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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
ESTTA Tracking number: ESTTA1081746
Filing date: 09/14/2020
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Proceeding 91241077
Party PlaintiffMatch Group, LLC
CorrespondenceAddress
JEREMY S BOCZKOHUNTON ANDRES KURTH LLP200 PARK AVENUENEW YORK, NY 10166UNITED STATESPrimary Email: [email protected] Email(s): [email protected], [email protected],[email protected]
Submission Brief on Merits for Plaintiff
Filer's Name Jessica Cohen-Nowak
Filer's email [email protected]
Signature /Jessica Cohen-Nowak/
Date 09/14/2020
Attachments Opposer s Opening Trial Brief PUBLIC VERSION.pdf(2290913 bytes )
PUBLIC VERSION
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
In the Matter of Trademark Application: Serial No. : 87/589,562 Applicant : POORIA SHAHIN Filed : August 30, 2017 Mark : BEENDER Published in the Official Gazette of January 9, 2018
MATCH GROUP, LLC
Opposer,
v. POORIA SHAHIN,
Applicant.
Opposition No.: 91241077
OPPOSER MATCH GROUP, LLC’S
OPENING TRIAL BRIEF
Jonathan D. Reichman Jeremy S. Boczko
Jessica Cohen-Nowak HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166
Tel.: (212) 309-1000 Fax: (212) 309-1100 Email: [email protected] [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]
Counsel for Opposer
Match Group, LLC
PUBLIC VERSION
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION. ........................................................................................................... 1
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES...................................................................................... 2
III. THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD. ..................................................................................... 2
A. Opposer’s Evidence. ............................................................................................. 2
B. Applicant’s Evidence ............................................................................................ 3
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE IN RECORD. ......................................................................................................................... 3
A. Match’s TINDER® mark and the TINDER® App and Brand. .............................. 3
B. Match’s TINDER® Registrations. ......................................................................... 8
C. Applicant’s BEENDER Mark and App ................................................................ 9
V. ARGUMENT. ................................................................................................................... 11
A. Opposer has Standing and Priority. ...................................................................... 11
B. Confusion Would Likely Result From the Parties’ Uses of Their Respective Marks. ................................................................................................. 12
i. Legal Standard. ......................................................................................... 12
ii. Registrant’s Mark is Famous and Strong (Du Pont Factor #5). ............... 13
iii. The Marks Are Confusingly Similar (Du Pont Factor #1). ...................... 16
iv. The Goods and Services Are Similar or Identical (Du Pont Factor #2). ............................................................................................................ 19
v. The Parties’ Channels of Trade Are the Same (Du Pont Factor #3). ....... 22
vi. There is Evidence of Actual Confusion (Du Pont Factors #7 and #8). ............................................................................................................ 22
vii. There is no Evidence of Third-Party Use of the Mark for Similar Goods or Services (Du Pont Factor #6). ................................................... 23
viii. Other Miscellaneous Du Pont Factors are Neutral or Support Confusion (Du Pont Factors #4, #9, #10, #12, #13). ................................ 23
C. Applicant’s Registration of the BEENDER Mark is Likely to Dilute the Distinctive Quality of Opposer’s TINDER® Mark. ............................................. 26
VI. CONCLUSION. ................................................................................................................ 27
PUBLIC VERSION
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
In re Am. Sail Training Ass’n, 230 USPQ 879 (TTAB 1986) ..................................................................................................13
Anheuser-Busch, 115 USPQ2d at 1826 ...............................................................................................................22
Barbara’s Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283 (TTAB 2007) ..............................................................................................11
Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)...........................................................................................14
Bose, 63 USPQ2d at 1305-06 .................................................................................................... passim
Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 102 USPQ2d 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2012).........................................................................................18
Centraz Indus. Inc. v. Spartan Chem. Co. Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1698 (TTAB 2006) ..............................................................................................18
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 23 USPQ2d 1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992).....................................................................................16, 19
Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 101 USPQ2d 1713 (Fed. Cir. 2012).........................................................................................22
In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997)...........................................................................................12
In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973) .......................................................................................... passim
First Int’l Servs. Corp. v. Chuckles Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1628 (TTAB 1988) ................................................................................................24
Frehling Ent., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 52 USPQ 2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1999) .........................................................................................25
PUBLIC VERSION
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Giant Foods, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 218 USPQ 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983)...............................................................................................22
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Circ. 2002) ...................................................................................12, 23
In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370 (TTAB 2006) ..............................................................................................21
Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1992)...........................................................................................14
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enter., Ltd., 227 USPQ 541 (Fed. Cir. 1985)...............................................................................................15
L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434 (TTAB 2012) ......................................................................................15, 24
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 25 USPQ 2d 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1993)..........................................................................................25
L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 2008) ..............................................................................................24
In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041 (TTAB 1987) ..........................................................................................16, 18
Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982) ..................................................................................................11
In re Majestic Distilling Co., 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003)...........................................................................................12
In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 94 USPQ2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010)...........................................................................................24
Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Antartica, S.R.L., 69 USPQ2d 1718 (TTAB 2003) ..............................................................................................23
Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018 (TTAB 2011) ............................................................................................15
Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1989)...........................................................................................14
PUBLIC VERSION
iii
Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005).....................................................................................14, 15
Park ʼN Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 224 USPQ 327 (1985) ..............................................................................................................13
Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 54 USPQ2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000)...........................................................................................15
Ritchie v. Simpson, 50 USPQ2d1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................11
In re Shell Oil Co., 26 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1993)...........................................................................................12
Starbucks U.S. Brands LLC v. Ruben, 78 USPQ2d 1741 (TTAB 2006) ............................................................................13, 16, 19, 21
Tisch Hotels v. Americana Inn, Inc., 146 USPQ 566 (7th Cir. 1965) ................................................................................................25
In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................19
Statutes
15 U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1114(1) .......................................................................................................12
15 U.S.C. § 1065 ............................................................................................................................13
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) .......................................................................................................................13
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) .......................................................................................................................26
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I. INTRODUCTION.
Opposer Match Group, LLC’s (“Match’s” or “Opposer’s”) TINDER® app is a cultural
phenomenon. First released in August 2012, the TINDER® app provides users with an innovative
platform that has revolutionized, and continues to revolutionize, how people meet, interact and
date. Although the TINDER® app has been updated over the years, its basic functionality has
largely stayed the same: users like and dislike other nearby users by viewing short profiles
consisting of photographs and brief biographical descriptions. Due both to Match’s marketing
efforts and the wide media coverage surrounding the brand, its success has grown exponentially.
The TINDER® brand’s success is unparalleled: billions of dollars in cumulative sales, tens of
thousands of daily downloads, and millions of subscribers around the world. The TINDER® app
is the only dating app that is consistently reported as one of the top five grossing apps on Apple’s
iOS and Google’s Play stores in both the U.S. and worldwide. The TINDER® app is so ubiquitous
in the U.S. that, according to one estimate, more than a third of the U.S. population ages 18 to 24
years old, and more than a quarter of those 25 to 34 years old, use or have used it. As a result,
many in the media have referred to millennials as the “TINDER® Generation.” Bonnstetter Decl.
¶ 13, Ex. B-4(4).
On August 30, 2017 (the “Application Date”), Applicant Pooria Shahin (“Applicant” or
“Mr. Shahin”) filed U.S. Trademark Appl. Ser. No. 87/589,562 (the “’562 Application”) for the
mark BEENDER (the “BEENDER Mark”) in Class 9, covering “[c]omputer application software
for mobile phones, namely, software for social introduction and dating” (“Applicant’s Services”).
24 TTABVUE 5, Ex. A (emphasis added). Applicant’s selection of the BEENDER Mark was not
coincidental. Mr. Shahin, a former TINDER® app user, was aware of Match and the enormous
success of the TINDER® brand as the leader in internet dating and social introduction services and
thus purposefully adopted the confusingly similar BEENDER Mark. Indeed, Applicant admitted
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dating services in Match’s portfolio, its TINDER® brand is consistently its most famous and
profitable. Bonnstetter Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. B.
Match’s TINDER® app was introduced to the public in August 2012 as a user-friendly
online-dating and social-introduction platform. Bonnstetter Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B; 29 TTABVUE, Ex.
G (“For a generally very tech literate generation that demands a user friendly experience, the
simplicity of Tinder is a huge plus.”). The mobile app incorporates a simple interface that presents
each user with profiles of nearby potential companions and the option to “like” the other users by
tapping a heart graphic. Id; Ex. A. The TINDER® app allows users to see closer or more distant
potential companions by adjusting its geographic range. Id. ¶ 7, ¶¶ 17-21, Ex. A. Each profile
consists of a stack of photographs and a short description. Id. Screenshots of the TINDER® app
from 2013 (on the left) and from 2019 (on the right) are below:
Id.; Ex. A. If two users “like” each other, they are able to communicate directly. Bonstetter Decl.
¶7, ¶¶18-19, Ex. A; B-1. The TINDER® app is both easy to use and easy to set up. 29 TTABVUE
1, Ex. F (quoting female users and reporters who say “there’s something about Tinder’s simple,
flirty interface that is undeniably fun” and the design of the app “manages to decrease the
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creepiness of communicating with strangers ten-fold”). As an example, a new user can automate
the process of creating a profile by logging into and linking a preexisting Facebook account. Id.
(“The app syncs up with the social network in a ‘cleverly discreet way.’”); Bonnstetter Decl. ¶¶17-
19.
While, in the abstract, the TINDER® app’s concept may seem simple, upon launch it
proved to be a revolutionary communication tool and garnered a reputation for innovation among
both the consuming public and the media. Bonnstetter Decl. ¶12, Ex. B; 29 TTABVUE
(generally). As early as 2013, the TINDER® app was reportedly downloaded an average of 20,000
times per day on Apple’s iOS platform. Bonnstetter Decl. ¶12, Ex. B-1(2). In fact, mere hours
after Match launched its first Android version of the TINDER® app in 2013, an estimated 10,000
users downloaded it from the Googly Play App store. Id., Ex. B-2(2). More than 4.9 million
users downloaded the TINDER® app in its first year. Bonnstetter Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. B. The number
of worldwide user downloads surpassed 100 million only three years later, in 2016. Bonnstetter
Decl. ¶12, Ex. B-4. By the start of 2020, user downloads totaled more than three hundred million
worldwide, 70 million of which are attributed to customers in the United States. Bonnstetter Decl.
¶12, Ex. B-7(2); Ex. C.
As a clear indicator of the brand’s reputation among consumers, the TINDER® app’s
consumer base is highly engaged in its usage. Bonnstetter Decl. ¶¶ 12-15, Ex B-1 (Match’s
TINDER® app “has become so wildly popular in the six months since its launch that it’s already
spawned its own malady: Tinderitis, or the sensation of having a sore thumb from swiping to
approve or reject the faces of people offered up as potential date material.”); Ex. B-4 (a widely
reported third-party study found that 55% of TINDER® app users engage with it on a daily basis);
Ex. B-9; (estimating user engagement at “90 minutes each day.”); 29 TTABVUE, Ex. H (“Based
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on that data — supplied by Facebook via public APIs — on average, Tinder has been the most-used
app all month. That puts it ahead of Candy Crush Saga, Spotify, even YouTube and Pinterest.”).
By 2013, the TINDER® app was already processing upwards of 350 million “likes” or “dislikes”
per day (which calculates to approximately 4,000 profile views per second). Bonstetter Decl. ¶
12, Ex. B-4(2). By the end of 2014, this number had risen to more than one billion profile ratings
per day. Id., Exs. L-M (“The app has consistently ranked among the most-downloaded lifestyle
apps on the Apple and Google Play app stores since launching two years ago, according to data
from [third-party surveyor] AppAnnie.”). Today, the TINDER® app processes more than two
billion profile views per day and produces approximately 26 million connections on a daily basis,
resulting in an average of 1.5 million dates per week and over 43 billion TINDER® connections to
date. Bonstetter Decl. ¶¶12-13, Ex. C; 29 TTABVUE, Ex. J.
The TINDER® app is available in 190 countries and at least forty different languages.
Bonstetter Decl. ¶13, Exs. B-C; 29 TTABVUE Ex. H (“Tinder won the dating app war. By a large
margin.”). A widely reported third party study concluded that by the start of 2018, 35% of the
U.S. population ages 18 to 24 years old uses or has used the TINDER® app. Id., Ex. B-4(4); 29
TTABVUE, Ex. J. TINDER® users account for 25% of internet users between 25 and 34 years
old; and among those 35 to 44 years old, this number was estimated at 20%. Id; 29 TTABVUE,
Ex. H (“But for the rest of us — for the vast majority of single people — Tinder is it. The usage
data says so, and as other apps just parrot what it’s [sic] done, its lead will likely widen. So get
swiping, single people.”).
The TINDER® app’s success has been extensively covered by the media online, on
television, and in prominent general circulation publications such as The New York Times, The
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Atlantic, The Huffington Post, and Time Magazine. Bonnstetter Decl. Ex. B; see also generally,
29 TTABVUE.
The TINDER® app has experienced an average of 30% revenue growth year-to-year.
Bonstetter Decl. ¶14; 29 TTABVUE, Exs. J, L-M. Indeed, it is the only dating app consistently
reported as one of the top five apps, if not the highest grossing app, on Apple’s iOS and Google’s
Play store in both the U.S. and worldwide. Bonstetter Decl. ¶14, Ex. B-9 (21-23), B-14(1-2); 29
TTABVE, Ex. L, Ex. J (“According to Sensor Tower’s analysis of mobile apps, looking at Apple
Store and Google Play Store stats over Q3 2018, Tinder was the second-highest non-game app in
terms of revenue generation. It is not on the most downloaded list, but that is dominated by free
social media apps.”). The TINDER® app has generated total global revenue of more than
from 2013 through 2019. Bonstetter Decl. ¶ 9.
Match regularly updates the TINDER® app’s features to encourage and maintain
meaningful user interaction and dialogue. For example, the TINDER® app offers multiple ways
for a user to indicate approval and provides a feature allowing its users to “Super Like” a profile,
increasing the chances of a connection. Bonstetter Dec. ¶19 (describing the “Super Like” feature
as introduced in 2015); 29 TTABVUE, Ex. X (“And using super like is amazing as well. You get
to say ‘Hey, you're cute, and you sound great, let's match!’ And if they don't like you back that's
OK! There are so many other people you can super like later.”). Match also introduced the
“TINDER® PLUS” feature. Ex. L (“Tinder Plus, which was introduced in 2015, lets users undo
swipes, swipe for overseas matches, use five ‘super likes’ to get other users’ attention, and deploy
monthly ‘boosts’ to increase the visibility of their profiles.”).
In December 2017, Match announced the introduction of its “TINDER® FEED” feature.
Id. ¶15, Exs. D-E. (“Feed shows you real-time updates from your matches, all in one place. . . .
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“BEENDER,” and thereafter filed the ’262 Application. 24 TTABVUE 1, Ex. A at 5; 26
TTABVUE Ex. A, Ex. D.
The BEENDER app, like the TINDER® app, is available on both iOS and Google Play app
stores. Id.; see also, Shahin Dep. Tr. 43:21-44:3, Ex. B (3). As shown below, users of the
BEENDER app, just like users of the TINDER® app, can automate the sign-up process by signing
into Facebook or other social media. Bonstetter Decl. Ex. H. Once a profile is created, a
BEENDER user is presented with various potential companions, and is able to “like” other users
by tapping on a heart graphic.
Bonstetter Decl. Ex. H. Like Match’s TINDER® app, potential companions are nearby users, and
users can adjust the geographical radius in the BEENDER app’s settings. Id., Ex. H. Shahin Dep.
Tr. 39:2-39:22; 42: 8-11.
Given Applicant’s lack of industry experience, and his “research” into Match’s TINDER®
app before developing a nearly identical dating/social introduction app under a confusingly similar
mark, it is clear that Applicant filed the ’262 Application to trade off Match’s hard earned
FILED UNDER SEAL
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consumer goodwill and reputation.
V. ARGUMENT.
A. Opposer has Standing and Priority.
Match Group has standing to oppose and priority of use. Standing is a prerequisite in every
inter partes case and it is met here. See Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 213 USPQ 185,
189 (CCPA 1982), see also, Ritchie v. Simpson, 50 USPQ2d1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (opposer
must first establish that it has standing to pursue its claim). Here, Match has raised a non-frivolous
claim that Applicant’s use of BEENDER for Applicant’s Services is likely to cause confusion with
and dilute Match’s famous TINDER® mark. See 1 TTABVUE 4-5 (¶¶ 3-9). Thus Match Group
has standing. See, e.g., Barbara’s Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1285 (TTAB
2007) (standing established by making pleaded registration of record and asserting non-frivolous
confusion claim).
And it is undisputed that Match has priority. As detailed supra, Match is relying on its
family of TINDER® registrations; which long predate the subject application; several of which are
incontestable; and which remain in full force and effect. Applicant has taken no action to cancel
these registrations. Cf. 7 TTABVUE; see also, 25 TTABVUE, Ex. A Shahin Dep. Tr., 30:4-13
(admitting that Applicant knew of and used the TINDER® app some time before 2014, and before
applying to register the disputed mark). Thus, priority of right is not at issue. See TBMP §
309.03(c)(2)(A) (“[P]riority is not in issue in an opposition where opposer pleads (and later proves)
that it owns a registration for its pleaded mark, provided that there is no counterclaim or separate
petition to cancel the pleaded registration . . . .”).
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B. Confusion Would Likely Result From the Parties’ Uses of Their Respective Marks.
One of the primary goals of trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion. Accordingly,
whenever the use of a mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive purchasers or
users, based upon the superior rights of another party, registration must be refused. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1114(1). In this case, every relevant Du Pont factor (as described below)
reflects a likelihood of confusion. Consequently, the Board should sustain this opposition.
i. Legal Standard.
The Board must assess the likelihood of confusion between marks based on the factors set
out in In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). The ultimate issue is
not whether all consumers will be confused, or whether anyone has actually mistaken one party’s
services for the other’s, but rather, whether an appreciable number of consumers are likely to form
a mistaken belief as to the source of such goods or services. See, e.g., In re Shell Oil Co., 26
USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The Federal Circuit has explained that “[n]ot all of the DuPont factors may be relevant or
of equal weight” in a likelihood of confusion analysis, and that depending on the circumstances of
a particular case, “‘any one of the factors may control.’” In re Majestic Distilling Co., 65 USPQ2d
1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir.
1997)). Furthermore, the Board must resolve in the prior registrant’s favor any lingering doubt as
to the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Shell Oil, 26 USPQ2d at 1691; Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Packard Press Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Circ. 2002) (“This court resolves doubts about
the likelihood of confusion against the newcomer because the newcomer has the opportunity and
obligation to avoid confusion with existing marks.”).
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ii. Registrant’s Mark is Famous and Strong (Du Pont Factor #5).
Although listed as the fifth factor in Du Pont, “the fame of the prior mark plays a dominant
role in the process of balancing the Du Pont factors in cases featuring a famous or strong mark.”
Starbucks U.S. Brands LLC v. Ruben, 78 USPQ2d 1741, 1750 (TTAB 2006).
Registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. §
1115(a). Given Match’s registrations for the TINDER® mark (28 TTABVUE Exs. A, C), the
TINDER® mark is presumptively valid. Moreover, Opposer’s TINDER® mark is an arbitrary term
that neither suggests nor conveys information about the nature of Opposer’s goods or services,
such as “downloadable software,” “dating services,” and “internet-based social networking.”4 Cf.
U.S. Reg. Nos. 4,976,225 and 4,479,131 (addressed infra). Bonnstetter Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. A.
The TINDER® mark is exceptionally strong. Indeed, Applicant has already acknowledged
it is indisputable that the TINDER® mark is “distinctive and famous within the meaning of Section
43(c) of the Lanham Act,” owing in part to Match Group’s “long, extensive, and continuous use”
of the mark. See 14 TTABVUE 8, ¶ 13; see also, Shahin Dep. Tr., 29:18-22 (naming the TINDER®
app as among the most “prominent” dating apps available); 130:13-19 (admitting that Applicant
reviewed the TINDER® app before creating his own dating app because TINDER® is a popular
dating app); 138:18 – 139:4, Ex. 13 (email from a potential BEENDER brand ambassador to
Applicant asking “What is the main point of this app? Is it like Tinder or more like Instagram?
Thank you.”).
Furthermore, Opposer’s TINDER® mark is famous. See supra § IV(A), IV(C). The classic
definition of a “famous mark” for likelihood of confusion purposes is “a mark with extensive
4 In any event, Match’s incontestable registrations for TINDER® (15 U.S.C. § 1065) cannot be challenged on the
ground that the mark is merely descriptive. See Park ʼN Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 224 USPQ 327 (1985); In
re Am. Sail Training Ass’n, 230 USPQ 879 (TTAB 1986) (precluding applicant’s “merely descriptive” argument based on prior registration’s incontestable status).
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27 years of use); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enter., Ltd., 227 USPQ 541, 542 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ($300 million in sales over nine years, $15 million in advertising in one year); accord Bose,
63 USPQ2d at 1306 (“[W]e have consistently accepted statistics of sales and advertising as indicia
of fame: when the numbers are large, we have tended to accept them without any further supporting
proof.”).
Beyond this traditional quantitative evidence, however, other facts prove the TINDER®
mark is famous. As noted supra, the pervasive media mentions of the TINDER® app include
coverage of its widespread use among celebrities, and its use for a variety of causes beyond social
introduction, in particular political campaigning and civic engagement. Bonnstetter Decl. Ex. D(8)
(“In taking a physical world dating experience and reinventing it online, Tinder has been successful
in digitally recreating the powerful initial feeling of attraction.”); Ex. H(5) (“[T]here is something
about Tinder that makes it feel like it is the defining app of the online dating era . . . . Its gamified
style, its perfectness for mobile, and its honest simplicity perhaps go some of the way to explaining
its runaway success.”).
As a famous mark, TINDER® is afforded “a broad scope of legal protection because [it is]
more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind than a weaker mark.” See TMEP
§ 1207.01(d)(ix) (citing Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1694). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
explained that when present, fame is “a dominant factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis . .
. independent of the consideration of the relatedness of the goods.” Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 54
USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord, e.g., L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434,
1438 (TTAB 2012) (“[A] finding that a mark enjoys significant fame expands the scope of
protection which might be accorded a lesser-known mark.”); see also Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100
USPQ2d 1018, 1023 (TTAB 2011) (finding JUST JESU IT and JUST DO IT similar for confusion
FILED UNDER SEAL
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purposes “despite the potential differences in meaning, given the fame of opposer’s mark and the
similarity of appearance, pronunciation and overall commercial impressions”); Du Pont, 177
USPQ at 567 (identifying the “fame of the prior mark” as an important factor).
iii. The Marks Are Confusingly Similar (Du Pont Factor #1).
This factor looks to the similarities between the two parties’ marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. See Du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567.
Similarity as to one factor alone (sight, sound, or appearance) is sufficient to support a finding of
confusing similarity, especially if the goods/services are identical or closely related. In re Lamson
Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987). Further, “[a]s the fame of a mark increases, the
degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion
declines.” Starbucks, 78 USPQ2d at 1750; accord, Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life
of Am., 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he lens of the other duPont factors tends to
magnify the likelihood of . . . confusion”). Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 63 USPQ2d
1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is because famous marks “are more likely to be remembered
and associated in the public mind than a weaker mark,” and consumers are less likely to perceive
differences from famous marks.
The present case involves a comparison between Match’s block-letter TINDER® mark and
Applicant’s block-letter BEENDER Mark. The marks are similar in appearance because both are
short words (one is seven letters, the other six) dominated by the same four-letter “NDER” ending.
The marks undeniably sound similar—not only are both two-syllable words with identical “dur”
(“DER”) ending sounds, but he “BEEN” portion of BEENDER phonetically carries the “bin”
sound, which is very close to the “tin” in TINDER®. 29 TTABVUE, Exs. R; T (dictionary entries
for “been” showing phonetic pronunciation as “bin”); Exs. S; U (dictionary entries for phonetic
pronunciation of “tin”); accord Shahin Dep. Tr. 150:2-4 (“Q: So again, B-E-E-N was pronounced
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B-I-N, correct? A: Right”). Thus, consumers, who only “retain[] a general, rather than specific,
impression” of the marks, see TMEP, § 1207.01(b) (collecting authorities), would hear highly
similar “bin-dur” and “tin-dur” sounds, creating confusion. Even Mr. Shahin admitted that
consumers might pronounce his mark as sounding similar to TINDER. Shahin Dep. Tr. 150:2-9.5
Throughout this proceeding, Applicant has tried, unpersuasively, to rebut the foregoing
conclusion by offering his own alternative pronunciation of the “BEENDER.” However, the
weakness of Applicant’s rebuttal is apparent from Applicant’s own inconsistent pronunciations.
Shahin Dep. Tr. 72:9-23; 146:2-20; 147:6-150:21; 151:4-151:14; 155:6-16; 155:19-157:16; 158:7-
159:25; 28 TTABVUE, Exs. A-D. Initially, Mr. Shahin asserted that his mark is pronounced “ben-
dair,” and that saying “bin-dur” (which is how the mark is phonetically constructed) was
“incorrect.” Shahin Dep. Tr. 155:6-16; 158:7-159:25 (claiming consumers will understand
BEENDER is “a play on the English phrase ‘Been There, Done That’”); 28 TTABVUE, Ex. A
(Interrogatory Response No. 14). Then, after listening to multiple videos where narrators
repeatedly pronounce the mark as “bin-dur” (rhyming with TINDER), Mr. Shahin decided, for the
first time, that BEENDER is pronounced with a “T-H” instead of a “D.” See Shahin Dep. Tr.
155:6-16; 155:19-157:16; 158:7-159:25;163:5-9; 28 TTABVUE Ex. A (Interrogatory Response
No. 1). Yet these various pronunciations are contradicted by Mr. Shahin’s own narration in
Applicant’s marketing video, where he unmistakably pronounces the mark “bin-dur,” i.e., the
BEENDER Mark as ending in a “dur” sound (and without a “T-H”). Shahin Dep. Tr. 158:11-16;
see also Shahin Dep. Tr. 155:6-15, Ex. 18; 159:20-25 (“Q: How is anyone supposed to know it’s
5 The visual similarity between TINDER® and BEENDER is heightened by the popular variation “TINDER®
Bender,” which users have coined to describe a short period of time where a user utilizes the TINDER® app to make several connections and several dates. 29 TTABVUE, Ex. Y (Urban Dictionary has published the definition of a “TINDER BENDER” to describe a spree of TINDER® dates over a short amount of time.), Ex. X (attaching “Me, on a Tinder Bender: Why Tinder teaches self-love and empowerment.), and Ex. Z (attaching “A New Era: The Tinder Bender,” an article on dating habits published on Penn State’s Applied Social Psychology website).
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pronounced with a ‘T-H’? A: How are they [] supposed to know how they are pronounced? I
couldn’t answer that question.”). Shahin Dep. Tr., 159:16-18 (Q: Why not just name it with a ‘T-
H’ instead of a “D”. A: We answered that question. It doesn’t look as cool.”). Thus, it is obvious
that Mr. Shahin’s alternative pronunciations are fictions invented solely for purposes of defending
this opposition. See, e.g., 28 TTABVUE, Ex. A (Interrogatory Response Nos. 1, 14 and 15), Ex.
D (Response to Request for Admission Nos. 22, 23 and 24); Shahin Dep. Tr. 155:6-16; 155:19-
157:16; 158:7-159:25, Ex. 18; see also 31 TTABVUE (noting delivery of thumb drive to the Board
containing video exhibits).
Regardless, there is no such thing as the “correct” pronunciation of a mark that differs from
its phonetic pronunciation, because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce it.
See TMEP, § 1207.01(b)(iv) (a “correct” pronunciation “cannot be relied on to avoid a likelihood
of confusion”) (citations omitted). Applying the proper analysis then, a reasonable consumer
would likely confuse the BEENDER and TINDER® marks, especially when (as here) they are used
for identical goods and services—i.e., mobile apps for providing dating and social introduction
services. Cf. TMEP, § 1207.01(b) (“When the goods or services are identical or virtually identical,
the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is
likely declines.”); see also, e.g., Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 102
USPQ2d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The Board consistently holds that applicants may not rely on subjective pronunciations to
impose independent meaning to an applied-for-mark as a means to avoid a confusion
determination. See, e.g., Centraz Indus. Inc. v. Spartan Chem. Co. Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1698, 1701
(TTAB 2006) (acknowledging that “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark,” and finding
ISHINE (stylized) and ICE SHINE, both for floor finishing preparations, confusingly similar); In
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re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1042 n.3 (TTAB 1987) (“[C]orrect pronunciation as desired
by the applicant cannot be relied upon to avoid a likelihood of confusion.”); In re Cycles, Serial
No. 87132160 at *3 (September 18, 2018) (refusing to interpret the term LUNACYCLE as “a
portmanteau of the words ‘LUNACY’ and ‘CYCLE’” even when coupled with Applicant’s
marketing strategy aimed at playing off this highly specific concept and concluding “While in
theory this is possible, it is highly unlikely . . . it is more likely that consumers will understand the
mark to represent a ‘telescoped form’ of the two separate words ‘LUNA CYCLE’”); In re Viterra
Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding Board’s affirmance of
Section 2(d) refusal to register XCEED for agricultural seed based on likelihood of confusion with
registered mark X-SEED).
Thus, no evidence in the record suggests BEENDER has a commercial meaning different
from Opposer’s TINDER® mark. Consequently, consumers are more apt to believe it is an
extension or variation of, or otherwise related to, Match Group’s famous TINDER® app, resulting
in a likelihood of confusion. Starbucks, 78 USPQ2d at 1750 (finding even where possible
differences in meaning may have existed between famous mark and applicant’s mark, similarities
in sound and overall commercial impression made confusion likely). It is clear that in sight, sound,
and appearance, the parties’ respective marks are substantively the same.
iv. The Goods and Services Are Similar or Identical (Du Pont Factor
#2).
Another Du Pont factor is the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services
as described in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use.”
See Bose, 63 USPQ2d at 1309 (quoting Du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567); see also, e.g., Starbucks, 78
USPQ2d at 1751. Like the “fame” element, the similarity of goods/services can have a direct
effect on the other Du Pont factors. See Starbucks, 78 USPQ2d at 1751 (“[W]hen marks appear
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on ‘virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion
of likely confusion declines.’” (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life Am., 23
USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
It is axiomatic that “[t]he nature and scope of a party’s goods or services must be
determined on the basis of the goods or services recited in the application or registration.” TMEP
§ 1207.01(a)(iii) (collecting authorities). In this case, Match’s TINDER® registrations cover, in
relevant part, “downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for internet-based
dating and matchmaking” (Cl. 9) and “dating services” (Cl. 45). 23 TTABVUE, Exs. C and E
(U.S. Reg. Nos. 4479131, 4976225). Conversely, Applicant seeks to register his BEENDER Mark
for “Computer application software for mobile phones, namely, software for social introduction
and dating” (Cl. 9). Thus, the parties’ goods are identical (“[mobile phone] application software
for . . . dating” vs. “mobile application for internet-based dating”) and related (“software for ...
dating” vs. “dating services”). See TMEP, § 1207.01(a)(ii) (“It is well recognized that confusion
may be likely to occur from the use of . . . similar marks for goods, on the one hand, and for
services involving those goods, on the other.”).
During discovery, Applicant attempted to rebut the obvious overlap of the parties’ goods
and services by arguing that the parties’ respective apps do not “function” in the same way. But
these arguments have no basis in trademark law or reality. For example, Applicant claims his
BEENDER app facilitates connections between people who have already met in person, it does
not relate to “online” dating--despite the fact that his app is only available through the internet.
Q: Okay. So earlier, you testified that Beender is a dating app, but not like other online dating apps.
A: It’s not an online dating app. Q: But it’s an online application? A: Correct. Q: And can you clarify what it means to not be an online
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dating app, that’s accessible on an online application? A: Sure. So online dating app and the word ‘online’ part of it,
that the part that’s different with us means, you know, people who are online, not necessarily like strangers, I would put it that way. Online dating means dating strangers. Our app, the main feature will be dating people, acquaintances, people you probably have seen or might know. But not necessarily strangers. That’s our main difference.
Q: But you -- is it possible to see people you haven’t met in person before on the app?
A: Sure.
Shahin Dep. 167:2-168:2. As shown by these contradictory statements, Mr. Shahin himself does
not follow this argument. Despite Applicant’s mischaracterization of his applied-for goods, he
admitted under oath that (i) it will be possible for BEENDER users to connect with other users
whom they have never met, and, conversely (ii) it is possible for TINDER® app users (and users
of third party dating apps) to connect with other users whom they have already met in person. See
Shahin Dep. Tr., 167:23-168:12.
The parties’ respective goods and services are identical for purposes of the Du Pont
analysis. Mr. Shahin points to the BEENDER app feed function and to his characterization of the
app as social media, to distinguish his product from the TINDER® app. Shahin Dep. Tr. 49:2-6.
However, this argument is unavailing. Opposer’s TINDER® registrations broadly cover online
“dating and matchmaking services” and “social media,” including “web feeds, uploading and
downloading electronic files to share with others,” and are not restricted in any way. 28
TTABVUE, Exs. A-F; see, e.g., In re Jump Designs, LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006)
(registrations must be presumed to encompass all goods and services of the nature and type
described). Moreover, as described above, the addition of the FEED function and other social
media-adjacent features were all part of the natural zone of expansion of the TINDER® goods and
services that existed prior to the ʾ562 Application.
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v. The Parties’ Channels of Trade Are the Same (Du Pont Factor #3).
The third Du Pont factor is the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels.” See Bose, 63 USPQ2d at 1310 (quoting Du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567); Starbucks,
78 USPQ2d at 1751. “[A]bsent any explicit restriction in the application or registration, [the
Board] must presume the parties’ identified goods . . . travel through all normal channels of trade
for goods of the type identified, and [the Board] must consider them to be offered and sold to all
of the usual customers of such goods.” Anheuser-Busch, 115 USPQ2d at 1826; Coach Servs., Inc.
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Match’s TINDER®
registrations and Mr. Shahin’s ʾ562 Application contain no limitations on trade channels or
targeted customers and their respective trade channels are identical. Both parties offer their dating
apps on Apple iOS and Google PLAY stores, and the apps are geared toward the same pool of
online users (anyone over the age of 18). Shahin Dep. Tr.164:11-15; 45:22-25.
vi. There is Evidence of Actual Confusion (Du Pont Factors #7 and #8).
The seventh and eighth Du Pont factors relate to the presence or absence of actual
consumer-confusion evidence. See Du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. It is well settled that proof of
actual confusion is not necessary to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Giant
Foods, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 218 USPQ 390, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In this case,
however, evidence does exist that customers are already confused as to BEENDER’s association
with Match’s TINDER® brand. See, e.g., Shahin Dep. Tr. 138:18-139:4, Ex. 13 (email from a
third party to Applicant asking “What is the main point of this app? Is it like Tinder or more like
Instagram?”). Thus, confusion is likely.
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vii. There is no Evidence of Third-Party Use of the Mark for Similar
Goods or Services (Du Pont Factor #6).
This Du Pont factor looks to “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar
goods” (see Du Pont, 177 USPQ at 576), which could be relevant to an evaluation of the strength
of the prior mark, see, e.g., TMEP, §1207.01(d)(iii)). However, there is no evidence in the record
that any third party is using “TINDER” or a variant of “TINDER” in connection with Opposer’s
goods or services, or any related goods or services.
viii. Other Miscellaneous Du Pont Factors are Neutral or Support
Confusion (Du Pont Factors #4, #9, #10, #12, #13).
In addition to the factors discussed above, there are Du Pont factors that may be considered
as part of the confusion analysis even if one “focus[es] . . . on dispositive factors.” See Nasdaq
Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Antartica, S.R.L., 69 USPQ2d 1718, 1728 (TTAB 2003) (quoting Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Each of these
remaining factors, however, either supports a likelihood of confusion, or is objectively neutral.
a. The Respective Products are Sold to the Same Buyers
under the Same Conditions (#4).
Both the TINDER® app and the BEENDER® app are free to download through the
Google’s Playstore and Apple’s AppStore, and thus this factor weighs in favor of confusion.
Bonnstetter Decl. Ex. B-6; B-8 (discussing the “free” model offered by the TINDER® app).
b. The Prior Mark is Used on a Wide Variety of Services(#9).
Opposer uses its TINDER® mark on a wide variety of goods and services, and as a “house
mark” in numerous forms, including on its branded app and marketing campaigns, which have
been continuously exploited long prior to the ‘562 Application. This breadth of usage supports
the strength of the TINDER® mark and the likelihood of confusion with Mr. Shahin’s BEENDER
Mark.
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c. The Market Interface Between the Parties (#10).
The parties’ respective markets are identical, and thus fully overlap. Both parties use their
marks on dating and social introduction services rendered via mobile software apps. See supra, §
IV-A; § IV-C. Both parties offer their goods and services to individuals over the age of 18 years
and throughout the United States. See supra, § V-B(v). Both parties market their products and
services toward consumers who have interest in and enjoy social media and social interaction with
like-minded consumers. Id., Bonnstetter Decl. ¶ ¶7, 18-22, Exs. A; H; Shahin Dep. Tr. 138:25-
139:12 (testifying that the BEENDER app is marketed as a dating app). Consequently, this factor
weighs heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
d. There is Substantial Potential Confusion (#12).
The extent of potential confusion in this case is substantial, as addressed above. See supra,
pp. 16-19; accord, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (The
“newcomer has the opportunity of avoiding confusion, and is charged with the obligation to do
so.”). For example, consumers of both parties’ goods and services are all persons 18 years of age
or older. Shahin Dep. Tr.164:11-15. Further, the rapid growth of the dating app and social media
landscape, coupled with Match’s aggressive product development and marketing efforts, make the
potential for a likelihood of consumer confusion exceedingly high.
e. Applicant’s Bad Faith Supports a Confusion Finding (#13).
A bad faith, or an intent to confuse consumers, falls under the thirteenth DuPont factor,
“any other established fact probative of the effect of use.” L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86
USPQ2d 1883, 1890 (TTAB 2008). “[A] party which knowingly adopts a mark similar to one used
by another for related goods should not be surprised to find scrutiny of the filer’s motive.” L’Oreal
S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1442 (TTAB 2012). “[W]here there is evidence of an
applicant’s intent to adopt a mark that suggests to purchasers a successful mark already in use by
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another, the Board may, and ought to, take into account that intent when resolving the issue of
likelihood of confusion when that issue is not free from doubt.” First Int’l Servs. Corp. v. Chuckles
Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1628, 1633 (TTAB 1988).
Mr. Shahin was well aware of Opposer’s well-known TINDER® brand, and in fact had
used the TINDER® app on more than one occasion, prior to adopting the BEENDER Mark and
developing his competing app. Shahin Dep. Tr., 30:4-13; 130:13-19. While mere knowledge of
a mark is insufficient for a bad faith determination, Applicant’s conduct throughout this proceeding
supports such a determination. First, Applicant initially lied and claimed he had never used the
TINDER® app. See, e.g., 26 TTABVUE, Ex. D (“Applicant only had knowledge of the Tinder®
dating service in the context as he had heard of it from others, but was not necessarily cognizant
of its existence, the design of Opposer’s mark, or Opposer’s rights as to its mark when Applicant
filed his App. ‘562.”). However, during his deposition, Mr. Shahin changed his tune and admitted
under oath that he had used the TINDER® app sometime prior to 2014, and then downloaded the
app again in 2017 for the sole purpose of reviewing its design and functions before he adopted the
BEENDER Mark and created the BEENDER app. Shahin Dep. Tr., 30:4-13; 130:13-19,
(admitting knowledge and use of TINDER® app prior to creating BEENDER app). As an obvious
reflection of deceit, when Mr. Shahin downloaded the TINDER® app in 2017 to “review” a
“popular” dating app before creating a competing product, he did so under an alias, presumably to
avoid getting caught. Shahin Dep. Tr., 135:13-21. These activities show a clear intent to
deliberately trade off of Opposer’s goodwill and fame in the TINDER® mark. See Tisch Hotels v.
Americana Inn, Inc., 146 USPQ 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1965) (“[W]e think that defendants adopted
plaintiffs’ name deliberately with a view to obtaining some advantage from plaintiffs’ investments
in promotion and advertising. The inference of likelihood of confusion is therefore readily drawn
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because the adoption itself indicates that defendants expected that likelihood to their profit.”)
(citations omitted); see also Frehling Ent., Inc. v. Int'l Select Grp., Inc., 52 USPQ 2d 1447, 1453
(11th Cir. 1999) (“If it can be shown that a defendant adopted a plaintiff’s marks with the intention
of deriving a benefit from the plaintiff's business reputation, this fact alone may be enough to
justify the inference that there is confusing similarity.”); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.,
25 USPQ 2d 1913, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If there was intentional copying the second comer will
be presumed to have intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance and will be presumed
to have succeeded.”).
C. Applicant’s Registration of the BEENDER Mark is Likely to Dilute the
Distinctive Quality of Opposer’s TINDER® Mark.
The federal anti-dilution statute accords protection to the owner of a famous mark against
another who uses the famous mark in a way that is “likely to cause dilution” of the distinctiveness
or goodwill of such mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The ‘562 Application should be rejected, because
it is likely to blur the distinctiveness and strength of Match’s famous TINDER® mark.
As demonstrated above, the TINDER® mark was famous as of the date Applicant filed his
application. The factors for determining likelihood of dilution by blurring include (i) similarity
of the marks; (ii) distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) the degree to which the owner of the
famous mark is engaged in substantially exclusive use of it; (iv) the degree of recognition of
·the famous mark; (v) whether the junior user intended to create an association with the famous
mark; and (vi) any actual association between the marks. Id. The anti-dilution statute is a
separate form of relief from Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act because the statute protects against
the erosion of a mark’s distinctiveness that may occur in the absence of confusion. J. Thomas
McCarthy, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:69 (5th ed.
2020).
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Opposer has already established factors 1 through 5 above in its Section 2(d) analysis, and
such factors strongly support a finding of likelihood of dilution. The BEENDER Mark is highly
similar to the TINDER® mark; the TINDER® mark is both distinctive and famous; the TINDER®
mark is being used exclusively by Opposer for dating apps and social introduction services; the
TINDER® mark is well-recognized by the general public as belonging to Match; and Mr. Shahin
intended to associate with and trade off of the well-known TINDER® mark. Consequently, the
ʾ562 Application should be rejected due to a likelihood of dilution by blurring.
VI. CONCLUSION.
Based on the foregoing reasons and the evidence of record, Opposer respectfully requests
that the Board reject Application No. 87/589,562 for the BEENDER Mark on the grounds that the
‘562 Application is likely to (i) cause confusion with Opposer’s TINDER® mark, and (ii) dilute
Opposer’s famous TINDER® mark.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: September 14, 2020 By: /Jonathan D. Reichman/
Jonathan D. Reichman Jeremy S. Boczko Jessica Cohen-Nowak HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166
Tel.: (212) 309-1000 Fax: (212) 309-1100 Email: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Counsel for Opposer
Match Group, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Opposer Match Group LLC’s Opening Trial Brief and was
served on the Applicant and Applicant’s Counsel of Record as indicated below on the date and in
the manner indicated:
By Email
Robert Powers, Esq. Andrea Harris, Esq. McClanahan Powers, PLLC Email: [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]
Pooria Shahin (Applicant) Email: [email protected]
Date: September 14, 2020 By: /Jessica Cohen-Nowak /
Jessica Cohen-Nowak HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166
Tel.: (212) 309-1000 Fax: (212) 309-1100 Email: [email protected]
Counsel for Opposer
Match Group, LLC
118894.0277183 EMF_US 81581634v6
