ENGAGEMENT - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy · new thinking into the policy process at precisely the moment when it is most needed—the moment of presidential transi-tion,

POLICY STATEMENT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTUREOF U.S-EGYPT RELATIONS

A W A S H I N G T O N I N S T I T U T E S T R A T E G I C R E P O R T

ILLUSIONSENGAGEMENT

WITHOUT

Building an Interest-Based Relationshipwith the New Egypt

VIN WEBERGREGORY B. CRAIG

�

s t r at e g i c r e p ort 9 | n o v e m be r 2 0 1 2

VIN WEBERGREGORY B. CRAIG

Building an Interest-Based Relationshipwith the New Egypt

ILLUSIONSENGAGEMENT

WITHOUT

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica-

tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or

mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval

system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

© 2012 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050

Washington, DC 20036

Cover design: 1000colors

Cover illustration: Detail from early Egyptian wall carving.

Contents

The Authors | v

Preface | vii

1. The Strategic Context | 1

2. The Morsi Government | 5

3. Building a New Relationship with the New Egypt | 9

4. Sinai: A Region of Special Concern | 17

5. A Broader Engagement with the New Egypt | 19

v

The Authors

vin weber, co-chairman of the government relations firm Mercury/Clark & Weinstock, served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1981 to 1993, representing Minneso-ta’s second congressional district. He was a member of the Appropriations Committee and an elected member of the House Republican leadership. Mr. Weber is former chair-man of the National Endowment for Democracy, where he still serves on the Board of Directors, a trustee of the Aspen Institute, and is on the Board of the Council of Foreign Rela-tions. In addition, he has served on the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion.

gregory b. craig, a partner at the law firm Skadden Arps, has served in key policy positions for much of the past thirty years, including as President Obama’s White House counsel, director of State Department Policy Plan-ning in the Clinton administration, and senior advisor on defense, foreign policy and national security issues to Sena-tor Edward M. Kennedy. In 1998, he was named assistant to the president and special counsel in the White House, where he led the team assembled to defend President Clin-ton against impeachment. Mr. Craig has served as vice chair of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and chair of the International Human Rights Law Group.

vii

Preface

every presidential election year since 1988, The Washington Institute has convened groups of statesmen, dip-lomats, legislators, scholars, and experts to examine critical Middle East issues and offer their collective advice on Middle East policymaking to a new administration. Time and again, these bipartisan efforts have proven successful at injecting new thinking into the policy process at precisely the moment when it is most needed—the moment of presidential transi-tion, whether from president to president or from the first to the second term of the same president.

This year, which saw the first U.S. presidential election since the seismic regional events known as the “Arab Spring,” we decided that it was timely to focus on U.S. policy toward Egypt, a longtime pillar of U.S. interests in the Middle East that has undergone fundamental change. While this project was launched before Egypt’s presidential election, it became especially appropriate in light of that watershed event, which produced the first civilian leader in the country’s history and ended the period of military-led rule that followed Hosni Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011. The fact that Islamists long critical of the U.S.-Egypt relationship have emerged as the dominant political force—capturing even the presi-dency—only underscored the urgency of this undertaking.

In summer 2012, The Washington Institute invited two respected voices in foreign policy—Vin Weber, former Republican congressman from Minnesota and former chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, and Gregory B. Craig, former White House counsel in the Obama administration and director of State Department policy planning in the Clinton administration to consti-tute the Institute’s Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Egypt Relations. Their charge was straightforward: to assess the

viii n Engagement without Illusions

new political situation in Egypt and offer recommen-dations to the new administration on the best way to advance U.S. interests in the current environment.

To learn firsthand about the situation in Egypt, the authors traveled to Cairo in late September–early Octo-ber 2012, where they met with a broad array of Egyptian politicians, party leaders, civil society activists, scholars and journalists. Their interlocutors represented the breadth of Egyptian public opinion, from Salafists to Western-oriented liberals. In addition, because of the importance of the Egypt-Israel relationship to U.S.-Egypt ties, they traveled to Israel as well, where they met with senior political, diplomatic, and security officials. Throughout, they benefited from extensive conversations with U.S. diplomats—in Cairo, Tel Aviv, and back in Washington.

This concise report represents the views of the Task Force. Mr. Weber and Mr. Craig have endorsed this statement solely in their individual capacities; their endorsements do not nec-essarily reflect the views of the institutions or firms with which they are currently affiliated.

The Task Force would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance provided by Washington Institute staff in orga-nizing their meetings, arranging their travel, and prepar-ing this publication. They are particularly grateful to Eric Trager, the Institute’s Next Generation fellow, who provided invaluable insight on contemporary Egypt throughout this project. Special thanks go to Rebecca Erdman, whose administrative support ensured the success of the team’s Middle East study tour.

While the Institute is proud to publish this report, it had no control over the Task Force’s deliberations or this final product. The report has not been endorsed by the Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors, and it should not be construed as representing their views.

Robert Satloff Executive Director November 2012

1

Chapter 1

The Strategic Context

for reasons of demography , geography, history, and strategy, Egypt is a country of vital importance to U.S. interests. Egypt’s fundamental realignment in the 1970s—from warfighter to peacemaker and from Soviet client to American ally—was one of the most important regional and international developments of the Cold War and, since then, Cairo and Washington have worked together on many fronts to build a strong, mutually beneficial relationship.

Specifically, it is in the American interest that Egypt maintain its peace treaty with Israel; engage in security cooperation with the United States; participate fully in the fight against terrorism, especially radical jihadism; and build a strong and vibrant economic and political basis on which to pursue these policies. As evidence of America’s interest in Egypt and the important cooperation between the two countries, the United States has provided more than $70 billion to support Egypt’s economic develop-ment and military preparedness since Cairo’s turn toward the West and commitment to peace with Israel more than thirty years ago.

The United States rightly supported the people of Egypt’s courageous demands for political change in early 2011. Although President Hosni Mubarak was long valued as a strategic partner on issues ranging from the maintenance of peace to cooperation in the fight against terrorism, for years his suppression of democratic development was not consistent with American aspirations for the Egyptian people and caused considerable tension in the bilateral relationship. This came to a head in the early weeks of 2011, when it was clear from the mass demonstrations in Cairo and throughout Egypt that he had lost the confidence of his people, who themselves were no longer cowed by security

2 n Engagement without Illusions

forces. The decision by the U.S. administration to embrace the call by protestors for dramatic political change should not be viewed as the only realistic course of action; rather, reflecting a confluence of American interests and ideals, it was the just and appropriate policy to pursue.

The resignation of President Mubarak began a political transition in Egypt that has gone through several phases over the nearly two years since the heady days of Tah-rir Square. This includes the eighteen-month rule by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, during which Egyp-tians went to the polls no fewer than five times (includ-ing votes for a constitutional referendum, the lower and upper houses of parliament, and two rounds of the presi-dential election). As this period came to a close with the election of Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Morsi as the country’s first civilian president and the transfer of executive authority to him by the military, the question on the minds of most observers at that time was “Who holds power in Egypt—the president or the now-behind-the-scenes military leadership?” That question seems to have been answered by President Morsi’s assertion of control over the military in August 2011 via the retirement of senior officers, including the defense minister and chief of staff, and the appointment by him of new officers in their place.

Despite this important clarifying step, the political transition in Egypt is not complete. The country not only lacks a constitution and a functioning parliament, but its various political forces are in a state of profound flux. Some say that the revolution is not over. Others simply say that there are no rules governing the transition and the road, therefore, will likely be bumpy.

The military has returned to the barracks and evinces deference to elected political authority. However, there can be no doubt that the military continues to retain consid-erable power and influence; few believe it has irrevocably surrendered its pivotal role in Egyptian politics. Still, the trigger for its return to active politics is unknown—perhaps even to the military itself.

Weber and Cr aig n 3

Among Islamists, the ally/adversary relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extreme Salafists, as well as the situation both within the Brother-hood and within the Salafist movement, are all fluid. The most important question concerns the Brotherhood, which—as a result of its success in the parliamentary and then presidential elections—suddenly found itself as a gov-erning party after more than eighty years in the opposition, often underground. Will the Brothers, fearful of being out-flanked by the more purist appeal of the Salafists, veer right and govern ideologically, or alternatively, will they be moti-vated more by the fear of economic collapse and its atten-dant political failure and instead govern from the more pragmatic center?

On the other end of the political spectrum, non-Islamists did progressively better in elections over the last two years, ultimately winning nearly half of votes cast in the presiden-tial run-off. The fact that the non-Islamist standard-bearer did so well despite being tarred with close association to the Mubarak government suggests that the nation is deeply divided on sectarian grounds: Islamist versus non-Islamist. However, the very term “non-Islamists” masks a broad array of secular, liberal, leftist, communist, nationalist, and Cop-tic-oriented parties that are disorganized, deeply divided ideologically, and demoralized by Islamist political success. Indeed, in the current environment, the main competitors to the Muslim Brotherhood are not the non-Islamist parties, but rather the Salafists, who stand the best chance of expand-ing their support—and their influence—if the Brotherhood falters. Here, the critical question is whether non-Islamists have the will and ability to coalesce into a small number of coherent, cohesive political parties able to compete with the better organized, more ideologically disciplined Islamists.

It will take years—and perhaps several elections—before these questions are sorted out. The important process of writing a constitution, which some hoped would clarify these issues, more closely resembles a competition among the Islamists—Brotherhood versus Salafists—on issues

The main competitors to the Muslim Brotherhood are not the non-Islamist parties but rather the Salafists.


related to religion and state, the role of women in society, and the proper balance between individual rights and col-lective responsibilities than it does the pursuit of consen-sus among Egypt’s numerous political trends, as was the original promise of the Constituent Assembly when it was formed. The result of this is to put off defining clear answers to Egypt’s pressing political questions to another day and another forum. In the meantime, the potential for mass pol-itics (a return of Tahrir-magnitude protests) to overwhelm contested politics (representative government through a process of elections) is very real.

This political ambiguity has emerged against a backdrop of dire economic crisis. Egypt—the world’s largest importer of wheat—is near bankruptcy, with the new government going hat-in-hand to capitals around the world asking for urgent help to support its battered currency and dwindling foreign currency reserves. Strikes by both public and pri-vate sector employees are further crippling the economy. While day-to-day security has improved somewhat since the days of postrevolutionary vigilantes and neighborhood watch committees, large swaths of the country go dark every night because of energy blackouts; to save power, the government is now implementing unpopular late-night energy restrictions. While ideology may divide Egyptians politically, they are united in facing a stark—possibly cata-strophic—economic fate.

5

Chapter 2

The Morsi Government

still in its early days, the performance of the Morsi government reflects the uncertainty of Egypt’s still-evolving transition. On economic issues, the speed and decisive-ness with which President Morsi settled the issue of mili-tary leadership projected strength and sent a positive sig-nal to jittery investors; similarly, the focus he projected on addressing Egypt’s urgent economic crisis eased fears that Islamization, not problem-solving, would be his top prior-ity. At the same time, however, the overreach of his early commitments—promising an end in just 100 days to such endemic problems as the lack of adequate food and fuel, the failure to collect garbage, and the gridlocked traffic—and the vagueness and indecisiveness of his economic recovery plan had the opposite effect, inviting ridicule and unnerv-ing the business community.

In terms of domestic politics, the government has permit-ted an unprecedented flowering of public debate and media freedom, with the president himself the object of criticism that his predecessors would never have tolerated. However, even in revolutionary Egypt, freedom of speech has limits that recall the prerevolutionary era, as the firing of editors, arrests of civil society activists, and jailing of provocative bloggers all attest. From a U.S. perspective, President Morsi’s most problematic act was his apparent sympathy with the mob that attacked the U.S. embassy on September 11, 2012, and that he ultimately took steps to protect the embassy only after a direct rebuke from the American president.

Similarly, on the international front, the new president injected energy and vigor into Egypt’s foreign policy, travel-ing around the world to reassert Cairo’s moribund leader-ship role in regional affairs and promote the country as an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI).


However, President Morsi has little to show for his efforts thus far, as evidenced by the reluctance of major investors—e.g., China, Gulf Arab states—to make or follow through on substantial pledges of support, and by the cool reception to Egypt’s proposed quadripartite solution for the Syria crisis. Indeed, while the new government’s welcome refrain is that FDI, not foreign aid, is the solution for Egypt’s economic problems, a closer look shows that Egypt lacks any real strategy to attract the billions of FDI it needs to translate that vision into reality.

On no issue is the uncertainty of Egypt’s transition more apparent than in its relations with Israel. On the positive side, President Morsi’s early weeks in power included repeated affirmations of Egypt’s commitment to abide by its international agreements, widely interpreted as a promise to maintain the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and he underscored this by sending a new ambassador to Tel Aviv. In addition, the president sought to use Egypt’s influence with Hamas, the Palestinian Muslim Brother-hood affiliate that governs Gaza, to restrict the operations of more radical anti-Israel groups and to thereby prevent potential military flare-ups along the Egypt-Gaza-Israel border zone. At the same time, however, the new president ended all political-level exchanges with Israel, restricted the relationship to military and intelligence contacts that are away from the public eye, authorized a provocative military deployment (since rescinded) in contravention of the terms of the peace treaty, and has yet to endorse a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Perhaps more ominously, the leadership of the president’s Mus-lim Brotherhood political base is as vociferous in reject-ing Israel’s right to exist today as it was throughout the decades it fought against the Sadat and Mubarak govern-ments’ turn toward peace.

The early days of the Gaza crisis in November highlighted President Morsi’s ambivalence toward Israel. On the one hand, he indicated no desire for a direct Egypt-Israel con-frontation, authorized his security and intelligence contacts


with Israel to underscore continued commitment to the bilateral peace treaty, and signaled his preference to de-esca-late the conflict through a new Israel-Hamas cease fire. On the other hand, his public posture was to affirm full support for Hamas, condemn “Israeli aggression”—the first time he used the word “Israel” in an official capacity—as the cause of the violence without reference to Hamas rocket fire, and turn a blind eye to the incendiary rhetoric of Muslim Brother-hood and other Islamist officials who called for jihad against the Jewish state. Operationally, he not only recalled Egypt’s newly credentialed ambassador in Tel Aviv—which Mubarak also did as a sign of protest during a previous moment of Egypt-Israel tension—but also dispatched his prime minister to visit Gaza, which effectively gave Hamas a human shield to prevent Israeli bombardment at a time when Hamas was continuing to lob its own rockets into Israel.

As the crisis unfolded, Morsi was clearly uncomfortable with many aspects—the idea that weak Gaza determined the foreign policy of mighty Egypt, rather than the reverse; the criticism from more-radical Islamists that he was inef-fectual in confronting Israel; and the unease of having to navigate these turbulent waters at a moment when interna-tional donors were closely scrutinizing Egypt’s worthiness for billions of dollars of new credit.

Taken together, this analysis underscores the still-unan-swered questions about Egypt under Morsi, including the following:

f Does the new president view himself as a faithful rep-resentative of the Muslim Brotherhood, committed to advancing its ideological cause, or as someone whose identity is larger than the Brotherhood, whose duty runs to the entire nation and who sees himself as the leader of the largest, most powerful Arab state, with a weighty set of responsibilities in regional and interna-tional affairs?

f Is the Muslim Brotherhood itself a monolithic organi-zation that does not suffer internal dissent, or will its

On no issue is the uncertainty of Egypt’s transition more appar-ent than in its relations with Israel.


members be free to debate the future path for Egypt and even disagree with the movement’s leadership on key issues?

f Are Islamists popular in Egypt today because they repre-sent an authenticity that Egyptians lacked after decades of experimenting with Western ideologies and alliances, or because the Mubarak regime took special effort in quash-ing any non-Islamic group that it feared Washington might view as a refreshing alternative, leaving the Islamists as the only cohesive and organized movement in the country?

f Do a disturbingly large number of Egyptians truly support the extreme anti-modern, anti-Western worldview of Salaf-ists, as indicated by recent elections and polling, or is this a passing peculiarity of the political transition?

f Are non-Islamist political forces so traumatized by their defeat and marginalization in the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster that they will remain divided and ineffectual for the foreseeable future, or can they rebound from their setback, overcome ideological differences, organize themselves effectively, and begin to engage in the same constituent-focused politics that have been such a central feature of the Islamists’ political formula?

f Do Egyptians (and their leaders) recognize the enormous benefits that peace with Israel has provided over more than thirty years, especially in the thousands of Egyptian lives that have not been lost to unnecessary conflict, or would they prefer the “purity” of abrogating the treaty and risking a descent to war?

f Has the issue of civilian control over the military been set-tled once and for all, or will reversion to autocracy, imple-mentation of strict religious views, or sheer governmental incompetence convince the armed forces to engage directly in politics once again?

It is too early to answer these and other critical questions about the direction of the new Egypt with any certainty. But uncertainty does not relieve U.S. policymakers from the task of charting the future U.S.-Egypt relationship.

9

Chapter 3

Building a New Relationship with the New Egypt

because of abiding u.s. interests in Egypt, Washing-ton has a stake in the choices that the country’s new govern-ment makes; disinterest is not an option. Certain outcomes are more likely than others to lead to an Egypt that is will-ing to cooperate with the United States on critical issues, and consonant with respect for Egypt’s democratic transi-tion, Washington should work to advance the prospects of such cooperation.

The United States has three main sources of leverage in its relationship with Egypt: foreign military financing (FMF), currently $1.3 billion per year, which comprises the bulk of Cairo’s defense acquisition budget; economic aid, which the Obama administration proposed to set at $250 million in 2012; and American influence with other donors, including the major international economic institutions to which Egypt is turning in light of its ongoing economic crisis, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. How should Washington use these tools to advance the prospect of bilateral cooperation? Broadly speaking, there are three options.

First, the United States could act swiftly—on its own, with other bilateral and multilateral donors, and in the con-text of international financial institutions—to ensure that Egypt has adequate financial resources to prevent a descent into crisis, civil disorder, and, potentially, failed-state status. A policy designed to prevent these calamities at all costs would be premised on the idea that a failed or near-failed state of eighty-plus million people would be a source of profound instability and a threat to U.S. interests. Notwith-


standing the profound differences in values and worldview that separate the United States from Egypt’s new Islamist leaders, the speedy provision of U.S. aid and support, with loose and minimal conditionality, would demonstrate to Cairo that it needs America as a partner, thereby cultivat-ing among Egypt’s leaders a powerful interest to work with Washington on issues important to the United States.

Alternatively, Washington could withhold aid and diplo-matic support from Egypt because it has no interest in the success of an Islamist-led government. According to this view, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political offspring, the Freedom and Justice Party—which must be considered Egypt’s ruling party despite the absence of a parliament and the technically nonpartisan position of the president—are motivated by a well-entrenched ideology that is deeply hos-tile to key U.S. interests.

On the domestic front, the Brotherhood’s commit-ment to the supremacy of a state governed by Islamic law (sharia), its intolerance toward religious minorities (includ-ing Christians, Bahais, and Muslim minorities such as Shiites), and its narrowness on women’s rights cannot be condoned as a natural outgrowth of Egypt’s “democratic transition.” In terms of foreign policy, the Brotherhood’s denial of Israel’s right to exist, embrace of 9/11 revision-ism, leadership of other Brotherhood affiliates around the region opposed to U.S. interests and allies, and rejection of key U.S. security policies in the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Mediterranean mean that a Brotherhood-led Egypt will never be a reliable partner.

A fundamental underpinning of this approach is the idea that it is a mistake to believe that President Morsi has—solely by virtue of his election—separated himself from this ideological current or that the Brotherhood itself has jet-tisoned its ideological commitments after eighty years of struggling in the trenches to achieve power. By withhold-ing aid and encouraging others to do the same, the United States would ensure the Islamists’ failure, prevent them from gaining the resources with which they could move


aggressively against U.S. interests, and perhaps open up vis-tas of opportunity for other political actors more amenable to U.S. interests to come to the fore.

While each of these first two options has a certain appeal, we reject them. Both are too risky. On the one hand, it is too risky to provide Egypt with virtually uncondi-tional aid and support and thereby feed a dangerous sense of entitlement—the notion that Egypt is somehow owed American reparations for Washington’s past support of nondemocratic leaders who served U.S. strategic interests. Adopting this approach would free Egyptian leaders from taking the tough decisions necessary to repair the economy and assume a responsible position on the regional and global stage. On the other hand, it is too risky to endanger America’s strategic situation by purposefully contributing to the creation of a potentially failed state—one with a huge population and a large military—astride the Suez Canal and across the Sinai from Israel. Moreover, both of these options place the onus on Washington to properly analyze the Islamists’ intentions, rather than putting the onus on the Egyptian government to make the right decisions—and to be held accountable for making the wrong ones.

In the current circumstances, a more effective U.S. strat-egy toward Egypt would do the opposite: present Egyptian leaders with a set of clear choices that would give them a pathway to act as responsible national leaders rather than as religiously inspired ideologues. Indeed, while it is an error to base policy on the idea that the United States can convince or compel the Islamists governing Egypt to give up their deeply held ideology, it is not an error to base policy on the idea that American leverage can affect Egyptian behavior.

Hence the third option: an approach whereby the United States continues to provide substantial economic and military aid while linking both direct support and backing for international financial support to Egyptian cooperation on key U.S. interests. To be successful, this policy should have three essential attributes: clarity, pri-oritization, and discretion.

It is too risky to pro-vide Egypt with virtually unconditional aid and sup-port and thereby feed a dangerous sense of entitlement.


f first, it requires a high degree of clarity, with Wash-ington defining for Egyptians the specific benefits they would receive or be denied depending on their specific actions vis-à-vis U.S. interests.

f second, it requires the administration to go through the sometimes-painful process of defining U.S. priori-ties. This approach will not be effective if Washington merely provides Cairo with a laundry list of preferred policy choices on a broad array of issues.

f third, it requires a deft hand, with considerable dis-cretion left to the implementers. Some aspects of the conditionality envisioned here would be open and pub-lic; other aspects may be best left to quiet exchanges between leaders and their aides.

Implemented properly, this strategy would enable the United States to use its assets to incentivize Egypt’s new leadership to act responsibly, especially on those issues most important to U.S. interests. This is especially the case given that the con-sequences of irresponsible behavior would make it nearly impossible for President Morsi and his colleagues to respond to the economic and social demands of the Egyptian peo-ple—the essential prerequisite of their political success.

Implicit in this approach is a willingness to work cooper-atively with the government of Egypt under the leadership of President Morsi, despite the ideological divide between the Muslim Brotherhood and the United States, as long as Cairo upholds its part of the strategic understanding. Con-versely, this approach means that the administration must be willing to curtail assistance in the event that Egypt fails to fulfill its part of the bargain.

In pursuit of this strategy, the United States must define and articulate its key interests in Egypt so that Cairo can know what is expected of it. Those interests can be summa-rized in three baskets:

f regional peace: This includes not only fulfilling the terms of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, but also meeting three broader responsibilities: maintaining


appropriate political, diplomatic, military, and intel-ligence links with Israel so that potential crises can be resolved cooperatively and expeditiously; playing a constructive role vis-à-vis Gaza so as to limit the potential for violent conflict again emerging from the area; and taking no steps that impede the poten-tial for a negotiated two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

f strategic cooperation with the united states: This means maintaining the close working relationship between the Egyptian and American armed forces, including privileged status accorded to U.S. ships tran-siting the Suez Canal and U.S. planes flying through Egyptian airspace; practical support for U.S. regional security objectives; and full commitment to the fight against terrorism, especially within Egypt’s borders (i.e., the extremist threat in Sinai).

f constitutional democracy and political pluralism: This means maintaining a system of con-tested elections that are open to an array of political parties across a broad spectrum and governed by the rule of law. In addition, the United States has an inter-est in seeing Egypt’s democracy develop in such a way that religious minorities, and their right to worship freely, are protected in both law and practice, and that women’s right to participate fully in the social, political, and economic life of the country is not inhibited by the imposition of new, religiously inspired restrictions.

How Washington relates these priorities to Cairo and expresses the terms of U.S. aid and support is as impor-tant as the definition of these interests. Here, the themes of clarity, prioritization, and discretion apply as well. Specifi-cally, U.S. leverage could most effectively be exerted if the administration presents these three baskets of interests to the Egyptian leadership in the following manner:

f a policy of strategic conditionality: The president should agree to certify annually to Congress


that Egypt is fulfilling the “regional peace” and “stra-tegic cooperation” obligations described above as a precondition for continuation of U.S. aid and for con-tinued support for Egypt with international financial institutions, multilateral agencies, and other donors.

f a policy of informal conditionality: Through both private conversation and public messaging, U.S. political leaders—including the president, senior administration officials, and influential members of relevant congressional committees—should explain to Egyptians how difficult it would be for the United States to maintain a close and mutually beneficial relationship with a government that failed to meet the standards of building toward a full, constitutional democracy and of preserving an environment of political pluralism. The reality of American values—as reflected in our own domestic politics—makes it difficult, if not impossible, to sustain a policy of generous economic support to a regime that violates such basic human rights.

All of these interests—regional peace, strategic coopera-tion, and constitutionalism/pluralism—are important. Separating the first two from the third in this manner reflects the cold reality that the U.S. government will not provide aid to Egypt if Cairo fails to fulfill its part of the strategic bargain that lies at the heart of the relationship. And with respect to the third basket, the U.S. government will not have the political support to provide such aid even if it wanted to in the event that Cairo either moves back-ward in its progress toward constitutional democracy or systematically violates the universal rights of its citizens, especially women and religious minorities.

By this differentiated approach, linking U.S. aid and support to Egyptian actions and commitments vis-à-vis key U.S. interests, the administration could engage the Egyptian leadership with both clarity and discretion and, if successful, bring about more consistently responsible behavior from Cairo on the broad range of U.S. policy


concerns. Such a policy, effectively implemented, would provide the United States with will real strategic value for the large sums of aid given to Egypt. That is espe-cially important given the tough fiscal environment in the United States more generally, the competing demands on America’s foreign assistance programs more specifically, and the eminently reasonable request from Congress to reassess the cost-benefit analysis of aid to Egypt in the post-Mubarak era.

The recent conflict in Gaza—and Egypt’s role in secur-ing a cease fire—may provide a basis on which to forge the interest-based engagement recommended in this report. The White House has praised the “constructive” role that President Morsi has played, and although Egypt’s initial uncritical support for Hamas was troubling, the president’s own conduct in the crisis seemed to reflect recognition that his interests lie more in working with Washington to stabilize the situation than in supporting Hamas’ vio-lent adventurism. This crisis only underscores the impor-tance of maintaining a watchful eye on Egypt’s activity in the region, of retaining flexibility when it comes to U.S. economic assistance, and of carefully monitoring whether Egypt continues to fulfill its side of the strategic bargain.

Even in the best of circumstances, one should antici-pate a rocky relationship with the new Egypt. If Egypt adheres to its commitments on peace and security and stays within the boundaries of acceptable behavior on political and social issues, the relationship will still endure public criticism from certain quarters inside the United States that Washington should, under no circum-stances, provide aid and assistance to a government that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood and espouses the Brotherhood’s worldview. And if Egypt comports itself responsibly on all these fronts, there are still bound to be numerous statements and actions by Brotherhood leaders and other Islamists aligned with the government that will be viewed by many in Washington as hateful, outrageous, incendiary, and vile. And one cannot count, of course, on

Even in the best of cir-cumstances, one should anticipate a rocky rela-tionship with the new Egypt.


the best of circumstances. In practice, this means Wash-ington should pursue an interest-based engagement with the new Egypt with no illusions.

17

Chapter 4

Sinai: A Region of Special Concern

there is one arena in which a more dramatic display of conditionality is needed—incentivizing Egyptian commit-ment to fight terrorism in the Sinai via both military and civilian means. When Egypt and Israel made peace, Sinai was the buffer that made peace possible. Today, however, the spread of radicalism and terrorism is transforming Sinai into a swamp that will suck peace into an abyss. The poten-tial for instability, crisis, and international conflict is all too real. Terrorists in the peninsula—a consortium of radical jihadists, Palestinian extremists, disaffected Bedouin, and Iranian-backed elements—have already attacked the gas pipeline to Jordan and Israel fifteen times, tried repeatedly to attack Israel from Sinai to ignite a crisis between Egypt and Israel, and killed significant numbers of Egyptian secu-rity forces in brazen attacks.

There are many reasons why Sinai has become such a center of terrorism and radicalism—lack of interest in its economic and social development by the central author-ity in Cairo, reluctance by the Egyptian armed forces to dispatch even the number of troops allotted under agree-ment with Israel to address the Sinai security problem, and the lure of the contraband trade into Gaza and Israel, to name just three. Whatever the reason, the problem has now risen to the level where U.S. interests in regional peace and security are at stake.

Therefore, the administration should use a portion of Egypt’s FMF—at least $100 million to start, and increasing over time—to incentivize more aggressive efforts by the Egyptian government to combat terrorism in Sinai. Fund-ing could be targeted toward additional counterterror-


ism tools (communications, surveillance, transportation, appropriate weaponry) as well as investments in Sinai’s socioeconomic infrastructure that might erode the politi-cal attraction of the terrorists.

Egypt’s military leadership will protest against this Sinai-directed spending of U.S. assistance, but for the sake of Egypt’s own internal security and the long-term health of the Egypt-Israel relationship—which was (and remains) a key pillar on which the U.S.-Egypt relationship is based—Washington needs to use the financial lever to ensure that Cairo addresses this growing problem.

19

Chapter 5

A Broader Engagement with the New Egypt

to ensure the durability of U.S. relations with post-Mubarak Egypt, the United States must not limit its engage-ment to the Egyptian government or the Islamist parties that dominate the political scene. Non-Islamist parties and the broad range of civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations also deserve the attention and concern of U.S. diplomats in Cairo and political leaders back in Washington.

Given the U.S. interest in a pluralistic Egypt, American policymakers must guard against the impression—wide-spread in Egypt and around the Middle East—that Wash-ington endorses the Muslim Brotherhood as the rightful and appropriate heir to Mubarak and made the Brother-hood’s rise to power possible. Prior to Tahrir Square and throughout the subsequent transition, it was U.S. policy to commit funds and political capital to develop a vibrant civil society. This included providing support for election educa-tion and political organizing training to numerous parties and political groups. Given the uncertainty of Egypt’s polit-ical transition and the high value Washington should place on the process of building real constitutional democracy, it would be a mistake to curtail these efforts just because Egypt has had its first contested presidential election.

Indeed, while the Brotherhood and Salafists will likely dominate Egyptian politics in coming years, the chance that they will fail to provide answers to the country’s numerous political, economic, and social problems may, in the lon-ger run, create an opening for a non-Islamist alternative. Washington should try to cultivate this next generation of non-Islamists, not least because a stronger non-Islamist opposition presents the best opportunity for pulling the


Brotherhood in a more moderate direction, as opposed to the current situation in which a strong Salafist oppo-sition is the magnet pulling the Brotherhood toward a more ideologically pure course.

As noted above, the outcome of Egypt’s democratic transition remains uncertain. In this environment, the Obama administration should have a policy of engage-ment with the broadest possible spectrum of political parties, groups, movements, and leaders. Now is not the time to trim the sails of U.S. outreach; to the con-trary, now is the time to redouble U.S. effort to talk with the broad array of actors in Egypt’s fluid political environment. Washington should make special effort to reach out to those courageous groups and individu-als willing to project shared values and interests with the United States. This policy of engagement should include a renewed commitment to target substantial sums for civil society promotion, enthusiasm for which has waned inside the administration since the Egyp-tian government’s crackdown on U.S.-supported NGOs in the interim period. It should be a goal of U.S. policy for Egyptians of all political stripes to see a more com-prehensive American engagement, one that incorpo-rates U.S. diplomats, businessmen, investors, journalists, scholars, NGOs, and civic groups. Such an approach is in America’s interest as much as in Egypt’s.

In this regard, it is important to note that America’s engagement with the new Egypt can accommodate working cooperatively to advance mutual interests with a government headed by an Islamist president and, at the same time, working cooperatively with parties, groups, and civil society organizations that are the govern-ment’s ideological competitors. There is no contradic-tion between these two arms of U.S. policy. While pur-suing both tracks may pose tactical challenges for U.S. diplomats, this policy protects U.S. interests and is likely to contribute to Egypt’s democratic transition, which is itself an important U.S. objective.

A stronger non-Islamist

opposition presents the

best opportunity for pulling

the Brotherhood in a more moderate direction.

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1828 L STREET NW, SUITE 1050, WASHINGTON DC, 20036

WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG

“A more effective U.S. strategy toward Egypt would present Egyptian leaders with a set of clear choices that would give them strong incentives to act as responsible national leaders rather than as religiously inspired ideologues. Indeed, while it is an er-ror to base policy on the idea that the United States can convince or compel the Islamists governing Egypt to give up their deeply held ideology, it is not an error to base policy on the idea that

American leverage can affect Egyptian behavior.”

Documents

ENGAGEMENT - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy · new thinking into the policy process at precisely the moment when it is most needed—the moment of presidential transi-tion,