Essay - Clausewitz vs Sun Tzu

7/28/2019 Essay - Clausewitz vs Sun Tzu

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Gherghilescu Daniela, PO916

Essay: What are the similarities and differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, on the concepts of

war as a continuation of politics and moral forces?

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Thomas Williams (2003) warns that contemporary technological advancement and the rise of

asymmetric warfare pushes military and political leaders to creative thinking, building new strategies

and out-thinking their fast-learning enemies. Now, more than ever before, Sun TzuChinese military

advisor before 500 B.C and Carl von Clausewitz military officer serving the Prussian regime -

theories and ideas have to be analysed and new frontiers have to be opened. If thinking about the

conflicts between The United States of America and Afghanistan (Zweibelson, 2010), although there

was a clear unbalance of forces, the war did not turn up to be absolute or quick. Zweibelson (2010)

argues that it would have been better to follow Sun Tzus advices in order to win and let aside the

particularities of von Clausewitzs war. As Donald Rumsfeld said: we have to put aside the

comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our

forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us (Williams, 2003).

For a better and also academic understanding of contemporary military and security issues, Sun Tzu

and Carl von Clausewitz have to be read and acknowledged, focusing upon their strenghts and

weaknesses and evaluating their applicability upon contemporary problems. Although Sun Tzu and

Carl von Clausewitz have lived and wrote in two different periods of time, their concepts and theories

still have major relevance today, as none-the-less, history repeats itself (Ross, 2006, p. 32) and all

history is reconstruction (Paret, 1976, p. 387). Both Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz have been focusing

upon the concept of war, on the beliefs and commitments of soldiers and strategies of generals, on

passions and fears driving operational agendas, on brutal force and intelligence as means of

accomplishing victory.

The conceps of war is explained by Peter Paret (1976) as a duel on a larger scale (Paret, 1976, p.

383), a fight that aims to force the opponent or enemy to play after your owns will. War is a complex

nucleum fundamented on physical force and strenghtened by moral forces, having as principal target

to render the enemy powerless (Paret, 1976, p. 383). He distinguishes between two types of nations

that conduct war: civilised ot savages, that are driven either by mind (intelligence) or by passion.


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Following the words of von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, Paret (1976) underlines the fact that regardless

of the typologies of the nations conducting it, war is for sure an act of force, and there is no logical

limit to the application of that force (Paret, 1976, p.384), and in an ideal context, both forces have

equal chances to win.

Although the definition of war, as indirectly revealed from their writings, seem to be similar for both

von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, the techniques and components of war they have identified may be

interpreted differently. Both of them do consider and highlight the importance of the moral forces in

structuring and driving a war, but they have slightly parralell impressions and opinions about the war-

politics nexus. In Sun Tzus terms, war is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life

or death, the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied (Sun Tzu, p.63).

Sun Tzu does rely heavily on studying strategies and interpreting intelligences data in order to obtain

victory through mind and less through physical power. Conversely, von Clausewitz sees war as not a

mere act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means

(1976, p. 87). His explanations of war are more brutal, tough and rely on sheer millitary and political

power, as victory is a consequence of the ability of the general to coordinate those material powers.

Although the appeal and the deployment of war today has changed considerably due to technological

advancement, it has to be underlined that Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitzs concepts do not have to

be applied per se, as:

Rather than establishing fixed laws and principles, theory is supposed to help us think

analytically. With this in mind, we should not expect to find the truth in Sun Tzus and

Clausewitz writings but they should be seen as tools to recognize similar patterns of strategy

in contemporary conflicts (Hardwick, 2011).

As Williams (2003) explains, their theories have to be used in order to think outside-the box, to

develop new horizons starting from the elegant and simple ideas of Sun Tzu or the tough and quite

phylosophical approached of Carl von Clausewitz. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz regard moral forces

as defining the military and political achievements of wars, which further influence the channels

through which victory is gained.


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Clausewitz explains the difficulties and burdens of war through friction, for the actions and dynamics

of war lead to a disruption of quotidiene continuity, a fragmentation of normal values and

augmentation of senses. War is the result of recirpocity between two living forces (Paret, 1989,

p.384), between oneselves and their enemies. This friction has different solution in clauswitzian terms

and in Sun Tzus vision. If Clusewitz states that combat is the core principle of war, that the decision

by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce (von

Clausewitz, 1976, p. 97).

Conversely, Sun Tzu would argue that In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance

relying on sheer military power. [...] It is more important to outthink you enemy than to outfight him

(Tzu, 1993, p.122). It is dangerous to adopt the Clauswitzian position, because, as Bevin Alexander

(2003) says, no war has ever been won through brute force or impulsivity: If the general is choleric

his authority can easily be upset. His character is not firm (Tzu, 1993, p.67). It is the mind and the

intelligence that puts the enemy down. Sun Tzu, also approved by Corbett (1972), assures his victories

through constant force multipliers and enemy deception. From a pure political perspective, probably

the greater the number of the military forces, the more chances to obtain victory. The moral forces are

very important into building up and sustaining physical stength and forces.

Kolodziej (2005, p. 59) writes from a clausewitzian perspective and warns that states by their very

claimed moral composition as sovereign and independent units of rule could not submit themselves to

a Leviathan to ecape perpetual conflict. Unlike individual worriors that obey to their generals morals

and aspirations, states cannot submit to one another as this would ultimately mean self destruction.

From a more socio-political point ov view, Sun Tzu believes that the supreme war has no bloodshed

and minimum costs. Von Clausewitz would concentrate all forces to win the battle, fight with all

resources and decisively attack the center of gravity of his enemies. Schlacht, as Clauseiwtz calls it, or

blitzkrieg (Mearsheimer, 1981, p. 103) is a type of concentrated war, that has all the forces of one side

focused on the rapid, decisive and complete destruction of the enemy. This focus on winning the battle

brings to the surface a series of dialects that make wars complex and difficult to dissolve: moral and

physical forces, defence and attack, ends and means, reciprocity of action, genius and friction.


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It is important to underline that pre-war strategies and actions plans are the ones building an ideal or

absolute war (von Clausewitz, 1976). The move from abstracticism to reality is made by friction that

disrupts the perfection of an ideal war on paper (Paret, 1976, p. 385; Howard, 1983, p. 53) and genius

is responsible to find suitable solutions and field-inspired and applicable strategies. In reality, there is

no such thing as absolute war, as real wars are limited to the conditions within wich they take place:

terrain, enemys weaponry, personal and foreign strategies, weather (von Clausewitz, 1976).

Both Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz do agree to the fact that the entire war relies on the historical

knowledge and critical judgement of the generals, of their ability of persuading masses and gaining

their respect and confidence the moral forces. For Sun Tzu, the way a wise general can achieve

greatness beyond ordinary men is through foreknowledge (Tzu, 1993, p. 144), When the troops flee,

are insubordinate, collapse or are routed in battle, it is the fault of the general (Tzu, 1993, p. 125).

The general needs to keep his troops close, merged and unified, to fight cooperating between them and

this could be done only if he knows how to hearten them to achieve success. For Sun Tzu, a general

has to have five virtues to be sussessfull in his applications: he has to be wise, humane, sincere,

courageous and strict. General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the USAs military troops in World War II

records the following speech for livening his soldiers:

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept

nothing less than full victory! Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessings of Almighty

God upon this great and noble undertaking (U. S. Army, no date).

Some could argue that Sun Tzus concepts are more valid for asymetric wars, as they involve unequal

balances of forces and they need strength and power reinforcements, and also have one side that is

numerically, technologically or military less fortunate then the other. A perfect example of this

asymetric wars would be the invasion of Normandy, in the Second World War, as part of the

Operation Overlord in 1944. The generals wisdom and courage (Tzu, 1993, p.65) or the genius as it is

called by von Clausewitz, is a collboration between the coup doeil - ability to see efficient and

applicable strategies - and resolution - the courage and the resoluteness to put them in practice. It is

the role of the commander to give the best orders and lead the way of his soldiers advantageously.


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Even though the Normandy invasion was a mishap for Germans, Hitler had flawless victories in 1939

against Poland, helped by the advancement of weaponrys. Linking to von Clausewitzs centre of

gravityHitler used blitzkriegas a means of destroying Polands military lines, its objective is to

disrupt the victims lines of communication and deny the defender time to reinforce weak points and

regroup (Mearsheimer, 1981, p. 103). By using a single, concentrated battle against Poland, Hitler

perfectly won the battle and saved the effort and losses of a series of smaller and less efficient strikes

against the Polish forces.

Besides knowledge about systematic military actions, although von Clausewitz does not pay that much

emphasis on it except he includes it in friction, terrain has a vital role, as Sun Tzu explains, in the

course of war. From a political perspective, knowing beforehand the land where one is going to fight

gives high chances of being better prepared from strategic and tactic perspectives. Sun Tzu (1993, p.

109) says: When the enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him. If he attacks downhill, do not

oppose him. The entire terrain accomodation is part of the complex strategic approach of knowing

your enemy as much as possible, to obtain as much information about his position in war, his tactics,

his amunition, the number of his soldiers and attack plans. Know your enemy and know yourself; in a

hundred battles you will never be in peril (Tzu, 1993, p.84). In order to reach Von Clausewitz sense

of locality and Sun Tzus terrain knowledge, the general has to be flexible and adapt his army to

the situation experienced just as the water finds its way in the already existing channels (Tzu, 1993).

This situations refers to the territoriality of the battle, the structure of the wars fighting equipment and

teams, and also to the political context of the state or region involved in war. The political context of

an enemy has a series of channels through which it could be decripted in order to find out all of its

weaknesses and powerfull points. From a political point of view, Sun Tzu sees war as an expression of

politics, a materialization of it and von Clausewitz sees war as a continuation or a tool for

accomplishing political goals.

There are different factors that allow building up military intelligence and political informational

background: historical knowledge, technological devices, spies and battle field experience. It is

difficult or even impossible to obtain valuable data without having strong and powerful connections


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inside the enemys country or region. Sun Tzu pays a lot of emphasis upon knowing your enemy and

taking advantage of his weak points (Tzu, 1993, p. 92), whereas Von Clausewitz focuses upon

reassuring your own force and knowing your strength and power (von Clausewitz, 1976). By knowing

your enemys weak points and battle plans, one could minimize the costs of own battle and build up

deception plans. Through deception Sun Tzu explains all warfare, as building phantasmas for enemies

and making them believe your strenghts as weakness and weaknesses as strenghts : when near, make

it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near (Tzu, 1993, p.66; 91). Sun Tzu

believed that this disemination of truth is the key to succes.

A big role of in conducting valuable information related to warfare is possessed by spies and secret

agents and services. During World War Two, the United Kingdom had the best secret services

network and very well trained spies to work for them. They have been able to gain a lot of

information about the German armies and this helped them build up successful fighting plans. Spies

are the connectors of ones army with its enemies, of all those in the army close to the commander

none is more intimate than the secret agents; of all rewards none is more liberal than those given to

secret agents (Tzu, 1993, p. 147). Conversely, von Clausewitz is more circumspect about the role of

agents in obtaining War information because he considers them mostly false and highly doubtful.

Paret (1976) also concludes that the only true knowledge a military leader has is about his own troops

and situations, as the things one could find out about their enemies is unreliable intelligence that

could actually lead to ill-timed action and ill-timed inaction, and is no more conducive to slowing

down operations than it is to speeding them up (Paret, 1976, p. 391).

He could be considered partially right as Sun Tzu (1993, p. 148) actually wrote that you have to find

the secret agents that spy on you and bribe them to serve you. In this case, how could one be sure that

those agents do not spread information both to himself or herself and and to the enemy as well? Von

Clausewitz was mostly relying on the sheer millitary experience and battle abilities of his generals and

sees intelligence as being part of genius, it is a logical and natural tool of wise and versant generals.

As stated earlier, Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz have different approaches regarding connection

between wars and their state inceptors. Although both agree that the reasons and ends of wars have


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political connotations, Sun Tzu clearly states that generals [that] are able and not interfered by the

sovereign will be victorious (Tzu, 1993, p.83). He underlines the importance of non-involvment of

state sovereigns in acts of war. Political leaders do not have the proper military training and

knowledge in order to take efficient decisions. They cannot and should not be in charge for all military

forces available on the battle field and, as Sun Tzu explains, they should know who are the right

persons to take care of those duties and should expect results from them (Tzu, 1993, p. 83).

More elaborate, von Clausewitz (1976) explains war through a trinity made of thepeoples forces

expressed through the violent character of war against the enemies, the military commanders ability

to reduce friction in war and enhance the chances of winning and the political purposes and

consequences of war (Heuser, 2002, p.52).

Generals have to be in constant communication and conference with their political leaders in order to

find solution and to finalize their political aims. But, if we take for example the two different political

and military structures of Germany and the United States of America in the Second World War, it

could be concluded that the implication of political leaders in the generals decisions have not been

beneficial at all.

Hitler did not give full credibility to his millitary commanders and his involvement blurred the

confidence between troops, the roles of the generals were confusing and mixed up and they cannot

accomplish professionally their assignments. Besides the tangled organisation of the German Army

that proved to be an advantage for Gen. Eisenhower, the latter was the only coordinator of the army,

with no political leaders interfering his decisions.

Paret (1976, p. 388) differentiates between the different situations where wars and political objectives

become one and the situations where one could exceed the powers and applicabilities of the other.

The millitary implication depends on the context and is directly proportionate with the political goal it

accompanies, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation (Paret, 1976,

p. 388). As stated earlier in this paper, von Clausewitz (1976) differentiate between limited or

absolute war, distinquishes the simplicity of the war on paper and the complexity of the war on the


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battle field. Michael Howard (1983) comment of the clausewitzian differentiation of wars and

underlines the high historical conotations of their limitations and absoluteness.

Pointing out von Clausewitzs perception of the politics-war connection, Kolodziej (2005, p. 58 - 59)

writes that conflicts and wars, from societal or individual level, do affect the relationships between

nation-states and, especially in modern times (probably a consequence of globalisation) require the

political implication of state leaders, laws and regulations. War is strongly linked to the societies that

fight it and to the cultural norms and peculiar preconceptions (Howard, 1983, p. 49) that surround it.

Different to Sun Tzus perception that worriors can be build and taught, Howard (1983) suggests that

although the political government could influence the thirst for fighting of their civilians, the historical

changes and the intensity of the political aspiration behind wars determine the degree of implication of

the people and the type of war to take place: the kind of war that is completely governed and

saturated by the urge for a decisionor a war of observation (Howard, 1983, p. 47).

Colin Powell, George W. BushsUnited States Secretary of State,says As soon as they tell me its

limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me its

, I head for the bunker (Western, 2005, p. 166). There is a common agreement in practical

terms to say that absolute does not mean actually war on paper, but fighting with all your forces and

means and limited would be understood as a less serious cause for that war, a war that could be

reduced only to the term of obsevation. Conversely to von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu did not pay attention

to the particularities of cultures and people, the differences between political regimes and future

transformations. A reason for this omission could be the periods of time when the two theorists: Sun

Tzu and von Clausewitz wrote, as von Clausewitz was touched by the modernization and

emancipations of history (Howard, 1983, p. 48), that would have convulsed the stability and steadiness

of the time of Sun Tzu.

Besides the moral forces that generals have to possess, Sun Tzu also underlines the importance of

deception and diversions within warfare. Both in traditional wars and also within asymetric warfares,

deception is a handy tool for building personal advantages and accomplishing quicker victory. Corbett

(1972) explains that war is not just military force and well planned strategies, it also means
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Statehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_State


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distortioning the enemys appreciation so that he will believe he is playing after his own rules. Sun

Tzu (1993) also acknowlesges this through saying that you have to attract the enemy, entice him with

something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they wait for him in strength (Tzu,

1993, p. 93).

Regardless of their similarities and differences, both Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu will remain two

of the greatest warfare minds of our epoch. Although their works were written in different timeframes,

their theories could be very well applied even to contemporary problems and issues regarding war.

Moreover, even though theory and practice do not always converge successfully, history has proved

that if theory is followed in case of wars, serious harms, losses and defeates can be prevented, as in the

example of Operation Overlord 1944. Both Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz agree upon the

importance of moral forces of the commanders and their support regarding soldier affections and

vibes, as well as on the fact that each war has political roots and purposes. If Sun Tzu and von

Clausewitz do not pay equal attention upon some notions: such as terrain, strictness of generals it

does not mean that they disagree upon the importance of such factors. They differ from the perspective

of their writings: phylosophical vs military. Sun Tzu is more phylosophical in writing and his

perspectives could be more easily applied in a variety of sectors: business, sports, marketing, whereas

von Clausewitz is more politically and military oriented and his area of applicability is restrained only

to this areas. That is why Sun Tzu is using more abstract explanations, more ideological ones, as his

main offensive principle is attacking the enemys strategies and battle plans and von Clausewitz is

more tangible and his offensive plans involves the vanishing of the enemys center of gravity.


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Hardwick, N.A. (2011)Is Clausewitz or Sun Tzu more relevant to understanding contemporary war?

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Murray, W. (2001)Joint and Combined Warfare in the Twenty-first Century [online] Available at: Accessed 04

December 2012

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Essay - Clausewitz vs Sun Tzu