ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 · ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 9/2009 Initials

ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1

Facility: 2009 Seguoxah Written Retake Date of Examination: 9/9/2009

~ NRC Examinations Developed by: Gritt;:>/ Operating Test Written / Operating Test Target

Chief

Date • Task Description (Reference) Examiner's Initials

-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) ~J}c -120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) t~ -120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) ~ -120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) ~.k [-90] [5. Reference material due (C. I.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] tje

{ -75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES- tJ1,c 301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1I2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C. I.e and f; C.3.d)

{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility 4>~L licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}

{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ~jA-ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C. I.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)

-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.l.l; C.2.g; ES-202) i>J)L

-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-20 1-4 prepared (C.1.l; C.2.i; ES-202) ~ -14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review ~JK (C.2.h; C.3.f) -14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) ~.!J- 1 0) applications audited to confirm fY-qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent

(C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)

-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee 1Jk-(C.3.k) -7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to ~)}L

NRC examiners (C.3.i)

* Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee. [Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.

ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1

Facility: 2009 Seguo:yah Written Retake Date of Examination: 9/9/2009

~ NRC Examinations Developed by: Gritt;:>/ Operating Test Written / Operating Test

Target Chief

Date * Task Description (Reference) Examiner's

Initials

-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) fJ}c -120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) +~ -120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) ~ -120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) f-k [-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] tjL-

{ -75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-f$L 301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-l's, ES-401-1I2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as

applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)

{ -70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility iJJtL licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}

{ -45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ~~ ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)

-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.Ll; C.2.g; ES-202) ~JY--

-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.Ll; C.2.i; ES-202) ~ -14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review +¥ (C.2.h; C.3.f) -14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) ~)J,c

-7 13. Written examinations and j~ratiag tests approved by NRC supervisor 4lc (C.2.i; C.3.h) -7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if> 1 0) applications audited to confirm fY-qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent

(C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)

-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee 1.¥--(C.3.k) -7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to ~~

NRC examiners (C.3.i)

* Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee. [Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2

Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 9/2009

Initials Item Task Description

a b* C#

1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401. I~ Pit- ~~ w R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with

~ ~Jk I Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled. Z1+ T

()Iv ~JU T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. 11+-E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate. ~ 114- IJJ'L 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number nla nla ~A-

of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients. I M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number nla nla ,J~ U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule

L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated

T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

0 To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative nla nla tJi'I R c. and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2: nla nla rJl\ (1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks

W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form / (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria

on the form.

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1: nla nla NA (1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix nla nla rJp, of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered ~lJ;o 7ff ~ in the appropriate exam sections. G

I~ 141- ~L E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. N Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~ -Vlr- tM-E c. R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. f}(J/t 14:)- ~Y!A-A

If#' ~.D

£6QUOYAH 10a q R6r fll( 6 PA~§ I ~2 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination

I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 9) 91 (J q as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authOrized by the NRC (e.g" acting as a simulator booth operator or communicatOr is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/oran enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination

To the best of my knOWlrgl' I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of q 9 «01. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE iRESPONSIBILITY DATE NOTE

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5. C4lltS-e."

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S~Lby4U 2009 7Z~K-C ;2.., I 'J....

ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination

I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised. '

2. Post-Examination

To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE NOTE

~:='fi~ ~~~~"brr.lt"J=, ~ 3. If/UJenr'~ .zo~ Y 'r( sl ,.,.e.o G!f.-4. ~"c.... StV\l\~,.r ap> M(;.Cl- ~~ 5.~'t &-fCY ~L$A.D ~~ 6. ""VI (J:M/1f£ (~ $A.~ .J.U3....a.:L 7. ___ _ 8. ___ _ 9. ___ _ 10. ___ _ 11. ___ _ 12. ___ _ 13 .. __________________________________ _ 14. ___ _ 15. ___ _ NOTES:

ES-201, Page 27 of 28

ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination

I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination

To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

PRINTED NAME

I 7. ________________________ -'-____________________________ _ 8. __________________________________________________ _ 9. _____________________________________________________ _ 10 .. __________________________________________________ _ 11 .. __________________________________________________ _ 12 .. _____________________________________________________ _ 13., ____________________________________________________ _ 14., ____________________________________________________ _ 15. ____________________________ ~---------'----------- _____ _ NOTES:

ES-201, Page 27 of 28

Sequoyah 2009 Initial Retake Exam Final Outline

ES-401! Rev. 9 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2! I

; Facility: Sequoyah Date of Exam: 2009 Retake Exam

RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points

Tier Group

K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 * Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6

Emergency & 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 9 2 2 4

Abnormal Plant N/A N/A Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 5 5 4 4 27 5 5 10

1 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 28 3 2 5

2. Plant

2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3

Systems Tier Totals 2 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 38 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories

2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals'

in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by ± 1 from that specified in the table

based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are

not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding

the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution

in the group before selecting a second topiC for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KIAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be

selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for TIers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.

7. *The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics

must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

S. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance

ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point toulls (#) for each system and category. Enter

the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other

than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the Ileft. side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note

# 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, anoi enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections till KIAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

I

Sequoyah 2009 Initial Retake Exam Final Outline

ES-401, Rev. 9 PWR examination Outline Form ES-401-2!

; Facility: Sequoyah Date of Exam: 2009 Retake Exam

RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points

Tier Group

K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 * Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6

Emergency & 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 9 2 2 4

Abnormal Plant N/A N/A

Evolutions Tier Totals 4 5 5 5 4 4 27 5 5 10

1 2 2 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 28 3 2 5

2. Plant

2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3

Systems Tier Totals 2 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 38 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories

2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals' in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by ± 1 from that specified in the table

based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systemslevolutions within each group are Identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do

not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are

not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding

the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.

4. Select topiCS from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution

in the group before selecting a second topiC for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KIAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be

selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.

7. *The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics

must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

S. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance

ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point tobills (#) for each system and category. Enter

the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment Is sampled in other

than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the lIeft side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note

# 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, anCiI enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections tCiI K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

i

ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

007EK2.03 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 3.5 3.6 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11

009EK1.02 Small Break LOCA 13 3.5 4.2 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

011EK2.02 Large Break LOCA/3 2.6 2.7 0 ~ 0 0 000 0 0 0 0

015AK2.10 RCP Malfunctions I 4 2.8 2.8 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

022AG2.1.31 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup I 2 4.6 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

026AA2.02 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 2.9 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

029EG2.2.22 ATWS 11 4.0 4.7 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 ~

038EA1.13 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture/3 3.7 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0

040AA 1.09 Steam Une Rupture - Excessive Heat 3.4 3.4 ODD 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Transfer 14

054AK1.02 Loss of Main Feedwater 14 3.6 4.2 ~ ODD 0 DODO 0 0

055EK3.02 Station Blackout 16 4.3 4.6 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Page 1 of 2

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Reactor trip status panel

Use of steam tables

Pumps

RCP indicators and controls

Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

The cause of possible CCW loss

Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Steam flow indicators

Setpoints of main steam safety and PORVs

Effects of feedwater introduction on dry SIG

Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power

211112009 12:16 PM


KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

007EK2.03 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 3.5 3.6 D ~ D D D D D D D D D I 1

009EK1.02 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.5 4.2 ~ D D D D D D D D D D

011EK2.02 Large Break LOCA/3 2.6 2.7 D ~ D D D D D D D D D

015AK2.10 RCP Malfunctions I 4 2.8 2.8 0 ~ D D D D D D DOD

022AG2.1.31 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 12 4.6 4.3 D D D D D D D D D D ~

026AA2.02 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 2.9 3.6 D D DOD D D ~ D D D

029EG2.2.22 A TWS I 1 4.0 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

038EA1.13 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 3.7 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0

040AA1.09 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 3.4 3.4 DDDDDD~DDDD Transfer I 4

054AK1.02 Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 3.6 4.2 ~DDDDDDDDDD

055EK3.02 Station Blackout I 6 4.3 4.6 DD~DDDDDDDD

Page 1 of 2

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Reactor trip status panel

Use of steam tables

Pumps

RCP indicators and controls

Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

The cause of possible CCW loss

Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Steam flow indicators

Setpoints of main steam safety and PORVs

Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G

Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9

KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION:

056AA1.11 Loss of Off-site Power / 6

057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6

058AK1.01 Loss of DC Power /6

062AK3.01 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4

065AA2.05 Loss of Instrument Air / 8

077AG2.2.39 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6

T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

AO SAO

3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0

4.1 4.4 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2.8 3.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3.2 3.5 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3.4 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

3.9 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

WE11 EA2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Aecirc. / 4 3.4 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

Page 2 of 2

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

HPI system

Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus

Battery charger equipment and instrumentation

The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water coolers

When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing

Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems.

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

2I11/200912:16PM

ES-401, REV 9

KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:

056AA1.ll Loss of Off-site Power / 6

057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Ins!. Bus / 6

058AK1.0l Loss of DC Power / 6

062AK3.01 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4

065AA2.05 Loss of Instrument Air / 8

077AG2.2.39 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6


IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

3.7 3.7 DDDDDD~DDDD

4.1 4.4 DD~DDDDDDDD

2.8 3.1 ~DDDDDDDDDD

3.2 3.5 D D ~ D D D D D D D D

3.4 4.1 D D D D D D D ~ D D D

3.9 4.5 D D D D D D D D D D ~

WEll EA2.1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.4 4.2 D D D D D D D ~ D D D

Page 2 of 2

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

HPI system

Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus

Battery charger equipment and instrumentation

The conditions that will initiate the automatic opening and closing of the SWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water coolers

When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing

Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems.


2111/2009 12:16 PM


KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

003AK3.06 Dropped Control Rod 11 2.7 3 D D ~ D D D D D D D D

032AK1.01 Loss of Source Range NI/7 2.S 3.1 ~ D D D D D D D DOD

058AI~.02 Accidelital Liquid Rad ..... aste ReI. I' 8 2.7 2.7 059AK2.01 Accidental Gaseous RadWaste ReI. 2.6 2.9 D ~ D D D D D D D D D

068AG2.1.27 Control Room Evac. I 8 3.9 4 DDDDDDDDDD~

076AA 1.04 High Reactor Coolant Activity 19 3.2 3.4 D D D D D D ~ D D D D

WE03EK3.4 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. 14 3.5 3.9 D D ~ D D D D D D D D

WE07EA2.1 Saturated Core Cooling Core Cooling 3.2 4.0 D D D D D D 0 ~ D D D 14

WE10EK2.1 Natural Circ. With Seam Void! 4 3.3 3.5 D ~ D D D D D D D D D

WE16EA 1.3 High Containment Radiation I 9 2.9 3.3 D D D D D D ~ D D D D

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Reset of demand position counter to zero

Effects of voltage changes on performance

Radioaeti.e gas monitors ARM system, including the nonnal rad-Ievel indications and the op status.

Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

Failed fuel-monitoring equipment

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.


Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.

Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9


003AK3.06 Dropped Control Rod / 1

032AK1.01 Loss of Source Range NI / 7

059AI



RO SRO

003A3.03 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.2 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0

004A1.12 Chemical and Volume Control 2.S 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0

004A2.2S Chemical and Volume Control 3.S 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

00SK1.13 Residual Heat Removal 3.3 3.S ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

006KS.06 Emergency Core Cooling 3.S 3.9 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0

007A2.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.9 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

007A4.09 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.S 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0

00SK3.01 Component Cooling Water 3.4 3.S 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

010G2.4.30 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

0121t6.6S Reactor Protection 3:6-&.'7 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 012K6.03 3.3 3.5

013KS.02 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 2.9 3.3 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0

Page 1 of3

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Seal D/P

Rate of boron concentration reduction in RCS as a function of letdown flow while deborating demineralizer is in service

Uncontrolled boration or dilution

SIS

Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure

Stuck-open PORV or code safety

Relationships between PZR level and changing levels of the PRT and bleed holdup tank

Loads cooled by CCWS

Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.

~ Trip logic circuits

Safety system logic and reliability

2/1112009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2

KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO

003A3.03 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.2 3.1 DDDDDDDD~DD Seal D/P

004A1.12 Chemical and Volume Control 2.8 3.2 DDDDDD~DDDD Rate of boron concentration reduction in RCS as a function of letdown flow while deborating demineralizer is in service

004A2.25 Chemical and Volume Control 3.8 4.3 DDDDDDD~DDD Uncontrolled boration or dilution

005K1.13 Residual Heat Removal 3.3 3.5 Iii'lDDDDDDDDDD SIS

006K5.06 Emergency Core Cooling 3.5 3.9 DDDD~DDDDDD Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure

007A2.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.9 4.2 DDDDDDD~DDD Stuck-open PORV or code safety

007A4.09 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.5 2.7 DDDDDDDDD~D Relationships between PZR level and changing levels of the PRT and bleed holdup tank

008K3.01 Component Cooling Water 3.4 3.5 DD~DDDDDDDD Loads cooled by CCWS

010G2.4.30 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.7 4.1 DDDDDDDDDD~ Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.

0121


KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

022K3.02 Containment Cooling 3.0 3.3 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

025A4.02 Ice Condenser 2.7 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0

025G2.2.42 Ice Condenser 3.9 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

026K2.01 Containment Spray 3.4 3.6 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

~~:~~~ OOlitaililiieli1 Splay ~:~ ::~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

039A1.03 Main and Reheat Steam 2.6 2.7 00 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0

059K4.02 Main Feedwater 3.3 3.5 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 00

061A3.03 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 3.9 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0

061K6.02 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 2.6 2.7 00 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0

062K2.01 AC Electrical Distribution 3.3 3.4 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

063A4.02 DC Electrical Distribution 2.8 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0

Page 2 of3

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Containment instrumentation readings

Containment vent fans

Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications

Containment spray pumps

GG& Recirc Spray System

Primary system temperature indications and required values, during main steam system warm-up

Automatic turbine/reactor trip runback

AFW S/G level control on automatic start

Pumps

Major system loads

Battery voltage indicator

2I11/200912:16PM

ES-401, REV 9


022K3.02 Containment Cooling

025A4.02 Ice Condenser

025G2.2.42 Ice Condenser

026K2.01 Containment Spray

0261

ES-401, REV 9


064K4.03 Emergency Diesel Generator

073A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring

076K3.02 Service Water


078G2.2.38 Instrument Air

103K1.03 Containment


IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

2.5 3.0 D D D ~ D D D D D D D

2.5 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 D D

2.5 2.8 D D ~ D D D D D D D D

2.9 3.4 D D D ~ D DODD 0 0

3.6 4.5 0 DOD DOD DOD ~

3.1 3.5 ~ D D D D D D D D D D

Page 3 of 3

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Governor valve operation

Erratic or failed power supply

Secondary closed cooling water

Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges

Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Shield building vent system

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9


064K4.03 Emergency Diesel Generator

073A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring



~~~ ____ ~ ______ ~ ___ - ________ 0 ____ _

078G2.2.38 Instrurnent Air

103K1.03 Containment


IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

2.5 3.0 D D D Ii'] D D D D D D D

2.5 2.9 D D D D D D D Ii'] D D D

2.5 2.8 D D Ii'] D D D D D D D D

2.9 3.4 D D D Ii'] D D D D D D D

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Governor valve operation

Erratic or failed power supply

Secondary closed cooling water

Autornatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges

-~---~---------~-- ____ -----,,---____ --c-------,-____ ----::------::-____ --[J D DOD D D D D D Ii'] Knowledge of conditions and lirnitations in the facility

license. 3.6 4.5

3.1 3.5 Ii'] D D D D D D D D D D Shield building vent system

Page 3 of 3 2I11/200912:16PM


KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO

011A1.03 Pressurizer Level Control 2.8 3.2 DDDDDD~DDDD VCTlevel

015K2.01 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.3 3.7 D~DDDDDDDDD NIS channels, components and interconnections

028K3.01 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.3 Control

4.0 DD~DDDDDDDD Hydrogen concentration in containment

029G2.1.31 Containment Purge 4.6 4.3 DDDDDDDDDD~ Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

033K4.01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2.9 3.2 DDD~DDDDDDD Maintenance of spent fuel level

034K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.6 3.3 DDDDD~DDDDD Radiation monitoring systems

041K5.05 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control 2.6 3.2 DDDD~DDDDDD Basis for RCS design pressure limits

071A2.02 Waste Gas Disposal 3.3 3.6 DDDDDDD~DDD Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate and totalizer

079A4.01 Station Air 2.7 2.7 DDDDDDDDD~D Cross-tie valves with lAS

. 086A3.03 Fire Protection 2.9 3.3 DDDDDDDD~DD Actuation of fire detectors

Page 1 of 1 2111/2009 12:16 PM


KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO

011A1.03 Pressurizer Level Control 2.8 3.2 DDDDDD~DDDD VCT level

015K2.01 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.3 3.7 D~DDDDDDDDD NIS channels, components and interconnections

028K3.01 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge 3.3 4.0 DD~DDDDDDDD Hydrogen concentration in containment Control

029G2.1.31 Containment Purge 4.6 4.3 DDDDDDDDDD~ Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

033K4.01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2.9 3.2 DDD~DDDDDDD Maintenance of spent fuel level

034K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.6 3.3 DDDDD~DDDDD Radiation monitoring systems

041K5.05 Steam Dumprrurbine Bypass Control 2.6 3.2 DDDD~DDDDDD Basis for RCS design pressure limits

071A2.02 Waste Gas Disposal 3.3 3.6 DDDDDDD~DDD Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate and totalizer

079A4.01 Station Air 2.7 2.7 DDDDDDDDD~D Cross-tie valves with lAS

086A3.03 Fire Protection 2.9 3.3 DDDDDDDD~DD Actuation of fire detectors

Page 1 of 1 2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9


G2.1.41 Conduct of operations


G2.2.23 Equipment Control


G2.3.11 Radiation Control


T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

2.8 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

2.5 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.1 4.6 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 0 0 ~

4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

FORM ES-401-* 3

TOPIC:

Knowledge of the refueling processes

Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures

Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations.

Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system. and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions

Ability to control radiation

Ability to use radiation monitoring systems

-=-=--=-=:------c=--::--:--=-----c---------------------------------~--.,.._-_:___-.---------

G2.3.7 Radiation Control 3.5 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements

~------c=---------=--__,__-=_:_----~-____=____==___==___::=___=::_::=___==__=___=::_:::=___ ---G2.4.11 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.0 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

G2.4.16 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.5 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

G2.4.37 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.0 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

during normal or abnormal conditions

Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines.

Knowledge of the lines of authority during implamentation of an emergency plan.

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9









G2.4.11 Emergency Procedures/Plans



T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

2.8 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

2.5 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

3.1 4.6 0 0 0 DOD 0 0 DOli']

4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.5 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

4.0 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

3.5 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

3.0 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOli']

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-* 3

TOPIC:

Knowledge of the refueling processes

Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures

Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations.

Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions

Ability to control radiation releases.

Ability to use radiation monitoring systems

Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions

Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.


Knowledge of the lines of authority during implamentation of an emergency plan.

2I11/200912:16PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2

KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO

009EA2.11 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.8 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity

015AA2.11 RCP Malfunctions I 4 3.4 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 When to jog RCPs during ICC

038EG2.4.20 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture 13 3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.

040AA2.02 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 4.6 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Transfer 14

057 AG2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Ins1. Bus I 6 4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

062AG2.1.7 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 4.4 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

Conditions requiring a reactor trip


Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE


RO SRO

009EA2.11 Small Break LOCA I 3 3.8 4.1 D D D D D D D ~ D D D

015AA2.11 RCP Mal/unctions I 4 3.4 3.8 D D D D D D D ~ D D D

038EG2.4.20 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 3.8 4.3 D D D D D D D D D D ~

040AA2.02 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 4.6 4.7 D D D D D D D ~ D D D Transfer 14

057AG2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Ins!. Bus 16 4.2 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~

062AG2.1.7 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 4.4 4.7 D D D D D D D D D D ~

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Containment temperature, pressure, and humidity

When to jog RCPs during ICC

Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.

Conditions requiring a reactor trip


Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE


RO SRO

060AA2.05 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. / 9 3.7 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

061AG2.4.46 ARM System Alarms / 7 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

WE13EA2.1 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 2.9 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

we15EG2.4.30 Containment Flooding / 5 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

That the automatic safety actions have occurred as a result of a high ARM system signal

Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.



2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1 G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE


RO SRO

060AA2.05 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. / 9 3.7 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

That the automatic safety actions have occurred as a result of a high ARM system signal

----------------------- ~~---~--------------------___,____----___,____---,__-__:_c____:_---061AG2.4.46 ARM System Alarms / 7 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to verify that the alarnis are consistent with the

WE13EA2.1 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 2.9 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

we15EG2.4.30 Containment Flooding / 5 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

plant conditions.



2I11/200912:16PM

ES-401, REV 9


004G2.2.44 Chemical and Volume Control

005A2.04 Residual Heat Removal

012A2.05 Reactor Protection

059A2.06 Main Feedwater

064G2.4.8 Emergency Diesel Generator

SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

4.2 4.4 OOOOOOOOOO~

2.9 2.9 OOOOOOO~OOO

3.1 3.2 OOOOOOO~DOO

2.7 2.9 OOOOOOO~OOO

3.8 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:


RHR valve malfunction

Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function generators

Loss of steam flow to MFW system

Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9


004G2.2.44 Chemical and Volume Control

005A2.04 Residual Heat Removal

012A2.05 Reactor Protection

059A2.06 Main Feedwater

064G2.4.8 Emergency Diesel Generator


IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

4.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

2.9 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

3.1 3.2 DODD 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

2.7 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

3.8 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:


RHR valve malfunction

Faulty or erratic operation of detectors and function generators

Loss of steam flow to MFW system

Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

2I11/200912:16PM

ES-401, REV 9


028G2.1.23 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control

068A2.04 Liquid Radwaste


IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

4.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

~~1:·.: ~~~te eas Disposal !:; ! .. ! 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

Failure of automatic isolation

RuptUie disk failures Loss of coolant pressure

2/11/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9


028G2.1.23 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control

068A2.04 Liquid Radwaste

071A2.0S Vvaste 6as Disposal 002A2.02 RCS


IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

4.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0

2.7 S.S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 4.2 4.4

Page 1 of 1

FORM ES-401-2

TOPIC:

Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

Failure of automatic isolation

AtiptUi e disk !ai/tires Loss of coolant pressure

2/11/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9





SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

2.9 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

2.6 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

FORM ES-401-t 3

TOPIC:

Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations.

G2.3.11 Radiation Control 3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to control radiation releases




3.4 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

3.5 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~

2.4 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 DOD 0 ~

Page 1 of 1

Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities


Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator.

211112009 12:16 PM

ES-401, REV 9








SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE

IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G

RO SRO

2.9 4.5 D D D D D D D D D D ~

3.7 4.1 D D D D D D D D D D ~

o.

2.6 3.8 D D D D D D D D D D ~

3.8 4.3 D D D D D D D D D D ~

3.4 3.8 D D D D D D D D D D ~

3.5 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~

FORM ES-401-~ 3

TOPIC:

Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations.

Ability to control radiation releases

Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal. abnormal. or emergency conditions or activities


G2.4.38 o ___ ~~~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4 4.4 D D D D D D D D D D ~

Page 1 of 1

Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan. including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator.

2111/2009 12:16 PM

ES-401 Record of Rejected KI As Form E S-40 1-4

Sequoyah 2009 RO Retake Exam

Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA -

1/2 059 AK2.02 Unable to write question relating the interrelations between an accidental liquid Radwaste Release and a radioactive-gas monitor.

Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 059 AK2.01

2/1 012 K6.09 Question on Reactor Protection system related to CEAC which is a Combustion Engineering vendor application.

Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 012 K6.03

2/1 026 K3.01

Anything that initiates Containment Spray System also trips and isolates the Containment Cooling System components. Therefore have been unable to write a question that meets the KIA addressing the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Spray System would have on the containment cooling system.


ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4

Sequoyah 2009 RO Retake Exam

Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA -

1/2 059 AK2.02 Unable to write question relating the interrelations between an accidental liquid Radwaste Release and a radioactive-gas monitor.

Replaced by Edwin Lea on 4/06/09 with KA 059 AK2.01

2/1 012 K6.09 Question on Reactor Protection system related to CEAC which is a Combustion Engineering vendor application.


2/1 026 K3.01

Anything that initiates Containment Spray System also trips and isolates the Containment Cooling System components. Therefore have been unable to write a question that meets the KIA addressing the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Spray System would have on the containment cooling system.


ES-401 Record of Rejected KI As Form ES-401-4

Sequoyah 2009 SRO Retake Exam

Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA

2/2 071 A2.03 There is no rupture disc in the Waste Gas System and the KIA addresses predicting the impacts of and using procedures to address the failure of the rupture disc. There is a separate KIA on stuck open relief valves.

Replaced by Edwin Lea on 04/06/09 with KA 002 A2.02

ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4

Sequoyah 2009 SRO Retake Exam

Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA

2/2 071 A2.03 There is no rupture disc in the Waste Gas System and the KIA addresses predicting the impacts of and using procedures to address the failure of the rupture disc. There is a separate KIA on stuck open relief valves.

Replaced by Edwin Lea on 04/06/09 with KA 002 A2.02

ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6

Date of Exam: 9/2009 Exam Level: RO ~ SRO ~

1.

2.

3.

a. b.

SRO

NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions. "h"",..ti",,,: are referenced as available.

nnr'f'lnri;::,t,,, in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401

4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were from the last 2 NRC consult the NRR OL

5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:

_ the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or _ the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or 2L the examinations were developed independently; or

6.

7.

_ the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or _ other (explain)

Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only

Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO

8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.

Bank Modified

23/24 37/32

Memory

40 /32

9. Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are . ed.

10. Question nC:'/I"h,Nr,oh·i,. . and format meet the nes in ES AnI'On,n,v B.

11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and with the value on the cover sheet.

a. Author b. Facility Reviewer (*) c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)

d. NRC Regional Supervisor

New

40/44

CIA

60 / 68

Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations. # I ent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c'" chief examiner concurrence

Initial

a

ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6

Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 9/2009 Exam Level: RO 1&1 SRO~ Initial

Item Description a b* c#

1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. frl.- O ~ 2. a. NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions.

~ J fJjL b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available. 3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 l~ Dt. ~/'-4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions Ij~~:.;;· .•.•. if· :,:", ~jL were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office). .~. ~ 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled

as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: _ the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or

{ilL I~}L _ the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or IJ! ~ the examinations were developed independently; or _ the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or _ other (explain)

6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New

~ I~JL from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest j/tl new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only 23/24 37/32 40/44 question distribution(s) at right. 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory CIA

exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level;

/It ~ fJJ"-the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly 40 /32 60 / 68 selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.

8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers ~ (j ~ or aid in the elimination of distractors. 9. Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved pt 9J f#-examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified. 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B. /1& ,f;jJ !~)L

< \

11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; Wt I!I I~r-the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet. \

Printed NAnature Date

a. Author John B. Roden / a~'hv ¥Ii b. Facility Reviewer (*) B",dlev D. P;"";OIl';O I m -:--c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) i>\-,;.'\-,~ 6- . C"'-bek-A I I, . Q.... k '1 . l- " d. NRC Regional Supervisor ~!J).. ". VlI~JJIJ,I\V dft~th

f ,ru.uy~

Note: * The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations. # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9

SEQUOYAH INITIAL REVIEW

Instructions [Refer to Section 0 of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F}undamental or (H}igher cognitive level.

Enter the level of difficulty (LOO) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too milch needless information). • The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. • The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. • One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

14. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: • The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content). • The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). • The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). • The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U}nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E}ditorial enhancement, or (S}atisfactory?

7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOO

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UlE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only

Reexamine use of 15{ part of each distractor to see if necessary. Change e E-O in distractor A to E-O.

76 H 2 Correct typo in distractor A. Added bullet to the stem to define RWST level S and trend make 0 distractor more plausible. Oistractor B & 0 imply that there is train relationship for CETs. If there is

e not, then B & 0 are not valid distractors. CETs are train related. Change 77 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices to 0 and 4 for incorrect answer. S

Changed distractor B & 0 to "2 thermocouples in each train" Oistractor B & 0 imply that an entry into a FRP is lJlausible even if there is

e no condition to do so. B & 0 do not appear to be valid distractors. Change 78 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices B & 0 more plausible. S

Reworded the question to eliminate concern with 2 distractors.

A is not plausible. The only uncontrolled Boron change that would increase Rx power would be caused by a significant dilution event and

e there is no correspondingMWe increase. This is generic fundamental 79 H 2 X knowledge and is not SRO only. AOP entry conditions are RO knowledge

S level. SRO level criteria is based on knowing the specific guidance from the AOP. Reviewed wI license. OK. Make editorial corrections. Replaced 2nd layer dashes in the stem w/bullets to improve appearance.

U What makes this SRO? Appears that both parts of the answer can be 80 H 2 X X deduced using system knowledge. In the stem, "SI not actuated". This

S appears to be leading the candidate to part of the answer. Why not


SEQUOYAH INITIAL REVIEW

Instructions [Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). • The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

The answer choices are a collection of unrelated truelfalse statements. The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: The question is not linked to the job requirements (Le., the question has a valid KiA but, as written, is not operational in content). The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (Le., it is not required to be known from memory). The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KiA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD

(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KiA Only

Reexamine use of 1st part of each distractor to see if necessary. Change € E-O in distractor A to E-O.

76 H 2 Correct typo in distractor A. Added bullet to the stem to define RWST level S and trend make D distractor more plausible. Distractor B & D imply that there is train relationship for CETs. If there is

€ not, then B & D are not valid distractors. CETs are train related. Change 77 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices to 0 and 4 for incorrect answer. S

Changed distractor B & D to "2 thermocouples in each train" Distractor B & D imply that an entry into a FRP is plausible even if there is

€ no condition to do so. B & D do not appear to be valid distractors. Change 78 H 2 X 2nd part to change choices B & D more plausible. S

Reworded the question to eliminate concem with 2 distractors.

A is not plausible. The only uncontrolled Boron change that would increase Rx power would be caused by a significant dilution event and

€ there is no corresponding MWe increase. This is generic fundamental 79 H 2 X knowledge and is not SRO only. AOP entry conditions are RO knowledge

S level. SRO level criteria is based on knowing the specific guidance from the AOP. Reviewed wi license. OK. Make editorial corrections. Replaced 2nd layer dashes in the stem w/bullets to improve appearance.

y What makes this SRO? Appears that both parts of the answer can be 80 H 2 X X deduced using system knowledge. In the stem, "SI not actuated". This

S appears to be leading the candidate to part of the answer. Why not


(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only

instead say that "SI is not injecting". SI not actuated implies that no signal has been received therefore, it is NOT required to be initiated and this is one part of the answer. Eliminated the "SI not actuated" information and changed 2nd part of the question to address T.S. entry to meet the SRO Only portion. Changed stem conditions to support the T.S. entry criteria.

1Nhat makes this SRO? The NOTE for non EOP entry is in the body of the ~OP. Does this make it RO criteria? If so, A& C are not plausible. B & D

€ are not symmetrical. Reword B to match D. "Acknowledge the Orange 81 H 3 X X path and continue... Is the first part of D plausible? Why not change to

S say Orange path also? The last part is incorrect anyway. Reviewed wI license. Made editorial corrections so that B & D are symmetrical and simplified wording in the distractors.

1J What make this SRO? Appears question is derived based only on system 82 H 3 X knowledge. Changed 2nd part of question to be SRO Only.

S

The stem contains a cue: "The CRO reports that the fuel pool rad monitors

1J are blocked". If they're blocked then only the Aux Bldg alarm is

83 F 3 X X meaningful. It also implies that there is no concern with ABGTS being

S INOP. This makes B & D not plausible. Rewrite to remove cue and ask about ABGTS operability. Will revise to remove cue. Reworded stem to remove cue.

A & C do not appear to be plausible. No procedure direction to fill S/G to 100% anywhere. FR-H.3 is not a RED or ORANGE path EOP. Is this an

1J entry level knowledge criteria for a RO. If so C & D are also UNSAT for

84 H 2 X this condition. Revise C & D to change 100% to a procedure related

S number or guidance. Removed SG level in distractors C & D and changed SG #2 level in stem of question from 86% to 79%. This changed the correct answer from the original question and made the other distractors more plausible.

€ Are FR entry conditions required RO knowledge? Is 1 hr NRC notification 85 H 2 X X required RO knowledge? Is not just RO knowledge.

S

1J Incorrect KA. Not lAW sample plan. 2.4.44 vs. 2.2.44. New question 86 H X written to match KA.

S

1 st half of answer "event in progress is RO knowledge". 2nd part of "B" & "D" distractors is not plausible. Water level is stated as increasing in stem

€ of question. Therefore, can deduce answer with RO knowledge alone. 87 H 2 X X Reviewed wI license. Question is detailed procedure knowledge and is

S therefore at SRO Only level. Procedure title corrected in stem of question.

€ Does not appear that the "lAW" statements are needed in 2nd part of 88 F 2 X distractors. Licensee put hard return in stem, eliminated wording "in

S --


(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only

instead say that "SI is not injecting". SI not actuated implies that no signal has been received therefore, it is NOT required to be initiated and this is one part of the answer. Eliminated the "SI not actuated" information and changed 2nd part of the question to address T.S. entry to meet the SRO Only portion. Changed stem conditions to support the T.S. entry criteria.

What makes this SRO? The NOTE for non EOP entry is in the body of the AOP. Does this make it RO criteria? If so, A& C are not plausible. B & 0

e are not symmetrical. Reword B to match O. "Acknowledge the Orange 81 H 3 X X path and continue... Is the first part of 0 plausible? Why not change to

S say Orange path also? The last part is incorrect anyway. Reviewed wi license. Made editorial corrections so that B & 0 are symmetrical and simplified wording in the distractors.

y What make this SRO? Appears question is derived based only on system 82 H 3 X

S knowledge. Changed 2nd part of question to be SRO Only.

The stem contains a cue: "The CRO reports that the fuel pool rad monitors

y are blocked". If they're blocked then only the Aux Bldg alarm is

83 F 3 X X meaningful. It also implies that there is no concern with ABGTS being

S INOP. This makes B & 0 not plausible. Rewrite to remove cue and ask about ABGTS operability. Will revise to remove cue. Reworded stem to remove cue.

A & C do not appear to be plausible. No procedure direction to fill S/G to 100% anywhere. FR-H.3 is not a RED or ORANGE path EOP. Is this an

y entry level knowledge criteria for a RO. If so C & 0 are also UNSAT for

84 H 2 X this condition. Revise C & 0 to change 100% to a procedure related

S number or guidance. Removed SG level in distractors C & 0 and changed SG #2 level in stem of question from 86% to 79%. This changed the correct answer from the original question and made the other distractors more plausible.

e Are FR entry conditions required RO knowledge? Is 1 hr NRC notification 85 H 2 X X required RO knowledge? Is not just RO knowledge.

S

y Incorrect KA Not lAW sample plan. 2.4.44 vS. 2.2.44. New question 86 H X written to match KA

S

1st half of answer "event in progress is RO knowledge". 2nd part of "B" & "0" distractors is not plausible. Water level is stated as increasing in stem

e of question. Therefore, can deduce answer with RO knowledge alone. 87 H 2 X X Reviewed wi license. Question is detailed procedure knowledge and is

S therefore at SRO Only level. Procedure title corrected in stem of question.

e Does not appear that the "lAW" statements are needed in 2nd part of 88 F 2 X distractors. Licensee put hard return in stem, eliminated wording "in

S


1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.

I 0# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- 0= SRO U/E/S Explanation

Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only

accordance with" in all choices.

89 H 3 X S Can deduce answers from RO knowledge only. Reviewed w/ license. Licensee verified this is SRO level knowledge.

€ B & D do not appear plausible. When would the procedure reader perform 90 H 2 X an AOP and handoff an EOP? Reviewed wi license. OK This is a past

S event. Simplified distractor wording

€ Distractor B & D not plausible. Vessel venting is not part of C/D & 91 F 2 X Depress strategy. Why would you vent the vessel in ES-1.2? Modified

S stem wording to improve clarity of question.

92 H 2 S Reformatted to be consistent with other 2 part questions.

y 1st half of distractors is AOP entry (RO Knowledge). Appears 2nd half may 93 H 2 X also be RO Knowledge. Licensee wrote a new 2" part to be SRO Only

S (T.S. operability).

94 F 3 S

95 F 3 S

96 F 3 S

Can deduce answer from system knowledge only. Backfill goes back to RX, blowdown goes to environment. 2nd part is EOP entry (RO

y Knowledge) Also this question is a potential repeat of question 76. 97 H 2 X Completely re-wrote question to remove reference to ECA·3.1 to avoid

S conflict with 076. The revised question centers around the selection of recovery actions in the preferred procedure that will be used as the mitigating strategy and the basis of why the action was chosen.

98 F 2 S

99 H 3 S

100 F 2 S ---_ ... _----- -_ .. _-- ---_._-- -- -



(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO u/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only

accordance with" in all choices.

89 H 3 X S Can deduce answers from RO knowledge only. Reviewed wi license. Licensee verified this is SRO level knowledge.

E B & 0 do not appear plausible. When would the procedure reader perform 90 H 2 X an AOP and handoff an EOP? Reviewed wi license. OK This is a past

S event. Simplified distractor wording

E Distractor B & 0 not plausible. Vessel venting is not part of C/O & 91 F 2 X Depress strategy. Why would you vent the vessel in ES-1.2? Modified

S stem wording to improve clarity of question.

92 H 2 S Reformatted to be consistent with other 2 part questions.

1J 1st half of distractors is AOP entry (RO Knowledge). Appears 2nd half may

93 H 2 X also be RO Knowledge. Licensee wrote a new 2" part to be SRO Only S (T.S. operability).

94 F 3 S

95 F 3 S

96 F 3 S

Can deduce answer from system knowledge only. Backfill goes back to RX, blowdown goes to environment. 2nd part is EOP entry (RO

1J Knowledge) Also this question is a potential repeat of question 76. 97 H 2 X Completely re-wrote question to remove reference to ECA-3.1 to avoid

S conflict with Q76. The revised question centers around the selection of recovery actions in the preferred procedure that will be used as the mitigating strategy and the basis of why the action was chosen.

98 F 2 S

99 H 3 S

100 F 2 S


(F/H) (1-5) utE/S Explanation

~ Enhance the question by rewording distractors to start with "The Reactor 1 H 3 will remain at ... " or "The Reactor will trip due to a ... " ~

S dlstractors.

~ Could you change to have Th included as in the bank question to 2 H 3 X eliminate the use of 2 part answers? Also, why is (Subcoollng margin = 0)

S given In the stem? Is this cueing? Removed ~ fir

ES·401, Rev. 9 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES·401·9

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 0# LOK LOD

(F/H) (1-5) utE/S Explanation

€ Remove "and dropping" from stem. This appears to be unnecessary

14 H 2 X cueing. The applicant should know this. Add the word "current" prior to

S status, i.e. "current status" of 125V DC Battery. Removed "and dropping" from the stem, reformatted the question to simplify.

€ Distractor A does not appear plausible. How much ERCW would it take to 15 H 2 X cause a rise in containment pressure? A & C distractors changed to ask

S about flooding vs. increasing containment pressure.

€ How did you acquire 44% and 54% for distractor choices B & C? If

16 H 3 program level is 69% should choice B & C be 64% & 74% for < 5% or >

S 5% of program level? PZR program level at 69% power is 49%. Reworded question to simplify.

17 H 3 S

€ Is this level of knowledge above RO knowledge? Do you need to tell them 18 H 4 X they're in an orange path? Removed "orange path" from question stem.

S

19 F 3 S

lj This is a plant specific exam. This question reflects generic fundamentals 20 H 3 and as is has a LOD of 1. Moved 0#57 to 0#20. Wrote a new question

S for 0#57.

lj 1st bullet appears to be a cue and is not needed to arrive at the proper

21 H 3 X X answer. It also contains a portion of the answer. A & B do not appear

S plausible. How could a high rad alarm setpoint be the cause of an excessive release (it would prevent it). New question written.

22 F 2 S Verify this is RO knowledge with licensee. SO confirms that this meets their criteria for RO knowledge.

Not sure if LOK is an F, looks more like an H. Change B to be

€ symmetrical with A, i.e. "The development of an RCS leak inside

23 H 3 containment". Make D start with "An", i.e. "An oscillating ... " Also, do we

S need to say lAW SGTR in stem? If we omit, SGTR could be added as a distractor if needed. NOTE: Reference not provided for distractor D (AOP R.02). Changed LOD to H. Other changes from above incorporated.

€ Add qualifier to 3rd bullet in stem to specify what press 1125# correlates to: -24 H 2 i.e. RCS press or PZR press. Confirm A & B plausible. Pressure bullet S now states RCS press. Confirmed A & B plausibility with licensee.

€ 4th bullet, change "in" to "is". Is RCS subcooling = 0 unnecessary cueing? 25 H 3· Changes made as noted above.

S

€ Verify this meets the KA. Change D to match wording in procedure. Also

26 F 3 X verify that D can NOT be considered as also correct or partially correct. D

S fNording changed as noted above. D distractor verified to be incorrect wI licensee.


1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 0# LOK LOD

(F/H) (1-5) U/E/S Explanation

E Remove "and dropping" from stem. This appears to be unnecessary

14 H 2 X cueing. The applicant should know this. Add the word "current" prior to

S status, i.e. "current status" of 125V DC Battery. Removed "and dropping" from the stem, reformatted the question to simplify.

E Distractor A does not appear plausible. How much ERCW would it take to 15 H 2 X cause a rise in containment pressure? A & C distractors changed to ask

S about flooding vs. increasing containment pressure.

E How did you acquire 44% and 54% for distractor choices B & C? If

16 H 3 program level is 69% should choice B & C be 64% & 74% for < 5% or>

S 5% of program level? PZR program level at 69% power is 49%. Reworded question to simplify.

17 H 3 S

E Is this level of knowledge above RO knowledge? Do you need to tell them 18 H 4 X they're in an orange path? Removed "orange path" from question stem.

S

19 F 3 S

Y This is a plant specific exam. This question reflects generic fundamentals 20 H 3 and as is has a LOD of 1. Moved 0#57 to 0#20. Wrote a new question

S for 0#57.

y 1st bullet appears to be a cue and is not needed to arrive at the proper

21 H 3 X X answer. It also contains a portion of the answer. A & B do not appear

S plausible. How could a high rad alarm setpoint be the cause of an excessive release (it would prevent it). New question written.

22 F 2 S Verify this is RO knowledge with licensee. SO confirms that this meets their criteria for RO knowledge.

Not sure if LOK is an F, looks more like an H. Change B to be

E symmetrical with A. i.e. "The development of an RCS leak inside

23 H 3 containment". Make D start with "An", i.e. "An oscillating ..... Also, do we

S need to say lAW SGTR in stem? If we omit, SGTR could be added as a distractor if needed. NOTE: Reference not provided for distractor D (AOP R.02). Changed LOD to H. Other changes from above incorporated.

E Add qualifier to 3rd bullet in stem to specify what press 1125# correlates to:

-24 H 2 i.e. RCS press or PZR press. Confirm A & B plausible. Pressure bullet S now states RCS press. Confirmed A & B plausibility with licensee.

E 4th bullet, change "in" to "is". Is RCS subcooling = 0 unnecessary cueing? 25 H 3 Changes made as noted above.

S

E Verify this meets the KA. Change D to match wording in procedure. Also

26 F 3 X verify that D can NOT be considered as also correct or partially correct. D

S wording changed as noted above. D distractor verified to be incorrect wi licensee.



This appears to be a memory question, F. This seems very difficult if it is a memory question. Also, the 1st half is in the SO procedure. Is the 2nd

half also there? If so, the 1st 3 bullets are not needed to answer the 27 F 4 E question. Also, the EA procedure only states that the annulus dp must be

more negative than -0.5" H20. This is the procedure in effect, not the SO ~hich states -.02" to -1.2" H20, i.e. C could also be construed as correct. Changed LOD as noted.

~ picture of RCP Seal dp is needed to verify max range is 500 psid. Why ~oes RCP Op Parameters Table (SO-68-2 Table 1) give a max value of

28 F 3 S 2300 psid & a normal of 2250psid if this value can not be read? Does the question need to specify where the indication is? Verified during in office visit that question is SAT as is.

~ppears to be cueing in stem. Why do we say CVCS mix bed "being used or deborating"? Is this necessary? Is C & D 1st half plausible? How

€ would lowering letdown flow increase IB] removal? Also, do we need to

29 F 2 X X add the word BOTH to the question prior to "Letdown Flow & Temp."?

S Agreed wI licensee's logic for C & D plausibility. If flow is lowered through IX, applicant could misconstrue this to mean a better IX process would occur. Question was also reworded to simplify choices to a "combination of letdown flow & temp."

Distractor A & C implies an outward inadvertent control rod motion due to

y an inadvertent boration from CCS. Is this plausible? How would a leak in the CCS HX cause boron level to increase in the RCS? Question was

30 H 2 X reworded with distractors modified to improve plausibility. Question now S asks for when the 1st operator action is required vs. procedure section entry.

Not sure of LOD. I'think this is a H. B is missing "in" after the word

€ available. Reword as a fill in the blank statement to simplify. With U1 @ 31 F 4 100%, the RHR Xtie Isolation Valves ... are required to be maintained in

S the open position to ensure in the event an RHR pump fails during response to a LOCA. LOD is OK. Reworded question to simplify.

U A & D not plausible if the Rx is in SDC mode. THE CLA would be valved out of service. You only need to know the highest and lowest press

32 F 2 X € component to answer the question. Question modified to add 100%

S power level to stem of question so that all modes would apply. Rearranged component selection.

€ Is 360 degrees F the right distractor? Changed the distractors to a 33 H 3 correlating temp. band vs. < or > 360 degrees.

S

€ Does the PRT have an auto pump down feature? No auto pump down 34 H 2 feature. Clarified the stem question to say "Iong term effects".

S ---



This appears to be a memory question, F. This seems very difficult if it is a memory question. Also, the 1st half is in the SO procedure. Is the 2nd

half also there? If so, the 1st 3 bullets are not needed to answer the 27 F 4 E question. Also, the EA procedure only states that the annulus dp must be

more negative than -0.5" H20. This is the procedure in effect, not the SO which states -.02" to -1.2" H20, i.e. C could also be construed as correct. Changed LOO as noted.

A picture of RCP Seal dp is needed to verify max range is 500 psid. Why does RCP Op Parameters Table (SO-68-2 Table 1) give a max value of

28 F 3 S 2300 psid & a normal of 2250psid if this value can not be read? Does the question need to specify where the indication is? Verified during in office visit that question is SAT as is.

Appears to be cueing in stem. Why do we say CVCS mix bed "being used for deborating"? Is this necessary? Is C & 0 1st half plausible? How

E /Nould lowering letdown flow increase [B] removal? Also, do we need to

29 F 2 X X add the word BOTH to the question prior to "Letdown Flow & Temp."?

S Agreed wI licensee's logic for C & 0 plausibility. If flow is lowered through IX, applicant could misconstrue this to mean a better IX process would occur. Question was also reworded to simplify choices to a "combination of letdown flow & temp."

Oistractor A & C implies an outward inadvertent control rod motion due to

lj an inadvertent boration from CCS. I

Documents

ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 · ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 9/2009 Initials