Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3714             January 26, 1909

ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL, petitioner-appellee, vs.

THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL., respondents. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for appellant.F. Buencamino, for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being $505.05, United States currency.

This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known asObrasPias de la SagradaMitra, the former on the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.

The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and registration of the property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.

From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. It is a kindred case to CiriloMapa vs. The Insular Government, decided by this court on February 19, 1908, reported in 10 Phil. Rep., 175.

As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The issue was, whether the lands used as a fishery , for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some distance from the sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be overflowed at high tide could be registered as private property on the strength of ten years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Phil. Commission. The point decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to the conclusion being that congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in one of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into two division of agricultural land. In the concurring opinion, in order to avoid misapprehension on the part of those not familiar with United States land legislation and a misunderstanding of the reach of the doctrine, it was pointed out that under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States the phrase "public lands" is held to be equivalent to "public domain," and dos not by any means include all lands of Government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like general laws. Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous items; the first includes not only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.

This meaning attached to the phrase "public lands" by Congress in its land legislation is settled by usage and adjudication beyond a doubt, and without variation. It is therefore doing the utmost violence to all rules of construction to contend that in this law, dealing with the same subject-matter in connection with these Islands, a different meaning had, without indication or motive, been imported into the words. They cannot have one meaning in any other statute and a different and conflicting meaning in this statute. Where property in general is referred to therein, other and apt phrases are used in order to include it; for instance, section 12 provides "that all the property and rights which have been acquired in the Phil. Islands by the United States ... are hereby placed under the control of the Government of the said Islands." Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.

Among the authorities cited in the Mapa case are two, Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1), and Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co. (153 U.S., 273), in which it was held that general public land laws did not apply to land over which the tide ebbs and flows. Mr. Justice Gray, in Shively vs. Bowlby, which is in itself an epitome of the American Law of Waters, speaking of the tide lands, said:

But Congress has never undertaken by general laws to dispose of such lands. . . .

The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public lands, has constantly acted upon the theory that those lands, whether in the interior, or on the coast, above high- water mark, may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to encourage the settlement of the country, but that the navigable water and the soils under them. whether within the above the ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and remain public highways; and being chiefly valuable for the public purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and for the improvement necessary to secure and promote those purposes, shall not be granted away during the period of territorial government. (Pp. 48 and 49.)

The conclusions of the court are in part stated as follows:

Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner of lands above high-water mark. They are of great value to the public for the purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people . . . .

Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States, whether by cession from one of the States, or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of whole people, and in trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the territory . . . .

The United States, while hold the country as a territory, having all the powers both of national and municipal government, may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights in the soil below high-water mark of tide waters. But that have never done so in general laws. (Pp. 57 and 58.)

In Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co., it was said by Mr. Justice Brewer (p. 284);

It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands does not extend to tide lands .... It provided that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92 U.S., 761, 763.) "The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to described such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws."

In Illinois Central R.R. Company vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387) Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

That the State holds the title tot he lands under the navigable waters of lake Michigan within its limits, in the same manner that the State hold title to soils under tide water, by the common law, we have already shown, and that title necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from that which the States holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the States that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and so long as their disposition is made for such purposes, no valid objections can be made to the grants .... The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining .... The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, that can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace .... So with trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like lands under navigable waters, they can not be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the State.

The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and can not be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. . . . . (Pp. 452-455.)

Mr. Justice Fields quotes from an opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, delivered in a case in the Circuit Court, speaking of lands under water, as follows (p. 457):

Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large. It is true that to utilize the fisheries, especially those of shellfish, it was necessary to parcel them out to particular operators, and employ the rent or consideration for the benefit of the whole people; but this did not alter the character of the title. The land remained subject to all other public uses as before, especially to those of navigation and commerce, which are always paramount to those of public fisheries. It is also true that portions of the submerged shoals and flats, which really interfered with navigation, and could better subserve the purposes of commerce by being filled up and reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of useless parts affect the character of the title to the remainder.

These citations are thus given at length in order to make clear, first, the lands under the ebb and flow of the tide of navigable waters are not in America understood to be included in the phrase "public lands" in Acts of Congress of United States; nor, perforce, can they best understood in laws of the Philippine Commission drawn immediately under the sanction of those Acts; and second, that such lands are under existing Congressional legislation the subject of private

ownership, any occupation therefore be subordinate to the public purpose of navigation and fishery. While as well in the original thirteen States in which there was never a national public domain to which the land laws of Congress could apply as in States more recently created out of that domain and which upon their formation became masters of their own land policy the local laws govern riparian and littoral rights, subject only to Congressional control in matters of foreign and interstate commerce ( U.S. vs. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S., 391), yet, as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, which are uniformly and consistently declined to assume the function of authorizing or regulating private appropriation of such rights. Therefore, in the absence of specific Congressional legislation, it is impossible for individuals to acquire title under the ten years provision of Act No. 926 or even through a definite grants from the local legislature of lands beneath navigable waters in which the tide ebbs and flows, except for wharf-age or other purposes auxiliary to navigation or other public uses, unless in conformity with the preexisting local law of the Archipelago.

The matter is dwelt is upon for the reason that the late Attorney-General in his very able brief calls attention to the effect apprehended from the extension of the words "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 to include all public lands not forest or mineral in character, specifying two acts of the Philippine Commission, the validity of which he fears might thereby be called into question. The first of these, Act No. 1039, dedicates to use of the Navy Department of the United States Government certain ground and buildings in Cavite, while the other, Act No. 1654, is a fore-shore law regulating the control and disposal of filled Government lands. If the term "agricultural lands" be held to include all government property not forest or mineral in character, he suggests that these Acts, not being in conformity with the procedure of Act No. 926, as approved by Congress, would be invalid, and moreover, that the Philippine Government would be seriously tied up in the management and disposition of other lands owned by it.

Without finally passing on this question in relation to lands the owners of which are not before us parties to this action, it is appropriate, in answering the argument of the law officer of the State, to point out that this consequence appears to be avoided by the restricted sense given to the words "public lands" or "public domain" in the Act of Congress and in Act No. 926, as hereinbefore noted. Neither the property affected by Act No. 1039, already in use by the Navy Department of the United States, nor the foreshore land mentioned in Act No. 1654, which is under the ebb and flow of the tide, was, in so far as appears in the Acts before us, part of the public domain to be disposed of under sections 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, and for that reason it is not included in any of the three subdivisions of "public lands" as agricultural or otherwise, although it was part of the property acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States by the treaty of peace with Spain, which by section 12 of that Act was "placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It would seem that the validity of the Cavite Act can not be successfully assailed on this ground, while it may well be that The Fore-shore Act on examination will be found to fall, as to its general purpose, within the authorization of section 11 of the Act of Congress, whereby the duty is imposed upon the Island government of improving the harbors and navigable waters in the interest of commerce.

As a consequence, it follows that The Public Land Act did not apply to the fisheries in the Mapa case, if they are to be regarded as constituting, in a general sense, land under tidal waters. It becomes necessary, therefore, to refer to the character of the lands.

Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all being covered by one brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic citations he describes that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known asmanglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the

sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American Jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains." Mr. Justice Bradley, in the passage quoted by Mr. Justice Field, makes an exception of submerged shoals and flats. In Railroad Company vs. Schurmeir (74 U.S., 272) , a Government patent of public land bordering upon a river was held to include a parcel submerge at very high water and separated from the mainland by a slough in which the water ran when ordinarily high. In Mobile vs. Hallett (41 U.S., 260), at page 266. Mr. Justice Catron remarked in his dissenting opinion:

. . . and that a mud flat, flowed by tide water, is the subject of grant by the Government to an individual, I think can not well be doubted by anyone acquainted with the southern country; when such valuable portions of it are mud flats, in the constant course of reclamation.

In several of the older States along the Atlantic coast such flats, either by force of ordinance, custom, judicial construction, or local laws are held to pass under private grants as appurtenant to the uplands. (Winslow vs.Patten, 34 Maine, 25; Litchfield vs. Scituate, 135 Mass., 39; People vs. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y., 71; Stevens vs. P.& N. Railroad, 5 Vroom, 34 N.J. Law, 532.) There is even stronger reason for excepting mud flats from the rule of tide lands in these Islands, owing to the peculiarities of their configuration and to the nature of the tropical growth thereon, and whatever may be action of the tide, we do not think that in the Philippines such of the shoals covered by this vegetation, whether spontaneously or by cultivation, as are not available for free navigation, or required for any other purpose of general benefit, can be considered tidal land reserved for public use alone, under the governmental trust for commerce and public fishery, but on the contrary, we regard them as public property, susceptible of a sort of cultivation and of improvement, and as such, subject to occupation under paragraph 6 of section 54 of the Land Law. Instances may hereafter arise of fisheries unduly established in what are clearly navigable waters which would constitute a nuisance, and not be the subject of prescription or of grant. A brief reference to the five cases under consideration in this court, however, will serve to show that they all fairly fall within the benefits of the law. In the Mapa case1 the property was far from the the sea, partly occupied as fish pond, as nipa land, and as a salt pit. It does not appear whether it was connected with the sea by nature or by art, or whether the tide ebbed or flowed upon it, or whether the salt was sufficient to impart to any portion of it a mineral character. In the Santiago case2 there was a fishery about two thousand yards from the sea, with which it communicated by a river, and a portion of the inclosure was dedicated to growing the aquatic tree called bacawan. The fishery had been constructed by man, upon land heretofore sown with this tree. In the Gutierrez case3 it was shown that the land was partly highland, growing fruit trees, and partly lowland , converted by the occupant of the upland into a fishery by this labor. In the Baello case,4 the river running to the sea was a hundred meters away, the salt water therefrom reaching the lowland by means of an artificial canal cut by the owner of the land when he gave up cultivating bacawan thereon, an made it into a fishery. In the Montano case, although there was a considerable depth of water over the soil, yet before the fishery was made, some thirty years before the trial, bacawan had been sown and propagated in the mud by the owner who finally sold the entire cut when he built the dikes.

All these lots, in their original state, whether near the sea or at a distance from it inland, and whether bare or washed by the tides, were not covered by waters practically navigable and were filled, whether naturally or artificially, with vegetation sometimes cultivated and in common use for fuel and for building purposes, and they were all adapted to fisheries or fish hatcheries by the

labor of man introducing or regulating the access of salt water thereto. It is obvious that that all five cases are of the same general nature and that one rule must be applied to them all.

In this discussion of the meaning which the Congress of the United States attached to the phrase "public lands" in the Philippine Bill, we have assumed that it was used in the same sense as in other laws enacted by that body. If, however, it can be considered as employed with reference to the peculiar conditions of the territory to which it was to be applied and to the local law or usage prevailing therein, the result would not be different. In many of its general features the Spanish law of public lands in the Philippines resembled the American. Government property was of two kinds — first, that of public use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public character are inalienable; those of the second are not.

By the royal decree of February 13, 1894, it was enacted that all "the land, soil, ground not under cultivation, and forests in the Philippine Islands should be considered saleable crown lands," which are not included in the four exceptions stated, among which were "those which belonged to the forest zones which the State desires to hold for the Commonwealth." This corresponds in the main to the American classification into Government property, public lands, and forest reserve. Mineral lands are elsewhere defined. It is to be noted, however, that in the two languages terms ordinarily equivalent are not in this relation employed in the same sense and that lands de dominiopublico signify quite a different thing from the arbitrary English Phrases "public lands" or "public domain."

The Law of Waters of 1866, which was the latest Spanish Law of Waters extended to these Islands, provides that private property can not be acquired in lands preserving the character of public ownership (title 1, art. 1, par. 29), and among the lands declared of public ownership and use by article 1 of chapter 1 of title 5 of the same law are:

The seashore. — By shore is understood the land alternately covered and uncovered by the sea in its tidal movement. Its interior, or land limit, is the point reached by the highest and equinoctial tides. At those places not affected by tides, the land limit is the highest point reached by sea water in ordinary storms or hurricanes. (Par. 3.)

So that under this legislation the same question also presented itself as to what constituted seashore, which was of public use and trust and therefore not alienable. This question can not be said to have been settled by official ruling at the time of the American occupation. From the official records it appears that there were then pending for registration a great number of possessory expedientes, twenty-two of which, made before April 17, 1895, were from the Province of Pampanga alone, in which the land was described as manglares. Under the royal decree of 1894 such manglares appear at the outset to have been registered and considered alienable and numbers of them were conceded by adjustment, including considerable tracts in the town of Sexmoan and Lubao in Pampanga. Claims having been made that on account of the trees growing thereon they formed part of the forest reserve and also because, being covered and uncovered by the tide, they were part of the shore, and in either case were inalienable, the engineer in chief of the forestry district of the center of Luzon addressed, on January 7, 1893, a communication to the inspector general de montes ( Forestry Department) in which he expressed an opinion that as part of the shore they were not subject to private ownership and asked for an early decision of the question. On November 26, 1893, the acting inspector-general notified the chief of the district of the Visayas in Mindanao that his excellency, the governor-general, had that they ordered all action suspended on expedientes ofmanglar and nipa lands and salt marshes until the questions involved in regard thereto should be determined. In this condition the matter remained until the expiration of the Spanish sovereignty.

By article 14 of the Law of Waters the right of shore fishery was declared public, but by article 23 authority might be granted individuals to establish shore hatcheries for fish and shellfish, and by

article 15 salt-water ponds on private ground not communicating with the sea by water navigable by boats were recognized as private property, while chapter 10 permitted and regulated the draining of swamps and marshes, both of private and of public ownership.

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law the custom had grown up of convertingmanglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became common feature of settlements along the coast and at the time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. In our opinion it was the object of Congress not to work such a result but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the purposes of the treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land Registration is affirmed, without costs.

Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARELLANO, C.J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing decision, but reserve my opinion as to the scope of the phrase "public lands" in the Act of Congress referred to.

WILLIARD, J., concurring in the result.

In the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government ( 10 Phil. Rep., 175 ) it is stated in the opinion, page 176, that —

The only question submitted tot he court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the question whether the land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted.

The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926, in which the phrase used is "agricultural public lands."

Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly and exclusively used. The entire discussion was directed to the question as to whether the property there in question being "public land," it could be considered asagricultural public land, and the conclusion reached is stated at page 182, as follows:

In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in Act No. 926, means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

In that case the land in question was a long distance from the sea. In fact, the entire town of Molo was between it and the water. It could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore, the opinion was devoted to a consideration of not what were "public lands" but whether this particular tract was or was not agricultural public land. The question what the phrase "public lands" meant neither considered nor decided in that opinion, for its resolution was not necessary. In the concurring opinion, however, that question was discussed and it was stated that the

phrase "public lands" used in Act No. 926 must be interpreted according to the American understanding of the words employed and the meaning of the terms as definitely fixed by the decrees of the United States Supreme Court.

This statement was not necessary to the decision of the case then under discussion and was moreover, as shall attempt to show hereafter, not a correct statement made in that opinion, to the effect that there may be real property belonging to the Government which would not be included in the phrase "public lands," there can be no doubt concerning its correctness. This is and always has been apparent. It is indicated by articles 339 and 340 of the Civil Code, which are as follows:

ART. 339. Property of public ownership is —

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.

2. That belonging exclusively to the State without being for public use which is destined to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until concession has been granted.

ART. 340. All other property belonging to the State which has not the conditions stated in the preceding article is considered as private property.

Articles 24 and 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law also indicate it. These articles are as follows:

ART. 24. All real estate and property rights thereto may be recorded, without exception, whether belonging to private parties, to the State, to the province, to the municipality, or to civil or ecclesiastical corporations.

ART. 25. Exceptions to the record required by article 2 of the law are:

First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon roads, and roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of towns. provided they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, any other analogous property during the time they are in common and general use, always reserving the servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.

Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.

In the Mapa case it was not necessary to decide, nor was it there decided, what the real property was which, belonging to the government, still would not come within the phrase "public lands," nor how private persons could acquire rights in such property, nor whether that phrase should have the same meaning here as it has in the United states. In the present case, it is said in the opinion that "all these five cases are of the same general character, and that the same rule should be applied to all." If it was not necessary to decide in the Mapa case the questions above mentioned, why is it necessary to discuss and decide them here? We are all agreed (1) that these lands are not tidal lands and are public lands, and (2) that they are agricultural lands. Having arrived at these conclusions, I see no reason for the question as to what the result would be if they were tidal lands. It is apparent that anything said upon that question is not necessary to the decision of these cases and is obiter dictum.

Whether Act. No. 1654, relating to the reclaimed land in Manila near the Luneta, is authorized by section 11 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or by section 12, is a question outside of the issues in the case at bar, and it seems unnecessary now to commit the court to any definite resolution thereof. If it is the purpose of the decision to announce the doctrine that rights in tidal waters in the Philippines must be governed by the principles already announced by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited, this objection attains greater force. Thus construed, it decides the rights of innumerable persons in the Islands who have reclaimed land from the sea and built upon it, none of whom has had an opportunity to be heard before his rights are thus decided.

These objections to the decision, on the ground that it discusses and apparently decides questions not before the court, and which affect parties not before it, would not be so serious if the conclusions reached were sound. But they are, as I believe, erroneous. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited the opinion have nothing to do either with the question as to what rights private persons can acquire in tidal lands in the Philippines or with the meaning which should be given to the phrase "public lands" found in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

1. Upon the first question as to private rights in tidal lands, it has been definitely settled by the Supreme Court at Washington in many decisions, which are collected in the case of Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1 ), cited in the opinion, that the rights of private persons in such lands depend upon the law of the State where the lands are. The court said in that case (p. 40) :

VII. The later judgments of this court clearly establish that the title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark of navigable waters are governed by the local laws of the several States, subject, of course, to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution.

It also appears from that case that these laws vary in different States. The court said, at page 26:

The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but that each State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another.

In Massachusetts the owner of the upland is the owner in fee to the low-water mark if not beyond 100 rods. In other States he is the owner in fee only to high-water mark. In Minnesota the owner of the upland has the exclusive right to occupy the shore in front of his land, not only to low-water mark but even into the water to the point of navigability, and to occupy it for purely private purposes. And he is so far the owner of the land under water to the point of navigability that he can sell portions thereof and retain himself the shore line. ( Hanford vs. St. Paul & D.R. Co., 43 Minn., 104.) It will be observed that some of the cases cited in support of the decision in the case at bar arose in Massachusetts and Minnesota. The result is that when the Supreme Court of the United States decides a case relating to such lands it necessarily decides it according to the law of the State from which it comes. So that if any law of American origin is to be applied here it can not be a national law of waters for none exists. It must be necessarily be the law of some one of the different States. This would require a selection of the jurisprudence of one of those States which this court should not attempt to make.

At the cession of the Islands to the United States there was in force here a body of laws relating to this subject. These laws are still in force. They are found in the Law of Waters of 1866 and in articles 407 to 425 of the Civil Code. Cases which have heretofore arisen in this court have been decided with reference to these laws and not with reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to cases arising there. Among others are the cases of Ker &

Co. vs. Cuden (6 Phil. Rep., 732), and Jover vs. Insular Government1 (No. 2674, decided March 25, 1908). That questions relating to tidal lands should continue to be so decided seems to me free from doubt. It may be said that the decision does not intend to announce a contrary doctrine. If it does not, I see no purpose, for example, in the long citation from the case of Illinois Central R. Co. vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387), nor in the declaration that the purpose of the citation of these decisions is to show in the second place that the rights in tidal lands are not under the legislation of Congress the subject of private property.

2. The second question relates to the meaning which should be given to the phrase "public lands" in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. In the concurring opinion in the Mapa case it was stated, as has been seen, that it has the same meaning here as in the United States. This doctrine seems to be reiterated in the opinion in this case. After announcing it in equivocal terms, it is said, to be sure that the result would be the same if the words were to be construed with reference to the local law. This would be true if the laws of the other two jurisdictions were the same. But it is easily demonstrated that they are not.

With reference to tidal lands, we have seen that in some of the States private persons are the owners of the land between high and low water mark. By the Law of Waters of 1866, and article 339 of the Civil Code, the shore or beach is public property. It not only does not belong to private persons, but it is not even the private property of the State.

The difference between the two systems is more marked when we consider public roads and streets and the beds of non-navigable rivers. By the common law of England, which has been followed by and is now in force in a great many of the States, the beds of such rivers belong to the owners of the adjoining land. But by the law here in force (arts. 339 and 407, Civil Code) they are public property and can not be considered even as the private property of the State. The same is true of streets and roads. (Arts. 339 and 344, Civil Code.)When the United States issues a patent for public land owned by it situated in the State of Minnesota, for example, and bounded by a non-navigable river.the patentee becomes the owner of one-half of the bed of the river. When the Spanish Government issued a patent for land in the Philippines bounded by river, the patentee did not become the owner of the bed of the river. His ownership extended only to low-water mark.

What has been said of rivers is true of roads. If the phrase "public lands" be given the meaning here that it has in the United States, whenever the Director of Public Lands grants a patent for land bounded by a non-navigable river or road the patentee will become the owner of one-half of the bed of the river and one-half of the road. This result would be in direct conflict with the articles of the Civil Code above cited, and would amount to a repeal thereof. Such a result Congress never could have intended. Prior to the treaty of Paris the Spanish Government was the owner of the roads and the beds of streams in the Philippines in trust for the benefit of the people. The treaty itself did not change this status. On the contrary, it preserved rights of property as they then existed. By the treaty, the United States acquired interest which the Spanish Government had in roads and the beds of streams. It did not become the absolute owner thereof.

The laws of Spain relating to this matter were continued in force by the proclamation of General Merritt. This would have been the result even without any proclamation.(American Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet., 511.) They are in force now, and the Government is still the owner of roads and the beds of rivers unless Congress by the use of the phrase "public lands" in the Act of July 1, 1902, has repealed the articles of the Civil Code above cited. I do not think that such an intention can be attributed to it . It is more reasonable to say that it is intended to give to the phrase the meaning which was given to it by the laws in force in the territory where the Act was to take effect. And this intention is more apparent when we consider that there then existed article 340 of the Civil Code, which contained a complete definition of these lands belonging to the Government, which it had the right to dispose of as private property. It had no intention of

disposing of property which it held in trust. The property which the Commission intended to dispose of by Act No. 926 was undoubtedly the private property of the State as defined by article 340.

To say that Congress had a different purpose would be to attribute to it an intention to discriminate against the Philippines and to impose upon the Islands laws other than those there in force, a thing which it has never done when legislating in regard to its land situated within a particular State. As we have seen, it has always allowed each State to determine for itself the laws which shall govern real State to determine for itself the laws which shall govern real estate within its borders. When this court is called upon to define the phrase "public lands" as used in the Act of Congress and in Act No. 926, it should in my opinion say that it includes the property described in article 340 of the Civil Code.

For the reasons above stated, I agree with the result in this case, but I dissent from those parts of the opinion which I have discussed.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14722             May 25, 1960

IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.

Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.Luis Manalang and Associates for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case pending before the same court covering the property described therein be given due course and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations. The reasons advanced are: the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while the transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. The present action which calls for the cancellation of said decree and title has, therefore, been filed after the elapse of more than four years, which cannot be done, because the title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world and up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at present the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the knowledge that defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the register of deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land because it is a private property of plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff prays that said decree and title be cancelled.

Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141), provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years

immediately preceeding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Thus, the following is what this Court said on the matter:

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. ... When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-forty years. And if it is taken into account that NemesioPinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. ... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the presumption juris et de jure established paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. (Emphasis supplied)

Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in his complaint. He alleges that he is the owner in fee simple of the lot in question, with the improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims that said lot is present the subject of a registration proceeding pending in the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,1 which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the caseoutright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 134308               December 14, 2000

SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO

MENGUITO, petitioners, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified as alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for a period of thirty years.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 30, 1997 Decision1and the June 23, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the appellees’ application for registration is hereby DISMISSED."3

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157),4 which was reversed by the appellate court, granted petitioners’ application for registration in this wise:5

"WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants to the land described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its technical descriptions, situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containing an aggregate area of 2,112 square meters; and individual and separate certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said land are hereby ordered registered in the names of the applicants, as follows:

1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal age, widow, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;

2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene Toledo, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of BersaminMenguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of GenerosoMenguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of FroilanMenguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to ZenaidaCarag, with residence and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of EmelitaMenguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila; and

8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of GenerosoMenguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano Manalili; and FroilanMenguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to ZenaidaCarag, all with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration Authority for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in favor of the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.

SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses CiriloMenguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court as LRC Case No. N-10938, the application reads:

‘APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE

The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed,

AND DECLARE:

1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and corresponding technical descriptions, x xx;

2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;

3. That to the best of applicants’ knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons having

any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;

4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;

5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners, of said parcels of land for more than thirty years;

6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties are as follows:

a) PilarMenguitoPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, TaguigMetro Manila

b) Andres FilemonPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, TaguigMetro Manila

c) Beatriz DumagatPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, TaguigMetro Manila

d) Maura CabanatanPateros-Taguig RoadUsusan, TaguigMetro Manila

e) Pateros-Taguig Roadc/o The District EngineerPasig, Metro Manila

7. That the applicants’ full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as follows:

SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN MARTA M. LUNA, married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion; FROILAN MENGUITO, married to ZenaidaCarag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case, the applicants hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended;

9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:

(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227

(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227

(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:

Lot 6045-A

Lot 6045-B

Lot 6045-C

Lot 6045-D

Lot 6045-E

Lot 6045-F

Lot 6045-G

Lot 6045-H

Lot 6045-I

Lot 6045-J

Lot 6045-K

(d) Three (3) copies of Engineer’s Certificate

(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351

x xx           x xx          x xx

(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).

"Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a ‘Notice of Initial Hearing’ addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the adjacent properties as mentioned in the application, informing them that the application is scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The addressees were then ordered ‘to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon’ (Exhibit ‘A’).

"Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid (Exhs. ‘C’, ‘C-1’, ‘C-1-A’).

"Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed its Opposition to the application for registration contending:

‘1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990.

4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.’ (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).

"The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

"At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and registered a verbal opposition to the application. On motion of counsel for the applicants, the court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

"On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their ‘Formal Offer of Evidence,’ submitting therewith the following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. ‘F’); (2) technical descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs.‘F’ to ‘F-10’, inclusive); (3) Engineer’s Certificate (Exh.‘G’); (4) Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants dated December 12, 1985 (Exh.‘H’); (5) description of the land and the apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.’H-1’ and ‘H-2’, respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘N’ and ‘O’) (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. ‘O’, ‘O-1’, ‘P’.‘P-1’, ‘Q’ and ‘R’); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloobdated May 7, 1969 executed by CiriloMenguito in favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. ‘S’); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the applicants (Exh. ‘T’).

"On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants’ formal offer of evidence. The said manifestation reads:

‘It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, relative to jurisdictional requirements. It has no objection to Exhibits ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘F-1’, to ‘F-10’ relating to the plan and the technical description of the lots being applied for and Exhibit ‘G’ which is the Engineer’s certificate.

It objects to Exhibits ‘H’, ‘H-1’ to ‘H-2’ the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12, 1985 for being self serving. It objects to Exhibits ‘I’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’ and ‘N’ for being incompetent and insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. In fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits ‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, and ‘R’, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit ‘S’ as being self-serving being a mere photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by CiriloMenguito the same cannot be accepted in evidence, applicants not having first laid the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit ‘T’, being self-serving and a mere photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit,

where the supposed acknowledgment of the instrument appears, refers to different parcels of land other than those being applied for.

WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands applied for, it is respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit evidence in support of its opposition.’ (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).

"On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants x xx’

"On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.

"On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit."6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

"Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court."8

In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners’ application for the registration of their respective titles.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners’ Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,9 as amended, provides for the registration of imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in this wise:

"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been

perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x xx           x xx          x xx

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter."

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 107310 clarified paragraph "b" of the said provision by specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.11

Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.

The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.

Classification of the Land

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x xx." (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.12 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." 13 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.14 Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.

Period of Possession

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still

be denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in question -- openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.

Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which had allegedly belonged to CiriloMenguito before he donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners.

Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim.

Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974.15 Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before them, and CiriloMenguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. 16 However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.17

Cirilo’s six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their application for registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six children, only PilarMenguito was personally informed of petitioners’ application. Still, she was not presented as a witness.1âwphi1

There can be no question that Cirilo’s children were the best witnesses, because they could have substantiated petitioners’ claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of CiriloMenguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilo’s children nor the documents that they might have had in their possession were presented.1âwphi1

Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners’ claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because they are of recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. "I" to "N"), tax receipts (Exhs. "O". "O’1", "P", and "P-1") and the Municipal Treasurer’s certifications of tax payments (Exhs. "Q" and "R") presented in evidence are incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners’ and their predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the lots in question.

Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other, we waded into the records,18 but found no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want to conform to the State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law’s stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58867 June 22, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ, LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

 

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private respondents' favor. The land in question, Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, ObandoCadastre, under Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan River and private respondents have converted it into a fishpond.

In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands. "

Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1) whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to judicial confirmation of title.

The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March 1, 1927. 1 No evidence has been submitted that the land has been released or subsequently classified despite an

Indorsement, dated November 17, 1976, of the District Forester, to the Director of Forest Development, containing the following recommendation:

Subject area requested for release was verified and found to be within the Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection conducted by a representative of this Office, it disclosed that the same was devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent producing fishponds. Two houses of light materials were erected within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.

In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant considering the investment introduced therein this Office believes that the release is in order,

Recommended for approval and be disposed of in accordance with the Public Land Law. 2

The Government's case is meritorious.

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 5

The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact.

While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that an lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System.

Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 7

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the application for registration in Land Registration Case No. N299-V-76 of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the proper administrative remedy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part

 

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29575 April 30, 1971

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ADRIANO CARPIO, MARTIN AGUILAR and PEDRO AGUILAR, petitioners, 

vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIANO RAYMUNDO, respondents.

Barrera and Recto Law Office for private petitioners.

Dominador I. Reyes for private respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Hector C. Fule for petitioner Director of Lands.

 

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, in its Case CA-G.R. No. 29461-R, recognizing the registerable title of respondent Mariano Raymundo over certain parcels of land in Mabitac, Laguna, on the basis of an unsigned copy of a deed of sale, the original of which was said to have been lost.

The records show that on 16 June 1950, Mariano B. Raymundo filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna an application 1 for registration of his imperfect or incomplete title over five parcels of land (Lots Nos. 461, 462, 463, 480 and 483, MabitacCadastre) situated in Mabitac, Laguna, allegedly acquired by actual, open, adverse and continuous occupation of the properties, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.

The application for registration was opposed by several parties, specifically, (a) by the Director of Lands, on the ground of applicant's lack of registerable title; and (b) by Adriano Carpio, Martin Aguilar and Pedro Aguilar, as regards the northern portion of Lot No. 463, for the reason that they were the actual possessors thereof and had filed homestead applications therefor since 1935.

After hearing, the registration court rendered judgment declaring applicant Raymundo to have established proprietary rights over Lots Nos. 461, 462, 480, 483 and the southern portion of Lot No. 463; and ruling oppositorsCarpio and Aguilar brothers to have likewise proved their title as regards the northern portion of Lot No. 463, with an area of 72 hectares.

Both Raymundo and the Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 11 July 1968, the appellate court modified the judgment of the trial court, by recognizing Raymundo's registerable title, not only over Lots Nos. 461, 462, 480, 483 and the southern portion of Lot No. 463 but even over the northern part of Lot No. 463 adjudicated to oppositorsCarpio and Aguilar brothers. Raymundo's claim over the whole Lot No. 463 was

declared proved by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "E-1") dated August, 1936, covering 10 hectares, executed in his favor by Gerardo Olarte and by a deed of sale (Exhibit "O") involving around 80 hectares, allegedly executed by Mariano Castro on 18 September 1929. Overruling the objection of the oppositors to the admissibility of Exhibit "O," which is merely an unsigned copy of the supposed deed, the Court of Appeals said:

... However, applicant Raymundo satisfactorily explained the presentation of said copy in lieu of the original by proving that the original document together with other pertinent papers were entrusted by him to his lawyer, Judge Mariano C. Melendres, sometime before the war in connection with registration proceedings over the said parcels of land. Unfortunately, these documents were burned during the last World War and no official copy could be obtained from the Register of Deeds of Mabitac, Laguna. (Exhibit K, certification of Municipal Treasurer). The testimony of Raymundo was corroborated by Judge Melendres on the witness stand when he declared that he was indeed entrusted with the custody of these papers and that upon his appointment to the Judiciary he turned over all these papers to a certain Atty. Facundo San Agustin who was killed by the Japanese during the war and no trace of the aforesaid documents has been found. Moreover, Raymundo submitted a receipt, duly signed by Mariano Castro attesting to the fact that the latter received the amount of P100.00 as down payment on the purchase price of the property sold by him to Raymundo on 27 August 1929 (Exhibit O-1). This receipt, taken in conjunction with the copy of the deed of sale and the testimony of Judge Melendres, clearly indicates that applicant Raymundo did in fact buy some 80 hectares of land from Castro of Lot No. 463.

The Director of Lands and oppositors Adriano Carpio Martin Aguilar and Pedro Aguilar then come to this court, questioning the correctness and legality of the above ruling of the Court of Appeals, effecting solely the northern portion of Lot No. 463, that was allegedly made in contravention of the express provisions of the Rules of Court.

Section 51 of the old Rule 123, Rules of Court, referred to by herein petitioners, reads as follows:

SEC. 51.Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

There is merit in the petitioners' contention. From the enactment of Act No. 190 to the present Rules of Court, the rule governing the sale of real property has remained unchanged: it can be proved only by the very instrument reciting the transaction, duly subscribed by the proper party or his authorized agent, or else by secondary evidence of the contents of such document. 2 However, before the terms of a transaction in realty may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved.  3 For it is the due execution, and loss thereafter, of the document that would warrant or constitute basis for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document. 4 And the due execution of the document should be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed the execution thereof. 5 Thus, in one case, 6 the admission of the certified copy of the record of a deed in a public registry as secondary evidence of the terms of the deed of sale, was declared improper and invalid, the Court pointing to the party's failure to present the notary and those persons who must have seen the signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its due execution.

In the present case, the declaration of applicant Raymundo's former counsel, Mariano C. Melendres, does not satisfy the requirements of the Rules. As mentioned in the decision of the Court of Appeals, this witness testified that the alleged original deed of sale, together with other pertinent papers, were entrusted to him by applicant sometime before the war, that upon his appointment to the bench all those papers were turned over to one Attorney Facundo San Agustin; that Attorney San Agustin, however, was killed by the Japanese and no trace of the documents could be found thereafter. It may be noted from the foregoing finding of the Court of Appeals that Judge Melendres did not state that he was present when the deed of sale was supposedly executed by Mariano Castro, or that the fact of its execution was acknowledged or admitted to him by the latter. It appears simply that the deed, perhaps then already accomplished, was delivered to him by applicant, together with other papers. Even assuming, therefore, that this witness could have read the contents of the document, yet if it is considered that there is no showing that the witness knew and recognized the signatures affixed thereon, such knowledge of the terms would not qualify him to testify on the due execution of the document. The same thing may be said of the receipt signed by Mariano Castro, acknowledging payment by Raymundo of the sum of P100.00. It has nothing to do at all with the execution of the supposed deed of sale. Hence, the Court of Appeals clearly committed reversible error in declaring Raymundo's title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 to have been proven, on the basis of the foregoing evidence.

The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain. 7

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed, only insofar as it decreed to applicant Mariano Raymundo title to and ownership of the northern portion of Lot No. 463, MabitacCadastre, subject of this proceeding, which is hereby declared part of the public domain, subject to the possessory rights of oppositors Adriano Carpio, Martin Aguilar and Pedro Aguilar. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

 

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79684             February 19, 1991

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (formerly Ministry of Natural Resources), petitioners, 

vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and B.A. GONZALES SURVEYING CO.,

INC., respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated April 3, 1987 of the respondent court, 1 as well as its resolution dated August 27, 1987 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The restraining order promulgated by this Court on November 3, 1986 restraining the public respondents from issuing any award to the private respondents as the winning bidders in that public bidding held on October 24, 1986 or in any manner implementing by the public and private respondents the results thereof, is hereby converted into a preliminary injunction and upon the filing by the petitioner and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P30,000.00, the preliminary injunction shall remain permanent until the Minister of Natural Resources shall have acted, as he is hereby directed to act, on the appeals of the petitioner from the Orders of respondent Director of Lands dated June 20, 1977 (Numancia project) and April 14, 1983 (Valderama project). With costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

The facts are undisputed.

The petitioners Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources entered into a contract on June 30,1973 with the private respondent B.A. Gonzalez Surveying Company for which the latter was bound to execute a public land subdivision mapping (Plsm) of the alienable and disposable lands in the Municipality of Valderama, Antique, Blk. I-IIII, L.C. No. 819, for and in consideration of the amount of P183,818.00. 2

On January 28, 1974, the private respondent was likewise contracted by the petitioners to do the photo-cadastral mapping (Pcadm) of Project PCADM-493-D in Numancia, Aklan, for the sum of P130,000.00. 3

However, despite written demands from the Bureau of Lands to the private respondent to commence the Numancia, AklanPcadm project, the latter failed to do so; consequently, in an order dated February 7, 1977, the former cancelled the contract with regard to the said project and declared the performance bond No. BCICI-3323 as forfeited. 4

On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the Director of Lands reinstated the said contract on June 20, 1977 without however granting the company's request for a price adjustment, which denial the private respondent seasonably appealed to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. This appeal is pending.

On April 14, 1983, the Director of Lands likewise scrapped the ValderamaPlsm contract because of the non-completion of the project despite the grant of repeated extensions totalling 1,200 days. 5

Similarly, the private respondent appealed the cancellation of the said contract to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, where the appeal also still remains pending.

Meanwhile, without both appeals being resolved, the Director of Lands conducted a public bidding for the cadastral survey of several municipalities including the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the Municipality of Valderama, Antique. In the said bidding, Armando Villamayor and Cristina Matuod were declared as the successful bidders for the Numancia and Valderama projects, respectively.

Thereupon, the private respondent filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 10421, alleging that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in awarding the said cadastral survey projects to other persons while the appeals of the private respondent remain pending.

As adverted to at the outset, the respondent Court of Appeals in its decision dated April 3, 1 987 granted the said petition and denied in a resolution dated August 27, 1987 the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners assign the following errors 6 allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:

I

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUBLIC LAND SUBDIVISION MAPPING (PLSM) AND PHOTO-CADASTRAL MAPPING (PCADM), ON ONE HAND, AND A REGULAR CADASTRAL SURVEY, ON THE OTHER, "HAVE THE SAME PURPOSE OF REGISTERING TITLES AND AS SUCH, ONE MAY SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OTHER (Decision, p. 4, Annex "C").

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE OPINION OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ON A MATTER WITHIN HIS EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AS WELL AS NLRC RULES AND REGULATIONS, TO THE EFFECT THAT GRAPHICAL TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS, AS THOSE PRODUCED FROM A PLSM OR PCADM, CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF LAND REGISTRATION.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ENJOINING THE AWARD OF THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF VALDERAMA AND NUMANCIA TO THE WINNING BIDDERS WHICH IS A SURVEY ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE MAPPING SURVEY CONTRACTS OF THE COMPANY WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT THE COMPANY'S MAPPING SURVEY CONTRACTS, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN CANCELLED, CONSTITUTE A BAR TO THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF VALDERAMA AND NUMANCIA, THEREBY PRE-EMPTING THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN DETERMINING THE MERITS OF THE COMPANY'S APPEALS.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The four errors assigned by the Solicitor General appearing for the public officials-petitioners may be integrated into the sole issue as to whether or not the respondent court erred in holding that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the award of the cadastral survey projects to new contractors involving lands subject to prior mapping projects with another contractor (the private respondent) whose contracts are involved in a pending appeal to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.

The respondent court, in sustaining the private respondent, asseverated that while cadastral survey on one hand, and the Pcadm and the Plsm projects on the other, are classified differently, i.e., the former being numerical cadastre and the latter as graphical, both projects nonetheless "have the same purpose of registering titles and as such, one may substitute for the other. Accordingly, allowing the award of the cadastral survey projects to other contractors will render unnecessary the pending mapping survey contracts of the government with the petitioner (private respondent herein), as if the same were already awarded to others." 7

We do not think so. Given the premises that both projects, mapping and cadastral survey, have the same purpose of registering titles and that one may substitute for the other, do not justify the sweeping conclusion that the undertaking of one would render the other unnecessary.

The question on the necessity of either or both projects must be better addressed to the sound discretion of the proper administrative officials who admittedly have the competence and technical expertise on the matters. In the case at bar, the petitioner Director of Lands is "the official vested with direct and executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public domain." 8 Specifically, Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that . . . [T]he Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any form of concession or disposition and management of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources)."

We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on this doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court has consistently held that "acts of an administrative agency must not casually be over-turned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the parameters of its own competence," 9 unless "there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and serious error." 10 In similar vein, we reiterated recently the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, in the present case cadastral surveys and mappings and land registration, are accorded not only respect but more often than not even finality. 11

On the other hand, the private respondent claims that his case is an exception and invokes Leongson vs. Court of Appeals12 which states that "once the actuation of an administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then, it is incumbent on the court's of justice to set matters right, with the Tribunal having the last say on the matter."

But ironically, it is precisely the "command of the law" that the Director of Lands sought to implement when the respondent court enjoined the former from pushing through with the award of the cadastral survey projects. We have quoted earlier the provisions of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 [The Public Land Law], which explicitly empower and command the Director of Lands to have the direct executive control of the survey and classification, inter alia, of lands of the public domain. Moreover, in the same law, in Section 6 thereof, "[T]he Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources) shall prepare and issue such forms, instructions, rules, and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions."

Aside from these "command(s) of the law" giving to the Director of Lands the "direct executive control" of the subject matter of the controversy in this case, the Land Registration Commission (LRC) requires in its Circulars 13Nos. 371 (1980), 394 (1981), and 32 (1983) the full and complete technical description of lands prior to their registration. The said requirement can only be accomplished through the conduct of a regular cadastral survey which, as aforesaid, is under the direct executive control of the Director of Lands.

Moreover, the respondent court admits that mapping projects and cadastral surveys are classified differently. That is correct because indeed there exists real distinctions between these mapping and cadastral survey projects. Due to these distinctions, the mapping or graphical survey would apply more to pre-cadastral operations and the numerical one to the regular cadastral survey proper. These distinctions may be more easily appreciated by a scrutiny of the respective program of activities in each of these three technical endeavors.

I. Photo-Cadastral Mapping Project (Pcadm)

1. sub-lot identification and delineation of tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn (photo-sketching for land reform);

2. project controls of secondary precision only;

3. establishment of photo control points for every photograph by tertiary traverse from control stations;

4. monumenting of lots claimed as private or public lands and sketching on photo-maps;

5. numerical survey of the residential, commercial and industrial lots in the poblacion and barrios, preparation of cadastral maps from sketches on maps, and mapping by ground method of covered areas;

6. establishment of political boundary monuments of secondary survey controls;

7. preparation of the complete mapping returns.

I-A.Public Land Subdivision Mapping Project (Plsm)

1. sub-lot identification and delineation and tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn (sketching for land reform) and sketching of lots claimed as private or public lands;

2. project controls of tertiary precision only;

3. Monumenting of corners of lots claimed as private or public lands;

4. Numerical survey of the residential lots in the poblacion and barrios;

5. Establishment of political boundary monuments by tertiary survey controls;

6. The preparation of the complete mapping returns.

II. Scope of Work –– Cadastral Survey Project

1. Sketching by transit and stadia or any acceptable method of lots claimed as private or public lands;

2. Project controls shall be of primary precision;

3. Monumenting of corners of lots claimed as private, government or public land;

4. Numerical survey of all lots including parcels covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) whether or not previously subjected to PMS;

5. Survey of foreshore areas as a strip indicating on the cadastral map areas covered by existing lease applications;

6. Establishment of political boundary monuments and survey thereof by secondary control;

7. Accomplishment of land use maps, questionnaire for land use inventory and land use summary report;

8. Preparation and submittal of the complete survey returns of the cases submitted for verification and approval;

9. Preparation of overlays on drafting film of CMs containing OLT areas and list of claimants thereof.

An analysis of above list depicts that the greater bulk of the activities in Plsm and Pcadm projects is sketching; whereas, in a regular cadastral survey, the entire area of the municipality is subjected to a numerical survey. WhilePlsm and Pcadm projects lead to the preparation of mere graphical sketches or maps, a cadastral survey results in the preparation of complete survey returns and technical descriptions of individual lots necessary for registration purposes. 14

But even granting arguendo that the Plsm and Pcadm projects on the one hand, and the cadastral survey on the other, are similar activities, there is no legal bar for the private respondent, assuming that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources resolves the appeals in its favor, to finish the mapping projects and then demand the corresponding remuneration from the Director of Lands. In the same way, compensation would be due to the winning bidders in question once their own cadastral survey projects would have been accomplished. In case the Director of Lands fails to pay upon fulfillment of the said contracts, then any contractor may validly resort to judicial action to enforce its legitimate demands.

Meanwhile, the proper remedy of the private respondent would be to pursue promptly its appeals with the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as regards its cancelled and questioned contracts rather than seek judicial imprimatur to its improper interference with

administrative prerogatives and thus provide a convenient cover-up for its breaches of its own contractual obligations.

Notwithstanding the private respondent's dubious attitude in not participating in the bidding in question, he could have also appealed the conduct of the said bidding to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as was the case in his Plsm and Pcadm contracts with the government and asserted therein that the same would be prejudicial to his interests.

In sum, the respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation of the results of the bidding for the cadastral survey projects conducted by the Director of Lands. The said injunction issued by the respondent court constitutes a violation of the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and defeats the very purpose thereof, which is, "not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts." 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the injunction issued is hereby lifted; the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 1987, as well as its Resolution dated August 27, 1987, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. With costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 81564               April 26, 1990

ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, PASIG AND MAKATI, METRO MANILA,petitioners, 

vs.THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, IN MAKATI, METRO MANILA PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE

LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, respondents.

G.R. No. 90176               April 26, 1990

THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner, 

vs.HONORABLE CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., Presiding Judge, BRANCH 118, RTC, RICARDO P.

SANTIAGO, ET AL., respondents.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for the Intestate Estate of the Late DelfinCasal.Antonio J. Dalangpan for himself and the heirs of DelfinCasal.

Pedro S. Ravelo for Gerardo Casal.Filomeno Peralta, Jr. for Domingo C. Palomares.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioners ** charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati, Metro Manila, with grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order authorizing the private respondent, through Domingo Palomares, to perform acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare parcel of land known as Hacienda de Maricabanspread out in various parts of Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay City, and Parañaque. There is no controversy as to the facts.

On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of DelfinCasal, commenced suit with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291.

Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar petition, and in addition, to direct the Register of Deeds to issue a duplicate owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 291, embracing allegedly Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9, 1985, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 69834).

On December 19, 1985, the petitioners filed their answer.

On June 2, 1986, the private respondent filed a motion to admit amended complaint impleading the Republic of the Philippines and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig, Makati, and Pasay City as parties-respondents, and alleging, among other things, that: (1) on October 1, 1906, the Court of Land Registration (James Ostrand, Presiding Judge) confirmed the title of Dolores PascualCasal y

Ochoa, a native of Madrid, Spain, over the 2,574-hectare parcel above-mentioned; (2) on October 17, 1906, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued OCT No. 291 in her name; (3) upon her death, and successive deaths of her heirs, the property devolved on Gerardo, Reynaldo, Lolita, and Erlinda, all surnamed Casal, great grandchildren of Dolores; (4) no conveyances or dispositions of any kind have been allegedly made upon the parcel; (5) TCT No. 192, which covers the same landholding, is allegedly spurious and inexistent; (6) the State itself, by placing 27,213,255 square meters thereof under a military reservation (Fort McKinley now Fort Bonifacio), by Proclamation No. 423, and fifty hectares thereof pursuant to Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of landgrabbing; (7) any and all holders of any and all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No. 192, are null, void, and of no force and effect; and (8) as a consequence thereof, the heirs of Dolores Casal suffered various damages and attorney's fees.

On June 26, 1986, the petitioners filed an answer, stating, among other things, that: (1) the estate of Dolores Casal (or DelfinCasal, her grandchild) is not a juridical person authorized by law to bring suit; (2) the Registers of Deeds of Makati, Pasig, and Pasay City are not the real parties in interest, but rather, the registered owners over which the court had not acquired jurisdiction; (3) the non-joinder of the real parties in interest is fatal; (4) OCT No. 291 has long been cancelled; (5) Judge Gregorio Pineda of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, had earlier denied prayers for the issuance of duplicate owner's copy of OCT No. 291 because the land embraced therein had been validly delivered to the Government; (6) the Supreme Court itself had denied the Casals' appeal; *** (7) as a consequence, res judicata is a bar; (8) prescription has also set in; and (9) the Casal's claims can not validly override the titles of innocent purchasers for value.

On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order, directing the petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts complained of.

In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal had conveyed the property to the Government of the United States in 1906 and the Manila Railroad Company on which Judge Ostrand, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Land Registration, later Justice of this Court, had stamped his imprimatur.

On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order in the tenor, as follows:

No other opposition having been registered, this Court hereby resolves to grant the plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS MOTION in order to safeguard the integrity of the land embraced in OCT 291, hereby authorizing for this purpose the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares:

1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or surveys within Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed geodetic engineer or engineers at plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate and simplify the efficient administration of the property described in OCT 291; and

2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose (of) any area or areas or portion or portions thereof, subject to the approval of the Intestate Estate Court, to cover expenses for the payment of taxes to which the property is subject, as well as expenses of administration and for the protection of the integrity of the said lands.

SO ORDERED. 1

Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987 to be precise, it issued another order, as follows:

Acting on the plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987 praying for the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the Order of this Court dated October 12, 1987 before the

expiration of the time to appeal, and after inquiring from the plaintiff's counsel for their reason in seeking the same, the Court hereby issues this clarificatory order affirming the power of the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares to execute and perform the acts authorized in the said Order of October 12, 1987 without the need of a Writ of Execution, where no relief has been sought therefrom by any party, said Order being implementable at the instance of the said plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares, anytime when the said Order becomes final 15 days after the said plaintiff received copy of the same (see Section 39, Chapter IV, B.P. Blg. 129). Plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares may therefore take whatever steps he considers appropriate for the implementation of the said Order without need of further Orders or additional authority from this Court.

SO ORDERED. 2

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal; the respondent court, however, denied it" 3 "it being directed against . . . an interlocutory order. . . 4

Hence, this recourse.

The petitioners interpose the following questions:

A. Whether or not respondent Court can validly decide before trial in favor of private respondent the ownership and possession of the 25,743,514 square meters (of) land known as "Hacienda de Maricaban", which is the main issue in this case;

B. Whether or not respondent Court can validly allow private respondent to exercise and perform all acts of ownership and possession over the said land before trial

C. Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide this action;

D. Whether of not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing this action or allowing petitioners to appeal from the orders in question. 5

In their comment, the private respondent averred, among other things, that: (1) the respondent court, contrary to the petitioners' claim, did not decide the case "before trial"; (2) OCT No. 291 had not been validly cancelled and that the rubber stamp impression thereon, "CANCELLED" is a forgery; (3) the act of Judge Pineda, in denying issuance of OCT No. 291, duplicate owner's copy, can not be considered res judicata because that case involved purportedly a mere petition for issuance of duplicate owner's copy; (4) non-joinder of proper parties is not a jurisdictional defect; (5) the TCTs issued thereafter are a nullity because OCT No. 291 had not been shown to have been duly cancelled; (6) OCT No. 291 has become imprescriptible; and (7) the private respondent has a valid right of dominion over the property.

In the meantime, the private respondent came to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. 90176) alleging that on December 15, 1987, in connection with Sp. Proc. No. P-2993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 118, Pasay City, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Fortunato Santiago and Mariano PantanillaCrisanta P. Santiago, et al., Petitioners," Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr. issued an order disposing of certain parcels which the private respondent claims as forming part and parcel of Hacienda de Maricaban.

On June 20, 1988, the respondent judge in G.R. No. 81564 filed his own comment, asserting, among other things, that: (1) what he had sought to bar, by virtue of injunction, was incursions and forcible entries of trespassers and squatters; (2) the petitioners can not rightly claim that he had prematurely adjudicated the case, because there was allegedly no decision to begin with; (3)

that he issued the writ of preliminary injunction in order only to maintain the status quo ante bellum that is, to re-place the private respondent, which had been allegedly in prior possession, in possession; (4) he did not allegedly authorize unbridled "acts of ownership" to be exercised on the property; (5) all rights of dominion given thereon were subject to the approval of the intestate estate court; (6) he denied the notice of appeal because the order dated October 12, 1987, was interlocutory in nature from which no appeal lies; (7) as to jurisdiction, the various motions filed by petitioners, allegedly accepting the court's jurisdiction, have clothed the court with jurisdiction, and that besides, the jurisdictional question was never raised except now.

On July 7, 1988, the petitioners filed a reply traversing the respondent judge's allegations.

On August 26, 1988, the respondent judge filed a supplemental comment. He reiterated that the writ of injunction was directed only on such spaces not occupied by the Government (Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mgaBayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission, National Science and Development Board, and National Housing Authority).

Meanwhile, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan for and on behalf purportedly of the "Heirs of DelfinCasal" and the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, file a Comment/Opposition in Intervention", dated December 23, 1988 asking for the outright dismissal of the petition.

On December 14, 1989, the private respondent filed a manifestation, stating, among other things, that assuming OCT No. 291 had been cancelled, there was still basis for the respondent judge to prevent landgrabbers from entering into vacant portions of the state embraced thereby.

The Court finds the issues, quintessentially, to be:

(1) Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?

(2) Did the respondent judge, in issuing the orders, dated October 12 and October 23, 1987, commit a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

I.

Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage embraced by TCT No. 192 (OCT No. 291) consists of Government property. Three things persuade the Court: (1) the decrees of Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the incontrovertible fact that OCT No. 291 has been duly cancelled; and (3) the division of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming the decision of Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484, Case No. R-1467 thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's Duplicate of Certificate of Title No. 291," as well as our own Resolution, in G.R. No. 69834, entitled "Domingo Palomares, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court".

(a)

Proclamation No. 192 ("RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON") and Proclamation No. 423 ("RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY") have the character of official assertions of ownership, and the presumption is that they have been issued by right of sovereignty and in the exercise of the State's dominical authority. We take not only

judicial notice thereof 6 but accept the same as a valid asseveration of regalian light over property.

With respect to the premises occupied by the Libingan ng mgaBayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, the Population Commission, National Science and Development Board, and the National Housing Authority, we do not have the slightest doubt that they stand on Government property by sheer presumption that, unless otherwise shown, what the Government occupies is what the Government owns.

While there is no presumption that property is Government property until otherwise shown, because the law recognizes private ownership, thus:

Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively. 7

we find hard evidence on record that: (1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had been conveyed to the United States of America; (2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of the Philippines, and (3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final order of Judge Ostrand.

Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R. No. 81564 is pressed hard to establish the fact that portions of the property, especially the open spaces referred to in the lower court's writ of injunction and the private respondent's manifestation of December 14, 1989, and which open spaces it claims to be outside Maricaban, areindeed outside Maricaban (or OCT 291). With respect, however, to parts thereof on which Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mgaBayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission National Science and Development Board, and National Housing Authority sit, the hands of the private respondent are tied.

Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was a counterfeit is not only self-serving, it finds no support from the records. The presumptions is "that official duty has been regularly performed," 8 and the burden is on the private respondent to prove irregular performance. The barren insistence that Judge Ostrands order was a forgery is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption. To begin with, the act of forgery has been seasonably disputed by the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Pasig, who supposedly certified to the fake character of Judge Ostrand's order, has himself joined the other petitioners in opposing the reconveyance sought.

(b)

The decision in AC-G.R. No. 00293, dismissing the private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's copy of OCT No. 291, a dismissal affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 69834, also militates against the return of the property to the heirs of DelfinCasal. The Appellate Court's judgment, a judgment sustained by this Court, operates as, at the very least, the law of the case between the parties, that OCT No. 291 has been cancelled and the land covered has been conveyed and ceded to the National Government. The fact that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 dealt with a petition for issuance of lost owner's duplicate copy is no argument because be that as it may, the private respondent can not rightfully say that the heirs of DelfinCasal still have title to the land. If it can not secure a new owner's copy, it can mean that they have lost title thereto.

(c)

The principle of res judicata is also a bar to the instant proceedings. It should be noted that in G.R. No. 69834, Mr. Domingo Palomares prayed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed to the most Honorable Supreme Court, that in the name of law, justice and fair play, to prevent and frustrate "land-grabbing" by the government, decision be rendered:

FIRST, That a thorough review of the aforementioned resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court be made;

SECOND, That after due consideration, the resolution subject of review be set aside based on the aforestated assignment of error;

THIRD, That the Order of the Lower Court dated Jan. 19, 1977 be affirmed as the lawful and valid order;

FOURTH, To erase all doubts by declaring OCT No. 291 as continuously and existing validly against the whole world;

FIFTH, Clearing OCT No. 291 of all adverse claims, since the herein petitioners are the true and legally declared heirs; and

SIXTH, Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to issue the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 291.

Petitioner-Appellant further prays for other just and equitable reliefs.****

When we therefore denied that petition, we, in effect, held that reconstitution (of lost duplicate owner's copy) was not possible because the mother title (OCT No. 291) had been duly cancelled. And when we therefore declared OCT No. 291 to have been cancelled, we perished all doubts as to the invalidity of Mr. Palomares' pretenses of title to Maricaban. Our judgment was conclusive not only as to Mr. Palomares, but also as to the existing status of the property. As we have held:

The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is barred by the final judgment rendered in the previous case of Tuason& Co. vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The reason is plain: if the herein appellants really had a preferential right to a conveyance of the land from J.M. Tuason& Co., or if the certificate of (Torrens) title held by Tuason& Co. were truly void and ineffective, then these facts should have been pleaded by these appellants in the previous case (Q-4275), since such facts, if true, constituted a defense to the claim of Tuason& Co. for recovery of possession. If appellants failed to plead such defenses in that previous case, they are barred from litigating the same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a well established rule that as between the same parties and on the same subject and cause of action, a final judgment is conclusive not only on matters directly adjudicated, but also as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto. 9

II

Did the respondent judge, in issuing the order, dated October 12, 1987, commit a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of excess of jurisdiction?

(a)

The Court has no doubt that Judge Velez is here guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari. As above-stated, what he gave away, by virtue of reconveyance, was property that inalienably belongs to the Government or its successors. Worse, he gave away property without notice to the actual possessors, that is, the present registered owner. It is beyond debate, as we have indicated, that the land had been, since the

cancellation of OCT No. 291, parcelled out to a succession of buyers and owners. In the absence of notice, it acquired no jurisdiction to decree redelivery or reconveyance. It is well-established that owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties, without whom no relief is available and without whom the court can render no valid judgment. 10

Furthermore, the present holders of the land in question are innocent purchasers for value, or presumed to be so in the absence of contrary evidence, against whomreconveyance does not lie. 11

(b)

The respondent judge can not conceal his faults behind arguments that he did not intend to convey the premises, but rather, to secure, allegedly, vacant portions thereof from interlopers. First, this is not stated in his order. Second, that order is clear and unequivocal that Domingo Palomares has the right "[t]o sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of any area or areas or portion or portions thereof . . . " 12 Third and last, the security of the property is the lookout of the claimants, and not the court's. In case the premises the respondent judge's injunctive writ have been directed belong to others, let them air their plaints.

(c)

The Court is also agreed that the challenged order was issued with no benefit of trial or hearing. The private respondent can not validly rely on AC-G.R. No. 00293 as the "trial or hearing" to justify the issuance of its said order, in the first place, because it is a different proceeding. But above all, the private respondent itself says that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 can not be made a basis for denying reconveyance because "the . . . petition was merely for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy . . . 13 Accordingly, it can not invoke that case and yet, repudiate its effects. It is the height of contradiction.

(d)

It was also grave error for the lower court to deny the Solicitor General's notice of appeal. The Government had all the right to appeal because: (1) the order of October 12, 1987 was in the nature of a final judgment, as "final judgment" is known in law (however it is captioned), that is to say, one that "finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court; 14 (2) it did not merely maintain the status quo, but allowed Mr. Domingo Palomares to transact on the property by near right of dominion over it.

Judge Velez had therefore no reason, indeed, excuse, to deny the Government's notice of appeal. What is plain is the fact that Judge Velez was hell-bent, so to speak, in blocking the Government's efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it.

What has obviously been lost on the parties, Judge Velez in particular, is the established principle that injunction does not lie "to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another." 15 In this wise it has also been held:

x xx           x xx          x xx

It is a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that an injunction is not the proper remedy for the recovery of possession of real estate and the improvements thereon, as well as for the ejectments therefrom of the actual occupants who claim to have title to or material interest therein. The use of said remedy in such cases has invariably been considered unjustified, in open violation of the legal presumption that the bona fide possessor of a certain piece of land and improvements thereon, holds the same under

claim of ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced concession of the remedy to which the claimant might be entitled. (Citations omitted) 16

x xx           x xx          x xx

Injunction, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. It lies only in certain cases, to wit:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established:

(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or

(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 17

x xx           x xx          x xx

The conspicuous and unusual zeal with which Judge Francisco Velez now defends his acts 18 has not escaped us. His Honor should have borne in mind that in proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules, such as the present cases, the judge is included only as a nominal party. Unless otherwise ordained by this Court, he is not called upon to answer or comment on the petition, but rather, the private respondent. It is indeed distressing to note that it is the very judge who has taken the cudgels for the latter, in defending its interests, when he, the judge, should have remained a neutral magistrate. Res ipsaloquitor. 19 He must get his just deserts.

III

The Court thus closes the long-drawn tale of Hacienda de Maricaban. In this connection, let trial judges be cautioned on the indiscriminate disposition of our dwindling natural resources to private persons. Accordingly, we grant G.R. No. 81564 and dismiss G.R. No. 90176, and so also, end what has come down as nearly a century of uncertainty, doubt, and conflict Maricaban has left in its trail. The Court has finally spoken. Let the matter rest.

WHEREFORE:

1. The petition in G.R. No. 81564 is GRANTED:

(a) The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by our Resolution, dated April 13, 1988, enjoining the respondent judge from enforcing his: (i) order of October 12, 1987 and (ii) the follow-up order of October 23, 1987, is made permanent and

(b) Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is declared duly CANCELLED;

2. The petition in G.R. No. 90176 is DISMISSED; and

3. Judge Francisco Velez is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with for giving away, by virtue of reconveyance, property that inalienably belongs to the Government, without notice to the registered owner, and without benefit of trial or

hearing; for blocking Government efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it; and for filing his comment of June 17, 1988 and supplemental comment of August 26, 1988 without express leave of court.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.Fernan, C.J., and Gutierrez, Jr., J., are on leave.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162291 August 11, 2010

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,vs.

SHEMBERG BIOTECH CORPORATION and BENSON DAKAY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, of the Decision1 dated September 24, 2003 and Resolution2 dated February 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69461. The CA had dismissed the petition assailing the October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. CEB-26481-SRC.

The proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:

Respondent Shemberg Biotech Corporation (SBC), a domestic corporation which manufactures carrageenan from seaweeds, filed a petition4 for the approval of its rehabilitation plan and appointment of a rehabilitation receiver before the RTC. The RTC issued a stay order,5 and petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed its opposition6 to SBC’s petition.

After initial hearings, the RTC issued the assailed October 12, 2001 Order7 which gave due course to SBC’s petition; referred the rehabilitation plan to the Rehabilitation Receiver for evaluation; ordered the Rehabilitation Receiver to submit his recommendation; recalled the appointment of the first Rehabilitation Receiver; and appointed Atty. Pio Y. Go as new Rehabilitation Receiver. The RTC found that SBC complied with the conditions necessary to give due course to its petition for rehabilitation. The RTC was also satisfied of the merit of SBC’s petition and noted that SBC’s business appears viable since it has a market for its product. A sufficient breathing spell, according to the RTC, may help SBC settle its debts. The RTC further said that it will reflect on the issue raised by SBC’s creditors that the rehabilitation plan is not feasible, upon submission by the Rehabilitation Receiver of his recommendation.

BPI filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the RTC denied in its Order9 dated December 26, 2001.

Consequently, BPI filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus10 before the CA.

In its assailed decision, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that the RTC’s Decision11 dated April 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. CEB-26481-SRC, which approved with modification SBC’s rehabilitation plan, rendered the petition moot. The CA also ruled that the issues raised against the rehabilitation plan should be raised in BPI’s appeal from the said RTC Decision. The CA found that the RTC did not commit an error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders.

On February 3, 2004, BPI’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, BPI filed the present petition.

BPI laments that the CA focused its discussion on the procedural matters, i.e., on the propriety of the petition for certiorari, rather than on the substantial and jurisdictional issues raised.12

BPI also contends that the rehabilitation plan does not require "infusion of new capital from its guarantors and sureties"13 and that forcing creditors to transform their debt to equity amounts to taking private property without just compensation and due process of law.14 BPI further contends that the RTC exercised its rehabilitation power "whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically by eliminating penalties and reducing interests amounting to millions." Such exercise of power, BPI contends, also amounts to taking of property without just compensation and due process of law that could not be justified under the police power. BPI adds that the Interim Rules of Corporate Recovery is unconstitutional insofar as it alters or modifies and expands the existing law on rehabilitation contrary to the principle that rules of procedure cannot modify or affect substantive rights.15

BPI prays that the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation16 be declared unconstitutional; that the order approving the rehabilitation plan be declared unconstitutional and void; and that the petition for rehabilitation be ordered dismissed and terminated.17We find the petition bereft of merit.We will address BPI’s contentions seriatim.First, BPI is mistaken in asserting that the CA focused on procedural matters because the CA actually ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders. Before the CA, BPI raised questions about the viability of the rehabilitation plan. BPI said that SBC supports its rehabilitation plan with a shift to low-grade carrageenan to offset a lower volume of purchase by Colgate-Palmolive. BPI questions this plan and doubts how it can help SBC’s recovery considering that it will result in a lower profit margin.18 We also note that the other matters raised by BPI, i.e., new capital infusion and debt-to-equity conversion, are matters directly concerning the merit of the rehabilitation plan. The RTC, however, has yet to fully consider the rehabilitation plan at the time it issued the October 12, 2001 Order. It did not approve any rehabilitation plan in the assailed orders. As stated by the RTC, it will reflect on the issue of viability of the rehabilitation plan upon submission by the Rehabilitation Receiver of his recommendation. BPI and its counsels readily imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when such imputation had no basis at all.Second, even as we say that the imputation against the RTC has no basis, we are also in agreement that the CA has sufficient basis to rule that this case is already moot. An issue is said to have become moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on

the issue would be of no practical use or value.19 In this case, a ruling on the propriety of the RTC’s directive in its October 12, 2001 Order that the Rehabilitation Receiver submit his recommendation would have no more practical value since the recommendation was already submitted. Similarly, a ruling on the propriety of the RTC’s statement that it will reflect on the issue of viability of the rehabilitation plan upon receipt of the receiver’s recommendation would also have no more practical value since the RTC had already considered the recommendation in rendering its Decision dated April 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. CEB-26481-SRC.

Third, BPI’s contention that forcing debt-to-equity conversion is constitutionally infirm is way out of order as the RTC did not approve debt-to-equity conversion in its October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders. Nor did the CA approve debt-to-equity conversion in the assailed decision and resolution. In fact, the RTC did not even order conversion of debt-to-equity in its decision approving with modification SBC’s rehabilitation plan.20

Fourth, BPI’s contention that the RTC exercised its rehabilitation power arbitrarily and BPI’s prayer that the order approving the rehabilitation plan be declared unconstitutional are improper attempts to appeal again the RTC Decision dated April 22, 2002. We will see no end to litigations if we grant BPI’s wish. Said RTC decision was affirmed by the CA in BPI’s appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75781.21 In G.R. No. 175359, we denied BPI’s petition for review of the decision and resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 75781.22 Our denial of BPI’s petition in G.R. No. 175359 has become final and entry of judgment has been made. BPI has even admitted that the rehabilitation plan is already being implemented.23

Fifth, on the question of the constitutionality of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, BPI failed in its burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its assertion. Its failure to so prove defeats the challenge.24 We even note that BPI itself opposes its own stand by invoking Section 27,25 Rule 4 of the Interim Rules to support its prayer that the rehabilitation proceedings be declared terminated.26 BPI also impliedly invoked the Interim Rules before the CA in seeking a modified rehabilitation plan considering that SBC’s petition for approval of its rehabilitation plan had been filed under the Interim Rules.

In addition, the challenge on the constitutionality of the Interim Rules is a new and belated theory that we should not even entertain. It was not raised before the CA. Well settled is the rule that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.27 Relatedly, the constitutional question was not raised at the earliest opportunity. The rule is that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the case.28 In Umali v. Guingona, Jr.,29 the constitutionality of the creation of the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption was raised in the motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision. This Court did not entertain the constitutional issue because it was belatedly raised at the RTC.

Sixth, we cannot grant BPI’s prayer that the petition for rehabilitation be ordered dismissed and terminated. To dismiss the petition for rehabilitation would be to reverse improperly the final

course of that petition: the petition was granted by the RTC; the RTC decision was affirmed with finality; and the rehabilitation plan is now being implemented. And while the Interim Rules30 and the new Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation31 contain provisions on termination of the corporate rehabilitation proceedings, neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on this point. In fact, BPI did not ask the CA to terminate the rehabilitation proceedings.32 Aside from being another new issue, its resolution involves factual matters such as: (1) whether there was failure to achieve the desired targets or goals as set forth in the rehabilitation plan; (2) whether there was failure of the debtor (SBC) to perform its obligations under the plan; (3) whether the rehabilitation plan may no longer be implemented in accordance with its terms, conditions, restrictions or assumptions; or (4) whether there was successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. We are not at liberty to consider these factual matters for the first time. This Court is not a trier of facts and our role in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law.33 The Rule 45 petition itself must raise only questions of law.341avvphi1

On another matter, we received a motion for substitution35 by Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I (SPV-AMC), Inc. with prayer that it be substituted as new party-petitioner in this case. Subsequently, however, Investments 2234 informed us that the RTC has already substituted Investments 2234 for BPI in the rehabilitation proceedings. We see no need to further duplicate the action of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated September 24, 2003 and Resolution dated February 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69461 are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 162291

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,Chairperson,

BRION,BERSAMIN,ABAD,* and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.SHEMBERG BIOTECH CORPORATION and BENSON DAKAY,

Respondents.Promulgated:

August 11, 2010

DECISIONVILLARAMA, JR., J.:Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, of the Decision[1] dated September 24, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated February 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69461. The CA had dismissed the petition assailing the October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. CEB-26481-SRC.The proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:Respondent Shemberg Biotech Corporation (SBC), a domestic corporation which manufactures carrageenan from seaweeds, filed a petition[4] for the approval of its rehabilitation plan and appointment of a rehabilitation receiver before the RTC. The RTC issued a stay order,[5] and petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed its opposition[6] to SBCs petition.After initial hearings, the RTC issued the assailed October 12, 2001 Order[7] which gave due course to SBCs petition; referred the rehabilitation plan to the Rehabilitation Receiver for evaluation; ordered the Rehabilitation Receiver to submit his recommendation; recalled the appointment of the first Rehabilitation Receiver; and appointed Atty. Pio Y. Go as new Rehabilitation Receiver. The RTC found that SBC complied with the conditions necessary to give

due course to its petition for rehabilitation. The RTC was also satisfied of the merit of SBCs petition and noted that SBCs business appears viable since it has a market for its product. A sufficient breathing spell, according to the RTC, may help SBC settle its debts. The RTC further said that it will reflect on the issue raised by SBCs creditors that the rehabilitation plan is not feasible, upon submission by the Rehabilitation Receiver of his recommendation.BPI filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which the RTC denied in its Order[9] dated December 26, 2001.Consequently, BPI filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus[10] before the CA.In its assailed decision, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that the RTCs Decision[11]dated April 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. CEB-26481-SRC, which approved with modification SBCs rehabilitation plan, rendered the petition moot. The CA also ruled that the issues raised against the rehabilitation plan should be raised in BPIs appeal from the said RTC Decision. The CA found that the RTC did not commit an error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders.On February 3, 2004, BPIs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, BPI filed the present petition.BPI laments that the CA focused its discussion on the procedural matters, i.e., on the propriety of the petition for certiorari, rather than on the substantial and jurisdictional issues raised.[12]BPI also contends that the rehabilitation plan does not require infusion of new capital from its guarantors and sureties[13] and that forcing creditors to transform their debt to equity amounts to taking private property without just compensation and due process of law.[14] BPI further contends that the RTC exercised its rehabilitation power whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically by eliminating penalties and reducing interests amounting to millions. Such exercise of power, BPI contends, also amounts to taking of property without just compensation and due process of law that could not be justified under the police power. BPI adds that the Interim Rules of Corporate Recovery is unconstitutional insofar as it alters or modifies and expands the existing law on rehabilitation contrary to the principle that rules of procedure cannot modify or affect substantive rights.[15]BPI prays that the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation[16] be declared unconstitutional; that the order approving the rehabilitation plan be declared unconstitutional and void; and that the petition for rehabilitation be ordered dismissed and terminated.[17]We find the petition bereft of merit.We will address BPIs contentions seriatim.First, BPI is mistaken in asserting that the CA focused on procedural matters because the CA actually ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders. Before the CA, BPI raised questions about the viability of the rehabilitation plan. BPI said that SBC supports its rehabilitation plan with a shift to low-grade carrageenan to offset a lower volume of purchase by Colgate-Palmolive. BPI questions this plan and doubts how it can help SBCs recovery considering that it will result in a lower profit margin.[18] We also note that the other matters raised by BPI, i.e., new capital infusion and debt-to-equity conversion, are matters directly concerning the merit of the rehabilitation plan. The RTC, however, has yet to fully consider the rehabilitation plan at the time it issued the October 12, 2001 Order. It did not approve any rehabilitation plan in the assailed orders. As stated by the RTC, it will reflect on the issue of viability of the rehabilitation plan upon submission by the Rehabilitation Receiver of his recommendation. BPI and its counsels readily imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when such imputation had no basis at all.

Second, even as we say that the imputation against the RTC has no basis, we are also in agreement that the CA has sufficient basis to rule that this case is already moot. An issue is said to have become moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.[19] In this case, a ruling on the propriety of the RTCs directive in its October 12, 2001 Order that the Rehabilitation Receiver submit his recommendation would have no more practical value since the recommendation was already submitted. Similarly, a ruling on the propriety of the RTCs statement that it will reflect on the issue of viability of the rehabilitation plan upon receipt of the receivers recommendation would also have no more practical value since the RTC had already considered the recommendation in rendering its Decision dated April 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. CEB-26481-SRC.Third, BPIs contention that forcing debt-to-equity conversion is constitutionally infirm is way out of order as the RTC did not approve debt-to-equity conversion in its October 12, 2001 and December 26, 2001 Orders. Nor did the CA approve debt-to-equity conversion in the assailed decision and resolution. In fact, the RTC did not even order conversion of debt-to-equity in its decision approving with modification SBCs rehabilitation plan.[20]Fourth, BPIs contention that the RTC exercised its rehabilitation power arbitrarily and BPIs prayer that the order approving the rehabilitation plan be declared unconstitutional are improper attempts to appeal again the RTC Decision dated April 22, 2002. We will see no end to litigations if we grant BPIs wish. Said RTC decision was affirmed by the CA in BPIs appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75781.[21] In G.R. No. 175359, we denied BPIs petition for review of the decision and resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 75781.[22] Our denial of BPIs petition in G.R. No. 175359 has become final and entry of judgment has been made. BPI has even admitted that the rehabilitation plan is already being implemented.[23]Fifth, on the question of the constitutionality of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, BPI failed in its burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its assertion. Its failure to so prove defeats the challenge.[24] We even note that BPI itself opposes its own stand by invoking Section 27,[25] Rule 4 of the Interim Rules to support its prayer that the rehabilitation proceedings be declared terminated.[26] BPI also impliedly invoked the Interim Rules before the CA in seeking a modified rehabilitation plan considering that SBCs petition for approval of its rehabilitation plan had been filed under the Interim Rules.In addition, the challenge on the constitutionality of the Interim Rules is a new and belated theory that we should not even entertain. It was not raised before the CA. Well settled is the rule that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[27] Relatedly, the constitutional question was not raised at the earliest opportunity. The rule is that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the case.[28] In Umali v. Guingona, Jr.,[29] the constitutionality of the creation of the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption was raised in the motion for reconsideration of the RTCs decision. This Court did not entertain the constitutional issue because it was belatedly raised at the RTC.Sixth, we cannot grant BPIs prayer that the petition for rehabilitation be ordered dismissed and terminated. To dismiss the petition for rehabilitation would be to reverse improperly the final course of that petition: the petition was granted by the RTC; the RTC decision was affirmed with finality; and the rehabilitation plan is now being implemented. And while the Interim Rules[30]and the new Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation[31] contain provisions on termination of the corporate rehabilitation proceedings, neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on this point. In fact, BPI did not ask the CA to terminate the rehabilitation proceedings.[32] Aside from

being another new issue, its resolution involves factual matters such as: (1) whether there was failure to achieve the desired targets or goals as set forth in the rehabilitation plan; (2) whether there was failure of the debtor (SBC) to perform its obligations under the plan; (3) whether the rehabilitation plan may no longer be implemented in accordance with its terms, conditions, restrictions or assumptions; or (4) whether there was successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. We are not at liberty to consider these factual matters for the first time. This Court is not a trier of facts and our role in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law.[33] The Rule 45 petition itself must raise only questions of law.[34]On another matter, we received a motion for substitution[35] by Investments 2234 Philippines Fund I (SPV-AMC), Inc. with prayer that it be substituted as new party-petitioner in this case.Subsequently, however, Investments 2234 informed us that the RTC has already substituted Investments 2234 for BPI in the rehabilitation proceedings. We see no need to further duplicate the action of the RTC.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated September 24, 2003 and Resolution dated February 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69461 are AFFIRMED.With costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-23702 January 30, 1968MARIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.ARTURO REYES, HON. FIDEL FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First

Instance of Samar and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF SAMAR, respondents.Rafael G. Suntay Law Office for petitioner.

Recto Law Office for respondents.FERNANDO, J.:

In this original petition for certiorari, filed on October 23, 1964, petitioner Maria Villaflor, who admittedly was a tenant of the late Ramona Reyes, would enjoin respondent Judge, the Hon. Fidel Fernandez, from enforcing his order dated August 17, 1964. It was there stated that the judgment in Civil Case No. 4694 for forcible entry and illegal detainer against petitioner and the Samar Cooperative Store having become final and a writ of execution having been issued because of their refusal to vacate as a result of which they were given two (2) months within which petitioner Villaflor was required "to remove her house therefrom," such order having been received as far back as May 30, 1964, and such "two (2) months period having been already expired," without defendants "having yet vacated the property in open defiance of the order of [the] Court," and there being a motion to that effect, "the Sheriff shall proceed to the premises to demolish and remove therefrom all constructions of the defendants, and then deliver the land to the plaintiff." 1Petitioner herself admitted that an ejectment proceeding was instituted against her and that she lost both in the Justice of the Peace Court and the Court of First Instance in the above Civil Case No. 4694. 2 There was likewise the admission that she "appealed said decision to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court ... affirmed said decision, . . . ." 3 She alleged however, that there was an administrative investigation by the Bureau of Lands revoking the permit of the aforesaid Ramona Reyes "to possess a foreshore land in Catbalogan, Samar," and that she thereafter filed an application with the Bureau of Lands in her own name, the matter having thereafter been elevated to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which on March 29, 1961, ordered that such "foreshore area in dispute be opened to public bidding in accordance with the provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-I, dated April 3, 1936." The petition contained as Annex B the aforesaid decision of March 29, 1961 of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Cesar M. Fortich. It revealed that petitioner could not allege any existing right to such foreshore land for as stated therein: "In resume it must be clarified that the application for a revocable permit filed by Ramona Reyes was cancelled by order of the Director of Lands dated April 10, 1944; that the foreshore application of Maria Villaflor cannot be given due course for being in excess of that allowed by law; . . . . Consequently, for purposes of public bidding in which the land in question shall be subjected, to the three litigants in the instant case, must stand on the same ground and no preferential rights will accrue to anyone." 4Since the inherent defect of the petition was rather obvious and self-evident, it is understandable why this Court issued this Resolution of October 27, 1964: "After a study of the allegations of the petition for certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction in L-23702 (Maria Villaflor v. Arturo Reyes, et al.), . . . the petition should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit."A motion for reconsideration was filed however, alleging that there could not be an execution as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4694 had died on June 18, 1960, and respondent Arturo Reyes, presumably her heir, did not seek execution of such judgment until after almost four years from the time it was affirmed by this Court. There was a reconsideration by this Court of the dismissal

in a Resolution of November 12, 1964, requiring respondents to answer the petition and issuing the preliminary injunction prayed for.The answer of respondent Arturo Reyes was filed on December 7, 1964. The purpose of the petition, according to him, "is to question the legality of the order of respondent Judge dated October 9, 1964 (Annex G of the Petition) reviving his order dated August 17, 1964 (Annex D of the Petition), ordering the respondent Provincial Sheriff to demolish and remove from the premises herein involved all constructions of petitioner and then to deliver the land to respondent Arturo Reyes, pursuant to the decision of the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 4694 (Annex A of the petition) which was affirmed, upon appeal by petitioner, by this Honorable Court in G.R. No. L-15755 on May 10, 1961." 5The pertinent facts, according to such answer, were: "Ramona Reyes had been in the possession of the foreshore land involved herein since 1936 by virtue of RPA Permit No. 5260 (R-4155) issued by the Bureau of Lands in favor of Ramona Reyes. She had been paying to the aforementioned Bureau the permit fees in connection with RPA Permit No. 5260. Samar Cooperative Store (SACOS) and Maria Villaflor, petitioners herein, were able to obtain their original possession of the said premises by virtue of a verbal contract with Ramona Reyes to occupy the same on a lease of month to month basis at the rate of P50.00. Petitioner had been paying rentals up to 2 or 3 months before the fire which razed Catbalogan on April 1, 1957, which fire also burned down the building of SACOS managed by petitioner and which were built on the premises in question. After the fire, Ramona Reyes prevented petitioner from constructing a building in the said premises but petitioner insisted in constructing a temporary shed. On June 24, 1957, a formal demand to vacate the land in question was made by Ramona Reyes to the petitioner, but petitioner did not heed this demand. The demand was made by Ramona Reyes because she was about to construct thereon her own building. On April 26, 1957, petitioner filed her own application for the land in question with the Bureau of Lands in Manila. On August 16, 1957, Ramona Reyes instituted an ejectment proceeding against SACOS and petitioner, and the case was decided by the Justice of the Peace of Catbalogan in favor of Ramona Reyes." 6The above narration of facts was supplemented by the allegation that on January 3, 1959, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision in such Civil Case No. 4694 declaring Ramona Reyes to be the lawful possessor of the parcel of foreshore land in question and condemning petitioner to vacate, a decision affirmed by this Court on May 30, 1961 as already noted. The opinion of Chief Justice Bengzon in rejecting the untenable claim of petitioner was quite emphatic. Thus: "Indeed one of the conclusive presumptions prohibits the tenant from denying the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. The defendants here would claim that plaintiff had no right to sublease to them this parcel of land when, sometime in 1957, they agreed verbally to take it at P50.00 a month. They rest this denial on the alleged cancellation of her lease permit in April, 1944. But as the law says, the lessee may not deny the title of his or her lessor . . ., these defendants may not now assert that in 1957 plaintiff had no title or right to lease such foreshore land to them." The then Chief Justice Bengzon concluded. "This view of the case makes it unnecessary to discuss the question whether the dispute should be presented before the Bureau of Lands or Department of Agriculture."The answer of respondent Arturo Reyes likewise alleged: "Moreover, the question herein involved has become moot. Before this petition was given due course by this Honorable Court, the Provincial Sheriff, pursuant to the order of respondent Judge, had demolished all constructions of petitioner on the premises, and given possession to respondent Arturo Reyes." 7There was a plea by petitioner to submit an amended petition, which was filed on December 15, 1964. It was nothing but a reiteration of the original pleading with two additional allegations: Thus: "That subsequent to the filing of the instant petition, respondent Arturo Reyes, upon being

informed of the present petition, in gross and evident bad faith and without any other purpose but to defeat the instant petition, rushed the demolition of the petitioner's building, completely destroying it and laying everything to waste, inspite of the fact that Atty. Paulino S. Marquez, the Clerk of this Tribunal wired the Sheriff of Catbalogan, Samar informing him of the pendency of this petition and counsel for petitioner, likewise, wired the respondent judge asking for extension of time, within which to carry out the order of August 17, 1964 due to the pendency of the instant petition; and that respondent Arturo Reyes in violation of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Annex B of the Petition) is now erecting a building on the land in question and the Bureau of Lands sent him a communication enjoining him to desist from constructing or making any improvements on the land, . . . ." 8 The issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was sought, but this court did not oblige.The additional ground for certiorari alleged in the amended petition was traversed in an answer by respondent Arturo Reyes filed on February 9, 1965. Thus: "Respondent denies the allegations in paragraph 21 of the petition. While it is true that respondent Arturo Reyes has effected the demolition of the constructions of petitioners on the land in question, the same was made in good faith and pursuant to the order of August 17, 1964. Contrary to the claim of petitioner that respondent Reyes rushed the demolition upon being informed of the present petition, in spite of the fact that Atty. Paulino S. Marquez, the Clerk of this Honorable Tribunal wired the Sheriff of Catbalogan Samar of the pendency of this petition, respondent Reyes started the demolition of the building of petitioner in accordance with the order of respondent Judge dated August 17, 1964, upon learning that this Honorable Tribunal, in a resolution dated October 27, 1964 dismissed the original petition for lack of merit. The demolition started after said order of dismissal and was completed long before the petition was reconsidered by this Honorable Tribunal in a resolution dated November 12, 1964. Considering that respondent Reyes and respondent Provincial Sheriff acted on the basis of the aforesaid dismissal, the claim of petitioner that they acted in gross and evident bad faith to defeat the purpose of the present petition is certainly without merit and unfair to the respondents." 9The answer to the amended petition likewise denied the allegation therein "that he violated the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for his having started construction of his own building on the premises." For, according to respondent Reyes, while "the Bureau of Lands has sent him a communication dated December 11, 1964 (Annex H of the amended petition enjoining him to desist from constructing any building or making any improvements on the land, the same was however superseded by a letter which [he] received from the Bureau of Lands dated January 4, 1965 and which advised him to disregard their letter of December 11, 1964 (Annex H of the petition) and allowed him to proceed with his construction provided he gets the necessary permit from the Director of the Bureau of Lands." 10Respondent Arturo Reyes likewise stressed: "Petitioner is not entitled to be restored to the possession of the land in question. Being a party in G. R. No. L-15755 dated May 30, 1961, petitioner is bound by the judgment therein that between Ramona Reyes and herself, Ramona Reyes is the lawful possessor of the land in question. To restore possession to petitioner, in spite of the aforesaid final judgment in the ejectment proceedings against her, would cause great and irreparable injury to respondent Arturo Reyes, who together with Aurora Reyes de Recto, succeeded to all the rights and interests of the deceased Ramona Reyes over the land herein involved." 11The most cursory perusal of the pleadings argues most strongly for the denial of the petition.Both in the answer to the original petition and in the answer to the amended petition, an excerpt is quoted from the work of the late Chief Justice Moran on the Rules of Court. Thus: "It has been held that the determination of the respective right of rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the actual possession or occupation with a view to protecting

the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the Court ordering restitution of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or any other illegal manner, can never be prejudicial interference with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the contrary, if courts were deprived of jurisdiction over the cases involving conflicts of possession, the threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants, or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule." 12The late Chief Justice Moran relied in the above excerpt on the leading case of Pitargue v. Sorilla. 13 In Madamba v. Araneta, 14 this Court through the then Justice Concepcion cited with approval the above Pitargue case, among others, in support of the proposition that one in the same situation as the late Ramona Reyes could sue in her own right against an intruder as petitioner was in effect, without requiring the government as lessor to initiate such a move. The Pitargue ruling was again invoked in Bueno v. Patanao, 15 where "the right of a bona fide occupant of public land [as the late Ramona Reyes undoubtedly was] may be protected by the possessory action of forcible entry or by any other suitable remedy" was upheld. As a matter of fact, forcible entry, or in the alternative, unlawful detainer, was characterized as "the most expedient, not to say, the proper move," 16 under circumstances as that disclosed here.Under the circumstances, it being indisputable that the decision has reached the stage of finality with no less than former Chief Justice Bengzon making it clear that petitioner could not allege any right, being barred in the first place from denying the title of the late Ramona Reyes, to whom she stood in the relation of a tenant to a landlord, the issuance of the order complained of, far from constituting an abuse of discretion, was precisely commanded by law. It would be a sad commentary on the administration of justice if a judge were condemned for strict and full compliance with the obligation of his office.Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez, 17 imperatively calls for application. Thus, "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." Likewise applicable is this rule, reiterated in Tolentino v. Ongsiako, 18 "that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicaeutfinis sitlitium."Petitioner then must fail. Even if, contrary to what was shown by the answer, the case had not previously become moot, the challenged order of August 17, 1964, 19 having been carried out, still petitioner did not and could not sustain her untenable stand. There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied. With costs against petitioner.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as

well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parenspatriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the

legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in

its capacity as parenspatriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner WilfridoVillacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3.Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1.Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2.Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary

should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Separate OpinionsFELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the

future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and

abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not,

in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where

no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

DIGEST

Date of the Ruling: Jul 30 1993Forum: Supreme Court of the PhilippinesNature of the Case: Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of contracts; Environmental law; judicial review and the political question doctrine; inter-generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on StateSummary: An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: “[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”. The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding generations as “the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.”

G.R. No.s 171947-48 Case DigestG.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Concerned Citizensvs MMDA

Ponente: Velasco

Facts:January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).

DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its LinisDagat project.

RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.

Issue:(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.

Held:(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of

the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment CodeInclude Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Note:

- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official discretion nor judgment.http://jeanneguian.blogspot.com/2014/10/gr-nos-171947-48-case-digest.html