Ethics and Educational Purposes

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Democratic Values, Student Engagement and Democratic Leadership

Ethics and Educational Purposes2002

Introduction

Democratic transformational pedagogies focused on issues of

social justice, exemplified in the works of Paulo Freire, have recently

articulated the need for a coherent ethical position in relation to

teaching and the administration of schools. This ethical position stands

in opposition to claims of academic impartiality in the construction of

social knowledge related to the economic conditions of our

communities.

In the context of educational policymaking, David Corson of OISE

in Toronto argues for the need to achieve a system wide consensus in

policymaking to establish universal norms that operate as principles at

the system level to increase the scope and capacity for meeting social

justice needs and goals. (Corson 1995).1 Toward the construction of a

common ethic, Corson considered the clarification of principles toinvolve, finding a realistic set of shared values that overarch all the

various social and cultural groups that the political system contains.

(Smolicz, 1984).2

Frameworks for a Standard

Conservative, liberal, and democratic educational purposes

represent particular worldviews that differ mostly in their

understanding of the self and the nature of our connection to others.

Each perspective advocates for a different set of dominant institutional

1 p.134. David Corson.Power and the Discourses of Policy and Curriculum : An Introduction in Discourse

and Power in Educational Organizations, Ed. Corson (OISE Press, Toronto) 1995.2 P.134. ibid Corson on Smolicz, J. (1984). Multiculturalism and an overarching framework of values.

European Journal of Education , 19, 11-24.

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In Charles Taylors famous essay entitled The Politics of

Recognition, Taylor presents a conflict between competing conceptions

of liberalism represented by a difference between a politics of dignity

and a politics of difference. Taylor claims that both types of liberalism

are based on the notion of equal respect, expressed together with

other competing values and interests that evidently create

contradiction. In the end, he claims that a politics of dignity remains

uneasy about elevating ethnic or cultural identities over the uniform

application of universal rights, while a politics of difference protest

the application of uniform standards which result in unequal

consequences for different groups.

Habermas claims that harmony between this apparent

contradiction is possible through an understanding of the internal

connection between the individual rights of private persons and the

public autonomy of citizens who participate in making the laws.

(Habermas 1994).3 This paper attempts resolve the issue by

implementing ethical educational purposes within an independent

democratic framework borrowing from the intellectual heritage of

western liberalism, so influential in the application of positive law

principles and our understanding of institutional purposes.

Rights and Needs

By way of introduction to Taylors essay, Amy Gutman argues

that the ideal of human dignity points in at least two directions, the

protection of basic rights and the acknowledgment of particular needs.

According to Taylor, both positions are rooted in a politics of equal

recognition that promote in different ways the ideal of equal respect,

3 p.114. Habermas, J. Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in Multiculturalism

(1994).

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expressed as the difference between treating people in a difference-

blind fashion versus agreeing on a special status for minorities whose

identity may be threatened within an adverse dominant culture.

The first type of Liberalism (Liberalism 1), based on a politics of

dignity is given expression by constitutional guarantees in the form of

universal individual basic rights. In this view, the role of the state is to

be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life and may

not promote particular cultural or religious projects but must deal

equally with all. They argue that equality between people is ensured

through the application of uniform rights and entitlements that provide

a framework for equal citizenship. In this view, human dignity consists

largely in the ability of each person to determine for themselves a

conception of the good life. Here, the notion of dignity is used in a

different manner then I intend to use it in this paper.

The second type of liberalism (Liberalism 2) has its foundations

in a politics of difference and as such advocates for public

recognition of a particular cultural or religious identity in order to

protect or promote a specific difference, as given by the example of

Quebecs language laws that exist notwithstanding federal laws that

protect freedom of expression in Canada. A politics of difference

argues that the application of difference-blind standards favours the

majority culture, and therefore they are willing to promote collective

goals in favour of marginalized groups at the expense of the principle

of equal treatment and non-discrimination so popular in a politics of

dignity.

Liberalism 1 is satisfied with the promotion of individual equal

rights as the means to protect universal human dignity and to realize

universal human potential, while Liberalism 2 suggests that recognition

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of unique identities and equitable rights is a necessary condition for

forming and defining ones own identity as it relates to minority

cultures within dominant cultures.

It appears to be a unique condition for Liberalism 2 that a breach

of equal rights or promotion of special status is made only on behalf of

historically disadvantaged groups. In Canada that exception is

recognized in s.15 (2) of the Canadian Charter or Rights and Freedoms.

I doubt whether the advocates in favour of Liberalism 2 would maintain

their arguments in favour of collectivist goals of dominant groups,

although dedicated Quebequois nationals, the supporters of Israel,

and various Islamic governments would likely disagree.

Underneath the Conflict

At issue between Liberalism 1 and Liberalism 2 are arguments

about access to wealth and power. Liberalism 1 prefers equal rights,

while Liberalism 2 demands systemic advantage for disadvantaged

groups. I find neither position satisfactory because both uncritically

accept a paradigm of wealth and power that I argue is the source of

systemic inequalities and basically incompatible with the ethical

imperative to humbly respect the dignity of others.

Discourses surrounding a politics of difference recognize that

gender, race, and class disparities result from circumstances of social

prejudice, but these arguments stop short of critiquing liberal market

values designed to create such disparity in the first place or to suggest

interventions that might dislodge this dominant discourse. They appear

satisfied to pursue gaining wealth and power for minorities rather than

critiquing differences of wealth and power and presumptions of private

production methods.

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Both views of Liberalism take for granted that equal respect is to

be expressed in a liberal society through the application of basic rights,

and neither theory identifies liberal economic assumptions designed to

create marginalized groups within our communities as being an issue

in the debate. Behind the political debate between these two forms of

Liberalism is an agreement to ignore poverty and the inequalities

created by late stage capital economic policies designed to maximize

the exploitation of resources in favour of corporate control and

consumption with few limitations or social responsibilities.

I believe that acceptance of equal worth entails ethical

imperatives for personal and institutional behaviour that are in conflict

with the idea of market driven production as relates to the production

of basic necessities. In other words I argue in favour of a theoretical

move beyond a liberal conception of equal dignity in order to

recognize two ethical imperatives derived from the idea of equal

worth.

On this basis it is necessary to revisit the core liberal conception

of a politics of equal recognition in order to uncover the ethical

imperatives implicit in that discourse prior to the application of liberal

legal and economic assumptions.

Equal Worth

Building on the work of Immanuel Kant, the proposition that all

individuals are of equal worth ensures that each person deserves

respect. What is of worth in each person deserving respect,

according to Kant, is the recognition of universal human potential,

rather than what a person may have made of it. Kants construction of

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equal worth includes a presumption in favour of the autonomy of

each person within a liberal framework limited by binding moral

imperatives.

For the purposes of this paper I will restate this value in what I

call the principle of equal worth : all human beings deserve respect

due to their human potential, whether they actualize it or not.

Many modern ideologies, ancient religions, and spiritual

perspectives contain a similar foundation. Liberal ideology is not the

only group to have created a system based on the idea of respect for

the equal worth of people. The early writings of Eastern Hindu and

Buddhist cultures contain spiritual perspectives relating to life and

death, and in particular ethical conceptions relating to relationships

and action. Early Greek and Roman texts are concerned with

articulating the foundations of ethical behaviour in laws that justify

punishment and exile. The Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition is primarily

constructed around ethical imperatives within the context of a

monotheistic absolute religion, while native American spiritualismmakes an equal claim to respect all of creation.

The main variation of the first principle within these various

worldviews is the extent to which respect is granted to others. Some

people limit recognition of equal worth to a particular in-group based

on relations of kin, gender, race, class, or nation. Recently many have

argued in favour of extending the principle to all living things, such as

animals and biospheres, as a response to environmental deterioration.

It is possible that acceptance of respect for all people is the first

psychological step toward developing a perspective of humility as

articulated by Freire. It is also possible that to not respect a group of

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people makes one generally indifferent to the application of violence

toward that excluded group.

Respect for Potential

It is only in reference to the idea of potential that we gain

further insight into the nature of the concept of respect. The concept

of potential appears to be a consequence of our experience of the

world, and in particular the experiences of growth and decay. We

observe that physical conditions can limit or expand the growth or

decay of living beings. Being reflects the conditions that support it. The

possibility of changing conditions generates our understanding of the

concept of potential.

Applied in a personal context, we are confronted with the

knowledge that certain conditions in the world are better or worse in

relation to our personal growth as well as the growth of others. A

presumption in favour of autonomy further asserts that individuals are

best situated to determine which conditions are desirable in relation to

their potential. If we decide to value our personal growth, physical and

mental, then we are additionally confronted with the need to

determine whether to respect the growth of others or not.

Dignity and Autonomy

If one chooses to adopt the ethical position that all people are of

equal worth one is likely to consent to institutional policies that

discourage violence and encourage respect for all people. Toward this

end, if one intends to avoid contradiction with the proposition of equal

worth then, one must both respect the dignity of others and the

autonomy of others. These two co-original secondary principles,

constructed by inference from the principle of equal worth, give

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expression to the idea of respect for potential as applied within an

existential framework recognizing both being and nothingness, or a

material/mental, tangible/intangible duality.

In other words, to respect the dignity of others requires

addressing the actual material conditions or physical dependencies of

people, while to respect the autonomy of others requires addressing

conditions for independent thinking, and dependencies of an intangible

nature.

The imperative to promote dignity within an administrative or

educational context suggests to me that ethical democratic institutions

have a duty to establish minimum living conditions for people who are

unable or unwilling to provide themselves with basic material

conditions.

The imperative to promote autonomy within an administrative or

educational context suggests to me, a duty to promote independent

thinking and argumentation on issues relating to forms of coercion and

manipulation that serve to reduce autonomy, including the fear of

poverty.

In other words, I argue that to respect the dignity of others

requires that one address physical dependencies in relation to each

individual. To respect the autonomy of others is likewise to be

committed to ensuring conditions for independent thinking and to

challenge ideas that would limit self-government or autonomy.

In our societies schools regularly undertake exercises that fit with

purposes related to respect for the autonomy of individuals, however

neo-liberal economic theory opposes any idea of socially directed

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production even if for the benefit of dignity. Social justice critiques

directed at schools acknowledge the need in some districts to focus

resources on providing disadvantaged ghetto children with material

supports like breakfast programs and remedial school supplies. It is my

position that to implement the principle of respect for the dignity of

others within educational institutions is to mandate production aimed

at the production of necessities for the general population.

Communication and Production

So far I have suggested two ethical educational purposes capable

of uniting divergent political perspectives and providing an ethical

direction for educational institutions. I have also suggested that

schools have a strong sense of respect for autonomy but are incapable

of addressing respect for dignity without the authority to engage in

social production.

From an institutional perspective, the goals of autonomy and

dignity might best be divided between the study of communication and

the study of production. From a pedagogical view the goals might be

divided between the study of art and the study of science. Such a

suggestion is based on an idea for an adult educational institution

organized around communication and production, art and science, to

reflect the dual purposes of autonomy and dignity respectively.4

The suggestion for an adult educational institution involved in

the production of necessities, might converge municipal, provincial or

federal resources, include health care, housing, employment services,

hydro, transportation, food services or other alternatives as directed by

4 In previous papers I have advocated in favour of graduating children from public school in Grade 10 and

constructing an adult educational sector open to all members of the community.

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democratic councils and institutions for the benefit of securing the

autonomy and dignity of the least advantaged, the resourceless, and

the dispossessed.

The study of communication might entail the construction of an

open communications network responsible for hosting a debate over

resource management and the production of basic necessities coupled

with an educational undertaking to teach adults critical thinking skills

in relation to personal or public issues under debate, and to teach self-

defence from interventions of persuasion and manipulation whether

sponsored by friends, teachers, the media, the state, or the economy

combined together under the study of art and science, communication

and production. To my mind these are some of the logical

consequences of implementing ethical purposes within public

institutions.

I do not anticipate agreement over the exact content of the

concept of necessary conditions in the above propositions, but I do

anticipate that assent to the basic proposition is acceptable to a large

group of people. If we could dispel the current belief in favour of

creating exclusive corporate dependencies we might consider

implementing a system of social production in response to the ethical

imperative to respect the dignity and autonomy of others.

People may not agree over the scope of a minimum standard for

dignity or the scope of conditions required for independent thinking,

but I expect they could agree at a minimum over the difference

between violence and respect and the need for public institutions to

act accordingly.

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Ethics and Rights

In the political realm, conflict over the equal or equitable

application of rights serves to point out the inadequacy of translating

ethical imperatives into positive legal rights. Such an argument

suggests that ethical imperatives should be expressed independently

of the protection of rights.

The full implications of the concept of equal worth in political

philosophy has generally been ignored in favour of rights rather than

dignity and autonomy. In early democratic capitalists states, like 15th

Century England, restricting the social purposes of public institutions to

the protection of rights would serve to exclude the interests of the poor

and benefit a particular in-group, including the judiciary who built the

laws of commerce and property hand in hand with the advancement

rights. On this basis then liberalism has limited its conception of

institutional purposes to the protection and mediation of rights rather

than what would otherwise be legitimate institutional purposes directly

related to the realization of ethical principles.

Conclusion

The claim for political and educational institutions to have clear

goals has been dealt with in relation to the promotion of ethical

standards relating to conditions for the dignity and autonomy of all

people. If a person believes in the equal worth of all people they must

agree to respect the dignity and autonomy of all people, expressed not

only by the creation of rights, but also as assent to ethical principles

for policy purposes within political institutions, and in particular the

domain of education.

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Dignity and autonomy can best be protected by the construction

of a dynamic public institution of social production and communication

that openly advocates for ethical standards and the use of social

capital to promote self-government. To ignore groups of people who

claim to be without the means to live above a minimum standard of

dignity is a form of applied violence, akin to not feeding a caged

animal. A similar argument could be made on the basis of creating

dependencies that reduce independent thinking.

In a nutshell, if one accepts the equal worth of all then one

must commit to respect the dignity and autonomy of others which is

linked to a proposal for an adult educational system divided into the

study of art and the study of science, both addressing the ethical

imperatives represented by communication and production.

Overall, this paper advocates for the end of violence through

implementing institutional and educational policies that recognize a

public duty to protect the dignityand autonomyof each citizen in order

to promote social justice goals and equal opportunities within a

democratic society.

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Ethics and Educational Purposes