QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989 THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents. K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country (per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its Decision, dated October 24, 1986. 3 The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. The Resolution, dated September 24, 1987 disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986 Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner's own motion for reconsideration. The facts are not in controversy. We quote: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises. The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. 5 Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985. In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be: 1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners; 2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor; 3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had already been implemented and executed. 8 On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately

all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the aforementioned search warrants. SO ORDERED. 9 On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration. On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court. In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held: Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void. Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.10 On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure. As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction," 11 specifically: a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of the Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts may countermand or restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by a quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS Task Force; b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its erroneous basis for reconsidering its previous Decision dated October 24, 1986 (see Annex "I") and thus promulgated the questioned Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers; c) In not resolving directly the other important issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622SP despite the fact that petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently and convincingly that respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders in Special Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C" and 'D"), committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction: 1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to be seized as stated in the contested search warrant were too general which allegedly render the search warrants null and void; (b) the applications for the contested search warrants actually charged two offenses in contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not become moot and academic, even if the contested search warrants had already been fully implemented with positive results; and 2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936 'judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. 12 We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions that confront us are- (i) is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's

jurisdiction; and (ii) may the said presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.** In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No. 1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication ." 14 The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which come before them." 16 This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the Court of Appeals exercises: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Court and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 18 xxx xxx xxx Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on Constitutional Commissions, it is provided, in part that: ... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 19 On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction: (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 20 xxx xxx xxx Likewise: ... The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian case, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi- judicial bodies and agencies and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. 21 xxx xxx xxx

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22 ... The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now, Court of Appeals] from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows: SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies. Any provision of existing law or Rule of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 24 Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, 25 jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal." 26 Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the Commission of Land Registration, en consults, are appealable to the Court of Appeals. 27 The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, 28 and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.29 As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasijudicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." 30 The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows: (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.

(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31 As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. We quote: SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force.-The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall have the following powers and authority: a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports; b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation; c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, both oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities; d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and to adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree. xxx xxx xxx f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country. Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883. The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti- Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors. The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20 %) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20 %) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40 %) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force . 33

The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases involving "ill-gotten wealth". It had been vested with enormous powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar processes, but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It cannot pronounce judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34 If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court. In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo. It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task Force has been empowered to issue warrants of arrest, search, and seizure, makes it, ergo, a "semi-court". Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the private respondent, whether or not it can under the 1973 Charter, issue such kinds of processes. It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent, the case has become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the question has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to resolve it as the final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution during whose regime the case was commenced. Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 36 a 1975 decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein that, by virtue of the responsible officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest.37 Authorities, however, have continued to express reservations whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given such a power. 38 Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in which we categorically averred: Until now only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest." 40 "No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular responsible officer ." 41 Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the same question persisted following this Courts subsequent rulings upholding the President's alleged emergency arrest powers .42 [Mr. Justice Hugo Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not a species of "arrest" in its technical sense, and that the (deposed) Chief Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his capacity as a "responsible officer" under the 1973 Charter, but rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of emergency, or in order to carry out the deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In the distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts that can be done without need of judicial intervention because they are not, precisely, judicial but Presidential actions.] In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by the Local Government Code, 45 but had ceased to be one with the approval of the 1987 Constitution according judges sole authority to issue arrest and search warrants. But in the same breath, we did not rule the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of the former Constitution. We were agreed, though, that the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 46 In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on American jurisprudence, notably,Katz v. United States, 47 Johnson v. United States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which the American Supreme Court ruled that

prosecutors (like the petitioner) cannot be given such powers because of their incapacity for a "detached scrutiny" 50 of the cases before them. We affirm the Appellate Court. We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," 51 he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities. According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process, notably, the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers on which our republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired by the Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the Constitution, the President has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they cannot be made to issue judicial processes without unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the courts. At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter, although the Court hopes that this disposition has clarified a controversy that had generated often bitter debates and bickerings. The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the scourge of "dollar- salting", a pernicious practice that has substantially drained the nation's coffers and has seriously threatened its economy. We recognize the menace it has posed (and continues to pose) unto the very stability of the country, the urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and foremost, the need for cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out campaign. But while we support the State's efforts, we do so not at the expense of fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable acts of Government. If in the event that as a result of this ruling, we prove to be an "obstacle" to the vital endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing of valuable foreign exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, do not mean it. The Constitution simply does not leave us much choice. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED G.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005 FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR., Petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, Respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: For our review on certiorari is the Decision dated September 2, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, as well as its Resolution2 dated November 12, 2002, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The appellate court dismissed the petition 3 4 for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for being an erroneous mode of appeal from the Resolution of the 5 Secretary of Justice. The Secretary had modified the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in I.S. No. PSG 0004-10205 and directed the latter to file an information for estafa against petitioners. The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).1

On October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public. Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn, FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owner s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase price. Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The latter demanded fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement. FEPI balked. In several letters to its clients, including respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPI s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPI s hands were tied by a cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Said order was the subject of several appeals now pending before this Court. FEPI assured its clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor. Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPI s statements and he made several demands upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 3166 and 3187 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI. The complaint for estafa averred that the Contract to Sell categorically stated that FEPI was the owner of the property. However, before the HLURB, FEPI denied ownership of the realty. Go alleged that the petitioners committed estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registered under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner. Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, countered petitioners, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were present. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. They further denied that FEPI ever made any written nor oral representation to Go that it is the owner, pointing out that Go failed to positively identify who made such misrepresentation to him nor did Go say where the misrepresentation was made. According to petitioner, there being neither deceit nor misrepresentation, there could be no damage nor prejudice to respondent, and no probable cause exists to indict the petitioners. Petitioners likewise insisted that they could not be held criminally liable for abiding with a cease-anddesist order of the DAR. In his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case. He argued that the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI s office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of the project since the contract described FEPI as owner without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI appearing in the contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere developer. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa, thus: Wherefore, the case for estafa, under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, filed against the respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepea, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez de Tagle, Jr. is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.8 The City Prosecutor found no misrepresentation stating that, (1) the Contract to Sell did not mention FEPI as the owner of the property; (2) since no Deed of Sale had been executed by the parties, then petitioners are not yet bound to deliver the certificate of 9 10 title since under both the Contract to Sell and Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957, FEPI was bound to deliver the certificate of title only upon the execution of a contract of sale; and (3) the City Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is the HLURB, which has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivision including claims involving refunds under P.D. No. 1344.11

Go appealed the City Prosecutor s Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City Prosecutor s findings, and held, to wit: WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Pasig City is directed to file an information for estafa defined and penalized under Art. 316, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code against respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepea, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr. and report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.12 The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa under Article 316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, pointing out that the elements of the offense were present as evidenced by the terms of the Contract to Sell. It ruled that under the Contract, the petitioners sold the property to Go despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract and had accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts. Thus, FEPI was exercising acts of ownership when it conveyed the property to respondent Go. Acts to convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property are acts of strict ownership. Furthermore, nowhere did FEPI mention that it had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true owner of the property. Clearly, petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied ownership after the perfection of the contract and the payment of the purchase price. Since a corporation can only act through its agents or officers, then all the participants in a fraudulent transaction are deemed liable. Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the trial court deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review was resolved. On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in this wise: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition, HAVING NO MERIT, is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND ORDERED DISMISSED, with cost to Petitioners. SO ORDERED.13 The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function. Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the motion was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds: (1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO APPEAL THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.14 (2) THE DOJ SECRETARY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE AND RESOLVED TO FILE AN INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA UNDER ART. 316, SEC. 1 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AGAINST PETITIONERS, CONSIDERING THAT: (A) Petitioners did not pretend that they, or FEPI, were the owners of the subject property; (B) FEPI need not have been the owner at the time the Contract to Sell was furnished to respondent Go; (C) There was no prejudice caused to respondent Go; (D) There is no personal act or omission constituting a crime ascribed to any of the Petitioners, therefore, there can be no probable cause against them; and (E) There was no deceit or even intent to deceive.15 To our mind, the sole issue for resolution is whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case. In the course of this determination, we must also consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-judicial function.

Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43 covers rulings of the Secretary of Justice since during preliminary investigations, the DOJ s decisions are deemed as "awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions", and its prosecutorial offices are considered quasi-judicial bodies/officers performing quasi-judicial functions. Respondent counters that the herein petition is a dilatory tactic and emphasizes that "injunction will not lie to restrain criminal prosecution." Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The 16 Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. We cannot agree with petitioners submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, we held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus: [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.18 Though some cases19 describe the public prosecutor s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.20 A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.21 A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former s order or resolutions. Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review. Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse the findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under Rule 43 from the court a quo failed. This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to review the DOJ s factual findings and its determination of probable cause. First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covers the judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or any authorized court and should raise onlypure question of law. The Department of Justice is not a court. Also, in this petition are raised factual matters for our resolution, e.g. the ownership of the subject property, the existence of deceit committed by petitioners on respondent, and petitioners knowledge or direct participation in the Contract to Sell. These are factual issues and are outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. The cited questions require evaluation and examination of evidence, which is the province of a full-blown trial on the merits. Second, courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form.22 The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is 23 dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the17

Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, dated September 2, 2002 and November 12, 2002, respectively, areAFFIRMED.

24

G.R. No. 150270

November 26, 2008

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN, petitioners vs. ROLANDO BANIQUED, respondent. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: OFT-QUOTED in cases involving searches and seizures is the principle that a man's home is his castle. Not even the king would dare desecrate it. In protecting his home, the poorest and most humble citizen or subject may bid defiance to all the powers of the State.1 Indeed, a man is king in his own house. The case before Us views the sanctity of a man's home in a different light. It is about a man's struggle against the attempt of the State to demolish his house. Petitioners Leo Bernardez, Jr. and Mauricio Domogan question by way of appeal under Rule 45 the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint5 for prohibition with temporary restraining order (TRO)/injunction filed by private respondent Rolando Baniqued. The Facts Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land6 located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Pertinent parts of the notice read: The investigation and ocular inspection conducted by the City Engineer's Office (memorandum dated 18 February 1998) showed that you built your structures sometime in 1999 without any building permit in violation of P.D. 1096 and possibly R.A. 7279, qualifying your structure structures illegal, thus, subject to demolition. The Anti-Squatting Committee in its Resolution No. 52-4 dated 22 April 1999 has recommended for the demolition of your illegal structures. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, you are hereby notified to voluntarily remove/demolish your illegal structures within seven (7) days from receipt of this notice, otherwise the City Demolition Team will undertake the demolition of your illegal structures at your own expense.7 Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City. In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law and "was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion." Specifically, Baniqued alleged that he was (1) never given any copy of the complaint of Generoso Bonifacio; (2) "never summoned nor subpoenaed to answer that complaint"; (3) "never allowed to participate in the

investigation and ocular inspection which the City Engineer's Office allegedly conducted, as a consequence of the complaint of Bonifacio, much less to adduce evidence in support of his position"; (4) "never summoned nor subpoenaed to appear before the Anti-Squatting Committee"; and (5) "not given the opportunity to contest the complaint against him, before such complaint was decided and to be carried out by the Defendants."8 Baniqued buttressed his complaint by arguing that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, i.e., there should be a court action and a court order first before his house can be demolished and before he can be ousted from the lot.9 More, under Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, an adequate relocation should be provided first before demolition can be had.10 Too, by virtue of the National Building Code or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, the demolition of buildings or structures should only be resorted to in case 11 they are dangerous or ruinous. Otherwise, the remedy is criminal prosecution under Section 213 of P.D. No. 1096. Lastly, the 1991 Local Government Code does not empower the mayor to order the demolition of anything unless the interested party was afforded 12 prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied. Thus, Baniqued prayed for the following reliefs: A. Immediately upon the filing hereof, a temporary restraining order be issued stopping the Defendants, or any other person acting under their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of Plaintiff's residential unit at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City under Notice of Demolition No. 55; B. After due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued for the same purpose as to that of the TRO, and, thereafter, for this preliminary writ to be made permanent; C. A writ of prohibition be issued, commanding the Defendants to stop carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of the aforesaid unit of the Plaintiffs.13 On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the carrying out of the demolition of the house of Baniqued. The hearing on his application for preliminary injunction was also set.14 On June 25, 1999, petitioners moved to dismiss15 the complaint of Baniqued on the ground of lack of cause of action because (1) there is nothing to be enjoined "as there is no Demolition Order issued by the City Mayor" and that the Demolition Team "does not demolish on the basis of a mere Notice of Demolition"; (2) he has "no clear legal right to be protected as his structure is illegal, the same having been built on a land he does not own without the consent of the owner thereof and without securing the requisite building permit"; (3) the Notice of Demolition "was issued in accordance with law and in due performance of the duties and functions of defendants, who being public officers, are mandated by law to enforce all pertinent laws against illegal constructions"; and that (4) "[d]efendants do not exercise judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Neither was the issuance of the assailed Notice of Demolition an exercise of a ministerial function. Nor is there any allegation in the complaint that defendants acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."16 RTC and CA Dispositions On October 15, 1999, the RTC granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the complaint of Baniqued with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the same is hereby GRANTED and this case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. Atty. Melanio Mauricio is hereby cited for contempt of court and is hereby warned that a repetition of his use of improper language whether orally or in any of his pleadings will be dealt with more severely in the future. SO ORDERED.17

The RTC reasoned that petitioners "are unquestionably members of the executive branch whose functions are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial."18 The RTC also sustained the argument of petitioners that "the act complained of can hardly qualify as ministerial in 19 nature as to put it within the ambit of the rule on prohibition." Lastly, the complaint of Baniqued was procedurally infirm because 20 he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Baniqued moved for reconsideration21 which was opposed.22 On March 3, 2000, the RTC denied the motion.23

Refusing to give up, Baniqued appealed the decision of the RTC. The CA sustained Baniqued, disposing as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders dated October 15, 1999 and March 3 2000 are both RECALLED and SET ASIDE and a new one issued DENYING the Motion to Dismiss dated June 25, 1999. After the finality of this judgment, let the entire original records of the case at bench be returned to the court a quo which is reminded to decide the case on the merits and with dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.24

According to the CA, it may be true that the mayor is an executive official. However, as such, he has also been given the authority to 25 hear controversies involving property rights. In that regard, the Mayor exercises quasi-judicial functions. The CA also held that the allegations in the complaint of Baniqued state a cause of action. The averments in the complaint call for a 26 determination whether court action is needed before Baniqued can be ousted from the questioned lot. Petitioners attempted at a reconsideration27 to no avail. Left with no other recourse, they interposed the present appeal.28 Issues Petitioners impute to the CA the following errors, viz.: 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE ACT OF THE CITY MAYOR IN ISSUING A NOTICE OF DEMOLITION IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION; 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE ACTION OF PROHIBITION FILED BY BANIQUED WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES; 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.29 (Underscoring supplied) In sum, petitioners claim that Baniqued incorrectly availed of the remedy of prohibition. Our Ruling The petition is unmeritorious. Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law.30 As its name indicates, the writ is one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is about to do. The writ is also commonly defined as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of 31 which it has cognizance. At common law, prohibition was a remedy used when subordinate courts and inferior tribunals assumed jurisdiction which was not properly theirs. Prohibition, at common law, was a remedy against encroachment of jurisdiction. Its office was to restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial tribunals from extending their jurisdiction and, in adopting the remedy, the courts have almost universally preserved its original common-law nature, object and function. Thus, as a rule, its proper function is to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested by law, and confine them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. However, the function of the writ has been extended by some authorities to cover situations where, even though the lower tribunal has jurisdiction, the superior court deems it necessary and advisable to issue the writ to prevent some palpable and irremediable injustice, and, x x x the office of the remedy in some jurisdictions has been enlarged or restricted by constitutional or statutory provisions. While prohibition has been classified as an equitable remedy, it is generally referred to as a common-law remedy or writ; it is a remedy which is in nature legal, although, x x x its issuance is governed by equitable principles.32(Citations omitted)

Prohibition is not a new concept. It is a remedy of ancient origin. It is even said that it is as old as common law itself. The concept originated in conflicts of jurisdiction between royal courts and those of the church.33 In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to wit: Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require. The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. It is very clear that before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Thus, jurisprudence teaches that resort to administrative remedies should be had first before judicial intervention can be availed of. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. x x x34 Explaining the reason behind the rule, Mr. Justice Justo Torres, Jr., expounded, thus: x x x This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. x x x35 Petitioners are of the view that the complaint of Baniqued for prohibition is fatally defective because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. If he felt aggrieved by the issuance of the notice of demolition, administrative remedies were readily available to him. For example, he could have easily filed a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration.36 The argument fails to persuade. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule.37 It admits of several exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the doctrine does not apply in cases (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is private land; (10) in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation of due process.38 Here, there was an urgent need for judicial intervention. The filing of a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have been a useless exercise. The notice of demolition is very clear and speaks for itself. City Mayor Domogan already made up his mind that the house of Baniqued was illegally built and was thus subject to demolition. It could reasonably be assumed that a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have also been denied outright. The irreparable damage to Baniqued in case his house was demolished cannot be gainsaid. Petitioners contend, though, that the complaint of Baniqued is premature. They say that what was issued by City Mayor Domogan 39 was only a notice of demolition, and not an order of demolition. In short, petitioners are saying that Baniqued jumped the gun. He

should have waited first for the issuance of a demolition order because no demolition can be carried out in the absence of such order. To Our mind, the distinction between a notice of demolition and an order of demolition is immaterial. What is material is that Baniqued felt threatened with the impending demolition of his house. It would have been too late and illogical if he waited first for his house to be actually demolished, before seeking protection from the courts. Acting in the earliest opportunity and availing of the best remedy available to protect his right was the prudent course of action. Petitioners also argue that the complaint of Baniqued should not prosper because he never alleged that the act complained of was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.40To support their stance, they cite Reyes v. Romero41 where this Court denied the petition for prohibition because there was "no allegation whatsoever charging the respondent Judge with lack of jurisdiction or with having committed grave abuse of discretion."42 Put differently, petitioners argue that for a complaint for prohibition to prosper, there should be a specific allegation that the act complained of was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The argument is specious on two grounds. First, Romero is not necessarily applicable to the instant case because it involved a different set of facts. There, a team of PC Rangers raided a house in Pasay City, Rizal, which was dubbed as a Gambling Casino. As a result, twelve persons were charged for violating the gambling law. The case was tried in the branch of the Municipal Trial Court in Pasay presided by Judge Lucio Tianco. The accused were later acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. An off-shoot of the raid was the prosecution of petitioners as maintainers of a gambling den. The case was also assigned to the sala of Judge Tianco. However, as Judge Tianco was on leave, the Secretary of Justice designated Judge Guillermo Romero to preside over said branch. Sometime later, Judge Tianco returned to office and resumed his duties. This, notwithstanding, Judge Romero ordered the continuation of the trial before him. Petitioners then sought the inhibition of Judge Romero in view of the return of Judge Tianco. The motion was denied. The matter was brought directly to this Court on petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. One of the two issues resolved by the Court was "whether respondent Judge in refusing to inhibit himself from continuing with the trial of the criminal case in question, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion."43 Clearly, the surrounding circumstances in Romero are absent in the case now before Us. They cannot be remotely applied even by analogy. Second, petitioners misconstrued Romero by interpreting it literally. The better interpretation is that the absence of specific allegation that the act complained of was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion would not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint for prohibition, provided that a reading of the allegations in the complaint leads to no other conclusion than that the act complained of was, indeed, done without or in excess of jurisdiction. To subscribe to the reasoning of petitioners may lead to an absurd situation. A patently unmeritorious complaint for prohibition may not be given due course just because of an allegation that the act complained of was committed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. This interpretation is supported by Romero itself. Petitioners overlooked that the case goes on to say that even if there were allegations of grave abuse of discretion, "there can be no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, for respondent Judge to comply with a valid and legal Administrative Order (No. 183) of the Secretary of Justice."44 The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. As a parting argument, petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of the rule on prohibition which covers the proceedings of any "tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions." The issuance of the notice of demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rulemaking function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and implementation, which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City Mayor a quasi-judicial body.45 Again, petitioners are mistaken. We need not belabor so much on this point. We quote with approval the CA observations in this regard, viz.:

Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities. There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines quasi-judicial function as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 458 [1986]). Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.46 We also agree with the CA that the complaint of Baniqued states a cause of action. The averments in the complaint "call for a determination of whether or not there is need for a court action or a court litigation to oust plaintiff from the possession of the subject lot, or, it is within the jurisdictional prerogative of the Office of the Mayor to eject [an] unlawful occupant from a private titled land he does not own."47 Lest this Decision be misunderstood, We hasten to clarify that We have not prejudged the merits of the case. Whether or not Baniqued is, indeed, entitled to a writ of prohibition is a matter which the trial court should determine in the first instance without further delay. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth. 1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc.

Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3 Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5 3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8 4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teachermembers so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded." 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10 6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11 On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.: a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17 9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra). It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues: 1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and 2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the

authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22 The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25 (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn,

obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34 Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter