Environmental Statement – Chapter 16: Shipping and Navigation … · 2017-02-01 · Galloper Wind Farm ES 9V3083/R01/303424/Exet Final Report Chapter 16 – Page 1 October 2011

Galloper Wind Farm ProjectEnvironmental Statement – Chapter 16: Shipping and Navigation

October 2011Document Reference – 5.2.16

Galloper Wind Farm Limited

Galloper Wind Farm ES 9V3083/R01/303424/Exet

Final Report – i – October 2011

Document title Galloper Wind Farm Project

Environmental Statement – Chapter 16:

Shipping and Navigation

Document short title Galloper Wind Farm ES

Document Reference 5.2.16

Regulation Reference APFP Regulations, 5(2)(a)

Version 4

Status Final Report

Date October 2011

Project name Galloper Wind Farm Project

Client Galloper Wind Farm Limited

Royal Haskoning

Reference

9V3083/R01/303424/Exet

Drafted by Rosie Kelly & Greg Shaw

Checked by Peter Gaches

Date/initials check PG 19.10.2011

Approved by Martin Budd

Date/initials approval MB 21.10.2011

GWFL Approved by Kate Harvey

Date/initials approval KH 01.11.2011


Final Report – iii – October 2011

CONTENTS Page

16 SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION 1 16.1 Introduction 1 16.2 Guidance and Consultation 1 16.3 Methodology 11 16.4 Existing Environment 15 16.5 Assessment of Impacts – Worst Case Scenario 46 16.6 Assessment of Impacts during Construction 52 16.7 Assessment of Impacts during Operation 55 16.8 Impacts during Decommissioning 81 16.9 Inter–relationships 81 16.10 Cumulative Impacts 82 16.11 Transboundary effects 86 16.12 Monitoring 86 16.13 Summary 86 16.14 References 92

Technical Appendix 16.A Marine Navigation Risk Assessment


Final Report Chapter 16 – Page 1 October 2011

16 SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION

16.1 Introduction

16.1.1 The following Chapter of the Environmental Statement (ES) presents the work undertaken to date as part of the Marine Navigation Risk Assessment (NRA) for the proposed Galloper Wind Farm (GWF) (Anatec, 2011) (see Technical Appendix 16.A). The baseline vessel activities and navigational features are assessed, and a preliminary assessment presented of the potential impacts that may be associated with the different phases of the development.

16.1.2 The nature of the shipping activities in the area have been established by reviewing fishing vessel activity, recreational vessel activity, identifying maritime incidents and reviewing Search and Rescue (SAR) resources. In addition the navigational features in the vicinity of the proposed GWF are identified and real time shipping survey data is analysed.

16.2 Guidance and Consultation

Legislation, policy and guidance

16.2.1 National Policy Statements (NPS) provide the primary basis on which the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) is required to make its decisions. Of relevance to the Shipping and Navigation Chapter is the NPS for Renewable Energy Infrastructure (EN-3) (July 2011).

16.2.2 The specific assessment requirements for shipping and navigation, as detailed within the NPSs, are repeated in the following paragraphs. Where any part of the NPS has not been followed within this assessment, it is stated within in the ES why the requirement was not deemed relevant or has been met in another manner.

16.2.3 EN–3 highlights the importance of thorough and early consultation and stakeholder engagement, including consultation with the Marine Fisheries Agency (MFA), Marine Management Organisation (MMO), Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA), relevant General Lighthouse Authority and industry bodies and any representatives of recreational users of the sea (e.g. the RYA). In addition the assessment should include:

Information on internationally recognised sea lanes (Section 16.4);

A NRA (see Technical Appendix 16.A) in accordance with the relevant guidance, this should necessitate:

o A survey of vessels in the vicinity of the wind farm;

o A full NRA of the likely impact of the wind farm on navigation in the immediate area of the site; and

o Cumulative risks associated with the development and other projects / activities.



The assessment of the potential effects as a result of safety zones and where this is unknown an assessment of a realistic worse case scenario (Section 16.6 and 16.7) ; and

An assessment of the potential effect on recreational craft (Sections 16.6, 16.7 and Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.2.4 The primary guidance documents used during the assessment are as follows:

Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) Guidelines “Methodology for Assessing the Marine Navigational Safety Risks of Offshore Windfarms”, Version Date: 7th September 2005; and

Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Marine Guidance Notice 371, Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREI) “Guidance on UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response Issues”.

16.2.5 Other forms of guidance used in the assessment are listed below:

International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2002);

MCA Marine Guidance Notice 372 (M+F), Guidance to Mariners Operating in the Vicinity of UK OREIs, August 2008;

MCA North Hoyle Trials (MCA, 2004; MCA, 2005);

International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) Recommendation O–139 On The Marking of Man–Made Offshore Structures, Edition 1, Dec 2008;

Trinity House Lighthouse Service Guidance (Trinity House, 2005);

Kentish Flats Trials (British Wind Energy Association (BWEA), 2007);

The RYA’s position on offshore energy developments (Royal Yachting Association (RYA), 2009); and

DECC Guidance Notes on Safety Zones (DECC, 2007).

Consultation

16.2.6 A summary of the consultation carried out at key stages throughout the project (principally Scoping in and Section 42 consultation), of relevance to the shipping and navigation assessment, is presented in Table 16.1.



Table 16.1 Summary of consultation and issues

Date Consultee Summary of issue Section where addressed

Ongoing

between

September

2009 and

August

2011

Chamber of

Shipping

(including

Scoping

Opinion and

Section 42)

Potential conflict with shipping route – shipping surveys required. Section 16.3 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

Pre–mitigation risks for collision incidents should be included. Section 16.4 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

The potential consequences of construction phase collision with other vessels, operational phase

ship to ship collision, and operational phase ship to structure collision should be reassessed and

stakeholders should be provided with clearer explanations as to how the result of the assessment are

produced.

Section 16.6, 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

The proposed GWF is in direct conflict with some of the major shipping routes. The extension will

bring risk to the ships, where the busiest port is located, where hazardous loads are carried.

Safety navigation risks should be assessed in relation to narrowing shipping corridors.

Impacts from the potential re–routing of north–south traffic currently transiting the proposed

boundaries should be included.

The Sunk TSS extension is inadequate in addressing all concerns over the site proposals.

There should be an assessment of the risks to shipping and navigation in a scenario where the

Section 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A




south–west corner of the zone is developed.

There has been too great a reliance placed on the ability of the Sunk TSS extension to mitigate risk.

Potential re–routing of vessels from within GWF has been given too little coverage and further work

should be undertaken to fully assess impacts.

Issues of impacts on bad weather routing has not been assessed. This should be requested from

vessel operators. A report from the port authorities of the necessary measures put in place to

maintain the traffic flow into their ports in adverse weather should also be requested and due

consideration given to conditions of reduced visibility, particularly where navigation is entirely reliant

on radar.

The cumulative impacts with the North Hinder South TSS will be minimal.

The cumulative impacts of development within the East Anglia ONE Zone (particularly in the south–

west corner) should be included.

Recommend that dialogue takes place between GWF and East Anglia ONE to give the shipping

industry a clearer picture of the extent of the overall development within the region with a view to

allowing further feedback on GWF.

Section 16.10 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

Meeting on

04.09.09

and

ongoing

CEMEX

Marine UK

Ltd (CEMEX)

Concerns raised surrounding the proximity of the cable corridor with Shipwash application area 507.

Discussions are ongoing with CEMEX in order to agree the final location of GWF export cables in

relation to this area. CEMEX has confirmed that it has no objections to GWFL submitting a planning

application that includes reference to potential cable routes both in and adjacent to Area 507/5,

Section 16.6, also

considered in Chapter

18 Other Human

Activities.




consultation subject to reaching agreement on any outstanding issues prior to construction.

Meeting on

04.09.09

Hanson

Aggregates

Marine

No issues highlighted (aggregate area to the West of the GWF has been returned to The Crown

Estate).

N/A

Meeting on

04.09.09

RYA

(including

Section 42)

No major concerns. However they would like only temporary safety zones put in place when wind

turbines are being commissioned and decommissioned and warning signs for sea users. The ‘RYA

Position Statement on Offshore Renewable Energy Developments’ needs to be taken account in

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

Section 16.7.2 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

Meeting on

17.08.10

Surveys in summer 2010 should be carried out to account for lower numbers of recreational vessels

during 2009 as a result of the recession.

Section 16.3 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2011

The impact of a smaller navigational passage between GWF and East Anglia ONE on recreational

and commercial vessels should be considered in the Navigational Risk Assessment.

Section 16.10 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

14.09.09

August

2011

Cruising

Association

(including

Section 42)

No issues highlighted.

Emphasis is put on the importance of the proposed TSS extension to yachts.

N/A

23.09.09 Medway No issues highlighted. N/A




Ports

Sheerness

Ongoing

between

September

2009 and

March 2011

Harwich

Haven

Authority

(HHA)

Conflict with shipping routes – suggest the provision of a fully serviced radar station offshore (in the

field) from which HHA and MCA could access the data which would give both organisations better

radar coverage than currently exists and therefore better monitoring of the traffic in the proposed

area.

Concerns about interference with fishing vessels also highlighted.

Sections 16.6, 16.7,

16.8 and Technical

Appendix 16.A

16.10.09

19.08.10

Port of

London

Authority

No issues highlighted.

N/A

Ongoing

between

September

2009 and

February

2011

Norfolkline

Shipping

No issues highlighted. N/A

Meeting on

12.11.09

Dover

Maritime

Rescue

Coordination

Concerns regarding the potential impact on Round 3 developments and subsequent potential for

further amendments to the traffic in the area – TSS should be amended as a result. MCA would like

to see a robust assessment prepared that meets the IMO objectives and would like the export cable

to be buried sufficiently.

Section 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A




Centre

(MRCC)

Meeting on

26.07.10

Stena Line

Ferries

Concern about conflict with shipping routes although site was much improved over the original plans.

TSS would need to be extended and no problems on ships radar to date with the GGOWF project.

A concern was expressed regarding the interaction with the East Anglia ONE.

N/A

Meeting on

27.07.10

UK

Hydrographic

Office

No issues highlighted. N/A

August

2010

IPC, Trinity

House and

MCA

(Scoping

Opinion)

Cumulative impacts should be addressed, including any interaction with the Norfolk Zone. Section 16.9 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2010

IPC, Trinity

House and

MCA

(Scoping

Opinion)

Impacts on existing aids to navigation should be addressed (i.e. Outer Gabbard buoy). Section 16.4 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August MCA Requirement for shipping and navigation studies, including a 28 day survey of all shipping which Section 16.3 and




2010 and

August

2011

(Scoping

Opinion and

Section 42)

should take account of any seasonal variation in shipping activity.

Where risks are indicated as tolerable, this must be supported by evidence of the ALARP principals.

Clarity needs to be provided as to the setup and methodology for the radar survey, indicating

parameters and limitations of the radar survey.

Technical Appendix

16.A

Particular interest is concerned with the interaction between the development (during construction,

operation, decommissioning and removal if thereafter any obstruction remains which is considered at

the time to be a danger to navigation) and all types of shipping (including commercial, commercial

fishing and leisure).

Concerned about potential impacts to shipping routes close to GWF and as far east as North Hinder

Junction.

Drifting disabled vessels need to be included, particularly during the operational phase. The risk

factor of ‘tolerable’ needs reviewing.

Any application for an operational safety zone would have to be supported by an appropriate

Navigation Risk Assessment incorporating operational experience.

Mitigation measures for drifting broken down vessels will need to be included within the risk profile

and embedded within the ERCoP.

Particular attention should be paid to cabling routes and burial depth for which a Burial Protection

Index study should be completed and subject to traffic volumes, an anchor penetration study may be

necessary.

Section 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A




Cumulative issues between Galloper and East Anglia ONE and the proximity of the route to the

northern boundary and the mean passing distance to the sandbank to the North West (which vessels

are passing to the south of).

The CIA needs to adopt the Rochdale envelope approach and include the full development area for

the East Anglia ONE.

It is recommended that the Kentish Flats Study report be carefully considered and its findings

referred to in the impacts section.

Section 16.10 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2011

Trinity House

(Section 42)

Additional aids to navigation may be required by TH in order to mitigate the risk to the mariner Section 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2010

MCA

(Scoping

Opinion and

Section 42)

The expansion of port functions of Haven Gateway (including expansions at Felixstowe South and

Bathside Bay) may be relevant in the assessment of shipping impacts.

Section 16.4, 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2011

The increase in shipping movements from dredging operations in 2013 / 2014 should be considered

as part of the Navigational Risk Assessment.

Disruption of transit routes to Belgium and the Netherlands is of concern as aggregates extracted

Section 16.7 and

Technical Appendix

16.A




from the licence are supplied to customers on the continent as well as wharves on the UK east coast.

The EIA should consider the scenario of a dredger losing power whilst operation in Area 498 and the

possibility of it drifting towards the turbines.

The existing shipping route between the proposed GWF and East Anglia ONE must remain open

during construction and operation. Closure would result in increased steaming times of 20%.

Cumulative impacts to navigational safety aspects of compressed shipping activity should be given

due consideration as well as the socio–economic impacts of increased shipping times.

Section 16.10 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2011

National

Federation of

Fishermen

Organisations

(Section 42)

The cumulative impact of other offshore developments, including Greater Gabbard, must be taken

into account as displacement impacts a number of vessels.

Section 16.10 and

Technical Appendix

16.A

August

2011

East Anglia

Offshore

Wind

(Section 42)

The proposed GWF limits would push traffic north, increasing traffic in the Rotterdam–Harwich /

Felixstowe traffic corridor. This will impact on development options for East Anglia Offshore Wind

Farm Zone by removing any option to displace traffic to the south, other than to make vessels zig zag

would be unacceptable to most stakeholders.

An overall traffic modelling scenario which takes into account wider development potential, including

the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone, is expected in the final ES.

Section 16.10 and

Technical Appendix

16.A



16.2.7 Ship management companies that use the shipping routes around the proposed GWF have been consulted as part of the shipping and navigation assessment process, the responses, none of which highlighted any concerns, are summarised in Table 16.2.

Table 16.2 Consultation with Ship management companies of relevance to the proposed GWF

Date Ship management

Company

Summary of response

10.02.11 Oldenburg–Portugiesische No objections / concerns regarding

the proposed extension to the TSS

15.02.11 Wilson Euro Carriers AS GWF is likely to have a limited effect

on navigation routing

18.02.11 Arklow Shipping Ltd The GWF proposal looks sound and

the extension of the existing traffic

separation scheme seems a safe and

prudent measure

10.02.11 Eitzen Gas AS No issues highlighted

16.3 Methodology

Study area

16.3.1 The study area considered is a 10 nautical mile (nm) (18.5km) buffer around the proposed GWF site. This is considered sufficient to identify and assess all potential shipping and navigational impacts of the project.

16.3.2 With regard to the cumulative impact assessment, the wider area of the Outer Thames Estuary has been studied in order to capture all activities / projects which may be relevant to the shipping and navigation assessment.

Characterisation of existing environment

16.3.3 The existing environment was primarily characterised by the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Radar survey, which was carried out by survey vessels at the proposed GWF site between August and December 2009, thus covering summer and winter seasons. The effective survey duration was 36 days (this is greater than the minimum of 28 days required by the MCA). Validation of the survey was undertaken using more recent AIS data from 2010 (Anatec, 2011).

Other information sources used during the characterisation of the existing environment are listed below:

UK Coastal Atlas (RYA, 2009);



MMO Fisheries Sightings and Satellite Data (from DMSL, 2011);

The Crown Estate Aggregates Dredging Charts;

Admiralty Charts and Sailing Directions; and

SAR Framework (MCA, 2002). Assessment of impacts

16.3.4 The approach to the shipping and navigation assessment uses two methodologies which is dependant on the potential impact being considered. Those associated with collision risk are assessed in line with the IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) process (see Technical Appendix 16.A for full details). The risk based assessment (detailed in Technical Appendix 16.A) is carried out in accordance with methodology set out in the DTI Guidelines “Methodology for Assessing the Marine Navigational Safety Risks of Offshore Windfarms”, (Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 2005).

16.3.5 Those impacts that are not collision related are assessed in accordance with the standard EIA methodology as set out in Chapter 4 Approach to EIA. Table 16.3 provides further detail on the methodology used for each potential impact which has been identified.

Table 16.3 Impact Assessment Approach

Potential impact Assessment approach

Construction phase

Collision risk with vessels Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)

Collision risk with structures Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)

Operation phase

Re–routing of shipping EIA methodology (Chapter 5)

Ship to ship collision (change) Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)

Collision with structures Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)

Recreational vessel collision Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)

Fishing vessel collision Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)

Cable route interaction EIA methodology (Chapter 5)

Interference with marine radar EIA methodology (Chapter 5)

Search and Rescue EIA methodology (Chapter 5)

Decommissioning

As per construction phase Risk based approach in line with DTI (2005)



16.3.6 For the risk–based approach, collision risks have been assessed using the following risk matrix (Plot 16.1). The “X” represents the predicted risk which has been identified as a result of the consequence and frequency.

16.3.7 The matrices are based on expert judgment. They were revised following a Hazard Review Workshop in May 2011 for local maritime stakeholders. Where the risk is identified as ‘tolerable’ in the impact assessment (Sections 16.6 to 16.8), this is supported by evidence of the ALARP principals.

Plot 16.1 Risk matrix

Co

nse

qu

ence

5

4

3

2 x

1

1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Broadly Acceptable Region (Low Risk)

Tolerable Region (Moderate Risk)

Unacceptable Region (High Risk)

16.3.8 The following definitions apply to the collision risk matrix.

Generally regarded as insignificant and adequately controlled. Nonetheless, the law still requires further risk reductions if it is reasonably practicable. However, at these levels the opportunity for further risk reduction is more limited.

Typical of the risks from activities which people are prepared to tolerate. There is however an expectation that these hazards are properly assessed, appropriate control measures are in place and that the residual risks are as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP). These risks require periodic review to investigate whether further controls are appropriate.

Generally regarded as unacceptable whatever the level of benefit associated with the activity.

16.3.9 The following frequency and consequence definitions apply within the risk

rankings (Table 16.4 and 16.5).

Table 16.4 Frequency Bands

Rank Description Definition

1 Negligible < 1 occurrence per 10,000 years

2 Extremely Unlikely 1 per 100 to 10,000 years

3 Remote 1 per 10 to 100 years




4 Reasonably Probable 1 per 1 to 10 years

5 Frequent Yearly

Table 16.5 Consequence Bands


People Property Environment Business

1 Negligible No injury <£10k <£10k

<10k

2 Minor Slight

injury(s)

£10k–£100k Tier 1

Local

assistance

required

£10k–£100k

3 Moderate Multiple

moderate or

single serious

injury

£100k–£1M Tier 2

Limited

external

assistance

required

£100k–£1M

Local

publicity

4 Serious Serious injury

or single

fatality

£1M–£10M Tier 2

Regional

assistance

required

£1M–£10M

National

publicity

5 Major More than 1

fatality

>£10M Tier 3

National

assistance

required

>£10M

International

publicity

16.3.10 The four consequence scores were averaged and multiplied by the frequency

to obtain an overall ranking (or score) which determined the hazard’s position within the risk matrix (score between 1 and 25). Technical Appendix 16.A provides full details of this process.

16.3.11 Following early project consultation (Table 16.1) it was identified that in order to avoid potential for significant impacts on shipping and navigation there would need to be an extension to the East Sunk Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) (see Section 16.7 and Figure 16.15) that extended the existing TSS to the eastern edge of the proposed GWF boundary. The extension is expected to be ratified in November 2011 and come into effect on 1st July 2012 and will separate the opposing traffic when in the vicinity of GWF, reducing the risk of head–on encounters in an area of restricted sea room.



As a result of the status of the extension to the Sunk TSS, it has been incorporated into the assessment presented in this Chapter.

16.4 Existing Environment

Overview

16.4.1 The main navigational features in the vicinity of the proposed GWF site are the Sunk Area (including TSS) and the Port Operations at HHA and Port of London Authority (PLA). Route deviation due to GWF possibly affecting traffic as far east as North Hinder was raised as a concern by some stakeholders (Trinity House and the MCA) with the potential cumulative impact from East Anglia ONE a particular concern. These issues have been discussed in the NRA (see Technical Appendix 16.A) with the outcome presented in the relevant assessment sections.

16.4.2 The Sunk Area to the east of Felixstowe consists of five sets of approach and departure routes for shipping (see Figure 16.1(a)).

Sunk TSS North;

Sunk TSS East;

Sunk Recommended Route for Ferries;

Sunk TSS South; and

Long Sand Head Two Way Route.

16.4.3 The Sunk TSS East traffic lanes route ships between the two areas of the GGOWF site and the eastern boundary of the Sunk TSS East is aligned with the eastern boundary of the GGOWF site.

16.4.4 To the North-west of the Sunk TSS there is the Sunk Deep Water (DW) Anchorage, which is used by large vessels bound for Felixstowe. The charted water depth ranges from 14m to 21m lowest astronomical tide (LAT). This anchorage is located approximately 15km from the proposed GWF site; all other anchorages are over 25km from the site.

16.4.5 The Sunk TSS is covered by the Sunk Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operated by Dover Coastguard, which covers the Sunk Inner Precautionary Area, the Sunk Outer Precautionary Area and the Sunk TSS lanes.

16.4.6 Further south, there are several well–established shipping channels between sand banks in the area, including Barrow Deep, Black Deep and Fisherman’s Gat, used by shipping to / from ports within the Thames Estuary. A full discussion and description of all relevant features will be included in the full NRA. Figure 16.1(a) and (b) present the main navigational features within the area surrounding the proposed GWF.







Shipping analysis

16.4.7 The majority of vessels confirmed during the AIS and radar survey were recorded on AIS. AIS is now fitted on the vast majority of commercial ships operating in UK waters, including all ships of 300 Gross Tonnage (GT) and upwards engaged on international voyages, which covers the vast majority of merchant shipping passing through the area. Small vessels not broadcasting on AIS were recorded on radar, with visual observations made of type and size when possible. Only days when the survey vessel was in the area of interest were included in the survey. Experienced crew utilising a modern radar carried out the survey. The crew were briefed on survey requirements and were also tasked with liaising with fishing vessels in the area. Survey forms were also provided for the recording of additional details of non-AIS targets.

16.4.8 It is anticipated that a larger number of deeper draughted and larger container ships will pass through the Sunk TSS in future. However, due to their larger size and deeper draught it is expected that these vessels would attempt to keep a large distance between themselves and the wind farm. Furthermore, the current TSS and its extension would be sufficient to accommodate larger vessels and although there is potential for an increase in number it is expected to be relatively small (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.4.9 In terms of ship routeing, all the main ship operators were consulted to validate the routes they were taking through the area. The operators confirmed that the tracks recorded represented their routeing through the area in different conditions.

16.4.10 Figures 16.2 to 16.7 show all tracks within 10nm of the proposed GWF for context, but the analysis by daily numbers, types, sizes, etc., only includes tracks passing through the GWF as these would be most directly affected by GWF.

16.4.11 There was significant wind farm support vessel and survey activity being carried out in the area during the shipping survey, due to the construction of GGOWF. This activity, due to its temporary nature, has been filtered out for the shipping analysis. Figure 16.2 (a) and (b) shows the overall survey results within the 10nm study area, using combined AIS and radar tracks, mapped by type of vessel.

Vessel type

16.4.12 Excluding vessels associated with GGOWF, there were on average 12 vessels per day passing within the proposed GWF area. This can be further divided to an average of five per day through Area A and seven per day through Areas B / C (some tracks crossed both sections) (see Technical Appendix 16.A).



16.4.13 The busiest day during the survey period was 15th October 2009 when 26 vessels travelled through the proposed GWF site (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.4.14 With regard to the number of vessels by type recorded within the study area, cargo vessels were the most common, comprising 62% of traffic (Plot 16.2). An average of 6 cargo vessels per day passed through the proposed GWF site, the majority within the Sunk TSS. The most regular cargo vessels, which also passed through the proposed GWF site, were the Cobelfret Ro–Ro ferries, such as Taurine, operating between Ipswich and Zeebrugge. Other regular vessels were vehicle carrier Autoprogress; en route to Emden and Ro–Ro cargo ship Ortviken; en route to Tilbury.

16.4.15 Tankers made up 22% of traffic and primarily used the Sunk North and Sunk South TSS to the west and also the North Hinder TSS to the east. Vessels travelling through the proposed GWF site were predominantly en route to / from the Thames.

16.4.16 7% of vessels recorded within the study area were “other” ships, comprising of salvage, research and pilot vessels. The remaining 8% included passenger vessels, fishing vessels, dredging vessels and tugs (Plot 16.2).

Plot 16.2 Vessel type distribution recorded within the study area



Vessel size, speed and destination

16.4.17 Figure 16.2 (b) shows the combined AIS and radar tracks by ship length. The average length of vessel passing within the proposed GWF during the survey period was 115m. The longest vessel crossing the GWF was the container ship Cosco Indian Ocean at 348.5m. This vessel is 46m wide at the beam and has a maximum draught of 14.5m.

16.4.18 The average speed of vessels travelling through the study area was 11.6 knots. The maximum speeds were between 22 – 24 knots, however less than 1% of vessels were recorded travelling at this speed. The greatest proportion of vessels (over 40%) were recorded travelling at between 14 – 19 knots (Plot 16.3).

16.4.19 The main destinations of the vessels recorded were Harwich Haven (Ipswich, Felixstowe and Harwich), The Netherlands (ports in and around Rotterdam) and ports in the Thames and Medway (Chatham, Tilbury and Sheerness) (Plot 16.4).







Plot 16.3 Speed distribution of vessels passing within Galloper Wind Farm

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

22%

24%

0-2 2-4 4-6 6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 14-16 16-18 18-20 20-22 22-24

Speed (knots)

Per

cen

tag

e

Plot 16.4 Main destination ports of vessels passing through Galloper Wind Farm

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

Ipsw

ich

Tilb

ury

Tee

s

Rot

terd

am

Imm

ingh

am

She

erne

ss

Cha

tham

Fel

ixst

owe

Har

wic

h

Zee

brug

ge

Bra

vike

n

Faw

ley

Destination

Per

cen

tag

e

East – west traffic analysis (via TSS)

16.4.20 This section presents analysis of east–west traffic through the Sunk TSS East. Figure 16.3(a) presents the number of vessels per day observed eastbound and westbound within the TSS, and Figure 16.3(b) shows these movements as vessel type. Taking into account the effective survey duration of 36 days, an average of 10 vessels per day were eastbound and 5 per day westbound. The higher number of eastbound vessels is largely due to regular ferries, which use the TSS when travelling to Rotterdam but on their return to Harwich take a more northerly route avoiding the TSS.



16.4.21 Vessels using the westbound lane of the TSS were mainly headed to Felixstowe, Harwich and ports in the Thames. Eastbound vessels were predominantly destined for ports in The Netherlands (especially Rotterdam) and Germany.

16.4.22 The majority of tracks were made by cargo vessels (68%), followed by passenger vessels (21%) and tankers (7%). The remaining vessels fell within the “other” group, military vessels, dredging vessels, or were unspecified.

16.4.23 The westbound TSS lane is generally used by deeper draught vessels with almost 60% of vessels in the 8–16m draught bracket. Approximately 40% of vessels in the eastbound TSS fall into the same size bracket.

North – South traffic analysis

16.4.24 Figure 16.4 presents the number of vessels per day observed heading north–south, intersecting the proposed GWF boundary. Taking into account the effective survey duration of 36 days, an average of 6 vessels per day passed through proposed GWF in a north–south direction. Most ships were seen travelling between UK east coast ports (e.g., Humber and Tees) and ports to the south (mainly via the Dover Strait).

16.4.25 The majority of tracks were made by cargo vessels (54%), followed by tankers (32%) and fishing vessels (8%) and the average draught of tracks heading north–south was 5.7m. The deepest–draught vessel was the crude oil tanker Hengam, with a broadcast draught of 21.9m. In addition, vessels with deeper draughts tended to navigate further to the east. Future traffic levels will be assessed in the NRA. There is no indication of a significant increase in traffic in the area based on known proposals (Anatec, 2011).

East – West traffic passing north of the proposed GWF

16.4.26 The affect of the proposed GWF on east – west traffic passing within the vicinity of the northern boundary of the site has been significantly reduced by reshaping the site boundary to bring it more in line with the GGOWF site, thereby minimising the additional re-routeing required.

16.4.27 An average of one east – west ship passes within the northern GWF boundary every two days, which is a minority (12%) with the majority of ships to the north passing outside the GWF boundary.

16.4.28 There is a shallow patch of water to the north of the site boundary with a minimum charted depth of 8.8m (LAT). For east – west shipping, the available sea room between the shallow patch and the northern site boundary is approximately 0.75nm (1.4km).



16.4.29 Figure 16.5 presents the east – west tracks passing the north of the proposed GWF site, recorded over a 28 day period and passing within 1nm of the shallow patch. There were an average of 4 vessels per day within 1nm, most of which pass to the south.











Fishing vessel activity

Site survey results

16.4.30 The maritime traffic survey identified fishing activity in the vicinity of the proposed GWF and overall, 77 fishing vessel tracks were recorded during the survey period, averaging approximately two tracks per day. A plot of the combined tracks is presented in Figure 16.6.

16.4.31 A total of 34 fishing vessel tracks were logged passing through the proposed GWF during the survey, in addition a proportion of the unidentified vessels tracked on radar (non–AIS) are also likely to be fishing vessels.

Surveillance data results

16.4.32 Fisheries statistics in the UK are reported by ICES statistical Rectangles and Sub–squares. The proposed GWF is located within ICES Rectangles 32F1 and 32F2, straddling four Sub–squares (see Figure 16.7). Further details on fisheries and the activities associated with this resource can be found in Chapter 13 Fish and Shellfish Resource and Chapter 15 Commercial Fisheries.

16.4.33 Data on fishing vessel sightings were obtained from the Marine Management Organisation (MMO). The Sea Fisheries Inspectorate (SFI) monitor the fishing industry’s compliance with UK, EU and international fisheries laws through the deployment of patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and the sea fisheries inspectorate. Data were obtained for the five–year period 2005 to 2009 and showed that between one and two fishing vessels were recorded per patrol. Sub–square 32F1/4 had the highest average sightings per patrol at 1.9 vessels, which includes the north–western tip of Area A and the majority of Area C.

16.4.34 The MMO also operate a satellite–based vessel monitoring system, which receives vessel position reports approximately every 2 hours (if a vessel has a terminal on board that cannot be polled then it must report once per hour). The data cover all EC countries within British Fisheries Limits and certain Third Countries, e.g., Norway and Faeroes.

16.4.35 From 2005 to 2009, a total of 117 fishing vessel were recorded, the majority of which were located in the southern section (58%). The majority of fishing vessels were Belgian registered (56%). However, there was a clear geographical variation with Belgian vessels predominating in the western Sub–squares and Dutch vessels predominating in the eastern two Sub–squares, as illustrated in Figure 16.7. Within the proposed GWF boundary, the majority of vessels sighted were Belgian registered vessels (50%) and Dutch vessels (38%).

16.4.36 With regard to gear type, the main fishing method used throughout the study area was beam trawling, accounting for approximately 70% of all sightings. Unspecified otter trawlers accounting for 19% of recorded sightings. The



vast majority of vessels sighted within the proposed GWF boundary were also beam trawlers (88%).

16.4.37 93% of vessels sighted were engaged in fishing (i.e. with gear deployed), 6% were steaming (transiting to / from fishing grounds) and 1% were laid stationary (vessels at anchor or pair vessels whose partner vessel is taking the catch whilst the other stands by). Within the proposed GWF boundary, the proportion actively fishing was slightly lower at 79%.

Satellite data analysis

16.4.38 The fishing vessel satellite positions recorded in 2009 and 2010, covering both UK and non–UK vessels of 15m length and over, have been combined to produce a fishing vessel density plot based for this two year period (Figure 16.8 (a)). Vessel nationality information is not available for the 2009 – 2010 satellite data. However, data from 2006, which include nationality, tend to corroborate the sightings data, by indicating that the majority of activity is by foreign vessels (Figure 16.8 (b)).

16.4.39 Overall, the majority of fishing vessels tracked by satellite in the ICES Sub–squares were registered in Belgium (55%) followed by the Netherlands (23%). This varies considerably between the western Sub–squares (32F1/2 & 32F1/4) where the majority were Belgian registered and the eastern Sub–squares further offshore in which Dutch vessels were the largest fleet.

16.4.40 The Belgian fishing fleet was the largest within the proposed GWF boundary, accounting for 68% of recorded satellite positions. The second largest was the Dutch fleet with 23%.











Recreational activity

16.4.41 According to the RYA’s “Sharing the Wind” publication (2004), the Thames Estuary Strategic Environmental Assessment area has a density of recreational sailing second in the UK only to the Solent area. Further details on recreational activities are discussed in Chapter 24 Land–use, Tourism and Recreation.

16.4.42 Recreational sailing in the area consists of:

Canoeing and sail–boarding in the creeks and minor rivers;

Dinghies and other small boats in all rivers and offshore all coasts to about 15 nm;

Cruiser passage–making, both motor and sail, between all combinations of shore facilities;

Cruiser day–sailing, both motor and sail, in all coastal areas from Whitstable to Harwich;

Personal watercrafts are popular but confined to locations inshore only;

Practical sail training in the area is extensive and based out of most of the larger marinas;

‘Traditional’ sailing craft in the area such as smacks, barges and other gaff–rigged craft; and

Visitors from Scandinavia, the Netherlands and south coast of England.

16.4.43 Recreational boating, both under sail and power is highly seasonal and highly

diurnal. The division of recreational craft routes into Heavy, Medium and Light Use is therefore based on the following classification:

Heavy Recreational Routes: very popular routes on which a minimum of six or more recreational vessels will probably be seen at all times during summer daylight hours. These also include the entrances to harbours, anchorages and places of refuge;

Medium Recreational Routes: popular routes on which some recreational craft will be seen at most times during summer daylight hours; and

Light Recreational Routes: routes known to be in common use but which do not qualify for medium or heavy classification.

16.4.44 The recreational vessel activity and facilities in the vicinity of the proposed

GWF are presented in Figure 16.9.

16.4.45 Based on the RYA published data, the wind farm is well outside the general racing and sailing areas off the coast. There are no cruising routes passing through the proposed GWF, however, there is one light–use route shown to



be heading via the Sunk TSS East (Separation Zone) used by traffic between the Thames / Harwich Haven and The Netherlands (Figure 16.9). There are several marinas and clubs for recreational vessels located along the coast near Harwich and Felixstowe. The nearest club is the Bawdsey Haven Yacht Club, 20nm west of the western extremity of the northern wind farm. The closest marinas are Shotley Marina and Titchmarsh Marina (Figure 16.9).

16.4.46 The Inner Gabbard and The Galloper sandbanks are visited by recreational angling charter parties on a regular basis, where the main attraction is bass fishing. Diving activities in this area are infrequent due to the distance from the shore and the limited interest of the sandbank habitats (see Chapter 24).





Maritime incidents

16.4.47 Data from the following sources has been analysed in order to review the maritime incidents that have occurred in the vicinity of the proposed GWF site:

Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB); and

Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI).

MAIB

16.4.48 All UK commercial vessels are required to report accidents to MAIB. Non–UK vessels do not have to report unless they are in a UK port or are within territorial waters (i.e. within 12nm) and carrying passengers to a UK port. There are no requirements for non–commercial recreational craft to report accidents to MAIB.

16.4.49 The locations1 of accidents, injuries and hazardous incidents reported to MAIB within 10nm of the proposed GWF boundary between January 1994 and March 2010 are presented in Figure 16.10 (a) and are colour–coded by type.

16.4.50 A total of 53 incidents were reported in the area within 10nm of the proposed GWF site, corresponding to an average of 3–4 per year. There was only one collision in that period, between two cargo vessels in August 1997 (pre–Sunk TSS). The primary causes of collision were that one vessel failed to recognise the risk of collision due to fog and the other vessel failed to take early and substantial actions to avoid a collision. There was material damage on both vessels but no casualties were reported. It is noted that this incident occurred prior to the Sunk TSS being established.

RNLI

16.4.51 Data on RNLI lifeboat responses within 10nm of the proposed GWF in the ten–year period between 2000 and 2009 have been analysed. A total of 80 launches to 71 unique incidents were recorded by the RNLI (excluding hoaxes and false alarms).

16.4.52 The overall distribution by casualty type is summarised in Figure 16.10 (b). The most common vessel types involved were yachts (39%) and fishing vessels (23%). Power boats and other sail boats together accounted for 15% of all incidents. Merchant vessels accounted for 11% and other boat / vessels (mostly diving boats) accounted for 4%.

16.4.53 The two main causes of incidents were machinery failure (34%) and person in danger (14%). The stations and types of lifeboat responding to incidents (ALB = all–weather lifeboat and ILB – inshore lifeboat) are detailed in the following section (Search and Rescue resources)

1 MAIB aim for 97% accuracy in reporting the locations of incidents.



16.4.54 There were seven incidents recorded within the proposed GWF site over the 10 years analysed. Details of these incidents are given below:

Steering failure of a yacht; Harwich ALB responded on 1st August 2001;

Machinery failure on a fishing vessel; ALBs from Aldeburgh were launched on 10th August 2002;

Machinery failure on a fishing vessel; Harwich ALB responded on 10th August 2002;

Steering failure on a yacht; Harwich ALB responded on 13th August 2005;

Machinery failure on a yacht, Harwich ALB responded on 1st October 2005;

Machinery failure on a yacht, Ramsgate ALB responded on 19th July 2006 and

Machinery failure on an angling vessel, Aldeburgh ALB responded on 9th July 2007.







Search and rescue resources

Coastguard stations

16.4.55 HM Coastguard is responsible for requesting and tasking SAR resources made available by other authorities and for co-ordinating the subsequent SAR operations (unless they fall within military jurisdiction).

16.4.56 All of the MCA’s operations, including SAR, are divided into three geographical regions. The East of England Region covers the east and south Coasts of England from the Scottish border down to the Dorset / Devon border.

16.4.57 Each region is divided into six districts with its own Maritime Rescue Co–ordination Centre (MRCC), which co-ordinates the SAR response for maritime and coastal emergencies within its district boundaries (East of England Region includes an additional station, London Coastguard, for coordinating SAR on the River Thames).

16.4.58 The proposed GWF lies within the East of England Region with the nearest rescue coordination centre being Thames MRCC (located in Walton–on–Naze, Essex). MRCC Thames’s area of responsibility provides SAR coverage from Southwold to the Reculver towers, Herne Bay.

16.4.59 As a result of increased congestion of the seas around the UK, increases in the size of ships, the increasingly busy coastline and the occurrence of more extreme weather conditions, there are currently proposals to modernise the coastguard (MCA, 2010). As part of its consultation process the MCA held a series of public meetings, concerning the proposed Coastguard modernisation, which ended in March 2011. Improvements centre on modernising the coastguard structures and systems which includes the creation of a nationally networked system of operations centres (MCA, 2010).

SAR helicopters

16.4.60 A review of the assets in the area of the wind farm site indicated that the closest SAR helicopter base is located at Wattisham, operated by the RAF, approximately 37nm to the north-west of the proposed GWF (Figure 16.11).

16.4.61 This base has Sea King helicopters with a maximum endurance of 6 hours and speed of 110mph giving a radius of action of approximately 250nm which is well within the range of the proposed GWF. One helicopter is available at 15 minutes readiness between 0800 and 2200 hours, with another available at 60 minutes readiness between 0800 hours and evening civil twilight (ECT). Between 2200 and 0800 hours, one helicopter is held at 45 minutes readiness.

RNLI Lifeboats

16.4.62 The RNLI stations in the vicinity of the proposed GWF are presented in Figure 16.11. At each of these stations crew and lifeboats are available on a 24–hour basis throughout the year.



16.4.63 Table 16.6 provides a summary of the facilities at the stations closest to the proposed GWF. Based on the offshore position of the development it is likely that ALBs would respond to an incident at the wind farm from Aldeburgh and Harwich. The time for an all–weather lifeboat to reach GWF would be approximately one hour from the nearest RNLI station.

Table 16.6 Lifeboats held at nearby RNLI stations

Station Lifeboats ALB Spec ILB Spec Distance to Site Boundary

Aldeburgh ALB / ILB Mersey D Class 16nm

Harwich ALB / ILB Severn B Class

(Atlantic) 24nm

Walton &

Frinton ALB Tyne - 23nm

Clacton ILB - B Class (Atlantic) /

D Class 27nm

West Mersea ILB - B Class (Atlantic) 37nm





Salvage

16.4.64 MCA charters four Emergency Towing Vessels (ETV) to provide emergency towing cover in winter months in the four areas adjudged to pose the highest risk of a marine accident, the nearest being Dover Strait.

16.4.65 MCA has an agreement with the British Tug owners Association (BTA) for emergency chartering arrangements for harbour tugs. The agreement covers activation, contractual arrangements, liabilities and operational procedures, should MCA request assistance from any local harbour tug as part of the response to an incident.

16.5 Assessment of Impacts – Worst Case Scenario

16.5.1 This section establishes the worst case scenario from the range under consideration (see Chapter 5) to ensure that the assessment is focused on the maximum potential adverse effect that could arise from the development.

16.5.2 Full details on the range of options being considered by GWFL are provided throughout Chapter 5 Project Details. For the purpose of the shipping and navigation impact assessment, the worst case scenario, taking into consideration these options, is detailed in Table 16.7.

16.5.3 It is noted that only those design parameters detailed under each specific impact have the potential to influence the level of impact experienced by the relevant receptor. Therefore, if the design parameter is not discussed then it is considered not to have a material bearing on the outcome of the assessment.

16.5.4 The worst case scenarios identified below are also applied to the assessment of cumulative impacts. In the event that the worst case scenarios for the project in isolation do not result in the worst case for cumulative impacts, this is addressed within the cumulative assessment section of the Chapter (see Section 16.10).



Table 16.7 Worst case project design for shipping and navigation impact assessment

Impact Realistic worst case scenario Justification

Construction

Ship–to–structure

collision risk

Up to 140 WTGs

Three (3) met masts

Up to four (4) ancillary structures (comprising offshore

substation platform(s) (OSP), collection platform(s) and /

or accommodation platform)

All mounted on jacket foundations of the largest

dimensions at sea level (namely 25m by 25m for WTGs

and met masts and 40m by 30m for ancillary structures)

Development within all three arrays (Areas A, B and C),

(i.e. the red line area being filled with WTGs to the

boundary)

Installation of up to three export cables (totalling up to 190

cable kilometres) and up to 300km of inter/intra-array

cables.

The worst case scenario for collision with structures is controlled by size

of structures, numbers of structures and extent over which the structures

are spread.

A 7m diameter monopile has a sea level area of 38.5m2. The 35m and

45m GBS foundations have a sea surface area of 50.3m2 (based on a

4m column diameter). The suction monopod foundation option has a

sea level area of 63.7m2 (based on a column diameter of 4.5m). The

jacket option for WTG and met mast structures has a sea level area of

156m2 and 1,200m2 for ancillary structures.

The worst case scenario detailed adjacent therefore, provides for the

largest number of greatest sized (area at sea level) structures, across

the maximum possible development area and therefore provides for the

greatest collision potential.

Ship–to–ship collision

risk

Up to two structures installed at any one time.

Construction vessels comprising foundation installation

via Heavy Lift Vessel (HLV) / jack-up barge, grouting

vessel, foundation transportation vessel, substation

Worst case scenario provides for the maximum number of construction

vessels that may be present over the greatest geographical scale and

longest duration.




installation vessel and support vessels present within the

site within a 56 month construction window (commencing

in Q2/Q3 2015).

Construction activity over all three Development Areas (A,

B and C) with 24hr operations.

Operation

Re–routing of existing

shipping

Exclusion of all shipping from all areas within the

proposed GWF boundary

Whilst development may only occur in certain areas within the proposed

site boundary, the worst possible scenario would be to assume that all

shipping that currently passes through the proposed GWF site, would

avoid it on health and safety grounds. This option therefore, provides

for maximum potential disruption to existing activity in the site.

Ship–to–ship collision

risk

Up to five vessel movements (from a local port to the

project site) within the Development Area per day from

operational vessels (typified by the wind cat style craft).

The worst case scenario is represented by the maximum number of

operational maintenance (planned or unplanned) within the

Development Area, based on the development scenario provided under

construction.

Ship–to–installation

collision risk

As detailed above for construction As detailed above for construction

Impact on recreational

craft

140 WTGs

Three (3) met masts

Up to four (4) ancillary structures (comprising offshore

The justification for collision with structures is as detailed in construction.

In terms of displacement, recreational vessels will not avoid the wind

farm site and so the worst case scenario is represented by the maximum

number of structures over the widest extent with a 50m exclusion zone




substation platform(s) (OSP), collection platform(s) and /

or accommodation platform)

All mounted on jacket foundations of the largest

dimensions at sea level (40m x 30m)

All structures have a 50m operational safety zone around

structures and a minimum blade tip clearance of 22m

above MHWS

Development within all three arrays (Areas A, B and C)

around each structure. Adoption of other development scenarios (use of

less WTGs, other foundation types or restricting development to certain

Development Areas) would serve to reduce either the scale or overall

geographic extent of which disruption could occur.

Impact on fishing

activity (collision risk)

As detailed for ship–to–installation collision risk in

construction

Assuming fishing effort stays at current level

As detailed for ship–to–installation collision risk in construction

Assuming that fishing effort stays the same within the zone provides for

the maximum potential interaction with the fishing industry. Any

consideration of reduced fishing effort within the site would serve to

lower the potential for encounters with vessels and built structures

Impact from sub–sea

cables on ship

anchoring

Export and inter/intra-array cables buried to a

representative average minimum burial depth of 0.6m.

The worst case scenario for impact on cables is established through

determining the shallowest burial depth for the cable (the closer to the

seabed surface, the increased snagging risk).

The cable burial depth will be determined by a cable burial protection

study. This study will take place once site specific information is

available on the finalised cable routing plan. At this juncture, a cable

burial index will be established for the length of the cable routes (based

on the risk to the cable, which will include an anchor penetration study to




inform the risk of snagging) and appropriate burial depth determined

accordingly. It is therefore, assumed the cable route will be protected

against impacts from the local anchoring, dredging and trawling

practices, such that the risks are made ALARP.

Impact on marine

radar

140 WTGs, up to three (3) met masts and four (4)

ancillary structures throughout the all Development Areas

(A, B and C)

Impacts on radar are associated with the presence of structures above

sea level.

The greater the number of structures, the more the potential for

interference with marine radar. The worst case scenario therefore,

provides for the maximum number of structures.

The extent of development also has the potential to influence the level of

impact as shipping occurs around the whole of the proposed GWF site

(see Section 16.4). Therefore, the worst case scenario provides for

development in all three areas (A, B and C) on the basis that it

maximises the radar contact potential with structures. Any scenario that

restricted the placement of structures to certain Development Areas,

would reduce to the potential for interaction with shipping radar.

Impact on SAR 140 WTGs, up to three (3) met masts and four (4)

ancillary structures throughout the all Development Areas

(A, B and C)

The worst case scenario on SAR activity is influenced by the maximum

number of structures spread over the widest possible extent. Fewer

structures or development within restricted areas in the proposed site

would reduce the overall level of potential for interference with SAR

operations.




Decommissioning

All impacts as per

construction

See construction See construction



16.5.5 The current matrices are based on expert judgment. These were revised following the Hazard Review Workshop held in May 2011 and incorporated in the NRA report (see Technical Appendix 16.A). Any higher risk scenarios will be subject to quantitative modelling within the NRA.

16.6 Assessment of Impacts during Construction

16.6.1 As detailed in Technical Appendix 16.A, construction related impacts are broadly in line with those encountered during the operational phase (see Section 16.7). The principal ones that are distinctly associated with this phase of the project are as follows:

Increased ship–to–structure collision risk; and

Increased ship–to–ship collision risk.

16.6.2 Vessels in the area will be at risk of collision with the surface structures associated with the proposed GWF. This could be as a result of a vessel going off course either due to watch–keeper error or mechanical breakdown resulting in drifting vessels.

16.6.3 Modelling (through use of Anatec’s COLLRISK) based on revised shipping patterns (following application of TSS Extension) and a worst case development scenario (see Table 16.7), determined that the frequency of an errant ship under power deviating from its route to the extent that it comes into proximity with GWF is not considered to be a likely event, with an estimated collision rate of 1 in 334 years (see Technical Appendix 16.A). Figure 16.16 shows the modelled collision frequency per individual structure.

16.6.4 With the drifting vessels, the probability of a ship drifting towards a structure and the drift speed are dependent on the prevailing wind, wave and tide conditions at the time of the accident. The drifting ship collision assessment modelled the drift pattern of vessels within 10nm of the proposed GWF site based on wind, peak spring flood and peak spring ebb tidal conditions. It established that flood tide-dominated drift produced the worst case results for the proposed GWF (see Technical Appendix 16.A). The total drifting ship collision frequency with the proposed GWF structures was estimated to be an average of one drifting ship collision in 760 years.

16.6.5 The reduction in sea room and displacement of traffic will result in ships potentially passing closer together as well as an increased risk of ship–to–ship encounters / collisions. This has been modelled as part of the NRA (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.6.6 The modelling (using Anatec’s COLLRISK, see Technical Appendix 16.A) for the risk assessment was carried out on the encounter levels described above and existing routing (see Section 16.4). Based on the model run for the area, the baseline vessel-to-vessel collision risk level pre-wind farm is in the order of 1 major collision in just over 22.5 years (Anatec, 2011).



Based on vessel-to-vessel collision risk modelling of the revised traffic pattern (i.e. including the TSS extension and GWF), the collision risk is estimated to increase to 1 major collision in 22.2 years. (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.6.7 The presence of construction vessels within the proposed GWF will pose collision risks to wind farm structures and other vessels. There may also be increased collision risk associated with vessel movements between the proposed GWF and the operations base(s). Further detail on the ship to ship and ship to installation collision is provided within Section 16.7 and the NRA in Technical Appendix 16.A.

16.6.8 The following risk matrices were developed for the construction phase (Plot 16.5 and 16.6). Refer to Table 16.4 and 16.5 for the definitions of frequency and consequence.

Plot 16.5 Construction phase – collision with wind farm structures

Co

nse

qu

ence

5 4 3 2 x1

1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Definitions




Plot 16.6 Construction phase risk results – collision with other vessels

Co

nse

qu

ence

5 4 3 x 2 1

1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Definitions




16.6.9 Collision with a wind farm structure has a score of 8 (frequency of 4 x

consequence of 2) and collision with other vessels has a score of 9 (frequency of 3 x consequence of 3) (see Tables 16.4 and 16.5). The overall risk level is assessed to be Moderate (Tolerable) in each case.

16.6.10 Impacts and mitigation which apply across all of the development phases are discussed within the operational phase assessment, Section 16.7.



Mitigation and residual impact

16.6.11 The above assessment assumes industry good practice will be applied to minimise the construction phase risks. Commitments include:

Export cable route refinement to avoid key dredging area;

Guard vessel during construction;

Learning lessons from past accidents / near–misses;

Stringent selection process for construction and maintenance vessels;

Promulgation of information to local stakeholders (ports, fishing, recreation);

ERCoP developed in consultation with RNLI and MCA, including use of Marine Guidance Notice (MGN) 371 (incl Annex 5); and

Extension of the Sunk TSS.

16.6.12 Consultation with CEMEX UK Marine Ltd (Shipwash 507/5) and Britannia

Aggregates Ltd and Volker Dredging Ltd (Area 498) has been ongoing throughout the EIA process. A safe working distance of 500m has been provided between Area 498 thereby reducing the potential for interaction during the cable installation works period (see Chapter 18). With regard to Area 507/5 discussions are ongoing with CEMEX in order to agree the final location of GWF export cables in relation to this area. CEMEX has confirmed that it has no objections to GWFL submitting a planning application that includes reference to potential cable routes both in and adjacent to Area 507/5, subject to reaching agreement on any outstanding issues prior to construction.

16.6.13 Hazard / risk assessment workshops will be carried out as part of the construction project–planning process. The objective of the workshops will be to identify all of the different activities which will be taking place and identify any potential hazards as well as appropriate mitigation measures and operating procedures relevant to the selected vessels and construction methods, e.g., passage plans for routeing between the site and onshore base.

16.6.14 It is noted that the construction company appointed will have their own internal Health and Safety procedures that they will adhere to during the work, providing additional security. Experience and lessons learned from the construction of other offshore wind farm projects will also be considered, most notably the experience gained during the construction of the adjacent GGOWF.

16.6.15 500m safety zones around construction works during the construction phase (as discussed in Chapter 5) will be applied for under the provisions of the Energy Act 2004. This precaution will provide a means of regulating the rights of navigation so as to preserve the safety of those working in the proposed GWF and those onboard other vessels that may be navigating in



this area. The safety zones (if granted) will act to exclude all vessels not involved in the wind farm operations.

16.6.16 A guard vessel (or vessels) will be nominated during the construction phase with responsibility for monitoring passing traffic and intervening in the event of a vessel approaching on an unsafe course. A site–specific collision risk management plan will be provided to this vessel.

16.6.17 Other general mitigation measures that apply to all phases of development, such as marking and lighting, are outlined in Section 16.7. Additional potential measures were discussed at the Hazard Review Workshop involving local maritime stakeholders which is scheduled as part of the NRA. In addition to those measures mentioned in the sections above, adequate cable protection through suitable burial depths and periodic monitoring will be undertaken, as necessary.

16.6.18 Based on applying these mitigation measures, and by following industry good practice, it is considered the residual risks will be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

16.7 Assessment of Impacts during Operation

16.7.1 Impacts during operation are discussed in the following paragraphs. Mitigation measures are listed at the end of this section as the majority apply to all potential impacts described. However, particular mitigation applying to any specific impacts is presented where appropriate. Potential impacts during operation will be:

Re–routeing existing vessel traffic;

Increased ship–to–ship collision risk;

Increased ship–to–installation collision risk;

Impacts on recreational vessels;

Impacts on fishing vessels;

Impacts from sub–sea cables;

Impacts on marine radar; and

Impacts on SAR.

16.7.2 Impacts on dredging activity and operations are considered within the re-routing, collision risk and sub-sea cable assessments as identified in the list above.



Potential impacts on commercial shipping

Re–routeing of existing traffic

16.7.3 The characterisation of the baseline environment identified that there are three existing routes that have the potential to be impacted by the proposed GWF development:

East-west traffic through existing Sunk TSS;

North-south traffic in far east of the site; and

East-west traffic to the north of the site.

16.7.4 The detail on the shipping passing through these routes being provided in

Section 16.4 and further expanded on in Technical Appendix 16.A.

16.7.5 The east-west traffic through the Sunk TSS East will be affected by the operational GWF (see Figure 16.3 and Figure 9.1 in Technical Appendix 16.A). An average of 10 vessels per day pass eastbound and 5 per day pass westbound through the TSS. Vessels using the westbound lane of the TSS were mainly headed to Felixstowe, Harwich and ports in the Thames, whilst eastbound vessels were predominantly destined for ports in The Netherlands (especially Rotterdam) and Germany. The sea room available to the east-west vessels will be constrained by the proposed GWF WTGs to the north and south. However, the TSS extension will manage the traffic passing in the vicinity of GWF, routeing it parallel to the GWF WTGs (as is the case at GGOWF). This significantly mitigates the impact.

16.7.6 The east-west traffic which passes over the north of the site will not be significantly affected by the development of GWF (see Figure 16.3 and Figure 9.4 in Technical Appendix 16.A). On average over the 28 day survey period, only one vessel every two days passed within the northern boundary of the proposed GWF. It is not envisaged that this route will be closed at any time.

16.7.7 The overall anticipated effect on east-west traffic is presented in Figure 16.12.





16.7.8 The greatest potential for impacts is upon vessels that pass north-south through the proposed GWF. These vessels were mainly travelling between UK east coast ports, e.g., Humber, and ports to the South, such as Ostend or via the Dover Strait to ports such as Southampton or Le Havre. It has been identified through consultation that aggregates companies around this area of the UK supply customers on the continent, particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands. An average of four ships a day passed through the proposed site during the 28 day survey period (Anatec, 2011).

16.7.9 Figure 16.13 shows the pattern of the re-routeing that would be predicted as a result of the development of the proposed GWF. The Figure shows a plot of the current and predicted track (post-TSS extension) for a typical north-south voyage between Immingham and Ostend (Anatec, 2011).

16.7.10 The increased voyage distance associated with this north-south re-routeing is approximately 2.2nm which is less than 1% of the overall voyage distance between Humber and Ostend.

16.7.11 The displacement of the north-south shipping to the east will bring it marginally closer to the following busy shipping areas:

North Hinder TSS and Junction; and

Deep Water Route (via the DR1 Light-buoy).

16.7.12 The North Hinder TSS and DWR are located at a distance of 9.8nm south-

east and 15.6nm east, respectively, of the SW edge Area A of the proposed GWF site. It is considered that there is adequate sea room available between the proposed GWF project and these features that can be used by the displaced north-south shipping (Anatec, 2011 see Technical Appendix 16.A). However, this traffic will interact with other north-south shipping passing east of the Sunk TSS (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.13 An average of six ships per day passed north-south between the proposed GWF (TSS extension) and North Hinder TSS. It is likely that a proportion of the additional 4 ships per day will be added to this traffic (Anatec 2011, see Technical Report 16.A). However, a proportion may also re-route via the Sunk TSS North and South that lies to the west of the proposed GWF site (see Figure 16.1 (a)). Smaller vessels are likely to favour the more coastal, Sunk TSS route while larger vessels are considered more likely to use the route further offshore (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.14 For the vessels choosing to pass further to the east to avoid the proposed GWF, their overall voyage distance increases by less than 1% of the overall distance (see Technical Appendix 16.A for detail).





16.7.15 East-west traffic passing in the vicinity of the northern boundary of the proposed GWF will also be affected to an extent by the site although this has already been significantly reduced by the modifications to the GWF site boundary to bring it more into line with the GGOWF site, thereby, minimising the requirement for any significant re-routeing.

16.7.16 An average of one east-west ship every two days passes inside the northern boundary. However, the majority of the shipping traffic already passes outside the proposed GWF site to the north (see Technical Appendix 16.A). The proposed development of GWF will affect the small proportion of traffic passing inside the site as well as traffic (an average of 4 vessels a day within 1nm) passing outside which wish to increase their clearance from the turbines (see Figure 9.17 in Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.17 Available space for re-routing to the north of the proposed GWF site is slightly constrained by a patch of shallow water to the north where a minimum charted depth of 8.8m (LAT) exists. The available sea room between the shallow patch and the northern site boundary is approximately 0.75nm (1,400m) (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.18 Vessels (a Ro-Ro cargo ship) have been recorded crossing this shallow area during spring tidal conditions. However the majority of ships passed to the south of the shallow patch, between it and the GWF site boundary. Based on the level of shipping traffic and available space and potential for passing over the shallow area (at least during certain tidal conditions), it is considered that east-west shipping passing north of the site will not be significantly affected, although re-routeing vessels will need to be aware of the 8.8m shallow patch when planning their passage (Anatec, 2011, see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.19 Overall, it is concluded that the main impact on disruption to existing navigation as a result of the proposed GWF will be on north-south shipping, which will be displaced a few miles to the east; the deviation being less than 1% of the overall voyage distance (approximately 10 minutes extra voyage time). However, it will lead to increased encounters with ships already routeing east of GWF (ship to ship collision risk is assessed separately below).

16.7.20 Impacts on the east-west traffic have been mitigated by the approval of the Sunk TSS East extension (which will serve to prevent these vessels passing through the proposed site). In addition, the original boundary option for the proposed GWF covered an area of 68nm2 (233km2) and encroached on busy shipping lanes. Following collection of preliminary maritime traffic survey data in 2009 and consultation with stakeholders (e.g. MCA, Trinity House and Chamber of Shipping) the proposed GWF boundary was modified to cover an area of 53nm2 (183km2), to reduce the impact on the adjacent shipping routes.

16.7.21 Given the low numbers of vessels that will need to re-route as a result of the proposed development and the small scale of this re-routing, the change is considered easy to accommodate, and therefore the sensitivity is considered



low. The magnitude is considered medium as the impact is certain and permanent (for the lifetime of the project). As a consequence the significance of this impact is considered to be Minor adverse (subject to the Sunk TSS extension being ratified in November 2011.

Increased ship–to–ship collision risk

16.7.22 The reduction in sea room as a result of the operational GWF, as well as the displacement of traffic, will result in ships potentially passing closer together as well as an increased risk of ship–to–ship encounters / collisions. This has been modelled as part of the NRA (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.23 MCA have received approval from the United Kingdom Safety Of Navigation (UKSON) for the extension of the Sunk East TSS. They have now submitted the proposal to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). It was discussed at the 57th Session of the NAV Sub–Committee (NAV 57) in June 2011 and was duly passed and is now expected to be ratified around November 2011 and come into effect on 1st July 2012. It separates the opposing traffic when in the vicinity of GWF, reducing the risk of head–on encounters in an area of restricted sea room. The extended TSS will be aligned with the new wind farm boundary so that it extends the existing separation at GGOWF to the eastern limit of GWF (see Figure 16.15).

16.7.24 The first phase of the risk assessment focused on encounters (see Technical Appendix 16.A) to identify where shipping congestion is highest and therefore the risk of encounters / collisions is elevated. As shown in Figure 16.14 the majority of the encounters occurred in the Sunk Area to the west of the proposed GWF site, or within the North Hinder TSS to the south-east. There were relatively few encounters within the proposed GWF site (Anatec, 2011).

16.7.25 There were 1,470 encounters during the effective 14-day period, corresponding to an average of 105 per day. The majority of these were associated with cargo vessels (64%) and tankers (21%). The remainder comprised dredging, underwater operations, HSC, tugs, passenger ferries, military vessels and ‘other’ vessels (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.26 The modelling (using Anatec’s COLLRISK, see Technical Appendix 16.A) for the risk assessment was carried out on the encounter levels described above and existing routing (see Section 16.4). Based on the model run for the area, the baseline vessel-to-vessel collision risk level pre-wind farm is in the order of 1 major collision in just over 22.5 years (Anatec, 2011).

16.7.27 Modelling was then carried out on a worst case scenario (as detailed in Table 16.7) for the proposed GWF development (encompassing the approved TSS extension). Based on vessel-to-vessel collision risk modelling of the revised traffic pattern, the collision risk is estimated to increase to 1 major collision in 22.2 years. The change in collision frequency due to the wind farm and TSS extension was estimated to be 3.56 x 10-4 per year, corresponding to an average of one collision in 2,800 years (Anatec, 2011). It is noted that the model is calibrated based on major incidents at sea which



allows for benchmarking but does not cover all incidents, such as minor impacts, or incidents occurring within port (see Technical Appendix 16.A).





16.7.28 The risk assessment indicated the TSS extension significantly reduced the risk of collision, compared to the wind farm going ahead with no TSS extension (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.29 Although there has been shown to be a net increase in collision risk, the planned extension of the Sunk TSS to the east, as illustrated below, significantly mitigates this increase. The extension is illustrated in Figure 16.15.

16.7.30 The following risk matrix was developed for the change in ship–to–ship collision (Plot 16.7).

Plot 16.7 Operational phase – ship–to–ship collision risk

5 4

3 x

2 1

1 2 3 4 5 Frequency

Definitions



Unacceptable Region(High Risk)

16.7.31 An overall score of 6 was estimated (frequency of 2 x consequence of 3).

The change in ship–to–ship collision risk is considered to be Low (Broadly Acceptable). This takes into account mitigation in the form of the planned TSS extension.





Increased ship–to–installation collision risk

16.7.32 Vessels in the area will also be at risk of collision with the surface structures associated with the proposed GWF. This could be as a result of a vessel going off course either due to watch–keeper error or mechanical breakdown resulting in drifting vessels.

16.7.33 With the drifting vessels, the probability of a ship drifting towards a structure and the drift speed are dependent on the prevailing wind, wave and tide conditions at the time of the accident.

16.7.34 The probability of vessel recovery from drift is estimated based on the speed of drift and hence the time available before reaching the wind farm structure. Vessels that do not recover within this time are assumed to collide (see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.35 Modelling (through use of Anatec’s COLLRISK) based on revised shipping patterns (following application of TSS Extension) and a worst case development scenario (see Table 16.7), determined that the frequency of an errant ship under power deviating from its route to the extent that it comes into proximity with GWF is not considered to be a likely event, with an estimated collision rate of 1 in 334 years (see Technical Appendix 16.A). Figure 16.16 shows the modelled collision frequency per individual structure.

16.7.36 The drifting ship collision assessment modelled the drift pattern of vessels within 10nm of the proposed GWF site based on wind, peak spring flood and peak spring ebb tidal conditions. It established that flood tide-dominated drift produced the worst case results for the proposed GWF (see Technical Appendix 16.A). The total drifting ship collision frequency with the proposed GWF structures was estimated to be 1.3 x 10-3 per year, corresponding to an average of one drifting ship collision in 760 years.

16.7.37 Drifting collisions are assessed to be less frequent than powered collisions, which matches the trends in the historical data (Anatec, 2011).





16.7.38 The following risk matrix was therefore developed for the ship–to–structure collision from powered vessels (Plot 16.8).

Plot 16.8 Operational phase – ship–to–structure collision risk

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1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Definitions




16.7.39 With an overall score of 9 estimated (frequency of 3 x consequence of 3), the

risk would be Moderate (Tolerable). This takes into account mitigation in the form of the planned TSS extension, which will tend to move ships further away from the proposed GWF which will help to reduce the risk of powered or drifting groundings on the Inner Gabbard and Outer Gabbard Banks. In the case of a ship losing power and drifting it would have additional time to recover itself or be recovered by a tug before reaching the hazard. Other mitigation that GWFL propose to ensure the risk remains tolerable, include:

Information Circulation – appropriate liaison to ensure information on the wind farm and special activities is circulated in Notices to Mariners, Navigation Information Broadcasts and other appropriate media;

Monitoring of vessels by Marine Coordination Centre;

Continuing discussions with HHA and Dover Coastguard about establishing suitable measures at GWF in order to maintain and enhance VTS coverage of the area, including the extended TSS. This may involve fitting equipment to one of the GWF structures to relay back suitable information;

Marking and Lighting – throughout the project marine navigational marking will be provided in accordance with Trinity House requirements, which will comply with the IALA standards and the additional requirements of MGN 371;

Minimum 22m above MHWS blade clearance to avoid potential yacht mast interaction;

Cable burial and protection informed by anchor penetration study and cable burial index;

Compliance with MCA MGN 371; and

Formulation of an Emergency Response Cooperation Plan (ERCoP), to include for drifting vessels.



Potential impact on recreational vessels

16.7.40 The two main collision risks for recreational vessels comprise WTG rotor blade to yacht mast collision and vessel collision with the main structures.

16.7.41 The air clearance between WTG rotors and sea level conditions at Mean High Water Springs (MHWS) will not be less than 22m, as recommended by the MCA and RYA. An assessment of the typical UK recreational sailing fleet composition (see Technical Appendix 16.A) identified that only 3% of boats have air draughts that exceed 22m. Furthermore, the wind farm will be designed and constructed to satisfy the requirement of the MCA in respect of control functions and safety features, as specified in MGN 371 M+F. The risk of dismasting of a yacht by a rotating blade of a GWF wind turbine is expected to be minimal (Anatec, 2011),

16.7.42 In terms of boat to structure collisions, the wind farm will become an area with a significantly higher number of potential collision structures compared to the existing baseline environment. In good weather conditions, recreational vessels will be able to safely navigate between WTGs. The spacing between WTGs has been informed by consultation with the MCA and based on the activity review and consultation, the level of activity is not considered to be significant (light and medium–use as defined by RYA / CA).

16.7.43 Recreational vessels heading east–west through the area will be able to continue to avoid commercial shipping by using the separation zone of the extended TSS, i.e., travel parallel between the TSS lanes. They may also pass between the TSS and the first row of WTGs in suitable conditions and if a vessel were to get into difficulty, most should be able to keep clear of the structures (i.e. fend off or drop anchor) whilst they fix the problem or call for assistance (Anatec 2011 see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.44 The main potential for collision is associated with bad weather. Most craft are fitted with radio receivers and VHF so will be able to listen to regular broadcasts of the weather forecast by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Coastguard. When combining this with the use of Global Positioning System (GPS), the potential for a vessel being in proximity to the wind farm in bad weather is considered to be low but not negligible (Anatec, 2011). The risk is further reduced by the following mitigation measures (see Technical Appendix 16.A for further detail):



Continuing discussions with HHA and Dover Coastguard about establishing suitable measures at GWF in order to maintain and enhance VTS coverage of the area, including the extended TSS. This may involve fitting equipment to one of the GWF structures to relay back suitable information;



Marking and Lighting – throughout the project marine navigational marking will be provided in accordance with Trinity House requirements, which will comply with the IALA standards and the additional requirements of MGN 371;

Minimum blade clearance to avoid potential yacht mast interaction;

Tug availability is being determined by GWFL for drifting vessels;



16.7.45 These measures mean that whilst the collision risk cannot be completely

eliminated it will be reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable. In terms of consequences, most collisions with the turbines should be relatively low speed and hence low energy. If the seaworthiness of the recreational craft was threatened by the impact, the WTGs will be equipped with access ladders for use in an emergency, placed in the optimum position taking into account the prevailing wind, wave and tidal conditions, as required by the MCA. This should provide a place of safety/refuge until such time as the rescue services arrive (Anatec, 2011).

16.7.46 The following matrix was developed for the risk of collision between a recreational vessel and a wind farm structure (Plot 16.9).

Plot 16.9 Operational phase – recreational vessel collision risk

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1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Definitions




16.7.47 An overall score of 6 was estimated (frequency of 3 x consequence of 2).

The risk is considered to be ‘Broadly Acceptable’. This assumes standard mitigation, such as appropriate marking and lighting of the structures, which is discussed at the end of this section.

16.7.48 Further impacts associated with recreational activities are assessed within Chapter 24.



Potential impact on fishing vessels

16.7.49 The commercial fisheries study identified the potentially impacted fishing fleet as the offshore passive gear sector as well as trawlers based in Belgium, UK the Netherlands and France (see Chapter 15).

16.7.50 The potential risk has been established through use of Anatec’s COLLRISK fishing vessel risk model that has been calibrated using fishing vessel activity data along with offshore installation operating experience in the UK (oil and gas) and the experience of collisions between fishing vessels and UKCS offshore installations (published by HSE), see Technical Appendix 16.A for further details.

16.7.51 No restriction is to be placed on fishing vessel activity once the site is operational, with the exception of 50m safety zones around WTGs (appropriate risk assessments will be undertaken for these at the point of application for the safety zone, as requested by THL in Table 16.1). This safety zone will be consistent with the operational safety zones at the adjacent GGOWF site and is considered adequate by the developer during normal working operation. Therefore this assessment assumes (using a precautionary approach) that the level of fishing will remain the same. Therefore there will be an increased risk of fishing vessel collision in the wind farm area (i.e. the potential for fishing vessels to collide with WTGs). In practice, the increased risk of collision or snagging of gear on the turbines may well lead to a reduction in the use of the site (see Chapter 15 for details). Fishing vessel activity within the site is likely to be limited given the location of cables and the offshore structures. The fishing vessel density in the area of the proposed wind farm used in the modelling was based on the number of sightings per patrol in the five-year period 2005-09, as these patrols attempt to identify all vessels in the area, unlike the VMS data which is restricted to vessels of 15m length and over (Anatec, 2011).

16.7.52 The modelling results indicated that the annual fishing vessel collision frequency with the GWF structures was estimated to be 6.7 x 10-2, which corresponds to an average of 1 collision in 15 years. This is relatively high and reflective of the highly conservative assumption that fishing activity will continue at the same intensity as currently seen at the un-developed location.

16.7.53 Increased activity within the wind farm due to maintenance vessels is expected. The majority of the maintenance work will take place during daylight hours which will be monitored and coordinated by the marine coordinator who will be in contact with the relevant port authorities. Notices to mariners and information dissemination will ensure that the maintenance activities are well publicised. Therefore although a collision between two vessels may have moderate consequence, the frequency is expected to be extremely low and a residual risk of Low Risk is expected.

16.7.54 The following matrix was developed for the risk of collision between a fishing vessel and a wind farm structures (Plot 16.10).



Plot 16.10 Operational phase – fishing vessel collision risk

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5 4 3 x 2 1

1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Definitions




16.7.55 With an overall score of 9 was estimated (frequency of 3 x consequence of 3), the risk would be considered as Moderate (‘Tolerable’). This assumes standard mitigation, such as appropriate marking and lighting of the structures, which is discussed under the previous collision risk sections above.

16.7.56 The cable routes are not routed through any existing anchorage area and therefore are not expected to directly impact shipping in the area. There will be a risk of a vessel dragging anchor or dropping anchor on a cable in an emergency, however, the cables will be marked on hydrographic charts and vessels should be aware of their location.

16.7.57 Additionally, all the subsea cables will be buried (to an average representative minimum depth of 0.6m, see Table 16.7) or trenched to protect against hostile seabed interaction, such as fishing activity, dragging of anchors and dropped objects. There will be periodic inspections, as necessary, to ensure they do not become exposed.

16.7.58 Further impacts associated with commercial fisheries are assessed in Chapter 15.

Potential impact as a result of subsea cables

16.7.59 All the subsea cables associated with the proposed GWF will be buried to a representative average minimum burial depth of 0.6m, or protected against hostile seabed interaction (as detailed above and in Table 16.7), such as fishing activity, dragging of anchors and dropped objects and there will be periodic inspections to ensure cables do not become exposed. Cable crossings will require additional protection such as rock dump or mattressing (as described in Chapter 5 Project Details). All cables will also be marked on Admiralty Charts.

16.7.60 The export cable route corridor to shore runs from the north–western boundary of the site to a planned landfall in Sizewell (see Chapter 5). There will also be inter and intra–array cables connecting Development Areas A, B



and C as well as intra–array cabling connecting individual wind turbine generators (WTGs) to each other and the substations.

16.7.61 As the cable routes are not routed through any existing anchorage area they are unlikely to impact normal shipping in the area. There will be a risk of a vessel dropping anchor on a cable in an emergency, however, the cables will be marked on hydrographic charts and vessels should be aware of their location. Furthermore, the cable burial plan will be informed by an anchor penetration study to help inform the cable burial index (which will set out a safe and achievable burial depth for the length of the cable route).

16.7.62 The closest site Shipwash 507/5 and the North Inner Gabbard Area 498 prospecting areas are more than 500m from the boundary of the GWF. As discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 18 Other Human Activities, the export cable route has been modified to remove any overlap with potential future aggregate extraction areas. With this built in mitigation and the cable burial commitments discussed above it is considered that the risk for aggregate extraction vessels snagging GWF cables will be of Low Risk and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

16.7.63 The following matrix was developed for the risk of fishing gear or anchor interaction with subsea cables (Plot 16.11).

Plot 16.11 Operational phase – risk associated with subsea cables

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5 4 3 2 x 1

1 2 3 4 5

Frequency

Definitions




16.7.64 With an overall score of 6 was estimated (frequency of 3 x consequence of

2), the risk would be considered to be Low (‘Broadly Acceptable’). This assumes standard mitigation, such as:

Publication of cable routes on Navigational Charts;


Cable burial and protection informed through an anchor penetration study to help inform the cable burial index; and

Compliance with MCA MGN 371.



16.7.65 Further impacts associated with subsea cables are assessed within Chapter 18.

Potential impact on marine radar systems

16.7.66 Radar is the only equipment that has the potential to be significantly affected based on the trials carried out to date (Anatec 2011, see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.67 Trials carried out by the MCA at North Hoyle in 2004 identified areas of concern with regard to the potential impact of WTGs on ship borne and shore based radar systems. This is due to the large vertical extent of the WTGs returning radar responses strong enough to produce interfering side lobe, multiple and reflected echoes (ghosts).

16.7.68 Based on the results of the North Hoyle trial, the MCA produced a wind farm / shipping route template to give guidance on the distances which should be established between shipping routes and offshore wind farms.

16.7.69 A second trial was conducted at Kentish Flats on behalf of BWEA (BWEA, 2007). The project steering group had members from BERR, the MCA and the Port of London Authority (PLA). The trial took place between 30th April and 27th June 2006. This trial was conducted in Pilotage waters and in an area covered by the PLA VTS. It therefore had the benefit of Pilot advice and experience but was also able to assess the impact of the generated effects on VTS radars.

16.7.70 The trial concluded that the ghosts detected on marine radar displays in the vicinity of wind farms can be produced by other strong echoes close to the observing ship (although not necessarily to the same extent). It also concluded that reflections and distortions by ships structures and fittings created many of the effects, which vary from ship to ship and radar to radar. VTS scanners static radars can also be subject to similar phenomena if passing vessels provide a suitable reflecting surface, but the effect did not seem to present a significant problem for the PLA VTS. Also concluded was that small vessels operating in or near the wind farm were detectable by radar on ships operating near the array but were less detectable when the ship was operating within the array.

16.7.71 The radar effects described are only likely to pose a potential safety risk within 1.5nm of the WTGs in reduced visibility when the ship watch–keeper is unable to verify the radar information visually. The radar display will progressively deteriorate as the range closes to the WTGs.

16.7.72 Figure 16.17 presents the survey tracks passing within 1.5nm of the GWF maximum case layout (140 turbines).

16.7.73 With the exception of traffic in the Sunk TSS, there is sea room available on all sides of the proposed GWF layout for ships to increase their clearance. The proposed extension to the Sunk TSS will help to maintain a minimum



clearance for vessels exiting the Sunk TSS and therefore lessen their risk associated with the exposure to potential radar interference.

16.7.74 Figure 16.18 outlines the mean route positions for vessels using the proposed extension to the Sunk TSS.

16.7.75 Based on the assumption of vessels travelling at 11 knots (derived from the traffic survey data) a typical westbound vessel will, under current conditions, be within 1.5nm of the WTGs for a total duration of approximately 40 minutes and will have a minimum closest point of approach (CPA) of 0.4nm. If the proposed post-TSS extension transits are taken into consideration, a typical westbound ship will have a CPA slightly less than 1.5nm from the WTGs for only 14 minutes.

16.7.76 The eastbound vessels, under the current conditions, will be within 1.5nm of the WTGs for a total duration of approximately 25 minutes and have a minimum CPA of 0.9nm. However, with the proposed post-TSS extension transit, a typical ship will have a minimum CPA of 1.5nm from the WTGs.

16.7.77 Experienced mariners should be able to suppress the observed problems to an extent and for short periods by careful adjustment of the receiver amplification (gain), sea clutter and range settings of the radar. However, there is a consequent risk of losing targets with a small radar cross section, which may include buoys or small craft, particularly yachts or Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) constructed craft, therefore due care is needed in making such adjustments. It was noted in the Kentish Flats study that the use of easily identifiable reference targets (e.g. a small buoy) assisted the operator in selecting the optimum radar settings.

16.7.78 The performance of a vessel’s automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) could also potentially be affected by the WTGs. In the Kentish Flats study, however, it was noted that false targets were quickly identified by the operators and then by the equipment itself.

16.7.79 Based on the EIA Methodology (see Chapter 4), the sensitivity of the vessels relying on radar systems to navigate is high given that in the worst case scenario ships may collide with other vessels, buoys or structures which could cause damage or result in death. The magnitude of the impact is classed as low as the effect on the radar systems is only prevalent within 1.5nm of the WTG. It is unlikely that a competent crew would rely solely on radar and therefore the significance of this impact would be considered to be of moderate adverse. .

16.7.80 Other planned mitigation measures, of relevance to the potential radar impacts described, include:


Continuing discussions with HHA and Dover Coastguard about establishing suitable measures at GWF in order to maintain and enhance VTS coverage of the area, including the extended TSS. This



may involve fitting equipment to one of the GWF structures to relay back suitable information;



16.7.81 In addition the TSS extension will also reduce the potential impacts

associated with marine radar systems. The onset range from turbines of false radar returns is estimated to be about 1.5nm, with progressive deterioration in the radar display as the range closes. The TSS will help control the minimum passing distances for eat–west shipping. Ships using the TSS will maintain a minimum offset of 1.5–2nm from turbines. Without the TSS, some vessels would pass much closer and thus experience more severe radar interference.

16.7.82 As a result of the mitigation measures outlined above, and the additional measures described under the relevant impacts, it is anticipated that the residual impacts will be of minor adverse significance.







Impact on Search and Rescue (SAR)

16.7.83 The proposed GWF lies within the East of England Region with the nearest Maritime Rescue Co–ordination Centre, being MRCC Thames (located in Walton on the Naze).

16.7.84 In the event of an emergency arising within or adjacent to the proposed GWF the main types of search and rescue would be carried out by RNLI all–weather lifeboat and / or SAR helicopter. A review of the assets in the area of the proposed GWF indicated that the closest all–weather lifeboat is 16nm away at Aldeburgh, whilst there is a SAR helicopter base located at Wattisham, approximately 37nm north-west from the proposed GWF. This RAF base has Sea King helicopters with a maximum endurance of 6 hours giving a radius of action of approximately 250nm which is well within the range of the proposed GWF.

16.7.85 A review of historical incidents indicated that the incident levels in the vicinity of the proposed GWF have been relatively low.

16.7.86 The proposed GWF could impact upon SAR in two ways. Firstly the rotating blades of the WTGs could interfere with the ability of SAR aircraft to respond to an incident within or near to the wind farm. Secondly, the wind farm itself could lead to an increase in the level of incidents which could stretch SAR resources in the area (RNLI lifeboats and SAR helicopter).

16.7.87 The response time to the GWF by helicopter during the day is estimated to be in the order of 30 minutes, increasing to 1 hour at night due to the additional response time at the base. These calculations are based on still air and will vary depending on the prevailing wind conditions.

16.7.88 Response times for the lifeboats will vary but for an all-weather lifeboat to reach GWF would be approximately 1 hour from the nearest RNLI station.

16.7.89 Based on the EIA Methodology, the significance of impact on the ability of the SAR helicopter to respond to an incident is considered to be of moderate adverse significance. The inability for the helicopter to complete a rescue in the minimum amount of time, due to interference of WTGs, may result in the loss of life. In combination with poor conditions or low visibility the risk to the helicopter may increase which may result a delayed response time. This may lead to an increase in reliance on the RNLI lifeboat to respond.

16.7.90 However, as a result of the design features associated with the proposed GWF and commitments by the developer to meet the MCA MGN 371 guidance and industry best–practice. GWFL will meet all the requirements of MGN 371 Annex 5 “Standards and procedures for generator shutdown and other operational requirements in the event of a search and rescue, counter pollution or salvage incident in or around an OREI”. This includes having an Emergency Response Co–operation Plan (ERCoP) in place for each phase of the development.



16.7.91 The above is standard practice and the wind farm will not be granted consent without a commitment to meet these requirements including the development of an Emergency Response Co–operation Plan (ERCoP) pre–construction, it is considered that SAR issues can be well managed.

16.7.92 The significance of the impact of the GWF on the SAR resources is expected to be moderate adverse. However, as discussed previously, the incident levels in the vicinity of the GWF have historically been relatively low and based on the predicted increased risk due to the wind farm, the magnitude of the impact on SAR resources is considered to be low.

Mitigation and residual impact

16.7.93 As detailed previously, the north-east boundary of the site has been amended in order to reduce the impact on the adjacent shipping routes (Anatec, 2011, see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.7.94 The Sunk TSS extension and reshaping of the north-eastern boundary of the proposed GWF site would mitigate the impact on east – west traffic and significantly reduce the ship to structure collision risk by reducing the number of vessels transiting through the proposed site area. The Sunk TT extension would allow recreational yachts to travel in between the TSS lanes, or between the lanes and first row of turbines thereby reducing the risk of ship to ship collision for these vessels. The Sunk TSS will also tend to move ships further away from the proposed GWF, Inner Gabbard and Outer Gabbard Banks which would help reduce the risk of powered or drifting grounding. Ships will have additional time to recover themselves or be recovered before reaching the hazard.

16.7.95 All WTGs and other offshore structures will each be marked with clearly visible unique identification characters which can be seen by both vessels at sea level and aircraft (helicopters and fixed wing) from above.

16.7.96 The identification characters shall each be illuminated by a low intensity light visible from a vessel which will enable the structure to be detected at a suitable distance to reduce the potential for a collision with it. The size of the identification characters in combination with the lighting will be such that, under normal conditions of visibility and all known tidal conditions, they are clearly readable by an observer, stationed 3m above sea level and at a distance of at least 150m from the WTG.

16.7.97 During operation of GWF the Central Control Room, or a mutually agreed single contact point, will be manned 24 hours a day.

16.7.98 All MRCCs will be advised of the contact telephone numbers of the Central Control Room, or single contact point (or vice-versa).

16.7.99 The control room operator, or single contact point, will immediately initiate the shut-down procedure for WTGs as requested by the MRCC and maintain the WTG in the appropriate shut-down position as requested by the MRCC until receiving notification from the MRCC that it is safe to restart the WTG.



16.7.100 Further consultation will be carried out with SAR authorities during the development of the ERCoP for GWF, which will be informed by a Search and Rescue Response Assessment.

16.7.101 As a result of the proposed mitigation measures outlined above, and the additional measures described under the relevant impacts, it is anticipated that the residual impacts for all potential impacts would be of minor adverse significance (Anatec, 2011, see Technical Appendix 16.A).

16.8 Impacts during Decommissioning

16.8.1 The discussions presented on impacts during construction are considered to apply to the decommissioning phase. As a result the potential collision risk during this phase, after the application of the appropriate mitigation measures, is anticipated to be ALARP.

16.9 Inter–relationships

16.9.1 The inter-relationships between Shipping and Navigation and other physical, environmental and human parameters are inherently considered throughout the Chapter (Sections 16.6 and 16.7) as a result of the receptor lead approach to the assessment. For example, Shipping and Navigation has the potential to be influenced by changes in fishing activity as a result of the proposed development. The potential impacts as a result of this indirect effect have been discussed within this chapter based on the findings of the assessments made in Chapter 15 Commercial Fisheries.

16.9.2 Similarly any impact on the Shipping and Navigation interests from the proposed development has the potential to impact on a number of other receptors, such as recreational activities. The information provided in this Chapter is used in turn by these relevant receptor lead Chapters to establish the potential for and significance of inter-related impacts.

16.9.3 Table 16.8 summarises those inter–relationships that are considered of relevance to shipping and navigation and identifies where within the ES these relationships have been considered.

Table 16.8 Inter–relationships for Shipping and Navigation

Inter–relationship Section where addressed Linked Chapter

Construction, operation and decommissioning

Impacts on fisheries

activities

Section 16.6, 16.7 and 16.8 Affected parameter: Chapter

15 Commercial Fisheries

Indirect impacts on

recreational activities


24 Tourism and Recreation

Indirect impacts on dredging

activities


18 Other Human Activities



Inter–relationship Section where addressed Linked Chapter

Operation

Impacts associated with

subsea cables

Section 16.2 and 16.7 Affected parameter: Chapter

18 Other Human Activities

Indirect impacts on

ornithology from navigation

lighting

Section 16.7 Affected parameter: Chapter

11 Offshore Ornithology

16.9.4 Chapter 29 Assessment of Inter-relationships provides a holistic overview of all of the inter-related impacts associated with the project.

16.10 Cumulative Impacts

16.10.1 Figure 16.19 presents the wind farm developments in the vicinity of the proposed GWF. The GGOWF site has been considered intrinsically within the analysis (i.e. as part of the baseline).

16.10.2 The offshore wind farms (Gunfleet Sands I, II and III, London Array Phases I and II, Thanet, and Kentish Flats & Kentish Flats Extension) in the Thames Estuary are of a scale and at a sufficient distance from the proposed GWF site that it is not considered there will be a significant cumulative impact on shipping and navigation (see Technical Appendix 16.A for further detail). The same principal is applied to developments in Continental Europe. The main issue for the NRA is safety of navigation rather than financial cost. However, the fact that the deviation of shipping brought about by GWF is only about 1% for north – south ships (the main route affected) and none of the shipping operators highlighted the issue during consultation suggests the financial impact is minimal.

16.10.3 The only site currently with the potential to result in a cumulative navigational impact with proposed GWF is the proposed East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone. At the time of writing only the location of East Anglia ONE Offshore Wind Farm has been published (Figure 16.19). It is acknowledged that further development will occur within the Round 3 Zone and therefore, whilst these future development locations cannot be predicted, a high level discussion is provided in terms of potential impact.

16.10.4 The East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone boundary is located at a distance of 4.9nm (9.0km) north–east of the proposed Sunk TSS east extension, whereas the East Anglia ONE boundary is 15nm (27.8km) away.

Potential impact on East Anglia ONE from re-routing

16.10.5 Section 16.7 identifies the re-routing associated with the proposed GWF project. The only one that will interact with the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone is the north-south (Humber to Ostend) route.



16.10.6 Figure 16.19 shows the implications of the re-routing associated with the proposed GWF project in relation to East Anglia ONE. It can be seen that the re-routing associated with the proposed GWF project will not result in the introduction of new shipping routes in the proximity of East Anglia ONE.

16.10.7 Given the lack of impact pathway, no significant cumulative impacts would therefore, be anticipated.

Potential for increased collision risk

16.10.8 The potential for increased ship to ship collisions may be increased by compressing the shipping route, however, all traffic would be travelling in the same direction (as a result of the Sunk TSS), which would serve to reduce the potential for collisions.

16.10.9 Given the lack of impact pathway, no significant cumulative impacts would therefore, be anticipated.

16.10.10 As described above, the proposed GWF development will have an impact of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) on the licensed dredging areas activity (see Technical Appendix 16.A). The closest site Shipwash 507/5 and the North Inner Gabbard Area 498 prospecting areas are more than 500m from the boundary of the GWF. The temporary nature of the export cable installation works and the 500m safety zones (if granted) will reduce the collision risk during construction. The increase in operational vessels is not a significant increase in the total number of vessels in the area and therefore no additional risk is anticipated.

Future development within the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone

16.10.11 Consultation with East Anglia Offshore Wind (EAOW) and other shipping and navigation consultees has highlighted that there is concern regarding potential cumulative impacts between the proposed GWF project and future development within the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone (see Table 16.1).

16.10.12 The development of the proposed GWF and development within the south-west corner of the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone could potentially lead to compression of the east – west shipping route or re-routeing of vessels which could increase steaming times. There is approximately 1.3nm (2.5km) of sea room available between the proposed GWF and East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone (see Figure 16.19). Should development occur within this area of the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone then the potential for cumulative impacts on shipping and navigation along the northern boundary of the proposed GWF is therefore recognised.

16.10.13 However, there is potential for constriction of the traffic corridor to the north of GWF but it is not considered that this would increase the collision risk of vessels with structures, given that the 1.3nm of sea room (0.65nm from the centre of the route to each wind farm boundary) is considered to be tolerable according to the MCA’s Wind Farm Shipping Route Template (Anatec, 2011,



see Technical Appendix 16.A). Development in other areas of the East Anglia Offshore Wind Farm Zone is considered to be less sensitive to effects on shipping and navigation receptors from the GWF project.

16.10.14 Consultation with EAOW will be continued to minimise this impact to shipping and navigation as far as possible.





16.11 Transboundary effects

16.11.1 This chapter has considered the potential for transboundary effects to occur on shipping and navigation as a result of the construction, operation or decommissioning of the proposed GWF project. In all cases it is concluded that the potential impacts arising, by virtue of the predicted spatial and temporal magnitude of the effects, would not give rise to significant transboundary effects on the environment of another European Economic Area (EEA) member state. A summary of the likely transboundary effects of the proposed GWF are summarised in Chapter 31 Transboundary Effects.

16.12 Monitoring

16.12.1 Monitoring relevant to shipping and navigation will take place throughout the development programme, this will comprise of:

Traffic monitoring during the construction phase of the project, with a vessel (or vessels) assigned for guard duties;

Vessel monitoring during the operation phase which will be carried out using AIS from the marine coordination centre; and

Cable inspections, as necessary, to ensure adequate burial depth is maintained.

16.13 Summary

16.13.1 This Chapter discusses the existing shipping and navigation interests within the vicinity of the proposed GWF site through a review of fishing vessel activity, recreational vessel activity, maritime incidents and SAR resources. The main navigational features in the vicinity of the proposed GWF are the Sunk Area (including Traffic Separation Schemes) and the Port Operations at HHA and PLA. A variety of vessels use the shipping lanes surrounding the proposed GWF site including fishing vessels, cargo vessels and passenger ferries.

16.13.2 A summary of the results is presented in the following table. Having identified the worst case scenario for each receptor, the assessment represents the maximum potential adverse impact for any given aspect, and therefore, regardless which development scenario (as presented within the worst case justification table (Table 16.7) and outlined in Chapter 5) is taken forward, the impact levels will be no greater than those stated within these assessments.

16.13.3 It should be noted that the risk rankings for the shipping and navigation assessment assume standard mitigation will apply based on industry good practice. Therefore the pre–mitigation risk / impact in Table 16.9 is shown as N/A.



Table 16.9 Impact assessment summary

Description of Impact Risk / Impact

Proposed Mitigation Measures Residual Impact

Construction Phase

Collision risk /

structures

8 (Tolerable) Operating Procedures

Selection of vessels

Lessons learnt from other projects

Marking / Lighting

Emergency Response Cooperation

Plan

Compliance with MCA MGN 371

ALARP

Collision risk / other

vessels

9 (Tolerable) Export cable route refinement to

avoid dredging area, unless agreed

with operators

Guard Vessel

Passage Planning

Marking / Lighting

Safety Zones (to be applied for)

Notices to Mariners

Hazard / risk assessment workshops


Plan


ALARP

Operational Phase

Re–routeing of

shipping

Moderate

adverse

TSS Extension

Notices to Mariners

Aids to Navigation

Minor

adverse

Ship to ship collision

risk

N/A (see

Paragraph

16.12.2)

TSS Extension

Marking and Lighting

Notices to Mariners

6 (Broadly

Acceptable)






Plan


Ship collision with

structures

N/A (see

Paragraph

16.12.2)

TSS Extension


Notices to Mariners

Marked on Hydrographic Charts

Site boundary modification

Monitoring of vessels by MCC

Continuing discussions with HHA and

Dover Coastguard about establishing

suitable measures at GWF in order to

maintain and enhance VTS coverage

of the area, including the extended

TSS. This may involve fitting

equipment to one of the GWF

structures to relay back suitable

information

Minimum blade clearance

Formulation of an Emergency

Response Cooperation Plan

(ERCoP), to include for drifting

vessels


9 (Tolerable)

Collision of drifting

vessels with structures

N/A (see

Paragraph

16.12.2)

TSS Extension

VTS coverage of the area





vessels

Marking and lighting

9 (Tolerable)





Anchoring by drifting vessel

Minimum blade clearance


Recreational vessel

collision

N/A (see

above)

Minimum Blade Clearance

TSS Extension


Notices to Mariners











information





vessels

6 (Broadly

Acceptable)

Fishing vessel collision N/A (see

Paragraph

16.12.2)


Notices to Mariners






vessels

9 (Tolerable)






Cable route interaction N/A (see

Paragraph

16.12.2)

Cable Burial

Anchor penetration study


Notices to Mariners

Kingfisher notifications

Periodic inspection / surveying of

route





vessels

6 (Broadly

Acceptable)

Interference with

marine radar

Moderate

adverse


TSS Extension










information

Site boundary modification (already

implemented)





vessels

Minor

adverse





Search and Rescue Moderate

adverse





vessels


Alignment of turbines

TSS Extension

24 hour manned control room or

single contact point

Minor

adverse

Decommissioning Phase

Impacts as

construction

Tolerable Similar to those implemented during

the construction phase

ALARP

16.13.4 No potential significant residual cumulative impacts on shipping and

navigation due to the proposed GWF and other activities in the area have been identified.

16.13.5 Monitoring relevant to shipping and navigation, including vessels and traffic monitoring, will take place throughout the development programme. In addition, cable inspections will be undertaken as necessary.



16.14 References

Anatec Limited (2011). Galloper Navigation Risk Assessment, Report No. A2258–GWF–NRA–1. BWEA (now RenewableUK) (2007). Investigation of Technical and Operational Effects on Marine Radar close to Kentish Flats Offshore Wind Farm, BWEA, April 2007. Danbrit Ship Management Ltd (DSML) (2011). Galloper Wind Farm Project Commercial Fisheries Assessment Draft V5 26032011.doc DECC (2007). Applying for Safety Zones around Offshore Renewable Energy Installations, Guidance notes, August 2007. IMO (2002). Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule Making Process, 5th April 2002. IMO (2007). Consolidated text of the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule–making process (MSC/Circ.1023−MEPC/Circ.392) (14th May 2007). IPC (2010) Scoping Opinion Proposed Galloper Wind Farm Project August 2010 MCA (2002). Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 2002. MCA (2004). Results of the EM Investigations and assessments of marine radar, communications and positioning systems undertaken at the North Hoyle Wind Farm by QinetiQ and the Maritime & Coastguard Agency; 29 September 2004. MCA (2005). Offshore Wind Farm Helicopter Search and Rescue Trials undertaken at the North Hoyle Wind Farm, May 2005. MCA (2010). Protecting our Seas and Shores in the 21st Century. Consultation on proposals for modernising the Coastguard 2010. Available at URL:http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/consultation_on_the_proposals_for_modernising_the_coastguard.pdf. Accessed 30/08/2011. RYA (2004). Sharing the Wind. Recreational Boating in the Offshore Wind Farm Strategic Areas. Identification of recreational boating interests in the Thames Estuary, Greater Wash and North West (Liverpool Bay) Available at URL:http://www.rya.org.uk/sitecollectiondocuments/legal/Web%20Documents/Environment/Sharing%20the%20Wind%20compressed.pdf. Accessed 30/08/2011.



RYA (2009). The RYA’S position on offshore energy developments) Available at URL: http://www.rya.org.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/legal/Web%20Documents/Environment/RYA%20position%20OREI%20Dec%202009.pdf. Accessed 30/08/2011. RYA (2009). Second Edition, UK Coastal Atlas of Recreational Boating published by RYA, supported by Trinity House and Cruising Association. First published 2005. Trinity House (2005). Renewable Energy Installations Farms and Fields, Provision and Maintenance of Local Aids to Navigation by Trinity House Lighthouse Service; October 2005.