First draft only

Ethnic and Political Identities and Territorialities inthe Post-Soviet Space

Vladimir Kolossov

Institute of Geographyof the Russian Academy of Sciences,

Staromonetny per., 29,Moscow 109017, Russia

Email: <grikol@glasnet.ru>

Paper submitted to NATIONALISMS AND IDENTITIES IN A GLOBALIZEDWORLD, August 17-22, 1998, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland, and Belfast,

Northern Ireland.

Moscow, August 1998

There are a lot of theoretical models explaining the outburst of nationalism inthe post-Soviet space since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some authors stress thatnationalism in East Europe is in principle different from relatively liberal and«inclusive» nationalist traditions of West Europe, where the membership of anindividual in a nation became a function of his civil behavior, and of countries ofimmigration, where tolerance towards an ethnic «other» has been a natural feature ofstate-building. It was argued that ethnic nationalism in East Europe was based ontraditions of the local life in communities which meant that the membership in themwas grounded on the feelings of kinship, collectivism and solidarity, which preventedthe formation of a civil nationalism (Greenfeld, 1993). This hypothesis is not confirmedwith empirical studies, in particular, in Russia, showing that a large part of citizensidentify themselves with both their ethnic group, the state and the region even duringthe period of painful transition and that self-identification changes are rapidly enoughand to an increasing extent concern the values of civil rights and of political freedom(Chernysh, 1995; Drobizheva et al., 1996).

Anyway, there is evident that the frequency and the acuity of ethnic conflicts ortheir probability do not depend strictly on the ethnic, social and demographic structureof population and that the assessment of ethnpolitical risks cannot be based on the onlyone group of factors. For instance, the ethnic composition of Latvia, Kirghizstan andKazakhstan is similar, but the processes of nation- and state-building and the fate ofnational minorities in these newly independent countries differ strongly. Areas withthe most worrying ethnic situation do not coincide with the border zones betweencivilizations, i.e. between the ethnic groups separated by a longer cultural distance, asit was predicted by S.Huntington. They do not coincide as well with the spaces sharedby different peoples - notably, because ethnic borders in the post-Soviet are seldomlinear («fronts», in terms of Huntington), but represent rather vast transitive strips.Obviously, this issue depends on the complex interplay of ethnic, religious, political,regional and other identities. The role of the territorial factor is clearly salient.

The objective of this paper is to examine specific and typical features ofnation- and state building in the post-Soviet space as a whole and, in particular, 1)peculiarities of territorial identities; 2) the role of different means used by politicalelites in these processes.

I. Specific ethnic and political identities

1. Mixed, blurred and «hierarchical» identities. It is already well shown thatthe relationship between identity and territory becomes more complex (Paasi, 1996;Newman and Paasi, 1998) and that the «deterritorialization» of the state leaded to thecreation of multi-layered and mixed identities, and this is especially peculiar to Centraland East European countries (Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998). National identity,though still occupying the central place in the hierarchy of human territorialities, isgradually losing its hegemony. In the contemporary interrelated and interdependentworld, more and more individuals have a mixed ethnic background, move betweenregions and countries as a result of urbanization and globalization, or are forced to livetheir homes because of civil wars, ethnic conflicts or environmental disasters. In thepost-Soviet space, like in many East European countries outside the borders of the

former Soviet borders, a great number of ethnic groups shared the same territory forcenturies. Moreover, the ethnic heterogeneity of this space has dramatically increasedin the Soviet years because of industrialization of peripheral areas which involved theimport of labor, mainly Slav and particularly Russian so that major cities in all therepublics came to have a large proportion of Russians than in other regions (Kolossovet al., 1992, Kolossov, 1993). The ratio of «Europeans» in the Asian part of the formerUSSR during the last century grew up, as well as the share of «Asian» peoples in thepopulation of almost all regions of the European part (see the map). The concept of“matrioshka” nationalism, from the Russian dolls that are hidden inside each other,holds much appeal for understanding the post-1989 political developments in formerEastern Europe (Taras, 1993). Ukraine is a good example of a striking difference inidentities between the regions, of a great role of regional identities and of non-coincidence between the ethnic structure and the hierarchy and the structure ofterritorial identities. Obviously, most Russians of Ukraine do not identify themselvesneither with Russia nor with the young Ukrainian state, as their share in population iseverywhere much more than the share of those who feel affiliation with RussianFederation (table 1).

Table 1. Identities of the population of Ukrainian regionsTo which population group doyou feel most closely aligned?

Nationwide “West” (Lviv)

Kiev “East” (Donetsk)

Ukrainian 48.3 75.4 64.9 29.6Russian (i.e. - Russian Federation) 2.0 0.5 0.2 2.0CIS or former Soviet Union 27.2 12.3 20.1 42.0Regional 14.5 8.0 8.0 20.4Source: May 1995 and February 1996 National Surveys and May 1995 Four CitiesSurvey conducted by “Democratic Initiatives Center” (Kiev).

Another typical example of an area with a complicated identity is the self-proclaimed part of Moldova called Transdniestr Moldovan Republic (TMR), stretchedalong the left bank of the Dniestr, with the only small enclave on the right bank of theriver. This territory is situated in the border area between East-Roman cultures, thenomads of the Great Step and the East-Slavic world. It is the gate area on the wayfrom the East-European plain to the Balkans and Southern Europe. Historically, it wasa border area between Russian and Ottoman empires (as well as Chechnia andNagorno-Karabakh). About 50% of the population of TMR have a mixed ethnicbackground, though formally Russians, Ukrainians and Moldovans each constituteabout 30% of the total population. According to a recent poll, 78% of the populationstill feel themselves totally or to a large extent «Soviet people»1. At the same time,they identify themselves with Moldova as a whole, Russians or Ukrainians, anddwellers of Transdnestria (Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998b).

The regional component of identity in Transdnestria is especially strong, and itis being purposefully developed by actual authorities of TMR cultivating therepresentation about «the people of Transdnestria» and its political and ideologicalsymbols (iconography). This representation is, in particular, based on the longseparation of Trandnestrian Moldovans from the rest of Moldova, and on two

1 Dr. N.V.Babilunga, University of Transdniestria, personal communication.

historical experiences of a separate statehood of Transdnestria - within the MoldovianAutonomous SSR in Ukraine (1924-1940) and in the existing de facto since 1990TMR. More than 90% of participants of the 1990 referendum (85% of electors) aboutits establishment pronounced in favor of it.

2. A specific overlapping of political and national identities. One of themajor problems of most new post-Soviet independent states, including Russia itself,consists in the coincidence in time and space of the processes of state- and nation-building. Indeed, in new countries states of full value are not created yet, because:

n a large part of their population, especially in particular regions, do notrealize yet their affiliation with the state-political community (the politicalnation), which supposes a consensus about values of the common citizenshipbetween all social, ethnic and regional groups;

n as societies are deeply split on «winners» and «losers» in economic reforms(this is the main political cleavage), the state did not achieve the fulllegitimacy, i.e. the recognition by all citizens of the authority of the centralpower. To be truly legitimate, a state needs recognition not only by themajority of the titular ethnic group, but also by the majority of each ofminorities;

n political participation is not satisfactory, as most often it does not ensureterritorial integrity, national unity and political stability;

n political distribution, i.e. equal accessibility to material resources, values andprivileges, is still far to be recognized as fair by the main political factor, as,for instance, regions do not have the same status and do not agree with theexisting system of financial redistribution;

n the state does not succeed in penetrating in the same way to all ethnic,territorial and social segments of the society: the existence of five self-proclaimed republics is the best evidence of it.

With partial exceptions of Turkmenistan and probably of Lithuania, all post-Soviet states survive the crisis of identity, which can be defined as a period, whenethnic or other regionally-specific subnational segments of a society create obstaclesto the national unification and identification with a certain political community. As aresult, a considerable part of the population does not recognize boundaries of theterritorial state as a legitimate political unit. This crisis of identity is due not only to themultiethnic character of all successor states of the Soviet Union, but also to the varietyand the heterogeneity of the ethnic identity of titular peoples.

In early 1996, 31% of the adult population of Ukraine liked that their countrywould reunite with Russia (Khmelko, 1996). A survey of 1991 showed that only 55%of the 977,000 who were classed in the 1989 census as local “Ukrainians’ inTranscarpathia thought of themselves as such, whereas 27% considered themselves tobe Rusyn and some other ethnic groups In 1992, they established their own politicalparty, the Subcarparthian Republican Party, which has demanded cultural and evenpolitical autonomy for the region. Kiev has granted the local ex-communist eliteconsiderable economic freedom to discourage it from making common cause with theRusyns (Wilson, 1997). In Russia, in 7 years after the dismantling of the Soviet Union12.4% of population still identify themselves with the whole territory of the USSR,

and almost a quarter of population still feel embarrassed and have an ambiguous ideaabout their territoriality and state affiliation (table 2). In other words, more than 40%of the Russian population is not able or does not wish to identify themselves with thecountry they are living. At the same time, in 1997, only 34% of Russian populationbelieved that Russian Federation should remain an independent state, without reunitingwith another country.

Table 2. Self-identification of Russian citizens in 1997A citizen of what country do youfeel?

1993 1995 1997

Russia 45,6 53,1 58,2USSR 12,7 15,5 12,4Citizen of the world 8,8 7,3 5,1Don’t know 32,9 24,1 24,3Total 100 100 100Source: Gorshkov, 1997.

As a result of complicated history (of the various «age» and of variouscircumstances of incorporation into Russian Empire/Soviet Union, remainders of tribaland clan ties etc.), strong ethnic identities among titular peoples have yet to becreated. The state has to «glue up» at the same time the titular people and the nationconsisting of many ethnic groups. Thus, it has to identify its priorities and strategy.What should be considered as its main support:

n the titular people or, in geographical terms, its core group which historicallyhas been less submitted to the influence of the «empire» because of the lateinclusion within its borders, and is usually more rural and economically lessdeveloped, or

n the nation as whole.

Each way has its advantages and its shortcomings. The first, exclusive option,meaning the choice in favor of the nineteenth century concept of the nation-state,makes easier political mobilization of the core group and allows to redistribute and tokeep property and power in hands of the titular elite, but is risky with exacerbatednationalism, the counter-reaction from the part of minorities described by the«interactive concept of nationalism» (Hennayake, 1992) and the blame of theinternational community. The second, contemporary, inclusive option is oftenperceived by the ruling elites as threatening the integrity of the state territory and thereal independence of the young state. In most cases, political elites cannot clearlyselect any of these options and try to combine both of them/ They declare theiradherence to the concept of political nation and, in necessary and unavoidable cases,even making real steps and concessions in order to build it. But, in fact, they neverhesitate to insist on privileges to titular nations and their tongues and unremittinglywork on diffusing and enrooting of old and new national myths in order to imposethem to all population.

Quite clearly, under these conditions, the concept of double citizenship cannotbe adopted because it contradicts to the basic postulates of state-building. For obvious

reasons, only Russian Federation permits to its citizens to have another citizenship.But in areas with especially complicated identities, there are lots of people without anydefinite identity at all or without citizenship, as in Latvia and Estonia. As it oftenhappens in such transitive zones (Sahlins, 1989), the people in such areas manipulatewith their identities/passports. In TMR, whose citizenship is not recognized, manypeople illegally have two or three passports: the Transdnestrian, the Russian and theMoldovian ones. In Latvia and Estonia, as well as in TMR, a considerable part ofpermanent dwellers have the Russian citizenship.

3. The continuing existence and even strengthening of supranationalidentities.

There are a lot of evidence that the «Soviet» identity continues to exist, thoughin most cases has no ideological character, and most of its bearers would not like areturn to the Soviet, or to a communist power. Territoriality of these people embracesthe whole or most of the Soviet territory. Our recent (June 1998) poll in the city ofStavropol and eastern, multiethnic district of its region showed that about 25% ofrespondents identified themselves as «Soviet people», especially those who belongedto small «non-territorial» minorities in these areas, who were born in other formerUnion republics or recently came from there, independently of their ethnic background.It is a common phenomenon for all new independent states but, of course, inparticular, for Russia and Russians who formerly have felt everywhere comfortably(though to a lesser and lesser extent, which is proved by their migrational outflow frommany republics). According to the polls conducted by the All-Russian Center of PublicOpinion Studies (YTsIOM), in 1989 30% of Russians perceived themselves as«Soviet». In cosmopolitan capital cities, Moscow and Leningrad (Petersburg), theshare of «Soviet people» among ethnic Russians was even greater - 38%.

Now, the group with the «Soviet» identity includes in many republics mostRussian speakers of different ethnic origin, close to each other by the status,occupation, education, and culture. Most of them are urban dwellers engaged inindustry, health care, education, science and other activities requiring a relatively highlevel of education and skill; they usually do not speak the language of the titularpeople, and most are affected by the economic crisis. Opposition to the transition tothe «state language» is the strongest factor creating their common identity which is, inparticular, manifested in political behavior.

II. Specific means used in state and nation-building and in manipulations withidentities

1. Language policy. According to the hypothesis of E.Gellner, during thetransition from the agricultural to the industrial society culture needs to bestandardized through the system of general education in the national tongue, which canbe ensured only by the nation-state (Gellner, 1983). It makes the educational systemand the nation-state strictly interdependent: one cannot exist without another. Politicalelites in all new independent states realize quite well the importance of primarysocialization and of elementary education in state-building and, respectively, in thecreation of new political identities. The use of Russian is interpreted as a major threatto the national identity and as a tool of «Russian imperialism».

With the exception of Latvia and Estonia, where nationalist elites do not evendisguise their intentions, usually new republics adopt «good» democratic laws buttheir practical implementation based on ministerial instructions pursues otherobjectives.

Unlike two Baltic countries, where the state refused from the very beginning tofund high education in Russian, in Ukraine, a Law on National Minorities in Ukraineadopted in late 1991, i.e. just before independence, included the right to be educated inone’s native tongue in a state educational institution. But the ministry of educationproclaimed the principle of the «optimal concordance» of the language of educationwith the ethnic composition of population according to passport nationality. Russianbegan to be ascribed the status of one of the “languages of the peoples of Ukraine”,appearing in alphabetical order after Polish (0.4%) and Romanian (0.2%).

But for a great part of ethnic Ukrainians, Russian is the mother tongue.Moreover, recent survey data show that even the census indicator “mother tongue”severely overestimates the actual use of Ukrainian in family settings (table 3). Theprinciple of «optimal concordance» means that, for instance, in Donetsk oblast 40% ofthe 1,100-odd schools would need to change their language of instruction. Since 1993,entrance examinations to higher educational institutions are taken in Ukrainian, and, asa rule, first-year classes should now be taught in Ukrainian. This conforms thelanguage law which foresaw the Ukrainization of the higher educational network.

Table 3. The use of Ukrainian in the regions of Ukraine, 1991-94Regions Ethnic

UkrainiansUkrainian asmother tongue

Ukrainian as language ofpreference

East 59.3 42.1 14.6South 52.5 40.8 11.3Center-East 88.2 83.4 49.6Center-West 88.9 88.6 78.0West 89.2 89.2 91.6Kiev city 72.4 57.5 23.6TotalUkraine

72.7 64.0 43.9

Center-East: Chernigov, Poltava, and Sumy; Center-West: Kiev city, Kiev oblast,Cherkasssy, Zhitomir, Kirovograd, Vinnitsa, and Khmelnitsky. Source: KievInternational Institute of Sociology, 1991-94, 18,586 respondents. Quoted in Arel,1995, p.170.

Fortunately, the zeal of local authorities in the implementation of this principlevaries from one region to another and fluctuates in time. As for Ukrainization of higheducation, there are objective problems of textbooks, of fluency in Ukrainian of theteaching staff and even of Ukrainian equivalents of professional terms. As a result,Ukrainization of education, at least, in East Ukraine is going on much slower thannational «revivalists» would like. Enrollment in Ukrainian-language schools between1988 and 1993 grew in the East and South by only 5% (up to 20.7% and to 28.1%);there was almost no real progress in the Crimea (Arel, 1995; Okhrimenko, 1998).

This policy clearly originates from the nationalist perception of Ukrainians whodo not speak the Ukrainian language as traitors: «Who refrain from using Ukrainianare not supporting Ukrainian statehood, do not believe it, and are somehow hoping fora return of Ukraine to a new colonial slavery». Even in the parliament, Russianspeaking deputies were severely accused by their nationalist colleagues: «The Russianspeech of deputies morally and psychologically legitimizes a lack of respect towardUkrainian as a language of official use and contempt for Ukrainian culture and itspeople in general». Nationalists introduced the concept of «indigenous» and «nonindigenous» national minorities. The first ones have their homeland in Ukraine andshare their territory with Ukrainians (Crimean Tatars, for instance) and, therefore,should be allowed to speak their mother tongue. The second ones, including Russians,are «migrants», «newcomers» on the Ukrainian territory, and their languages are nomore than «languages of other peoples of Ukraine».

In Moldova, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Georgia, too, in the 1970s-1980s thelanguage has been the main basis of identities for 80-90% of the people belonging totitular groups, and for 35-45% for those who belonged to titular peoples in theautonomous republics of Russian Federation (Drobizheva et al., 1996).

In Kazakhstan, Russian is still the language of preference for 70% ofpopulation (Ogneva, 1996). The use of Russian as the second state language is therethe main ethnopolitical issue. As the Russian speaking population is underrepresentedin the Kazakh parliament as a result of electoral engineering, after long debates Kazakhhas been proclaimed the only state language of the country (a half of the population ofwhich does not belong to the titular group). Not only the Russian speakers but alsomost Kazakhs of Northern Kazakhstan support the idea of the second state language(from 49% of Kazakhs in Kustanai oblast to 60-65% in other northern oblasts(Susarov, 1997). Kazakhstan risks to split along regional, and not ethnic dividinglines. It was one of the reasons why President Nazarbaev moved his capital to thecenter of the country from Alma-Ata. The former capital is situated on the territory ofthe so called Elder Zhuz (horde) of Kazakhs, more nationalist, Asia-oriented anddominating in the Kazakh politics.

2. Split of the informational space. Russian speakers in former Unionrepublics cannot now watch to Russian TV, with the exception of few entertainmentprograms, which still penetrate outside Russian borders. Even in predominantlyRussian-speaking East Ukraine and in Crimea, the only channel broadcasting Russianprograms, the so called Ukrainian International Television, broadcasts mostly inUkrainian and can interrupt the only news program from Moscow only because it doesnot fit well in time with what was planned in Kiev. It is officially explained witheconomic reasons, because Russian TV companies and the state do not want to pay fortranslation abroad. True, in Russia programs from new independent countries are notbroadcasted as well (though the share of the people speaking respective languages isincomparably less than the share of the people for whom Russian is the mother tonguein each of them). «Foreign» (Russian) newspapers are rather expensive2, as well astransportation and post services.

2 Partly because of bureaucratic reasons: for example, in Ukraine a special tax for kiosks sailing«foreign» newspapers has been established in 1996 which made the diffusion of Russian media

All this broke the unite informational space of the former USSR and exposedthe whole population to the nationalist discourse, i.e. to the attempts of the rulingnationalist elites to forge new identities in elaborating new visions and interpretationsof the world recognized by a dominant majority and new ways of action and ofpolitical institutionalization which are a result of such visions and interpretations(Miller, 1997). The simplest example is the interpretation of the crash of the plane«Antonov-124» (the biggest plane in the world) over Irkutsk in December 1997:Russian media tried to blame Ukrainian-made engines. For Ukrainian newspapers, itwas a new pretext for speculations about the state of Russian economy and society. Inother words, this sad event served as an occasion for new statements to different«nationalisms» competing on both sides for adherents. In the same way, events inCaucasus are presented by «ethnic entrepreneurs» in different republics from differentperspectives.

Therefore, mass media strongly accelerate the development of differentidentities among the same ethnic groups separated by political boundaries. Mass mediacreate a different informational context on both sides of a border, which deprives anindividual of the ability to catch all the meanings of the texts even in his mother tongue(Deutsch, 1953).

3. Invention of national myths and stereotypes shaping territorial identities.State- and nation-building processes in the post-Soviet space are accelerated at all thelevels. Ukraine gives a brilliant example of the efficient use of old and new historicalmyths in the construction of the new national and political identity and of socialpresentations about traditional enemies and friends and of new geopolitical codes.

Ukrainian historians and contemporary nation-builders bear the“lacrimogenesis” concept of history, in terms of a Romanian writer, Florin Toma,quoted by von Hagen. Such concepts are typical to many Central-East Europeancountries, present their titular nations as ancient European peoples which can be proudof glorious periods of their history, mainly in the Middle ages, and as innocent victimsof primordially hostile “other” nations. More recent periods are described exclusivelyas a dark of foreign occupation, and the whole history is depicted as a sequence ofheroic and tragic battles for national independence (von Hagen, 1995), just as Marxist-Leninist historians reduced history to the class struggle.

Ukrainian ideologists have already inundated the book market with abundantliterature in the attempt to enroot in the mass consciousness a new set of primordialmyths about Ukrainian history on which Ukrainian identity can be built. The first mythconcerns the origin of Ukrainians as a nation and the origin of the Ukrainian statehood.The Ukrainian historical school promoted to the level of the state ideology prefers touse the chronicles of the Galicia-Volhynian princedom and views this polity and eventhe Grand Duchy of Lithuania (before it concluded in 1569 the union with Poland) asthe only heirs of Kievan Rus’ and embodiments of Ukrainian statehood. This view isclearly opposed to the traditional Russian historiography, according to which, absolutely ruining. As a result, main Russian newspapers are sold with the same content (exceptadvertising and weather) and under the same titles but with two additional words - «in Ukraine»:(«Izvestia in Ukraine» etc.), because they are registered in Kiev as Ukrainian periodicals.

Vladimir-Suzdal and, later, Muscovy were the direct heirs to Kievan Rus’, and KievanRus’ was a common motherland of all East-Slavic peoples - Russians, Ukrainians, andBelorussians. Ukrainian ideologists also make a conclusion that only Ukrainians are atruly ancient European people, whose historical destinies are related with Europe,while the Russian ethnos has been formed only in the 14th century and is not trulySlavic.

According to the second myth, the polity of Zaporozhian Cossacks in the 17th-early 18th centuries was a true independent state, the most democratic in Europe (it isclaimed that the status of Cossacks was the first constitution in the world), Cossackswere all ethnic Ukrainians, their state incarnated traditions of Kievan Rus’, and theirarea of settlement embraced all of actual Southern and Eastern Ukraine. The Cossackmyth is probably the most important in grounding the present-day all-Ukrainianidentity and territoriality (the boundaries of the independent Ukrainian state, includingeven Crimea and Sevastopol itself). The Cossack polity, the hetmanate, included therelatively small part of the Ukrainian territory; Cossack were irreconcilable enemies ofthe Uniate Church in the then Polish part of Ukraine, Galicia estimated; the BrestUnion with the Catholic Church was estimated as a betrayal. But, paradoxically, it wasjust Galician intelligentsia who not only adopted in the 19th century the Cossack myth,but, due to the works of the national Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko who enchantedthe Cossack freedom-love and their struggle against the Polish domination,transformed it into a nation-wide mythology. Special sub-myths about the migration ofpeople from Galicia to Dnieper Ukraine were invented in order to justify the all-Ukrainian unity and territoriality. The Cossack myth is also clearly opposed to thepreviously dominant interpretation of the history of the whole South of the Europeanpart of the former Soviet Union, which was usually associated with the colonizationefforts of Catherine II and of the Russian Empire.

The third Ukrainian historical myth reads that Russian and Soviet (i.e., alsoRussian) dominance was imposed to Ukrainian by force, had a colonial character andcaused irreversible demographic, economic and environmental damage to theUkrainian people and put in doubt its very existence (Luk’ianenko, 1992, Bilinsky,1994, etc.). Ukrainian nationalists claim that sufferings of Ukrainians under theRussian oppression have no precedents in history: in 1654, when B.Khmelnitsky tookhis decision to sign the agreement about the union with Russia, there were supposedlymore Ukrainians than Russians (Wilson, 1997).

The fourth myth concerns the history of Ukrainian republic of 1918-1921,which is considered as a truly democratic state, and the reason of its defeat was theRussian Bolshevik-chauvinist intervention in the absence of its own well-organizedarmy resulted in a new forcible incorporation and colonization, and the internalweakness of this republic (or, better to say, these republics, because several verydifferent regimes changed in Kiev during a short time, so brightly described in thenovels of Mikhail Bulgakov) and the lack of mutual understanding between Kiev andGalicia. In fact, there were many Ukrainians in the Red Army.

The fifth myth, which has played a very important role in the voting forindependence on December 1, 1991, is the representation of Ukraine as a breadbasketof Europe, a rich country whose suffered from the colonial exploitation by Russia and

would live much better if it there was no Russian subjugation. The first difficult yearsafter independence, the absence of the expected large-scale support form the West andthe relatively better economic situation in Russia turned to be a surprise for a part ofthe Ukrainian public opinion.

The sixth myth is related with the interpretation of Stalinist crimes in Ukraine -first of all, of the mass man-made famine in 1932-1933 caused by forcedcollectivization and repression. Though all peoples of the USSR were subjected toterror and purges in this period, including millions of Russians, Ukrainian nationaliststreat it as an act of purposeful genocide of Russia against the Ukrainian people.

The seventh myth has the most controversial and absolutely exclusive character.As the whole history of Ukraine since the Pereyaslav treaty in 1654 is considered as anuninterrupted struggle against the Russian (and the Polish) colonial domination, thefight of the OUN and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Galicia against the SovietArmy during the World War II and their guerrilla actions which continued until theearly 50s is logically views as the continuation of this struggle. Indeed, WesternUkraine suffered from executions, mass arrests, and deportations since its annexationby the Soviet Union in 1939 and after the victory of the Soviet army over the nazitroops in the late 1940s - the early 1950s. So, the defeat of Germany is consideredthere not as the liberation but simply as the replacement of one dictatorship withanother. But the problem is again in territoriality: most Ukrainians from all regions,except Galicia, fought against nazis in the Soviet Army, and for them and theirdescendants the World War II is the Great Patriotic war, and Galicians participants ofthe anti-Soviet resistance which at certain stages collaborated with Germans aretraitors. Some attempts of the government to reconcile veterans from both sides clearlyfailed, as well as the attempts to inculcate the ideas about the fair war of the OUNagainst Russian Communists to draftees in the Ukrainian Army, which remainsethnically heterogeneous and multicultural. They prefer now in the army to talk aboutmore save topics, for instance, Cossacks.

So, in fact, all national myths in all post-Soviet countries, including Russia, cannot be accepted without criticism. For instance, the Kievan state was neitherUkrainian, nor Russian, just as Charlemagne was neither French, nor German(Kappeler, 1995: 698; Wilson, 1997). But these myths formed the basis of school anduniversities textbooks, of new state symbols and ceremonies and of the creation ofsacred places and efficiently contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian ethnicidentity.

At their level, quite in the spirit of the Hobsbawm’s concept (Hobsbawm andRanger, 1993), political elites in Russian republics are intensively inventing traditionsand strengthening identities. In Yakutia, this is the idea of a particular northerncivilization and of national self-respect on the basis of the high economic potential, thesupposedly high level of local culture and education matching international standards(according to official statistical data, the per capita number of persons with higheducation and especially of PhDs and professors among Yakuts is considerably higherthan among Russians). The purpose of Yakutian nationalism is political: economicsovereignty, which meant the increasing autonomy from Moscow in the control andthe use of natural resources by the titular elite.

In North Osetia, it is glorious history which is mostly used in the constructionof ethnic stereotypes. Most people of the titular nationality are perfectly bilingual anddo not like to refuse from Russian as one of two state languages. Religion also cannotbe used as the basis of identity, because most Osetians are Orthodox Christians, butmany are Muslims. So, the titular intelligentsia diffuses representations about thepowerful state of Alania (the predecessor of Osetia), which survived the invasion ofMongols, adopted Christianity and controlled vast territories in Caucasus. The republicis now officially called North Osetia-Alania. Territoriality is the major national issue,as Ingushes claim a part of the Osetian territory (the so called Suburban district, whoseterritory used to be shared by Osetian and Ingushes before the 1992 bloody conflict),and as South Osetia remains an unrecognized republic within Georgia. Thestrengthening of the identity is needed to continue the struggle for territory.According to the polls of the Institute of Ethnology of Russian Academy of Sciences,Osetians have the highest share of the ethnic component in all individual self-identifications. Osetian nationalism can be defined as «defensive» (Drobizheva et al.,1996).

In Tuva, the memory about the recent state independence3 and again writingsabout more remote past serve to ground nationalist representations.

On the background of efficient manipulations with ethnic identities in newcountries and in the republics of Russia, the complete failure of Russia as a whole tooppose to this process its own national idea is striking. The Yeltsin’s administrationcreated special commissions whose mission was to «write» a concept of the nationalidea. But, of course, such an idea cannot be introduced by an order «since Monday».The Russian government clearly loses the informational «cold war», and theChechenian «hot» war proved it again. First, as A.Miller noticed, there are no nationalsymbols, which could belong to the Russian political nation and would not be Russianin ethnic terms (in Russian language, there are two different words to define thisdifference and ensuring «political correctness» - «rossiiskii» and «russkii») (Miller,1997). Second and the most important, there is no consensus in society about thefuture of the nation. Polls show the growing ambiguity of Russian citizens’ self-images,i.e. they choose to an increasing extent controversial options.

So, according to a 1997 poll, on the one hand, 33,6% of respondents believedthat the new Russian state could be based on the idea of the unity of peoples of Russiain order to restore it as a great power, 18,4% (in 1995, 10,0%) remained faithful tosocialist values (most often the same respondents, as it was possible to select severaloptions). 6,5% supposed that Russian citizens could be inspired with the idea of thegrandeur of Russia, of its national uniqueness and of a special historical mission of theRussian people, and 6,3% - with the idea of opposition to the West and self-sufficiency of Russia. On the other hand, 37,8% of respondents (in 1995, only 30,0%)believed that the main national idea should be the construction of the state based onthe dominance of law, 7,7% - solidarity with all the peoples in the solution of global

3 Tuva had profited of a wide autonomy within Russian Empire, in which it entered as a protectorateonly in 1914, and has been independent between 1921 and 1944.

problems, 6,9% - individual freedoms and civil rights, 8,5% - rapprochement with theWest and the construction of the common European house (Gorshkov, 1997).

Thus, the Russian public opinion remains deeply split, and self-images andidentities of Russian citizens and of properly Russians vary from region to region. Forinstance, the affiliation with the region in Stavropol is stronger than in Voronezh, andin Voronezh - stronger than in Moscow. In its turn, the identity with Russia inMoscow is stronger than in both Voronezh and Stavropol, while the «Soviet» identityis the strongest in Voronezh (the largest oblast of the «red belt») (Survey INTAS,1995-1996). In Tatarstan, the urban Russian population entrusts to the republicanadministration even to a higher extent than to the federal (properly «Russian»)authorities, and in Yakutia - to almost the same extent. This is a very favorable factorfor reaching a national consensus. But in Tuva the situation is just opposite(Drobizheva et al., 1996), and so on.

4. Increasing role of economic leverages and factors. Usually, nationalistforces are backed by capitals and by more rural, less urbanized and industrializedregions where the ethnic structure is more homogeneous, and the titular group hasdominant positions. Because of their relative backwardness and for political reasons,these areas are recipients of the financial transfers from the central government, whilemore urbanized and less nationalist regions are donors of the central budget. Thissituation is typical for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan and widely used in thenationalist discourse. Besides, areas with different proportions between the titulargroup and ethnic minorities often have a historically established economicspecialization caused in particular by natural factors, like in Kazakhstan, where thereexists a kind of the cultural division of labor between Kazakhs and the most non-Kazakh («European») population and between «northern», «middle» and «southern»Kazakhs in such a way that the socio-economic divisions do not strictly follow ethnicwatersheds.

In most new independent states in the post-Soviet space there is a cleardifference in the ethnic composition between urban and rural population. In caseswhen the ethnic boundary still passes by urban outskirts, until recently, it has notinfluenced identities, but now, when the economic crisis and the decline ofmanufacturing forces Russians and other Russian speaking groups to leave, it startedto be used in the nationalist discourse: «Russians can leave for their country, and forus, this land is the only motherland». When there is a competition between the titulargroup and ethnic «others» for jobs, housing, status and privileges, when the titularethnic group is being rapidly urbanized, this situation has a much more significantimpact on identities strengthening them on both sides and contributing to politicalmobilization. The experience shows that in such situations, the departure of theRussian speaking population is inevitable.

In Russian Federation, relations between the federal center and regionstransformed into a competition of ruling oligarchic groups. Regional legislatures turnedto be meeting points for functionaries and local business, which creates alliancescooperating or trying to counteract to strong Moscow banks and companies.Nationalist arguments and territorial identities is a convenient tool in this struggle(«instrumental» nationalism). Despite of the new wave of centralization which has to

balance the consequences of direct elections of governors and despite an attempt ofMoscow to deprive republican leaders of privileges they obtained in the early 1990s,the threat of an extreme regionalism or even separatism remains a sharp weaponagainst the federal center. The most economically powerful republics, Tatarstan andBashkiria, began a new tour of bargaining with Moscow, threatening to establish theirown citizenship and independent republican courts, which contradicts to the federalConstitution, and claiming the control over land, state property and natural resources.Most often, local authorities get unlimited political and economic power within theborders of their republic in exchange of loyalty towards Moscow. It creates «localtyrannies»: federal laws are ignored, electoral procedures are openly adapted to theneeds of the leader, political rivals are pursued, outcomes of elections are falsified.More is autonomy of a republic towards Moscow, less civil freedoms and human rightsare respected.

Everywhere the post-Soviet ethnic bureaucracy firmly keeps power and is themain protagonist of nationalism. In Russian republics, incumbent leaders try to presentthemselves as moderate mediators between the center, the Russian-speakingpopulation and radical nationalists, especially the titular intelligentsia. But in reality,the pressure of nationalism allows them to come to profitable compromises with thefederal center and to control material resources. Interestingly and not accidentally, theper capita number of regional functionaries in small «national» republics are muchhigher than in large properly Russian provinces. In «Russian» regions, it varies from1:1,200 to 1:1,500, while in Kabardino-Balkaria, Yakutia, Bashkiria and in Tatarstan itreaches 1:600 - 1:1,000. In relatively small northern city of Yakutsk, the capital of theRepublic of Yakutia-Sakha, there are 14 ministries and 13 state committees. Nationalpolitical elites controlling now high education successfully reproduce themselves anddo not have any will to lose their dominant positions (Afanasiev, 1998). They createdquasi-feudal hierarchies of their vassals at the lower levels of administration. Most ofthem belong to the titular nationality. So, in Buriatia, Buriats make up 28% of the totalpopulation, but 40% of deputies of the People’s Khural (republican parliament),35,6% of deputies of local governments, 50% of the heads of districts’ administration,including five districts with the absolute majority of Russian population (Karnyshev,1997, p.168).

This development has already practically transformed (at least, in NorthCaucasus) titular ethnic groups, and not the respective republics, into the real subjectsof Russian Federation (Khoperskaya, 1997). It can create a basis for future conflicts.Indeed, why only peoples possessing of their territorial autonomies have this privilegedstatus? What about others? What about the ousting of the Russian population? Thesequestions remain open.

Conclusion. The political control over a geographical space is the mainopportunity to realize nationalist aspirations as a political program. The nationalistperception of the territorial identity with the soil of ancestors as the place whichbelongs only to the members of the nation and is the only place where its historicaldestiny can be fulfilled is being transformed into a feeling of national exclusiveness.Nationalism became the principal equivalent of national territoriality identified as apolitical strategy using which nationalists are going to control the fate of the nation.National stereotypes necessarily include images of space: regions incorporated into the

state territory by the national consciousness get their codes, and many of them becamenational symbols (like Sevastopol for Russia). Negative stereotypes are especiallypurposefully cultivated when national elites feel a threat to their national integrity andculture and these representations are the key elements of the human territoriality, likein the case of Ukraine. The hierarchy of identities and their very content depend on theregional context.

The mass ethnic hysteria is created by «activists» among the same group or bythe state authorities in order to achieve concrete political objectives. Therefore, «thevoice of the people» against or for something is the most widespread myth.Fortunately, a very large part of population is absolutely indifferent to national issue: inRussia, their share varies from 35 to 43% among titular peoples in the republics andfrom 45 to 53% among Russians. Our survey in the territory of Stavropol showed thatfor more than 80% of respondents the ethnic background of their friends andcolleagues does not matter and for about 30-50% of respondents even the ethnic originof their closest parents plays no role. The ethnic component is only the fourth or thefifth among factors of the individual self-identification after personal characteristics,such as sex, profession etc. In most regions of the former Soviet Union and, inparticular, of Russia (though, unfortunately, not in all of them), other sociologicalindicators also show a relatively high degree of ethnic tolerance and demonstrate thatmost people are not ready to sacrifice their well-being in order to achieve «superior»ethnic or political goals. It inspires optimism about the future of nation- and state-building in this area of the world.

References

Afanasiev, M. Sovereignty is good when it is limited. - Izvestia, 1998, June 2.Arel, D. Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State. In: Tismaneanu,

Vladimir, ed. Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States ofEurasia. Armonk, N.Y. - London: M.E.Sharp, 1995, p. 157 - 188.

Bilinsky, Ya. Basic Factors in the Foreign Policy of Ukraine. The Impact of theSoviet Experience. In: Frederick Starr S., ed. The legacy of History in Russia and theNew States of Eurasia. Armonk, N.Y. - London: M.E.Sharp, 1994, p.171-193.

Chernysh, M.F. National identity: features of evolution. - SociologicalJournal,1995, N 2, p 110-114 (in Russian).

Deutsch, K. Nationalism and Social Communication: an Inquiry Into theFoundation of Nationalities. Cambridge, Mass., 1953.

Drobizheva, L.M., A.R.Aklaev, V.V.Koroteeva and G.U.Soldatova.Democratization and Images of Nationalism in Russian Federation in the 90s.Moscow: Mysl Publishers, 1996 (in Russian).

Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, 1983 (the Russian edition -Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991).

Gorshkov, M. What is happening with us? - Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1997,15.05.

Greenfeld, L. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993.

Von Hagen, M. Does Ukraine Have a History? Slavic Review, 1995, 54, No 3,pp. 658-690.

Hennayake S. Interactive Ethnonationalism: An Alternative Explanation ofMinority Ethnonationalism. - Political Geography, 1992, vol.11, N 6, p.526.

Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, 1993.Karnyshev, A.D. Interethnic Interactions in Buriatia: Social Psychology,

History, and Politics. Ulan-Ude: University of Buriatia Press, 1997 (in Russian).Khmelko, V. The attitude to Russia. - Nezavissimaya Gazeta, 1996, 19.12. (in

Russian).Khoperskaya, L.L. Contemporary Ethnopolitical Processes in North Caucasus:

a Concept of Ethnic Subjectivity. Rostov: SKAGS, 1997 (in Russian).Kolossov, V., Glezer O. and Petrov N. Ethnoterritorial conflicts in the Former

USSR. Durham: IBRU Press, 1992.Kolossov, V. and J. O’Loughlin. New borders for new world orders:

territorialities at the fin-de-siecle. Geojournal, 1998a (in press).Kolossov, V. and J. O’Loughlin. National Construction, Territorial

Separatism and Post-Soviet Geopolitics: The Example of the Transdniester MoldovanRepublic. - Post Soviet Geography and Economy, 1998b (in press).

Kolossov, V. La Russie dans le monde. - In: Le monde: espace et systemes.Sous la direction de J.Levy, M.-F.Durand, D.Retaille. Paris: Dalloz, 1993 (secondeedition).

Luk’ianenko, L. I trust in God and in Ukraine. In: Gonchar, O., ed. Ukraine asthe heir of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. - Rozbudova derzhavy, 1992, N 5 (inUkrainian).

Newman, D. and A.Paasi. Fences and neighbors in a postmodern world:boundary narratives in political geography. - Progress in Human Geography, 22(2),1998 (in press).

Miller, A. About the discursive nature of nationalisms. - Pro et Contra, 1997,Vol.2, N 14, 141-152 (in Russian).

Ogneva, V.V. Entering in Democracy. An Experience of a Political Analysis ofthe Problems of the Transitive Period in Kazakhstan). Alma-Ata, 1996 (in Russian).

Okhrimenko, V.S. Russian populaton in Ukraine and Belorussia: settlement,migrations, orientations. Moscow: Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy ofSciences, 1998 (in Russian).

Paasi, A. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The ChangingGeographies of the Finnish-Russian Border. Chichester: John Wiley, 1996.

Sahlins, P. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees.Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1989.

Susarov, A. The nature of cultural distances and borders in Kazakhstan. -Bulletin of the Center of Ethnpolitical and Regional Studies, 1997, N 7 (63), p.5 - 54(in Russian).

Survey INTAS «Prometee» - VTsIOM, 12.1995 - 01.1996. Moscow, 1996.Taras, R. Making sense of matrioshka nationalism. In: I. Bremmer and R.

Taras (Eds) Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 513-538.

Wilson, A. Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A minority faith. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997.