 km of pipeline to two per 1,000 km of pipeline.3 Energy East would be 4,400 kms long and could have nine incidents every year based on this average.

Energy East: When the pipeline spills...

TransCanada’s Energy East pipeline project would convert an up to 40-year-old natural gas pipeline to carry crude oil from Saskatchewan to Ontario, connecting it with new pipeline through Quebec and on to Saint John, New Brunswick. It would be the largest oil pipeline in North America, transporting 1.1 million barrels of oil every day.

When it comes to pipelines, it is not a matter of if a pipeline spills, it is a matter of when, where and how much it spills.

Regina

Winnipeg

Hardisty

Ottawa

Montreal

Quebec City

Saint John

Edmonton

Thunder Bay

North Bay

ABSK MB

ONQC

NL

NB

NS

PE


What would a spill from Energy East look like?

According to information provided at TransCanada’s Energy East open houses, TransCanada is aiming to be able to shut down their pumping within 10 minutes of the discovery of a leak. Bearing in mind the total capacity of 1.1 million barrels of crude per day, Energy East would transport 2,024 litres of oil per second. This means more than one million litres could spill in 10 minutes. A huge amount of oil remaining in the pipeline between valves could also leak. For example, at the Nipigon River crossing of the current natural gas pipeline there is 11.8 km between valve stations. This means more than 10 million litres of additional oil could leak after the pumping has stopped.

TransCanada plans to convert a pipeline system with an explosive history

On January 25, 2014, a TransCanada-owned natural gas pipeline ruptured in Otterburne, Manitoba, sending balls of flame 300 metres in the air. The rupture created a crater 10 feet deep, and left 4,000 natural gas customers in the cold for several days. The cause of the rupture is still under investigation.4 In February, TransCanada made headlines again when one of its natural gas pipelines ruptured near Rocky Mountain House, Alberta.5

The explosion near Otterburne happened in a pipeline that is part of TransCanada’s Mainline System. This is the same system from which TransCanada is seeking to convert a pipeline to carry crude oil for Energy East.6

Rapid CityBeardmore

Englehart

ABSK MB

ONQC

NL

NB

NS

PE

Source: TransCanada Canadian Mainline Sales and Marketing, 2011RAPID CITY, MANITOBA Line 100-4, slated for conversion to carry crude for Energy East, ruptured on July 29, 1995 near Rapid City, Manitoba. The rupture, which lasted two hours, was caused by external stress corrosion cracking.8 The delayed shutdown of the pipeline led to a second fire on a nearby pipeline. The rupture was discovered by an on-duty TransCanada staff member who made two failed attempts to contact the Regional Operations Controller from their station. After another failed attempt from an emergency phone located outside the station, the staff member finally reached the controller using a cell phone borrowed from a bystander.

Examples of Mainline System Pipeline Explosions

BEARDMORE, ONTARIOIn February 2011, the 100-2 pipeline ruptured. It took six hours to completely stop the gas from flowing to the damaged pipe. In this case, stress corrosion cracking reduced the load-bearing capacity of the pipeline, leading to the rupture, explosion and fire. TransCanada was notified of the explosion when a member of the public called TransCanada’s gas control operator.

ENGLEHART, ONTARIOIn 2009, the 100-2 pipeline ruptured and then exploded, burning close to 25 hectares of forest and grassland. The rupture was discovered by the Englehart Fire Department and was caused by external stress corrosion cracking.


The Otterburne and Rocky Mountain House ruptures are in addition to the eight incidents that occurred on the Mainline System between 1991 and 2013. These incidents were found to be largely the result of stress corrosion cracking,7 external corrosion, and coating and welding failures, suggesting the pipeline was poorly designed, poorly built and has been poorly maintained.

Converting a pipeline to carry a substance that it wasn’t originally built to carry heightens the risk of a pipeline rupture.

A study prepared by the National Petroleum Council for the U.S. Department of Energy states: “Pipelines operating outside of their design parameters, such as those carrying commodities for which they were not initially designed, or high flow pipelines, are at the greatest risk of integrity issues in the future due to the nature of their operation.”9

Similarly, Richard Kuprewicz of Accufacts Inc. warns in his report on Enbridge’s Line 9b reversal: “Changing crude slates, especially running dilbit, can significantly increase pressure cycles that can accelerate crack growth. The various and changing compositions of dilbit, both the bitumen and/or the diluent, can significantly impact pressure cycles on a pipeline where crack risk is a bona fide threat. Accufacts believes that the movement of dilbit in pipelines at risk to cracking presents a higher potential to cause pipeline ruptures if not adequately managed.”10

The new pipeline from Cornwall, Ontario through Quebec to Saint John, New Brunswick and the new pipeline segment from Hardisty, Alberta to the existing pipe in Saskatchewan also raises spill concerns. A TransCanada-owned three-year-old pipeline ruptured in October 2013, close to Fort McMurray, Alberta.

The pipeline supplies natural gas to large tar sands producers that were forced to slow down operations.11 TransCanada’s first Keystone pipeline also spilled 12 times in its first year of operation. One spill dumped 75,000 litres of tar sands crude.12

TransCanada has bullied landowners and cut corners on Keystone

Just recently, the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration added two safety conditions for the Keystone XL pipeline. These requirements were added because of defects with the (already built) southern leg of the Keystone system.13

Bold Nebraska, a group that works with landowners, has collected accounts of easily identified problems, including trenches that are too shallow, pipeline placed over rocks and faulty welds that don’t seal, on the southern Keystone system. According to Jane Kleeb, the director of Bold Nebraska, “several landowners I’ve spoken to live in fear that a major spill could happen any day.”

A number of reports have also documented TransCanada’s practice of strong-arming landowners, including using the threat of “eminent domain” and expensive lawsuits to strike deals for land along Keystone XL’s route.14

Residents of Houston, TX protest the use of “eminent domain” to seize lands for the Keystone XL pipeline.

Photo by Elizabeth Borrasa, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0


The problems with leak detection systems

Days before the now infamous Enbridge pipeline spill in Kalamazoo, Michigan of more than 3.8 million litres of diluted bitumen, the pipeline’s operator publicly stated it would remotely detect a spill in eight minutes. It was 17 hours before Enbridge confirmed the massive spill that has now cost $1 billion to clean up.

In fact, the general public is far more likely to discover a pipeline rupture than a company’s leak detection system. Looking at 10 years of federal data in the U.S., an investigative journalist found that remote sensors detected only five per cent of spills.15 Looking just at large spills of over 1,000 barrels, only 20 per cent of the spills were first discovered by leak detection systems. In the vast majority of cases, the companies were unaware that their pipelines were spewing oil until the public alerted them.

In Canada, we are dealing with many of the same big pipeline companies, including TransCanada, Enbridge and Exxon. The companies are telling Canadians that their leak detection systems work and will protect people from spills.

Much of the Energy East pipeline is in sparsely populated areas, so a spill may not be detected until people far downstream notice it. Even then, it will be difficult for TransCanada emergency crews to get to the site of the leak to plug it. More than 13 million litres of crude can be in the pipeline between shutoff valves, which can leak even after the pumping is stopped.16

According to pipeline expert Richard Kuprewicz, who has worked with TransCanada in the past, “[operators can feel pressured to] tell people things they shouldn’t tell them because it’s not true....[while the companies] may not be saying that with the intent of lying, the reality is, it’s just real difficult to detect [releases] remotely.”17

Our review of Transportation and Safety Board reports on TransCanada’s Mainline pipeline

system incidents reveals that only one of the eight ruptures was discovered by a leak detection system.18 In the case of the Brookdale, Manitoba rupture, a detection system did trigger a signal, but failed to register the extent of the rupture for more than 10 minutes, by which time members of the public were already raising the alarm.19 The other ruptures were discovered by staff, nearby residents and an OPP officer. It took anywhere between 10 minutes to 2.5 hours from the time of the rupture to when the gas supply was shut off. In Beardmore, Ontario, gas continued to pass into the isolated segment of pipeline for a total of six hours.20

But Canadian regulations protect us, right?

In 2012, the Harper government passed an omnibus budget bill that gutted Canada’s long-standing environmental laws by eliminating key protection measures and making it far more difficult for people to have their say on large energy projects.

The bill means that massive projects like Energy East no longer require a federal environmental assessment or independent information about the project’s risks or alternatives.

Instead, the approval of all major energy projects falls to the federal cabinet with recommendations from the National Energy Board (NEB). While the NEB’s mandate is to act in the public interest when it comes to energy infrastructure, time and again the NEB has fallen short.

A December 2011 report by the Commissioner on Environment and Sustainable Development found Transport Canada and the NEB “did not adequately follow up on instances of non-compliance when pipeline companies were told by those agencies to improve the safety of their pipelines.”21


The NEB has a history of approving almost all major energy projects. The NEB’s board is dominated by ex-industry executives. Public participation in an NEB review is now extremely prohibitive – submitting a letter requires filling out a nine-page form.

Prior to the NEB’s approval of Enbridge’s Line 9b reversal, CTV’s W5 found that the NEB only knew of seven spills along this pipeline, while Enbridge claimed there were 13 spills.22 In fact, W5 found the pipeline had spilled five times as often as the NEB disclosed – a total of 35 spills.

The NEB also failed to publicly release a damning report on a 2009 explosion in a TransCanada pipeline that sent 50-metre-high flames into the air destroying a two-hectare wooded area on Dene Tha’ First Nation land.23 This report, not posted publicly due to an “administrative error,” criticized TransCanada subsidiary NOVA Gas Transmission for “inadequate” field inspections, “ineffective” management, and the failure of in-line inspection systems to detect the “corrosion within corrosion.”

There are currently a number of legal challenges underway related to the NEB process24 for reviewing pipelines, including five judicial reviews of the Northern Gateway joint review panel, and the limitations of the Kinder Morgan pipeline review.25

The Council of Canadians has filed an appeal in Federal Court of the limited list of issues the NEB has decided it will examine for the Energy East pipeline project. The concerns are twofold: (1) the list was issued prematurely, before TransCanada even filed its full project description, and (2) while the review will allow evidence about the commercial, economic, supply and market impacts of the project, such as tax revenues, royalties and job creation, it excludes any consideration of the upstream and downstream activities associated with the development of “oil sands,” the end use of the oil to be transported, or climate change implications.26

For more information about the Council of Canadians’ campaign to stop the Energy East pipeline visit www.noenergyeast.ca.

Aerial photo of the occurrence site with town of Beardmore, Ontario in the background, from Pipeline Investigation Report P11H0011, Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Available at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2011/p11h0011/p11h0011.asp


Endnotes

1 Amber Hildebrandt. “Pipeline safety incident rate doubled in past decade.” CBC News. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/pipeline-safety-incident-rate-doubled-in-past-decade-1.2251771>

2 National Energy Board. Focus on Safety and Environment - A Comparative Analysis of Pipeline Performance - 2000-2007. Jul. 2009. <http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rsftyndthnvrnmnt/sfty/sftyprfrmncndctr/fcsnsfty/2009/fcsnsfty2000_2007-eng.html#s2>

3 Amber Hildebrandt. “Pipeline safety incident rate doubled in past decade.” CBC News. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/pipeline-safety-incident-rate-doubled-in-past-decade-1.2251771>

4 CBC News. “Natural gas pipeline explodes near Otterburne, Man.” 25 Jan. 2014. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/natural-gas-pipeline-explodes-near-otterburne-man-1.2510873>

5 The Canadian Press. “Natural gas pipeline breaks near Rocky Mountain House.” 18 Feb. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/02/18/rocky-mountain-house-pipeline-_n_4809651.html>

6 The pipeline segments slated for conversion are Prairies segment Line 100-4, Northern Ontario line 100-4 and portions of 100-3, and North Bay Short Cut Line 1200-2. National Energy Board. Energy East Pipeline Ltd. - Energy East Pipeline Project - Project Description (A59129).” <https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll?func=ll&objId=2428790&objAction=browse&viewType=1>

7 Stress corrosion cracking on pipelines begins when small cracks develop on the outside surface of the buried pipeline. These cracks are initially not visible to the eye and are most commonly found in “colonies”, with all of the cracks positioned in the same direction. Over a period of years, these individual cracks may lengthen and deepen and the cracks within a colony may join together to form longer cracks. Since SCC develops slowly, it can exist on pipelines for many years without causing problems. But if a crack becomes large enough, eventually the pipeline will fail and will either leak or rupture. <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/NE23-58-1996E.pdf>

8 Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Pipeline Investigation Report P95H0036. <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/1995/p95h0036/p95h0036.asp>

9 John H. Cushman Jr. “Federal Rules Don’t Control Pipeline Reversals Like Exxon’s Burst

Pegasus.” InsideClimate News. 3 Apr. 2013 <http://insideclimatenews.org/print/25033> p.49

10 Accufacts Inc. Report on Pipeline Safety for Enbridge’s Line 9B Application to NEB. 5 Aug. 2013. <http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/748594/9b-safety-report-2013-08.pdf> p.6

11 Scott Haggett and Nia Williams. “TransCanada gas pipeline rupture cuts oil sands production.” Reuters. 17 Oct. 2013. <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/10/17/transcanada-says-gas-pipeline-in-northern-alberta-may-have-ruptured/?__lsa=27c2-c97b>

12 Anthony Swift. “TransCanada’s record presents a strong case for rejecting Keystone XL tar sands pipeline (again).” 2 Nov. 2012. Natural Resources Defense Council. <http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/aswift/transcanadas_record_presents_a.html>

13 “Anomalies - Including Dents and Welds - Found Along Newly Laid Keystone XL Pipeline in Texas.” Public Citizen. 30 May 2013. <http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3901>; The Canadiadn Press. “Keystone XL new safety conditions don’t alter economics.” 27 May 2014. CBC News. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/keystone-xl-new-safety-conditions-don-t-alter-economics-1.2655368>

14 Kenny Bruno, Steve Herz and Alex Moore. Dirty Business: How TransCanada Pipelines bullies farmers, manipulates oil markets, threatens fresh water and skimps on safety in the United Sates. Apr 2011. Friends of the Earth. <http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/Dirty-Business-TransCanada.pdf>

15 Lisa Song. “Few oil pipeline spills detected by much-touted sensors.” 19 Sep. 2012. InsideClimate News. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-19/oil-pipeline-spills-go-undetected-by-much-touted-sensors.html>

16 This is based on 892 litres per linear metre.

17 Lisa Song. “Few Oil Pipeline Spills Detected by Much-Touted Sensors.” 19 Sept. 2012. InsideClimate News. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-19/oil-pipeline-spills-go-undetected-by-much-touted-sensors.html>

18 Pipeline investigation reports on TransCanada Mainline ruptures available at: <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/index.asp>. In the case of the Marten River rupture, the Supervisory Control land Data Acquisition (SCADA) operating data identified a


drop in pressure, which triggered an alarm in the Calgary Gas Control on line 100-1. Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Pipeline Investigation Report P09H0083. 26 Sep. 2009 <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2009/p09h0083/p09h0083.asp>

19 The SCADA system gave a signal indicating strong evidence of a line break at the same time a bystander reported the fire. Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Pipeline Investigation Report P02H0017. 14 Apr. 2002. <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2002/p02h0017/p02h0017.asp>

20 Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Pipeline Investigation Report P11H0011. 19 Feb. 2011. <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/pipeline/2011/p11h0011/p11h0011.asp>

21 Nathan Lemphers. “Pipeline spills and safety violations justify an independent review.“ Pembina Institute. 10 Jul. 2012. <http://www.pembina.org/blog/639>

22 Annie Burns-Pieper. “Line 9 has had significantly more spills than previously stated, W5 reports.” 21 Feb. 2014. CTV W5. <http://www.ctvnews.ca/w5/line-9-has-had-significantly-more-spills-than-previously-stated-w5-reports-1.1698286#ixzz2x5LJgZsb>

23 Amber Hildebrandt. “Pipeline rupture report raises questions about TransCanada inspections.” CBC News. 4 Feb. 2014. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/pipeline-rupture-report-raises-questions-about-transcanada-inspections-1.2521959>

24 “ForestEthics Advocacy files lawsuit against federal government and National Energy Board.” 12 Aug. 2013. ForestEthics. <http://forestethics.org/news/forestethics-advocacy-files-lawsuit-against-federal-government-and-national-energy-board>

25 James Keller. “B.C. First Nation launches legal challenge over Kinder Morgan pipeline.” The Canadian Press. 2 May 2014. <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/b-c-first-nation-launches-legal-challenge-over-kinder-morgan-pipeline-1.1804190>

26 “Council of Canadians seeks to appeal Energy East ruling.” The Council of Canadians. 15 May 2014. <http://www.canadians.org/media/council-canadians-seeks-appeal-energy-east-ruling>

700-170 Laurier Ave. West Ottawa, ON, K1P 5V5

www.canadians.org | 1-800-387-7177

June 2014

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Energy East: When the pipeline spills