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Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamics January 2017 – p. 1

Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

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Page 1: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Advanced Fixed Point Theory

Andrew McLennanUniversity of Queensland

Equilibria in Games:Existence, Selection, and Dynamics

January 2017

– p. 1

Page 2: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Advanced Fixed Point Theory

1. Existence and Algorithms

– p. 2

Page 3: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

IntroductionWhy should we study fixed point theory?

Page 4: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

IntroductionWhy should we study fixed point theory?

• The main equilibrium existence theorems (Nashand general equilibrium) are equivalent toBrouwer’s fixed point theorem.

Page 5: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

IntroductionWhy should we study fixed point theory?

• The main equilibrium existence theorems (Nashand general equilibrium) are equivalent toBrouwer’s fixed point theorem.• That is, economic theoryis fixed point theory.

Page 6: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

IntroductionWhy should we study fixed point theory?

• The main equilibrium existence theorems (Nashand general equilibrium) are equivalent toBrouwer’s fixed point theorem.• That is, economic theoryis fixed point theory.

• Refinements of Nash equilibrium are oftendefined in terms of fixed points of perturbationsof the best response correspondence.

Page 7: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

IntroductionWhy should we study fixed point theory?

• The main equilibrium existence theorems (Nashand general equilibrium) are equivalent toBrouwer’s fixed point theorem.• That is, economic theoryis fixed point theory.

• Refinements of Nash equilibrium are oftendefined in terms of fixed points of perturbationsof the best response correspondence.

• The mathematical concepts and tools used tostudy fixed points are useful throughouteconomics.

Page 8: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

IntroductionWhy should we study fixed point theory?

• The main equilibrium existence theorems (Nashand general equilibrium) are equivalent toBrouwer’s fixed point theorem.• That is, economic theoryis fixed point theory.

• Refinements of Nash equilibrium are oftendefined in terms of fixed points of perturbationsof the best response correspondence.

• The mathematical concepts and tools used tostudy fixed points are useful throughouteconomics.• We will emphasize mathematical concepts

and key results, with key ideas of proofs.

Page 9: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics

Page 10: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.

Page 11: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.• Degree, fixed point index, and vector field index

for smooth functions (regular case) in Euclideancontext.

Page 12: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.• Degree, fixed point index, and vector field index

for smooth functions (regular case) in Euclideancontext.

• Sard’s theorem, and extensions of index-degree tocontinuous functions.

Page 13: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.• Degree, fixed point index, and vector field index

for smooth functions (regular case) in Euclideancontext.

• Sard’s theorem, and extensions of index-degree tocontinuous functions.

• Absolute neighborhood retracts.

Page 14: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.• Degree, fixed point index, and vector field index

for smooth functions (regular case) in Euclideancontext.

• Sard’s theorem, and extensions of index-degree tocontinuous functions.

• Absolute neighborhood retracts.• Approximation of contractible valued

correspondences by functions.

Page 15: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.• Degree, fixed point index, and vector field index

for smooth functions (regular case) in Euclideancontext.

• Sard’s theorem, and extensions of index-degree tocontinuous functions.

• Absolute neighborhood retracts.• Approximation of contractible valued

correspondences by functions.• Conditional systems and sequential equilibrium.

Page 16: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Main Topics• Brouwer and Kakutani via imitation games.• Degree, fixed point index, and vector field index

for smooth functions (regular case) in Euclideancontext.

• Sard’s theorem, and extensions of index-degree tocontinuous functions.

• Absolute neighborhood retracts.• Approximation of contractible valued

correspondences by functions.• Conditional systems and sequential equilibrium.• Dynamic stability and relation to index.

Page 17: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopes• A polytopeis the convex hull of finitely many

points in some Euclidean space.

b

b

b

b

b

Page 18: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopes• A polytopeis the convex hull of finitely many

points in some Euclidean space.

b

b

b

b

b

Page 19: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopes• A polytopeis the convex hull of finitely many

points in some Euclidean space.

b

b

b

b

b

• Exercise:A polytope is the intersection of finitelymany half spaces. An intersection of finitelymany half spaces is a polytope if it is bounded.

Page 20: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Faces of a Polytope• Thefacesof a polytopeP are∅, P itself, and the

intersections ofP with supporting hyperplanes.

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Page 21: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Faces of a Polytope• Thefacesof a polytopeP are∅, P itself, and the

intersections ofP with supporting hyperplanes.

b

b

b

b

b

Faces

b

Page 22: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Faces of a Polytope• Thefacesof a polytopeP are∅, P itself, and the

intersections ofP with supporting hyperplanes.

b

b

b

b

b

Faces

b

• A face isproper if it is not P itself.

Page 23: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Affine Independence• An affine combinationof pointsp0, . . . , pi is a

sumα0p0 + · · ·+ αipi whereα0, . . . , αi are realnumbers withα0 + · · ·+ αi = 1.

Page 24: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Affine Independence• An affine combinationof pointsp0, . . . , pi is a

sumα0p0 + · · ·+ αipi whereα0, . . . , αi are realnumbers withα0 + · · ·+ αi = 1.

• We say thatp0, . . . , pi areaffinely independentifit is not possible to write one of them as an affinecombination of the others. (Equivalently,p1 − p0, . . . , pi − p0 are linearly independent.)

Page 25: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Affine Independence• An affine combinationof pointsp0, . . . , pi is a

sumα0p0 + · · ·+ αipi whereα0, . . . , αi are realnumbers withα0 + · · ·+ αi = 1.

• We say thatp0, . . . , pi areaffinely independentifit is not possible to write one of them as an affinecombination of the others. (Equivalently,p1 − p0, . . . , pi − p0 are linearly independent.)• A simplexis the convex hull of an affinely

independent collection of points.

Page 26: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Affine Independence• An affine combinationof pointsp0, . . . , pi is a

sumα0p0 + · · ·+ αipi whereα0, . . . , αi are realnumbers withα0 + · · ·+ αi = 1.

• We say thatp0, . . . , pi areaffinely independentifit is not possible to write one of them as an affinecombination of the others. (Equivalently,p1 − p0, . . . , pi − p0 are linearly independent.)• A simplexis the convex hull of an affinely

independent collection of points.• Thedimensionof a polytope is the maximald

such that the polytope has elementsp0, . . . , pdthat are affinely independent.

Page 27: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

Page 28: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

• avertexif it is zero dimensional.

Page 29: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

• avertexif it is zero dimensional.• Formally a vertex is a set containing a single

point, but usually we regard it as the pointitself.

Page 30: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

• avertexif it is zero dimensional.• Formally a vertex is a set containing a single

point, but usually we regard it as the pointitself.

• Exercise:An extreme pointof P is a point inP that is not a convex combination of otherelements ofP . Prove that the vertices ofPare its extreme points.

Page 31: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

• avertexif it is zero dimensional.• Formally a vertex is a set containing a single

point, but usually we regard it as the pointitself.

• Exercise:An extreme pointof P is a point inP that is not a convex combination of otherelements ofP . Prove that the vertices ofPare its extreme points.

• anedgeif it is one dimensional.

Page 32: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

• avertexif it is zero dimensional.• Formally a vertex is a set containing a single

point, but usually we regard it as the pointitself.

• Exercise:An extreme pointof P is a point inP that is not a convex combination of otherelements ofP . Prove that the vertices ofPare its extreme points.

• anedgeif it is one dimensional.• a facetif it is a maximal proper face.

Page 33: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Types of FacesA face of a polytopeP is:

• avertexif it is zero dimensional.• Formally a vertex is a set containing a single

point, but usually we regard it as the pointitself.

• Exercise:An extreme pointof P is a point inP that is not a convex combination of otherelements ofP . Prove that the vertices ofPare its extreme points.

• anedgeif it is one dimensional.• a facetif it is a maximal proper face.

• The interior of P is the set of points that arenot in any facet.

Page 34: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

Page 35: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

• any face (including∅) of an element ofT isan element ofT ;

Page 36: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

• any face (including∅) of an element ofT isan element ofT ;

• the intersection of any two elements ofT is a(possibly empty) common face.

Page 37: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

• any face (including∅) of an element ofT isan element ofT ;

• the intersection of any two elements ofT is a(possibly empty) common face.

• Thespaceof T is|T | =⋃

P∈T P .

Page 38: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

• any face (including∅) of an element ofT isan element ofT ;

• the intersection of any two elements ofT is a(possibly empty) common face.

• Thespaceof T is|T | =⋃

P∈T P .

• Thedimensionof T is dim T = maxP∈T dimP .

Page 39: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

• any face (including∅) of an element ofT isan element ofT ;

• the intersection of any two elements ofT is a(possibly empty) common face.

• Thespaceof T is|T | =⋃

P∈T P .

• Thedimensionof T is dim T = maxP∈T dimP .• Ti is the set ofi-dimensional elements ofT .

Page 40: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Polytopal Complexes• A (finite) polytopal complexis a finite collectionT of polytopes such that:

• any face (including∅) of an element ofT isan element ofT ;

• the intersection of any two elements ofT is a(possibly empty) common face.

• Thespaceof T is|T | =⋃

P∈T P .

• Thedimensionof T is dim T = maxP∈T dimP .• Ti is the set ofi-dimensional elements ofT .• If all of its elements are simplices, thenT is a

simplicial complex.

Page 41: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Barycentric Subdivision

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b

b b

b

b

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bb

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b

Page 42: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Barycentric Subdivision

b

b

b

b

b

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b

bb

b b

b

b

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b

bb

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b

Page 43: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Barycentric Subdivision

b

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bb

b b

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vP1

vP2

vP3

Page 44: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Barycentric Subdivision

b

b

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b

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bb

b b

b

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bb

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vP1

vP2

vP3

• For eachP ∈ T \ {∅} choosevP ∈ int P .

Page 45: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Barycentric Subdivision

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vP1

vP2

vP3

• For eachP ∈ T \ {∅} choosevP ∈ int P .• Let T ′ = {∅} ∪ { conv{vP1

, . . . , vPk} :

P1, . . . , Pk ∈ T \ {∅}, P1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Pk }.

Page 46: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Exercise:Prove thatT ′ is a simplicial complexand|T ′| = |T |.

Page 47: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Exercise:Prove thatT ′ is a simplicial complexand|T ′| = |T |.

• Let diam(P ) = maxx,y∈P ‖x− y‖.

Page 48: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Exercise:Prove thatT ′ is a simplicial complexand|T ′| = |T |.

• Let diam(P ) = maxx,y∈P ‖x− y‖.

• Letmesh(T ) = maxP∈T diam(P ).

Page 49: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Exercise:Prove thatT ′ is a simplicial complexand|T ′| = |T |.

• Let diam(P ) = maxx,y∈P ‖x− y‖.

• Letmesh(T ) = maxP∈T diam(P ).• Thebarycenterof the simplexconv{v1, . . . , vk}

is the point1k(v1 + · · ·+ vk).

Page 50: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Exercise:Prove thatT ′ is a simplicial complexand|T ′| = |T |.

• Let diam(P ) = maxx,y∈P ‖x− y‖.

• Letmesh(T ) = maxP∈T diam(P ).• Thebarycenterof the simplexconv{v1, . . . , vk}

is the point1k(v1 + · · ·+ vk).

• If T is a simplicial complex and eachvP is thebarycenter ofP , thenT ′ is thebarycentricsubdivisionof T .

Page 51: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Exercise:Prove thatT ′ is a simplicial complexand|T ′| = |T |.

• Let diam(P ) = maxx,y∈P ‖x− y‖.

• Letmesh(T ) = maxP∈T diam(P ).• Thebarycenterof the simplexconv{v1, . . . , vk}

is the point1k(v1 + · · ·+ vk).

• If T is a simplicial complex and eachvP is thebarycenter ofP , thenT ′ is thebarycentricsubdivisionof T .• Ugly Calculation:In this case

mesh(T ′)

mesh(T )≤

dim T

dim T + 1.

Page 52: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.

Page 53: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.• Let∆ = conv({e1, . . . , ed}).

Page 54: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.• Let∆ = conv({e1, . . . , ed}).• Let T be a simplicial complex with|T | = ∆.

Page 55: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.• Let∆ = conv({e1, . . . , ed}).• Let T be a simplicial complex with|T | = ∆.

• We say thatT is atriangulationof ∆.

Page 56: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.• Let∆ = conv({e1, . . . , ed}).• Let T be a simplicial complex with|T | = ∆.

• We say thatT is atriangulationof ∆.• A Sperner labelingfor T is a functionℓ : T0 → {1, . . . , d} with vℓ(v) > 0 for all v.

Page 57: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.• Let∆ = conv({e1, . . . , ed}).• Let T be a simplicial complex with|T | = ∆.

• We say thatT is atriangulationof ∆.• A Sperner labelingfor T is a functionℓ : T0 → {1, . . . , d} with vℓ(v) > 0 for all v.

• A completely labelledsimplex forT andℓ is aconv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 such that{ℓ(v1), . . . , ℓ(vd)} = {1, . . . , d}.

Page 58: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma• Let e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , ed = (0, . . . , 0, 1) be

the standard unit basis ofRd.• Let∆ = conv({e1, . . . , ed}).• Let T be a simplicial complex with|T | = ∆.

• We say thatT is atriangulationof ∆.• A Sperner labelingfor T is a functionℓ : T0 → {1, . . . , d} with vℓ(v) > 0 for all v.

• A completely labelledsimplex forT andℓ is aconv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 such that{ℓ(v1), . . . , ℓ(vd)} = {1, . . . , d}.

Sperner’s Lemma:A Sperner labelling of a simplicialsubdivision of∆ has a completely labelled simplex.

Page 59: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma Illustrated

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Page 60: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma Illustrated

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Page 61: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma Illustrated

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Page 62: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sperner’s Lemma Illustrated

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Page 63: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

BFPT: First ProofBrouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem:For any continuousf : ∆ → ∆ there is anx∗ ∈ ∆ such thatf(x∗) = x∗.

Page 64: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

BFPT: First ProofBrouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem:For any continuousf : ∆ → ∆ there is anx∗ ∈ ∆ such thatf(x∗) = x∗.To prove this take a sequence{T r} of triangulationsof ∆ with mesh(T r) → 0.

Page 65: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

BFPT: First ProofBrouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem:For any continuousf : ∆ → ∆ there is anx∗ ∈ ∆ such thatf(x∗) = x∗.To prove this take a sequence{T r} of triangulationsof ∆ with mesh(T r) → 0.

• For eachr:

Page 66: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

BFPT: First ProofBrouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem:For any continuousf : ∆ → ∆ there is anx∗ ∈ ∆ such thatf(x∗) = x∗.To prove this take a sequence{T r} of triangulationsof ∆ with mesh(T r) → 0.

• For eachr:• Forv ∈ T r

0 let ℓr(v) = min{ i : vi > fi(v) }.

Page 67: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

BFPT: First ProofBrouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem:For any continuousf : ∆ → ∆ there is anx∗ ∈ ∆ such thatf(x∗) = x∗.To prove this take a sequence{T r} of triangulationsof ∆ with mesh(T r) → 0.

• For eachr:• Forv ∈ T r

0 let ℓr(v) = min{ i : vi > fi(v) }.• Chooseconv({vr1, . . . , v

rd}) ∈ T r

d−1 such thatℓr(vr1) = 1, . . . , ℓr(vrd) = d.

Page 68: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

BFPT: First ProofBrouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem:For any continuousf : ∆ → ∆ there is anx∗ ∈ ∆ such thatf(x∗) = x∗.To prove this take a sequence{T r} of triangulationsof ∆ with mesh(T r) → 0.

• For eachr:• Forv ∈ T r

0 let ℓr(v) = min{ i : vi > fi(v) }.• Chooseconv({vr1, . . . , v

rd}) ∈ T r

d−1 such thatℓr(vr1) = 1, . . . , ℓr(vrd) = d.

• Pass to a convergent subsequence, so thatvri → x∗ for some (hence all)i, sox∗i ≥ fi(x

∗) forall i, but

i x∗i =

i fi(x∗) = 1.

Page 69: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proving Sperner’s LemmaFollowing McLennan and Tourky (2008) observe thatthe sum of the volumes of the elements ofTd−1 is thevolume of∆.

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Page 70: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proving Sperner’s LemmaFollowing McLennan and Tourky (2008) observe thatthe sum of the volumes of the elements ofTd−1 is thevolume of∆.

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e1 e2

e3

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3

Page 71: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

This remains the case if we perturb eachv ∈ T0 in thedirection ofeℓ(v).

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Page 72: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

This remains the case if we perturb eachv ∈ T0 in thedirection ofeℓ(v).

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Page 73: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Forv ∈ T0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let v(t)=(1− t)v+teℓ(v).

Page 74: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Forv ∈ T0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let v(t)=(1− t)v+teℓ(v).

• ForP = conv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 let

qP (t) = det(v2(t)− v1(t), . . . , vd(t)− v1(t)).

Page 75: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Forv ∈ T0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let v(t)=(1− t)v+teℓ(v).

• ForP = conv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 let

qP (t) = det(v2(t)− v1(t), . . . , vd(t)− v1(t)).

• qP (1) = 0 if P is not completely labelled.

Page 76: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Forv ∈ T0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let v(t)=(1− t)v+teℓ(v).

• ForP = conv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 let

qP (t) = det(v2(t)− v1(t), . . . , vd(t)− v1(t)).

• qP (1) = 0 if P is not completely labelled.

• LetQ(t) =∑

P∈Td−1qP (t).

Page 77: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Forv ∈ T0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let v(t)=(1− t)v+teℓ(v).

• ForP = conv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 let

qP (t) = det(v2(t)− v1(t), . . . , vd(t)− v1(t)).

• qP (1) = 0 if P is not completely labelled.

• LetQ(t) =∑

P∈Td−1qP (t).

• Q is a polynomial function oft that is± det(e2− e1, . . . , ed− e1) in a neighborhoodof zero, so it has this value everywhere.

Page 78: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Forv ∈ T0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, let v(t)=(1− t)v+teℓ(v).

• ForP = conv({v1, . . . , vd}) ∈ Td−1 let

qP (t) = det(v2(t)− v1(t), . . . , vd(t)− v1(t)).

• qP (1) = 0 if P is not completely labelled.

• LetQ(t) =∑

P∈Td−1qP (t).

• Q is a polynomial function oft that is± det(e2− e1, . . . , ed− e1) in a neighborhoodof zero, so it has this value everywhere.

Thus∑

P∈Td−1qP (1) = Q(1) 6= 0.

Page 79: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 80: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 81: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 82: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 83: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 84: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 85: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 86: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 87: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 88: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 89: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 90: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 91: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 92: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 93: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 94: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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Page 95: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Scarf PathThere is a proof of Sperner’s lemma that provides analgorithm for computing a completely labelledsimplex.

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1

Page 96: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Imitation Game MethodWe now study a different method of proving fixedpoint theorems, and computing fixed points, due toMcLennan and Tourky.

Page 97: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Imitation Game MethodWe now study a different method of proving fixedpoint theorems, and computing fixed points, due toMcLennan and Tourky.

• LetC ⊂ Rd be a nonempty compact convex set.

Page 98: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Imitation Game MethodWe now study a different method of proving fixedpoint theorems, and computing fixed points, due toMcLennan and Tourky.

• LetC ⊂ Rd be a nonempty compact convex set.

• Let F : C → C be an upper semicontinuousconvex valued (usccv) correspondence. That is,for eachx ∈ C:

Page 99: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Imitation Game MethodWe now study a different method of proving fixedpoint theorems, and computing fixed points, due toMcLennan and Tourky.

• LetC ⊂ Rd be a nonempty compact convex set.

• Let F : C → C be an upper semicontinuousconvex valued (usccv) correspondence. That is,for eachx ∈ C:• F (x) ⊂ C is nonempty, compact, and convex;

Page 100: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Imitation Game MethodWe now study a different method of proving fixedpoint theorems, and computing fixed points, due toMcLennan and Tourky.

• LetC ⊂ Rd be a nonempty compact convex set.

• Let F : C → C be an upper semicontinuousconvex valued (usccv) correspondence. That is,for eachx ∈ C:• F (x) ⊂ C is nonempty, compact, and convex;• for everyε > 0 there is aδ > 0 such thatF (x′) ⊂ Bε(F (x)) for all x′ ∈ Bδ(x).

Page 101: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Imitation Game MethodWe now study a different method of proving fixedpoint theorems, and computing fixed points, due toMcLennan and Tourky.

• LetC ⊂ Rd be a nonempty compact convex set.

• Let F : C → C be an upper semicontinuousconvex valued (usccv) correspondence. That is,for eachx ∈ C:• F (x) ⊂ C is nonempty, compact, and convex;• for everyε > 0 there is aδ > 0 such thatF (x′) ⊂ Bε(F (x)) for all x′ ∈ Bδ(x).

Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem:F has a fixedpoint: x∗ ∈ F (x∗) for somex∗ ∈ C.

Page 102: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

Page 103: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

• u(x, y) = −minz∈F (y) ‖x− z‖2.

Page 104: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

• u(x, y) = −minz∈F (y) ‖x− z‖2.

• v(x, y) = δxy. (Kroneckerδ)

Page 105: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

• u(x, y) = −minz∈F (y) ‖x− z‖2.

• v(x, y) = δxy. (Kroneckerδ)

Fixed points off are in 1-1 correspondence with thepure Nash equilibria of this game:

Page 106: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

• u(x, y) = −minz∈F (y) ‖x− z‖2.

• v(x, y) = δxy. (Kroneckerδ)

Fixed points off are in 1-1 correspondence with thepure Nash equilibria of this game:

• If f(x∗) = x∗, then(x∗, x∗) is Nash.

Page 107: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

• u(x, y) = −minz∈F (y) ‖x− z‖2.

• v(x, y) = δxy. (Kroneckerδ)

Fixed points off are in 1-1 correspondence with thepure Nash equilibria of this game:

• If f(x∗) = x∗, then(x∗, x∗) is Nash.• If (x∗, y∗) is Nash, thenx∗ ∈ F (y∗) andy∗ = x∗.

Page 108: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Intuitive MotivationConsider a two person game in which for each playerthe set of pure strategies isC, and the payoffs are:

• u(x, y) = −minz∈F (y) ‖x− z‖2.

• v(x, y) = δxy. (Kroneckerδ)

Fixed points off are in 1-1 correspondence with thepure Nash equilibria of this game:

• If f(x∗) = x∗, then(x∗, x∗) is Nash.• If (x∗, y∗) is Nash, thenx∗ ∈ F (y∗) andy∗ = x∗.

We study a similar game in which the commonstrategy set is a finite subset ofC.

Page 109: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Two Player GamesA two player gameis a pair(A,B) in which, forgiven positive integersm andn, A andB arem× npayoff matriceswith real entries.

Page 110: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Two Player GamesA two player gameis a pair(A,B) in which, forgiven positive integersm andn, A andB arem× npayoff matriceswith real entries.

• Let∆k−1 = { ρ ∈ Rk+ :

i ρi = 1 } be the(k − 1)-dimensional simplex.

Page 111: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Two Player GamesA two player gameis a pair(A,B) in which, forgiven positive integersm andn, A andB arem× npayoff matriceswith real entries.

• Let∆k−1 = { ρ ∈ Rk+ :

i ρi = 1 } be the(k − 1)-dimensional simplex.

• A mixed Nash equilibriumof (A,B) is a pair(σ, τ) ∈ ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 such that:

Page 112: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Two Player GamesA two player gameis a pair(A,B) in which, forgiven positive integersm andn, A andB arem× npayoff matriceswith real entries.

• Let∆k−1 = { ρ ∈ Rk+ :

i ρi = 1 } be the(k − 1)-dimensional simplex.

• A mixed Nash equilibriumof (A,B) is a pair(σ, τ) ∈ ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 such that:

• σTAτ ≥ σ̃TAτ for all σ̃ ∈ ∆m−1;

Page 113: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Two Player GamesA two player gameis a pair(A,B) in which, forgiven positive integersm andn, A andB arem× npayoff matriceswith real entries.

• Let∆k−1 = { ρ ∈ Rk+ :

i ρi = 1 } be the(k − 1)-dimensional simplex.

• A mixed Nash equilibriumof (A,B) is a pair(σ, τ) ∈ ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 such that:

• σTAτ ≥ σ̃TAτ for all σ̃ ∈ ∆m−1;• σTBτ ≥ σTBτ̃ for all τ̃ ∈ ∆n−1.

Page 114: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Two Player GamesA two player gameis a pair(A,B) in which, forgiven positive integersm andn, A andB arem× npayoff matriceswith real entries.

• Let∆k−1 = { ρ ∈ Rk+ :

i ρi = 1 } be the(k − 1)-dimensional simplex.

• A mixed Nash equilibriumof (A,B) is a pair(σ, τ) ∈ ∆m−1 ×∆n−1 such that:

• σTAτ ≥ σ̃TAτ for all σ̃ ∈ ∆m−1;• σTBτ ≥ σTBτ̃ for all τ̃ ∈ ∆n−1.

The game(A,B) is animitation gameif m = n andBis them×m identity matrix, which we denote byIm.

Page 115: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The ProcedureInitialization: choosex1 ∈ C andy1 ∈ F (x1).

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The ProcedureInitialization: choosex1 ∈ C andy1 ∈ F (x1).

Recursion: ifx1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym ∈ C are given:

Page 117: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The ProcedureInitialization: choosex1 ∈ C andy1 ∈ F (x1).

Recursion: ifx1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym ∈ C are given:

• Let (Am, Im) be the imitation game in which them×m matrixA has entries

aij = −‖xi − yj‖2.

Page 118: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The ProcedureInitialization: choosex1 ∈ C andy1 ∈ F (x1).

Recursion: ifx1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym ∈ C are given:

• Let (Am, Im) be the imitation game in which them×m matrixA has entries

aij = −‖xi − yj‖2.

• Find a Nash equilibrium(σm, τm) of (Am, Im).

Page 119: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The ProcedureInitialization: choosex1 ∈ C andy1 ∈ F (x1).

Recursion: ifx1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym ∈ C are given:

• Let (Am, Im) be the imitation game in which them×m matrixA has entries

aij = −‖xi − yj‖2.

• Find a Nash equilibrium(σm, τm) of (Am, Im).

• Let xm+1 =∑m

j=1 τmj yj. Takeym+1 ∈ F (xm+1).

Page 120: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The ProcedureInitialization: choosex1 ∈ C andy1 ∈ F (x1).

Recursion: ifx1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , ym ∈ C are given:

• Let (Am, Im) be the imitation game in which them×m matrixA has entries

aij = −‖xi − yj‖2.

• Find a Nash equilibrium(σm, τm) of (Am, Im).

• Let xm+1 =∑m

j=1 τmj yj. Takeym+1 ∈ F (xm+1).

We will show that any accumulation pointx∗ of {xm}is a fixed point ofF .

Page 121: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Fix ε > 0. For arbitrarily smallε there isδ > 0such thatF (x) ∈ Bε(F (x

∗)) for all x ∈ B2δ(x∗).

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• Fix ε > 0. For arbitrarily smallε there isδ > 0such thatF (x) ∈ Bε(F (x

∗)) for all x ∈ B2δ(x∗).

• It suffices to show thatx∗ ∈ Bδ+ε(F (x∗)).

Page 123: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Fix ε > 0. For arbitrarily smallε there isδ > 0such thatF (x) ∈ Bε(F (x

∗)) for all x ∈ B2δ(x∗).

• It suffices to show thatx∗ ∈ Bδ+ε(F (x∗)).

• Simply becauseC is compact,

limm→∞

minj=1,...,m

‖xj − xm+1‖ = 0.

Page 124: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Fix ε > 0. For arbitrarily smallε there isδ > 0such thatF (x) ∈ Bε(F (x

∗)) for all x ∈ B2δ(x∗).

• It suffices to show thatx∗ ∈ Bδ+ε(F (x∗)).

• Simply becauseC is compact,

limm→∞

minj=1,...,m

‖xj − xm+1‖ = 0.

• Of courseσmj > 0 wheneverτmj > 0.

Page 125: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Fix ε > 0. For arbitrarily smallε there isδ > 0such thatF (x) ∈ Bε(F (x

∗)) for all x ∈ B2δ(x∗).

• It suffices to show thatx∗ ∈ Bδ+ε(F (x∗)).

• Simply becauseC is compact,

limm→∞

minj=1,...,m

‖xj − xm+1‖ = 0.

• Of courseσmj > 0 wheneverτmj > 0.

• Claim: Wheneverσmi > 0, xi is as close toxm+1

as any otherxh.

Page 126: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Fix ε > 0. For arbitrarily smallε there isδ > 0such thatF (x) ∈ Bε(F (x

∗)) for all x ∈ B2δ(x∗).

• It suffices to show thatx∗ ∈ Bδ+ε(F (x∗)).

• Simply becauseC is compact,

limm→∞

minj=1,...,m

‖xj − xm+1‖ = 0.

• Of courseσmj > 0 wheneverτmj > 0.

• Claim: Wheneverσmi > 0, xi is as close toxm+1

as any otherxh.• Thus{xj : τmj > 0} ⊂ Bδ(xm+1) for all largem.

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• For infinitely manym we havexm+1 ∈ Bδ(x∗).

Page 128: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For infinitely manym we havexm+1 ∈ Bδ(x∗).

• Therefore for somem it is the case that

{xj : τmj > 0} ⊂ Bδ(xm+1) ⊂ B2δ(x

∗).

Page 129: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For infinitely manym we havexm+1 ∈ Bδ(x∗).

• Therefore for somem it is the case that

{xj : τmj > 0} ⊂ Bδ(xm+1) ⊂ B2δ(x

∗).

• For such anm we have

xm+1 =∑

j

τmj yj ∈∑

j

τmj F (xj) ⊂ Bε(F (x∗)).

Page 130: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For infinitely manym we havexm+1 ∈ Bδ(x∗).

• Therefore for somem it is the case that

{xj : τmj > 0} ⊂ Bδ(xm+1) ⊂ B2δ(x

∗).

• For such anm we have

xm+1 =∑

j

τmj yj ∈∑

j

τmj F (xj) ⊂ Bε(F (x∗)).

• Finally x∗ ∈ Bδ(xm+1) ⊂ Bδ+ε(F (x∗)).

Page 131: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proof of the ClaimPlayer1’s expected payoff if she playsi is

u(i, τm) =m∑

j=1

τmj aij = −m∑

j=1

τmj 〈xi − yj, xi − yj〉.

Page 132: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proof of the ClaimPlayer1’s expected payoff if she playsi is

u(i, τm) =m∑

j=1

τmj aij = −m∑

j=1

τmj 〈xi − yj, xi − yj〉.

We expand the inner product after writing

xi − yj = (xi − xm+1) + (xm+1 − yj),

Page 133: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proof of the ClaimPlayer1’s expected payoff if she playsi is

u(i, τm) =m∑

j=1

τmj aij = −m∑

j=1

τmj 〈xi − yj, xi − yj〉.

We expand the inner product after writing

xi − yj = (xi − xm+1) + (xm+1 − yj),

then use∑

j τmj (xm+1 − yj) = 0 to see that

u(i, τm) = −‖xi − xm+1‖2 −

m∑

j=1

τmj ‖xm+1 − yj‖2.

Page 134: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Lemke-Howson AlgorithmA pivoting algorithm that computes a Nashequilibrium of a two person game was given byLemke and Howson (1964).

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The Lemke-Howson AlgorithmA pivoting algorithm that computes a Nashequilibrium of a two person game was given byLemke and Howson (1964).

• Since this proves the existence of an equilibrium,in conjunction with the procedure above is givesa proof of the KFPT.

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The Lemke-Howson AlgorithmA pivoting algorithm that computes a Nashequilibrium of a two person game was given byLemke and Howson (1964).

• Since this proves the existence of an equilibrium,in conjunction with the procedure above is givesa proof of the KFPT.

• Combined with the procedure above, it gives analgorithm for finding anapproximate fixed pointof a continuous functionf : C → C, since acondition for halting such as

‖xm+1 − f(xm+1)‖ < ε

will eventually be satisfied.

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Complexity of 2-NashIs there a polynomial time algorithm for2-Nash,which is the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium ofa two person game?

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Complexity of 2-NashIs there a polynomial time algorithm for2-Nash,which is the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium ofa two person game?

• For several years Papadimitriou promoted thisquestion as (along with factoring) "the mostimportant open problem on the boundary ofP."

Page 139: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Complexity of 2-NashIs there a polynomial time algorithm for2-Nash,which is the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium ofa two person game?

• For several years Papadimitriou promoted thisquestion as (along with factoring) "the mostimportant open problem on the boundary ofP."

• In many senses 2-Nash "looks like" linearprogramming, and the Lemke-Howson algorithmclosely resembles the simplex method.

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Complexity of 2-NashIs there a polynomial time algorithm for2-Nash,which is the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium ofa two person game?

• For several years Papadimitriou promoted thisquestion as (along with factoring) "the mostimportant open problem on the boundary ofP."

• In many senses 2-Nash "looks like" linearprogramming, and the Lemke-Howson algorithmclosely resembles the simplex method.

• Like the simplex method, Lemke-Howson workswell in practice, solving games with dozens orhundreds of strategies.

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However, Chen and Deng (2005) showed that 2-Nashis complete forPPAD.

Page 142: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

However, Chen and Deng (2005) showed that 2-Nashis complete forPPAD.

• They give a polynomial time procedure thatpasses from any fixed point problem described bya Turing machine to a two person game whoseequilibria can be "translated" (in polynomialtime) into solutions of the given problem.

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However, Chen and Deng (2005) showed that 2-Nashis complete forPPAD.

• They give a polynomial time procedure thatpasses from any fixed point problem described bya Turing machine to a two person game whoseequilibria can be "translated" (in polynomialtime) into solutions of the given problem.

• Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis (1989) showthat algorithms for computing an approximatefixed point that obtain all their information aboutthe function from an “oracle” that evaluates ithave exponential worst case running times.

Page 144: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

However, Chen and Deng (2005) showed that 2-Nashis complete forPPAD.

• They give a polynomial time procedure thatpasses from any fixed point problem described bya Turing machine to a two person game whoseequilibria can be "translated" (in polynomialtime) into solutions of the given problem.

• Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis (1989) showthat algorithms for computing an approximatefixed point that obtain all their information aboutthe function from an “oracle” that evaluates ithave exponential worst case running times.

• In view of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that apolynomial time algorithm for 2-Nash exists.

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Advanced Fixed Point Theory

2. The Smooth Degree and Index

– p. 29

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Degree and Index: IntroductionWe now study “the same” mathematical structurefrom three different points of view.

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Degree and Index: IntroductionWe now study “the same” mathematical structurefrom three different points of view.

• The degree counts the number of times a functioncovers a point in the range, whereorientation-reversing coverings count negatively.

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Degree and Index: IntroductionWe now study “the same” mathematical structurefrom three different points of view.

• The degree counts the number of times a functioncovers a point in the range, whereorientation-reversing coverings count negatively.

• The fixed point index counts the number of fixedpoints that are qualitatively like a constantfunction minus the number that are not.

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Degree and Index: IntroductionWe now study “the same” mathematical structurefrom three different points of view.

• The degree counts the number of times a functioncovers a point in the range, whereorientation-reversing coverings count negatively.

• The fixed point index counts the number of fixedpoints that are qualitatively like a constantfunction minus the number that are not.

• The vector field index transports these conceptsto vector fields, which are thought of asdynamical systems.

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Degree and Index: IntroductionWe now study “the same” mathematical structurefrom three different points of view.

• The degree counts the number of times a functioncovers a point in the range, whereorientation-reversing coverings count negatively.

• The fixed point index counts the number of fixedpoints that are qualitatively like a constantfunction minus the number that are not.

• The vector field index transports these conceptsto vector fields, which are thought of asdynamical systems.

We study these first in the best behaved setting.

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OrientationThe notion of orientation expresses intuitivelyfamiliar phenomena. (The world in the mirror isdifferent, a right shoe can’t be turned into a left shoeby rotating it, etc.) Formally it is expressed in termsof equivalence classes of bases.

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OrientationThe notion of orientation expresses intuitivelyfamiliar phenomena. (The world in the mirror isdifferent, a right shoe can’t be turned into a left shoeby rotating it, etc.) Formally it is expressed in termsof equivalence classes of bases.

• LetX be anm-dimensional vector space.

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OrientationThe notion of orientation expresses intuitivelyfamiliar phenomena. (The world in the mirror isdifferent, a right shoe can’t be turned into a left shoeby rotating it, etc.) Formally it is expressed in termsof equivalence classes of bases.

• LetX be anm-dimensional vector space.• Let Fm(X) be the set ofm-frames(ordered

bases)(v1, . . . , vm) of X.

Page 154: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

OrientationThe notion of orientation expresses intuitivelyfamiliar phenomena. (The world in the mirror isdifferent, a right shoe can’t be turned into a left shoeby rotating it, etc.) Formally it is expressed in termsof equivalence classes of bases.

• LetX be anm-dimensional vector space.• Let Fm(X) be the set ofm-frames(ordered

bases)(v1, . . . , vm) of X.• An orientationof X is a connected component ofFm(V ).

Page 155: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

OrientationThe notion of orientation expresses intuitivelyfamiliar phenomena. (The world in the mirror isdifferent, a right shoe can’t be turned into a left shoeby rotating it, etc.) Formally it is expressed in termsof equivalence classes of bases.

• LetX be anm-dimensional vector space.• Let Fm(X) be the set ofm-frames(ordered

bases)(v1, . . . , vm) of X.• An orientationof X is a connected component ofFm(V ).

Proposition:There are exactly two orientations ofX.

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ProofFor any(e1, . . . , em) ∈ Fm(X) the map

A 7→ (∑

j

a1jej, . . . ,∑

j

amjej)

is a linear bijection between the set ofm×mmatricesA = (aij) andXm.

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ProofFor any(e1, . . . , em) ∈ Fm(X) the map

A 7→ (∑

j

a1jej, . . . ,∑

j

amjej)

is a linear bijection between the set ofm×mmatricesA = (aij) andXm.

• There are at least two orientations because therecannot be a continuous path inFm(X) betweenelements ofFm(X) whose correspondingmatrices have determinants of opposite signs.

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To prove that there are at most two orientations:

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To prove that there are at most two orientations:

• If (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X) andi 6= j, then

t 7→ (v1, . . . , vi + tvj, . . . , vm)

is a map fromR to Fm(X).

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To prove that there are at most two orientations:

• If (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X) andi 6= j, then

t 7→ (v1, . . . , vi + tvj, . . . , vm)

is a map fromR to Fm(X).• Combining such paths, we can go from anym-frame to(

j b1jej, . . . ,∑

j bmjej) withbij 6= 0 for all i andj.

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To prove that there are at most two orientations:

• If (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X) andi 6= j, then

t 7→ (v1, . . . , vi + tvj, . . . , vm)

is a map fromR to Fm(X).• Combining such paths, we can go from anym-frame to(

j b1jej, . . . ,∑

j bmjej) withbij 6= 0 for all i andj.

• Continuing from this point, such paths can becombined to eliminate all off diagonalcoefficients, arriving at an ordered basis of theform (c1e1, . . . , cmem).

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• From here we can continuously rescale thecoefficients, arriving at(d1e1, . . . , dmem) withdi = ±1 for all i.

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• From here we can continuously rescale thecoefficients, arriving at(d1e1, . . . , dmem) withdi = ±1 for all i.

• Starting at any(v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X), for anyi = 1, . . . ,m− 1 there is a path

θ 7→ (. . . , cos θvi+sin θvi+1, cos θvi+1−sin θvi, . . .)

that goes to(v1, . . . ,−vi,−vi+1, . . . , vm).

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• From here we can continuously rescale thecoefficients, arriving at(d1e1, . . . , dmem) withdi = ±1 for all i.

• Starting at any(v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X), for anyi = 1, . . . ,m− 1 there is a path

θ 7→ (. . . , cos θvi+sin θvi+1, cos θvi+1−sin θvi, . . .)

that goes to(v1, . . . ,−vi,−vi+1, . . . , vm).• Thus there is a path inFm(X) from anym-frame

to either(e1, . . . , em) or (−e1, e2, . . . , em).

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Regular Points and ValuesLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces, letU ⊂ X be open, and letf : U → Y be aC1 function.

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Regular Points and ValuesLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces, letU ⊂ X be open, and letf : U → Y be aC1 function.

• The derivative off atx (which is a linearfunction fromX to Y ) is denoted byDf(x).

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Regular Points and ValuesLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces, letU ⊂ X be open, and letf : U → Y be aC1 function.

• The derivative off atx (which is a linearfunction fromX to Y ) is denoted byDf(x).

For anyS ⊂ X, a functionf : S → Y isC1 (bydefinition) if it has aC1 extension to an open supersetof S.

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Regular Points and ValuesLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces, letU ⊂ X be open, and letf : U → Y be aC1 function.

• The derivative off atx (which is a linearfunction fromX to Y ) is denoted byDf(x).

For anyS ⊂ X, a functionf : S → Y isC1 (bydefinition) if it has aC1 extension to an open supersetof S.

• x ∈ S is aregular pointof f if Df(x) is welldefined (the same for everyC1 extension) andsurjective. Otherwisex is acritical point of f .

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Regular Points and ValuesLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces, letU ⊂ X be open, and letf : U → Y be aC1 function.

• The derivative off atx (which is a linearfunction fromX to Y ) is denoted byDf(x).

For anyS ⊂ X, a functionf : S → Y isC1 (bydefinition) if it has aC1 extension to an open supersetof S.

• x ∈ S is aregular pointof f if Df(x) is welldefined (the same for everyC1 extension) andsurjective. Otherwisex is acritical point of f .

• y ∈ Y is acritical valueof f if f−1(y) contains acritical value. Otherwisey is aregular valueof f .

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Oriented Vector SpacesAn oriented vector spaceis a vector spaceX with aspecified orientation.

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Oriented Vector SpacesAn oriented vector spaceis a vector spaceX with aspecified orientation.

• We say that(v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X) is positivelyorientedif it is an element of the specifiedorientation, and otherwise it isnegativelyoriented.

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Oriented Vector SpacesAn oriented vector spaceis a vector spaceX with aspecified orientation.

• We say that(v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X) is positivelyorientedif it is an element of the specifiedorientation, and otherwise it isnegativelyoriented.

Now letX andY be orientedm-dimensional vectorspaces.

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Oriented Vector SpacesAn oriented vector spaceis a vector spaceX with aspecified orientation.

• We say that(v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Fm(X) is positivelyorientedif it is an element of the specifiedorientation, and otherwise it isnegativelyoriented.

Now letX andY be orientedm-dimensional vectorspaces.

• If S ⊂ X, f : S → Y isC1, andx is a regularpoint off , thenf is orientation preserving(orientation reversing) atx if Df(x) mapspositively orientedm-frames ofX to positively(negatively) orientedm-frames ofY .

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Smooth DegreeForC ⊂ X let ∂C = C ∩X \ C. A C∞ f : C → Yis smoothly degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

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Smooth DegreeForC ⊂ X let ∂C = C ∩X \ C. A C∞ f : C → Yis smoothly degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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Smooth DegreeForC ⊂ X let ∂C = C ∩X \ C. A C∞ f : C → Yis smoothly degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value off ;

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Smooth DegreeForC ⊂ X let ∂C = C ∩X \ C. A C∞ f : C → Yis smoothly degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value off ;

• f−1(y) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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Smooth DegreeForC ⊂ X let ∂C = C ∩X \ C. A C∞ f : C → Yis smoothly degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value off ;

• f−1(y) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If f is smoothly degree admissible overy, then thedegreedegy(f) of f overy is the number ofx ∈ f−1(y) at whichf is orientation preserving minusthe number ofx ∈ f−1(y) at whichf is orientationreversing.

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Properties of Smooth DegreeWe will work axiomatically, specifying properties ofthe smooth degree that characterize it.

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Properties of Smooth DegreeWe will work axiomatically, specifying properties ofthe smooth degree that characterize it.

• (Normalization) Iff is smoothly degreeadmissible overy andf−1(y) is a single point atwhichf is orientation preserving, thendegy(f) = 1.

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Properties of Smooth DegreeWe will work axiomatically, specifying properties ofthe smooth degree that characterize it.

• (Normalization) Iff is smoothly degreeadmissible overy andf−1(y) is a single point atwhichf is orientation preserving, thendegy(f) = 1.

• (Additivity) If f : C → Y is smoothly degreeadmissible overy, C1, . . . , Cr are pairwisedisjoint compact subsets ofC, f−1(y) ⊂

iCi,andf−1(y) ∩ ∂Ci = ∅ for all i, then

degy(f) =∑

i

degy(f |Ci).

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• A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y is smoothlydegree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

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• A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y is smoothlydegree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:• C is a compact subset ofX;

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• A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y is smoothlydegree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value ofh, h0, andh1;

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• A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y is smoothlydegree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value ofh, h0, andh1;• h−1(y) ∩ (∂C × [0, 1]) = ∅.

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• A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y is smoothlydegree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value ofh, h0, andh1;• h−1(y) ∩ (∂C × [0, 1]) = ∅.

• (Homotopy) Ifh : C × [0, 1] → Y is a smoothlydegree admissible homotopy overy ∈ Y , then

degy(h0) = degy(h1).

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• A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y is smoothlydegree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:• C is a compact subset ofX;• y is a regular value ofh, h0, andh1;• h−1(y) ∩ (∂C × [0, 1]) = ∅.

• (Homotopy) Ifh : C × [0, 1] → Y is a smoothlydegree admissible homotopy overy ∈ Y , then

degy(h0) = degy(h1).

Theorem:The smooth degree is the unique integervalued function on the set of smoothly degreeadmissible functions overy that satisfiesNormalization, Additivity, and Homotopy.

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Remarks on the Proof• Normalization is a special case of the definition.

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Remarks on the Proof• Normalization is a special case of the definition.• It is obvious that the degree satisfies Additivity.

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Remarks on the Proof• Normalization is a special case of the definition.• It is obvious that the degree satisfies Additivity.

The proof that the degree satisfies Homotopy hasmore substance. Leth : C × [0, 1] → Y be aC∞

homotopy that is degree admissible overy.

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Remarks on the Proof• Normalization is a special case of the definition.• It is obvious that the degree satisfies Additivity.

The proof that the degree satisfies Homotopy hasmore substance. Leth : C × [0, 1] → Y be aC∞

homotopy that is degree admissible overy.

• The implicit function theorem (and a bit ofsweating the details) implies thath−1(y) is afinite union of smooth loops and line segments.

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Remarks on the Proof• Normalization is a special case of the definition.• It is obvious that the degree satisfies Additivity.

The proof that the degree satisfies Homotopy hasmore substance. Leth : C × [0, 1] → Y be aC∞

homotopy that is degree admissible overy.

• The implicit function theorem (and a bit ofsweating the details) implies thath−1(y) is afinite union of smooth loops and line segments.

• Suppose thatγ : [a, b] → C × [0, 1] is a smoothparameterization of the one of the line segments,with γ′(t) 6= 0 for all t.

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t=0 t=1

γ′(a)

γ′(t)

γ′(t′)

γ′(b)

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t=0 t=1

γ′(a)

γ′(t)

γ′(t′)

γ′(b)

• γ′m+1(a) 6= 0 6= γ′m+1(b) becausey is a regularvalue ofh0 andh1.

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t=0 t=1

γ′(a)

γ′(t)

γ′(b)

– p. 42

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• Let v1, . . . , vm : [a, b] → X × R be smoothfunctions such that:

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• Let v1, . . . , vm : [a, b] → X × R be smoothfunctions such that:• (v1(t), . . . , vm(t), γ

′(t)) ∈ Fm+1(X × R) forall t;

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• Let v1, . . . , vm : [a, b] → X × R be smoothfunctions such that:• (v1(t), . . . , vm(t), γ

′(t)) ∈ Fm+1(X × R) forall t;

• (v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) are(in effect)m-frames forX, because all finalcomponents are zero.

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• Let v1, . . . , vm : [a, b] → X × R be smoothfunctions such that:• (v1(t), . . . , vm(t), γ

′(t)) ∈ Fm+1(X × R) forall t;

• (v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) are(in effect)m-frames forX, because all finalcomponents are zero.

• Proving that suchv1, . . . , vm exist is a rathertedious construction.

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t=0 t=1

v1(a)

v1(t)

v1(t′)v1(b)

– p. 44

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t=0 t=1

v1(a)

v1(t)

v1(b)

– p. 45

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• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then(v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) havethe same orientation.

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• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then(v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) havethe same orientation.• This is also the case ifγm+1(a) = 1 andγm+1(b) = 0.

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• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then(v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) havethe same orientation.• This is also the case ifγm+1(a) = 1 andγm+1(b) = 0.

• If γm+1(a) = γm+1(b) = 0, then(v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) haveopposite orientation.

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• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then(v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) havethe same orientation.• This is also the case ifγm+1(a) = 1 andγm+1(b) = 0.

• If γm+1(a) = γm+1(b) = 0, then(v1(a), . . . , vm(a)) and(v1(b), . . . , vm(b)) haveopposite orientation.

• This is also true ifγm+1(a) = γm+1(b) = 1.

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• For all t,Dh(γ(t))γ′(t) = 0, so

(Dh(γ(t))v1(t), . . . , Dh(γ(t))vm(t)) ∈ Fm(Y ).

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• For all t,Dh(γ(t))γ′(t) = 0, so

(Dh(γ(t))v1(t), . . . , Dh(γ(t))vm(t)) ∈ Fm(Y ).

• By continuity the orientation of thism-frameis the same for allt.

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• For all t,Dh(γ(t))γ′(t) = 0, so

(Dh(γ(t))v1(t), . . . , Dh(γ(t))vm(t)) ∈ Fm(Y ).

• By continuity the orientation of thism-frameis the same for allt.

• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then thecontribution ofγ(a) to degy(h0) is the same asthe contribution ofγ(b) to degy(h1).

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• For all t,Dh(γ(t))γ′(t) = 0, so

(Dh(γ(t))v1(t), . . . , Dh(γ(t))vm(t)) ∈ Fm(Y ).

• By continuity the orientation of thism-frameis the same for allt.

• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then thecontribution ofγ(a) to degy(h0) is the same asthe contribution ofγ(b) to degy(h1).

• If γm+1(a) = γm+1(b) = 0, then the totalcontribution ofγ(a) andγ(b) to degy(h0) is zero.

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• For all t,Dh(γ(t))γ′(t) = 0, so

(Dh(γ(t))v1(t), . . . , Dh(γ(t))vm(t)) ∈ Fm(Y ).

• By continuity the orientation of thism-frameis the same for allt.

• If γm+1(a) = 0 andγm+1(b) = 1, then thecontribution ofγ(a) to degy(h0) is the same asthe contribution ofγ(b) to degy(h1).

• If γm+1(a) = γm+1(b) = 0, then the totalcontribution ofγ(a) andγ(b) to degy(h0) is zero.

• Summing over all the components ofh−1(y) thatare paths givesdegy(h0) = degy(h1).

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The proof of uniqueness is much simpler.

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The proof of uniqueness is much simpler.

• By Additivity it suffices to show that iff−1(y) = {x}, thendegy(f) is+1 or −1

according to whetherDf(x) is orientationpreserving or reversing.

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The proof of uniqueness is much simpler.

• By Additivity it suffices to show that iff−1(y) = {x}, thendegy(f) is+1 or −1

according to whetherDf(x) is orientationpreserving or reversing.

• If f is orientation preserving atx, this isNormalization.

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The proof of uniqueness is much simpler.

• By Additivity it suffices to show that iff−1(y) = {x}, thendegy(f) is+1 or −1

according to whetherDf(x) is orientationpreserving or reversing.

• If f is orientation preserving atx, this isNormalization.

• If f is orientation reversing atx, one canconstruct a homotopy between a function that hasno preimages ofy (and thus has degree zero byAdditivity) and a function that agrees withf in aneighborhood ofx and has another preimage ofyat which the function is orientation preserving.

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Other Properties of DegreeThe determinant of a block diagonal matrix is theproduct of the determinants of the blocks, so:

Proposition:If X andY arem-dimensional vectorspaces,X ′ andY ′ arem′-dimensional vector spaces,C ⊂ X andC ′ ⊂ X ′ are compact, andf : C → Yandf ′ : C ′ → Y ′ are smoothly degree admissableovery andy′ respectively, then

f ×f ′ : C×C ′ → Y ×Y ′, (x, x′) 7→ (f(x), f ′(x′)),

is smoothly degree admissible over(y, y′), and

deg(y,y′)(f × f ′) = degy(f) · degy′(f′).

– p. 49

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The chain rule gives:

Proposition:If X, Y , andZ arem-dimensional vectorspaces,C ⊂ X andD ⊂ Y are compact,f : C → Dandg : D → Z areC∞, g is smoothly degreeadmissable overz, g−1(z) = {y1, . . . , yr}, andf issmoothly degree admissible over eachyi, theng ◦ f issmoothly admissible overz. If, in addition,D1, . . . , Dr are pairwise disjoint compact subsets ofD such that for eachi, yi is contained in the interior ofDi, then

degz(g ◦ f) =∑

i

degyi(f) · degz(g|Di).

– p. 50

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Smooth Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X andf : C → X let

F(f) = {x ∈ C : f(x) = x }

be the set of fixed points off . A C∞ functionf : C → X is smoothly index admissibleif:

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Smooth Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X andf : C → X let

F(f) = {x ∈ C : f(x) = x }

be the set of fixed points off . A C∞ functionf : C → X is smoothly index admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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Smooth Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X andf : C → X let

F(f) = {x ∈ C : f(x) = x }

be the set of fixed points off . A C∞ functionf : C → X is smoothly index admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofIdC − f ;

Page 220: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Smooth Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X andf : C → X let

F(f) = {x ∈ C : f(x) = x }

be the set of fixed points off . A C∞ functionf : C → X is smoothly index admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofIdC − f ;• F(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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Smooth Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X andf : C → X let

F(f) = {x ∈ C : f(x) = x }

be the set of fixed points off . A C∞ functionf : C → X is smoothly index admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofIdC − f ;• F(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If f is smoothly index admissible, then thefixed pointindexof f is

ΛX(f) = deg0(IdC − f).

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b

b

b

+1

−1

+1

0 10

1

– p. 52

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Properties of the Smooth IndexThe axiomatic characterization of the smooth fixedpoint index is a translation of the characterization ofthe smooth degree.

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Properties of the Smooth IndexThe axiomatic characterization of the smooth fixedpoint index is a translation of the characterization ofthe smooth degree.

• (Normalization) IfC ⊂ X is compact,x ∈ C \ ∂C, andc : C → X is the constantfunction with valuex, thenΛX(c) = 1.

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Properties of the Smooth IndexThe axiomatic characterization of the smooth fixedpoint index is a translation of the characterization ofthe smooth degree.

• (Normalization) IfC ⊂ X is compact,x ∈ C \ ∂C, andc : C → X is the constantfunction with valuex, thenΛX(c) = 1.

• (Additivity) If f : C → X is smoothly indexadmissible,C1, . . . , Cr are pairwise disjointcompact subsets ofC, F(f) ⊂

iCi, andF(f) ∩ ∂Ci = ∅ for all i, then

ΛX(f) =∑

i

ΛX(f |Ci).

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A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → X is smoothlyadmissibleif:

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A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → X is smoothlyadmissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → X is smoothlyadmissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value of(x, t) 7→ x− h(x, t),IdC − h0, andIdC − h1;

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A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → X is smoothlyadmissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value of(x, t) 7→ x− h(x, t),IdC − h0, andIdC − h1;

• For all t ∈ [0, 1], F(ht) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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A C∞ homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → X is smoothlyadmissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value of(x, t) 7→ x− h(x, t),IdC − h0, andIdC − h1;

• For all t ∈ [0, 1], F(ht) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

(Homotopy) Ifh : C × [0, 1] → X is a smoothlyadmissible homotopy, then

ΛX(h0) = ΛX(h1).

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Theorem:The smooth index is the unique integervalued function on the set of smoothly indexadmissible functions that satisfies Normalization,Additivity, and Homotopy.

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Theorem:The smooth index is the unique integervalued function on the set of smoothly indexadmissible functions that satisfies Normalization,Additivity, and Homotopy.

• This is an immediate consequence of theaxiomatic characterization of the smooth degree.

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Other Properties of the IndexThe analogous property of the degree implies that:

Proposition:If X andX ′ are finite dimensional vectorspaces,C ⊂ X andC ′ ⊂ X ′ are compact, andf : C → Y andf ′ : C ′ → Y ′ are smoothly indexadmissable, then

f×f ′ : C×C ′ → X×X ′, (x, x′) 7→ (f(x), f ′(x′)),

is smoothly index admissible, and

ΛX(f × f ′) = ΛX(f) · ΛX ′(f ′).

– p. 56

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Commutativity

Proposition:If X andY are finite dimensional vectorspaces,C ⊂ X andD ⊂ Y are compact,f : C → Dandg : D → Z areC∞, andg ◦ f andf ◦ g aresmoothly index admissible, then

ΛX(g ◦ f) = ΛY (f ◦ g).

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Commutativity

Proposition:If X andY are finite dimensional vectorspaces,C ⊂ X andD ⊂ Y are compact,f : C → Dandg : D → Z areC∞, andg ◦ f andf ◦ g aresmoothly index admissible, then

ΛX(g ◦ f) = ΛY (f ◦ g).

• This isnot a consequence of the earlier resultconcerning the degree of a composition.

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Commutativity

Proposition:If X andY are finite dimensional vectorspaces,C ⊂ X andD ⊂ Y are compact,f : C → Dandg : D → Z areC∞, andg ◦ f andf ◦ g aresmoothly index admissible, then

ΛX(g ◦ f) = ΛY (f ◦ g).

• This isnot a consequence of the earlier resultconcerning the degree of a composition.

• In fact the underlying linear algebra result wasnot known prior to the 1948 Ph.D. thesis of FelixBrowder.

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Commutativity

Proposition:If X andY are finite dimensional vectorspaces,C ⊂ X andD ⊂ Y are compact,f : C → Dandg : D → Z areC∞, andg ◦ f andf ◦ g aresmoothly index admissible, then

ΛX(g ◦ f) = ΛY (f ◦ g).

• This isnot a consequence of the earlier resultconcerning the degree of a composition.

• In fact the underlying linear algebra result wasnot known prior to the 1948 Ph.D. thesis of FelixBrowder.

• This property of the index is the key to extendingthe index to very general spaces.

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Linear AlgebraProposition:(Jacobson (1953) pp. 103–106)SupposeK : V → W andL : W → V are lineartransformations, whereV andW are vector spaces ofdimensionsm andn respectively over an arbitraryfield. Supposem ≤ n. Then the characteristicpolynomialsκKL andκLK of KL andLK are relatedby the equationκKL(λ) = λn−mκLK(λ). In particular,

κLK(1) = |IdV − LK| = |IdW −KL| = κKL(1).

– p. 58

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Proof. We can decomposeV andW as direct sumsV = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ V3 ⊕ V4,W = W1 ⊕W2 ⊕W3 ⊕W4

where

V1 = kerK∩imL, V1⊕V2 = imL, V1⊕V3 = kerK,

and similarly forW . With suitably chosen bases thematrices ofK andL have the forms

0 K12 0 K14

0 K22 0 K24

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

and

0 L12 0 L14

0 L22 0 L24

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

– p. 59

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Computing the product of these matrices, we find that

κKL(λ) =

λI −K12L22 0 −K12L24

0 λI −K22L22 0 −K22L24

0 0 λI 0

0 0 0 λI

Using elementary facts about determinants, thisreduces toκKL(λ) = λn−k|λI −K22L22|, wherek = dimV2 = dimW2.

– p. 60

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In effect this reduces the proof to the special caseV2 = V andW2 =W , i.e.K andL are isomorphisms.But this case follows from the computation

|λIdV − LK| = |L−1| · |λIdV − LK| · |L|

= |L−1(λIdV − LK)L| = |λIdW −KL|.

– p. 61

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz.

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz. If z isC∞, it is smoothlyvector field admissibleif:

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz. If z isC∞, it is smoothlyvector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz. If z isC∞, it is smoothlyvector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofz;

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz. If z isC∞, it is smoothlyvector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofz;• E(z) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz. If z isC∞, it is smoothlyvector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofz;• E(z) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If z is smoothly vector field admissible, then thevector field indexvfind(z) of z is deg0(z).

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Smooth Vector Field IndexA vector fieldonC ⊂ X is a continuous functionz : C → X. An equilibriumof z is a pointx ∈ Csuch thatz(x) = 0. Let E(z) = {x ∈ C : z(x) = 0 }be the set of equilibria ofz. If z isC∞, it is smoothlyvector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• 0 is a regular value ofz;• E(z) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If z is smoothly vector field admissible, then thevector field indexvfind(z) of z is deg0(z). Theinterpretation (a dynamical system) is different, butmathematically this is just a special case of thedegree, so it has the same properties.

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Advanced Fixed Point Theory

3. Using Sard’s Theorem to Extend theDegree and Index

– p. 63

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Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

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Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

• Functions that are only continuous, notC∞.

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Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

• Functions that are only continuous, notC∞.• Sets of preimages (or fixed points, or equilibria)

that are infinite.

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Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

• Functions that are only continuous, notC∞.• Sets of preimages (or fixed points, or equilibria)

that are infinite.

Our method is to show that satisfactory definitions ofextensions are obtained by requiring the degree (orindex, or vector field index) to be that of nearbyC∞

objects.

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Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

• Functions that are only continuous, notC∞.• Sets of preimages (or fixed points, or equilibria)

that are infinite.

Our method is to show that satisfactory definitions ofextensions are obtained by requiring the degree (orindex, or vector field index) to be that of nearbyC∞

objects. To this end we will:

Page 255: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

• Functions that are only continuous, notC∞.• Sets of preimages (or fixed points, or equilibria)

that are infinite.

Our method is to show that satisfactory definitions ofextensions are obtained by requiring the degree (orindex, or vector field index) to be that of nearbyC∞

objects. To this end we will:

• Study the approximation of continuous functionsbyC∞ functions.

Page 256: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Continuous Degree and IndexOur next goal is to extend the theory of degree andindex to allow for:

• Functions that are only continuous, notC∞.• Sets of preimages (or fixed points, or equilibria)

that are infinite.

Our method is to show that satisfactory definitions ofextensions are obtained by requiring the degree (orindex, or vector field index) to be that of nearbyC∞

objects. To this end we will:

• Study the approximation of continuous functionsbyC∞ functions.

• State (but not prove) Sard’s theorem.

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Infinite Dimensional SpacesWe will need some basic terminology and conceptsconcerning infinite dimensional spaces, but not morethan this.

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Infinite Dimensional SpacesWe will need some basic terminology and conceptsconcerning infinite dimensional spaces, but not morethan this.

• A topological vector space(TVS) is a vectorspace endowed with a Hausdorff topology withrespect to which vector addition and scalarmultiplication are continuous.

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Infinite Dimensional SpacesWe will need some basic terminology and conceptsconcerning infinite dimensional spaces, but not morethan this.

• A topological vector space(TVS) is a vectorspace endowed with a Hausdorff topology withrespect to which vector addition and scalarmultiplication are continuous.• The continuity of addition implies that the

topology is characterized by theneighborhoods of the origin.

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Infinite Dimensional SpacesWe will need some basic terminology and conceptsconcerning infinite dimensional spaces, but not morethan this.

• A topological vector space(TVS) is a vectorspace endowed with a Hausdorff topology withrespect to which vector addition and scalarmultiplication are continuous.• The continuity of addition implies that the

topology is characterized by theneighborhoods of the origin.

• A TVS is locally convexif every neighborhood ofthe origin contains a convex neighborhood of theorigin.

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Normed SpacesA normon a vector spaceV is a function‖ · ‖ : V → [0,∞) such that for allx, y ∈ V andα ∈ R:

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Normed SpacesA normon a vector spaceV is a function‖ · ‖ : V → [0,∞) such that for allx, y ∈ V andα ∈ R:

• ‖x‖ = 0 if and only if x = 0;

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Normed SpacesA normon a vector spaceV is a function‖ · ‖ : V → [0,∞) such that for allx, y ∈ V andα ∈ R:

• ‖x‖ = 0 if and only if x = 0;• ‖αx‖ = |α| · ‖x‖;

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Normed SpacesA normon a vector spaceV is a function‖ · ‖ : V → [0,∞) such that for allx, y ∈ V andα ∈ R:

• ‖x‖ = 0 if and only if x = 0;• ‖αx‖ = |α| · ‖x‖;• ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖.

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Normed SpacesA normon a vector spaceV is a function‖ · ‖ : V → [0,∞) such that for allx, y ∈ V andα ∈ R:

• ‖x‖ = 0 if and only if x = 0;• ‖αx‖ = |α| · ‖x‖;• ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖.

A normed spaceis vector space endowed with anorm. It is automatically endowed with the topologyderived from the associated metric(x, y) 7→ ‖x− y‖,and is thus a locally convex TVS.

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Banach SpacesRecall that a metric space iscompleteif every Cauchysequence is convergent.

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Banach SpacesRecall that a metric space iscompleteif every Cauchysequence is convergent.

• Exercise:Prove that any metric space(X, d) canbe isometrically embedded in a complete metricspace(X, d) such thatX is the closure ofX, and(X, d) is unique up to isometry.

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Banach SpacesRecall that a metric space iscompleteif every Cauchysequence is convergent.

• Exercise:Prove that any metric space(X, d) canbe isometrically embedded in a complete metricspace(X, d) such thatX is the closure ofX, and(X, d) is unique up to isometry.

A Banach spaceis a complete normed space.

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Banach SpacesRecall that a metric space iscompleteif every Cauchysequence is convergent.

• Exercise:Prove that any metric space(X, d) canbe isometrically embedded in a complete metricspace(X, d) such thatX is the closure ofX, and(X, d) is unique up to isometry.

A Banach spaceis a complete normed space.

• Exercise:Prove that any normed space can beisometrically embedded in a Banach spaceV

such thatV is the closure ofV , andV is uniqueup to isometry.

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C(K,W )

Let V andW be normed spaces, and letK ⊂ V becompact.

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C(K,W )

Let V andW be normed spaces, and letK ⊂ V becompact.

• C(K,W ) is the space of continuous functionsf : K → W .

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C(K,W )

Let V andW be normed spaces, and letK ⊂ V becompact.

• C(K,W ) is the space of continuous functionsf : K → W .

• EndowingC(K,W ) with addition and scalarmultiplication, defined pointwise, makes it avector space.

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C(K,W )

Let V andW be normed spaces, and letK ⊂ V becompact.

• C(K,W ) is the space of continuous functionsf : K → W .

• EndowingC(K,W ) with addition and scalarmultiplication, defined pointwise, makes it avector space.

• We endow it with the norm

‖f‖∞ = maxx∈K

‖f(x)‖.

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C(K,W )

Let V andW be normed spaces, and letK ⊂ V becompact.

• C(K,W ) is the space of continuous functionsf : K → W .

• EndowingC(K,W ) with addition and scalarmultiplication, defined pointwise, makes it avector space.

• We endow it with the norm

‖f‖∞ = maxx∈K

‖f(x)‖.

• Exercise:Prove that ifW is a Banach space, thenC(K,W ) is a Banach space.

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Smooth Functions are DenseNow assume thatV andW are finite dimensional. LetC∞(K,W ) be the set ofC∞ functionsf : K →W .

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Smooth Functions are DenseNow assume thatV andW are finite dimensional. LetC∞(K,W ) be the set ofC∞ functionsf : K →W .

Proposition:C∞(K,W ) is dense inC(K,W ).

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Smooth Functions are DenseNow assume thatV andW are finite dimensional. LetC∞(K,W ) be the set ofC∞ functionsf : K →W .

Proposition:C∞(K,W ) is dense inC(K,W ).

• The key idea is theC∞ function

α(t) =

{

exp(−1/t), t > 0,

0, t ≤ 0.

Page 278: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Smooth Functions are DenseNow assume thatV andW are finite dimensional. LetC∞(K,W ) be the set ofC∞ functionsf : K →W .

Proposition:C∞(K,W ) is dense inC(K,W ).

• The key idea is theC∞ function

α(t) =

{

exp(−1/t), t > 0,

0, t ≤ 0.

• By induction,α(r)(t) = Pr(1/t) exp(−1/t)for some polynomialPr.

Page 279: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Smooth Functions are DenseNow assume thatV andW are finite dimensional. LetC∞(K,W ) be the set ofC∞ functionsf : K →W .

Proposition:C∞(K,W ) is dense inC(K,W ).

• The key idea is theC∞ function

α(t) =

{

exp(−1/t), t > 0,

0, t ≤ 0.

• By induction,α(r)(t) = Pr(1/t) exp(−1/t)for some polynomialPr.

• α(t) · α(1− t) is a “bump” function withcompact support. Multidimensional bumpfunctions can be added together, etc.

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Sard’s TheoremForα > 0, a setS ⊂ R

n hasα-dimensionalHausdorff measure zeroif, for any ε > 0, there is asequence{(xj, δj)}∞j=1 such that

S ⊂⋃

j

Bδj(xj) and∑

j

δαj < ε.

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Sard’s TheoremForα > 0, a setS ⊂ R

n hasα-dimensionalHausdorff measure zeroif, for any ε > 0, there is asequence{(xj, δj)}∞j=1 such that

S ⊂⋃

j

Bδj(xj) and∑

j

δαj < ε.

Theorem:L etU ⊂ Rm be open, and letf : U → R

n

be aCr function. For0 ≤ p < m letRp be the set ofpointsx ∈M such that the rank ofDf(x) is less thanor equal top. Thenf(Rp) hasα-dimensional measurezero for allα ≥ p+ m−p

r .

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Section 3.4 of Federer’sGeometric Measure Theoryproves this, and shows it to be best possible.

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Section 3.4 of Federer’sGeometric Measure Theoryproves this, and shows it to be best possible.

• A setS ⊂ Rn hasmeasure zeroif it has

n-dimensional Hausdorff measure zero.

Page 284: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Section 3.4 of Federer’sGeometric Measure Theoryproves this, and shows it to be best possible.

• A setS ⊂ Rn hasmeasure zeroif it has

n-dimensional Hausdorff measure zero.• The caseα = n andp ≤ n− 1 in the result above

reduces to the better known version of the result:

Page 285: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Section 3.4 of Federer’sGeometric Measure Theoryproves this, and shows it to be best possible.

• A setS ⊂ Rn hasmeasure zeroif it has

n-dimensional Hausdorff measure zero.• The caseα = n andp ≤ n− 1 in the result above

reduces to the better known version of the result:

Sard’s Theorem:L etU ⊂ Rm be open, and let

f : U → Rn be aCr function. If r > min{m− n, 0}

then the set of critical values off has measure zero.

Page 286: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Section 3.4 of Federer’sGeometric Measure Theoryproves this, and shows it to be best possible.

• A setS ⊂ Rn hasmeasure zeroif it has

n-dimensional Hausdorff measure zero.• The caseα = n andp ≤ n− 1 in the result above

reduces to the better known version of the result:

Sard’s Theorem:L etU ⊂ Rm be open, and let

f : U → Rn be aCr function. If r > min{m− n, 0}

then the set of critical values off has measure zero.

• See Milnor’sTopology from the DifferentiableViewpoint. The special casem = n is proved onp. 85 of Spivak’sCalculus on Manifolds.

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DegreeLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces. Acontinuousf : C → Y is degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

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DegreeLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces. Acontinuousf : C → Y is degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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DegreeLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces. Acontinuousf : C → Y is degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

• f−1(y) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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DegreeLetX andY be finite dimensional vector spaces. Acontinuousf : C → Y is degree admissibleovery ∈ Y if:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

• f−1(y) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

In the argument below thedegreeof f overy will bedefined to bedegy(f

′) for f ′ : C → Y sufficientlyclose tof that are smoothly degree admissible overy.

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Properties of DegreeNormalization is just as before, and the newAdditivity is an obvious slight modification.

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Properties of DegreeNormalization is just as before, and the newAdditivity is an obvious slight modification.

• (Normalization) Iff is smoothly degreeadmissible overy andf−1(y) is a single point atwhichf is orientation preserving, thendegy(f) = 1.

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Properties of DegreeNormalization is just as before, and the newAdditivity is an obvious slight modification.

• (Normalization) Iff is smoothly degreeadmissible overy andf−1(y) is a single point atwhichf is orientation preserving, thendegy(f) = 1.

• (Additivity) If f : C → Y is degree admissibleovery, C1, . . . , Cr are pairwise disjoint compactsubsets ofC, f−1(y) ⊂

iCi, andf−1(y) ∩ ∂Ci = ∅ for all i, then

degy(f) =∑

i

degy(f |Ci).

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Instead of generalizing homotopy in the obviousmanner (which would be possible) we take asomewhat more general perspective.

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Instead of generalizing homotopy in the obviousmanner (which would be possible) we take asomewhat more general perspective.

• (Continuity) If f is degree admissible overy,then there is a neighborhoodU ⊂ C(C, Y ) of fsuch that for eachf ′ ∈ U , f ′ is degree admissibleovery anddegy(f

′) = degy(f).

Page 296: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Instead of generalizing homotopy in the obviousmanner (which would be possible) we take asomewhat more general perspective.

• (Continuity) If f is degree admissible overy,then there is a neighborhoodU ⊂ C(C, Y ) of fsuch that for eachf ′ ∈ U , f ′ is degree admissibleovery anddegy(f

′) = degy(f).

• Exercise:If h : C × [0, 1] → Y is ahomotopy, thent 7→ ht is a continuous path inC(C, Y ), and conversely.

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Instead of generalizing homotopy in the obviousmanner (which would be possible) we take asomewhat more general perspective.

• (Continuity) If f is degree admissible overy,then there is a neighborhoodU ⊂ C(C, Y ) of fsuch that for eachf ′ ∈ U , f ′ is degree admissibleovery anddegy(f

′) = degy(f).

• Exercise:If h : C × [0, 1] → Y is ahomotopy, thent 7→ ht is a continuous path inC(C, Y ), and conversely.

• Thus Continuity implies Homotopy.

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Multiplication(Multiplication) If X andY arem-dimensional vectorspaces,X ′ andY ′ arem′-dimensional vector spaces,C ⊂ X andC ′ ⊂ X ′ are compact, andf : C → Yandf ′ : C ′ → Y ′ are degree admissable overy andy′

respectively, thenf × f ′ : C × C ′ → Y × Y ′ isdegree admissible over(y, y′), and

deg(y,y′)(f × f ′) = degy(f) · degy′(f′).

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Multiplication(Multiplication) If X andY arem-dimensional vectorspaces,X ′ andY ′ arem′-dimensional vector spaces,C ⊂ X andC ′ ⊂ X ′ are compact, andf : C → Yandf ′ : C ′ → Y ′ are degree admissable overy andy′

respectively, thenf × f ′ : C × C ′ → Y × Y ′ isdegree admissible over(y, y′), and

deg(y,y′)(f × f ′) = degy(f) · degy′(f′).

Theorem:There is a unique integer valued functionon the set of degree admissible functions overy,called thedegree, that satisfies Normalization,Additivity, and Continuity. It also satisfiesMultiplication.

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ProofSince Continuity implies Homotopy, the restriction ofany function satisfying our conditions to the functionsthat are smoothly degree admissible overy must agreewith the smooth degree.

– p. 76

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There areC∞ f ′ : C → Y that are arbitrarily close tof and are smoothly degree admissible overy:

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There areC∞ f ′ : C → Y that are arbitrarily close tof and are smoothly degree admissible overy:

• SinceC∞(C, Y ) is dense inC(C, Y ), there areC∞ f ′ that are arbitrarily close tof .

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There areC∞ f ′ : C → Y that are arbitrarily close tof and are smoothly degree admissible overy:

• SinceC∞(C, Y ) is dense inC(C, Y ), there areC∞ f ′ that are arbitrarily close tof .

• Sard’s theorem implies that the set of regularvalues of such anf ′ are dense, and ify′ is aregular value off ′, theny is a regular value ofx 7→ f ′(x) + y − y′.

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There areC∞ f ′ : C → Y that are arbitrarily close tof and are smoothly degree admissible overy:

• SinceC∞(C, Y ) is dense inC(C, Y ), there areC∞ f ′ that are arbitrarily close tof .

• Sard’s theorem implies that the set of regularvalues of such anf ′ are dense, and ify′ is aregular value off ′, theny is a regular value ofx 7→ f ′(x) + y − y′.

• If f ′ is sufficiently close tof , thenf ′−1(y) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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Continuity implies that the degree of anyf overymust be the smooth degree of the nearby functionsthat are smoothly degree admissible overy.

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Continuity implies that the degree of anyf overymust be the smooth degree of the nearby functionsthat are smoothly degree admissible overy.

• In view of the uniqueness of the smooth degree,this establishes the uniqueness claim.

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Continuity implies that the degree of anyf overymust be the smooth degree of the nearby functionsthat are smoothly degree admissible overy.

• In view of the uniqueness of the smooth degree,this establishes the uniqueness claim.

• This definition of the degree off overy isunambiguous: iff ′ andf ′′ are smoothly degreeadmissible overy, then

(x, t) 7→ (1− t)f ′(x) + tf ′′(x)

is aC∞ homotopy, which is smoothly degreeadmissible overy if f ′ andf ′′ are sufficientlyclose tof .

Page 308: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show that the degree, so defined, satisfiesall conditions.

Page 309: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show that the degree, so defined, satisfiesall conditions.

• Normalization is satisfied automatically.

Page 310: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show that the degree, so defined, satisfiesall conditions.

• Normalization is satisfied automatically.• The construction implies that Continuity holds.

Page 311: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show that the degree, so defined, satisfiesall conditions.

• Normalization is satisfied automatically.• The construction implies that Continuity holds.• Additivity and Multiplication follow easily from

the fact that these conditions are satisfied by thesmooth degree.

Page 312: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X, a continuous functionf : C → X isindex admissibleif:

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The Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X, a continuous functionf : C → X isindex admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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The Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X, a continuous functionf : C → X isindex admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• F(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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The Fixed Point IndexForC ⊂ X, a continuous functionf : C → X isindex admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• F(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If f is index admissible, then thefixed point indexoff is

ΛX(f) = deg0(IdC − f).

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Properties of the IndexThe fixed point index for continuous functions inheritsall the properties of the index for smooth functions.

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Properties of the IndexThe fixed point index for continuous functions inheritsall the properties of the index for smooth functions.

• (Normalization) IfC ⊂ X is compact,x ∈ C \ ∂C, andc : C → X is the constantfunction with valuex, then

ΛX(c) = 1.

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Properties of the IndexThe fixed point index for continuous functions inheritsall the properties of the index for smooth functions.

• (Normalization) IfC ⊂ X is compact,x ∈ C \ ∂C, andc : C → X is the constantfunction with valuex, then

ΛX(c) = 1.

• (Additivity) If f : C → Y is index admissible,C1, . . . , Cr are pairwise disjoint compact subsetsof C, F(f) ⊂

iCi, andF(f) ∩ ∂Ci = ∅ for alli, then

ΛX(f) =∑

i

ΛX(f |Ci).

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• (Continuity) If f is index admissible, then there isa neighborhoodU ⊂ C(C,X) of f such that foreachf ′ ∈ U , f ′ is index admissible and

ΛX(f′) = ΛX(f).

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• (Continuity) If f is index admissible, then there isa neighborhoodU ⊂ C(C,X) of f such that foreachf ′ ∈ U , f ′ is index admissible and

ΛX(f′) = ΛX(f).

• (Commutativity) IfX andY are finitedimensional vector spaces,C ⊂ X andD ⊂ Yare compact,f : C → D andg : D → C areC∞,andg ◦ f andf ◦ g are index admissible, then

ΛX(g ◦ f) = ΛY (f ◦ g).

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• (Multiplication) If X andX ′ are finitedimensional vector spaces,C ⊂ X andC ′ ⊂ X ′

are compact, andf : C → Y andf ′ : C ′ → Y ′

are index admissable, then

f×f ′ : C×C ′ → X×X ′, (x, x′) 7→ (f(x), f ′(x′)),

is index admissible, and

ΛX(f × f ′) = ΛX(f) · ΛX ′(f ′).

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• (Multiplication) If X andX ′ are finitedimensional vector spaces,C ⊂ X andC ′ ⊂ X ′

are compact, andf : C → Y andf ′ : C ′ → Y ′

are index admissable, then

f×f ′ : C×C ′ → X×X ′, (x, x′) 7→ (f(x), f ′(x′)),

is index admissible, and

ΛX(f × f ′) = ΛX(f) · ΛX ′(f ′).

Theorem:The index is the unique integer valuedfunction on the set of index admissible functions thatsatisfies Normalization, Additivity, and Continuity. Italso satisfies Commutativity and Multiplication.

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Vector Field IndexA vector fieldz : C → X is vector field admissibleif:

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Vector Field IndexA vector fieldz : C → X is vector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;

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Vector Field IndexA vector fieldz : C → X is vector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• E(z) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

Page 326: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Vector Field IndexA vector fieldz : C → X is vector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• E(z) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If z is vector field admissible, then thevector fieldindexvfind(z) of z is deg0(z).

Page 327: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Vector Field IndexA vector fieldz : C → X is vector field admissibleif:

• C is a compact subset ofX;• E(z) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

If z is vector field admissible, then thevector fieldindexvfind(z) of z is deg0(z).

• As before, the main properties of the vector fieldindex are inherited from the properties of thedegree.

Page 328: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Advanced Fixed Point Theory

4. Absolute Neighborhood Retracts

– p. 85

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ANR’sIn the Kakutani fixed point theorem, the conclusion istopological, but the hypotheses are geometric. Can thehypotheses be weakened?

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ANR’sIn the Kakutani fixed point theorem, the conclusion istopological, but the hypotheses are geometric. Can thehypotheses be weakened?

• A topological spaceX is contractibleif there is acontinuous functionc : X × [0, 1] → X such thatc0 = IdX andc1 is a constant function.

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ANR’sIn the Kakutani fixed point theorem, the conclusion istopological, but the hypotheses are geometric. Can thehypotheses be weakened?

• A topological spaceX is contractibleif there is acontinuous functionc : X × [0, 1] → X such thatc0 = IdX andc1 is a constant function.

• A star shaped set is contractible, so convex setsare contractible.

Page 332: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ANR’sIn the Kakutani fixed point theorem, the conclusion istopological, but the hypotheses are geometric. Can thehypotheses be weakened?

• A topological spaceX is contractibleif there is acontinuous functionc : X × [0, 1] → X such thatc0 = IdX andc1 is a constant function.

• A star shaped set is contractible, so convex setsare contractible.

Does a continuous function from a compactcontractible set to itself necessarily have a fixed point?

Page 333: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ANR’sIn the Kakutani fixed point theorem, the conclusion istopological, but the hypotheses are geometric. Can thehypotheses be weakened?

• A topological spaceX is contractibleif there is acontinuous functionc : X × [0, 1] → X such thatc0 = IdX andc1 is a constant function.

• A star shaped set is contractible, so convex setsare contractible.

Does a continuous function from a compactcontractible set to itself necessarily have a fixed point?

• Kinoshita’s example shows that the answer is no!

Page 334: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Kinoshita’s ExampleWe first introduce some ingredients:

Page 335: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Kinoshita’s ExampleWe first introduce some ingredients:

• Let κ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be continuous with:

Page 336: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Kinoshita’s ExampleWe first introduce some ingredients:

• Let κ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be continuous with:

• κ(0) = 0;• z < κ(z) < 1 for all 0 < z < 1;• κ(1) = 1.

Page 337: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Kinoshita’s ExampleWe first introduce some ingredients:

• Let κ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be continuous with:

• κ(0) = 0;• z < κ(z) < 1 for all 0 < z < 1;• κ(1) = 1.

• Let ρ : R+ → [0, 1) be a homeomorphism.

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Kinoshita’s ExampleWe first introduce some ingredients:

• Let κ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be continuous with:

• κ(0) = 0;• z < κ(z) < 1 for all 0 < z < 1;• κ(1) = 1.

• Let ρ : R+ → [0, 1) be a homeomorphism.

• Of courseρ(0) = 0, ρ is strictly increasing,andρ(t) → 1 ast→ ∞.

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Kinoshita’s ExampleWe first introduce some ingredients:

• Let κ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be continuous with:

• κ(0) = 0;• z < κ(z) < 1 for all 0 < z < 1;• κ(1) = 1.

• Let ρ : R+ → [0, 1) be a homeomorphism.

• Of courseρ(0) = 0, ρ is strictly increasing,andρ(t) → 1 ast→ ∞.

• Fix a numberε ∈ (0, 2π).

Page 340: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

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We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

• The unit circle isC := { (r, θ) : r = 1 }.

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We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

• The unit circle isC := { (r, θ) : r = 1 }.• The open unit disk isD := { (r, θ) : r < 1 }.

Page 343: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

• The unit circle isC := { (r, θ) : r = 1 }.• The open unit disk isD := { (r, θ) : r < 1 }.

• (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) = “tin can.”

Page 344: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

• The unit circle isC := { (r, θ) : r = 1 }.• The open unit disk isD := { (r, θ) : r < 1 }.

• (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) = “tin can.”

• For τ ≥ 0 let s(τ) := (ρ(τ), τ).

Page 345: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

• The unit circle isC := { (r, θ) : r = 1 }.• The open unit disk isD := { (r, θ) : r < 1 }.

• (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) = “tin can.”

• For τ ≥ 0 let s(τ) := (ρ(τ), τ).

• The imageS = { s(τ) : τ ≥ 0 } of s is acurve that spirals out, asymptoticallyapproachingC.

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We work with polar coordinates, identifying(r, θ) ∈ R+ × R with (r cos θ, r sin θ).

• The unit circle isC := { (r, θ) : r = 1 }.• The open unit disk isD := { (r, θ) : r < 1 }.

• (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) = “tin can.”

• For τ ≥ 0 let s(τ) := (ρ(τ), τ).

• The imageS = { s(τ) : τ ≥ 0 } of s is acurve that spirals out, asymptoticallyapproachingC.

• S × [0, 1] = “roll of toilet paper.”

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The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

Page 348: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

• EvidentlyX is closed, hence compact.

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The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

• EvidentlyX is closed, hence compact.• X is contractible. To contract it:

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The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

• EvidentlyX is closed, hence compact.• X is contractible. To contract it:

• pushX down onto(C ∪D)× {0};

Page 351: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

• EvidentlyX is closed, hence compact.• X is contractible. To contract it:

• pushX down onto(C ∪D)× {0};• then contract(C ∪D)× {0} to the origin.

Page 352: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

• EvidentlyX is closed, hence compact.• X is contractible. To contract it:

• pushX down onto(C ∪D)× {0};• then contract(C ∪D)× {0} to the origin.

Let f1 : C × [0, 1] → X be the function

f1(1, θ, z) := (1, θ − (1− 2z)ε, κ(z)).

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The space of the example is

X = (C × [0, 1]) ∪ (D × {0}) ∪ (S × (0, 1]).

• EvidentlyX is closed, hence compact.• X is contractible. To contract it:

• pushX down onto(C ∪D)× {0};• then contract(C ∪D)× {0} to the origin.

Let f1 : C × [0, 1] → X be the function

f1(1, θ, z) := (1, θ − (1− 2z)ε, κ(z)).

• f1(1, θ, z) 6= (1, θ, z) (κ(z) = z implies thatz = 0, 1, andε is not a multiple of2π).

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• Observe thatD = { (ρ(t), θ) : t ≥ 0, θ ∈ R }.

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• Observe thatD = { (ρ(t), θ) : t ≥ 0, θ ∈ R }.

Let f2 : D × {0} → X be the function

f2(ρ(t), θ, 0) :=

{

(0, 0, 1− t/ε), 0 ≤ t ≤ ε,

(ρ(t− ε), θ − ε, 0), ε ≤ t.

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• Observe thatD = { (ρ(t), θ) : t ≥ 0, θ ∈ R }.

Let f2 : D × {0} → X be the function

f2(ρ(t), θ, 0) :=

{

(0, 0, 1− t/ε), 0 ≤ t ≤ ε,

(ρ(t− ε), θ − ε, 0), ε ≤ t.

• f2 maps{ (ρ(t), θ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ ε, θ ∈ R } onto{ (0, 0, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 }.

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• Observe thatD = { (ρ(t), θ) : t ≥ 0, θ ∈ R }.

Let f2 : D × {0} → X be the function

f2(ρ(t), θ, 0) :=

{

(0, 0, 1− t/ε), 0 ≤ t ≤ ε,

(ρ(t− ε), θ − ε, 0), ε ≤ t.

• f2 maps{ (ρ(t), θ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ ε, θ ∈ R } onto{ (0, 0, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 }.

• It stretches{ (ρ(t), θ) : ε ≤ t, θ ∈ R } onto all ofD while rotating it byε.

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• Observe thatD = { (ρ(t), θ) : t ≥ 0, θ ∈ R }.

Let f2 : D × {0} → X be the function

f2(ρ(t), θ, 0) :=

{

(0, 0, 1− t/ε), 0 ≤ t ≤ ε,

(ρ(t− ε), θ − ε, 0), ε ≤ t.

• f2 maps{ (ρ(t), θ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ ε, θ ∈ R } onto{ (0, 0, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 }.

• It stretches{ (ρ(t), θ) : ε ≤ t, θ ∈ R } onto all ofD while rotating it byε.

• f2 does not have any fixed points (the firstcomponents (that is, the radius) off2(ρ(t), θ, 0) isstrictly less thanρ(t) except whent = 0).

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Definef3 : S × [0, 1] → X by setting

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε)

if 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε and setting

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

if ε ≤ τ .

Page 360: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Definef3 : S × [0, 1] → X by setting

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε)

if 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε and setting

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

if ε ≤ τ .

• Observe thatf3(s(ε), z) = (s(2εz), κ(z))according to either formula.

Page 361: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Definef3 : S × [0, 1] → X by setting

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε)

if 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε and setting

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

if ε ≤ τ .

• Observe thatf3(s(ε), z) = (s(2εz), κ(z))according to either formula.• Thereforef3 is well defined and continuous.

Page 362: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points.

Page 363: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points. First supposethatτ ≤ ε, so that

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε).

Page 364: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points. First supposethatτ ≤ ε, so that

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε).

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(0), 1− τ/ε).

Page 365: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points. First supposethatτ ≤ ε, so that

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε).

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(0), 1− τ/ε).• The casez = 1: f3(s(τ), 1) = (s(τ + ε), 1).

Page 366: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points. First supposethatτ ≤ ε, so that

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε).

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(0), 1− τ/ε).• The casez = 1: f3(s(τ), 1) = (s(τ + ε), 1).• The caseτ = 0: f3(s(0), z) = (s(εz), 1).

Page 367: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points. First supposethatτ ≤ ε, so that

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε).

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(0), 1− τ/ε).• The casez = 1: f3(s(τ), 1) = (s(τ + ε), 1).• The caseτ = 0: f3(s(0), z) = (s(εz), 1).• The caseτ = ε: f3(s(ε), z) = (s(2εz), κ(z)).

Page 368: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

We claim thatf3 has no fixed points. First supposethatτ ≤ ε, so that

f3(s(τ), z) := (s((τ + ε)z), 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε).

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(0), 1− τ/ε).• The casez = 1: f3(s(τ), 1) = (s(τ + ε), 1).• The caseτ = 0: f3(s(0), z) = (s(εz), 1).• The caseτ = ε: f3(s(ε), z) = (s(2εz), κ(z)).• The equationz = 1− (1− κ(z))τ/ε is equivalent

to (1− κ(z))τ = (1− z)ε, which is impossiblewhen0 < z < 1 becauseκ(z) > z.

Page 369: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now suppose thatτ ≥ ε, so that

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

Page 370: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now suppose thatτ ≥ ε, so that

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(τ − ε), 0).

Page 371: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now suppose thatτ ≥ ε, so that

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(τ − ε), 0).• The casez = 1: f3(s(τ), 1) = (s(τ + ε), 1).

Page 372: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now suppose thatτ ≥ ε, so that

f3(s(τ) = (s(τ − (1− 2z)ε), κ(z))

• The casez = 0: f3(s(τ), 0) = (s(τ − ε), 0).• The casez = 1: f3(s(τ), 1) = (s(τ + ε), 1).• There cannot be any fixed point with0 < z < 1

because in this casez < κ(z).

Page 373: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show thatf1, f2, andf3 combine to givea continuousf : X → X.

Page 374: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show thatf1, f2, andf3 combine to givea continuousf : X → X.

• f2 andf3 combine to form a continuous functionon the union of their domains because

f2 or 3(s(τ), 0) =

{

(s(0), 1− τ/ε), 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε,

(s(τ − ε)0), ε ≤ τ.

Page 375: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show thatf1, f2, andf3 combine to givea continuousf : X → X.

• f2 andf3 combine to form a continuous functionon the union of their domains because

f2 or 3(s(τ), 0) =

{

(s(0), 1− τ/ε), 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε,

(s(τ − ε)0), ε ≤ τ.

• Exercise:Prove that if{(rn, θn, 0)} is a sequencein D × {0} converging to(1, θ, 0) ∈ C × {0},thenf2(rn, θn, 0) → f1(1, θ, 0).

Page 376: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

It remains to show thatf1, f2, andf3 combine to givea continuousf : X → X.

• f2 andf3 combine to form a continuous functionon the union of their domains because

f2 or 3(s(τ), 0) =

{

(s(0), 1− τ/ε), 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε,

(s(τ − ε)0), ε ≤ τ.

• Exercise:Prove that if{(rn, θn, 0)} is a sequencein D × {0} converging to(1, θ, 0) ∈ C × {0},thenf2(rn, θn, 0) → f1(1, θ, 0).

• Exercise:Prove that if{(s(τn), zn)} is a sequencein S × [0, 1] converging to(1, θ, z) ∈ C × {0},thenf3(s(τn), zn) → f1(1, θ, z).

Page 377: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

RetractsWe need some additional restriction beyondcontractibility to get fixed point theory to work. Thedominant response in the literature is to require thatthe space also be an absolute neighborhood retract(ANR). We develop the parts of the theory that clarifywhat sorts of spaces these are, and how fixed pointtheory is extended to them.

Page 378: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

RetractsWe need some additional restriction beyondcontractibility to get fixed point theory to work. Thedominant response in the literature is to require thatthe space also be an absolute neighborhood retract(ANR). We develop the parts of the theory that clarifywhat sorts of spaces these are, and how fixed pointtheory is extended to them.

• LetX be a metric space, and letA be a subset.

Page 379: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

RetractsWe need some additional restriction beyondcontractibility to get fixed point theory to work. Thedominant response in the literature is to require thatthe space also be an absolute neighborhood retract(ANR). We develop the parts of the theory that clarifywhat sorts of spaces these are, and how fixed pointtheory is extended to them.

• LetX be a metric space, and letA be a subset.• A retractionof X ontoA is a continuous

functionr : X → A with r(a) = a for alla ∈ A.

Page 380: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

RetractsWe need some additional restriction beyondcontractibility to get fixed point theory to work. Thedominant response in the literature is to require thatthe space also be an absolute neighborhood retract(ANR). We develop the parts of the theory that clarifywhat sorts of spaces these are, and how fixed pointtheory is extended to them.

• LetX be a metric space, and letA be a subset.• A retractionof X ontoA is a continuous

functionr : X → A with r(a) = a for alla ∈ A.

• We say thatA is aretract of X if such aretraction exists.

Page 381: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• We say thatA is aneighborhood retractin X ifA is a retract of an openU ⊂ X.

Page 382: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• We say thatA is aneighborhood retractin X ifA is a retract of an openU ⊂ X.

A metric spaceA is anabsolute neighborhood retract(ANR) if h(A) is a neighborhood retract wheneverXis a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed inX.

Page 383: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• We say thatA is aneighborhood retractin X ifA is a retract of an openU ⊂ X.

A metric spaceA is anabsolute neighborhood retract(ANR) if h(A) is a neighborhood retract wheneverXis a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed inX.

Our main goals are:

Page 384: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• We say thatA is aneighborhood retractin X ifA is a retract of an openU ⊂ X.

A metric spaceA is anabsolute neighborhood retract(ANR) if h(A) is a neighborhood retract wheneverXis a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed inX.

Our main goals are:

• To give sufficient conditions for a space to be anANR that imply that lots of spaces are ANR’s.

Page 385: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• We say thatA is aneighborhood retractin X ifA is a retract of an openU ⊂ X.

A metric spaceA is anabsolute neighborhood retract(ANR) if h(A) is a neighborhood retract wheneverXis a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed inX.

Our main goals are:

• To give sufficient conditions for a space to be anANR that imply that lots of spaces are ANR’s.

• To explain the main result used to extend thetheory of the fixed point index to ANR’s.

Page 386: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ParacompactnessFix a topological spaceX.

Page 387: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ParacompactnessFix a topological spaceX.

• A family {Sα}α∈I of subsets ofX is locally finiteif everyx ∈ X has a neighborhoodW such thatthere are only finitely manyα with W ∩ Sα 6= ∅.

Page 388: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ParacompactnessFix a topological spaceX.

• A family {Sα}α∈I of subsets ofX is locally finiteif everyx ∈ X has a neighborhoodW such thatthere are only finitely manyα with W ∩ Sα 6= ∅.

• A cover{Vβ}β∈B of X is arefinementof a cover{Uα}α∈I if eachVβ is a subset of someUα.

Page 389: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ParacompactnessFix a topological spaceX.

• A family {Sα}α∈I of subsets ofX is locally finiteif everyx ∈ X has a neighborhoodW such thatthere are only finitely manyα with W ∩ Sα 6= ∅.

• A cover{Vβ}β∈B of X is arefinementof a cover{Uα}α∈I if eachVβ is a subset of someUα.

The spaceX is paracompactif every open cover isrefined by an open cover that is locally finite.

Page 390: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ParacompactnessFix a topological spaceX.

• A family {Sα}α∈I of subsets ofX is locally finiteif everyx ∈ X has a neighborhoodW such thatthere are only finitely manyα with W ∩ Sα 6= ∅.

• A cover{Vβ}β∈B of X is arefinementof a cover{Uα}α∈I if eachVβ is a subset of someUα.

The spaceX is paracompactif every open cover isrefined by an open cover that is locally finite.

Theorem:I f X is a metric space, then it isparacompact.

Page 391: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ParacompactnessFix a topological spaceX.

• A family {Sα}α∈I of subsets ofX is locally finiteif everyx ∈ X has a neighborhoodW such thatthere are only finitely manyα with W ∩ Sα 6= ∅.

• A cover{Vβ}β∈B of X is arefinementof a cover{Uα}α∈I if eachVβ is a subset of someUα.

The spaceX is paracompactif every open cover isrefined by an open cover that is locally finite.

Theorem:I f X is a metric space, then it isparacompact.

A brief proof is given by Rudin, ME (1969) Proc.Am. Math. Soc. 20:603.

Page 392: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Partitions of UnityA partition of unityfor X subordinate to an opencover{Uα}α∈I is a collection of continuous functions{ψα : X → [0, 1]}α∈I such that:

Page 393: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Partitions of UnityA partition of unityfor X subordinate to an opencover{Uα}α∈I is a collection of continuous functions{ψα : X → [0, 1]}α∈I such that:

• ψα(x) = 0 for all α andx /∈ Uα;

Page 394: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Partitions of UnityA partition of unityfor X subordinate to an opencover{Uα}α∈I is a collection of continuous functions{ψα : X → [0, 1]}α∈I such that:

• ψα(x) = 0 for all α andx /∈ Uα;•∑

α∈I ψα(x) = 1 for eachx.

Page 395: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Partitions of UnityA partition of unityfor X subordinate to an opencover{Uα}α∈I is a collection of continuous functions{ψα : X → [0, 1]}α∈I such that:

• ψα(x) = 0 for all α andx /∈ Uα;•∑

α∈I ψα(x) = 1 for eachx.

Recall thatX is normal if any two disjoint closed setsare contained in disjoint open sets.

Page 396: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Partitions of UnityA partition of unityfor X subordinate to an opencover{Uα}α∈I is a collection of continuous functions{ψα : X → [0, 1]}α∈I such that:

• ψα(x) = 0 for all α andx /∈ Uα;•∑

α∈I ψα(x) = 1 for eachx.

Recall thatX is normal if any two disjoint closed setsare contained in disjoint open sets.

Theorem:I f X is normal and{Uα}α∈I is a locallyfinite open cover, then there is a partition of unitysubordinate to{Uα}.

Page 397: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proposition:I f X is normal and{Uα}α∈I is a locallyfinite open cover, then there is an open cover{Vα}α∈Isuch that for eachα, the closure ofVα is contained inUα.

Page 398: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proposition:I f X is normal and{Uα}α∈I is a locallyfinite open cover, then there is an open cover{Vα}α∈Isuch that for eachα, the closure ofVα is contained inUα.

• If X is a metric space we can letVα be the set ofx ∈ Uα such thatd(x,X \ Uβ) <

12d(x,X \ Uα)

for all β 6= α such thatx ∈ Uβ.

Page 399: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proposition:I f X is normal and{Uα}α∈I is a locallyfinite open cover, then there is an open cover{Vα}α∈Isuch that for eachα, the closure ofVα is contained inUα.

• If X is a metric space we can letVα be the set ofx ∈ Uα such thatd(x,X \ Uβ) <

12d(x,X \ Uα)

for all β 6= α such thatx ∈ Uβ.

Urysohn’s Lemma:I f X is normal andC ⊂ U ⊂ Xwith C closed andU open, then there is a continuousϕ : X → [0, 1] with ϕ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X \ U andϕ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ C.

Page 400: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proposition:I f X is normal and{Uα}α∈I is a locallyfinite open cover, then there is an open cover{Vα}α∈Isuch that for eachα, the closure ofVα is contained inUα.

• If X is a metric space we can letVα be the set ofx ∈ Uα such thatd(x,X \ Uβ) <

12d(x,X \ Uα)

for all β 6= α such thatx ∈ Uβ.

Urysohn’s Lemma:I f X is normal andC ⊂ U ⊂ Xwith C closed andU open, then there is a continuousϕ : X → [0, 1] with ϕ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X \ U andϕ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ C.

• For a metricX setϕ(x) = d(x,X\U)d(x,C)+d(x,X\U).

Page 401: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proof of the Theorem:

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Proof of the Theorem:

• Let {Vα}α∈I be an open cover ofX withV α ⊂ Uα for all α.

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Proof of the Theorem:

• Let {Vα}α∈I be an open cover ofX withV α ⊂ Uα for all α.

• For eachα let ϕα : X → [0, 1] be continuouswith ϕα(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X \ Uα andϕα(x) = 1 for all x ∈ V α.

Page 404: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Proof of the Theorem:

• Let {Vα}α∈I be an open cover ofX withV α ⊂ Uα for all α.

• For eachα let ϕα : X → [0, 1] be continuouswith ϕα(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X \ Uα andϕα(x) = 1 for all x ∈ V α.

• For eachα let ψα : X → [0, 1] be the function

ψα(x) =ϕα(x)

β∈I ϕβ(x).

Page 405: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dugundji’s TheoremThe following generalizes Tietze’ extension theoremfor metric spaces.

Theorem:I f A is a closed subset of a metric space(X, d), Y is a locally convex topological vector space,andf : A→ Y is continuous, then there is acontinuous extensionf : X → Y whose image iscontained in the convex hull off(A).

Page 406: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dugundji’s TheoremThe following generalizes Tietze’ extension theoremfor metric spaces.

Theorem:I f A is a closed subset of a metric space(X, d), Y is a locally convex topological vector space,andf : A→ Y is continuous, then there is acontinuous extensionf : X → Y whose image iscontained in the convex hull off(A).

To prove this:

• SinceX \ A is metric, hence paracompact, theopen cover{Bd(x,A)/2(x)}x∈X\I has a locallyfinite refinement{Uα}α∈I .

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• Let {ϕα}α∈I be a partition of unity subordinate to{Uα}α∈I .

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• Let {ϕα}α∈I be a partition of unity subordinate to{Uα}α∈I .

• For eachα chooseaα ∈ A with

d(aα, Uα) < 2d(A,Uα).

Page 409: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Let {ϕα}α∈I be a partition of unity subordinate to{Uα}α∈I .

• For eachα chooseaα ∈ A with

d(aα, Uα) < 2d(A,Uα).

• Define the extension by setting

f(x) :=∑

α∈I

ϕα(x)f(aα)

for x ∈ X \ A.

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• Let {ϕα}α∈I be a partition of unity subordinate to{Uα}α∈I .

• For eachα chooseaα ∈ A with

d(aα, Uα) < 2d(A,Uα).

• Define the extension by setting

f(x) :=∑

α∈I

ϕα(x)f(aα)

for x ∈ X \ A.

Exercise:Prove thatf is continuous.

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A Sufficient ConditionIt is easy to be an ANR:

Theorem:A metric spaceA is an ANR if it (or itshomeomorphic image) is a retract of an open subset ofa convex subset of a locally convex linear space.

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A Sufficient ConditionIt is easy to be an ANR:

Theorem:A metric spaceA is an ANR if it (or itshomeomorphic image) is a retract of an open subset ofa convex subset of a locally convex linear space.

• To prove this letr : U → A be a retraction, whereU is an open subset of a convex setC.

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A Sufficient ConditionIt is easy to be an ANR:

Theorem:A metric spaceA is an ANR if it (or itshomeomorphic image) is a retract of an open subset ofa convex subset of a locally convex linear space.

• To prove this letr : U → A be a retraction, whereU is an open subset of a convex setC.

• Supposeh : A→ X mapsA homeomorphicallyonto a closed subseth(A) of a metric spaceX.

Page 414: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

A Sufficient ConditionIt is easy to be an ANR:

Theorem:A metric spaceA is an ANR if it (or itshomeomorphic image) is a retract of an open subset ofa convex subset of a locally convex linear space.

• To prove this letr : U → A be a retraction, whereU is an open subset of a convex setC.

• Supposeh : A→ X mapsA homeomorphicallyonto a closed subseth(A) of a metric spaceX.

• Dugundji’s theorem implies thath−1 : h(A) → Uhas a continuous extensionj : X → C.

Page 415: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

A Sufficient ConditionIt is easy to be an ANR:

Theorem:A metric spaceA is an ANR if it (or itshomeomorphic image) is a retract of an open subset ofa convex subset of a locally convex linear space.

• To prove this letr : U → A be a retraction, whereU is an open subset of a convex setC.

• Supposeh : A→ X mapsA homeomorphicallyonto a closed subseth(A) of a metric spaceX.

• Dugundji’s theorem implies thath−1 : h(A) → Uhas a continuous extensionj : X → C.

• ThenV := j−1(U) is a neighborhood ofh(A),andh ◦ r ◦ j|V : V → h(A) is a retraction.

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Examples• Exercise:Prove that any finite simplicial complexT is a neighborhood retract of an open subset of aEuclidean space. (Hint:T is a subcomplex of theset∆ of probability measures on its set ofvertices.)

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Examples• Exercise:Prove that any finite simplicial complexT is a neighborhood retract of an open subset of aEuclidean space. (Hint:T is a subcomplex of theset∆ of probability measures on its set ofvertices.)

• If C is a compact metric space, the set ofbounded regular measures onC is a vector space.Theweak topologyis the coarsest topology suchthat for eachf ∈ C(C) the functionµ 7→

f dµis continuous. This topology is locally convex, sothe set of probability measures onC is an ANRbecause it is convex.

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Examples• Exercise:Prove that any finite simplicial complexT is a neighborhood retract of an open subset of aEuclidean space. (Hint:T is a subcomplex of theset∆ of probability measures on its set ofvertices.)

• If C is a compact metric space, the set ofbounded regular measures onC is a vector space.Theweak topologyis the coarsest topology suchthat for eachf ∈ C(C) the functionµ 7→

f dµis continuous. This topology is locally convex, sothe set of probability measures onC is an ANRbecause it is convex.

• The tubular neighborhood theorem implies that aC2 submanifold of a Euclidean space is an ANR.

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A Necessary Condition

Proposition:(Kuratowski, Wojdyslawski)A metricspaceX has an embeddingι : X → C(X) such thatι(X) is a relatively closed subset of a convex set, andis a closed subset ofC(X) if X is complete.

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A Necessary Condition

Proposition:(Kuratowski, Wojdyslawski)A metricspaceX has an embeddingι : X → C(X) such thatι(X) is a relatively closed subset of a convex set, andis a closed subset ofC(X) if X is complete.

• Exercise:For eachx ∈ X let fx ∈ C(X) be thefunctionfx(y) := min{1, d(x, y)}. Prove thatι : x 7→ fx is satisfactory.

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Theorem:I f A is an ANR, then there is a convexsubsetC of Banach space such that (a homeomorphicimage of)A is both a closed subset ofC and a retractof a neighborhoodU ⊂ C.

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Theorem:I f A is an ANR, then there is a convexsubsetC of Banach space such that (a homeomorphicimage of)A is both a closed subset ofC and a retractof a neighborhoodU ⊂ C.

• Proof. Let h : A→ Z (whereZ is a Banachspace) such thath mapsA homeomorphicallyontoh(A) andh(A) is closed in the relativetopology of its convex hullC. SinceA is anANR, there is a relatively openU ⊂ C and aretractionr : U → h(A).

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Absolute RetractsA metric spaceA is anabsolute retract(AR) if h(A)is a retract ofX wheneverX is a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed.

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Absolute RetractsA metric spaceA is anabsolute retract(AR) if h(A)is a retract ofX wheneverX is a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed.

• The most important facts concerning AR’s are:

Theorem:For a metric spaceA the following areequivalent:

Page 425: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Absolute RetractsA metric spaceA is anabsolute retract(AR) if h(A)is a retract ofX wheneverX is a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed.

• The most important facts concerning AR’s are:

Theorem:For a metric spaceA the following areequivalent:

• A is an AR.

Page 426: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Absolute RetractsA metric spaceA is anabsolute retract(AR) if h(A)is a retract ofX wheneverX is a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed.

• The most important facts concerning AR’s are:

Theorem:For a metric spaceA the following areequivalent:

• A is an AR.• There is a convex subsetC of a Banach space

such that (a homeomorphic image of)A is both aclosed subset ofC and a retract ofC.

Page 427: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Absolute RetractsA metric spaceA is anabsolute retract(AR) if h(A)is a retract ofX wheneverX is a metric space,h : A→ X is an embedding, andh(A) is closed.

• The most important facts concerning AR’s are:

Theorem:For a metric spaceA the following areequivalent:

• A is an AR.• There is a convex subsetC of a Banach space

such that (a homeomorphic image of)A is both aclosed subset ofC and a retract ofC.

• A is a contractible ANR.

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DominationFix a metric space(X, d).

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DominationFix a metric space(X, d).

• If Y is a topological space andε > 0, a homotopyη : Y × [0, 1] → X is anε-homotopyifd(η(y, t), η(y, t′)) < ε for all y,∈ Y andt, t′ ∈ [0, 1]. We say thatη0 andη1 areε-homotopic.

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DominationFix a metric space(X, d).

• If Y is a topological space andε > 0, a homotopyη : Y × [0, 1] → X is anε-homotopyifd(η(y, t), η(y, t′)) < ε for all y,∈ Y andt, t′ ∈ [0, 1]. We say thatη0 andη1 areε-homotopic.

• A topological spaceD ε-dominatesC ⊂ X ifthere are continuous functionsϕ : C → D andψ : D → X such thatψ ◦ ϕ : C → X isε-homotopic toIdC .

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Theorem:If X is a separable ANR andC ⊂ X iscompact, then for anyε > 0 there is a finite simplicialT complex such that|T | ε-dominatesC.

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Theorem:If X is a separable ANR andC ⊂ X iscompact, then for anyε > 0 there is a finite simplicialT complex such that|T | ε-dominatesC.

• One can easily show that if this is true for themetricd, then it is true for any equivalent metric.Therefore we may assume that:

Page 433: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Theorem:If X is a separable ANR andC ⊂ X iscompact, then for anyε > 0 there is a finite simplicialT complex such that|T | ε-dominatesC.

• One can easily show that if this is true for themetricd, then it is true for any equivalent metric.Therefore we may assume that:• X is a closed subset of convex subsetC of a

Banach space.

Page 434: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Theorem:If X is a separable ANR andC ⊂ X iscompact, then for anyε > 0 there is a finite simplicialT complex such that|T | ε-dominatesC.

• One can easily show that if this is true for themetricd, then it is true for any equivalent metric.Therefore we may assume that:• X is a closed subset of convex subsetC of a

Banach space.• There is a retractionr : U → X whereU ⊂ C is relatively open.

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• For eachx ∈ X chooseρx > 0 such that

B2ρx(x) ⊂ U and r(B2ρx(x)) ⊂ Bε/2(x).

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• For eachx ∈ X chooseρx > 0 such that

B2ρx(x) ⊂ U and r(B2ρx(x)) ⊂ Bε/2(x).

• Choosex1, . . . , xn such that

U := {Bρx1(x1), . . . ,Bρxn(xn)}

is a cover ofC.

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• For eachx ∈ X chooseρx > 0 such that

B2ρx(x) ⊂ U and r(B2ρx(x)) ⊂ Bε/2(x).

• Choosex1, . . . , xn such that

U := {Bρx1(x1), . . . ,Bρxn(xn)}

is a cover ofC.• Notation: for eachV = Bρxi

(xi) ∈ U letxV = xi, and leteV be the correspondingstandard unit basis vector ofRU .

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• Thenerveof U is the simplicial complex

NU = (U ,ΣU)

where the elements ofΣU are∅ and the simplices

con({ eV : V ∈ σ })

for those finiteσ ⊂ U such that⋂

V ∈σ V 6= ∅.

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• Thenerveof U is the simplicial complex

NU = (U ,ΣU)

where the elements ofΣU are∅ and the simplices

con({ eV : V ∈ σ })

for those finiteσ ⊂ U such that⋂

V ∈σ V 6= ∅.

• Let {αV : X → [0, 1]}V ∈U be a partition ofunity ofC subordinate toU .

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• Let ϕ : C → |NU | be the function

ϕ(x) =∑

V ∈U

αV (x)eV .

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• Let ϕ : C → |NU | be the function

ϕ(x) =∑

V ∈U

αV (x)eV .

• Let ψ : |NU | → X be the function

ψ(

V ∈U

βV eV

)

= r(

V ∈U

βV xV

)

.

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• Let ϕ : C → |NU | be the function

ϕ(x) =∑

V ∈U

αV (x)eV .

• Let ψ : |NU | → X be the function

ψ(

V ∈U

βV eV

)

= r(

V ∈U

βV xV

)

.

• The homotopyη : C × [0, 1] → X is

η(x, t) = r(

(1− t)∑

V

αV (x)xV + tx)

.

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GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

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GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Continuous functionsf : U → Y , f ′ : U ′ → Yhave the same germ atA if f |V = f ′|V for someneighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.

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GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Continuous functionsf : U → Y , f ′ : U ′ → Yhave the same germ atA if f |V = f ′|V for someneighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• This is easily seen to be an equivalence

relation.

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GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Continuous functionsf : U → Y , f ′ : U ′ → Yhave the same germ atA if f |V = f ′|V for someneighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• This is easily seen to be an equivalence

relation.• Its equivalence classes are calledgermsof

continuous functions fromX to Y atA.

Page 447: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Continuous functionsf : U → Y , f ′ : U ′ → Yhave the same germ atA if f |V = f ′|V for someneighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• This is easily seen to be an equivalence

relation.• Its equivalence classes are calledgermsof

continuous functions fromX to Y atA.• Let gA(X,Y ) be the set of such germs.

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GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Continuous functionsf : U → Y , f ′ : U ′ → Yhave the same germ atA if f |V = f ′|V for someneighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• This is easily seen to be an equivalence

relation.• Its equivalence classes are calledgermsof

continuous functions fromX to Y atA.• Let gA(X,Y ) be the set of such germs.• Forf as above letγA(f) be its equivalence

class.

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GermsLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Continuous functionsf : U → Y , f ′ : U ′ → Yhave the same germ atA if f |V = f ′|V for someneighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• This is easily seen to be an equivalence

relation.• Its equivalence classes are calledgermsof

continuous functions fromX to Y atA.• Let gA(X,Y ) be the set of such germs.• Forf as above letγA(f) be its equivalence

class.• We say thatf is arepresentativeof γA(f).

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Why Germs?Let V andW be finite dimensional vector spaces.

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Why Germs?Let V andW be finite dimensional vector spaces.

• Additivity implies thatΛV (f) = ΛV (f |C ′) whenf : C → V is index admissible and a compactC ′ ⊂ C containsF(f) in its interior.

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Why Germs?Let V andW be finite dimensional vector spaces.

• Additivity implies thatΛV (f) = ΛV (f |C ′) whenf : C → V is index admissible and a compactC ′ ⊂ C containsF(f) in its interior.

• This means thatΛV (f) is really an attribute ofthe germ off atF(f).

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Why Germs?Let V andW be finite dimensional vector spaces.

• Additivity implies thatΛV (f) = ΛV (f |C ′) whenf : C → V is index admissible and a compactC ′ ⊂ C containsF(f) in its interior.

• This means thatΛV (f) is really an attribute ofthe germ off atF(f).

• Recall Commutativity:ΛV (g ◦ f) = ΛW (f ◦ g)whenC ⊂ V andD ⊂ W are compact,f : C → D andg : D → C are continuous, andg ◦ f andf ◦ g are index admissible.

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Why Germs?Let V andW be finite dimensional vector spaces.

• Additivity implies thatΛV (f) = ΛV (f |C ′) whenf : C → V is index admissible and a compactC ′ ⊂ C containsF(f) in its interior.

• This means thatΛV (f) is really an attribute ofthe germ off atF(f).

• Recall Commutativity:ΛV (g ◦ f) = ΛW (f ◦ g)whenC ⊂ V andD ⊂ W are compact,f : C → D andg : D → C are continuous, andg ◦ f andf ◦ g are index admissible.• Actually, we only needf andg to be defined

on neighborhoods ofF(g ◦ f) andF(f ◦ g).

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Operations on GermsGerms can be recombined in several ways.

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Operations on GermsGerms can be recombined in several ways.

• If γ ∈ gA(X,Y ) andZ ⊂ A is compact, then therestrictionγ|Z of γ toZ is defined by requiringthat a representative ofγ is also a representativeof γ|Z .

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Operations on GermsGerms can be recombined in several ways.

• If γ ∈ gA(X,Y ) andZ ⊂ A is compact, then therestrictionγ|Z of γ toZ is defined by requiringthat a representative ofγ is also a representativeof γ|Z .

• If γ ∈ gA(X,Y ), η ∈ gB(Y, Z), andγ(A) ⊂ B,then thecompositionη ◦ γ is the germ atA of acomposition of representatives ofγ andη.

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Operations on GermsGerms can be recombined in several ways.

• If γ ∈ gA(X,Y ) andZ ⊂ A is compact, then therestrictionγ|Z of γ toZ is defined by requiringthat a representative ofγ is also a representativeof γ|Z .

• If γ ∈ gA(X,Y ), η ∈ gB(Y, Z), andγ(A) ⊂ B,then thecompositionη ◦ γ is the germ atA of acomposition of representatives ofγ andη.

• Forγ ∈ gA(X,Y ) andγ′ ∈ gA′(X ′, Y ′) we defineγ × γ′ ∈ gA×A′′(X ×X ′, Y × Y ′) to be the germof f × f ′, (x, x′) 7→ (f(x), f ′(x′)) wheref andf ′

are representatives ofγ andγ′.

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The Index for ANR’sLet ANR be the class of locally compact ANR’s, andfix X ∈ ANR.

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The Index for ANR’sLet ANR be the class of locally compact ANR’s, andfix X ∈ ANR.

• A continuous functionf : C → X, whereC ⊂ X is compact, isindex admissibleifF(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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The Index for ANR’sLet ANR be the class of locally compact ANR’s, andfix X ∈ ANR.

• A continuous functionf : C → X, whereC ⊂ X is compact, isindex admissibleifF(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• Let IX be the set of suchf .

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The Index for ANR’sLet ANR be the class of locally compact ANR’s, andfix X ∈ ANR.

• A continuous functionf : C → X, whereC ⊂ X is compact, isindex admissibleifF(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• Let IX be the set of suchf .

• A germγ ∈ gA(X,X) is index admissibleif ithas a representativef : C → X whereC ⊂ X iscompact,A ∩ ∂C = ∅, andF(f) ⊂ A.

Page 463: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Index for ANR’sLet ANR be the class of locally compact ANR’s, andfix X ∈ ANR.

• A continuous functionf : C → X, whereC ⊂ X is compact, isindex admissibleifF(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• Let IX be the set of suchf .

• A germγ ∈ gA(X,X) is index admissibleif ithas a representativef : C → X whereC ⊂ X iscompact,A ∩ ∂C = ∅, andF(f) ⊂ A.• Let GX be the set of such germs.

Page 464: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Index for ANR’sLet ANR be the class of locally compact ANR’s, andfix X ∈ ANR.

• A continuous functionf : C → X, whereC ⊂ X is compact, isindex admissibleifF(f) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• Let IX be the set of suchf .

• A germγ ∈ gA(X,X) is index admissibleif ithas a representativef : C → X whereC ⊂ X iscompact,A ∩ ∂C = ∅, andF(f) ⊂ A.• Let GX be the set of such germs.

• Let πX : IX → GX be the functionf 7→ γF(f)(f).

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Theorem:There is a unique system of functionsΛX : GX → Z for X ∈ ANR satisfying:

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Theorem:There is a unique system of functionsΛX : GX → Z for X ∈ ANR satisfying:

• (Normalization) For allX ∈ ANR andx ∈ X, ifcx : X → X is the constant function with valuex, then

ΛX(γ{x}(cx)) = 1.

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Theorem:There is a unique system of functionsΛX : GX → Z for X ∈ ANR satisfying:

• (Normalization) For allX ∈ ANR andx ∈ X, ifcx : X → X is the constant function with valuex, then

ΛX(γ{x}(cx)) = 1.

• (Additivity) If X ∈ ANR, γ ∈ GX has domainA, andA1, . . . , Ar are pairwise disjoint compactsubsets ofA with F(γ) ⊂ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ar, then

ΛX(γ) =∑

i

ΛX(γ|Ai) .

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• (Continuity) For eachX ∈ ANR and compactC ⊂ X, ΛX ◦ πX |C(C,X)∩IX is continuous.

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• (Continuity) For eachX ∈ ANR and compactC ⊂ X, ΛX ◦ πX |C(C,X)∩IX is continuous.

• (Commutativity) IfX,X ′ ∈ ANR, A ⊂ X andA′ ⊂ X ′ are compact,γ ∈ gA(X,X

′) andγ′ ∈ gA′(X ′, X) with γ(A) ⊂ A′ andγ′(A′) ⊂ A,andγ′ ◦ γ andγ ◦ γ′ are index admissible, then

ΛX(γ′ ◦ γ) = ΛX ′(γ ◦ γ′) .

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• (Continuity) For eachX ∈ ANR and compactC ⊂ X, ΛX ◦ πX |C(C,X)∩IX is continuous.

• (Commutativity) IfX,X ′ ∈ ANR, A ⊂ X andA′ ⊂ X ′ are compact,γ ∈ gA(X,X

′) andγ′ ∈ gA′(X ′, X) with γ(A) ⊂ A′ andγ′(A′) ⊂ A,andγ′ ◦ γ andγ ◦ γ′ are index admissible, then

ΛX(γ′ ◦ γ) = ΛX ′(γ ◦ γ′) .

In addition these functions satisfy:• (Multiplication) If X,X ′ ∈ ANR, γ ∈ GX , andγ′ ∈ GX ′, then

ΛX×X ′(γ × γ′) = ΛX(γ) · ΛX ′(γ′).

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Proof: the Key IdeaFix X ∈ ANR, a compactA ⊂ X, andγ ∈ gA(X,X) ∩ GX .

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Proof: the Key IdeaFix X ∈ ANR, a compactA ⊂ X, andγ ∈ gA(X,X) ∩ GX .

• Fix a compactC ⊂ X that containsA in itsinterior andf : C → X such thatγA(f) = γ andF(f) ⊂ A.

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Proof: the Key IdeaFix X ∈ ANR, a compactA ⊂ X, andγ ∈ gA(X,X) ∩ GX .

• Fix a compactC ⊂ X that containsA in itsinterior andf : C → X such thatγA(f) = γ andF(f) ⊂ A.

• For “sufficiently small”ε > 0 let T be a finitesimplicial complex thatε-dominatesC by virtueof the mapsϕ : C → |T | andψ : |T | → X andtheε-homotopyη : C × [0, 1] → X withη0 = IdC andη1 = ψ ◦ ϕ.

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Proof: the Key IdeaFix X ∈ ANR, a compactA ⊂ X, andγ ∈ gA(X,X) ∩ GX .

• Fix a compactC ⊂ X that containsA in itsinterior andf : C → X such thatγA(f) = γ andF(f) ⊂ A.

• For “sufficiently small”ε > 0 let T be a finitesimplicial complex thatε-dominatesC by virtueof the mapsϕ : C → |T | andψ : |T | → X andtheε-homotopyη : C × [0, 1] → X withη0 = IdC andη1 = ψ ◦ ϕ.

• Embed|T | in someRm. Since|T | is an ANRthere is a retractionr : U → |T | whereU is aneighborhood of|T | whose closure is compact.

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• LetB ⊂ C be a neighborhood ofF(f) such thatη(x, t) ∈ C for all (x, t) ∈ B × [0, 1].

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• LetB ⊂ C be a neighborhood ofF(f) such thatη(x, t) ∈ C for all (x, t) ∈ B × [0, 1].

• We wish to defineΛX by setting

ΛX(γ) = ΛRm(ϕ ◦ f ◦ ψ ◦ r|r−1(ψ−1(B))).

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• LetB ⊂ C be a neighborhood ofF(f) such thatη(x, t) ∈ C for all (x, t) ∈ B × [0, 1].

• We wish to defineΛX by setting

ΛX(γ) = ΛRm(ϕ ◦ f ◦ ψ ◦ r|r−1(ψ−1(B))).

• (Here we writeΛX(f) in place ofΛX(πX(f)).)

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• LetB ⊂ C be a neighborhood ofF(f) such thatη(x, t) ∈ C for all (x, t) ∈ B × [0, 1].

• We wish to defineΛX by setting

ΛX(γ) = ΛRm(ϕ ◦ f ◦ ψ ◦ r|r−1(ψ−1(B))).

• (Here we writeΛX(f) in place ofΛX(πX(f)).)

• We are motivated by the calculation

ΛRm(ϕ◦f ◦ψ◦r|r−1(ψ−1(B))) = ΛX(ψ◦r◦ϕ◦f |B)

= ΛX(ψ ◦ ϕ ◦ f |B) = ΛX(η1 ◦ f |B)

= ΛX(η0 ◦ f |B) = ΛX(f |B).

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• The calculation above shows that if a system{ΛX}X∈ANR satisfying our conditions exists, theformula we wish to take as a definition must hold.

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• The calculation above shows that if a system{ΛX}X∈ANR satisfying our conditions exists, theformula we wish to take as a definition must hold.• This establishes the Theorem’s uniqueness

assertion.

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• The calculation above shows that if a system{ΛX}X∈ANR satisfying our conditions exists, theformula we wish to take as a definition must hold.• This establishes the Theorem’s uniqueness

assertion.• It remains to:

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• The calculation above shows that if a system{ΛX}X∈ANR satisfying our conditions exists, theformula we wish to take as a definition must hold.• This establishes the Theorem’s uniqueness

assertion.• It remains to:

• Show that the definition is workable, in thesense of begin well posed and independent ofchoices.

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• The calculation above shows that if a system{ΛX}X∈ANR satisfying our conditions exists, theformula we wish to take as a definition must hold.• This establishes the Theorem’s uniqueness

assertion.• It remains to:

• Show that the definition is workable, in thesense of begin well posed and independent ofchoices.

• Show that whenΛX is defined in this way, allconditions are in fact satisfied.

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• The calculation above shows that if a system{ΛX}X∈ANR satisfying our conditions exists, theformula we wish to take as a definition must hold.• This establishes the Theorem’s uniqueness

assertion.• It remains to:

• Show that the definition is workable, in thesense of begin well posed and independent ofchoices.

• Show that whenΛX is defined in this way, allconditions are in fact satisfied.• We omit these numerous and lengthy

verifications.

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Advanced Fixed Point Theory

5. Approximation of Correspondences byFunctions

– p. 122

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Approximation by FunctionsOur topic in this section is the following result.

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Approximation by FunctionsOur topic in this section is the following result.

Theorem:Suppose thatX andY are ANR’s,X isseparable, andC andD are compact subsets ofXwith C ⊂ intD. LetF : D → Y be an upperhemicontinuous contractible valued correspondence.Then for any neighborhoodW of Gr(F |C) there are:

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Approximation by FunctionsOur topic in this section is the following result.

Theorem:Suppose thatX andY are ANR’s,X isseparable, andC andD are compact subsets ofXwith C ⊂ intD. LetF : D → Y be an upperhemicontinuous contractible valued correspondence.Then for any neighborhoodW of Gr(F |C) there are:

(a) a continuousf : C → Y with Gr(f) ⊂ W ;

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Approximation by FunctionsOur topic in this section is the following result.

Theorem:Suppose thatX andY are ANR’s,X isseparable, andC andD are compact subsets ofXwith C ⊂ intD. LetF : D → Y be an upperhemicontinuous contractible valued correspondence.Then for any neighborhoodW of Gr(F |C) there are:

(a) a continuousf : C → Y with Gr(f) ⊂ W ;

(b) a neighborhoodW ′ of Gr(F ) such that, for anytwo continuous functionsf0, f1 : D → Y withGr(f0),Gr(f1) ⊂ W ′, there is a homotopyh : C × [0, 1] → Y with h0 = f0|C , h1 = f1|C ,andGr(ht) ⊂W for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.

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AgendaWe have the following concerns:

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AgendaWe have the following concerns:

• We will use the result above to extend the theoryof the fixed point index to contractible valuedcorrespondences.

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AgendaWe have the following concerns:

• We will use the result above to extend the theoryof the fixed point index to contractible valuedcorrespondences.

• We will say a few things about the proof.

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AgendaWe have the following concerns:

• We will use the result above to extend the theoryof the fixed point index to contractible valuedcorrespondences.

• We will say a few things about the proof.• Probably time will not permit a lengthy

discussion.

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AgendaWe have the following concerns:

• We will use the result above to extend the theoryof the fixed point index to contractible valuedcorrespondences.

• We will say a few things about the proof.• Probably time will not permit a lengthy

discussion.

Notation: If C andY are metric spaces withCcompoact, thenU(C, Y ) is the space of upperhemicontinuous correspondencesF : C → Y , withthe topology generated by the base of open setsUW := {F : Gr(F ) ⊂ W } whereW ⊂ C × Y isopen.

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Germs of CorrespondencesLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

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Germs of CorrespondencesLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Upper hemicontinuous correspondencesF : U → Y , F ′ : U ′ → Y have the same germ atA if F |V = F ′|V for some neighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.

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Germs of CorrespondencesLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Upper hemicontinuous correspondencesF : U → Y , F ′ : U ′ → Y have the same germ atA if F |V = F ′|V for some neighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• The equivalence classes of this equivalence

relation aregermsof upper hemicontinuouscorrespondences fromX to Y atA.

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Germs of CorrespondencesLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Upper hemicontinuous correspondencesF : U → Y , F ′ : U ′ → Y have the same germ atA if F |V = F ′|V for some neighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• The equivalence classes of this equivalence

relation aregermsof upper hemicontinuouscorrespondences fromX to Y atA.

• LetGA(X,Y ) be the set of such germs.

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Germs of CorrespondencesLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Upper hemicontinuous correspondencesF : U → Y , F ′ : U ′ → Y have the same germ atA if F |V = F ′|V for some neighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• The equivalence classes of this equivalence

relation aregermsof upper hemicontinuouscorrespondences fromX to Y atA.

• LetGA(X,Y ) be the set of such germs.• ForF as above letΓA(F ) be its equivalence

class.

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Germs of CorrespondencesLetX andY be topological spaces, and letA ⊂ X becompact, and letU,U ′ ⊂ X be neighborhoods ofA.

• Upper hemicontinuous correspondencesF : U → Y , F ′ : U ′ → Y have the same germ atA if F |V = F ′|V for some neighborhoodV ⊂ U ∩ U ′ of A.• The equivalence classes of this equivalence

relation aregermsof upper hemicontinuouscorrespondences fromX to Y atA.

• LetGA(X,Y ) be the set of such germs.• ForF as above letΓA(F ) be its equivalence

class.• We say thatF is arepresentativeof ΓA(F ).

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Operations on GermsAs before, germs of correspondences can berecombined.

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Operations on GermsAs before, germs of correspondences can berecombined.

• If Γ ∈ GA(X,Y ) andZ ⊂ A is compact, then therestrictionΓ|Z of Γ toZ is defined by requiringthat a representative ofΓ is also a representativeof Γ|Z.

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Operations on GermsAs before, germs of correspondences can berecombined.

• If Γ ∈ GA(X,Y ) andZ ⊂ A is compact, then therestrictionΓ|Z of Γ toZ is defined by requiringthat a representative ofΓ is also a representativeof Γ|Z.

• ForΓ ∈ GA(X,Y ) andΓ′ ∈ GA′(X ′, Y ′) wedefineΓ× Γ′ ∈ GA×A′′(X ×X ′, Y × Y ′) to bethe germ ofF × F ′, (x, x′) 7→ F (x)× F ′(x′)whereF andF ′ are representatives ofΓ andΓ′.

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The Index for CorrespondencesFix X ∈ ANR.

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The Index for CorrespondencesFix X ∈ ANR.

• An upper hemicontinuous contractible valuedcorrespondenceF : C → X, whereC ⊂ X iscompact, isindex admissibleif F(F ) ∩ ∂C = ∅.

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The Index for CorrespondencesFix X ∈ ANR.

• An upper hemicontinuous contractible valuedcorrespondenceF : C → X, whereC ⊂ X iscompact, isindex admissibleif F(F ) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• LetJX be the set of suchF .

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The Index for CorrespondencesFix X ∈ ANR.

• An upper hemicontinuous contractible valuedcorrespondenceF : C → X, whereC ⊂ X iscompact, isindex admissibleif F(F ) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• LetJX be the set of suchF .

• A germΓ ∈ GA(X,X) is index admissibleif ithas a representativeF ∈ U(C,X) ∩ JX , whereC ⊂ X is compact, withF(F ) ⊂ A.

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The Index for CorrespondencesFix X ∈ ANR.

• An upper hemicontinuous contractible valuedcorrespondenceF : C → X, whereC ⊂ X iscompact, isindex admissibleif F(F ) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• LetJX be the set of suchF .

• A germΓ ∈ GA(X,X) is index admissibleif ithas a representativeF ∈ U(C,X) ∩ JX , whereC ⊂ X is compact, withF(F ) ⊂ A.• Let CX be the set of such germs.

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The Index for CorrespondencesFix X ∈ ANR.

• An upper hemicontinuous contractible valuedcorrespondenceF : C → X, whereC ⊂ X iscompact, isindex admissibleif F(F ) ∩ ∂C = ∅.• LetJX be the set of suchF .

• A germΓ ∈ GA(X,X) is index admissibleif ithas a representativeF ∈ U(C,X) ∩ JX , whereC ⊂ X is compact, withF(F ) ⊂ A.• Let CX be the set of such germs.

• ForF ∈ IX let πX(F ) := ΓF(F )(F ).

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Theorem:There is a unique system of functionsΛX : CX → Z for X ∈ ANR satisfying:

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Theorem:There is a unique system of functionsΛX : CX → Z for X ∈ ANR satisfying:

• (Normalization) For allX ∈ ANR andx ∈ X, ifcx : X → X is the constant function with valuex, then

ΛX(γ{x}(cx)) = 1.

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Theorem:There is a unique system of functionsΛX : CX → Z for X ∈ ANR satisfying:

• (Normalization) For allX ∈ ANR andx ∈ X, ifcx : X → X is the constant function with valuex, then

ΛX(γ{x}(cx)) = 1.

• (Additivity) If X ∈ ANR, Γ ∈ CX has domainA, andA1, . . . , Ar are pairwise disjoint compactsubsets ofA with F(Γ) ⊂ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ar, then

ΛX(Γ) =∑

i

ΛX(Γ|Ai) .

Page 513: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• (Continuity) For eachX ∈ ANR and compactC ⊂ X, ΛX ◦ πX |U(C,X)∩JX

is continuous.

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• (Continuity) For eachX ∈ ANR and compactC ⊂ X, ΛX ◦ πX |U(C,X)∩JX

is continuous.

• (Commutativity) IfX,X ′ ∈ ANR, A ⊂ X andA′ ⊂ X ′ are compact,γ ∈ gA(X,X

′) andγ′ ∈ gA′(X ′, X) with γ(A) ⊂ A′ andγ′(A′) ⊂ A,andγ′ ◦ γ andγ ◦ γ′ are index admissible, then

ΛX(γ′ ◦ γ) = ΛX ′(γ ◦ γ′) .

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• (Continuity) For eachX ∈ ANR and compactC ⊂ X, ΛX ◦ πX |U(C,X)∩JX

is continuous.

• (Commutativity) IfX,X ′ ∈ ANR, A ⊂ X andA′ ⊂ X ′ are compact,γ ∈ gA(X,X

′) andγ′ ∈ gA′(X ′, X) with γ(A) ⊂ A′ andγ′(A′) ⊂ A,andγ′ ◦ γ andγ ◦ γ′ are index admissible, then

ΛX(γ′ ◦ γ) = ΛX ′(γ ◦ γ′) .

In addition these functions satisfy:• (Multiplication) If X,X ′ ∈ ANR, Γ ∈ CX , andΓ′ ∈ CX ′, then

ΛX×X ′(Γ× Γ′) = ΛX(Γ) · ΛX ′(Γ′).

Page 516: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Idea of the Proof• Fix anX ∈ ANR and a germΓ ∈ CX .

Page 517: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Idea of the Proof• Fix anX ∈ ANR and a germΓ ∈ CX .

• LetG be a representative ofΓ withF(G) = F(Γ), and letC be the domain ofG.

Page 518: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Idea of the Proof• Fix anX ∈ ANR and a germΓ ∈ CX .

• LetG be a representative ofΓ withF(G) = F(Γ), and letC be the domain ofG.

• LetW be a neighborhood ofGr(G) that does notintersect{ (x, x) : x ∈ ∂C }.

Page 519: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Idea of the Proof• Fix anX ∈ ANR and a germΓ ∈ CX .

• LetG be a representative ofΓ withF(G) = F(Γ), and letC be the domain ofG.

• LetW be a neighborhood ofGr(G) that does notintersect{ (x, x) : x ∈ ∂C }.

• The Theorem gives a neighborhoodV ⊂ W ofGr(G) such that for any mapsf0, f1 : C → Xwith Gr(f0),Gr(f1) ⊂ V there is a homotopyh : C → [0, 1] → X with h0 = f0, h1 = f1, andGr(ht) ⊂W for all t.

Page 520: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Idea of the Proof• Fix anX ∈ ANR and a germΓ ∈ CX .

• LetG be a representative ofΓ withF(G) = F(Γ), and letC be the domain ofG.

• LetW be a neighborhood ofGr(G) that does notintersect{ (x, x) : x ∈ ∂C }.

• The Theorem gives a neighborhoodV ⊂ W ofGr(G) such that for any mapsf0, f1 : C → Xwith Gr(f0),Gr(f1) ⊂ V there is a homotopyh : C → [0, 1] → X with h0 = f0, h1 = f1, andGr(ht) ⊂W for all t.

• The Theorem also gives a continuousf : C → Xwith Gr(f ′) ⊂ V , and we setΛX(Γ) := ΛX(f).

Page 521: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Advanced Fixed Point Theory

6. Sequential Equilibria as Fixed Points

– p. 131

Page 522: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential EquilibriumThis topic considers sequential equilibria of finiteextensive games.

Page 523: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential EquilibriumThis topic considers sequential equilibria of finiteextensive games.

• After looking at an example, we lay out themachinery of extensive form game theory.

Page 524: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential EquilibriumThis topic considers sequential equilibria of finiteextensive games.

• After looking at an example, we lay out themachinery of extensive form game theory.

• Sequential equilibria is defined.

Page 525: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential EquilibriumThis topic considers sequential equilibria of finiteextensive games.

• After looking at an example, we lay out themachinery of extensive form game theory.

• Sequential equilibria is defined.• A well behaved (uhccv) correspondence is

introduced that (roughly speaking) has the set ofsequential equilibria as its fixed points.

Page 526: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential EquilibriumThis topic considers sequential equilibria of finiteextensive games.

• After looking at an example, we lay out themachinery of extensive form game theory.

• Sequential equilibria is defined.• A well behaved (uhccv) correspondence is

introduced that (roughly speaking) has the set ofsequential equilibria as its fixed points.• By perturbing this correspondence, or

defining subcorrespondences, we may definerefinements of the sequential equilibriumconcept.

Page 527: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Signalling GamesThe Beer-Quiche game from Cho and Kreps (1987):(

0

1

)

(

2

0

)

(

1

0

)

(

3

1

)

(

1

1

)

(

3

0

)

(

0

0

)

(

2

1

)

b b b

b b bW

0.1

BW CW

S

0.9

BS CS

AB

AB

WB

WB

AC

AC

WC

WC

R R

– p. 133

Page 528: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The TreeThe set of possible states of the game, which arecallednodes, is a finite setT .

Page 529: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The TreeThe set of possible states of the game, which arecallednodes, is a finite setT .

• Let≺ (“precedes”) be a strict partial ordering(transitive irreflexive binary relation) ofT .

Page 530: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The TreeThe set of possible states of the game, which arecallednodes, is a finite setT .

• Let≺ (“precedes”) be a strict partial ordering(transitive irreflexive binary relation) ofT .

• For t ∈ T let P (t) := {x ∈ T : x ≺ t} be the setof predecessorsof t.

Page 531: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The TreeThe set of possible states of the game, which arecallednodes, is a finite setT .

• Let≺ (“precedes”) be a strict partial ordering(transitive irreflexive binary relation) ofT .

• For t ∈ T let P (t) := {x ∈ T : x ≺ t} be the setof predecessorsof t.

• We assume that(T,≺) is anarborescence: foreacht, P (t) is completely ordered by≺.

Page 532: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The TreeThe set of possible states of the game, which arecallednodes, is a finite setT .

• Let≺ (“precedes”) be a strict partial ordering(transitive irreflexive binary relation) ofT .

• For t ∈ T let P (t) := {x ∈ T : x ≺ t} be the setof predecessorsof t.

• We assume that(T,≺) is anarborescence: foreacht, P (t) is completely ordered by≺.

Notation: Let:

W = {w ∈ T : P (w) = ∅ }, X = T\Z, Y = T\W,

and Z = { z ∈ T : P−1(z) = ∅ }.

Page 533: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Information Sets and ActionsThere is a partitionH of X whose cells are calledinformation sets.

Page 534: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Information Sets and ActionsThere is a partitionH of X whose cells are calledinformation sets.

• For eachh ∈ H there is a nonempty setAh ofactionsthat may be chosen ath.

Page 535: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Information Sets and ActionsThere is a partitionH of X whose cells are calledinformation sets.

• For eachh ∈ H there is a nonempty setAh ofactionsthat may be chosen ath.

• There is a functionc :⋃

h∈H h× Ah → Y ;c(x, a) is theimmediate consequenceofchoosinga ∈ Ah atx ∈ H.

Page 536: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Information Sets and ActionsThere is a partitionH of X whose cells are calledinformation sets.

• For eachh ∈ H there is a nonempty setAh ofactionsthat may be chosen ath.

• There is a functionc :⋃

h∈H h× Ah → Y ;c(x, a) is theimmediate consequenceofchoosinga ∈ Ah atx ∈ H.

• Fory ∈ Y let p(y) = maxP (y).

Page 537: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Information Sets and ActionsThere is a partitionH of X whose cells are calledinformation sets.

• For eachh ∈ H there is a nonempty setAh ofactionsthat may be chosen ath.

• There is a functionc :⋃

h∈H h× Ah → Y ;c(x, a) is theimmediate consequenceofchoosinga ∈ Ah atx ∈ H.

• Fory ∈ Y let p(y) = maxP (y).• We require that for eachh andx ∈ H,c(x, ·) : Ah → Y mapsAh bijectively ontop−1(x).

Page 538: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Information Sets and ActionsThere is a partitionH of X whose cells are calledinformation sets.

• For eachh ∈ H there is a nonempty setAh ofactionsthat may be chosen ath.

• There is a functionc :⋃

h∈H h× Ah → Y ;c(x, a) is theimmediate consequenceofchoosinga ∈ Ah atx ∈ H.

• Fory ∈ Y let p(y) = maxP (y).• We require that for eachh andx ∈ H,c(x, ·) : Ah → Y mapsAh bijectively ontop−1(x).• Defineα : Y →

hAh implicitly byrequiring thatc(p(y), α(y)) = y.

Page 539: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Agents and Perfect RecallThere is a finite setI = {1, . . . , n} of agentsand asurjectionι : H → I the specifies which agentchooses the action at each information set.

Page 540: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Agents and Perfect RecallThere is a finite setI = {1, . . . , n} of agentsand asurjectionι : H → I the specifies which agentchooses the action at each information set.

• We assume thatperfect recallholds: for allh ∈ H, x, x′ ∈ h, andy ∈ (P (x) ∪ {x}) ∩ Ysuch thatι(η(p(y))) = ι(h), there is ay′ ∈ (P (x′) ∪ {x′}) ∩ Y such thatα(y′) = α(y).

Page 541: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Agents and Perfect RecallThere is a finite setI = {1, . . . , n} of agentsand asurjectionι : H → I the specifies which agentchooses the action at each information set.

• We assume thatperfect recallholds: for allh ∈ H, x, x′ ∈ h, andy ∈ (P (x) ∪ {x}) ∩ Ysuch thatι(η(p(y))) = ι(h), there is ay′ ∈ (P (x′) ∪ {x′}) ∩ Y such thatα(y′) = α(y).

• In words, anything that happened toι(h) onthe way tox must also have happened on theway tox′.

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Continuous DataThe description of the game is completed byspecifying:

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Continuous DataThe description of the game is completed byspecifying:

• The initial assessmentis ρ ∈ ∆◦(W ).

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Continuous DataThe description of the game is completed byspecifying:

• The initial assessmentis ρ ∈ ∆◦(W ).• The theory works equally well if we allow the

different agents to have different prior beliefsin ∆◦(W ); the assumption that all priors arethe same is called theHarsanyi doctrine.

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Continuous DataThe description of the game is completed byspecifying:

• The initial assessmentis ρ ∈ ∆◦(W ).• The theory works equally well if we allow the

different agents to have different prior beliefsin ∆◦(W ); the assumption that all priors arethe same is called theHarsanyi doctrine.

• There is apayoff function

u = (u1, . . . , un) : Z → RI .

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Strategies and BeliefsLetA =

hAh be the set ofpure behavior strategyprofiles.

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Strategies and BeliefsLetA =

hAh be the set ofpure behavior strategyprofiles.

• Forx ∈ X andy ∈ Y with x ≺ y letC(y|x) ⊂ Abe the set of pure strategy profiles that lead fromx to y: a ∈ C(y|x) if and only for eachx ∈ {x′ ∈ P (y) : y � x′ } the action specified bya at the information set containingx′ is the onethat leads towardy.

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Strategies and BeliefsLetA =

hAh be the set ofpure behavior strategyprofiles.

• Forx ∈ X andy ∈ Y with x ≺ y letC(y|x) ⊂ Abe the set of pure strategy profiles that lead fromx to y: a ∈ C(y|x) if and only for eachx ∈ {x′ ∈ P (y) : y � x′ } the action specified bya at the information set containingx′ is the onethat leads towardy.

• For t ∈ T letC(t) ⊂W ×A be the set of initialnode-pure strategy pairs that inducet:C(t) = {w} × C(t|w) wherew is the initialpredecessor oft.

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Let Π =∏

h∈H ∆(Ah) be the set ofbehavior strategyprofiles.

Page 550: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Let Π =∏

h∈H ∆(Ah) be the set ofbehavior strategyprofiles.

• LetΠ◦ =∏

h∈H ∆◦(Ah) be the set ofinterior ortotally mixedbehavior strategy profiles.

Page 551: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Let Π =∏

h∈H ∆(Ah) be the set ofbehavior strategyprofiles.

• LetΠ◦ =∏

h∈H ∆◦(Ah) be the set ofinterior ortotally mixedbehavior strategy profiles.

• Forπ ∈ Π:

Page 552: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Let Π =∏

h∈H ∆(Ah) be the set ofbehavior strategyprofiles.

• LetΠ◦ =∏

h∈H ∆◦(Ah) be the set ofinterior ortotally mixedbehavior strategy profiles.

• Forπ ∈ Π:• If x ≺ y, the probability of going fromx to y

isPπ(y|x) = (

h

πh)(C(y|x)).

Page 553: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Let Π =∏

h∈H ∆(Ah) be the set ofbehavior strategyprofiles.

• LetΠ◦ =∏

h∈H ∆◦(Ah) be the set ofinterior ortotally mixedbehavior strategy profiles.

• Forπ ∈ Π:• If x ≺ y, the probability of going fromx to y

isPπ(y|x) = (

h

πh)(C(y|x)).

• The probability thatt ∈ T occurs is

Pπ(t) = (ρ×

h

πh)(C(t)).

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• The space ofbeliefsisM =∏

h∆(h).

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• The space ofbeliefsisM =∏

h∆(h).

• The space ofassessmentsisΠ×M .

Page 556: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• The space ofbeliefsisM =∏

h∆(h).

• The space ofassessmentsisΠ×M .• Forπ ∈ Π◦ defineµπ ∈M by setting

µπh(x) = Pπ(x)/

x′∈H

Pπ(x′).

Page 557: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• The space ofbeliefsisM =∏

h∆(h).

• The space ofassessmentsisΠ×M .• Forπ ∈ Π◦ defineµπ ∈M by setting

µπh(x) = Pπ(x)/

x′∈H

Pπ(x′).

• LetΨ◦ = { (π, µπ) : π ∈ Π◦ }, and letΨ be theclosure ofΨ◦ in Π×M .

Page 558: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• The space ofbeliefsisM =∏

h∆(h).

• The space ofassessmentsisΠ×M .• Forπ ∈ Π◦ defineµπ ∈M by setting

µπh(x) = Pπ(x)/

x′∈H

Pπ(x′).

• LetΨ◦ = { (π, µπ) : π ∈ Π◦ }, and letΨ be theclosure ofΨ◦ in Π×M .• An element ofΨ is aconsistent assessment.

Page 559: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• The space ofbeliefsisM =∏

h∆(h).

• The space ofassessmentsisΠ×M .• Forπ ∈ Π◦ defineµπ ∈M by setting

µπh(x) = Pπ(x)/

x′∈H

Pπ(x′).

• LetΨ◦ = { (π, µπ) : π ∈ Π◦ }, and letΨ be theclosure ofΨ◦ in Π×M .• An element ofΨ is aconsistent assessment.• A consistent assessment isinterior if it is

contained inΨ◦.

Page 560: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential Rationality• Given an assessment(π, µ), agenti’s expected

payoff conditional on information seth is

Eπ,µ(ui|h) =

x∈h

µh(x)∑

z∈Z

Pπ(z|x)ui(z) .

Page 561: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential Rationality• Given an assessment(π, µ), agenti’s expected

payoff conditional on information seth is

Eπ,µ(ui|h) =

x∈h

µh(x)∑

z∈Z

Pπ(z|x)ui(z) .

• Forπ ∈ Π, h ∈ H, anda ∈ Ah, letπ|a denote thebehavior strategy profile that agrees withπ at allinformation sets other thanh and assigns playinga with probability one toh.

Page 562: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sequential Rationality• Given an assessment(π, µ), agenti’s expected

payoff conditional on information seth is

Eπ,µ(ui|h) =

x∈h

µh(x)∑

z∈Z

Pπ(z|x)ui(z) .

• Forπ ∈ Π, h ∈ H, anda ∈ Ah, letπ|a denote thebehavior strategy profile that agrees withπ at allinformation sets other thanh and assigns playinga with probability one toh.

• Let

bh(π, µ) := argmaxa∈AhEπ|a,µ(uι(h)|h).

Page 563: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• An assessment(π, µ) is sequentially rationalifπh ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h ∈ H.

Page 564: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• An assessment(π, µ) is sequentially rationalifπh ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h ∈ H.

• An assessment(π, µ) is asequential equilibriumif it is consistent and sequentially rational.

Page 565: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• An assessment(π, µ) is sequentially rationalifπh ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h ∈ H.

• An assessment(π, µ) is asequential equilibriumif it is consistent and sequentially rational.• An inductive calculation shows that a

sequential equilibrium is rational in theconceptually correct sense: there is noinformation set such that the agent whochooses there can increase her expectedpayoff, conditional on that information set, bychanging her behavior at that information setand/or other information sets she controls.

Page 566: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

Page 567: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

• It is easy to show thatΦ(π, µ) 6= ∅.

Page 568: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

• It is easy to show thatΦ(π, µ) 6= ∅.• ThereforeΦ : Π×M → Ψ is a

correspondence.

Page 569: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

• It is easy to show thatΦ(π, µ) 6= ∅.• ThereforeΦ : Π×M → Ψ is a

correspondence.• Since the relevant expected payoffs are

continuous functions,Φ is upper hemicontinuous.

Page 570: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

• It is easy to show thatΦ(π, µ) 6= ∅.• ThereforeΦ : Π×M → Ψ is a

correspondence.• Since the relevant expected payoffs are

continuous functions,Φ is upper hemicontinuous.• It is easy to see that the fixed points ofΦ are

precisely the sequential equilibria.

Page 571: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

• It is easy to show thatΦ(π, µ) 6= ∅.• ThereforeΦ : Π×M → Ψ is a

correspondence.• Since the relevant expected payoffs are

continuous functions,Φ is upper hemicontinuous.• It is easy to see that the fixed points ofΦ are

precisely the sequential equilibria.• IsΨ contractible, and isΦ contractible valued?

Page 572: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• For an assessment(π, µ) let

Φ(π, µ) = { (π′, µ′) ∈ Ψ : π′h ∈ ∆(bh(π, µ)) for all h }

• It is easy to show thatΦ(π, µ) 6= ∅.• ThereforeΦ : Π×M → Ψ is a

correspondence.• Since the relevant expected payoffs are

continuous functions,Φ is upper hemicontinuous.• It is easy to see that the fixed points ofΦ are

precisely the sequential equilibria.• IsΨ contractible, and isΦ contractible valued?

• These questions are open.

Page 573: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Conditional SystemsA conditional systemp on a finite setA is anassignment of a probability measurep(·|E) ∈ ∆(E)to each nonemptyE ⊂ A such that

p(C|E) = p(C|D) · p(D|E)

wheneverC ⊂ D ⊂ E ⊂ A with D 6= ∅.

Page 574: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Conditional SystemsA conditional systemp on a finite setA is anassignment of a probability measurep(·|E) ∈ ∆(E)to each nonemptyE ⊂ A such that

p(C|E) = p(C|D) · p(D|E)

wheneverC ⊂ D ⊂ E ⊂ A with D 6= ∅.

• ∆∗(A) is the set of conditional systems onA.

Page 575: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Conditional SystemsA conditional systemp on a finite setA is anassignment of a probability measurep(·|E) ∈ ∆(E)to each nonemptyE ⊂ A such that

p(C|E) = p(C|D) · p(D|E)

wheneverC ⊂ D ⊂ E ⊂ A with D 6= ∅.

• ∆∗(A) is the set of conditional systems onA.• There is a mapδ : ∆∗(A) → ∆(A), p 7→ p(·|A).

Page 576: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Conditional SystemsA conditional systemp on a finite setA is anassignment of a probability measurep(·|E) ∈ ∆(E)to each nonemptyE ⊂ A such that

p(C|E) = p(C|D) · p(D|E)

wheneverC ⊂ D ⊂ E ⊂ A with D 6= ∅.

• ∆∗(A) is the set of conditional systems onA.• There is a mapδ : ∆∗(A) → ∆(A), p 7→ p(·|A).

• Exercise:Prove that∆∗(A) is the closure ofδ−1(∆◦(A)).

Page 577: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

LetB be another finite set.

Page 578: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

LetB be another finite set.

• If s : A→ B is a surjection, the mapσs : ∆

∗(A) → ∆∗(B) is given by

σs(p)(D|E) := p(s−1(D)|s−1(E)) .

Page 579: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

LetB be another finite set.

• If s : A→ B is a surjection, the mapσs : ∆

∗(A) → ∆∗(B) is given by

σs(p)(D|E) := p(s−1(D)|s−1(E)) .

• LetC : A→ B be a correspondence that isinjective in the sense that the various setsC(a)are pairwise disjoint.

Page 580: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

LetB be another finite set.

• If s : A→ B is a surjection, the mapσs : ∆

∗(A) → ∆∗(B) is given by

σs(p)(D|E) := p(s−1(D)|s−1(E)) .

• LetC : A→ B be a correspondence that isinjective in the sense that the various setsC(a)are pairwise disjoint.

• An induced mapθC : ∆∗(B) → ∆∗(A) isgiven by

θC(q)(D|E) := q(

a∈D

C(a)∣

a∈E

C(a))

.

Page 581: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• If ρ ∈ ∆◦(B), andp ∈ ∆∗(A), we defineρ⊗ p ∈ ∆∗(B × A) by setting

(ρ⊗ p)(D|E) :=

(b,a)∈D ρ(b) · p({a}|E′)

(b,a)∈E ρ(b) · p({a}|E′)

whereE ′ = { a : (b, a) ∈ E }.

Page 582: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now letA =∏

h∈H Ah.

Page 583: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now letA =∏

h∈H Ah.

• Forh ∈ H let jh : A→ Ah be the naturalprojection.

Page 584: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now letA =∏

h∈H Ah.

• Forh ∈ H let jh : A→ Ah be the naturalprojection.

Let Ξ be the closure of{ δ−1(∏

h πh) : π ∈ Π◦ } in∆∗(A).

Page 585: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Now letA =∏

h∈H Ah.

• Forh ∈ H let jh : A→ Ah be the naturalprojection.

Let Ξ be the closure of{ δ−1(∏

h πh) : π ∈ Π◦ } in∆∗(A).

• This is the domain of the well behavedcorrespondence.

Page 586: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

For ξ ∈ Ξ we defineγ(ξ) = (π(ξ), µ(ξ)) ∈ Π×Mwhere, for eachh ∈ H:

Page 587: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

For ξ ∈ Ξ we defineγ(ξ) = (π(ξ), µ(ξ)) ∈ Π×Mwhere, for eachh ∈ H:

• πh(ξ) = δ(σjh(ξ));

Page 588: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

For ξ ∈ Ξ we defineγ(ξ) = (π(ξ), µ(ξ)) ∈ Π×Mwhere, for eachh ∈ H:

• πh(ξ) = δ(σjh(ξ));

• µh(ξ) = δ(θC|h(ρ⊗ ξ)).

Page 589: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

For ξ ∈ Ξ we defineγ(ξ) = (π(ξ), µ(ξ)) ∈ Π×Mwhere, for eachh ∈ H:

• πh(ξ) = δ(σjh(ξ));

• µh(ξ) = δ(θC|h(ρ⊗ ξ)).

• Exercise:If π ∈ Π◦ andξ = δ−1(∏

h πh), thenγ(ξ) = (π, µπ).

Page 590: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

For ξ ∈ Ξ we defineγ(ξ) = (π(ξ), µ(ξ)) ∈ Π×Mwhere, for eachh ∈ H:

• πh(ξ) = δ(σjh(ξ));

• µh(ξ) = δ(θC|h(ρ⊗ ξ)).

• Exercise:If π ∈ Π◦ andξ = δ−1(∏

h πh), thenγ(ξ) = (π, µπ).

• Sinceγ is continuous, it follows thatγ(Ξ) = Ψ.

Page 591: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The CorrespondenceWe defineΓ : Ξ → Ξ by setting

Γ(ξ) =⋂

h∈H

π−1h (∆(bh(γ(ξ)))).

Page 592: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The CorrespondenceWe defineΓ : Ξ → Ξ by setting

Γ(ξ) =⋂

h∈H

π−1h (∆(bh(γ(ξ)))).

• Evidentlyξ is a fixed point ofΓ if and only ifγ(ξ) is a sequential equilibrium.

Page 593: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The CorrespondenceWe defineΓ : Ξ → Ξ by setting

Γ(ξ) =⋂

h∈H

π−1h (∆(bh(γ(ξ)))).

• Evidentlyξ is a fixed point ofΓ if and only ifγ(ξ) is a sequential equilibrium.

• Suppose thatξn → ξ. Sinceγ and the conditionalexpected payoffs are continuous functions,bh(γ(ξn)) ⊂ bh(γ(ξ)) for sufficiently largen, soΓ is upper hemicontinuous.

Page 594: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The CorrespondenceWe defineΓ : Ξ → Ξ by setting

Γ(ξ) =⋂

h∈H

π−1h (∆(bh(γ(ξ)))).

• Evidentlyξ is a fixed point ofΓ if and only ifγ(ξ) is a sequential equilibrium.

• Suppose thatξn → ξ. Sinceγ and the conditionalexpected payoffs are continuous functions,bh(γ(ξn)) ⊂ bh(γ(ξ)) for sufficiently largen, soΓ is upper hemicontinuous.

• Theorem:Γ is contractible valued.

Page 595: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The CorrespondenceWe defineΓ : Ξ → Ξ by setting

Γ(ξ) =⋂

h∈H

π−1h (∆(bh(γ(ξ)))).

• Evidentlyξ is a fixed point ofΓ if and only ifγ(ξ) is a sequential equilibrium.

• Suppose thatξn → ξ. Sinceγ and the conditionalexpected payoffs are continuous functions,bh(γ(ξn)) ⊂ bh(γ(ξ)) for sufficiently largen, soΓ is upper hemicontinuous.

• Theorem:Γ is contractible valued.• SinceΞ is a possible value ofΓ, it follows thatΞ is contractible.

Page 596: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Key IdeaIf p ∈ ∆∗(A) anda, b ∈ A, let

λp(a, b) = ln p(a|{a, b})− ln p(b|{a, b}) ∈ [−∞,∞].

Page 597: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Key IdeaIf p ∈ ∆∗(A) anda, b ∈ A, let

λp(a, b) = ln p(a|{a, b})− ln p(b|{a, b}) ∈ [−∞,∞].

• These numbers satisfy the relations

λp(b, a) = −λp(a, b) and λp(a, c) = λp(a, b)+λp(b, c)

for all a, b, c such that the sum is defined.

Page 598: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The Key IdeaIf p ∈ ∆∗(A) anda, b ∈ A, let

λp(a, b) = ln p(a|{a, b})− ln p(b|{a, b}) ∈ [−∞,∞].

• These numbers satisfy the relations

λp(b, a) = −λp(a, b) and λp(a, c) = λp(a, b)+λp(b, c)

for all a, b, c such that the sum is defined.• Conversely, for a system of (extended) numbersλ(a, b) satisfying these conditions definepλ ∈ ∆∗(A) by setting

pλ(D|E) =

a∈D exp(λ(a, b))∑

a∈E exp(λ(a, b))

wheneverD ⊂ E ⊂ A with E 6= ∅ andb ∈ E has

Page 599: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The mapsp 7→ λp andλ 7→ pλ are inversehomeomorphisms.

Page 600: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The mapsp 7→ λp andλ 7→ pλ are inversehomeomorphisms.

• The logarithmic framework has a majoradvantage: linear algebra can be applied.

Page 601: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The mapsp 7→ λp andλ 7→ pλ are inversehomeomorphisms.

• The logarithmic framework has a majoradvantage: linear algebra can be applied.

• In particular, the image of∏

h∆◦(Ah) is a

linear subspace.

Page 602: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The mapsp 7→ λp andλ 7→ pλ are inversehomeomorphisms.

• The logarithmic framework has a majoradvantage: linear algebra can be applied.

• In particular, the image of∏

h∆◦(Ah) is a

linear subspace.• The general idea is to show that (the

homeomorphic image of) ofΞ is a simplicialcomplex, and a Euclidean ball. Thecontractibility of best response sets is establishedby repeatedly retracting simplices.

Page 603: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Advanced Fixed Point Theory

7. Dynamic Stability and the Fixed PointIndex

– p. 152

Page 604: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

Page 605: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

• The necessary condition for stability of anisolated equilibrium is well known in the theoryof dynamic systems.

Page 606: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

• The necessary condition for stability of anisolated equilibrium is well known in the theoryof dynamic systems.

• Expecially in game theory, we are interested ininfinite sets of equilibria.

Page 607: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

• The necessary condition for stability of anisolated equilibrium is well known in the theoryof dynamic systems.

• Expecially in game theory, we are interested ininfinite sets of equilibria.

To this end we will:

Page 608: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

• The necessary condition for stability of anisolated equilibrium is well known in the theoryof dynamic systems.

• Expecially in game theory, we are interested ininfinite sets of equilibria.

To this end we will:

• Review basics of ordinary differential equations.

Page 609: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

• The necessary condition for stability of anisolated equilibrium is well known in the theoryof dynamic systems.

• Expecially in game theory, we are interested ininfinite sets of equilibria.

To this end we will:

• Review basics of ordinary differential equations.• Introduce dynamic stability concepts and results.

Page 610: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Dynamics and the IndexWe now study the relationship between the index of aset of equilibria of a vector field and dynamic stability.

• The necessary condition for stability of anisolated equilibrium is well known in the theoryof dynamic systems.

• Expecially in game theory, we are interested ininfinite sets of equilibria.

To this end we will:

• Review basics of ordinary differential equations.• Introduce dynamic stability concepts and results.• Sketch the proof of the general necessary

condition.

Page 611: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ODE Existence-UniquenessLetU ⊂ R

m be open, and letz be a vector field onU .

Page 612: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ODE Existence-UniquenessLetU ⊂ R

m be open, and letz be a vector field onU .

• A C1 functionγ : I → U (I ⊂ R an interval) is atrajectoryof z if γ′(s) = zγ(s) for all s.

Page 613: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ODE Existence-UniquenessLetU ⊂ R

m be open, and letz be a vector field onU .

• A C1 functionγ : I → U (I ⊂ R an interval) is atrajectoryof z if γ′(s) = zγ(s) for all s.

Let (X, d) and(Y, e) be metric spaces, and letf : X → Y be a function.

Page 614: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ODE Existence-UniquenessLetU ⊂ R

m be open, and letz be a vector field onU .

• A C1 functionγ : I → U (I ⊂ R an interval) is atrajectoryof z if γ′(s) = zγ(s) for all s.

Let (X, d) and(Y, e) be metric spaces, and letf : X → Y be a function.

• ForL > 0, f isL-Lipschitzife(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ Ld(x, x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X.

Page 615: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ODE Existence-UniquenessLetU ⊂ R

m be open, and letz be a vector field onU .

• A C1 functionγ : I → U (I ⊂ R an interval) is atrajectoryof z if γ′(s) = zγ(s) for all s.

Let (X, d) and(Y, e) be metric spaces, and letf : X → Y be a function.

• ForL > 0, f isL-Lipschitzife(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ Ld(x, x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X.

• f is Lipschitzif it is L-Lipschitz for someL.

Page 616: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

ODE Existence-UniquenessLetU ⊂ R

m be open, and letz be a vector field onU .

• A C1 functionγ : I → U (I ⊂ R an interval) is atrajectoryof z if γ′(s) = zγ(s) for all s.

Let (X, d) and(Y, e) be metric spaces, and letf : X → Y be a function.

• ForL > 0, f isL-Lipschitzife(f(x), f(x′)) ≤ Ld(x, x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X.

• f is Lipschitzif it is L-Lipschitz for someL.• f is locally Lipschitzif eachx ∈ X has a

neighborhoodU such thatf |U is Lipschitz.

Page 617: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Theorem:(Picard-Lindelöf)I f z is a locally Lipschitz,then for any compactC ⊂ U there is anε > 0 suchthat there is a unique functionF : C × [−ε, ε] → Usuch that for eachx ∈ C, F (x, 0) = x andF (x, ·) is atrajectory ofz. In additionF is continuous, and ifz isCs (1 ≤ s ≤ ∞) then so isF .

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Theorem:(Picard-Lindelöf)I f z is a locally Lipschitz,then for any compactC ⊂ U there is anε > 0 suchthat there is a unique functionF : C × [−ε, ε] → Usuch that for eachx ∈ C, F (x, 0) = x andF (x, ·) is atrajectory ofz. In additionF is continuous, and ifz isCs (1 ≤ s ≤ ∞) then so isF .

Idea: If z isL-Lipschitz and‖z(x)‖ < M for all x,Bδ(C) ⊂ U , andMε < δ, then the operator

Γ : C(C × [−ε, ε],Bδ(C)) → C(C × [−ε, ε],Bδ(C))

defined byΓ(F )(x, t) = x+∫ t

0 z(F (x, s)) ds is acontraction.

Page 619: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The FlowTheflow domainof z is the set of(p, t) ∈ U × R suchthat if t ≤ 0 (t ≥ 0) there is a trajectoryγ : [t, 0] → U(γ : [0, t] → U ) of z with γ(0) = p.

Page 620: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The FlowTheflow domainof z is the set of(p, t) ∈ U × R suchthat if t ≤ 0 (t ≥ 0) there is a trajectoryγ : [t, 0] → U(γ : [0, t] → U ) of z with γ(0) = p.

Proposition:The flow domain ofz is an openW ⊂ U ×R that containsU × {0}.

Page 621: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The FlowTheflow domainof z is the set of(p, t) ∈ U × R suchthat if t ≤ 0 (t ≥ 0) there is a trajectoryγ : [t, 0] → U(γ : [0, t] → U ) of z with γ(0) = p.

Proposition:The flow domain ofz is an openW ⊂ U × R that containsU × {0}. There is aunique functionΦ : W → U (which is continuous andCs (1 ≤ s ≤ ∞) if z isCs) such for eachp ∈ U ,Φ(p, ·) is a trajectory ofz.

Page 622: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The FlowTheflow domainof z is the set of(p, t) ∈ U × R suchthat if t ≤ 0 (t ≥ 0) there is a trajectoryγ : [t, 0] → U(γ : [0, t] → U ) of z with γ(0) = p.

Proposition:The flow domain ofz is an openW ⊂ U × R that containsU × {0}. There is aunique functionΦ : W → U (which is continuous andCs (1 ≤ s ≤ ∞) if z isCs) such for eachp ∈ U ,Φ(p, ·) is a trajectory ofz. If (p, s) ∈ W and(Φ(p, s), t) ∈ W , then(p, s+ t) ∈ W and

Φ(p, s+ t) = Φ(Φ(p, s), t) .

Page 623: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

The FlowTheflow domainof z is the set of(p, t) ∈ U × R suchthat if t ≤ 0 (t ≥ 0) there is a trajectoryγ : [t, 0] → U(γ : [0, t] → U ) of z with γ(0) = p.

Proposition:The flow domain ofz is an openW ⊂ U × R that containsU × {0}. There is aunique functionΦ : W → U (which is continuous andCs (1 ≤ s ≤ ∞) if z isCs) such for eachp ∈ U ,Φ(p, ·) is a trajectory ofz. If (p, s) ∈ W and(Φ(p, s), t) ∈ W , then(p, s+ t) ∈ W and

Φ(p, s+ t) = Φ(Φ(p, s), t) .

Exercise:Prove this.

Page 624: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Stability Definitions• A ⊂ U is invariant if A× [0,∞) ⊂ W andΦ(A, t) ⊂ A for all t ≥ 0.

Page 625: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Stability Definitions• A ⊂ U is invariant if A× [0,∞) ⊂ W andΦ(A, t) ⊂ A for all t ≥ 0.

• A is stableif, for any neighborhoodV of A, thereis a neighborhoodZ of A such thatΦ(p, t) ∈ Vfor all p ∈ Z andt ≥ 0.

Page 626: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Stability Definitions• A ⊂ U is invariant if A× [0,∞) ⊂ W andΦ(A, t) ⊂ A for all t ≥ 0.

• A is stableif, for any neighborhoodV of A, thereis a neighborhoodZ of A such thatΦ(p, t) ∈ Vfor all p ∈ Z andt ≥ 0.

• A is uniformly attractiveif there is aneighborhoodV of A such thatV × [0,∞) ⊂Wand for any neighborhoodZ of A, there is aT ≥ 0 such thatΦ(V × [T,∞)) ⊂ Z.

Page 627: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Stability Definitions• A ⊂ U is invariant if A× [0,∞) ⊂ W andΦ(A, t) ⊂ A for all t ≥ 0.

• A is stableif, for any neighborhoodV of A, thereis a neighborhoodZ of A such thatΦ(p, t) ∈ Vfor all p ∈ Z andt ≥ 0.

• A is uniformly attractiveif there is aneighborhoodV of A such thatV × [0,∞) ⊂Wand for any neighborhoodZ of A, there is aT ≥ 0 such thatΦ(V × [T,∞)) ⊂ Z.

The invariant set isuniformly asymptotically stableifit is compact, stable, and uniformly attractive.

Page 628: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

Page 629: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

• A Lyapunov functionfor D is aC1 functionL : D → [0,∞) such that:

Page 630: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

• A Lyapunov functionfor D is aC1 functionL : D → [0,∞) such that:

• L−1(0) = A.

Page 631: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

• A Lyapunov functionfor D is aC1 functionL : D → [0,∞) such that:

• L−1(0) = A.• There isa : (0,∞) → (0,∞) such that−DL(p)z(p) ≥ a(d(p,A)) for all p ∈ D.

Page 632: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

• A Lyapunov functionfor D is aC1 functionL : D → [0,∞) such that:

• L−1(0) = A.• There isa : (0,∞) → (0,∞) such that−DL(p)z(p) ≥ a(d(p,A)) for all p ∈ D.

• L(pn) → ∞ whenever{pn} is a sequenceconverging to a point outside ofD.

Page 633: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

• A Lyapunov functionfor D is aC1 functionL : D → [0,∞) such that:

• L−1(0) = A.• There isa : (0,∞) → (0,∞) such that−DL(p)z(p) ≥ a(d(p,A)) for all p ∈ D.

• L(pn) → ∞ whenever{pn} is a sequenceconverging to a point outside ofD.

• If there is a Lyapunov function, thenA isasymptotically stable. (Easy)

Page 634: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• Thedomain of attraction ofA is the setD ofpointsp such thatlim supt→∞ d(Φ(p, t), A) = 0.

• A Lyapunov functionfor D is aC1 functionL : D → [0,∞) such that:

• L−1(0) = A.• There isa : (0,∞) → (0,∞) such that−DL(p)z(p) ≥ a(d(p,A)) for all p ∈ D.

• L(pn) → ∞ whenever{pn} is a sequenceconverging to a point outside ofD.

• If there is a Lyapunov function, thenA isasymptotically stable. (Easy)

• If A is asymptotically stable, then there is aLyapunov function. (F. Wesley Wilson)

Page 635: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Below here things have only been copied and pasted,and things need to be revised carefully.

• Thevector field indexof a set of equilibria ofζ isthe set’s fixed point index for the function

α : p 7→ p+ ζ(p).

Page 636: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Below here things have only been copied and pasted,and things need to be revised carefully.

• Thevector field indexof a set of equilibria ofζ isthe set’s fixed point index for the function

α : p 7→ p+ ζ(p).

This is probably false! Check carefully.

Page 637: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Claim: If A is an asymptotically stable set forz, andan ANR, then the index ofA with respect toz is theEuler characteristicχA = Λ(IdA) of A.

– p. 160

Page 638: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

Sketch of the Proof• It suffices to show thatχA is the fixed point index

of A with respect to the function

βδ : p 7→ p+ δz(p)

for someδ > 0.

– p. 161

Page 639: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• LetD be the domain of attraction forA. SinceAis asymptotically stable, hence Lyapunov stable,there is a Lyapunov functionL : D → [0,∞).

Page 640: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• LetD be the domain of attraction forA. SinceAis asymptotically stable, hence Lyapunov stable,there is a Lyapunov functionL : D → [0,∞).

• SinceA is an ANR, for sufficiently smallε > 0there is a retractionr : N → A whereN = L−1([0, ε]).

Page 641: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• LetD be the domain of attraction forA. SinceAis asymptotically stable, hence Lyapunov stable,there is a Lyapunov functionL : D → [0,∞).

• SinceA is an ANR, for sufficiently smallε > 0there is a retractionr : N → A whereN = L−1([0, ε]).

• We haveΦ(N × [0,∞)) ⊂ N .

Page 642: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• LetD be the domain of attraction forA. SinceAis asymptotically stable, hence Lyapunov stable,there is a Lyapunov functionL : D → [0,∞).

• SinceA is an ANR, for sufficiently smallε > 0there is a retractionr : N → A whereN = L−1([0, ε]).

• We haveΦ(N × [0,∞)) ⊂ N .• Sincez is inward pointing on∂N and Lipschitz,

there is someδ > 0 such that convex combinationgives an IAH betweenβδ andΦ(·, δ)|N .

Page 643: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• LetD be the domain of attraction forA. SinceAis asymptotically stable, hence Lyapunov stable,there is a Lyapunov functionL : D → [0,∞).

• SinceA is an ANR, for sufficiently smallε > 0there is a retractionr : N → A whereN = L−1([0, ε]).

• We haveΦ(N × [0,∞)) ⊂ N .• Sincez is inward pointing on∂N and Lipschitz,

there is someδ > 0 such that convex combinationgives an IAH betweenβδ andΦ(·, δ)|N .• It suffices to show thatχA is the fixed point

index ofA with respect toΦ(·, δ)|N .

Page 644: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• s 7→ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenΦ(·, δ)|Nand anyΦ(·, t)|N .

Page 645: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• s 7→ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenΦ(·, δ)|Nand anyΦ(·, t)|N .

• If t is sufficiently large, then convex combinationgives an IAH betweenΦ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N .

Page 646: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• s 7→ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenΦ(·, δ)|Nand anyΦ(·, t)|N .

• If t is sufficiently large, then convex combinationgives an IAH betweenΦ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N .

• s 7→ r ◦ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, 0)|N = r.

Page 647: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• s 7→ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenΦ(·, δ)|Nand anyΦ(·, t)|N .

• If t is sufficiently large, then convex combinationgives an IAH betweenΦ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N .

• s 7→ r ◦ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, 0)|N = r.• It suffices to show thatχA is the fixed point

index ofA with respect tor.

Page 648: Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamicseventos.cmm.uchile.cl/.../40/2017/01/...all-1.8.17.pdf · Advanced Fixed Point Theory Andrew McLennan University of Queensland

• s 7→ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenΦ(·, δ)|Nand anyΦ(·, t)|N .

• If t is sufficiently large, then convex combinationgives an IAH betweenΦ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N .

• s 7→ r ◦ Φ(·, s)|N gives an IAH betweenr ◦ Φ(·, t)|N andr ◦ Φ(·, 0)|N = r.• It suffices to show thatχA is the fixed point

index ofA with respect tor.• If i : A→ N is the inclusion, Commutativity

gives

Λ(r) = Λ(i ◦ r) = Λ(r ◦ i) = Λ(IdA) = χA.