Emilio Scragg CamposKbenhavn UniversitetJanuary 4, 2015

Epistemology of Disagreement

Syllabus

Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Cornell University Press; Ithaca, NY.(Standard Pages: 356)

Alston, W. (2014). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 47, No. 1. International Phenomenological Society: 1-30.(Standard Pages: 30)

Barnett, D. (2013). Whats the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Draft: 1-28.(Standard Pages: 28)

Bergmann, M. (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. LXIX, No. 3: 709-727.(Standard Pages: 18)

Christensen, D. (2007). "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review 116(2): 187-217.(Standard Pages: 40)

Christensen, D. (2013). Epistemic Modesty Defended. Disagreement without Transparency. The Epistemology of Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford, Oxford.(Standard Pages: )

Cohen, S. (2013). A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View. The Epistemology of Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford, Oxford.(Standard Pages: )

Elga, A. (2007). How to disagree about how to disagree. Disagreement. R. Feldman and T. Warfield. Oxford, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Feldman, R. (2006). Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement. Epistemology Futures. S. Hetherington, Oxford Clarendon Press: 216-36.(Standard Pages: 20)

Feldman, R. & J. Lackey (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press; Oxford, UK.(Standard Pages: 417)

Frances, B. (2013). Philosophical Renegades. The Epistemology of Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Goldberg, S. C. (2013). Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion. The Epistemology of Disagreement. D. Christensen and J. Lackey. Oxford, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Goldman, A. (2001). "Experts: Which Ones Should You trust?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63.(Standard Pages: )

Goldman, A. I. (2007). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement. Disagreement. R. F. a. T. Warfield. Oxford, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Gowans CW. Moral Virtue and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophical Topics. 2010;38(2): 39-57.(Standard Pages: 18)

Greco, J. (2001). Epistemic Circularity: Vicious, Virtuous and Benign. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1: 105-112.(Standard Pages: 7)

Kelly, T. (2010). Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Disagreement. R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Lackey, J. (2010). A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance. Social Epistemology. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Machuca, D. (ed.) (2013). Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge; New York, NY.(Standard Pages: 373)

Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World. Philosophical Papers. Collier Books; New York, New York: 126-148.(Standard Pages: 22)

Sosa, E. (2010). The Epistemology of Disagreement. Social Epistemology. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )

Wedgwood, R. (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. Disagreement. R. Feldman and T. Warfield, Oxford University Press.(Standard Pages: )