1

ETHICS AND THE ECONOMY

2014-2015

Contact: danielle.zwarthoed@usaintlouis.be / danielle.zwarthoed@uclouvain.be

Course C7 (30.10): International distributive justice

Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism Reading: Gilabert, Global Justice, The Encyclopedia of Political Theory, ed. Mark Bevir

(London: Sage, 2010)

3 possible dimensions of justice:

Domestic (Nation-State-wide)

Global/International (World-wide)

Intergenerational (Justice between generations)

Figures on global inequalities

Inequalities at the global scale

"the top 10 per cent of adults own 85 per cent of global household wealth, so that the average

member of this group has 8.5 times the global average holding. []. This compares with the

bottom half of the distribution which collectively owns barely 1 per cent of global wealth. Thus

the top 1 per cent own almost 40 times as much as the bottom 50 per cent. [] The global

wealth Gini is higher still at 0.892. This roughly corresponds to the Gini value that would be

recorded in a 10-person population if one person had $1000 and the remaining 9 people each

had $1. 1

Between-countries inequalities are more important than within-countries inequalities

19th Century: the main income cleavage was the one between social and economic classes, and

not between countries. Franois Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson2 have reconstructed

worldwide income distributions, every 20 years for the period 1820-1992:

1 James B. Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth (UNU-WIDER, 2006). 2 Franois Bourguignon et Christian Morrisson, Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992 , American

Economic Review 92, no 4 (2002): 727 44, cited by Branco Milanovic, Global Inequality From Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants (The World Bank Development Research Group Poverty and

Inequality Team, 2011), http://www-

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/09/29/000158349_20110929082257/Re

ndered/PDF/WPS5820.pdf.

2

- global inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient3: 53 Gini points in 1850

- equal proportion of between-country inequalities (inequalities between the mean

income of different countries) and within-country inequalities (in each individual

country) 25.9 Gini points (49 percent) due to location, and 27.3 Gini points (51

percent) due to class.

Today:

- the global Gini: 65.4 points The overall inequality is greater today than it was in

1850

- 56.2 Gini points (85 %) is due to between-countries inequalities of income, and only 9.2

Gini points (15 %) to within-country inequalities of income Location is the key

factor4.

In other words, if we lined up all individuals from these countries by their per capita income,

Denmarks income distribution would only start at the point at which many African countries

distributions end. The richest Malians are poorer than the poorest Danes.5

This raises (at least) 3 questions:

Should we apply the same principles of justice at the domestic and at the global level?

How should wealth be distributed at the global level, taking into account incentives and

eventually national differences?

If we wanted to be radical, should we rather go for a massive redistribution of wealth at

the global level or other kinds of policies (global tax governance6, open borders7)

3 A Gini coefficient is a measure of inequalities. It varies between 0 (a fully equal society) and

100 (the most possible unequal society, one individual having all and the others nothing). It is

defined based on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve is a graphic representation of the

distribution of wealth (income, for example) within a society. Each proportion of the population

is associated with a proportion of the total social wealth (e.g. the 10% poorest citizens possess

x % of the social wealth, the 20% poorest citizens possess y %, and so on). In a perfectly equal society, 10% would possess 10% of the social wealth, etc. Graphically, the curve would

be at 45 degrees (line of equality). The Gini coefficient is the area between the equality line and the Lorenz curve divided by the whole area below the equality line. See:

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,conten

tMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.ht

ml 4 Milanovic, Global Inequality from Class to Location, from Proletarians to Migrants . 5 Ibid. 6 Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Inequality: The Case for Global Tax Governance , Global Governance:

A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 17, no 4 (1 octobre 2011): 447 67, doi:10.5555/1075-2846-17.4.447. 7 Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders , The Review of Politics 49, no 2 (1 avril

1987): 251 73.

3

1.1. Should international distributive justice be conceived as a world-wide blow-up of domestic distributive justice?

Those who answer YES: the Humanists or Cosmopolitans

Early Cosmopolitans: the Stoics, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Cloots (18th Century), Kant.

Core claims: (i) There are obligations of justice beyond borders and (ii) These

obligations are the same as domestic (intra-states) obligations.

WHY? All Human beings are morally equals each human being deserves an equal moral

concern, whatever his/her location is. Ex (Gilabert, 5): American Judith and Nicaraguan Maria

place of birth being an unchosen circumstance, inequality between them is unjust.

Those who answer NO: the Associativists

Core claim: Obligations of justice apply only among those who are already engaged in

some sort of association. Regarding those who are not part of this association

Some associativists think those who are in the association have not any moral or

ethical obligation (and, a fortiori, legal) towards those who are not in it.

Some associativists think those who are in the association have some moral

obligations towards those who are not part of it, but (i) they are different in kind

(humanitarian obligations as opposed to justice obligations) and they are generally

conceived as less demanding [e.g. Rawls].

What kinds of associations (Gilabert,5)?

1) Nations people have obligations of justice to each other only if they share a certain

set of institutions, a language, a common history, a culture.

Ex: France, Tatarstan

2) States people have obligations of justice to each other if they are the members of the

same political community having a common law and the capacity to enforce it.

Ex: United States, France

>>> These associations cannot be global in nature No global justice?

3) Institutions people have obligations of justice to each other if there are institutions

that can secure these obligations.

Ex: WTO, IMF

4) Cooperation people have obligations of justice to each other if they are involved in

mutually beneficial cooperative ties.

Ex: exchanges between economic agents from different countries

5) Interdependence people have obligations of justice to each other if their respective

decisions have an impact on others.

4

Ex: protectionist agricultural policies in United States impacting Mexican cultivators

>>> These associations can be global in nature Global justice is possible but not necessary

(contrary to the Cosmopolitan view)

1.2. Three distributive principles for global justice

Assuming either that all human beings are equals and deserve equal consideration with respect

to justice obligations (the humanist view) or that currently all inhabitants of the planets are

already involved in some kind of associations (i.e. according to the Institutionalist,

Cooperativist or Interdependency views), what kind of distribution of global wealth should we

strive for?

NB: HUMANISTS say we have the duty to create new associative frameworks (a Global State?)

to implement a just distribution. ASSOCIATIVISTS say we should, as far as we reasonably

can, implement these principles within already existing frameworks. Note that to reach a given

distribution, an institution (a Global State) taxing and redistributing assets is not the only

possible tool. Other policies could be considered as a means to reach a just distribution (free

markets? Tax governance? Migration policies?)

Basic Sufficientarianism: a distribution is just only if every concerned individual has access

to enough (to a sufficient level) of certain important advantages Basic needs approaches

against severe poverty.

Is that enough? Demand of justice or humanitarian aim? (Pogge VS Nagel)

Is it a negative duty (we should avoid depriving others from access to the resources

needed to satisfy their basic needs and rectify past violations very motivating) or a

positive one (we should take action to provide the global poor with this economic and

social minimum easier to identify our duties)? (Pogge VS Rawls)

Egalitaranism: a distribution is just only if every concerned individual has access to an equal

share of certain important advantages (Luck proviso: unless she is responsible for her having a

less than equal share)

While basic Sufficientarianism is often advocated by those who think that intra-states

obligations of justice are different from global obligations of justice, Egalitarianism is

advocated by those who think they should be the same (humanists and some

associativists)

Prioritarianism: a distribution is just only if the least well off of the concerned individuals

have access to the highest possible share of certain important advantages

Example: Beitz argues for a global original position and a global difference principle

5

Intermediate Inclusion: a distribution is just only if it is such that everyone has access to a

level of important advantage high enough to allow them to escape deprivation and exploitation.

Example of demands: full spectrum of human rights, fair governance of international

institutions, and global labor standards, a more fair distribution of benefits resulting

from international cooperation

1.3. Feasibility issues

Ideal VS Nonideal circumstances: Circumstances are nonideal when people are unable or

unwilling to honor demands of justice. Examples of circumstances like these are the absence of

robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity.

2. The Capability Approach [bring the Summary/Syllabus C5 (16 October)]

A theory of justice that tries to account for the problems of specific classes of people: the

disabled, women, but also, to some extent, animals8.

Two key theorists:

Amartya Sen (Indian economist, Nobel Price)

Martha Nussbaum (American philosopher)

Nussbaums project: implement a capability list at the global level.

Insight: the freedom to do what people have reason to value is of primary moral importance.

These freedoms should be described in terms of capabilities/opportunities to exercise human

functionings (//Marx).

What is a capability

RESOURCE

(food)

Individual

conversion

factors

(disabilities,

metabolism,

social

beliefs)

CAPABILITY

(opportunity

to being

nourished)

Individual

choice

(eating or

fasting)

FUNCTIONING

(being

nourished)

Objective

state/subjective

feeling

SATISFACTION

( taste)

.

Conversion factors vary according to disabilities, metabolism, age, gender, but also social

pressure.

Capabilities: being able to eat What is valuable is to be able to choose to eat (or not).

Contrary to a functioning-based approach, a capability-based approach takes into

8 Martha Craven Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard University

Press, 2006).

6

account the importance of choice. People must be free not to exercise functionings (ex:

they can choose to fast rather than eat)

What are the Central Capabilities?

What should people have reasons to value?

7

The purpose of the list: It is a partial theory of justice (a just society being a society where

each citizen has access to a specific threshold of each of these capabilities), a political proposal

aimed to be implemented in the form of constitutional principles in each country.

How are these capabilities selected?

(1) Philosophical argument: as Marx said, there are lives that are fully human (worthy of a

human being) and lives that are not worthy of a human being. A life worthy of a human

being includes the exercise of certain functions/functionings, e.g. certain states and

activities (beings and doings). These functions are intuitively identified, then

(2) the list is discussed by people from different cultures, in order to ensure that the list

is not culturally biased.

How to respond to people who argue that it is paternalistic or colonialist to impose the

Western value of gender equality on other cultures? Nussbaums answer (pp 224-227):

cultures are not homogeneous, and cultures evolve too. No culture completely agrees

on the way women should be treated.

Result: overlapping consensus even if people having different views of the good life

cannot agree on everything, they could presumably agree on this list of functionings.

CRITICISM 19: covert reliance on Nussbaums own moral authority?

CRITICISM 2:If the threshold is low, then the CA loses its radical appeal. If the threshold is

high, because resources are scarce, we might be forced to do trade-offs. And some capabilities

look more important than others (to be adequately nourished vs to enjoy recreational activities).

But Nussbaum offers no guidance for that. Ex: reproductive health vs move freely from place

to place.

9 Alison M. Jaggar, Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaums Methods of Justifying the Capabilities* , Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no 3 (2006): 301 22, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00253.x.