Large and artisanal scale mine development: The case for autonomous co-existence

Gavin Hilson (g.m.hilson@surrey.ac.uk),A* Titus Sauerwein (t.sauerwein@surrey.ac.uk)A

and John Owen (j.owen@uq.edu.au)B A Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, UK

B Sustainable Minerals Institute, University of Queensland, Australia

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was delivered as a keynote by Professor Gavin Hilson at the 4th International Conference on CSR, Murdoch University, Perth, 26-28 July 2017. The authors would like to thank Professor Tony Bebbington and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on a previous draft. Needless to say, any errors this paper may contain are the sole responsibility of the authors.

* Corresponding author

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1. Introduction

In 2009, the World Bank published Mining Together: Large-Scale Mining Meets Artisanal Mining (World Bank, 2009), a colorful document which shares ideas on why “Large-Scale Mining (LSM) companies [have] increasingly come across Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) workers during their exploration or production activities in the developing world” (p. 7). 1 The report was developed to assist the senior executives of large-scale mining companies with managing relationships with individuals who engage in ASM – low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing – on and around their concessions. Published at a time when clashes between these two parties were intensifying across the developing world, Mining Together calls on mining corporations to engage, partner and work with the latter, and provides a “Tentative List of Actions” on how they should go about doing this. It uses aspirational phrases such as “LSM is expected to play a role in ASM development,” “Plan to engage at the earliest possible stage…and as long as needed,” and “LSM has a potential advantage in engaging ASM,” and draws on examples from the Philippines, Tanzania and Uganda, to argue that it is in the best interest of large-scale mining companies to partner with and support local ASM operators.

Other donors, as well as representatives from the NGO community and private sector, have since echoed these sentiments, indicating that the large-scale mining-ASM interface should be thought of as a place where beneficial and amicable partnerships, cordial exchanges and robust working relationships can and should be facilitated. They have similarly called on multinational mining corporations to initiate dialogue with local ASM groups that have encroached on to company concessions, maintaining that doing so is “good for business.” A recent report published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (Fritz et al., 2018), for example, acknowledges that “In many parts of the world, ASM and LSM operate in neighbouring—and sometimes on the same— concessions” but stresses that “their coexistence opens the potential for cooperation” (p. iv). Similarly, officials at the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) state explicitly, in a joint report, Working Together: How Large-Scale Mining Can Engage With Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners (IFC, 2011), that there is a business case for supporting ASM:

The motivation for LSM engagement with ASM will vary in almost all operating circumstances, but it is likely to fall into at least one of the following broad categories: risk minimization and security, managing reputational risk, maximization of community development opportunities, pressure for corporate accountability and maximization of company benefit such as exploration benefits and improved mine closure planning. While the topic is not covered in this document, for LSM engagement with ASM to be successful, consideration also needs to be given to the business case for ASM engagement with LSM. [p. 12]

Several scholars (see e.g. Aubynn, 2009; Yakovleva and Vasquez-Brust, 2018) have shared similar ideas, citing examples of what they believe to be successful working partnerships between large-scale mining companies and ASM groups. The list of cases provided includes Damang (Ghana), North Mara (Tanzania), Mindanao (the Philippines) and La Rinconada (Peru).

What these and other champions of what is referred to here as “cohabitation” 2 fail to recognize, however, is that these partnerships are only optimal under an exceptional set of circumstances and sustainable for a finite period. They very crucially overlook in their assessments the temporal dimension of large-scale mining, in particular, how projects have lengthy lifecycles, during which numerous ownership changes typically take place and the prices of the minerals being extracted

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often fluctuate markedly. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a given property to maintain a static policy of any type over the long term, including one which applies to the management of encroaching ASM parties. Proponents of cohabitation have also overlooked – and in some instances, appear to dismiss outright – the context that typically brings these two parties together: namely, mining sector reform, under which, in most developing countries, priority is given to large-scale resource extraction and mineral exploration. This has spawned policy dialogues which even IFC and ICMM officials concede ignore “ASM miners” because there tends to be “a strong power imbalance in a negotiation or mediation process” (IFC, 2011, p. 82). What those advocating for “a togetherness” must recognize, therefore, is that the interface between large-scale mining and ASM, the resulting friction, and ultimately, the “imbalance” of power between these parties, are manifestations of a deliberate policy position. Given the shortcomings of, and unfavourable outcomes associated with, direct partnership or cohabitation, the design and implementation of a strategy emphasizing autonomous coexistence seems more appropriate. This would entail attending to ASM’s needs much earlier on in the reform process and undertaking comprehensive geological assessments with a view towards using findings to identify and demarcate areas capable of sustaining prospective licensees.

The purpose of this article is to advance the debate on large-scale mining-ASM relations in developing countries by examining further the negative implications of cohabitation, or policies which encourage the building of direct working partnerships between these parties. After reviewing the context in which large-scale miners and ASM groups are brought together, and ultimately what leads to a power “imbalance” between the two, the article identifies, in Section 3, two main reasons why asking mining companies to partner with encroaching ASM groups is an inappropriate development strategy, even in the short term. These are as follows: 1) the market price of a commodity, which, in the case of gold, the mineral at the heart of most large-scale mining-ASM conflicts due to its geological ubiquity and it being the most tradable commodity in the world, is significantly high; and 2) the frequent mergers and acquisitions that take place in the large-scale mining sector, at times sweeping ownership changes that lead to wholesale alterations in corporate strategy, including those which affect local economic development and community relations at the site level. Section 4 builds on these points through case studies of the Bonikro Gold Mine in Côte d’Ivoire and the Gold Ridge Mine in the Solomon Islands. The paper concludes in Section 5 by reflecting critically on the limitations of a cohabitation strategy and explaining why promoting more effectively the autonomous coexistence of these two very different mining parties would be a more practical solution moving forward.

2. Setting the Stage: Antecedents of large-scale mining-ASM conflicts

In most of the areas of the developing world where conflicts between miners are intensifying, governments are prioritizing heavily large-scale resource extraction. Although an exhaustive analysis of the resource curse and its many nuances is beyond the scope of this paper, the burgeoning literature on this subject does help to explain the pattern of institutional behaviour on display in most mineral-rich developing countries now pursuing this economic strategy. In the case of developing countries endowed with gold, host governments have tended to aggressively pursue foreign investment to “grow” all operational phases of the (large-scale) mining lifecycle, from reconnaissance, through prospecting and more intensive mineral exploration, to extraction and processing. This, however, has not only demanded that sizable plots of mineralized land be reserved for individual mines but has also required surrendering even more territory for reconnaissance and

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prospecting/exploration. This temporal dimension of large-scale mining has, very crucially, been overlooked by proponents of cohabitation.

A possible reason why officials at the World Bank, the ICMM and other organizations are calling on large-scale mining companies to initiate dialogue with ASM operators is the lack of initiative host governments have taken to diffuse and prevent outright conflicts (between the two parties). The policy frameworks now in place in most gold-rich developing countries have what Hilson (2019) refers to as a large-scale mining “bias,” which has ultimately created settings conducive for conflict: catalyzing, through financial incentives, the rapid entry of companies on the one hand, while simultaneously “squeezing out” ASM on the other hand.3 This “bias” is deeply-rooted because it positions host governments to secure steady streams of revenue in the form of taxes, rents and permit fees, from large-scale mining and mineral exploration companies with relative ease. It manifests as complacency, which, in the language of the resource curse, could be cited as an example of how “resource booms induce myopia, sloth, and/or over-exuberance in political elites” (McNeish, 2010, p. 5).

(a) Reform of the mining sector: Initial Reflections

Many organizations have become enamoured with the idea of mining companies forging working partnerships with ASM groups. An infusion of fresh ideas is desperately needed as host governments have shown little interest in preventing and resolving conflicts between the parties, which helps to explain the appeal of cohabitation-based solutions. With mineral exploration budgets and portfolios expanding precipitously across the world, it certainly makes sense – at least economically – to ask the executives of major mining companies to assume more of a leadership role in this area. Investment in gold, which accounts for 50 percent of the total global nonferrous exploration budget, rose 20 percent between 2017 and 2018, from US$4.05 billion to US$4.86 billion. Today, gold is the focus of most projects reporting drilling, increasing in number by 8 percent during this period. Gold accounts for approximately 44 percent and 61 percent of mineral exploration budgets in Latin America and Africa, respectively, and in Asia-Pacific countries such as Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, it is the focus of more than 50 percent of such financing (S&P Global, 2017, 2018, 2019).

When the drivers and dynamics of the conflicts between large-scale miners and ASM groups working in gold-rich sections of the developing world are studied more closely, the irony of Mining Together becomes clear. The World Bank has, over the past three decades, provided technical assistance to several developing countries that have committed to reforming their mining sectors. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, the organization has, since 1990, awarded more than US$2.75 billion in loans and guarantees to host governments to assist with the deregulation, direct financing and privatization of extractive industries (Pegg, 2006). For mining, these comprehensive funding packages have, in some instances, been standalone, whereas in other cases are tied to broader country donor funding (Table 1). Reforms have been mainly implemented with a view to luring the foreign investment needed to bolster large-scale mineral exploration facilities, and to resurrect defunct and/or establish new sites for extraction and processing (McMahon, 2010). In most instances, the sweeping changes made by host governments to legislation and taxation policies have proved catalytic, luring gold mining and exploration companies to their shores, and culminating in the demarcation of vast quantities of mineralized land to these parties. While – at times, sizable sums of – monies are often included in these projects to support the formalization and regulation of ASM, rarely are these activities prioritized. They are typically undertaken in the shadow of work aimed at facilitating the expansion of large-scale mining and mineral exploration.

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Table 1: Selected World Bank-funded mining sector reform and technical assistance projects (US$1 million), 1988–2011

Fiscal Year

Country Project Name Financing (US$ millions)

1988 Ghana Mining Sector Rehabilitation Project 401989 Bolivia Mining Sector Rehabilitation Project 351991 Mexico Mining Sector Restructuring Project 2001993 Mali Mining Sector Capacity Building Project 61994 Ecuador Mining Technical Assistance 141994 Peru Energy and Mining TA Program 121995 Ghana Mining Sector Development & Capacity Building 121995 Tanzania Mineral Sector Development 131996 Zambia Economic Recovery & Investment Promotion TA 231996 Argentina Mining Sector Development 301997 Burkina Faso Mining Sector Capacity Building & Environmental

Management Project21

1998 Argentina Mining Development TA 401999 Mauritania Mining Sector Capacity Building 151999 Zambia Public Sector Reform & Export Promotion 1732000 Papua New Guinea Sector Institution Mining Strengthening 102001 Mozambique Mineral Resources Project 182002 DR Congo Economic Recovery Credit (Begin restructuring of

mining sector) 100*

2003 Madagascar Mineral Resources Governance Project (2007) 32+8 2003 Mauritania 2nd Mining Sector Capacity Building 18+5 (2006)2003 Ethiopia Energy Access Project (Mining Sector Reform) 2.5*2003 Burkina Faso Competitiveness and Enterprise Development

(Mining Sector Reform)3.9*

2004 Uganda Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources 25+5 (2009)2005 Nigeria Sustainable Management of Natural Resources 1202005 Sierra Leone 4th Economic Rehabilitation & Recovery Project

(Capacity Building & Regulatory Reform)3.8*

2006 DR Congo Transitional Support for Economic Recovery (Improve mining sector governance)

13.5*

2006 Serbia & Montenegro Programmatic Private & Financial Development Policy (Strengthen mining legal framework)

2.2*

2006 Afghanistan Sustainable Development of Natural Resources 30+10 (2010)2007 Sierra Leone Programmatic Governance Reform & Growth

(Capacity building)2*

2008 Mongolia Mining Sector Institutional Strengthening TA 9.32008 Papua New Guinea 2nd Mining Sector Institutional Strengthening TA 172009 Tanzania Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources 502010 Lao PDR TA for Capacity Building in the Hydropower and

Mining Sectors5*

2010 Sierra Leone Mineral Sector Technical Assistance 42011 DR Congo Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector 502011 Solomon Islands Mining Sector Technical Assistance 12011 Malawi Mining Growth and Governance Support (under

preparation)12.5

* In the last column = this amount is the part that was or is for the mining sector activities of a bigger loan. For such projects a description of the mining component is given in parentheses after the project name in column 3.

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Additional financing for a project is captured by +X followed by the year. For example, the Uganda 2004 project received $5 million of additional finance in 2009.

Source: McMahon, 2010

Bank officials, however, omitted these important details in Mining Together: namely, how, by guiding host governments through reform and supporting this process financially, the organization has been complicit in creating the settings which have brought large-scale miners and ASM groups into contact, often under volatile circumstances. In particular, the document fails to explain how reforms implemented under the auspices of the World Bank have stimulated investment in, and the intensification of, activities across the large-scale mining sector’s lifecycle. These dynamics are visible in gold-rich developing countries, where, following World Bank intervention, most mineralized land ends up in the hands of multinational mining and mineral exploration companies. By calling on large-scale mining companies to partner with ASM operators and omitting the details of a history it has shaped heavily, World Bank officials, in Mining Together, paint an incomplete, and by extension, inaccurate, picture of the conflicts between these parties. The document portrays the latter as parasitic, opportunistic masses, and the former as saviours who are uniquely positioned and eager to diffuse community-level tensions.

Crucially, what continues to be ignored is how a commitment to “growing” large-scale gold mining – in particular, the way host governments have gone about pursuing this – has stifled efforts to meaningfully formalize and incorporate ASM into the national development agenda. As Table 2 indicates, governments have parcelled out vast quantities of land for exploration, at times, it seems, indiscriminately. This has been done with the belief that this activity will eventually bring to fruition the small group of capital-intensive operations which typically form the backbones of vibrant large-scale mining industries, long term. But in failing to think through, at an early stage of reform, the ramifications of the exercise, governments have systematically “squeezed out” prospective small-scale licensees and ultimately, created the conditions in which the conflicts in questions have arisen.

The following passage captures the essence of what mining sector reform has entailed, and the specific policy interventions, many of them wholesale changes, that are typically required to facilitate the growth of large-scale gold extraction:

A stable mineral policy that incentivises exploration will attract investment: From a government perspective, a good minerals concession policy should act as an incentive (rather than a deterrent) to attracting bona fide mineral explorers and miners to a jurisdiction. It should facilitate exploration and mining activity, but not at undue expense to the environment or other stakeholders; confer secure, undisputed title to the concession holder in return for periodic rental payments; and create economic incentive for concession holders to conduct meaningful exploration (and mining) activity rather than simply to ‘hibernate’ the concession. Policy stability is extremely important to mining companies given the immovable nature of their assets. [ABAC, 2015, p. xii]

When the lifecycle dynamics of large-scale – in this instance, gold – mining is not considered, the investment which occurs at all phases of the sector, in particular exploration, can be overlooked. The first pieces to take stock of conflicts between ASM groups and large-scale operators, particularly in gold-rich settings (e.g. ILO, 1999; Hilson, 2002; Hentschel et al., 2002), mostly shared details of individual cases. The temporal dimension – including, importantly, the lengthy and oftentimes, volatile, gestation period – of these disputes was ignored altogether, in all likelihood because of a limited understanding of the phenomena being examined, and the lack of evidence available at the time which pointed to mining sector reforms being the principal cause of the problem. 4 This continues to be the case, with two possible exceptions: Geenen’s (2014) work on the Banro

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concession in DR Congo and Spiegel’s (2016) research in Cambodia, although even these studies underplay the connection between mineral exploration and large-scale mining, and how intensification of the former in particular systematically “squeezes out” ASM parties.

Table 2: Total surface (km2) used by large-scale mineral exploration and mining activity in selected gold-producing developing countries

Côte d’Ivoire

Burkina Faso

Mali Ghana Mongolia Philippines

Total surface Exploration licences

59,262.46 55,969 55,863.65 No data

146,255.88 6,272.55

Total surface Production licences

3353.62 No data No data No data

15,673.60 677.01

Total surface Exploration + production

62,616.08 55,969 55,863.65 68,325 161,929.48 6,949.59

Total Surface Country 322,463 274,200 1,240,192 238,535 1,566,000 300,000Total surface mining concessions as % of total surface country

19.42% 20.41% 4.50% 28.64% 10.34% 2.32%

Total number of concessions

176 451 585 592 4295 374

Sources: EITI, 2014, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d; additional data obtained from Mineral Commission Accra

Those who have called for cohabitation, therefore, seem to be doing so without much appreciation for the dynamics of mineral exploration and more broadly, the lifecycle of large-scale mining and the commitment needed to sustain it. Before exploring in greater detail why, in the case of gold, when this temporal dimension is taken into account, pressuring mining companies to broker working partnerships with the ASM groups that have encroached on to their concessions is an unsustainable development strategy, it is instructive to explain why host governments and possibly the World Bank are unlikely to offer much assistance in this area.

(b) The large-scale mining “bias” and the state

In most of the gold-rich settings where conflicts between mining parties have been reported, there is an obvious large-scale mining “bias,” a dependency which reforms have been largely responsible for creating (see Table 3 for a list of gold-dependent developing countries). Recognizing that “Mining companies generally have a preference for direct taxes on profits” (ABAC, 2015, p. x), World Bank officials have, under reform, worked closely with host governments to overhaul mineral investment policies with a view to designing and implementing what they believe to be more competitive mineral taxation regimes capable of luring foreign investors (Otto et al., 2006). The “desirable qualities of a jurisdiction’s mineral concessions policy from a mining company perspective” (ABAC, 2015, p. x) include low transaction costs, administrative simplicity and efficiency, security of tenure, provisions to mortgage and/or transfer mineral rights, minimal administrative discretion and transparency. Otto et al. (2006) provide a more extensive list of criteria that influence investment decisions in mining but which, importantly, consider the sector’s temporal dimension (Table 4).

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Table 3: Gold mining as a percentage of exports in selected developing countries

Country Rank (gold production)

Output (2017 data) Ores, metals, precious stones and non-monetary gold as a share of total commodity exports, 2014-2015

Peru 6 162.3 63Indonesia 7 154.3 10Mexico 9 130.5 20Ghana 10 101.7 36Mauritania 11 84.9 58Papua New Guinea 14 61.9 39Mali 18 52.2 72Tanzania 20 49.1 42Burkina Faso 21 49.1 69Philippines 22 47.9 35Dominican Republic 24 35.3 43Suriname 25 33.4 69Zimbabwe 28 23.3 22Mongolia 34 14.7 69Nicaragua 43 7.7 15

Source: UNCTAD, 2016

Table 4: Mining company ranking of investment decision criteria

Importance Ranking, Exploration Stage

Importance Ranking, Mining Stage

Investment Decision Criteria

1 N/A Geological potential for target mineral

N/A 3 Measure of profitability2 1 Security of tenure3 2 Ability to repatriate profits4 9 Consistency and constancy of

mineral policies5 7 Company has management

control6 11 Mineral ownership7 6 Realistic foreign exchange

regulations8 4 Stability of exploration and

mining terms9 5 Ability to predetermine tax

liability10 8 Ability to predetermine

environmental obligations11 10 Stability of fiscal regime

Source: Otto et al., 2006

Can host governments be relied upon to intervene to ameliorate tensions between large-scale miners and ASM parties in gold-rich landscapes? As indicated, reforms have positioned most to receive a steady diet of revenue from large-scale mining and accompanying exploration activities in the form of taxes, permit fees and ground rents. Most developing countries, therefore, are fully committed to auctioning the lands needed to continue supporting and “growing” this industry. It is

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the nurturing and galvanization of this cycle which underpins the large-scale mining “bias” observed today in many gold-producing countries, and a complacency reminiscent of the “sloth” behaviour Sachs and Warner (2001) associate with rentier states. Host governments, therefore, cannot be relied on to take the lead in ameliorating conflicts, particularly if they believe that doing so may compromise their ability to extract revenue from large-scale gold mining and mineral exploration activity.

Any discussion on conflict should begin with the World Bank, which, again, as the architect of mining sector reform, is the party mostly responsible for bringing large-scale miners and ASM parties together. But expecting World Bank officials, who are complicit in nurturing a dependency on revenue from gold and are champions of an extractive industries-led developmental blueprint with large-scale, export-oriented mining activity as its centrepiece, to provide guidance, beyond rhetoric, on how to resolve these conflicts, is also unrealistic. In fact, in addition to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association steering host governments through reform and providing technical assistance, the IFC supports individual gold mines directly (Table 5). Some of its more significant forays into large-scale gold mining include its decision, in 1993, to catalyze US$26 million in loans for Newmont Gold Mining Ltd.’s Yanacocha gold mine in Peru; providing an additional US$125, with an exceptionally long maturity of 12 years, in support of the company’s Ahafo mine in Ghana, in 2006; and awarding a US$45 million loan, in 2004, to Montana Exploradora de Guatemala S.A. to develop the Marlin gold project in Western Guatemala, which, at the time, was the country’s first major mining investment in over 20 years. 5 While gold accounts for only 4 percent of the IFC’s mining portfolio, the impact of the organization’s presence, as an investor – even symbolically – cannot be overstated. The decisions made by the IFC, as the largest global development institution focused exclusively on the private sector in developing countries, to support individual gold mining projects, galvanizes the interest of, and catalyzes lending from, other major financial institutions and investors. Its influence cannot be overstated: it helps to build investor interests in new frontiers such as the Dominican Republic, where, due to it holding 8.2 percent of Canada-headquartered Unigold’s share capital, the organization has successfully fuelled the growth of exploration activities and the development of the gold assets of the Neita mine, 6 as well as restored confidence in settings such as Liberia – a landscape recently ravaged by an Ebola epidemic – where it invested £5.3 million in Aureus Mining to support an optimized plan for its New Liberty Project, a move that increased its holding in the company to 17.42 percent. 7 Overall, the IFC’s interest in a range of gold-rich settings has catalyzed investment in exploration activity, which is the engine that drives large-scale mining.

In summary, host governments and the World Bank are benefitting enormously, economically, from booming large-scale gold exploration and mining activity. The continued investment of the IFC in gold has gone a long way toward legitimizing this brand of development, in the process, further entrenching the large-scale mining “bias” that has stifled efforts to promote ASM and increase its visibility overall. When the temporal dimension of large-scale gold mining is considered, which documents such as Mining Together and Working Together fail to do, it becomes clear how a strategy of cohabitation is unsustainable. The next section of the paper begins to explain why.

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Table 5: IFC investments in selected gold mining projects

Country Company Project Amount in US$ millions

Year(s) Details

Burkina Faso Roxgold Yaramoko 22 2015 EquityBurkina Faso Volta

ResourcesKiaka Gold 6.6 2010 Equity

Burkina Faso Gryphon Minerals Ltd.

Banfora 9 2009-2012 Equity

Ghana Newmont Ghana

Ahafo 85 2006 Term Loans

Liberia Aureus Mining

New Liberty 19.3 2014, 2015 Equity

Liberia Hummingbird Resources

Dugbe 4.75 2012

Latin AmericaBrazil Crusader BorboremaColombia Colombia Angostura 15.4 2009 EquityGuyana Guyana

Goldfields Ltd.

Aurora 211.1 2006, 2009-2011, 2013, 2014

Equity, Term Loans

Guatemala Glamis Gold Ltd.

Marlin 45 2004 Short-Term Loan

Nicaragua Condor La India 5.99 2014 EquityPeru Newmont Yanacocha 126 1993, 1999 Equity and

Short-Term Loans

AsiaArmenia Lydian

InternationalAmulsar 6 Equity

Mongolia Oyu Tolgoi Oyu Tolgoi 1,854 2015 Loans and Mobilization

The Philippines Mindoro Resources

Mindoro Resources Ltd.

4.5 2010, 2012 Equity

Solomon Islands

Gold Ridge Australian Solomon Gold Ltd.

2010 Term Loan

Sources: World Bank, 2016; IFC, 2017

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3. Extractive partnerships: Why the cohabitation strategy for developing mineral resources is unsustainable

When the stages and dynamics of the lifecycle of a large-scale gold mine are considered, what becomes clear is that cohabitation is an untenable strategy. The two main reasons identified here for why this is the case are as follows: 1) a fluctuating gold price, and 2) mergers and acquisitions, which makes the implementation of any unmodified strategy, long term, challenging. Each is examined successively in this section of the paper, drawing on case study analysis from all three regions of the developing world.

(a) A fluctuating gold price

In 1999, the International Labour Organization published its landmark document, Social and Labour Issues in Small-Scale Mining (ILO, 1999). In addition to further legitimizing claims being made at the time that ASM is a “poverty-driven activity,” it was one of the first texts to examine in-depth the social and livelihoods dimension of the sector. The authors of the report also posed the tenacious question “Large-scale and small-scale mining: Cooperation or confrontation?” at a time when friction between large-scale mine management and those engaged in ASM was intensifying. It is now clear that mining sector reforms are bringing the two parties together.

Asking large-scale mining companies to forge working partnerships with ASM groups seemed like a logical move at that particular historical juncture. First, there was a belief that, if agreements could be reached that appeased both sides, tensions, and by extension the likelihood of violent clashes, would reduce considerably. Second, doing so would have legitimized the work being undertaken by donors at the time to recognize and support ASM. There was growing confidence that “artisanal mining, if properly organized and supported, has the potential to become a basis for related value-added economic activities, and to provide the raw material inputs for domestic manufacturing,” as well as “expand employment and income earning opportunities in rural areas, help to sustain rural lifestyles and communities, and generate additional income for both local and national economies” (Davidson, 1993, p. 317). The broad consensus at the time in donor circles, and a message resonating powerfully in a collection of documents published in the 1990s and early-2000s (e.g. Barry, 1996; ILO, 1999; Hentschel et al., 2002), was that a formalized ASM sector provides a much-needed platform to achieve this.

Anticipating that foreign interests in large-scale gold mining would surge across the developing world following sweeping changes made under the auspices of World Bank-led reform, Davidson (1993) called on host governments to take the lead with formalizing ASM:

Governments must be prepared to move beyond the establishment of legal frameworks, to identify deposits and areas amenable to small-scale development, including the preliminary evaluation of their technical and economic viability at different levels of operation. Security of tenure should be respected in such areas. At the same time the barefoot prospecting potential of the artisanal miner to locate new, large deposits should be preserved, and transferability of title permitted under certain conditions subject to safeguards and protection for the deposit’s finders(s), as well as for the local communities. [p. 317]

There were signs in several developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that important steps were being made to formalize ASM, similar to those outlined by Davidson (1993). In Ghana, for example, under the Mining Sector Environment and Development Project (World Bank, 1995), US$1.88 million was pledged to “delineate areas with favourable geological prospects where SSM [small-scale mining] concessions can be granted, and to work with the small-scale miners in

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delineating recoverable mineralization after a concession has been obtained” (p. 27). In Mali, under the US$6 million Mining Sector Capacity-Building Project (World Bank, 1992), an Artisanal Mining/Local Industry Development Study was conducted, with the intention of “determining how a local small- and medium-scale gold mining industry can be developed on the basis of local investment funds, a free local mineral rights market, and artisanal miners’ experience and gold discoveries” (p. 12). In Burkina Faso, US$4.2 million was pledged, under the Mining Sector Capacity Building and Environmental Management Project (World Bank, 1997), for “developing small-scale, mechanized mines in Burkina Faso” (p. 22), which entailed conducting geological work, establishing a pilot training center, identifying ways in which to support operators financially, and through equipment sharing and supply schemes.

With the legislative frameworks needed to facilitate the formalization of ASM beginning to take shape, and several countries taking steps toward making mineral rights transferable and mortgageable, which is “significant for it can enable miners to raise finance for project development and secure their investments” (UNECA, 2002, p. 23), momentum seemed to be building in favour of supporting the sector and providing its prospective licensees with greater visibility in policy. These changes were needed to buffer against the rapid influx of investment in, and growth of, gold exploration activity taking place across the developing world. The list included countries such as Burkina Faso and Tanzania, where exploration leases of 200 km2 and 250 km2 were being awarded, respectively (Forster and Bills, 2002); Peru, Indonesia, Ghana and the Philippines, where the overhaul of investment policies and subsequent installation of liberalized mining codes attracted unprecedented levels of investment in, and fuelled the rapid expansion of, prospecting activities in the 1990s (Benavides, 1990; Van Leeuwen, 1994; Aryee, 2001; Jeronimo et al., 2015); and Papua New Guinea, where, according to Section 22 of the Mining Act 1992, holders of an exploration license can be granted up to 750 “sub-blocks,” each of which measures 3.41 km 2 in size.8 Although moves made to formalize ASM failed to adequately insulate and protect it from the wave of exploration activities and “block out” the alluvial and near-surface hard-rock gold deposits the sector’s operators mostly covet, optimism remained high because it was at this time that the discourse of cohabitation first emerged. The rhetoric emanating from industry circles around the idea of forging working partnerships with the sector’s operators provided much-needed encouragement. A main source of this excitement was the series of announcements made by a group of companies operating around the world about their intentions to partner with local ASM groups.

None of these working agreements, however, were ever officialized, which leads to the first reason why cohabitation, as a strategy, is unviable: the volatility of the gold price. These announcements were made at a time when the gold price was extremely low. For many companies, therefore, it was uneconomic to mine particular areas of their concessions because of correspondingly high operational costs. In Ghana, for example, in response to escalated tensions between mine management and local informal ASM operators at its Damang site, Gold Fields Ltd. forged an agreement with local artisanal miners. As Aubynn (2009) explains, in a bid to diffuse these conflicts, in 1996, 740 artisanal miners were equipped with ID cards and permitted to work on the company’s Tomento and Rex leases. Similar developments took place at about the same time in Venezuela at the Los Rojas project, a mine located on a 4000ha lease near the Guyana border and which, at the time, was operated by the Canadian mining company Placer Dome. The Las Cristinas region, which the lease encompassed, had, since the 1950s, been the site of intensive ASM activity and at the time the Government of Venezuela decided to demarcate the area as large-scale mining concessions, was home to 10,000 operators and their families (Sweeting and Clark, 2000). In early-1996, mine management, recognizing that the Los Rojas project used only 126 ha of its concession, established a

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non-profit civil association for artisanal miners with US$1 million secured from company executives. The association was tasked with registering “eligible” ASM operators judged to be long-term residents (inhabitants of the area for more than three years), who were Venezuelan citizens and whose principal occupation was mining, a number which was 200 at the time it was established. Placer Dome permitted gold panning activity at Los Rojas, and, provided operators did not interfere with the company’s ongoing exploration activities, agreed to use unarmed security guards, which allegedly reduced tensions at the site. Throughout the late-1990s and early-2000s, several inspiring speeches (D’Souza, 2003; Loots, 2004; Aubynn, 2006; Davidson, 2007; Neale, 2007) were delivered at international workshops and seminars which singled out these two mines, and a small group of others, including Placer Dome’s Misima (Papua New Guinea) and AngloGold Ashanti’s Geita Mine (Tanzania), to showcase the virtues of cohabitation.

What seemed to have gone unnoticed in coverage of each of these cases, however, is that the conditions for cohabitation were negotiated during a period of unprecedentedly low gold prices. As Figure 1 illustrates, at the end of 1997, the gold price had plummeted to US$287.05/oz, and would remain under US$300/oz until 2002 because of a generally strong US dollar. This forced several companies to scale down, suspend and in some cases, shut down completely, their activities, particularly underground mines, which generally cost significantly more to operate than open pit projects. Yet, despite struggling to operate profitably in this climate, no mining company that had entered into working partnerships with ASM operators actually ceded portions of their concessions to them, a move which would have provided them with formally recognized tenure. In the Ghana case, despite exercising a “Live and Let Live” policy at Damang, Gold Fields never relinquished portions of its Tomento and Rex leases to government for subsequent demarcation to local galamsey9operators (Aubynn, 2009); nor did Newmont Gold Mining, which took a similar approach toward ASM at its Aykem mine in the country’s Eastern Region, cede the marginal sections of its adjacent Ntronang and Noyem prospecting leases that local galamsey coveted, despite rumours of requests made by site staff to company headquarters in Denver to do so (Banchirigah, 2008). Much of the same ambivalent behaviour was on display in the early 2000s in the municipality of Itogon, Benguet Province in the Philippines, where, in response to calls made by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau for mining companies to adopt a “big brother, small brother” strategy with feuding ASM groups, Benguet Corporation launched the Acupan Contract Mining Scheme. Under this scheme, the company delineated 22 “working places” for ASM but while the arrangement reached with “these ASM-operators” did “imply some sort of recognition of their mining rights,” there was no “full-blown formalization” (Verbrugge, 2017, p. 357) because the areas in which operators work were not officially titled. Similarly, at each of the other mines being showcased at the time as examples of “successful” cohabitation, including the aforementioned Misima, Geita and Las Cristinas projects, at no point did the “accommodated” ASM groups have legal mining rights to the land they were permitted to work.

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Figure 1: Gold price, 1990-present

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 20180

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

Year

Gold

Pric

e (U

S$/o

z)

Extrapolating from Aubynn’s (2009) analysis of the Damang case, the decision to exercise a “Live and Let Live” policy with ASM operators during a period of low gold prices, when for a company, only relatively high-grade ores can be mined economically, is “hardly altruistic and sustainable” over the “long-term.” When the gold price begins to increase, the “marginal deposits” these ASM groups have been permitted to work once again become attractive to the company, and the tenants themselves begin to be viewed as competitors. This happened at Damang, where, beginning in 2006, when the gold price had risen to US$600/oz, mine management initiated a series of uncomfortable dialogues with resident galamsey operators about their necessary expulsion from the concession. As the gold price continued to climb, peaking near US$2000/oz but eventually dipping and plateauing, over the past two years, to around US$1300/oz, similar types of evictions took place at the likes of Geita, Las Cristinas and Misima. In promoting a discourse of cohabitation and calling for companies to recreate the “success” of the past, therefore, documents such as Working Together and Mining Together crucially overlook how the gold price changes corporate perceptions of the value of local geology. They also fail to mention how virtually all examples of “successful” cohabitation took place during periods when the gold price was low. Yakovleva and Vasquez-Brust (2018), who recently provided an update on large-scale mining-ASM relations in Ghana, fall into the same trap, describing the “emergence of a cooperative strategy with informal miners as a sustainable alternative to the political strategy of reliance on the state to protect tenure” (P. 52) but in support of their argument, use data collected between 2005 and 2008, when the gold price had shown signs of recovery yet was still well below US$1000/oz and certainly not high enough for several companies operating in the country and elsewhere to begin mining again profitably. In the Damang case, the “relationship between the mine and ASM” has “remained tense” (Teschner, 2013, p. 336) because of forced evictions of galamsey operators from the Temento and Rex leases,

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sections of which, in line with claims made by Aubynn (2009), had hitherto contained “marginal grounds” but where, when “the gold price increased” between 2009 and 2011, “small-scale sites [were] now profitable for large-scale exploitation” (Teschner, 2013, p. 335).

An even bigger concern is that proponents of cohabitation more generally have misdiagnosed why companies have, in the past, pursued a “Live and Let Live” policy. Once again, building on points raised by Aubynn (2009), at Damang, “The sudden accommodating attitude” of the company, which “was a revelation at the time,” ironically “raised some doubt in indigenous communities, where people expressed concerns about the company’s ‘real’ intentions” (p. 67). These concerns may have been warranted: aside from appeasing host governments by “looking busy” and in the process, conveying the impression that they are not simply holding on to concessions, companies likely have a far more strategic reason to pursue a policy of cohabitation when the gold price is low, a time when geologists, mining engineers and other staff are most expendable and often themselves victims of employment purges. Companies have been known to intentionally observe “The much vaunted ability of small-scale miners to find deposits, particularly of high value minerals” (ILO, 1999, np), in preparation for when the gold price begins to rise. Fritz et al. (2018) provide a timely reminder of how mining companies have long used local ASM groups as geological “pathfinders”:

Another area of interaction between the two is when small-scale miners act as “pathfinders” or “barefoot prospectors.” During the exploration phase, junior mining companies will often follow small-scale miners in order to identify and search for potential new claims, only to later evict them from the site once they have obtained a licence, or place them in marginal parts of the concession where returns may be low and resources limited to a few years of mining. [p. 33]

Keovilignavong (2019) shares an illustrative example of this behaviour from the Lao PDR. In 2004, Phu Bia Mining (when it was under the ownership of former Australian-headquartered company Normandy Mining) was awarded a 2636 km2 concession by the Government of Lao. Management immediately hired local people to assist with exploration of the concession who “turned [out] to be ASM miners later on since they knew about gold mineral deposits” (p. 144) but as moves were made in 2009 and 2010 to ban ASM activities located close to the mine, it does appear as if these people were employed, at a time when the gold price was low, for the purposes of acquiring geological knowledge. The most visible case of such behaviour, however, has been in Burkina Faso, where, as Luning (2014) explains, “Artisanal miners can be used as pathfinders, but they may also later be disposed of, evicted for illegally mining on a concession” (p. 73). Here, the law allows a mining company to demarcate sections of its concession to artisanal miners, which, when the gold price was low, typically involved “blocking out” areas that cannot be worked viably on a large scale, or locations which Aubynn (2009) would consider “marginal grounds.” But since the mid-2000s, when the gold price began to recover, the Government of Burkina Faso has awarded over 130 prospecting licenses to international companies, and in the process, artisanal miners have become “disposable illegals” (p. 69): companies, now armed with crucial geological knowledge uncovered previously by these “pathfinders,” no longer have any use for them.

It would therefore be naïve to assume that large-scale mining companies openly pursue working partnerships with ASM groups because it is good for business or that they can be relied upon to do so. Most such partnerships were forged when the gold price was low, and even in cases where individual companies have released sections of their concessions to ASM groups, the arrangements underpinning these moves were informal, allowing management to regain control of these areas

15

legitimately once gold prices recover and when “marginal grounds” can be worked on a large scale profitably.

(B) Mergers and Acquisitions

Even in cases where the gold price has stabilized, can multinational mining companies be depended on to stay committed to a particular policy over the long term? For proponents of cohabitation, it is worthwhile reflecting on two cases in Ghana, long a top-ten global gold producer. The first site is the Prestea mine, located in the country’s Western Region. A meeting was held on 29 January 2003 between the site management of Bogoso Gold Limited (BGL), the company that owned the mine at the time, security consultants, and representatives from the Prestea Mining Group, a group of small-scale miners headed by former employees of the State Gold Mining Corporation (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007; Hilson et al., 2007). The latter were, for the most part, left idle following the privatization of the State Gold Mining Corporation in the early-1990s and made redundant following the acquisition of the property by the South Africa-based JCI Barnex Group in the mid-1990s. Years of friction between site management and these former employees led to this meeting, after which, the company decided to permit the Prestea Mining Group to work the “Number Four Bungalow” area of the Prestea concession: the low gold price at the time meant that the underground operations could not be run profitably by the company. This, however, swiftly changed following the acquisition (90 percent share) of BGL by Golden Star Resources, a Canadian mid-tier mining company, in 2004. Despite still being constrained by the gold price, new management brought to a halt the activities at Number Four Bungalow, and later contributed, financially, to the government’s nation-wide “crackdown” on galamsey in 2007, which included stopping all ASM activities in Prestea.

The second case is the aforementioned Damang site, which, and as indicated, is now owned and operated by the South African giant, Gold Fields Ltd. The property was under the ownership of Ranger Resources in the 1990s, when, following intensive mineral exploration, frictions between the mine management at the time and local ASM leaders began to intensify. The source of the friction and what would ultimately force Gold Fields – which acquired Ranger Minerals in 2001 – to implement its “Live and Let Live” policy in the early-2000s was that “government ambitions under President Rawlings' Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) were seeking to maximize foreign direct investment in mining with little regard for ASM operations,” and therefore “refused to renew registered small-scale concession areas held by local villagers just before the Damang concession was awarded to Ranger” (Teschner, 2013, p. 335). When Gold Fields purchased Ranger Minerals, relations between company staff were strained, which spawned negotiations that culminated in the temporary “Live and Let Live” strategy on the Tomento and Rex concessions.

What the Ghana experience crystalizes is how quickly a mine site’s strategy toward ASM – from a policy of cohabitation to more adversarial approaches and even vice versa – can change following a merger or acquisition. The volatility of ownership in the mining sector cannot be overstated, and each of the corporate changes that results has an important bearing on the treatment of ASM at individual sites. Mergers and acquisitions can spawn seismic shifts in managerial strategies that are ignored by documents such as Mining Together and Working Together. Exactly how volatile is ownership in the mining sector? Excluding the US$37.4 billion merger between Swiss mining giants Glencore and Xstrata, in 2013, there were 702 global deals, which had a combined value of US$87.3 billion (Vivoda and Graetz, 2017). In 2018, the combined value of all mergers and acquisitions globally in the mining industry was roughly the same at US$86.3 billion but the number of transactions (1349) was more than double that of 2013.10 Gold deals accounted for US$6.5 billion of this sum but 2019 witnessed two significant mergers, which will have profound impacts on

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management strategy at several mine worldwide, including many projects that are located in areas where ASM is widespread: 1) Newmont Gold Mining’s acquisition of Goldcorp Inc. in a deal valued at US$10 billion; and 2) Barrick Gold Corporation’s US$5.4 billion move to buy Randgold Resources Ltd. (EY, 2019). Many of the sites where relations between management and encroaching artisanal miners have become strained have a turbulent history of ownership (Table 7), in many cases yielding abrupt changes to managerial strategies linked to hostile acquisitions and mergers. In each of these situations, there are legacy issues and “inherited commitments” – many of which are linked to ASM – that management must address swiftly and comprehensively.

The aforementioned Las Cristinas captures these challenges, in the process underscoring why champions of cohabitation must take stock of the – at times, sweeping – changes in ownership structure within mining companies, and reflect critically on how this can reshape ASM strategies at individual sites. Since Placer Dome acquired rights to mine at Las Cristinas in 1991, the project has changed ownership several times. It began when the former Canadian company, through its subsidiary Placer Dome de Venezuela and the Venezuelan government entity (Mineria las Cristinas or MINCA), entered into a “joint venture” of 70-30 percent. After the gold price had plummeted to US$275/oz in 1999, Placer Dome sold its share in rather controversial fashion to Vanessa Ventures Ltd., a Vancouver-based mineral exploration company. The Government of Venezuela refused to recognize this transaction, however, and proceeded to award another Canadian Junior, Crystallex, exploration rights to the site in 2002 only to later seize control of the project in 2008, when it was decided that the company’s environmental permits were subpar. Today, the Government of Venezuela is working with the Rusoro, a Russian company, and the China Railway Resources Group to develop the mine.11

These changes in ownership have had a major impact on the artisanal miners operating at Las Cristinas. In 2005, artisanal miners were allegedly forcibly removed from the concession by Crystallex security, which labelled them “invaders,” and had their equipment seized.12 There were rumours that the abrupt decision made by the government to deny Crystallex an environmental permit in 2008 and ultimately, to seize control of the project, was based heavily on the view of then-president Hugo Chavez that the needs of small-scale miners needed to be addressed more humanely.13 But since the passing of Chavez and the arrival of the China Railway Resources Group, the future of small-scale mining could not be more uncertain. If, at any point, the terms of the original “agreement” for small-scale miners, which only came to fruition following protests, violent demonstrations and extensive negotiations, needed to be revisited, it is unclear how this would happen. Again, this was a policy implemented in the 1990s by the-then owner of the property, Placer Dome, itself acquired by Barrick Gold in 2006.14 Moreover, while the management of the China Railway Resources Group is unlikely to restore the original Placer Dome agreement, the Government of Venezuela may once again sympathize with local small-scale miners because it has been ordered by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes to pay now-bankrupt Crystallex US$1.38 billion in compensation.15

The impact a change in ownership has on management at the site level is yet another overlooked issue which needs to be highlighted. Specifically, changes in ownership, which spawn new managerial strategies, have undoubtedly put key staff stationed at mines – senior engineers, community relations officers and development practitioners – in compromising positions. As illustrated by a number of the cases in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Geita (Tanzania), Damang (Ghana) and the Loulo Gounkoto complex (Mali), several staff who were instrumental in brokering relations with resident artisanal mine operators under previous owners were retained following an acquisition or merger by the new company but significantly, are now being asked to take markedly different

17

approaches with these individuals and disregard legacy issues. But even in rare instances where management is able to look beyond the gold price and navigate the changes that come with new ownership, as the cases of the Bonikro Gold Mine in Côte d’Ivoire and Gold Ridge Mine in the Solomon Islands capture clearly, there are additional, location-specific elements that make a policy of cohabitation untenable and ungeneralizable.

Table 7: Changing ownership structures of selected gold mines

Mine and Location

Completion Date

Target Buyer Seller Percent Acquired (%)

Announced Transaction Value (US$ million)

Porgera, Papua New Guinea

31/08/15 Barrick (Niugini) Limited

Zijin Mining Group Company Limited

Barrick Gold Corporation

47.50 298

17/08/07 Porgera Barrick Gold Corp Emperor Mines Ltd

20 250

Terminated/Withdrawn

Porgera Mineral Resources Enga Ltd

Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd

5 22.50

15/10/03 Porgera Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd

Oil Search Ltd 20 73.30

27/05/02 AurionGold Ltd Placer Dome Inc Auriongold Ltd 100 78531/12/01 Delta Gold Ltd

(defunct)Gold Fields Ltd Delta Gold Ltd 100 242

08/02/00 Goldfields Kalgoorlie Ltd

Harmony Gold Mining Ltd

Hanson Plc 19.95 26

07/03/97 Placer Pacific Ltd (Placer Dome Inc)

Placer Dome Inc Placer Dome Inc (Placer Dome Inc)

25 NA

23/01/97 Porgera Placer Dome Inc Highlands Gold Ltd

25 250

15/03/93 Porgera Government of Papua New Guinea

Investor Group 25 136

Bogoso-Prestea Mine, Ghana

15/05/01 Bogoso/Prestea

Golden Star Anvil Mining 20 1.20

15/08/99 Bogoso Investor Group IFC 90 13.40Terminated/Withdrawn(15/05/99)

Bogoso Investor Group IFC 90 51

01/01/98 Bogoso/Prestea

IFC Consortium Gencor 90 NA

Terminated/Withdrawn(15/05/97)

Bogoso/Prestea

Eldorado Gold Gencor 81 NA

15/05/91 Bogoso Investor Group Sikaman Gold Resources

14 7

Terminated/Withdrawn(01/01/89)

Bogoso/Prestea

Sikaman Gold Resources

Billiton 11.50 5

Akyem Mine, Ghana

Terminated/Withdrawn(05/02/19)

Newmont Mining Corporation

Barrick Gold Corporation

NA 100 18,651.92

Terminated/ Newmont Barrick Gold Newmont Mining 100 NA

18

Withdrawn(28/04/14)

Mining Corporation

Corporation Corporation

16/02/06 Akyem Newmont Gold Corp Kenbert Mines Ltd

15 NA

Ahafo Mine, Ghana

Terminated/Withdrawn(25/02/19)

Newmont Mining Corporation

Barrick Gold Corporation

NA 100.00 18,651.92

Terminated/Withdrawn(28/04/19)

Newmont Mining Corporation

Barrick Gold Corporation

Newmont Mining Corporation

100.00 NA

22/01/10 Ahafo Franco-Nevada Corp Moydow Mines International Inc

100.00 13.00

27/02/08 Ahafo Newmont Mining Corp

Moydow Mines International Inc

40.00 20.00

01/02/02 Normandy Mining Ltd

Newmont Mining Corp

Investor Group NA 2,173.00

30/05/01 Normandy Mining Ltd

Franco-Nevada Mining Corp.

Normandy Mining Ltd

14.63 NA

15/08/99 Ahafo Normandy Moydow 50.00 NA

Loulo, Mali 01/01/19 Randgold Resources Limited

Barrick Gold Corporation

NA 80.00 6,006.37

15/08/96 Loulo Randgold Resources BHP Minerals 51.00 78.40

Morila, Mali 09/02/17 AngloGold Ashanti Limited

Van Eck Associates Corporation

NA NA NA

18/11/16 AngloGold Ashanti Limited

BlackRock, Inc. NA NA NA

15/11/06 Anglo American plc

China Vision Resources

Private Interest 0.19 806

21/04/06 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd

Market Investors Anglo American Plc

9.30 1,050

15/05/00 Morila AngloGold Ashanti Randgold Resources Ltd

40.00 132

Tarkwa Mine, Ghana

15/04/11 Tarkwa Gold Fields Ltd Iamgold Corp 18.90 NA

02/03/06 Polyus Gold Mining

Market Investors Norilsk Nickel (MMC)

14.22 NA

Terminated/Withdrawn

Iamgold Corp Gold Fields Ltd Iamgold Corp NA 2,100

Terminated/Withdrawn

Wheaton River Minerals Ltd

Iamgold Corp Wheaton River Minerals Ltd

NA 2,217.92

29/03/04 Gold Fields of South Africa

Norilsk Nickel (MMC) Anglo American Plc

20.00 1,160

28/10/02 Repadre Capital Corp

Iamgold Corp Repadre Capital Corp

NA 217

06/12/00 Gold Fields of South Africa

Anglo American Plc Remgro 11.30 159.50

16/05/99 Tarkwa Investor group Cabo Frio Investments

1.40 NA

15/05/99 Tarkwa Cabo Frio Investments

Social Security & Natural Insurance

2.50 NA

19

Trust of Ghana15/02/99 Tarkwa Repadre Capital Corp Investor Group 18.90 14.9015/08/96 Tarkwa Golden Knight

Resources IncCabo Frio Investments

12.50 47

21/10/94 Tarkwa Gold Fields Ghana State Gold Mining 90 226/11/93 Tarkwa Crescent Mining

FinanceGold Fields Ghana 5 NA

Bonikro Mine, Côte d'Ivoire

28/03/18 Bonikro mine Investor group Newcrest Mining Limited

89.89 72

30/08/10 Lihir Gold Ltd. Newcrest Mining Ltd. NA 90.00 8,394.5817/06/08 Equigold NL Lihir Australian

Holdings Pty LimitedEquigold NL 84.00 741.60

Damang Mine, Ghana

15/04/11 Damang Gold Fields Ltd Iamgold Corp 18.90 NA

06/03/06 Gold Fields Ltd Market Investors Polyus Gold Mining

14.22 2,018.59

02/03/06 Polyus Gold Mining

Market Investors Norilsk Nickel (MMC)

14.22 NA

Terminated/Withdrawn

Iamgold Corp Gold Fields Ltd Iamgold Corp NA 2,100

28/10/02 Repadre Capital Corp

Iamgold Corp Repadre Capital Corp

NA 217

15/11/01 Damang Investor Group Ranger Minerals Ltd

90 41.20

01/01/90 Damang Ranger Exploration Sikaman Gold 30 NA01/01/89 Damang Investor group Government of

Ghana90 NA

Goldridge Mine, Solomon Islands

NA AXF Gold Ridge Pty Ltd.

Wanguo International Mining Group Limited

AXF Group Pty Ltd.

77.78 77.78

16/01/18 Wanguo International Mining Group Limited

Undisclosed buyer Investor group 2.48 2.48

Terminated/Withdrawn

Gold Ridge mine Frontier Resources Limited

Goldridge Community (sic) Investment Limited

80 80

06/05/15 Gold Ridge project

Goldridge Community (sic) Investment Limited

St Barbara Limited

100 100

07/09/12 Allied Gold Mining plc

St Barbara Ltd Allied Gold Mining plc

100 100

15/12/09 Australian Solomons Gold Ltd (Allied Gold)

Allied Gold Ltd Australian Solomons Gold Ltd

100 100

16/09/09 Gold Ridge Allied Gold Ltd Australian Solomons Gold Ltd

100 100

17/01/05 Gold Ridge Investor Group American Home Assurance

100 100

20

31/12/01 Delta Gold Ltd (defunct)

Gold Fields Ltd Delta Gold Ltd 100 100

15/05/01 Gold Ridge Unnamed insurer Delta Gold 60 6005/05/00 Ross Mining NL Delta Gold Ltd Ross Mining NL NA NA29/03/95 Saracen Mineral

Holdings LtdRoss Mining NL Saracen Mineral

Holdings LtdNA NA

Las Cristinas, Venezuela

Terminated/Withdrawn

Las Cristinas China Railway Resources Group

Crystallex International Corp

66.60 NA

Terminated/Withdrawn

Las Cristinas Government of Venezuela

Crystallex International Corp

100 NA

Terminated/Withdrawn

Las Cristinas Vanessa Placer Dome 70 NA

15/07/91 Las Cristinas Placer Dome Corp Venezolana de Guayana

70 NA

Bulyanhulu NA Acacia Mining plc

Barrick Gold Corporation

NA 36 286.14

11/03/14 African Barrick Gold Plc

Institutional investors Barrick Gold Corporation

9.50 187.51

01/07/99 Bulyanhulu Barrick Gold Corporation

Sutton Resources Ltd (Barrick Gold)

85 352

15/08/94 Bulyanhulu Sutton Resources Ltd (Barrick Gold)

Government of Tanzania

85 15

Terminated/Withdrawn

Bulyanhulu Placer Dome Government of Tanzania

90 0.50

Source: Data extracted from S&P Global Market Intelligence

4. Two Case Studies: Gold Ridge (Solomon Islands) and Bonriko (Côte d’Ivoire)

Both cases underscore how additional site-specific issues should be considered before managerial decisions concerning ASM are made. In managing relations with local artisanal gold miners, staff at both sites not only have to address exceptionally difficult legacy issues linked to changes in ownership and gold prices but also operate knowing that they are working in fragile post-conflict settings where senior management perceives ASM as a risk. Gold Ridge and Bonriko are further testament to how the ideas put forward by proponents of cohabitation are by no means generalizable, and that any strategy employed by management to engage artisanal miners must be fashioned using the unique site-specific characteristics of the individual mines in question. The analysis that follows draws upon findings from ongoing research at both locations.16

(a) Gold Ridge

The Gold Ridge Project is in a highland area on Guadalcanal, approximately 40 km southeast of Honiara, Solomon Islands (Figure 2). It is the location of a low sulfidation, disseminated epithermal gold/silver deposit. The mining lease for the project is 30 km2, and is currently surrounded by a Special Prospecting License, which covers 130 km2. After several changes in ownership, the new mine operator, Allied Gold, produced its first gold in March 2011.

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Figure 2: Location of the Solomon Islands

In re-developing the mine, Allied Gold considered establishing an Exclusion Zone within the mining lease area (See Figure 3). The idea being considered was a “Live and Let Live” policy for ASM, as “ the people of the Gold ridge area have had previous experience of artisanal mining and are therefore conscious of the value of gold” (Nanua, 2014, p. 78). Management believed that allowing gold panning to take place outside of the exclusion zone but within the mining lease would help to offset the impact of resettling the host community while providing a vacant mining area for the company to operate within. A revised July 2010 census identified 1,895 people living in 23 villages across the mining lease area. The company’s plan was predicated on immigrant artisanal miners agreeing to return to their villages of origin (i.e. away from the lease) and for landowner families to willingly move to, and remain in, one of four resettlement sites. To engineer what was effectively a displacement of the entire resident population, management proposed a two-phase relocation process: Phase 1, which included villages near to the Valehaichichi and Namachamata pits, and a Phase 2 involving the displacement of villages close to the Kuper’s and Dawson’s pit areas.

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Figure 3: The Gold Ridge Mining Concession and the notional “Exclusion Zone”

What the case of Gold Ridge underscores clearly is that certain gold mining companies perceive and identify ASM, particularly activities in and around concessions, as an operational risk and would be unlikely to enter any kind of partnership unless it was absolutely necessary. At Gold Ridge, all community-related initiatives, including partnerships with ASM, are understandably approached by mine management with considerable trepidation, given the recent history of civil violence in the Solomon Islands. During the resettlement exercise, the land acquisition process had not accounted for discord among host landowners over not offering long-term, unlimited land tenure to displaced households; nor did the architects of the deal anticipate the reluctance of families to vacate their customary land without any guarantees. More significantly, the company’s livelihood restoration plan failed to recognize the importance of artisanal mining as a livelihood among displaced households and their intention to return to this activity if not provided with a viable alternative. Without land tenure being granted by the host landowners or the state, displaced households were reluctant to pursue alternative income-earning activities such as gardening on the basis that establishing crops could be interpreted as an exertion of property rights that would almost certainly have brought them into conflict with their hosts. This arrangement effectively increased the demand

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for livelihood support from the company, and when the programs did not deliver, eventually drove relocated families back to ASM.

This idea of “Live and Let Live” was abandoned by Allied Gold due to the environmental and safety concerns linked to escalated ASM activities, and between 2010 and 2012, it commenced the difficult process of displacing villagers across the mining lease area. The appeal of sharing any area within the concession promptly gave way to broader management concerns about cohabitation, a risk amplified by the company’s own lack of geological knowledge of the project area, and the potential impairment such an arrangement could have in the event of future divestment. In mid-September 2012, when St Barbara had finalized its US$540 million purchase of Allied Gold Ltd., and assumed control of the Gold Ridge mine, management continued to commit resources to tackling the illegal mining problem on the lease. With the resettlement program failing to provide the project with undisrupted operational access, the project’s machinery operators and local artisanal miners found themselves working alongside one another in Dawson’s pit, where most of the proven gold reserves are found. In April 2014, following severe storms and flooding, the company announced a suspension of operations, and in the following months, artisanal miners began to occupy key mining areas in vast numbers. Official announcements made little mention of the challenge posed by artisanal mining, and instead emphasized the significant costs associated with managing the environmental fallout of the floods. By August of that year, the company actively sought to extricate itself, by exploring the possibility of transferring the asset to the government. After six months of negotiations, St Barbara publicly announced that the government would not take ownership of the project but would assist the company in transferring the mine to another operator. The mine remained closed to large-scale mining from April 2014. In February 2018, the project was acquired by Wanguo International Mining Group Ltd., the start of yet another unpredictable chapter of large-scale-ASM interactions.

The risk which management commonly associates with ASM applies to cases such as the Gold Ridge Mine. Documents such as Mining Together and Working Together presuppose that gold mining companies would be open to pursuing a policy of cohabitation and can operationalize the recommendations they put forward. The Gold Ridge Mine is a reminder of how, at certain projects, aside from a fluctuating gold price and shifts in ownership, the local political and social context, and perception of ASM would determine heavily management’s pursuit of a cohabitation strategy.

(b) Bonikro

The case of Bonikro gold operation in Central Côte d’Ivoire, approximately 250 km from the country’s commercial capital of Abidjan (Figure 4) and which is located close to the town of Hire and borders several local villages, further reinforces how a senior management’s perception of ASM as a risk is a major barrier to cohabitation. It is further testament to how significant an impediment the large-scale mining “bias” can be for even the most ambitious and proactive mine managers.

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Figure 4: The Bonikro mine in the Côte d’Ivoire

While artisanal and small-scale gold mining activities in the region date back multiple centuries, intensive large-scale exploration work only began around Hire in 2006. Following some promising discoveries, the Australian exploration company, Equigold NL, commenced construction of the Bonikro mine in May 2007. In 2008, Equigold NL was bought by another Australian company, Lihir Gold Ltd., for US$1 billion. It began commercial gold production in October of that year, the company chairman, Nick Girogetta, claiming at the time that “Lihir would bring needed ‘financial muscle’ to develop its Ivory Coast mines.”17 In August 2010, Newcrest acquired the rights to the Bonikro mine, the result of a US$22.3 billion merger with Lihir Gold Ltd. These shifts in ownership, along with the Government of Côte d’Ivoire’s insistence that the Bonikro mine remains buoyant, are

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chiefly responsible for the tenuous relationship between project staff and surrounding communities at present.

Shortly after the merger, production at Bonikro stopped for six months, until May 2011, because of the post-electoral crisis in the country. During this period, however, informal ASM activities continued to mushroom across Côte d’Ivoire, due to the high gold price. This meant that people could fetch seven times what they were able to obtain locally for their gold only a few years prior. 18 In Hire and surrounding localities, the growth of the ASM sector and the hatching of Lihir’s plans to scale up production brought both parties into one another’s space. In the Social and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA), which was part of the pre-feasibility study on the Bonikro project, ASM activities in and around the concession area were identified as a risk to the successful development of the project. The reasons cited were “health and safety risks (mercury poisoning), employee security, immediate health effects on persons using highly toxic chemicals, and environmental impacts on streams and rivers.”19 To manage the increasing interaction between project staff and artisanal miners, therefore, steps were taken by the company following the completion of the SEIA. The first move made was the commissioning of an ASM baseline survey, which established that there were 2,449 people on the concession. Following this, “a sustained communication scheme with artisanal miners through regular public information and consultation” was put in place. According to company officials, the baseline survey uncovered important details which broadened understanding of the ASM picture on the concession.

In 2013, following the approval of the SEIA, Newcrest management wanted to access parts of its permit that were occupied by ASM operators. While the dialogue with these individuals and the mining company broached any loss of income for the community that would result from the cessation of their work, the increased focus of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire to “sanitize” the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector at this time would alter the dynamics of these negotiations entirely. This “sanitization” policy, which was effectively a ban on ASM activity, coincided with the government’s push to bolster large-scale mining and mineral exploration activity. To facilitate this, parliament approved, on 24 March 2014, a new mining code (Decree No. 2014-397, which actioned the code, was issued on 25 June 2014). The code offers a series of generous investment incentives to foreign mining and mineral exploration companies,20 and in anticipation of heightened interests, the government reserved vast tracts of land for activities. These changes to policy seemed to have their desired impact: according to the Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies, by 2016, Côte d’Ivoire was considered to have the most attractive mining investment climate in sub-Saharan Africa and most appealing in the developing world, ahead of even Canadian provinces Ontario and British Columbia, as well as US states such as Wyoming and New Mexico (Jackson and Green, 2017)

The government’s position to “sanitize” would have legitimized the company to forcibly remove ASM operators from its concession, and to brand their activities “illegal.” After a community awareness campaign led by the government, which made clear that ASM would “neither be legal nor tolerated anymore on industrial mining permits,”21 Newcrest started to engage with local traditional landowners in a bid bring under control the activities on its concession. Through multiple consultations with the local chiefs, the company managed to secure the communities’ endorsement of the government’s new position on ASM. This resulted in a non-violent liberation of ASM sites located on the concession ground of the company, and an agreement, brokered by stakeholders, that individuals would not be compensated for any loss of income due to the cessation of activities. Newcrest staff have since managed to progressively secure and rehabilitate the concession using bulldozers and other heavy machinery.

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But as a result of an increasing and uncontrollable number of illegal ASM operators working in and around the open pit of the Bonikro mine (Figure 5), primarily at night, the company adopted a more progressive approach from December 2017 onwards. Strictly focusing on a non-confrontational approach conceived by the Social Performance Department, the company managed to develop a sustainable relationship with the ASM communities on the concession ground, agreeing on a demarcated area where these communities could perform their activity outside of the open pit area, but within the Newcrest concession. This significantly reduced tensions between the company and ASM communities, with the former agreeing to assist ASM communities with formalization through financial and technological training. These dynamics changed drastically, however, following the influx of a new group of ASM operators from another region, who did not conform to the previous agreements made between Newcrest and the already-present community. This fuelled a series of violent confrontations between the company and the new group of miners in 2019, seriously damaging the former’s credibility in building a sustainable relationship with communities on its concession. These dynamics illustrate the extremely fragile environment in which these engagements can take place.

Figure 5: Bonikro mining concession and surrounding townships

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Gold Ridge and Bonriko illustrate how, in addition to fluctuations in the gold price and changes in ownership, there are site-specific characteristics that must be considered before any policy of cohabitation can be considered. In reflecting on the ideas put forward in this paper, the next, and concluding, section argues that a more appropriate strategy, even in settings where there is a large-scale mining “bias,” is autonomous coexistence between the two parties.

5. Concluding Remarks

This paper paints an extremely pessimistic picture of large-scale mining-ASM relations, bringing to light, once again, the question posed by ILO officials two decades ago (ILO, 1999): “Large-scale and small-scale mining: Cooperation or confrontation?” Based on the ideas presented in this paper, and more generally, the developments that have taken place in the two decades since this question was posed, the short answer is neither. It has never been a straightforward case of choosing between cooperation on the one hand, and confrontation on the other. Given the economic impact large-scale gold mining and accompanying mineral exploration has in most developing countries, host

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governments are unlikely to change policies and laws if they suspect that it will compromise their ability to extract revenue freely from this sector. But at the same time, despite being heavily neglected under reform, there is growing acceptance in policymaking and donor circles that ASM has a much more significant impact, economically and developmentally, at the local level. The challenge, therefore, lies in identifying measures that adequately safeguard this sector but which do not interfere with governments’ engagements with large-scale gold mining companies and their ability to extract rents from them.

The starting point must be a change in mind-set, specifically, abandoning thinking about “cohabitation,” which documents such as Mining Together and Working Together are advocating. A less encumbered model is what is referred to here as “autonomous coexistence.” The two sectors are notably different and require separate policy treatment: when taking into account the markets they serve, the types of individuals found working at operations, the mineral deposits they target and the level of technology used, large-scale mining and ASM are as distinct as fishing is from agriculture. The end goal, therefore, should be to avoid creating an interface altogether (Kemp and Owen, 2019), which can be achieved by making geological analysis the centerpiece of mining sector reform. As can be seen with most of the mining sector reform projects implemented in sub-Saharan Africa to date, a significant amount of money has been pledged to identify areas appropriate for ASM activity, with a view toward “blocking out” these lands to prevent them from being included as part of large-scale concessions. World Bank officials must make this exercise more of a priority focus, and coordinate the geological work needed to identify sections containing the alluvial and near-surface hardrock deposits that ASM operators covet but which, at the same time, large-scale operators cannot work profitably, irrespective of the gold price. Even some so-called “marginal deposits,” akin to what has been at the heart of ongoing conflict in the Damang case, should be added to the ASM geology portfolio. These moves would shore up prospects for formalization considerably and reduce the chances of conflict substantially in the medium term. No additional monies would be required to do this; it would just entail reprioritizing the activities carried out under reform and making geological work the primary undertaking.

This leads to a second point, which is the effort – or lack thereof – expended on blocking out areas appropriate for ASM. Several countries, such as DR Congo, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana and Papua New Guinea, have in place legislative provisions to block out “artisanal exploitation zones,” “corridors” or “plots” for ASM (Hilson et al., 2007; Dondeyne et al., 2009; Geenen, 2012; Corbett et al., 2017), and have often done so. The problem, however, is that few of these exercises have been proactive and carried out with any sense of urgency. In some countries, areas have been blocked out but decisions have been made without geological data on-hand, leading to the demarcation of ASM concessions which contain insufficient quantities of gold; in other cases, there have simply been too few areas put aside to absorb swelling ASM populations. In most countries, companies in possession of exploration/prospecting licenses are required to shed a sizable percentage of their leases if renewed. Host governments have tended to wait until the end of the 2-4 year expiration period, and blocked out portions of what has been released for ASM but again, without careful analysis of the geological composition of these lands; in some countries, it takes several years for this stage to be reached because the lands covered by the expired concession are demarcated immediately by the government to other companies.

It is at this stage where policymakers and perhaps donors such as the World Bank must be more proactive: these parties must ensure that areas suitable for ASM are identified with precision and are being blocked out continuously. Even in countries where there is a visible large-scale mining “bias,” in being proactive, host governments can take solace in knowing that having in place the

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structures to formalize and support legalized ASM at an early stage of the reform process makes facilitating the expansion of mineral exploration activity and ultimately, (large-scale) gold production, less problematic and more realizable over the long term. If cases such as Gold Ridge and Bonriko are any indication, companies view any engagement with ASM as a risk, and with competition for foreign investment to explore and extract gold stiffening, it could be in the best interests of host governments to minimize any chance of conflict and disruption to production by taking a more circumspect (“coexistence”) approach.

A geological-led ASM formalization strategy is necessary for “coexistence” to become a reality but for this to happen key institutional changes are required. It begins with decentralizing governance and processes for the sector, which empowers government officials and other local leaders most familiar with the situation on the ground to make key decisions on licenses for ASM operators and who are in the best position to identify and demarcate lands. This would also send a clear message to the management of prospective large-scale mining and mineral exploration companies that ASM formalization is a priority, as well as establishes the institutional bedrock needed to promote the growth of and support both sectors. This decentralization can be carried out in several ways, depending on the context. In countries where traditional leaders are already heavily involved in the day-to-day administration of ASM and where these roles are recognized in national laws, such as Mali and Senegal, one approach would be to implement a strategy which mirrors how designated areas are established and managed in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. As Corbett et al. (2017) explain, here, blocked out areas, referred to locally as “community mining license reserve areas,” are “proposed and managed by local-level authorities Councils of Elders (CoEs) and Village Assemblies (VAs) within their jurisdictions” (p. 396). It is worth noting, however, that while hybrid governance systems generally recognize customary authority over land, there is an inherent tension given that mineral rights almost universally remain vested in the state. In countries where the bureaucracy linked to obtaining a license to mine on a small scale has been reported to be excessive, the Tanzania case provides a valuable source of inspiration. Responding to criticism surrounding the delays with obtaining a Primary Mining License at the headquarters of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals in the country capital of Dar es Salaam, the Mining Act 2010 was amended to allow applications “to be processed at regional zonal offices [of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals]” to expedite decisions (World Bank, 2015, p. 24-25).

Moves to simplify licensing and decentralize decision-making for ASM have the residual effect of facilitating increases in the number of licensed operators and, by extension, making more visible ongoing efforts aimed at formalizing the sector that are often forgotten and/or overshadowed by broader development strategies. If government officials believe these moves to be daunting, as an initial step, they could organize meetings and workshops which feature ministerial representation outside of the typical mine ministries and geological surveys. Involving influential government figures from government units representing gender, youth, local economic development and agriculture, and other key areas of development which ASM intersects, would no doubt stimulate the vibrant discussions needed to facilitate a repackaging of the sector’s formalization challenge in ways that speak to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), targets which will guide all donor strategy until at least the year 2030 (Hilson and Maconachie, 2019). Governments could follow the lead of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which, since hosting its international multi-stakeholder workshop Building Capacity for Environmental Sustainability in Artisanal and Small Scale Mining in Africa United Nations Economic Commission at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, 24–26 May 2017 (UNECA, 2017), has regularly organized meetings and workshops with the aim of advancing debates about the SDGs and ASM and the extractive industries more broadly. These initial conversations are also fundamental in establishing the platform needed to facilitate a

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rebranding of ASM as a livelihoods issue and ensuring its autonomous existence in countries that are working desperately to attract foreign investment. This is particularly important in countries committed to luring the finance needed to expand their mineral exploration and large-scale mining facilities, which leads to the release of vast quantities of land to multinational corporations.

Fluctuations in the gold price, along with the volatility of mine ownership, makes cohabitation an untenable strategy. But making these small yet significant moves would lay the bedrock for a more appropriate strategy of coexistence: because of their marked differences, large-scale mining and ASM warrant separate policy treatment and, due to their unique individual impacts developmentally, each must be allowed to flourish autonomously. With the large-scale mining “bias” being one of the more formidable barriers preventing this vision from materializing, the question becomes: what would persuade host governments to change their position on ASM? Although beyond the scope of this paper, the solution must be economic. If, for example, governments can be convinced that an additional revenue stream could be generated without compromising their ability to secure revenue from multinational companies, they would likely begin to view formalization of ASM as more of priority objective.

As a point of departure, when analyzing further large-scale mining-ASM relations, it is worthwhile consulting the stakeholder salience model, which has become a pillar of analysis on community development in the business and management literature (Agle et al., 1999). According to this model, stakeholders are graded according to their level of importance: using the criteria power, legitimacy and urgency, the “priority” groups fall into the “dominant,” “dangerous,” “dependent” or in the most extreme of cases, “definitive,” categories. When applied in this context, in pursuing a strategy of coexistence which emphasizes attending to the needs of ASM early in the reform process, the sector comes close to falling into the category of “non-stakeholder” for large-scale mining companies. A model of cohabitation or a strategy which fails to account for the temporal dimension of large-scale resource extraction and lifecycles of operations, however, moves ASM or resident pathfinders from the “non-stakeholder” to the more “priority” categories. This approach, in effect, makes ASM more of a stakeholder for incoming companies than it should be. On a more general note, a strategy of coexistence which tends to the needs of ASM operators more proactively is an extractive industries-led blueprint which, for gold-producing countries, has the greatest impact developmentally and economically.

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Endnotes

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1 Throughout this paper “artisanal mining” and “small-scale mining” are used interchangeably.2 “Cohabitation,” as opposed to “coexistence,” is used as the label here for those promoting partnerships between the two mining parties. Unlike the latter, which insinuates tolerance, the former is a label judged here to be more commonly associated with friendship, assistance, selflessness and help.3 In the literature, the broad consensus is that a combination of an acute shortage of land, excessive bureaucracy linked to registration and exorbitant costs with securing licenses has impeded the formalization in the ASM sector (ILO, 1999; Hentschel et al., 2002; Buxton, 2013). 4 What also needs to be made clear is that these documents emerged at a time when the gold price was in the range of US$300/oz. In this economic climate, “cohabitation” was, indeed, a viable strategy because few companies could operate profitably with the gold price being this low. Exercising a policy of tolerance toward encroaching artisanal miners helped many companies hold on to their concessions during periods of depressed gold prices, and avoid the community resistance and backlash that typically accompanies the forcible removal of individuals who have encroached on to their plots to mine. 5 “IFC Provides $45 Million Loan to Gold Mining Project in Guatemala,” https://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext/pressroom/ifcpressroom.nsf/1f70cd9a07d692d685256ee1001cdd37/c005e3c00763f96085256ec30076c1ba?OpenDocument6 “IFC Makes Its First Investment in Dominican Republic Mining Sector through Unigold,” www.newswire.ca/news-releases/ifc-makes-its-first-investment-in-dominican-republic-mining-sector-through-unigold-512489461.html7 “IFC Equity Financing Supports Liberia Gold Mine Through Ebola Crisis,” https://ifcextapps.ifc.org/ifcext%5Cpressroom%5Cifcpressroom.nsf%5C0%5CEFC722AAB1352A2485257DF00056D2248 “Independent State of Papua New Guinea,” www.mra.gov.pg/Portals/2/Publications/MINING_ACT%201992.pdf9 A local label given to informal artisanal mining in Ghana.10 “Mining MA Jumps Five Year High,” www.mining.com/mining-ma-jumps-five-year-high/11 “In Place of Glitters, Lots of Business,” www.nytimes.com/2002/04/05/business/in-place-of-glitter-lots-of-bitterness.html; “Who Owns Las Cristinas Gold?” http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?no=384457&rel_no=112 “Venezuelan Ministry of the Environment Puts Breaks on Gold Mining Permits,” https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3408 13 “Venezuelan Ministry of the Environment Puts Breaks on Gold Mining Permits,”14 “Barrick Acquires 81% of Placer Dome and Extends Offer to February 3, 2006,” www.barrick.com/news/news-details/2006/Barrick-Acquires-81-of-Placer-Dome-and-ExtendsOffer-to-February-3-2006/default.aspx15 “World Bank Orders Venezuela to Pay Crystallex $1.4 Billion for Gold Mine,” https://corpwatch.org/article/world-bank-orders-venezuela-pay-crystallex-14-billion-gold-mine16 The cases draw upon ongoing research being carried out by the authors. At the Goldridge mine (Solomon Islands), John Owen was engaged as a resettlement specialist as part of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) environmental and social auditing programme. The project covered the company’s identification and acquisition of resettlement sites, the construction of housing and other amenity, and the roll out of the food security and agricultural extension programs. Over a period of three years (2010-2012), a total of six fieldwork visits were undertaken, each involving extensive consultation with company employees, World Bank and IFC personnel, senior government representatives, and representatives from village-based meetings across the entire project area, both prior to and following the re-development of the mine. The analysis of the Bonikro mine (Côte d’Ivoire) draws upon findings from ongoing research led by Titus Sauerwein. This work, which commenced in 2017, explores the challenges of formalizing ASM in Côte d’Ivoire. It also investigates the nature of the interactions between the sector’s operators and large-scale miners, with special focus on developments at the Bonikro site. Preliminary findings from this research are reported in Sauerwein (2019). 17 “Gold miner Lihir agrees to buy Equigold for $1billion,” www.reuters.com/article/us-equigold-lihir/gold-miner-lihir-agrees-to-buy-equigold-for-1billion-idUSSYD2853882008032018 PROGRAMME NATIONAL DE RATIONALISATION DE L’ORPAILLAGE EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE. PowerPoint Presentation during the ASM West Africa Workshop by the MIM on 2 March 2017, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.19 “Sustainability Report 2014, Newcrest Mining Limited,” http://www.newcrest.com.au/media/sustainability_reports/newcrest_sustain_2014_72dpi_web.pdf 20 Key moves included the removal of the additional profit tax (“taxe sur le profit additionnel”), which was payable by permit holders at 7% of their turnover; less transport and refinery costs; and an exploration permit now being issued for an initial period of four years, as opposed to the previous three years. 21 “Sustainability Report 2014, Newcrest Mining Limited.”