Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure: Understanding them before auditing them Arshad Noor CTO, StrongAuth, Inc. Chair, OASIS EKMI-TC

Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure: Understanding them before auditing themArshad NoorCTO, StrongAuth, Inc.Chair, OASIS EKMI-TC

Agenda

• What is an EKMI?• Components of an EKMI• Auditing an EKMI• ISACA members at OASIS EKMI• Summary

Business Challenges

• Regulatory compliance–PCI-DSS, FISMA, HIPAA, SB-1386, etc.

• Avoiding fines–ChoicePoint: $15M, Nationwide: $2M

• Avoiding lawsuits–TJX (multiple), Bank of America

• Avoiding negative publicity to the brand–TJ Maxx, Ralph Lauren, Citibank, Wells

Fargo, IBM, Ernst & Young, Fidelity, etc.

The Encryption Problem

● Generate● Encrypt● Decrypt● Escrow● Authorize● Recover● Destroy






....and so on

Key-management silos

Application Application Application Application Application Application

Database or DB Driver

KM


KM


KM


KM


KM


KM


KM


KM


KM


KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

OS or its Drivers

KM

Key Management Connections NetworkPKI

What is an EKMI?● An Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure is:

“A collection of technology, policies

and procedures for managing all cryptographic keys in the enterprise.”

EKMI Characteristics● A single place to define EKM policy● A single place to manage all keys● Standard protocols for EKM services● Platform and Application-independent● Scalable to service millions of clients● Available even when network fails● Extremely secure

EKM Harmony

PKI SKMS

Application




OS or its Drivers

Application Application Application Application Application

OS or its Drivers

OS or its Drivers

NetworkKey Management Connections

EKMI

The Encryption Solution

WAN

SKS Server

• Generate• Protect• Escrow• Authorize• Recover• Destroy

• Encrypt• Decrypt

SKS Server






EKMI Components● Public Key Infrastructure

● For digital certificate management; for strong-authentication, secure storage & transport of symmetric encryption keys

● Symmetric Key Management System● SKS Server for symmetric key management

● SKCL for client interaction with SKS Server● SKSML for SKCL-SKS communication

● EKMI = PKI + SKMS

PKI

• Well known, but not well understood• Reputation for being costly and complex• BUT.......–Used in every e-commerce solution–Used by DOD of most democratic

nations–Citizen cards, e-Passports–Corporate Access Cards–US Personal Identity Verification (PIV) – IETF PKIX standards

SKMS: SKS Server

• Symmetric Key Services Server–Contains all symmetric encryption

keys –Generates, escrows and retrieves keys–ACLs authorizing access to encryption

keys–Central policy for symmetric keys: • Key-size, key-type, key-lifetime, etc.

–Accepts SKSML protocol requests–Functions like a DNS-server

SKMS: SKCL

• Symmetric Key Client Library–Communicates with SKS Server–Requests (new or old) symmetric keys–Caches keys locally (KeyCachePolicy)–Encrypts & Decrypts data

(KeyUsePolicy)• Currently supports 3DES, AES-128, AES-192 & AES-256

–Makes SKSML requests–Functions like DNS-client library

SKMS: SKSML• Symmetric Key Services Markup

Language–Request new symmetric key(s) from

SKS server, when• Encrypting new information, or • Rotating symmetric keys

–Request existing symmetric key(s) from SKS server for decrypting previously encrypted ciphertext–Request key-cache-policy information

for client

The Big Picture

DB Server

Crypto Module

ApplicationServer

Crypto Module

SKCL

C/C++Application

RPGApplication

JavaApplication

Key Cache

JNIRPGNI

ServerClient

Network1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Client Application makes a request for a symmetric key2. SKCL makes a digitally signed request to the SKS3. SKS verifies SKCL request, generates, encrypts, digitally signs & escrows key in DB4. Crypto HSM provides security for RSA Signing & Encryption keys of SKS5. SKS responds to SKCL with signed and encrypted symmetric key6. SKCL verifies response, decrypts key and hands it to the Client Application7. Native (non-Java) applications make requests through Java Native Interface

7 7

Security in an SKMS

• Symmetric keys are encrypted with SKS server's RSA public-key for secure storage

• Client requests are digitally signed (RSA)• Server responses are digitally signed

(RSA) and encrypted (RSA)• All database records are digitally signed

(RSA) when stored, and verified when accessed – including history logs – for message integrity

Common KM problems

• Using proprietary encryption algorithm• “Hiding” encryption key on the machine• Embedding encryption key in software• Encrypting symmetric key with another• Using a single key across the enterprise• Backing up key with data on the same

tape• Using weak passwords for Password-

Based-Encryption (PBE)• No key-rotation or key-compromise plan

Auditing an EKMI

• Key-management policy• Prerequisite controls:–Physical access control to EKMI

machines–Logical & network access control to EKMI–Standard security controls• Firewall• Minimal attack-surface (minimal services)• Security patches• Security logging

Auditing an SKMS Client

• Is a hardware token being used? • How many people are required to log into

the token to activate it?• How many people have access to token?• How often is the token PIN changed?• How much data is encrypted with 1 key?• SHA-1 hash of client library?• Is the token backed up and how is it

protected?

Auditing an SKMS Server

• Is a hardware token being used? • How many people are required to log

into the token to activate it?• How many people have access to

token?• How often is token PIN changed?• SHA-1 hashes of server jar files?• Is the token backed up and how is it

protected?

OASIS IDTrust Member Section

● Identity & Trusted infrastructure components● Identity & Trust Policies, Enforcement, Education & Outreach● Identify barriers and emerging issues● Current Technical Committees:–Enterprise Key Management

Infrastructure TC–Public Key Infrastructure Adoption

TC

OASIS EKMI-TC● Four (4) objectives & Sub-Committees:– Standardize on Symmetric Key Services

Markup Language (SKSML)– Create Implementation & Operations

Guidelines– Create Audit Guidelines– Create Interoperability Test-Suite

Current EKMI-TC Members● FundServ (Canada)● PA Consulting (UK)● PrimeKey (Sweden)● Red Hat (USA)● StrongAuth (USA)● US Department of Defense (USA)● Visa International (USA)● Wave Systems (USA)● Many security/audit focused individuals

ISACA – OASIS

• Many ISACA members from San Francisco are EKMI-TC (AGSC) members

• Full-day workshop scheduled for October-November 2007–Setting up an SKMS–Operating an SKMS–Auditing an SKMS–Attacking an SKMS

Conclusion●“Securing the Core” should have been Plan A from the beginning ... but its not too late to remediate.● OASIS EKMI-TC is driving new key-management standards that cuts across platforms, applications and industries.● Auditing EKMIs requires new levels of knowledge and understanding.● Get involved!

Thank you!

Documents

Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure: Understanding them before auditing them Arshad Noor CTO, StrongAuth, Inc. Chair, OASIS EKMI-TC