TCultural and Social Research

in Greenland 95/96Gr0nlandsk kultur- og samfundsforskning

Essays in Honour of Robert Petersen

Ilisimatusarfik / Atuakkiorfik

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Cultural and Social Research in Greenland 1995/96Gronlandsk Kultur - og Samfundsforskning 1995/96Edited by Birgitte Jacobsen in collaboration withClaus Andreasen and Jette Rygaard© Ilisimatusarfik / AtuakkiorfikA/S, Nuuk 1996English translation and revisions: James ManleyLingvistic advice: Helle BrieghelCover: Photo by Ebbe MortensenOmbrydning og tryk: N0rhavenA/SPrinted in Denmark by N0rhaven A/S

ISBN 87 558 1277 5

.......

Ivar Jonsson

Reflexive Modernization,Organizational Dependencyand Global Systetns ofEm.bedded Developtnent- A Post-Colonial View-

In this article, we will discuss the transition from simple to reflexive modernityin relation to the 'systems of embedded development' and 'organizationaldependency' which characterize the relations between former colonies and for-mer colonial powers. Wewill concentrate on societal development in Greenlandin order to highlight the problems of reflexive modernization in a microeconomythat suffers from 'organizational dependency'.

The global contextModern societies appear to be going through a process of substantive change.This change affects both their external relations and their internal societalstructures. The transformation of their external relations is caused by four strandsof development. First, the end of the cold war and the crumbling of Americanhegemony have changed international relations such that the axis of conflict hasshifted from East-West/ capitalist-communist antagonisms to North-Southconflicts over natural resources (which recently culminated in the questionableexploitation of the UN in the symbolic Gulf War of the "West" against Iraq).Secondly, the external relations are changing because of the ever increasingglobalization of production and services, which undermines international ordirect state-to-state agreements in the organization of direct foreign investmentand international trade. Thirdly, the spread of a new techno-economic paradigm(Freeman 1987) based on information and communication technology, on theone hand, and the globalization of the production and consumption of cultureon the other, have created a new basis for the formation of individual andcollective identity and community. Finally, the deepening global environmental

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crisis calls for global solutions that go beyond the policies of individual states(Jonsson 1995a).

As for the development of internal societal structures, modern societies arefaced with an economic, social and political crisis that is culminating in the declineof mass production, permanent structural unemployment and underutilizationof their production power. Furthermore, modern societies are faced with arestructuring of the class system due to an emergent new job structure, and theyare faced with the growth of a new underclass constituted by people with obso-lete skills formerly exploited in the Fordist mode of production, who are becomingmarginalized by the new 'mode of information'. The underclass is swelled byimmigrants and minority groups such as women and ethnic groups who largelyjoin the "reserve army" of the unemployed (Jonsson 1989; Lash 1994). Classidentity (or class-for-itself) and class-based politics have declined as a result ofthe long-term development of 'utilitarian' individualization due first to the riseand diffusion of the nuclear family as the locus of mass consumption (Hirschand Roth 1986) organized in terms of the expansion of the welfare state andKeynesian control of general demand. Secondly, utilitarian individualization wasstrengthened by the decline of modern marriage (Lash 1994),individualized massconsumption and the decline of the workers' communities of industrial capitalism(Hirsch and Roth 1986).

Following the spread of global and local information and communication networks,there has been further individualization which is not utilitarian but 'reflexive' asindividuals join communities by virtue of types of cultural activity andconsumption which are not determined solely by social or even geographicalproximity. As we increasingly identify with global cultural figures and are ableto communicate with socially and geographically distant individuals or agents,the communities and class-based identities of Fordist modern societies areundermined even further, as is the role of particular societies as loci of cultureand community.

The political crisis of modern societies is characterized by the decline oftraditional political parties and interest groups and the increasing tendency forinterests to be served through the mediation of the state. At the same time, sub-political movements such as environmental movements, women's movements,social minority groups and forms of Burgerinitiaiio are increasingly influencingpolicy formation and undermining the traditional monopoly of the process ofsocietal policy formation by parties and interest groups (Beck 1994).

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Modernization: simple, reflexive and decentralizedWith reference to these developmental tendencies, theories of modem societiesare developing from theories of 'simple' modernization into theories of 'reflexive'modernization. The former concept refers to the disembedding and subsequentre-embedding of traditional social forms by industrial social forms, while thelatter concept refers to the disembedding and subsequent re-embedding ofindustrial social forms by another type of modernity (Beck 1994: 2). The 'mas-termind' of the former kind of analysis is Karl Marx (1976)with his 'subsump-tion logic' of capital, in which modernization is reduced to the tendential'laws'of valorization within the framework of political economy. The concept of reflexivemodernization stems from a different theoretical tradition, namely macro-sociology. Reflexivity in this context has been defined in three ways. First, it hasbeen defined in a deterministic, reified way, according to which the transforma-tion of modernity is fetishized as "blind" development (Beck 1994).Secondly, ithas been defined as a developmental stage at which some degree of technocraticexpertise takes over the role of establishing order in the chaotic fabric of modemsociety (Giddens 1994). Finally, it has been defined in terms of the increasingimportance of signs and aesthetic design and consumption for capitalaccumulation (Lash 1994;Lash and Urry 1994:61).

These definitions suffer from a lack of realism as they consider neither thestructural distribution of power relations nor the role and dynamism of reflection,or rather 'interiorization' in the existentialist sense, in the active struggle ofagencies for different paths in the transition to modernity (for a sociopoliticalversion of this train of thought, see Jonsson 1993 on the concept of 'hegemonicpolitics'). The politics of reflexive modernization takes place within the structuralsettings and power relations of agents who seek alternative ways of disembeddingand re-embedding the social forms of industrialism in the transitional processleading to information-intensive and communication-intensive modernity, Thepower relations of the reflexive transformation of modernity consist both ofsocieties' external relations in terms of international division of labour and ofthe position of a society in international hegemonic structures. It is on the basisof a matrix of power relations that agents of particular locality struggle fordifferent paths of development which in the case of reflexive modernity refers tothe dynamics of the global undermining of modem society's formations of class,stratum, occupations, sex roles, nuclear family,plant, business sectors and techno-economic paradigms.

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Global Systems of Embedded DevelopmentDevelopmental strategies are historically embedded in the sense that the politicalinstitutions and culture, foreign investment and techno-economic paradigms thatexist at a given moment in history determine the constraints on as well as thepotential for economic and social policies. They develop structures that havecome about as a result of struggle and the balance of social and economic powerin the past. Often they are remnants of colonial institutions and exploitation.Furthermore, the relations of different economies/ countries to global capital andglobal networks or 'webs' of accumulation (Reich 1992)are determined by theircountry-specific historical and institutional framework.

Following this train of thought, in comparisons of developing and developedcountries one will come across differences in 'organizational dependency' whichare rooted in historical embeddedness. In the case of developing countries onewill find that their political structures and state forms are often strongly influencedby their colonial past. In comparison, political life and the state in former colonialpowers have developed more independently. Furthermore, one will find thatformer colonies vary greatly in terms of their organizational dependency. As anexample, the development of the state in Taiwan and South Korea was stronglyinfluenced by the fact that they were Japanese colonies at a critical moment intheir history. Taiwan remained a colony of Japan in 1895-1945and Korea in 1910-45. The 'Japanized' organization of their states helped to foster the strong statismthat characterizes their economies (Chan and Clark 1992:75-77).

It follows that the paths of modernization that individual countries followmay be very different depending on the historical embeddedness of their socio-economic institutional structures. There appear to be four main types of regimesof development that are important today in terms of paths ofmodernization, i.e.statist, nee-corporatist, liberal-orthodox and ecclesiastical. A statist regime ofdevelopment is characterized by a strong state and the strong position of the statebureaucrats who lead industrialization, rather than capitalists or other economicgroups. This is the dominant type of regime, both in the sense that the mostpopulous states in the world, like China and India, belong to this group, andthat statist economies now have the highest growth rate and greatest future po-tential for growth. Neo-corporatist regimes are characterized by institutionalizedco-operation among capital, labour and the state in the fine tuning ofproductivitygrowth and wage development and the control of general demand in the formofwelfare expenditure. Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries belongto this group. Liberal-orthodox regimes are characterized by minimized stateinterventionism, deregulation and an emphasis on private, competitive capital

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as the fundamental factor in economic growth and progress. The USA and Britainto a lesser extent are cases of this. Ecclesiastical regimes are those in which religiousinstitutions lead the state and economy and regulate value accumulation. Iranand Pakistan are probably the clearest examples of ecclesiastical regimes (onecclesiastical regimes, see Mosesdottir 1995).

Most countries are hybrids of different regimes of development and theirdevelopmental strategies and paths of modernization fluctuate between thedifferent ideal types mentioned above. The Greenlandic regime of developmentis predominantly statist, but it has some neo-corporatist traits both in wage policyformation and the social-democratic emphasis on welfare expenditures. At thesame time it is characterized by great 'organizational dependency' and it ishistorically embedded in its colonial past as a colony of Denmark and in itshyper-colonial present as part of the Danish state with limited home rule. Beforewe discuss Greenland's' organizational dependency', we should analyse the mainfeatures of Greenlandic statism.

The strong position of the public sector in Greenland is in many ways animportant resource for successful developmental strategies in the period of transit-ion between simple and reflexive modernization. The experience of Taiwan, SouthKorea and Singapore indicates that statism and state entrepreneurship areextremely important for successful development (Chan and Clark 1992, White1988, Cotton 1992, Davis and Ward 1990, Huang 1989, Jonsson 1995a and c).

The public sector is relatively large in Greenland, with total public expenditurearound 90% of GDP. However, one has to keep in mind that the GNP of Green-land is around 50% larger than its GDP, because Greenland receives a block trans-fer from the Danish state. Much of public expenditure is spent on health andeducation, 14% and 12% of GDP respectively in 1990-93. Admin~strationaccounted for 8% and so did transfers. Subsidies for businesses accounted for5% (Paldam 1995,102). These figures are much higher than in the OECD countriesif estimated in terms of GDP, but in terms of GNP they would be 1/3 smaller.

The size of the public sector in terms of market production of goods andservices reflects how important it is for economic development. In the latestavailable labour market survey from 1987, the number of employed persons inGreenland was 24,789. Of those, 6,490 worked in public enterprises while 10,423worked in private enterprises. In some sectors the state-owned enterprises playa leading role, e.g. in fish processing, where the state-owned Royal GreenlandA/S has around 3,000 employees, the bulk of whom are stationed in Greenland.Royal Greenland A/S is one of Europe's largest fish processing firms.

The Greenlandic statist regime has been restructured in recent years, such

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that the state enterprises have now formally become limited liability companiesand are relatively more autonomous and market-orientated. Furthermore, adevelopment company was established in 1993which will finance venture capital.Since 1990 the statist regime has developed from being a directly centralizedsystem under the Home Rule Government to an 'organic centralized' system ofrelatively autonomous enterprises that are controlled by the Home RuleGovernment through its ownership of shares and nominations ofboard membersof the companies. Most of these companies have the position either of an oligopolyor a monopoly in the economy (Jonsson 1995a and b).

The firms of the Home Rule Government dominate almost all industrialsectors, spanning from production, shipyards, wholesale and retail to informa-tion technology and development firms. This structural base of the economymakes it possible to shift from one regime to another. In the present situation ofreflexive modernization a new context for the formation of developmentalstrategies has emerged. In the phase of simple modernization, Denmark wasclearly ahead of Greenland in terms of technology and know-how. Today, thesituation is not so simple. The Danish economy is developing into a form ofproduction system with intensive information and communication technologyand reflexive production. In the present situation there is hardly any technologicaldifference between Denmark and Greenland in areas that are relevant to theGreenlandic microeconomy. Furthermore, at this stage the Danish economy doesnot appear to be able to offer any comparative advantage in terms of theimplementation of the new technology. Hence, the time has come to look forother partners and to cut down the 'organizational dependency' from whichGreenland suffers, and to work on developmental and technological strategiesthat take into account Inuit culture and the specific natural resources of Green-land. In short, now is the time to establish business relations with firms fromother countries and to break down Greenland's 'organizational dependency' onDenmark.

Let us now look at Greenland's 'organizational dependency' and its roots in theera of simple modernization.

From igloo to Internet - problems of reflexive modernizationSince the 1950s Greenlanders have been exposed to a process of plannedmodernization 'from above'. The modernization process has resulted in the con-centration of the population in small fishing villages and the capital, Nuuk, which

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has approximately 15,000 inhabitants. Greenland was incorporated into theDanish state in 1950 as a Danish "county", as opposed to its former status as acolony. In 1979 home rule was introduced and since then Greenlanders havetaken over most of the administrative functions of the Danish state in Greenland(Tobiasen 1995:65). During this period the dominant accumulation strategy hasbeen export-orientated and based predominantly on investment in the F-sector(fishing and fish processing).

In the 1950s the emphasis was on investment in infrastructure in order tostimulate private Danish investment in the economy.As this strategy failed, publicinvestment increased during the 1960s, in terms of production, transport andservices. The bulk of the investment was channelled through the state-ownedcompany KGB. As a consequence, the process of modernization in Greenlandhas been characterized by the unusually predominant role of the state and anunusually high degree of centralization. The statist regime in Greenland wasstrengthened by the Greenlandic Home Rule Government in the 1980sas it placedeven greater emphasis on investment in the F-sector.

Following a severe slump in the F-sector in the late 1980s,a new accumulationstrategy has emerged, which emphasizes the development of tourism and arenewed interest in research related to mining and oil production in the future.At the same time, greater interest in knowledge-intensive accumulation strategyhas emerged and the Home Rule Government has recently created a post in theMinistry of Education and Culture that will deal with the co-ordination of re-search and development (R&D) in Greenland. Furthermore, the Ministry ispreparing to establish a research council that will co-ordinate R&D activity on apermanent basis (Jonsson 1995a, b and c). It appears that the Greenlandic sy-stem of innovation and R&D activity is now in its infancy and that it will developfast in the next few years.

The export-orientated accumulation strategy has been the cornerstone ofGreenland's industrialization and the basis for 'simple modernization' in Green-land. The modernization has been cruel, and has created a high level of anomieand resulted in large numbers of "losers" I i.e. disillusioned and apatheticindividuals, suicides and homicides (see the table below). Part of the problemhas been the great difficulties in resocializing the Inuit population because of thespeed at which the demographic concentration of the population took place.Furthermore, the bulk of the population had its roots in a culture based on thehunters' mode of production and has suddenly been faced with a totally differentpolitical and management culture based on Taylorist principles and largeorganizations imported from a highly industrialized, Fordist country, namely

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-Table 1.'Indicators of anomie, rates of unemployment and income distributionin the East and West Nordic Countries

Denmark Faroe Fin lard Green lard lcelard Norway

Islards Sweden

Homicide and o1herintended injury per100.000inhabitants 1993 1.2 3.3 14.4* 0.4 1.1 1.4"

Suicides per 100.000inhabitants 1993 22.3 8.7 27.6 882" 9.914.3*15.6*

Assault 1993 per 100.000inhabitants aged 15·67 256 528 1198** 353.875

Unemployment rate 1993 10.7 19.1 13.1 9,7 5.36.08.1

Inrome distribution 1993.Top 20% of inrome earn ers' 432 >51.8*** 41.1 >47.0***- 35.444.439.3share of pre tax total inoome (1991 ) (1992)

*1992; •.•.Aged 15-69; *uTop 17.7% of income earners; ****Top 17.5% of income earners.Sources: Hagstova Feroya: Arb6k fyri Faroyar 1992; Nordic Council of Ministers: Yearbook of

Nordic Statistics 1995; and Statistical Bureau of Greenland: Gran/and 1994, Ka/aallit Nunaat,Statistisk Arbog.

Denmark. The losers in the Greenlandic process of simple modernization werethose who had particular problems in resocializing to the new dominant Danishculture, most often those who did not learn Danish while young and came fromtiny settlements and hunter communities.

In practice, Danish modernization was realized in the form of a 'three-lanesociety', one lane was built for the losers in the process of simple modernization;but instead of a motorway lane this was a cul-de-sac with "petrol stations" alongthe way in the form of greatly increased investment in the construction of churchesand minimum welfare institutions such as health centres and hospitals. A secondlane was built for the future generation of Greenlanders who would fill the ranksof skilled labour and professionals and perhaps the ranks of a Greenlandic elitein some undefined future. Investment in the educational system was increasedheavily in the post-1960s period (Jonsson 1995a). However, this lane was built ina rush and turned out be unusually bumpy so that the traffic was slow. After 40years of educational efforts, Greenlanders lag far behind other Nordic nations interms of technical and university education (see the table below). Furthermore,around 85% of students studying at university level study abroad and

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approximately 40% of those students do not come back to Greenland after theirstudies (Direktoratet for Kultur, Uddannelse og Forskning 1995). This is anunusually high level of 'brain-drain'. The bulk of specialist posts in the admini-stration and in firms in Greenland are still filled by the Danish workforce. Thethird lane was/is the superhighway of skilled labour and specialists, who inmost cases were Iare Danes who for decades were paid wages that were 25%higher (or more) than the wages of the Greenlandic workforce, and who movedfast and stopped for a short time in Greenland. Over 70% of Danes who come towork in Greenland move back to Denmark within three years. Indeed in 1984,Danes accounted for 20% of the population in Greenland and received 40% ofthe total income in the economy (Lyck 1986). With their departure, accumulatedknow-how constantly leaks out of the economy, and since the predominantorganizational principle in the administration and firms is Taylorist andhierarchical, there is little room for 'learning-by-doing" or the fast training of theGreenlandic workforce through job rotation (Jonsson 1995c).

The present, historically embedded situation may have serious consequencesfor reflexive modernization in Greenland. First, the failure of the educationalsystem may create a new stratum of losers in the new 'mode of information' of

Table 2.Number of Students Studying on at Post-upper-secondary level (ISCED 5-7 Third Level) in 1993 inthe East and West Nordic Countries Per 1000 Inhabitants

Denmark"Faroe Finlard Greenlard Icelard

Norway

Islards 9Neden

S1Udents per 1000 30.3 38.9 63 22.8 40.9 26.9inhabitants

S1Udents per 1000 1332 186.7 213 94.9 177.8 124.8inhabitants aged 20.34

*1992; **Students 1992/3 studying at universities and schools that have similar requirements ofentrance such as teacher-training programmes, medical and diagnostic and treatment programmes,commercial and business administration programmes and, programmes in mass communicationand documentation.

Sources:Nordic Council of Ministers: Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1995 and The StatisticalBureau of Greenland: Grsnland 1995, Kalaallit Nunaat, Stat/stlsk Arbog.

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reflexive modernization - the group of the technically skilled in the slow lane ofsimple modernization in Greenland. The lack of emphasis on the aesthetic di-mension of reflexive production may cause this development, such that some ofthe investment in human capital may be wasted. Secondly, there is almost a totallack of an independent 'technological milieu' today in Greenland, and there isno independent technological institute or technical university that couldindependently import leading-edge technology into the economy. This is due toGreenland's hyper-colonial relations with Denmark (Jonsson 1995a, b and c) andits more or less voluntary dependence on 'Danocentric' Danish expertise. Thirdly,the monopoly status of TELE, the state-owned telecommunication company, itsshort-term income strategies, and its management's lack of progressive visionas regards the future potential of information technology, may have wastedimportant opportunities for investment in future infrastructures for accumulation.(A small example is the almost still-born development of Internet services inGreenland). Fourthly, the general state of the Greenlandic nation may be suchthat motivation for innovative activity, and interest in the new techno-economicparadigm of information and aesthetically intensive accumulation, is very low.

The last point is interesting, as in many respects it reflects cultural andideological conflicts between Greenlanders and Danes that are very importantfor the institutionalization of reflexive modernization in Greenland today. Somehave speculated as to whether it is a lack of the entrepreneurial spirit in Green-land that is manifested in the relatively few small enterprises, particularly in theservice sector. The lack of this spirit is often explained by a theory that theGreenlanders are a natuifolk (a people of nature - in other words, primitive),assuming that because of their roots in the former hunters' culture, they are notorientated towards enterprise. Another explanation assumes that the growth ofthe entrepreneurial spirit has been hindered by the paternalistic, centralizedcontrol of development in Greenlandic society by the Danish state. The Green-land Home Rule Government has persisted in the course of development laiddown by the Danish state, thus reproducing the situation. These speculationswere recently highlighted and rejected by professor M. Paldam at AarhusUniversity, Denmark (Paldam 1995: 113-114). According to Paldam, the blocktransfers from the Danish state to the Greenlandic Home Rule Government leadto an overheating of the economy which results in high wage levels and a largepublic sector. Hence it is particularly difficult to establish new firms because ofhigh labour costs and the squeezing-out of private enterprises by the public sector.This supply-side reductionist explanation suffers from a logical fault, becausethe high wage levels and high level of public sector employment generate a high

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level of general demand which stimulates the establishment of small firms.Indeed, high-wage countries like Denmark are characterized by a thriving smallbusiness sector (Jonsson 1995a).

To explain why there are relatively few private enterprises in an economy, onehas to do better than this. Indeed, as regards the point about the cultural roots ofmodem Greenlanders, it should be highlighted that the hunters' culture of theInuit was based on teamwork where a group leader led the hunting team to thehunting area; but each hunter within the team hunted independently (Petersen1992). This way of organizing labour is much more in line with modem manage-ment strategies than the imported, Fordist management strategies of simplemodernization. This cultural background could in fact help to foster a privateenterprise culture. However, it has been suppressed during the period of simplemodernization. In order to provide an adequate explanation of the lack ofentrepreneurial spirit, one has to analyse the situation as part of a more generalcomplex of problems. The general problems of the Greenlandic economy stemfrom the fact that it is a microeconomy (Jonsson 1992, 1993 and 1995a) that suffersfrom' organizational dependency'.

Being a microeconomy, Greenland is particularly vulnerable in terms of capitalaccumulation because the local markets are unusually small and there areunusually long distances between local markets. One finds a similar situation insome villages in Iceland where small private enterprises hardly exist, but evenin these villages the geographical dimension is not as difficult to cope with as inGreenland (for analysis of local markets in Iceland, see Jonsson 1991).

As for 'organizational dependency', one has to keep in mind that Greenlandis dependent on Denmark, in terms of both specific institutions and techno-economic paradigms. This is to be expected, because of Greenland's historicalcolonial relations with Denmark and because Greenlanders are still in the firstphase of their independence struggle. In terms of specific institutions theorganizational dependency is evident from the fact that the Danish elite directsalmost all trade towards Denmark and Danish firms. This is partly because alarge part of the elite group is imported from Danish firms and it is in theirinterest to direct trade and business activities to Denmark in order to reproducetheir own business network and secure their own future career in Denmark. Thesame goes for the state elite in the Home Rule apparatus. It is in the interest ofthe Danish part of this elite to import consultants from Denmark, as by so doingthey will extend their own network, which will work as a network resource fortheir future careers in governmental bodies in Denmark. Institutional inertia is

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also at work here, as the Greenlandic Home Rule apparatus has grown out of theDanish state. 'Organizational dependency' is in this case an importantinstitutional reason why trade and business contracts are not directed towards acountry like the USA, which would lead to much cheaper imports and quickertechnology transfers to Greenland, since the USA is a technological leader inmost fields.

Greenland's organizational dependency is also manifested in the form oftechno-economic paradigms. This is not only a matter of technical and industrialstandards, but of an overemphasis on the Taylorist, hierarchical organization offirms and administration. Manpower strategies are part of this paradigm andthey are in practice very disadvantageous to Greenlanders. The model ofhierarchical organizational structures is imported from Denmark, and so areemployment or hiring criteria. Qualification criteria are in practice such thatGreenlanders are automatically excluded from elite jobs, as Danish applicantsusually get the jobs despite the fact that they are in most cases overqualified. Itgoes without saying that there is no room for 'on-the-job-training' in the domi-nant manpower strategy.

The organizational dependency undermines motivation for work, career andthe entrepreneurial spirit. If one knows that there will always be others withhigher educational qualifications who will get jobs higher in the hierarchy, thenit is not rational to do one's best. The Danocentric trade and business strategiesthat the Danish elite pursues further undermine the entrepreneurial spirit andbusiness motivation because the concentration on trade and transport relationswith Denmark severely limits business opportunities.

The lack of motivation for work and of "service-mindedness" which manyassume to be characteristic of Greenlanders (Paldam 1995: 111-112)may havedeeper causes than the organizational and institutional relations mentionedabove. The high level of anomie which is evident for example from the unusuallyhigh suicide rate may indicate serious apathy. Apathy takes the form of a gene-rallack of motivation in the personal as well as the economic life of the individual.It is a psychosocial state of mind that often results when people's social situationhas changed so profoundly that they need to resocialize. Problems ofresocialization are often acute in cases where modernization takes place over avery short period of time or in cases such as ethnic cleansing. In extreme caseslike the Nazi concentration camps in the Second World War, the Jewish prisonerswere characterized by fast, radical personality changes (Bettelheim 1991). Fear,deprivation and uncertainty made the personalities of the prisoners crumble.Some were apparently devoid of will, initiative or any interest in their own fate.

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Others became childlike in their behaviour, losing their sense of time and theability to think ahead, and exhibited striking mood fluctuations in response toapparently trivial events. Those who survived for more than one year in thecamps experienced a process of resocialization, by means of which they copedwith camp life. They were often unable to recall names, places and events intheir previous lives. The reconstructed personalities of these prisoners weredeveloped in imitation of the outlook and behaviour of the very individualsthey had found so repugnant when they first came to the camps - the campguards themselves. They aped the guards' behaviour and even used tatteredpieces of cloth to attempt to imitate their uniforms (Giddens 1993: 81-82).

Concentration camps are obviously extreme cases, but they can be used asmodels for comparative purposes; and models developed on the basis of studiesof such camps can be used to explain cases on a smaller scale. The concentrationof the Greenlandic population brought about by simple modernization in Green-land is a case in point. People from very small settlements, often hunters leadingtraditional lives, were concentrated in small villages. Furthermore, they wereconcentrated in blocks that to some extent resembled barracks. Because of theharsh climate and long distances between villages and towns, geographical limitsmade "escape" difficult. The Jewish culture and language were different fromthe German culture, but the hunters' culture was even more different from theDanish culture. The guards in the German concentration camps were clearlydistinct from the prisoners and exercised a brutal monopoly of violence. In theconcentrated villages of simple modernization in Greenland, the inhabitants werefaced with a foreign Danish police force that maintained law and order. For many,the point of all these changes must have been literally incomprehensible, andthe future must have been unclear.

The educational system which was built up became the main instrument ofresocialization and transferred the values and norms of the industrial society tothe younger generation. A primary school system had already been establishedsome decades before, but large groups of the older generation still had little orno education. Many of these people became the losers in simple modernizationand became apathetic. Furthermore, apathy is a social phenomenon which is notlimited to individuals: it is passed on from generation to generation. There maythus be historical factors of this kind that can explain the apathy and lack ofmotivation today.

Interestingly enough, despite all the speculation about the Greenlanders' lackof the entrepreneurial spirit and motivation, there is actually no research whichsupports this view of Greenlanders. It therefore appears to be more plausible to

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r speak of 'organizational dependency' and the struggle against organizationaldependency rather than the lack of enterprise if we want to discuss the potentialcreated by the present phase of reflexive modernization in Greenland.

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