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Ethnic Construction and Journalistic Narrative. A Discourse Analysis of Selected Hungarian and Romanian

Newspapers in the Light of the Hungarian Status Law.

Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde

durch den Promotionsausschuss Dr. phil.

der Universität Bremen

Vorgelegt von

Mihai-Paul Márton

Bremen, den 18.12.2007

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To my grandparents and Mihaela

Meinen Großeltern und Mihaela

Nagyszüleimnek és Mihaela-nak

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Contents: 0. Preliminary remarks and acknowledgements 10 1. Theoretical and methodological framework 18 1.1 Analysing the discourse 18 1.1.1 General overview 18 1.1.2 Dialogic relationships 22 1.1.3 Narration 25 1.2 Ethnicity 27 1.2.1 Definitions and theoretical background 27 1.2.2 Denoting and power 30 2. Context 33 2.1 Historic background or political battleground:

Hungarians in Romania 34 2.1.1 The Romanian historic narrative 37 2.1.2 The Hungarian historic narrative 38 2.1.3 After 1989/1990 39 2.2 The Hungarian Status Law 42 3. Methods 46 3.1 Newspaper analysis 52 3.1.1 Criteria for the newspapers 53 3.1.2 Introducing the newspapers 56 3.1.2.1 57 3.1.2.2 Magyar Hírlap 58 3.1.2.3 Népszabadság 58 3.1.2.4 59 3.1.3 Analysing the articles 60 3.1.3.1 Ethnic denotations 62 3.1.3.2 Motifs 63 3.1.3.2.1 Europe 63 3.1.3.2.2 Comparison 64 3.1.3.2.3 Discrimination 64 3.1.3.2.4 NATO 64 3.1.3.2.5 History 65 3.1.3.2.6 Legal aspects 65 3.2 Interviews 66 3.2.1 Criteria for the journalists 66 3.2.2 Interviewing method 69 4. Results 71 4.1 Diachronic analysis 71 4.1.1 The Hungarian articles 72 4.1.1.1 Ethnic denotations 72 4.1.1.1.1 General features 73 4.1.1.1.2 Denotations regarding only Romania and Transylvania 83 4.1.1.2 Motifs 89 4.1.1.2.1 Europe 89 4.1.1.2.2 Comparison 92 4.1.1.2.3 Discrimination 96 4.1.1.2.4 NATO 99 4.1.1.2.5 History 102 4.1.1.2.6 Legal aspects 105 4.1.2 The Romanian articles 108

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4.1.2.1 Ethnic denotations 108 4.1.2.1.1 General characteristics 109 4.1.2.1.2 Denotations regarding only Romania and Transylvania 113 4.1.2.2 Motifs 114 4.1.2.2.1 Europe 114 4.1.2.2.2 Comparison 117 4.1.2.2.3 Discrimination 118 4.1.2.2.4 NATO 119 4.1.2.2.5 History 120 4.1.2.2.6 Legal aspects 121 4.1.3 Summarising the diachronic analysis 123 4.1.3.1 Ethnic denotations 123 4.1.3.2 Motifs 124 4.2 Synchronic analysis 128 4.2.1 128 4.2.1.1 A 24.12.2001 128 4.2.2 Magyar Hírlap (MH) 133 4.2.2.1 MH 24.12.2001 133 4.2.2.2 MH 24.12.2001a 136 4.2.2.3 MH 27.12.2001 139 4.2.2.4 MH 29.12.2001 144 4.2.2.5 MH 30.12.2001 148 4.2.2.6 MH 02.01.2002 151 4.2.3 Népszabadság (NSZ) 155 4.2.3.1 NSZ 22.12.2001 156 4.2.3.2 NSZ 22.12.2001a 158 4.2.3.3 NSZ 24.12.2001 161 4.2.3.4 NSZ 24.12.2001a 164 4.2.3.5 NSZ 27.12.2001 167 4.2.3.6 NSZ 31.12.2001 170 4.2.4 173 4.2.4.1 RL 27.12.2001 173 4.2.4.2 RL 07.01.2002 176 4.2.5 Summarising the synchronic analysis 178 4.3 Interviews 182 4.3.1 182 4.3.1.1 Rodica Ciobanu 182 4.3.2 Magyar Hírlap 184 4.3.2.1 Tibor Bogdán 184 4.3.2.2 Norbert Molnár 186 4.3.2.3 Iván Zsolt Nagy 189 4.3.2.4 Miklós Újvári 191 4.3.3 Népszabadság 193 4.3.3.1 Tibor Kis 193 4.3.3.2 József Szilvássy 195 4.3.3.3 Zoltán Tibori Szabó 197 4.3.4 199 4.3.4.1 Simona Popescu 199 4.3.5 Conclusions from the interviews 201 5. Final conclusions 203 5.1 Ethnic denotations 203 5.1.1 General features 204

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5.1.2 Specific Hungarian features 210 5.1.3 Specific Romanian features 214 5.1.4 Nation and ethnicity 218 5.2 Motifs 220 5.2.1 Motifs in the Hungarian newspapers 221 5.2.2 Motifs in the Romanian newspapers 224 5.2.3 Common motifs 228 5.3 Journalistic narratives 229 5.3.1 Comparative analysis 229 5.3.2 Individual newspaper analysis 232 5.3.2.1 232 5.3.2.2 Magyar Hírlap 233 5.3.2.3 Népszabadság 235 5.3.2.4 237 5.4 Closing remarks 238 6. Literature 242 7. Appendices 247 Tables: Table 1: Frequently used abbreviations 7 Table 2: Relevant political parties 8 Table 3: Relevant cities, regions and states 9 Table 4:

Kingdom of Hungary in 1000 A.D. 36 Table 5: The number of Hungarians (co-

adjacent states 40 Table 6: Brief chronology of relevant events 44 Table 7: Journalists from Magyar Hírlap and the number of articles they

published about the Hungarian Status Law 67 Table 8: Journalists from Népszabadság and the number of articles they

published about the Hungarian Status Law 68 Table 9: Period of analysis 72 Table 10: Hungarian denotations, which encompass the Hungarians of

Romania 75 Table 10a: Hungarian denotations, which refer explicitly to Hungarians in

Romania 84 Table 11: Romanian denotations, which encompass the Hungarians of

Romania 110 Table 11a: Romanian denotations, which refer explicitly to Hungarians in

Romania 113 Table 12: Interviewees 182 Table 13: Ethnic denotations by country/language 204 Table 14: Ethnic denotations: General features 206 Table 15: Ethnic denotations by newspaper 208 Table 16: Comparing the motifs 221 Table 17: Comparing narrative aspects 230 Maps: Map 1: Hungarians in Central and Eastern Europe 41 Map 2: 45

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Figures: Figure 1: The circle of texts 21 Figure 2: Triangular dialogical relationship 23 Figure 3: From public discourses to relevant segments 51 Figure 4: Second dialogic relationship 52 Figure 5: Article genres 62 Appendices: Appendix 1: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring

Countries (1st version, 19.06.2001) 247 Appendix 2: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the

Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania (ONM, 22.12.2001) 262

Appendix 3: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (2nd version, 23.06.2003) 266

Appendix 4: Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on implementation of the amended benefit law in Romania (23.09.2003) 282

Appendix 5: Excerpts from the Romanian Constitution 285 Appendix 6: Excerpts from the Hungarian Constitution 286 Appendix 7:

synchronic analysis 287

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Table 1: Frequently used abbreviations

Abbreviation Full name A rul CE Council of Europe CHN Certificate of Hungarian Nationality1 EP European Parliament EU European Union H Hungary HTMH Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad KSH Central Statistics Office MÁÉRT Hungarian Standing Conference MH Magyar Hírlap MP Member of Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NSZ Népszabadság ONM Orbán- -Memorandum OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe RL RO Romania SCG Serbia and Montenegro SK Slovakia

1 According to the Orbán- -Memorandum the name was changed to Hungarian Certificate. For reasons of simplicity I shall be always using the abbreviation CHN.

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Table 2: Relevant political parties

Party Official name English translation State Orientation2

FIDESZ Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége Union H Conservative

FKGP Független Kisgazdák Pártja Independent Smallholders Party H -

MDF Magyar Demokrata Fórum Hungarian Democratic Forum H Conservative /

liberal

MIÉP Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja Hungarian Justice and Life Party H Nationalistic

MSZP3 Magyar Szocialista Párt Hungarian Socialist Party H Social Democratic

PCR Partidul Comunist Român Romanian Communist Party RO -

PNL National Liberal Party RO Conservative PD Partidul Democrat Democratic Party RO Liberal PRM Partidul România Mare Greater Romania Party RO Nationalistic

PSD4 Partidul Social Democrat Social Democratic Party RO Social Democratic

SMK / MKP Magyar Koálició Párt

Hungarian Coalition Party SK Conservative

SZDSZ Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége

Alliance of Free Democrats H Liberal

UDMR / RMDSZ din România / Romániai Magyar

Demokrata Szövetség Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania RO Liberal

2 Obviously, the estimations of orientation are just tendencies, which are difficult to differentiate. They should only be used as a rough indicator. 3 Not to be confused with its predecessor, the MSZMP, the Hungarian Socialist Labour Party, that ruled during the socialist era. 4 entually to PSD.

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Table 3: Relevant cities, regions and states5

Official Name Romanian Hungarian English6 German7

Alba Iulia - Gyulafehérvár Alba-Iulia Karlsburg Banat - Bánság Banat Banat Bratislava Bratislava Pozsony Bratislava Preßburg

- Bukarest Bucharest Bukarest Budapest Budapesta - Budapest Budapest Cluj-Napoca8 - Kolozsvár Cluj-Napoca Klausenburg

- Körösvidék Crisana Kreischgebiet Magyarország Ungaria - Hungary Ungarn

- Máramaros Maramures Marmarosch Moldova9 - Moldva Moldavia Moldau România - Románia Romania Rumänien Slovensko Slovacia Szlovákia Slovakia Slowakei

- Havasalföld Wallachia Walachei - Marosvásárhely Targu Mures Neumarkt am Mieresch

- Temesvár Timisoara Temeschwar 10 - Székelyföld Szeklerland Seklerland

Transilvania / Ardeal11 - Erdély Transylvania Siebenbürgen

5 Sources: Lelkes 1992 and Szabó 2003. 6 English names when available. Otherwise official names without diacritical signs and in italics. 7 Due to the extended literature in German, I decided to add the old German names to this table. 8 Cluj-

Roman origin. Practically, the town is still called Cluj and the full name is used only for official purposes. 9 All synonyms refer to the region within Romania and not to the Republic of Moldavia. 10 11 Although Transilvania is the official name, the inhabitants of the region are called Ardeleni.

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Preliminary remarks

future, since the past is constantly 12

One

cultural phenomena. The element of comparison is derived from the realisation that

humans live in different social settings and within different cultural frameworks

(Fischer 1992). These differences are not only performed by individuals and groups in

social interaction, but are also displayed in the language they use, oral and/or written.

Groups and individuals use language as a means of communication in order to transfer

their concepts and ideas, e.g. displaying identity, into the public sphere and by doing so

influence others. However, they will be influenced as well in turn. Identity in its widest

sense is one of the key social settings to comprehend and analyse human society and it

is essential to anthropology for its understanding of social interaction. By applying

concepts of identity, groups can include or exclude members while individuals could

obtain social acceptance from the group at stake. Therefore I consider the display of

identity by using written language to be a cultural phenomenon that varies between

different social settings.

Another important aspect for anthropology since the late seventies has been the

question of discourse and its analysis. Going back to the critique of cultural analysis and

challenging the position of the speaker, discourse analysis has become an essential

instrument of interpretative anthropology. Discourse analysis, the way I understand it, is

theory and method at the same time, since it is a way of conceptualising the public

sphere while enabling a thorough analysis of the same. Consequently, I will apply

discourse analysis in this thesis to demonstrate the way in which producers of texts

construct different ethnic groups by using concepts of identity and specific language.

These concepts of identity are the linguistic manifestation of ethnicity within a

discourse.

This thesis is a piece of comparative work about language and identity. I will

analyse texts that connect concepts of identity with narrative discourse on the

background of a specific Hungarian law: The Hungarian Status Law13. This law came

into effect on the 1st

states certain educational rights and financial benefits and it binds them to Hungary 12 Yugoslav aphorism quoted in Verdery, Katherine 1991, p.215 13 Henceforth simply Status Law. For official name see Appenides 1 and 3.

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itself through a semi-official identity card handed out by the Hungarian state. The

Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin can be divided into two groups: Those who are

Hungarian citizens and those who are not. For reasons of simplification, I will refer to

the latter ones as co-ethnics14. The Status Law is interesting to anthropology for three

which is an act of ethnic denotation by a political authority. Secondly, it has sparked off

the debate over minority issues between Hungary and its neighbouring states, which is

again an issue of ethnicity and hence identity. Thirdly, the debates in the media about

this law reveal the cultural differences between Hungary and other states.

This work will focus mainly on the co-ethnics in Romania, since they make up

about 60% of all co-ethnics. They live predominantly in the region called Transilvania

or Ardeal [Transylvania]. Being the largest political group of co-ethnics, the Hungarians

application has become a source of serious political strife between the two states. This

needs further explanation since it is a question of political conceptualisation.

Apparently, in the political frame of the state, identity is no longer a social performance

but becomes a question of power (Sökefeld 2004: 119-120). Both states, i.e. Hungary

and Romania, consider their respective nation to be in the French style, which means a

community of citizens who were born in the same state, i.e. ius soli (Sundhaussen

2003). However, there are differences between the two. In contrast to Romania,

Hungary is still more influenced by the German concept of the nation, which is a

community based on common descent, i.e. ius sanguinis. In line with these thoughts,

relation to the co-ethnics. These people considered themselves to be Hungarian by their

ethnicity and were citizens of their respective states by political status. The Hungarian

Status Law is an attempt to tie the Hungarians from abroad legally to Hungary. This law

establishes a relationship between citizens of various countries on the one hand and the

Hungarian state on the other hand on a voluntary, ethnic basis. Consequently, Romania

considers the co-ethnics who are Romanian citizens to be a strictly internal issue while

Hungary regards the co- r that also concerns the Hungarian

state. But the strife also has deeper roots.

14 This denotation has two faults: it does not show exactly which state I am referring to and it also takes a Hungarian point of view in the context of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is a much shorter expression and should suffice for the purpose of this work.

12

On 9th October 2002, journalist Gábor Miklós wrote in the Hungarian15 daily

Népszabadság:

A magyar-román kapcsolatokban minden gesztust patikamérlegen mérlegelnek. Annyira tele a viszony történelemmel, valodi és vélt konfliktusokkal, elharapott átkokkal és kimondatlan félelmekkel, hogy itt 16 [In the Hungarian-Romanian relationship every word is weighed on golden scales. The relationship is so full with history, with true and pretended conflicts, dogged bans and unspoken anxieties that rational, meaningful political action is often useless.]17

The unspoken anxieties Gábor Miklós wrote about are one of the core issues in

understanding the ethno-political debate in the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. These

anxieties are the result of the nationalism that has been present in this relationship at

least since the revolution of 1848-1849 (Hitchins 2003a; Puttkamer 2003; Verdery

1991). This relationship has been evident especially in Transylvania.

Anxiety in this context encompasses a different set of experiences on each side,

usually

especially in communist Romania and was still present in politics after 1990 (Verdery

1991; Verseck 1997). From the Romanian side, the nationalist politics of the Romanian

Communist Party (PCR) in the seventies and eighties have created a self-image of a

Romania threatened by internal and external enemies. The external ones were usually

the Soviets. This fear was based on experiences during and after the 2nd World War

(WWII) when the Red Army not only looted on Romanian territory but also took over

political power until the sixties.

in 1965, his policy of pseudo-neutrality within the Warsaw Pact was presented as a

policy aimed at keeping Romania neutral to avoid a Soviet invasion á la Hungary in

1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The internal peril in Romania was that of a multiethnic state in which the

Hungarians, who composed the second largest ethnic group after the 1st World War

(WWI), were accused of wanting Transylvania to be part of Hungary again, as prior to 15 The ethnonyms Hungarian and Magyar are used in this work synonymously. For simplification and avoiding confusion I shall use the ethnonym Hungarian, unless it is a translation. 16 All non-English quotation will be in italics. 17 All translations by me. NSZ09.10.2002, path: 14.08.2003 wysiwyg://149/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

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192018. This was based on the latest and most vivid experience in Romania from WWII

when Romania had to cede large parts of Transylvania to Hungary. Consequently,

ethnic minorities in general and Hungarians in particular were portrayed as destabilising

factors within the state

Romanian majority (Verseck 1997).

The Hungarian experience is twofold since it varies between Hungary and

Transylvania. The Hungarians in Romania have had mostly bad experience with the

Romanian authorities. The promises and commitments made by the various

governments between the two world wars were hardly kept and there has been a

constant feeling of ethnic oppression (Verseck 1997). The communist rule was not

nationalistic against the Hungarians during its first decades and therefore conflicts only

started in the seventies when the regime began a policy of forced assimilation by taking

measures such as closing Hungarian-speaking schools, reducing the number of

-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and

drastically reducing the number of books published in Hungarian19.

who live in the neighbouring states only became an issue in the seventies with the

táncház

ording

consist of Hungarian refugees and their descendants (Fischer 1999). They were either

expelled from the neighbouring countries or left territories that used to be part of

Hungary until the Treaty of Trianon (1920) or territories regained and then lost again

during WWII. Consequently, they have a considerable influence on Hungarian suffrage

and I assume that their relation to the neighbouring states is somewhat biased. Their

experience is one of regaining supremacy and then losing it yet again.

-

unwillingness to tackle the fears and anxieties that have been abused by political and

academic elites for such a long period. Interestingly, this incapability has the same

pattern among Romanians and Hungarians alike and has prevailed for quite some time

(Mungiu-Pippidi 1999). This attitude has resulted in a chronic lack of communication

18 See Table 4. 19 See www.ubb.ro

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between public representatives of both sides. This, of course, does not include the

individual level where numerous inter-ethnic marriages clearly indicate that personal

relations are based on criteria other than ethnicity. These various national discourses are

the result of power struggles and they have drawn and redrawn ethnic and cultural

borders. By doing so these discourses have dominated political relations in the region

for the last hundred years. During the socialist era they were represented in the official

state doctrine and in academia. After the events of 1990, they became a part of the

public discourse fought out in the new, free media. Consequently, there are two

discursive segments that concern Hungarians who live in Romania, one from a

Hungarian discourse and the other from a Romanian discourse20. The discourses from

which these overlapping segments originated are the following:

- Hungarians in

the neighbouring states.

-

groups in Romania.

Bearing in mind the situation mentioned above, I will show in this thesis how public

texts from Romania and Hungary, wr

played their role in discursively forming the Hungarians in Romania. These public texts

are carefully chosen newspaper articles that relate to the Hungarian Status Law.

Although there is some work already published in this domain (Bakk Bodo

2003; Császár 2002; Kántor 2004), it rather tended to focus on the sociological and

more concerned about the Hungarian side of this debate (Bárdi 2003; Kántor 2002) or

just the Romanian side (Andreescu 2001). Yet others analysed the legal aspects of the

Status Law (Küpper 2006; Voigt 2005). This thesis is the first anthropological piece of

work about Hungarian-Romanian relations in relation to the Status Law. The topic, the

questions and the different methods chosen for the analytical part form a unique

combination. Due to the nature of the analysis I shall use one of the pillars of cultural

anthropology for this work, i.e. comparison. By comparing articles from two Hungarian

and two Romanian dailies, which refer to the same discursive segment, i.e. the co-

ethnics in Romania, I will answer the following questions:

20 See Figure 1.

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1. How did the journalistic texts construct the co-ethnics in the light of the

Hungarian Status Law?

2. How is the specific journalistic narrative manifested in each newspaper within

their respective discourse?

Out of the repertoire of anthropological methods I shall use three methods for

this discourse analysis, which I consider most appropriate for the purposes of this thesis:

diachronic analysis, synchronic analysis and interviewing. The first one will be a

diachronic analysis of all articles for an overview of the ethnic denotations used and for

the purpose of general estimation and detection of the specific narrative in each

newspaper. Ethnic denotations play a significant role within the discourse and the

respective narrative, since they demonstrate the patterns of thought and argumentation

regarding ethnicity and identity. The second will be a synchronic analysis of selected

articles from all four newspapers regarding a specific discursive event: the so-called

Orbán- 21 (ONM). This assessment will be a text analysis whose

aim will be to demonstrate with the help of selected examples the differences between

the four newspapers and between the two discourses previously mentioned. The third

analysis will consist of a closer look at the interviews conducted. In this context, the

interviews are not only a mechanism of verification but also a source of information

In the first chapter I will examine some of the main terms used in this work.

Terms such as discourse and ethnicity need to be discussed beforehand. Ethnicity plays

a particularly vital role in interpretative cultural anthropology and has been heavily

contested over the last two decades. The examination of these and other terms will

enable a better understanding of the thesis and will indicate its position in the current

scientific debates.

The next chapter will include an insight into the object of the two discourses, the

Hungarians in Romania. At that point I will take a historical and political look at the

changes that have occurred over the last hundred years so that the reader will be able to

apply the analysis not only to scientific discourse, but also to the political debates in

Central and Eastern Europe. Besides, the chapter will give a differentiated view of the

Status Law.

The three methods of analysis I have mentioned above, i.e. diachronic,

synchronic and interviewing, will be the core of the third chapter. In this chapter I will

also explain my approach during my preparatory work for the field research. The critical

21 See Appendix 2.

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attitude represented in this thesis towards the texts will also reflect my position in the

scientific field.

The results of my analysis are the subject of the fourth chapter. There I shall

analyse the results from all four newspapers going step by step. Each analysis will be

concluded by a short summary.

In the fifth chapter I will draw the conclusions from the results demonstrated in

the preceding chapter. The conclusions will also summarise the main features of this

thesis. The bibliography will follow in chapter six and the appendices in chapter seven

will present some of the main texts of reference in this thesis.

This thesis contains many abbreviations. To facilitate comprehension and

overview I have listed the most common general abbreviations in Table 1. Table 2

contains a list of all the political parties that played an important role in the discourses

surrounding the Status Law. Although it is exhaustive for Hungary in the years 2001 to

2003, it is not so for Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.

Donnan Wilson

2001), I have decided to use the English names for all geographical names when

available. For those cases when the English language does not have a specific name, I

have used the official name.

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Dorle Dracklé for her

assistance. Many special thanks to my second supervisor Prof. Dr. Jürgen Jensen for his

ongoing encouragement and support throughout these last years. I would also like to

thank Prof. Dr. Martin Sökefeld and Prof. Dr. Dan Bar-O

indebted to my family for their patience.

Having been in different places for my research, I have organised my other

acknowledgements in the alphabetical order of the cities visited:

Furthermore, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the members of the

Institute of Finno-Ugric and Uralic Studies and the Centre for Hungarian Studies, which

Tiborc Fazekas, Prof. Dr. Holger Fischer, Dr. Ulrike Kahrs, Dr. Réka Zayzon, Thomas

von Ahn, Dr. Paula Jääsalmi-Krüger, Dr. Monika Schötschel, PD Dr. Anna Widmer,

Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife, Mihaela, for supporting me throughout

these years. This work would not have been possible without her encouragement and

love.

Bratislava: Norbert Molnár and József Szilvássy. Bremen: Research Centre Dynamics and Complexity of Cultures at Bremen

University. Bucharest: Tibor Bogdán, Prof. Dr. Lucian Boia, Rodica Ciobanu, Béla Markó, Dr.

László Murvai, Simona Popescu, Gyula Szabó and the Hungarian Cultural Centre.

Budapest: - Europe Institute Budapest: Prof. Dr. Zoltán Szász, Dr. Tibor Dömötörfi and others. Special thanks for the residential scholarship. - Miklós Újvári and the Balassi Bálint Institute. - Dr. Tibor Bátai and the Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad for the kind permission to reprint the maps.

Cluj-Napoca: Zoltán Tibori Szabó. Hamburg: - Private colloquium (los doctorandes de la triste figura): Dr. Andrea

Kuckert, Anne Slenczka, Armin Hinz, Ralf Müller, Corinna Devner and others. - Jung-Do: Dennis Fanslau and Alida Tuli for mens sana en corpore sano. - Mirko Hohmann, Linda Struck, Annedore Spiller and Matthias Grieben.

Munich: Dr. Zsolt Lengyel and the Hungarian Institute Munich. Paris: Dr. Etienne Boisserie and Tibor Kis. Schwerte: Evangelisches Studienwerk [Protestant Study Foundation] for the PhD-

Fellowship.

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1. Theoretical and methodological framework

22

Theory and empirical research are two of the three elements of academic

endeavour. The 3rd element, the academic exchange of results and views, places theory

and empiric data into the wider context of academic life and hence also into perspective.

Before drawing out the empirical data gathered for this thesis, the methods behind it and

the results that go with it, I will sketch the theoretical mainlines behind this discourse

theoretical background of the following discourse analysis. Among the myriad of

publications concerning discourse analysis there are considerable differences, not only

in their methodological approach but also in their conceptual frame. The issue of

discourse in anthropology is the issue of texts. Be it verbal, visual or written, there is a

general consensus that discourse refers to social phenomena that can be expressed in

texts, i.e. can be described or partially transformed into written words (Van Dijk 1997).

Since this thesis is about the analysis of a large amount of newspaper articles, I will take

into consideration those publications that are suitable for a discourse analysis that

encompasses hundreds of separate texts.

1.1 Analysing the discourse

1.1.1 General overview

Discourse has many definitions. Dating back to Foucault, who considered

discourse to be societal talk, many scientists have been discussing the essence or the

meaning of discourse (Dracklé 1991). Others consider discourse to be the flow of

information in time (Jäger 2001; 129). This definition, however, excludes the

simply happen, since there are people within it who keep on producing new texts.

Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, discourse is an exchange of texts concerning a

specific topic within the given limitations of time, language and medium23.

The specific topics of this thesis are the ongoing debates in Hungary and

Romania concerning the Hungarians living in Romania in the light of the Hungarian

22 Hall, Stuart 1991, p.44. 23 This is obviously a simplified definition that does not encompass all facets of discourse studies. See also Van Dijk 1997.

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Status Law. Since discourses do not exist by themselves, the topic is in itself a fiction.

In other words, discourses have to be carved out of the multitude of texts relating to

many different subjects. Then again, the topic I have chosen for this thesis is a topic

carved out by others before me who also considered the exchange of texts about this

particular subject to be discursive. More specifically, I have taken up the thought that

there is an exchange of texts about the Hungarians living in Romania and this exchange

shows certain features in the respective texts that make up the exchange. Taken at face

value, one could suggest that there is no discourse if you do not see it. This is partially

true. Finding the discourse resembles solving a crossword puzzle. On first sight the

observer sees only rows and columns of letters, which apparently do not end up in

anything. At a second glance he discovers a word or two and after a while the whole

pattern reveals itself. Hence, the discourse is there to the one that sees it and is subject

to individual perception. This can then be explained and demonstrated by actually

marking the words on the puzzle. Thus, the discourse is visible to those who search for

it and want to see it.

of different topics to which it is related in one way or another, discourse analysis is

always a partial analysis (Jäger 2001). This means that each and every topic is related to

other topics and they are related to topics further away and so on. Therefore the

researcher has to define the topic as part of a discourse and limit it to certain boundaries.

Otherwise the topic will become endless and no analysis will be possible.

This still leaves the question of subjectivity unanswered. Following these ideas

of interpretative anthropology, I consider that a scientific investigation need not prove

its objectivity. What it needs is factual adequacy (Stellrecht 1993). By that I mean the

different person, lead to different results, they both have to be taken as two different

experiments that have a legitimate claim of representing scientific results. This means

that analysing a discourse is not a search for the ultimate scientific truth, but rather an

investigation to try and understand the disc

Exchanging texts requires at least two participants, a text and a medium: A text

can be written by X, read by Y who describes the text to Z who on his turn writes a text

that is read by X again24. Some participate only as passive recipients who read the text

but do not produce any by themselves and hence transmit their private thoughts verbally

24 See Figure 1.

20

without publishing them (observers). Those who not only read texts but also write texts

by themselves will be considered as producers in the sense of a discourse analysis.

Discourses need to be limited within a well-defined frame to be able to be

analysed, otherwise they could be continued endlessly. The limitations of a specific

discourse, however, need explanation:

- Time. This criterion is important for the historical perspective and for a

limitation of chronology. Certain aspects of the discourse can change in time and

take up new forms. The discourse can also cease to exist or merge with another

discourse to form a new, third discourse. Whilst bearing in mind the time aspect,

the researcher who analyses the discourse can carve out a time frame that shows

a unique pattern in the chronology of the discourse. This is a simplification that

needs careful attention. On the other hand, the analysis can go to the other

extreme and neglect the time aspect completely. In this case the researcher takes

up a practically synchronic standpoint of analysis that shows no time aspects.

This can be considered as the analysis of a moment within the timely flow of the

discourse. This type of analysis is useful for investigating a discursive event.

- Language. While neglecting certain semiotic features of texts in the field of

semantics, texts are a means of communication. Exchange can only take place

when the different participants of the discourse, i.e. those who write texts and

those who read them, can understand what is written. Hence communication can

exist only when the participants can exchange texts in the same language. Again,

in the context of this work, I assume that all participants of the Hungarian

discourse master the Hungarian language. The same criterion applies to the

Romanian discourse.

- Medium. The physical limitations of the discourse are given through the media

in which the texts are communicated and exchanged. The media can vary from

the press to political rallies and from books to TV programmes. To enable an

exchange the media have to be accessible to those who want to participate in the

discourse. Passive accessibility is usually a question of interest and affordability,

as in buying the newspaper or having the time to participate in a political rally.

The texts in this analysis originate from the press and are accessible either

through the newspaper or through their respective homepages on the World

Wide Web.

21

Bearing in mind the three criteria mentioned above, time, language and medium,

a discourse analysis is always a partial analysis. Completeness does not exist. If we take

in the German press, we

newspapers from the multitude of journalistic publications (Jäger 2001). He further

limited his research to a certain time frame and, obviously, to a certain language:

German.

Limitations guarantee a given framework, which enables the researcher to make

certain statements about the discourse he or she is analysing. Consequently, the

statements are valid mainly within the premises of the set frames.

Figure 1: The Circle of texts.

X writes a text about a discursive event

Text is published in the media

Y and Z write new texts

Texts are published in the media

Public texts create a discursive event

Other readers

Other Texts

Context

Context

Y and Z interpret the text

22

1.1.2 Dialogic relationships

The production of texts is the corner stone of the discourse. However, producers

of texts are difficult to define as a single group unless they are restricted to well defined

categories. For the purposes of this thesis, I will consider only those producers who

have written texts, which concern the topic of the discourse and do not have a political

office. Furthermore, the texts have been published and only texts from the selected

newspapers will be taken into consideration. Excluding producers who have a political

office is crucial especially in Hungary, where politicians often publish articles to

express their personal views. Since the overwhelming majority of producers consists of

those who do not have a political office, I shall use the terms journalists and producers

synonymously.

According to my understanding, published texts in newspapers can take up

different forms, e.g. interviews, bulletins or personal reports. The texts are then

published and thus become part of the respective discourse. Accordingly, there is a

triangular dialogical relationship that emerges (Bakhtin 1986; 47)25. The first

relationship is between the journalists and the texts they have produced. Journalists

produce texts in the sense that they put their thoughts down in coherent words and

sentences. While writing they develop a specific relationship with their texts. The text

then represents its author or producer, irrespec

interview where the interviewee is apparently the centre of the text, the questions reveal

a few years ago for a university project, I asked her about her relation to Transylvania.

She replied that the whole issue does not really concern her. Then she went on to tell me

that the question must be obviously very interesting for me as an interviewer, bearing in

mind the fact that I originated from that area. Consequently, the clear hierarchic relation

of subject and object became somewhat opaque.

The next step is the transformation of text from one context to another. If we

in Népszabadság26, we

could regard Miklós as the producer of a specific text that concerns Hungarian-

transformed from a text in the public discourse in Hungary into a quotation, which has

hence become part of this thesis. This thesis, however, is part of the academic discourse

25 See Figure 2. 26 See preliminary remarks.

23

concerning the Hungarian Status Law. Thus, Miklós produced a text within the frame of

a journalistic discourse, and I reproduced it in the academic discourse.

Figure 2: Triangular dialogical relationship

But did Miklós really produce a text or was he reproducing ideas he has obtained from a

different place or from a different source? In other words, the question is whether his

text is genuine or does it entail fragments from other texts. There is no exact answer to

the question of origin, like the deadlock between the chicken and the egg: it is unclear

which was there first. Nevertheless, there has to be a starting point for a text and in this

thesis it will be the published texts from selected newspapers. This is again a

simplification, but necessary for the purpose of this analysis. Also, texts do not

e quotations or

references to texts, which the author considers to be known to the reader, such as the

Hungarian Status Law. This can be regarded as a relationship between the texts and its

discourse. The discourse contains many texts that influence each other. Therefore, each

text in the discourse represents its producer as well as previous texts, which have

influenced him.

The second relationship is the one between texts and the respective discourse. If

we consider discourses to consist of texts, then the multitude of texts about a specific

topic form a stream of texts (Jäger 2001). These streams, when bundled, make up the

material essence of the discourse, which can then be analysed. Taking a different

perspective, texts can also be regarded as fragments of a discourse. The nature of the

texts in the discourse shows a great deal of variety. Considering the discourse in

Hungary about the co-ethnics, there are different kinds of texts that make up the

Discourse

Texts Journalists

24

discourse: scientific publications, public debates, news bulletins, articles in the press

and political manifests. Since this thesis is about a discourse in the daily press, I shall

consider only newspaper articles as texts in the sense of this analysis. Furthermore the

texts have to fulfil certain conditions: They have to relate to the Hungarians living

outside Hungary and they have be to part of the public, political discourse about the

Status Law in either Hungary or Romania. The first condition is about mentioning the

Status Law in the text; if it is not mentioned then the text cannot be taken into

consideration for this analysis. The second condition excludes texts that refer to the

Status Law but not to the political debate over it. These texts are usually about

secondary aspects, such as the Hungarian Rail

subsidised railway tickets for the co-ethnics. Furthermore, their producers place texts on

a specific level within the discourse, such as the political, academic or medial. The texts

have a certain quality and accessibility within the discourse, which depends on the level

(Jäger 2001). The texts for this analysis, since they are published in the press, are

accessible to the speakers of those languages who can either buy the newspaper or read

it on the Internet.

The third relationship is between the discourse and the journalists. As already

mentioned, journalists are active participants in the discourse. They place their articles

at a specific time on a particular level within it. In other words, they are able to change

th

depends on various elements, which have an impact on different levels. Journalistic

texts have a strong influence within the discursive level of the media, but it is unclear

whether that influence is valid in other levels, e.g. the academic level. Consequently, we

must ask what power the journalists have on the discourse in general and subsequently

what power the discourse has on the journalists. These questions have different answers

(Van Dijk 1997). Just like texts, journalists are part of the discourse. I do not consider it

possible that someone can produce texts about the discourse, which are placed outside

of it (Hall 1991). They write from within the discourse about it and hence they have a

certain limited influence on its course. On the other hand, journalists are continuously

influenced by the flux of information that the discourse contains and the constant flow

words again, there is dialogical

relationship not only between the journalists and their texts, but also between the

journalists that participate in the debates and the respective discourse. This dialogical

relationship requires a further explanation regarding the function of power. Power,

according to Foucault (Foucault 1976), is not possessed but exerted. According to him

25

those who supposedly possess power can only exert it within a very limited spatial and

timely frame. Thus power cannot be possessed but only exerted within the given

framework (Foucault 1976; 114). This is also true for the journalistic texts analysed in

this thesis. The power exerted by the journalists is limited since they can exert it only

within their level of endeavour. They surely have an influence on the political level and

perhaps even on the academic one, but their main sphere is the media and there lies their

position inside the discourse, which pr

hierarchy.

Another issue that relates all three elements is the debate over discursive events.

The Hungarian Status Law is a discursive event, because it is a text that concerns the

Hungarians in Romania, which is the topic of the discourse. Furthermore, it caused an

avalanche of texts in different forms and at different levels that have revived the debates

over this contested topic to an unprecedented height. But how does a text become an

event? Unlike historicism, which considers the event to be pre-existent and then writes

the texts about it (Bhabha 1999; 302), interpretative anthropology considers the

discourse and hence the texts to be pre-existent and events are created in the course of

this ongoing production of texts. Events do not exist if they are not transformed into

text, which are then made available in the discourse. Exemplified on the Status Law, it

is a political and juridical text that has certain implications for a limited amount of

persons. The debates about it in the various parliaments and the media have made it part

of the public concern and an issue within the discourse. Consequently, a discursive

1.1.3 Narration

The discourse analysed in this thesis consists of texts. These texts are mainly

produced by journalists and are published in a newspaper. This publication means that

the journalistic texts are available for purchase in the sense that they are printed and

sold or they are made available on the Internet. In this stream of texts it is impossible to

analyse each and every article in comparison to hundreds of other articles. Furthermore,

bearing in mind the fact that every newspaper has a certain position within the various

discourses it participates in; I shall consider the sum of all the articles published in one

newspaper as the journalistic narrative of the newspaper concerning a specific

discourse. The newspapers function as funnels, which gather all the texts into one flow

with more or less one direction. Hence, this thesis will consist of four journalistic

26

narratives since articles from four newspapers will be analysed. But how does this

conception of a narrative correlate with the two main questions?

One of the main issues in this thesis is ethnic construction. By that I am referring

every community, where the members of a given community cease to know all other

m

emphasis was on the division between rural and urban communities. Rural communities

were considered genuine while urban or larger ones as fictional. By using this

differentiation he went on to demonstrate how modern nation states are imagined

communities held together by the various national discourses. Different authors

challenged this idea, which is part of the constructivist stream in academia concerning

nations and nationalism. These scientists considered all communities to be fictional or

imagined (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker Cooper 2000). Even the village communities are

fictional, since they have their own mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Hence, in

concurrence with constructivism, all communities are imagined.

Following this line of thought, narration is a form of construction. Bearing in

mind the concept of imagined communities, I regard ethnic groups as an ongoing

discursive construct composed of public narratives. These narratives in this thesis,

which are made of published texts, shape and reshape the groups of people they refer to,

which ends up in a constant shift of the boundaries of the ethnic group in question, the

co-ethnics. These boundaries, which are often portrayed as divisive and impermeable

(Barth 1970), begin to fluctuate and show cracks when analysing the discourses

concerning them. This timely process of construction is a historical one:

narrative textual strategies, metaphoric displacements, sub-texts and figurative stratagems 27

Consequently, the journalistic narratives keep on changing the co-

with every new text published in the newspaper. By analysing the narrative of each

newspaper the overview of this constant process is being unveiled. Furthermore, the

they have a specific direction and position, which can be unveiled through a thorough

analysis of the texts.

27 Bhabha, Homi K., 1999, p.2.

27

1.2 Ethnicity

Discussing ethnic issues, ethnic groups or ethnicity has become popular not only

in the humanities but also in the media and in politics. Also, ethnicity plays a significant

role i

groups, I shall concentrate only on ethnicity and neglect all aspects of individual

identity. This leads to the problem that various academic disciplines or segments of the

public discourse use the term ethnicity differently. Therefore, in the first part of this

subchapter I shall clarify what I mean by ethnicity and ethnic groups, thereby referring

to recent changes of paradigm over the past few years (Andreescu 2004; 79-84). In the

second part of this subchapter I shall focus my attention to the idea of ethnic denotation

and the consequences it bears for this thesis.

1.2.1 Definitions and theoretical background

Definitions have a basic dilemma: if they are specific and poignant, they are too

narrow to encompass all the phenomena they are supposed to be applied to. If they are

general, then they are too wide to be practical for scientific purposes. Consequently,

every definition is a compromise. Regarding ethnicity, Rogers Brubaker formulated one

of the most recent definitions of ethnicity, which I consider useful for the purposes of

this work:

making sense of the social world. And it is one among many such interpretative 28

This definition, which is very general, entails certain aspects that are crucial to this

thesis:

1. Ethnicity should be understood as a product of social construction. It is not

given. It is made.

2. Ethnicity is part of a set of categories or interpretative frames that can be used to

classify groups of people. Other frames would be gender, age, caste etc.

However, by positioning ethnicity as equal among other frames, it negates

primordialism.

These expostulations I have made require further explanation. I shall begin with

the term constructivism. Essentialism and constructivism form a contradictory couple

28 Brubaker, Rogers 2006, p.15

28

that has been the cause for many disputes. In a very simplified way, essentialism means

that belonging to an ethnic group is a given state of affairs inherent to all humans, i.e.

everybody belongs to an ethnic group from the moment he is born. Thus, the world is

divided into ethnic groups with their individual systems of inclusion and exclusion.

Constructivism, on the other hand, considers belonging to an ethnic group to be a

group he or she wants to belong to (Heckmann 1992, Márton 2002). Current

theoreticians in social anthropology undoubtedly support constructivism and so do I.

The second statement refers to the idea of primordialism. Basically, this concept

suggests, that ethnic belonging is always the first among all other categories of social

differentiation or interpretative frames, as Brubaker put it. This concept, often related to

the work of Anthony D. Smith, consists of elements from the constructivist as well as

from the essentialist side (Heckmann 1992). Thus, according to the primordialists,

ethnic belonging is constructed but in such a manner that there is no difference whether

it was obtained by birth or chosen later on. Like Brubaker, I do not share this opinion. I

consider ethnicity to be highly contextual, as are all other social frames. Furthermore,

these frames differ in time, culture and position within society.

As I mentioned above, too general definitions are often difficult to apply in

this work, namely ascription, and neglect other aspects, which are not significant for the

purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the new definition reads as follows:

Ethnicity is not a thing, not a substance; it is an interpretative prism of ethnic ascription and/or self-ascription.

Ascription in the sense of this thesis can include two different aspects: performing

ethnic identity and ethnic denotation.

Performance means that individuals have the agency to perform their ethnic

identity. In other words, individuals are able to articulate their belonging by using

different means of communication, e.g. speech, dress, behaviour etc (Sökefeld 1999).

Ascription also means that the individual becomes a part of a group; in this case an

ethnic group. According to my understanding, an ethnic group is a social category

encompassing a conglomerate of people as sharing the following elements for purposes

of identification29:

29 For a different perspective see Elwert, Georg 2002.

29

1. A set of rules for inclusion and exclusion from the group. This does not mean

means that ethnic

groups perform boundary maintenance despite the fact that persons can move

into the group as well as get out of it (Barth 1970). These boundaries, however,

the

dimensions of the field within which group contact occurs. This contact, in turn, 30

h is crucial for understanding interethnic relations. The

distinct group.

2. Notion of a common past. This aspect of a common temporal depth is important

for the discursive maintenance of boundaries. The idea that the group has

arguments are often brought forward in order to justify a certain way of conduct

or a specific policy in the present. In other words, when discussing ethnicity and 31

One of the problems that arise when discussing ethnic groups and identities is

the question of ethnic performances and their hierarchy, since every individual

performance of ethnic identity depends on the circumstances he is in. As Jensen has

demonstrated, the inhabitants of the Finale region in northern Italy display different

collective ethnic identities on different occasions: as Finalese, as Ligurians or as

northern Italian (Jensen 1996). This flexibility in performing identities raises the

question of hierarchy among the different identities an individual can display By

c) identity is

displayed first in a given context:

32

Bearing in mind the definition of ethnicity and the active as well as the passive

aspect of ascription, the controversy between the individual and the group he ascribes

30 Horowitz, Donald 1975, p.121 31 Elwert, Georg 2002, p.33 32 Horowitz, Donald 1975, p. 118

30

himself to needs further explanation. The reason is that there are two elements to this

aspect: one regarding the individual (self ascription) and the other regarding his

33

Ado -ascription are

inseparable and interwoven despite their obvious distinction. The reason for this is the

fact, as Hall put it, is that you cannot say something about the discourse without

positioning yourself within it (Hall 1991; 44). Therefore, just as there is no strict

separation between an emic and an etic approach, ascription and self-ascription need

each other in the process of ethnicity formation.

On the other hand, talking, writing or debating about a group is also a part of the

ongoing process of creating and positioning oneself, as the actor in the discourse. The

actor could be a journalist reporting on such issues, a politician trying to position

himself in favour of more votes, or a researcher trying to understand how ethnicity

functions in the limits of a journalistic discourse.

research on the individual level and can thus not be part of this work, which has its

focus on the group level34. The environment, in this case the narratives of two

discourses, can be analysed by an investigation into published texts. The texts include

denotations and they can be categorised and analysed. The results would then reveal the

purposes behind each denotation and the ends the authors had in mind by using them.

1.2.2 Denoting and power

A key aspect regarding ethnicity in this thesis is denoting. By this term I mean

the naming of ethnic groups. Naming has implications upon the boundaries of each

group on the one hand, and raises the question of power on the other hand. If we

consider ethnicity as a result of discursive construction, then there can be no such an

entity such as the ethnic group. It is rather the ethnic groups that are debated. The ethnic

33 Bhabha, Homi 1999, p.4. 34 See also Sökefeld, Martin 1999.

31

groups in this thesis have a common background: they all relate to Hungarians or

Magyars in Romania35.

Continuing this line of thought, ethnicity is a product of power within the

exist by itself, it is rather a

position from which different actors can exert it (Foucault 1976; 114), journalists

writing about Hungarians in Romania are in the position to exert a power by writing.

The ethnic denotations they use define different ethnic groups, since every denotation

ethnic denotations are signifiers through which the signified, i.e. the ethnic groups, are

created (Prechtl 1994). There can be no groups without the denotations that go with

them. This is important for the discourse theory previously discussed36. Also, this means

that ethnicity is not ascribed only from a naïve point of view, but rather from a

perspective of intent in order to exert power. Practically, since every denotation ascribes

a different group, a physical conglomerate of people can find itself under very different

denotations, some of which it might reject. The Gypsies or Roma are a good example

for this fuzziness37. Due to new liberal ideas for denotation, the derogative term Cigány

in Hungarian and in Romanian (both meaning Gypsy) were considered unfit for

the current political correctness. Therefore, they were replaced with derivations of the

-European dialect continuum many

Gypsies use: Romi in Romanian and Rómák in Hungarian. These denotations, however,

have proved to be misleading and ineffective. The problem starts with the fact that not

all those who are now called Roma speak Romani. They might speak Serbian,

Romanian, Hungarian or any other regional language. Even further, some groups in

Romania preferred to continue to be called (in plural) instead of Romi (Okely

1993; Reemtsma 1996; Romsics 1998). How absurd things have become is shown by

the change in Romania, when the government decided to change the name yet again, by

adding another R. Thus an impossible situation in the Romanian language was created

by the government by having a consonant cluster at the beginning of a word: Rromi. It

is assumed that the denotations Români (Romanians) and Romi (Roma) were too similar

and could have been confused. Another example that refers to the catastrophic

35 Linguistically, there could be a difference between Magyars and Hungarians, since the first is derived from the Hungarian ethnonym magyar whilst the latter from Latin, hungarus. However, Hungarian language, unlike English or Romanian, which are used in this work, does not distinguish between the two since the stem hungarus does not exist in Hungarian. For their usage in English I shall consider both ethnonyms to be identical. 36 See subchapter 1.1 37 I shall refer only to Gypsies in Eastern Europe.

32

economic situation of many Roma in Eastern Europe, was a poster on Parade Square in

Budapest in autumn 200338. The poster showed a middle-aged man with poor clothing

on and the following text:

Régebben cigány voltam. Most róma vagyok. De mégis csóró39 maradtam.

Consequently, ethnicity is constructed and reconstructed within the limits of the

discourse in which it is presented and signified. However, when analysing ethnic

denotations, one has to bear in mind the following questions:

- Who is denoting?

- What is his/her position in the discourse?

- Which connotations and ends does that specific denotation entail?

The first question is determined by how the specific discourse is carved out from the

myriad of available possibilities. This has been done in the previous subchapter

regarding discourse and narrative. The second question refers to the position of power

from which the denotation is used. Bearing in mind that this thesis is about journalistic

texts, it refers to the position of the press within the public discourses in Romania and

Hungary regarding the Hungarian Status Law. The third and last question is subject to

analysis, but does require background information in order to be understood fully.

Therefore, in the following chapter, I will take a few glimpses into the historical and

political context in which Hungary and Romania are interwoven.

38 Poster exposition on Felvonúlás tér, Budapest, September 2003. 39 The slang word csóró also means burned out. Hence the phrase has a double meaning by referring to the fact that Gypsies often have a darker skin colour than the average Hungarian. This difference in pigmentation was used as an excuse for racist provocations, which the change in denotation was not able to prevent.

33

2. Context

Texts are not written in a context-free environment, they are bound to social and

timely parameters that need to be clarified beforehand. Consequently, no analysis in

cultural sciences can stand by itself. A certain amount of background information is

essential to be able to understand the context of this analysis. This is especially

important when discussing discourses in two different countries, whose histories shows

a trail of common historical events interwoven in a frame of contested geography.

Accordingly, in this chapter I shall explain two issues that concern the discourse

few remarks on the Hungarian Status Law. However, I should like to take a look at the

role of power in this context first.

Power is one of the main elements in this contested historical-political-

geographical field. Power in this sense is the capacity to enforce a specific perspective

and hence interpret historic events. Power, as Foucault said, is not possessed; it is

exerted since it cannot be transferred simply from one public sphere to another

(Foucault 1976). Therefore it is those who are in power, as the communist regimes in

Hungary and Romania have been for over forty years, who have the capacity to

dominate through exerting power. Every event or public figure is historic or important

only if it is created to become one by dominant forces within the public discourse:

articles in the press, massive presence on television and/or continuous presence in other

media. Therefore I do not consider historical events to be historic due to a primordial

essence. Neither do I contest their existence. Action in the form of events has always

taken place. It is the discursive interpretation from the position of power that turns

action into historical events.

The socialist regimes that took over in Central and Eastern Europe after WW2

created a pantheon of heroes and idols to enhance their ideology and political

legitimacy. The realm of historical myths was functionalised in order to justify political

power (Jensen 1976). According to my understanding, historical myths are the result of

an amalgamation of fact and fiction. The quest for truth within these historical myths is

at best secondary. Since some of these myths have lasted even after 1990, I shall give a

short overview of certain aspects of these domains.

34

2.1 Historic background or political battleground: The Hungarians of Romania

History in the context of this thesis is a contested field of perspective and power.

Hence, history has been shaped and re-shaped for political purposes thereby relying on

alleged historic rights thus legitimising specific demands (Sundhaussen 2003). As I

shall demonstrate with the example below, historic events can be viewed from different

angles and therefore research in this field can obtain different results on the same

subject. This background information is needed to be able to understand specific aspects

of the discourses in both countries concerning Hungarians in Romania and their

geographical space.

Back in 1940, the Hungarian and the Romanian governments were competing

which did not bear any fruits up to 1938, demanded a reunification with Transylvania,

which was lost to Romania due to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Romania, on the other

hand was keen on keeping Transylvania (Fischer 1999)40. After its guarantor in the

west, France, capitulated in Compiégne and the Small Entente ceased to exist due to the

by three hostile states: Hungary, Bulgaria, eager to regain southern Dobruja and the

Soviet Union, which had its own ambitions in the north-eastern parts of Romania,

mainly Moldova (Hitchins 2003a). Both sides tried to influence the new power in

Europe: Nazi Germany. Hitler, after having played out both Hungary and Romania to

obtain certain advantages for Germany and for the German minorities in Hungary as

well as in Romania, had eventually decided to make a decision in this matter. In the

already annexed Vienna he decided that Crisana, Maramures, the Szeklerland and the

rest of northern Transylvania should go back to Hungary while the southern part of

again while the majority of Transylvania

Language Name English translation English Vienna Award - Romanian: Dictatul de la Viena [Dictate from Vienna] Hungarian: Bécsi döntés [Viennese Decision] German: Wiener Schiedsspruch [Viennese Award]

40 This is a simplification, since the territories demand are much larger than just Transylvania. They include Crisana, Maramures and a portion of Banat, all with significant Hungarian minorities.

35

This ac

the respective political perception and intention in that country41: There is an obvious

semantic difference between the Hungarian and the Romanian name. The Hungarian

name has the connotation of a judicial procedure in which a super-instance has justly

and fairly decided that certain territories should be returned to Hungary. The Hungarian

word döntés [decision] implies neither injustice nor preferential treatment. On the other

hand, the Romanian name reveals a connotation of something oppressive, something

that has been brought upon Romania by an external force without any chance of

avoiding it or fighting it back. There is no sign of a just decision or a process of mutual

consent. Interestingly, both sides use Vienna as a point of reference and not Hitler. By

using Vienna, both sides avoid mentioning the embarrassment of being connected with

Nazi Germany and Hitler, which Hungary and Romania had practiced since the late

thirties. Although it is obvious that Hitler was the one who decided and not Vienna, by

single man could decide upon their faith and told both states how to redraw their

common political border.

History played and continues to play an important role in public life in Hungary

as well as in Romania, especially when it comes to the relationship between the two

states and to ethnic questions (Boia 2002, pp. 13-49; Verseck 1998, pp. 34-38). One

example is the analysis of the medieval Gesta Hungarorum, a chronicle written by

Anonymus Notarius, a legal advisor to King Béla of Hungary42. The chronicle mentions

a certain Gelou, who was Prince of the Blacs in the region called Ultrasiluana:

quidam Blacus dominum tenebat 43

This sparked off a serious debate in the 19th century, since historians from both sides

interpreted this chronicle differently. Romanian historians saw this as a clear indication

of the fact that the Blacs, or Vlahs and hence Romanians, already lived in Ultrasilvania,

Basin. The Hungarian side saw this chronicle as a proof of the earlier presence of the

Hungarians in that region, since the chronicle relates to events that took place centuries

41 I have added the German name for purposes of comparison. 42 Hungary had four Kings by the name of Béla. Apparently it is King Béla III. See also: http://mek.oszk.hu/00300/00355/html/ Date: 25.08.2006. 43 Popa-Lisseanu, G. 2000, p.46.

36

-Lisseanu 2000). Further

investigation and comparison to other sources eventually proved the chronicle to be a

very unreliable one.

Table 4: Hungary in 1000 A.D.

Years Affiliation Event

1000-1541 Hungary Transylvania part of the Kingdom of Hungary

1541-1570 de jure: Hungary de facto: sovereign

Hungary defeated at Mohács (1526). Fight for the Hungarian throne. Sovereign principality

1570-1699 Ottoman Empire44 Treaty of Speyer: Autonomous principality, later restricted autonomy

1699-1848 Habsburg Empire Treaty of Karlowitz. The Habsburgs administrate Hungary and Transylvania separately

1848-1849 Hungary Revolution: Reunification of Hungary and Transylvania 1849-1867 Austria Revolution crushed. Separation from Hungary 1867-1920 Hungary Act of Compromise. Reunification with Hungary 1920-1940 Romania Treaty of Trianon. Transylvania part of Romania

1940-1945 Romania/Hungary 2nd Vienna Award: Northern Transylvania part of Hungary while the south remains Romanian.

1945- Romania Treaty of Paris: Northern Transylvania reunified with Romania

This line of thought concerning perspective and power was present in Romania

as well as in Hungary during the socialist era when discussing power, legitimacy and

ethnic relations in Transylvania. It is this very area that caused the most severe

academic disputes (von Puttkamer 2003). Both sides tried to demonstrate their

legitimate claim over this contested piece of land, using archaeological, archival,

linguistic, demographic and judicial arguments to do so. The search for any objective

statements became futile as the nationalistic propaganda, especially in Romania, gained

the upper hand and consciously manipulated and abused the results of historical

research for its own political purposes (Verdery 1991). Consequently, it is import to

outline a few short remarks on the main disputes about ethnicity, geography and power

relationships over Transylvania and its inhabitants. The thought that Transylvania

sh it to be was

have had since 1990, any powerful movement by Hungarians from Romania towards

44 In the years 1599-1601 Mihai of Muntenia, who has previously conquered Moldova, has also conquered Transylvania for this short period of two years. Romanian historiography has considered this conquest to be a personal union and therefore the first unification of the Romanian lands. See also Boia, Lucian 2002; Introduction to the 2nd edition.

37

been a

serious issue in politics. Such discussions were usually dominated by the right wing

extremists on both sides and have been short lived (Andreescu 2001).

2.1.1 The Romanian historic narrative

The leitmotif of the Romanian historic narrative concerning Transylvania is the

constant need for justification. Scientists have tossed and turned historic events to prove

why Transylvania is and should always be a part of Romania:

1. Historic continuity: The principle of prior tempore potior iure has been the

corner stone of the Romanian position in the last two centuries. Based on the

idea that Romanian is a Romance language, a heritage of the Roman occupation

of Dacia in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD, the idea of continuity began to play an

important role in Romanian historiography and hence in politics. If the

Romanians were the heirs of the Roman Empire in the former province of Dacia 45

ungarians could not have been

there beforehand, since they reached the Carpathian Basin only in 895/896 AD

(Puttkamer 2003, pp. 349-362). By applying the principle mentioned above,

historic continuity grants Romanians the historic right to rule the area. Further,

the communist regime (1947-1989) renamed the minorities in Romania from

[national minorities] to [co-

inhabiting minorities]. This change of denotation had two consequences: First, it

gave the impression that Hungarians, Germans and other minorities were guests

with others (Verdery 1991). Second, it had a touch of threat: if the minorities do

d, they could be expelled. In the case of

Germans and Jews this did eventually happen: West Germany and Israel paid

unknown sums of money to get Romanian citizens out of Romania, who were of

German and Jewish ethnic background respectively.

2. The Grand Assembly in Alba Iulia (1st December 1918)46. At this assembly the

Romanian delegates of Transylvanian, Banat and other territories from the

Kingdom of Hungary declared their wish to be united with the Kingdom of

Romania on the basis of equality and justice for all ethnic groups. This

45 46 Alba Iulia is a town in Transylvania and by December 1918 was occupied by Romanian troops.

38

to be a part of Romania and is considered nowadays as the solid proof of the

yed

down by the regime in the seventies and eighties during the nationalistic phase

of socialism in Romania. The straightforward and democratic demand for equal

rights to all minorities did not suit nationalistic propaganda. After the political

change in 1989/1990 this date was declared a public holiday to commemorate

despite the fact that 1st December was declared a public holiday and that the

House of Assembly in Alba Iulia was turned into a museum, the text of the

declaration is difficult to find. Even the museum itself had only parts of the

declaration engraved on marble. Upon my visit there in September 2003, I could

not obtain a copy of the text. Apparently the myth around the Grand Assembly is

more important than the actual declaration.

2.1.2 The Hungarian historic narrative

upon Hungary at the peace treaty after WW1:

1. Injustice. Hungarian historiog

to Romania not in the fact that Romanians composed the majority of the

population in 1918, but rather the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy lost

the war and was punished by the Allies. This resulted in an unjust treatment in

the shape of ethnically disadvantageous political borders. The Wilsonian

Principles included self-determination for all nations, also for the Axis Powers

that lost the war. The peace treaties in Trianon, Saint-Germain and Versailles

included new borders that did not comply fully with those principles. In

majority were lost, such as the southern parts of Slovakia in the newly founded

Czechoslovak Republic or t

consequence was that about 1/3 of all Hungarians lived under foreign rule

(Fischer 1999). Obviously the Wilsonian Principles could not be implemented to

the last village, especially when bearing in mind how ethnically mixed the

Carpathian Basin was and still is47. Thus, Hungarian historiography is not

blaming the Romanians for conquering Transylvania but rather blames the

47 See Map 1.

39

former Allies for granting Romania territories, which it should not have

received, had the Wilsonian Principles been implemented properly.

2. Prior tempore potior iure. There is a general consensus among historians about

895/896 AD. By the beginning of the 10th century there is evidence that a people

called Szeklers, a Hungarian-

Transylvania by the Hungarian leaders. However, Hungarian historiography

doubts the existence of Vlachs and Moldavians, as the Romanians were called

up to the 18th century, in Transylvania proper. If there were no Romanians in

that area and no other ethnic group survived the centuries, then it means that the

Szeklers, hence Hungarians, were the first ones to settle in Transylvania

(Puttkamer, 2003; pp. 325-339). Going back to the prior tempore potior iure

principle, this gives the Hungarians the legitimate right over Transylvania.

3. Politics. The counter argument to the Grand Assembly is that Romanian

organisations have not expressed any wish to unite Transylvania with the

Kingdom of Romania up to the end of WW1 (Fischer 1999). Hence the

conclusion that this assembly was only a reaction to the presence of Romanian

Romanians of Transylvania only organised the Assembly in order to adapt

themselves to the new situation in which Romanians from Romania would be at

the centre of power and not Hungarians. Furthermore, the demand formulated in

the Alba Iulia declaration contained the demand for minority rights, which have

4. Merit. Hungarian historiography emphasises the fact that it was Hungarians

together with Transylvanian Saxons and Szeklers who founded cities, paved

roads, cultivated the land and built modern institutions over the centuries.

Consequently, it is their merit that Transylvania has become an independent

medieval principality that practiced religious tolerance and has reached

considerable wealth. In other words, providence should grant Hungarians the

right over Transylvania due to their cultural and financial investment (Puttkamer

2003; pp. 325-339 and 363-370).

2.1.3 After 1989/1990

Every epoch in history has its rules for the political game. After Glasnost and

Perestroika, the states of the Soviet block have experienced a political change, which

40

48. How did

these events affect the Hungarians in Romania?

Table 5: The number of Hungarians (co-ethnics) who live in neighbouring states.49

According to the most recent statistical data, there are about 1.5 million

Hungarians living in Romania51. They are the largest group of Hungarians outside

Hungary as the table clearly demonstrates, although they do not live in such compact

settlements as the Hungarians in Slovakia or Ukraine52. This means, that there are 1.5

million citizens in Romania, who made a cross on the statistical questionnaire against

overwhelming majority of these people live in the historic territories of Transylvania,

Banat, Maramures and Crisana53. Due to the large number of Hungarians in

used as a synonym for the Romanian territory inhabited by Hungarians54.

The conservative Hungarian government voted into office in 1990 has made a

48 According to the new Romanian constitution (2004), the events of December 1989 in Bucharest are

since the details of those events have never been fully made public and there is an ongoing manipulation of archives and other sources by the former political elite, which took over before Christmas 1989. Apparently it is their aim to prevent the public from discovering all the facts regarding those events. 49 Source: Gyurgyík Comments: 1. Austria: Data only for the Burgenland and for native Speakers. Austria in total: 40.583 and therefore also a total of 2.468.225 co-ethnics. 2. Serbia and Montenegro without Kosovo. 3.Data from 2001 and/or 2002. 50 As political events happen sometimes faster than one thinks, on 21st of May 2006 the majority of

population at about 800,000 and assuming that the vast majority of the co-ethnics will remain in Serbia, the share of the co- 51 See Table 5. 52 See Map 1. 53 See Map 2. 54 See Table 4.

State Co-ethnics Share of all co-ethnics (%) population

Share of total population (%)

Romania 1,434,377 58.9 21,698,181 6.61 Slovakia 520,528 21.4 5,379,455 9.68 Serbia and Montenegro50 293,299 12.0 7,498,001 3.91 Ucraine 156,600 6.4 48,416,000 0.32 Croatia 16,595 0.7 4,437,460 0.37 Austria 6,641 0.3 8,032,926 0.08 Slovenia 6,243 0.3 1,964,036 0.32 Total amount: 2.434.283 100% - -

41

neighbouring states (co-ethnics). Unlike socialist times, when public debates concerning

the co-ethnics were taboo, the new government led by Prime Minister József Antall

considered the co-ethnics to be a national issue, which should have a top priority on the

political agenda. His remarks about himself as the prime minister of 15 million

Hungarians who were taken at face value in the neighbouring states, especially

Czechoslovakia and Romania, and have caused serious political unease (Sitzler 1992).

have all made similar claims, although each with minor differences (Stewart 2004).

-ethnics has become a pillar of 55.

Map 1: Hungarians in Central and East Europe.56

Generally, the socialist and social-liberal governments were more interested in a dialog

with the neighbouring states in order to facilitate more possibilities for the co-ethnics,

while the conservative ones, bearing in mind the hostile political environment the co-

ethnics often had to face, opted for a direct support. Hence it was the content of the

policy that has varied from one legislative period to another (Bárdi 2004).

55 See also Appendix 6. 56 for Hungarian Minorities Abroad www.htmh.hu/en/ Source: http://www.htmh.hu/en/033_map/text037/doc_upload/back.jpg Date: 23.05.2006:

42

On the other side of the political border, in Romania, the nationalism that

dominated the communist discourse (Verdery 1991), continued to linger on until 1996.

The governments after 1990 did not follow a specific nationalist policy, but the political

elite ignored any endeavour to implement basic rights for ethnic groups57. The

Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which was formed in the

early nineties and turned into a unifying force among the co-ethnics in Romania,

became an associated party in the large coalition following the 1996 elections. It was

the first time ever that a political party representing the Hungarians living in Romania

took an active part in governing the state (Andreescu 2001). After the 2000 elections the

UDMR formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and after the 2004

elections the UDMR formed a coalition with the National Liberal Party - Democratic

Party (PNL-PD)58. This means the UDMR participated in governing the state for a

considerable time. Unfortunately for the co-ethnics, this participation did not yield the

expected results such as a Hungarian-speaking state university. Nevertheless, the

UDMR has been able to achieve some goals: receiving a part of the ecclesial estates and

properties confiscated by the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) in the pre-1989 period

and an improvement in the Hungarian language schools.

2.2 The Hungarian Status Law59

The background of the articles selected for this thesis is the Hungarian Status

Law, which is part of the ongoing political discourses between Hungary and Romania

over Hungarians living in Romania60. The Law is a political and judicial act that

-assigned obligation to be responsible for the Hungarians 61. This obligation is also manifested in the

foundation of a Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad62 in 1992

(Iordachi 2004). Hence I would like to outline the main chronological features that

surrounded this law.

campaign in 1998, has made during its legislative period from 1998 to 2002 a sharp

shift from the liberal towards the conservative part of the political spectrum. Some of

57 The Romanian Constitution (1992) does, however, grant each and every registered ethnic group a seat in the Lower House. Roma and Hungarians, due to their large number, were granted two seats. 58 See Table 2. 59 This short overview of the Law does not include juridical assessments. For further details see Voigt 2005 and Küpper 2006. 60 See also the preliminary remarks. 61 See Appendix 6. 62 Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala. See also: www.htmh.hu

43

the participants, such as foreign office secretary Németh, the honorary president of the

ray from the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) of

to the co-ethnics63. This initiative was presented at the Hungarian Standing

onference consisted of

Parliament, representatives of the political organizations of Hungarians living 64

-ethnics and the representatives

of Hungarian politics could exchange thoughts and views (Bakk Bodo 2003). This

proposal was laid down in the me th of November 1999

(Kántor et alii 2004: p. 529)65. The idea was repeated the following year in the closing

act of the conference on the 14th of December 2000. Since then the initiative gained

momentum and was finally debated in political circles and gradually also in the media.

By the beginning of 2001 the parliamentary debate was full on. The six parliamentary

Party (FKGP), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Hungarian Justice and

Life Party (MIÉP) supported FIDESZ. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) hesitated

for quite a while before agreeing and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), having

about 7% of the parliamentary seats, obj

that there have not been consultations with the neighbouring states. Consequently, the

law passed through parliament on the 19th of June 2001 with an overwhelming majority

and came into force on the 1st of January 2002 (Schöpflin 2004). The tense relations

with Slovakia and Romania became more acute after the voting in parliament. Romania

the law for three main reasons: the law was considered to have an extraterritorial

character, to be discriminatory towards Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnic

background and it was considered incompatible with European Law.

63 Interviews with Norbert Molnár and Tibor Kis. 64 Kántor, Zoltán et alii, 2004, p. 529. 65 See also: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4_ses/contents.html Date: 23.05.2006.

44

Table 6: Brief chronology of relevant events66 Year Hungary Romania

1998

Elections: The (FIDESZ) becomes the largest party in Hungarian parliament and forms coalition with the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) (1998-2002). New prime minister is Viktor Orbán. In the course of four years FIDESZ transforms from a liberal to a conservative party.

-

2000

The first draft of the Status Law is discussed at the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT)

Elections: PSD (Social Democratic Party) becomes largest party and forms coalition with the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). Adrian

-2004)

2001 19.06.2001: Status Law voted in parliament. 22.12.20memorandum (ONM) that allows Hungary to apply the Status Law on Romanian territory.

agreement to grant all Romanian citizens a working permit for three months p.a.

2002

01.01.2002: Status Law and ONM come into effect. April 2002: Elections. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) win and form coalition. New prime minister is Péter Medgyessy (2002-2004).

01.01.2002: Status Law and ONM come into effect.

2003 23.06.2003: MSZP-SZDSZ government modifies the Status Law

23.09.2003: Agreement between the two governments upon the final modalities concerning the Status Law

The two prime ministers, Viktor Orbá

agreement, which was signed on the 22nd of December 2001. One of the main features

of this agreement, also called Orbán- 67, was the fact that

every Romanian citizen, regardless of ethnic belonging, had the right for a three months

working permit per annum for Hungary. Another feature is the fact that spouses are

excluded from the benefits. Romania, on the other hand, agreed to stop its resistance to

fter the elections in Hungary (April 2002),

which resulted in the government party losing its majority and a new constellation in

parliament, the new social-liberal government, after having modified the law68, signed

an additional agreement with the Romanian government on the 23rd of September 2003.

66 Bakk, Miklós Bodo, Barna 2003. 67 See Appendix 2. 68 See Appendix 3.

45

That agreement the political quarrel slowly faded69 and the academic discourse began

gathering momentum (Kántor 2004; Küpper 2006). These two agreements, one from

2001 and the other from 2003, are the result of the fruitless efforts both sides initiated

by appealing to European institutions. By the end of the day, it seems that direct

negotiations were the far better solution: for Hungary, for Romania and especially for

Hungarians in Romania.

Map 2: Hungarians i 70

69 See Appendix 4. 70 for Hungarian Minorities Abroad www.htmh.hu/en/ Source: http://www.htmh.hu/en/033_map/text037/doc_upload/romhun1.jpg Date: 23.05.2006

46

3. Methods

Rashomon, a woman and

three men each tell a story from their personal perspective: a couple (husband and wife),

a bandit and a hidden observer of the other thre

spectators by the observer and his listeners. The observer tells his listeners what he has

seen as a single, stringent story. In other words he has presented his own personal truth

about the events that occurred. In the course of the film the observer narrates the deeds

from the perspectives of the other three participants as they were presented at the

tribunal. All four stories have a few points in common, e.g.:

- A married couple travels in the forest.

- There is an armed bandit in the same forest.

- The bandit attacks the couple.

- The bandit forces the woman to have sexual intercourse.

- The husband dies.

-

Each and every one of the three participants presents a different course of events at a

tribunal: the bandit presents himself as a hero; the husband as an honourable man71 and

describes his wife as a slut; the wife portrays the husband and the bandit as brutes and

cowards. Further, it is not clear who exactly killed the husband and whether the bandit

participants. To top it all, the listeners eventually challenge the obs

really

The reason why this perplex situation is of importance to this thesis is because of

the question it raises: Does the observer in Rashomon tell a single story from four

different perspectives or do the three participants and the observer himself tell different

stories that intersect because they have some points in common? To put it differently

and paraphrasing it for this study, do newspapers narrate a single story from different

perspectives or do they tell four different stories that intersect? In congruence with the

basic theoretical approach of this thesis I consider all four newspapers to refer to events

that took place but tell different stories about those specific events. If I consider truth or

reality to be personal, subjective and limited to a specific timely frame, then there can

71 Since the husband has died, his story was presented through a spiritual medium.

47

suggest that there is a correct and an incorrect perspective upon it which is hence

exerting power over it. There can be, however, consent upon events that took place, e.g.

the Status Law did pass through parliament on 19th June 2001 or the Orbán-

Memorandum was signed on the 22nd December 2001 in Budapest72. Consequently, the

discourses mentioned in Chapter 1 about the Hungarians living in Romania consist of

four different narratives. They do not tell a single story about the Status Law and the

Hungarians living in Romania from four different perspectives. They tell different

stories which intersect at specific discursive events. Although the newspapers shape the

story as they publish, these intersections are the basis of the discourse in the media and

thus are the basis for the comparison applied in this thesis.

When analysing the Romanian and Hungarian discourses surrounding the

Hungarian Status Law in the huge number of newspaper articles, I decided to apply two

methods: a diachronic and a synchronic method. The aim of the first one was to have an

overall view about the discourses and how they developed in the years 2001-2003 while

decisive and representative discursive event from the flow of the discourses and

analysing just the articles covering that very event. Further, I consider diachronic

analysis to be composed of a myriad of synchronic texts and therefore events. This

means that the synchronic analysis entails diachronic elements that have been neglected

for the sake of a structuralist analysis. However, despite the fact that both methods are

related to the same object, there is still the question as to whether they are compatible

for the discourse analysis mentioned in the first chapter. There are a few facets about

this question that need further explanation.

The first of these facets is the question of timely depth within the analysis.

Discourse analysis, the way I understand it, is a post-structuralist, diachronic analysis.

This means that the element of time is essential. Discourse is composed of texts and

other forms of communication that are interwoven in a limited physical and timely

space or as Jäger put it, discourse is the flow of information in time (Jäger 2001; 129).

Scientists analyse the texts in the given frame and take a look behind the mechanisms of

power and representation (Foucault 1976). To be able to see how a mechanism works it

has to run, to flow. Just like a river, the flow can only be viewed when the water is

running, changing its position constantly. In other words, time cannot be disregarded in

the deconstruction of the power mechanisms. Consequently, I have chosen newspaper

articles from an extended period of time (2001-2003) to be able to illustrate the flow of

72 See also Chapter 2.

48

the discourse. Further, the diachronic method enables a large database for the eventual

analysis.

Considering the abundance of data available in the case of the Hungarian Status

Law, it is difficult to compare hundreds of articles with each other. Further there is no

possibility to analyse each and every article to the full. It would be a task beyond the

limits of this thesis. On the other hand, there is the option of exemplifying the discourse

on a discursive event. As already mentioned73, events in general, and therefore also

discursive events are products of the forces applied within the discourse. Thus,

something that has occurred becomes an event when those who can exert power within

the discourse regard and postulate the occurrence as an event. Analysing a single event,

founder, Ferdinand de Saussure, linguistic analysis can only take place in a space

without time (Prechtl 1994). Since language is in a constant change we have to exclude

time in order to be able to make assertions. If time is being taken into consideration,

then the assertions will lose their validity the moment one of the linguistic elements or

phenomena analysed have changed. Since change is taking place continuously, this will

happen instantly. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis I shall consider the analysis of

a single event as a synchronic analysis. This is obviously a simplification since the

articles concerning that event were not all published at exactly the same time but rather

in the time frame of a few days. Nonetheless, if we compare these few days with the

period of three years of the diachronic analysis in perspective, they can be regarded as

synchronic. Consequently, I shall consider the examination of a single event to be a

simplified manner of a synchronic analysis in which time can be neglected.

The next difficulty when concerning the application of structuralism and modern

discourse analysis in one thesis is the question of limitations and boundaries.

Structuralism, in the way it is applied in anthropology, suggests that cultures should be

viewed as wholes, as entities with strict and impermeable boundaries in which rigid

power mechanisms regulate social life (Prechtl 1994, Hirschberg 1988). This

conception of culture is a synchronic one, because every transformation within the

system leads to different results. Subsequently, the change of actors from one entity to

another is not permissible since change implicates a timely dimension and would

therefore contradict the postulate of synchronicity. On the other hand, discourse analysis

is a constant process of defining and redefining the very boundaries or borders, which

were set up by the powerful discourse in question. If boundaries are a social construct,

73 See Chapter 1.

49

then they can be contested, changed or moved according to the social forces acting upon

it. Furthermore, they are permeable. These two points of view clash when analysing

ethnic denotations in a political context: Journalists from Hungary and Romania write

about Hungarians in Romania. If, for example, a Hungarian journalist writes from

Budapest about the situation of the Hungarians who live in Romania, then we have a

clear cut. The journalist is in the political structure of the Republic of Hungary while the

people he writes about are Romanian citizens. This situation changes drastically when a

Hungarian from Romania writes about his fellows in an ethnic background in a

Hungarian daily from Hungary. Thus he is physically in Romania while his text is

published in Hungary and is therefore in both discourses at the same time. According to

my understanding this is a change in the system and a trespassing of boundaries. This

will have a practical impact when discussing the interviews and the personal aspects

present in some of the articles.

The last important issue of the methodological part is the way the results are

being analysed, i.e. the interpretative method in cultural anthropology. Since texts are

not just produced but also reproduced74, we have to take a look at one of the key factors

theoretical background derives from the realm of interpretative anthropology (Stellrecht

1993), I understand interpretation in this sense as a cognitive process bound by cultural,

linguistic and spatial limits with specific characteristics. Thus I shall explain some of

this thesis:

- Personal subjectivity. This thesis does not write itself. I am writing it. This

means that writing is a personal process of continuous struggle with theory and

available data. Consequently, whichever statement is being made, it is done from

a personal point of view and therefore it cannot be objective. Humanities lay an

emphasis also on the personal background of the researcher. It is not just the

questions what and why that are important, but also who. When I make a

statement, then it is also a reflection of my universe of experience75, of what I

have learned and experienced in the context of the subject to be debated. As

previously mentioned, I descend from a Transylvanian family with mixed ethnic

background. This means that I am personally affected by the problems raised by

the Hungarian Status Law through people in my social surrounding.

74 See Figure 2. 75 I borrowed this expression from Anderson (Anderson 1998), although he used it in different context.

50

- Uniqueness. Interpretation is distinctive in two aspects: the unique nature of

subjectivity and the nature of communication. The first aspect refers to

comparison and repeating. If another researcher had analysed the same texts as I

did, he would have most probably arrived at different results and hence different

conclusions. This is again due to his or her universe of experience. He might

have noticed different aspects in the same text, which I did not discover and vice

versa. Communication, on the other hand, refers to the exchange between

different producers of texts. In other words, there is a second triangular dialogic

relationship in every text between the producer, the text itself and the researcher:

the producer transfers information through written text, which is read by the

researcher. Then the researcher interviews the producer to verify the text.

Therefore, communication between different producers is unique since they are

all individuals and hence subjective76.

- Unrepeatable. Again, due to subjectivity, interpretative analysis is unrepeatable.

This does not mean that the analysis cannot be repeated. It means that each

analysis is a fresh start. Between two analyses there will always be differences

that could matter for the outcome. This could be a different setting or context but

also additional information, of which the researchers might not be aware.

- Adequacy. According to interpretative anthropology there is no right or wrong

but outright adequacy. This means that also different perspectives on the same

matter can be adequate. Adequacy in this sense is the moment the researcher has

described his method and has made it comprehensible to others. Although the

same method may produce different results every time it is applied, it is

permissible as long as its application has been made transparent. Adequacy, as I

understand it, is the objective aspect of subjectivity in interpretative

anthropology.

- Reflecti

the writing process. Being subjective requires a self-

subjectivity. Practically, this means that the researcher has to be aware of his

shortcomings and so that one can accept the facts but doubt the interpretation.

76 See Figure 4.

51

Figure 3: From public discourses to relevant segments Sector: Event: Medium: Texts:

Public discourse in

relationship to the Hungarians in the

neighbouring states

Other newspapers

Other articles

Other segments

Sector of the public discourse in Romania:

Hungarians in Romania

Sector of the public discourse in Hungary:

Hungarians in Romania

Discursive event: Hungarian Status

Law

Selected newspapers

from Hungary

Pertinent articles

Relevant segments

Selected newspapers

from Romania

Pertinent articles

Relevant segments

Public discourse in

relationship to the various ethnic groups

in Romania

52

3.1 Newspaper analysis

Before analysing newspaper articles one has to bear in mind the nature of the

texts at hand. Newspaper articles are a means of communication without direct face to

face interaction (Dracklé 1999: p.262). They come in the form of published texts that

fulfil a specific set of characteristics within the discourse, e.g. affordability, accessibility

and comprehensibility. The physical access to the texts varies between the two media

used most frequently by the newspapers: the press and the Internet. In this thesis, for

purposes of simplification and efficiency, the Hungarian articles analysed were

downloaded from the Internet and afterwards analysed. The respective editorial boards

in Bucharest printed out the Romanian articles, due to the lack of accessibility via the

Internet. All journalists whom I have interviewed assured me that the Internet version of

the text is always identical with the one published in the press.

The newspaper articles that concern the Status Law from each and every paper

form the specific narrative of the respective paper to that theme. Since the newspapers

are conglomerations of different views that form a stream of thoughts, it was vital to set

up certain criteria when I approached the issue and was about to choose the newspapers

to be analysed. This means that the newspapers were chosen according to specific

criteria. Obviously, the criteria could encompass more than two newspapers from each

country. However it would have been an impossible task to analyse all the newspapers

that would have fulfilled the criteria and hence only two papers from both countries

were chosen. Consequently, the four newspapers represent fragments of the ongoing

respective discourses.

Figure 4: Second dialogic relationship

Producers

Texts Researchers

Writing and reflecting

Reading and analysing

Interviewing and informing

53

3.1.1 Criteria for the newspapers

Th

should still remain comparable. Hence I have chosen the following set of norms:

1. Daily newspapers. The papers had to have a daily edition for two reasons. The

first one concerns the quality of the information and the second its quantity. By

quality of information I do not mean any linguistic level but rather a fast and less

daily issues have to work fast to be able to print on

This category also includes articles from the weekend edition, which usually

presents the main issues from a more differentiated point of view. Consequently,

political events. The second reason for choosing daily papers is the quantity of

data available. Dailies allow a high number of publications to a specific theme.

While weekly papers often publish one article per event, dailies could publish

seven or even more articles (weekend edition added). It is difficult to say how

much data is required for a discourse analysis. However, it is not necessarily the

quantity of data, which sets the limits but rather the timely frame and the

abundance of information within that frame. The Hungarian Status Law has

been present in the media for the period of almost three years after which the

discourse concerning the Hungarians living in Romania has moved on to

different events and segments, such as the dual citizenship.

2. Nationwide edition. The paper has to be published nationwide to have a

maximum impact in the discourse. Regional papers also write about national or

international issues, but they are read only in a limited geographical area. This

aspect of regionalism is neglected in the present thesis77. Including regional

papers would have required a matrix of examinations: the regional papers of

each country among themselves, then a comparison on the national level and

then an international comparison to round it up. Regional aspects can also vary

due to the nature of the region in question. The narrative of a daily from Târgu

However, the aim of this thesis is an analysis on the national level, since it is

rs refer to articles

77 For a different assessment to regional papers see Maho Awes 1983 and Bakk Bodo 2003.

54

published in other countries they usually refer to those published on the national

level and not to the regional papers. The fact that the articles from regional

papers are also published online can compensate that deficit only to a certain

extent, because the paper has to be known in other regions as well for readers to

visit their homepage.

3.

dominant role in the public discourse. It is difficult to define the point where it

can be said that the paper has a high circulation. Again, the Internet can

compensate this to a certain extent. At this step the size of the target population

has to be taken into consideration. A German paper such as Bild with a

circulation of millions of sold copies per day cannot be compared with the

Hungarian paper with Magyar Hírlap, which has a daily circulation of

approximately 40,000 copies. Hence the decision to chose papers which are

among the dominant ones in the discourse. In Hungary there are 4-5 papers that

dominate the discourse while Romania has 7-8 such papers. The four papers

were chosen from among these groups. This criterion incorporates another one:

the paper has to be sold. There are papers that are distributed free of charge,

often at railway stations, and hence also have a high circulation, e.g. METRO in

France and the Netherlands. The fact that a paper is being sold indicates an

active interest of the readers by purchasing the paper. They are keen on having

the information in the way that a specific paper offers them and not otherwise.

This is not the case with free papers.

4. Claim of neutrality. Evidently, as mentioned earlier, there is no such thing as a

neutral newspaper. Every expostulation is bound to a certain context and a

specific time. Some newspapers declare themselves to be neutral or represent

opinions beyond the strife of political parties. These declarations have to stand

the test of analysis and often fail, such as the German paper Bild78. This criterion

aims at political newspapers that either belong or visibly support a political

party. The Hungarian daily Magyar Nemzet presented a banner of the Young 79 throughout 2001 and

continued to do so until autumn 2003. Hence the paper was visibly taking sides

in favour of that party. This was not so for the two newspapers which I chose for

purposes of analysis. However, bearing in mind the timely restrictions, in the

78 Bild declares on its front page: unabhängig [independent], überparteilich [above party belonging]. 79 www.mno.hu

55

spring of 2006, before the general elections in Hungary (April 2006),

Népszabadság presented political advertisement of Hungarian Socialist Party

(MSZP) on its homepage80 while Magyar Nemzet, yet again, took up sides and

supported FIDESZ on its homepage. Consequently, if I were now to select

newspapers with a claim of political neutrality, Népszabadság would not be

among them. There are also newspapers, which belong to political parties. In

Romania, for example, the daily România Mare belongs to the party of the same

name81. With this category I tried to avoid newspapers that were too obviously

favouring one of the political parties or opposing it too obviously.

5. General papers. There are dailies that are entirely dedicated to a specific field,

especially economics or sports. The Hungarian Status Law has influenced many

fields of social life and therefore should be examined in newspapers that cover

different spheres. The most important one is the political scene where the Law

has been debated most, and not in dailies that cover sports or economics. This

does not mean that these papers do not pick up political issues. Gazeta

Sporturilor dedicated its entire edition from 21st August 2002 to regional

discrimination in Romanian football and interviewing various politicians to that

subject. The paper showed that the Romanian national football team has played

only two international matches in Banat and Transylvania in the fifty years from

1938 to 1998.

6. 82. The aim of this category is to ensure

national press. There are other national

newspapers in Hungary, such as the Pester Lloyd that publishes in German, but

these do not have such a high circulation as Népszabadság or Magyar Nemzet.

This category is especially important for Romania, since there is not a single

minorities also use the Hungarian language for keeping up communication and

acquiring information. Although most Hungarians in Romania can read and

write in Romanian, there is a large press in Hungarian, with nationwide

newspapers such as Krónika or regional ones like Szabadság. However, being

only about 6% of the total population it is still the papers in Romanian language

that dominate the journalistic discourse. To put it differently, the vast majority

80 www.nol.hu 81 See also Table 2. 82 See also Appendix 5.

56

of Hungarians in Romania can read the Romanian papers while the

overwhelming majority of Romanians in Romania cannot read Hungarian.

7. No tabloids. Tabloids appeal to emotion. The newspapers I have chosen do not.

The reason for this criterion was the aim to pick out more or less balanced

opinions on the Status Law and to avoid banal polemics and nudities. It is

tabloids. Nudity or sexy photographs are not always of help. The German

most distinguished papers. Except for objective categories such as the price, one

could consider the headline of the newspaper as the most important indicator.

has an advertisement that fills the entire front page. Thus, I have put up three

criteria for avoiding tabloids: firstly, Tabloids have a very emotional, short and

provocative headline. Secondly, they make excessive use of red ink in

combination with black. Thirdly, there is a constant change in the size of the

text: Big headlines, which are followed by a smaller text up to short texts in tiny

fonts. Nonetheless, public discourse in many countries does rely a lot on

tabloids, whenever they have a strong position in the press, like Blikk in

Hungary or, to a lesser extent, Ziua in Romania. This means that they are an

integral part of the discourse. Since I am analysing only a segment of the press,

this is a segment that I shall neglect.

3.1.2 Introducing the newspapers

The four newspapers chosen for this thesis perform their respective narratives in

a specific cultural and political frame. The following short passages have been put

together to enable a short background for every paper (in alphabetic order). The data

not be regarded as solid information but rather as a general indication. The information

was gathered via the Internet83, through discussions with scientists and members of the

faculty, through the newspapers themselves and eventually through interviews with

journalists.

83 www.brat.ro

57

This paper published in Bucharest is the successor of Scîntea that ceased to

publish under that name after 1990. Scîntea was the official newspaper of the Romanian

Communist Party (PCR) and hence had the strongest position in the press prior to the

political changes of 1989-1990. Up to 1995, the newspaper, which was then called 84.

This tendency changed only gradually. From the dozens of employees the paper had

back in 1990, only about five are still employed. The others left and were replaced by

total sum of sold samples of 150.000, about 2/3 are sent to subscribers. Unlike

Libertatea85

distribution net in the countryside86

counties rather than in the capital87

due to its chief editor from 1994-2003, Cristian Tudor Popescu. By using sharp words

mismanagement he was in a constant row with the leading politicians88. The newspaper

also offers its entire current edition on the Internet, although without a proper archive.

-89. According to my own estimation, after carefully reading the

daily edition for a few weeks, is that the paper still has light tendencies to the

economical left. In other words it supports more state control in economic life. On the

other hand it has preserved a slightly nationalistic tone, especially in comparison with

România L

autumn 2006. There is a new editorial board; the tone is less nationalistic and, according

e

assured me that journalists had the freedom to write whatever they wanted. Upon my

question about conflicts between journalists and the editorial board she replied that

there were conflicts once in a while. However, she added, these conflicts were usually

settled by mutual consent.

84 See also Verdery 1991. 85 See also: http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=publications&id=87&index=0 86 See also: http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=publications&id=11&index=0 87 Romania has forty counties and a capital territory, Bucharest. 88 Interview with Rodica Ciobanu. 89 Nimeni nu esti mai presus de lege See also Appendix 5.

58

3.1.2.2 Magyar Hírlap

According to the criteria mentioned above Magyar Hírlap, published in

er. It has a circulation of approximately

40.000 copies per day. According to one of my interview partners, Magyar Hírlap

s emphasis lays in marginal

social and gender groups, e.g. the Roma or the homosexuals90. He added further that the

newspaper is a liberal daily that used to be more conservative at the beginning of the

nineties. Nevertheless, Magyar Hírlap is the only newspaper that has criticised every

government since the transformation 1989/1990. According to another interview

partner, the paper is trying to compete with dailies that are wholly dedicated to finance,

such as Napi Gazdaság and Világgazdaság. The aim is to attract more readers that are

not necessarily interested in politics, sports or literature, but rather in economics. The

2001 the party stopped Magyar Hírlap journalists from attending the party congress.

it. There is a growing number of politicians who want to publish articles in the paper.

Most of them belong to the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) or to the Hungarian

Socialist Party (MSZP) but there are also a few from the Hungarian Democratic Forum

(MDF) and the FIDESZ91. Although the same company owns Magyar Hírlap and

Népszabadság, all interview partners who work for Magyar Hírlap confirmed that they

consider Népszabadság to be their toughest rival on the market. Additionally, some of

the employees come from abroad, e.g. my interview partner Iván Zsolt Nagy, who

solely responsible for their articles while they give them a free hand to write however

they please92.

3.1.2.3 Népszabadság

The paper, also published in Budapest, has the highest circulation of all

Hungarian dailies. It varies from 150,000 to 210,000 copies. One journalist said that

Népszabadság is trying to be a symbiosis between a source of reference and a mass

paper without turning into a tabloid93

90 Interview with Norbert Molnár. 91 Interview with Miklós Újvári. 92 Interviews with Miklós Újvári and Iván Zsolt Nagy. 93 Interview with Tibor Kis.

59

official newspaper; hence it had the same powerful position as

Romania. During the nineties there were quite a few journalists that sympathised with

the political left. This has changed during that decade. Nowadays there are also

journalists who sympathise with the extreme right, such as the Hungarian Justice and

Life Party (MIÉP)94. According to one interview partner, the political direction depends

on the chief editor. There are three of them, and they change on a weekly basis and each

has his personal political direction95. This, in my opinion, does guarantee a certain

equilibrium within the newspaper. These chief editors decide upon the themes but not

upon the content of the articles. In other words the journalists are free to write whatever

they please. According to another interview partner96, despite being somewhat to the

left, the paper criticised both former socialist prime ministers, Gyula Horn and Péter

Medgyessy97. Furthermore, according to my third interview partner, Népszabadság also

n articles are translated

dedicated to the Hungarian press98. Like with Magyar Hírlap, there are quite a few

politicians in Hungary who want to publish articles in the newspaper. This is a clear

public discourse.

99. With an average daily edition of about 70,000 it is

100. According to my interview partner101, the chief

neither too far to the left nor to the right. The paper is trying to keep its distance from all

and its supporte

94 Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó. 95 Interview with Tibor Kis. 96 Interview with József Szilvássy. 97 Ferenc Gyurcsány became prime minister in 2004 and therefore after the debate over the Status Law. 98 Source on the 23.05.2006: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339&par1=1&idl=2 99 100 Source on the 21.04.2006: http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=publications&id=110&index=3&indexPer=0 101 Interview with Simona Popescu.

60

criticised the PSD government on matters of corruption and mismanagement. In

any tendency to become a tabloid. Unlike the Hungarian press, the Romanian press is

very dynamic. During the time of my research (2001-2003) Libertatea, Curentul or

3.1.3 Analysing the articles

For this analysis a substantial quantity of newspaper articles was collected102.

The articles were chosen according to two main criteria: they had to explicitly mention

the Hungarian Status Law and they had to show relevance to the ongoing political

debate regarding the Status Law. Practically, this meant that I looked for Hungarian

articles that included the word státustörvény and for Romanian articles that included the

phrase legea statutului, both meaning Status Law. The relevance of the articles to the

political debate is an important criterion, because there were articles that concentrated

on different issues, e.g. the applicability of the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

as they may

be, were irrelevant to the political debate and were consequently neglected. Further, the

articles had to show relevance to the co-ethnics in general or to the Hungarians in

Romania in particular. Articles with relevance to other geographical-ethnical spheres

only, e.g. the Hungarians in Ukraine, were also neglected.

This large amount of data was segmented in order to be able to compare certain

elements, which are of importance for the analysis. Therefore I have dissected this mass

into two main categories for better handling: ethnic denotations and motifs. These

categories will help sort out the main features of the four narratives and hence the

different discourses in which they are active. Subsequently, they will demonstrate the

differences between the four newspapers. While the ethnic denotations are vital for the

(Maho Awes 1983). The motifs I have chosen for this thesis, Europe, comparison,

discrimination, NATO, history and legal aspects, are obviously not the only ones

possible (Császár 2002). Nevertheless, they enable an analysis from different

perspectives, which I consider to be crucial for the debate over the Hungarian Status

102 See Table 9.

61

(when available), time aspects and also what I regard as missing information. By this

term I mean the situation that arises when journalists, for whatever reasons, omit or

neglect information, which according to my understanding should have been mentioned.

The method chosen for this synchronic analysis will follow a specific pattern,

which will be repeated for all the articles103. I have reconsidered all the articles that

were selected for the data basis of the diachronic analysis and were published on 22nd

December 2001, the day when the Orbán-

in the two weeks that followed. Consequently, the articles have also appeared as part of

the diachronic analysis. The individual steps chosen for this method are the following:

1. Re-reading the article and jotting down first notes and ideas for a better

segmentation of the article and a useful guideline.

2. Genre, structure, voices104. These three categories facilitate a better

segmentation of the article and subsequently enable a more profound

following categories: essay, report and account. Essay in this sense will mean

the personal assessment of a journalist concerning a specific topic, a report will

be a descriptive text representing different points of view about an event and an

account will be a short report often used by news agencies as shown in see

Figure 5. Furthermore, the ties from report to account and report to essay are

more intensive (double arrow) that between essay and account. This indicates

that the differences between reports and essays and reports and accounts are

more flexible or permeable than those between essays and accounts.

3. Literary means, e.g. metaphors, myths and style. The journalists may also use

elements previously mentioned in the diachronic analysis, such as Europe,

discrimination and history.

4. Target group. This category, when predictable, is essential for the discourse

more easily.

5. Assessing the text. Optionally, if the author of the respective article has been

interviewed, e.g. Miklós Újvári or Tibor Kis, I will compare the article(s) to the

content of the interview.

103 Obviously, text analysis has many different methods. For a different methodology see Fairclough 2003. 104 This triple division does not comply with literary categories. I have introduced them in order to distinguish between the different categories that have occurred to me during the diachronic analysis.

62

The articles will be analysed in alphabetical order of the newspapers and

chronologically according to their date of issue. This analysis does not encompass all

ct statements made by the journalist in

reference to the discourse concerning the Hungarians in Romania in general, and the

discursive event of the ONM in particular. Further, due to the nature of the obtained

results, texts and interviews, I shall have to use references which regard forthcoming

chapters.

Figure 5: Article genres

3.1.3.1 Ethnic denotations

category is also of substantial importance due to ethn

anthropology. The main objective is to find out how journalists constructed the

Hungarians outside Hungary in general and the Hungarians in Romania in particular.

For this purpose I gathered ethnic denotations that were used in the articles according to

a single criterion: only denotations that include Hungarians in Romania were being

considered. This meant that denotations such as Vajdasági magyarok [Magyars from

Vojvodina] were neglected. Following this line of argument, by Hungarians in Romania

I mean people in Romania that consider themselves to be ethnically Hungarian105.

Preliminary lecture of the papers has shown that there are different ways to describe the

105 This is obviously also a denotation. However I do need a denotation with as few connotations as possible to be able to start off my analysis.

Report

Essay Account

63

Hungarians in Romania and this multitude of denotations bears a problem within which

needs to be explained.

Structuralism according to de Saussure encompasses two postulates that are

relevant to this thesis: language cannot exist without difference and this difference is

regulated according to a man-made binary code of the signifiers, e.g. tree, and the

signified, the plant itself. In this system the signifier transforms the physical or

ideological object into the spoken language. By neglecting time at a given synchronic

moment, there is congruence between the signified and the signifier (Prechtl 1994). This

becomes difficult, as in the case of the Hungarians in Romania, when journalists apply

different signifiers to what they consider to be one signified. Following structuralist

logic, this would mean that there are as many ethnic groups as there are denotations. In

other words, every denotation carves out or constructs a new ethnic group from the

myriad of available possibilities. One could say that these are only stylistic synonyms

that refer to the same group. I cannot follow this line of argument. In my opinion there

is a substantial difference between denotations such as

[Magyars who live in Romania] and Erdélyi magyarság [Transylvanian Magyardom].

Although they may overlap physically, they are anything but synonymous. Many

denotations overlap physically to a large degree, i.e. they cover frequently large

proportions of the same groups of people. This, however, still does not solve the basic

problem at stake: while the journalists used the different denotation in a synonymous

manner and therefore they referred to a single group, I considered each denotation as the

creation of a new group106.

3.1.3.2 Motifs

3.1.3.2.1 Europe

Europe is by far not just the name of a geographical entity or a continent. In the

sense of this discourse analysis it encompasses the geographical meaning, the economic

and political establishment of the European Union (EU), the supranational Council of

Europe (CE) and all the organisations linked to them. But Europe is more than that.

Europe, or any of the above-mentioned institutions, plays a significant role in many

public discourses in Central and East Europe (CEE). It has become a symbol of order

and justice, even synonymous with civilisation. The European organisations are

considered by many to be unprejudiced supra instances that can settle the disputes of the

106 categories of analysis (for scientific discourse) and categories of practice (for daily use). See also Bourdieu Wacquant 2006.

64

es. This idea of a supra instance can also be regarded as tutelage or

oppression. However, these elements do not play a role in the discourse concerning the

Hungarian Status Law.

3.1.3.2.2 Comparison

Several states in Central and Eastern Europe have laws with a similar function to

the Hungarian Status Law and are therefore comparable. By comparison I mean the fact

that politicians and journalists often compare the Hungarian Status Law to similar laws

in other CEE states, i.e. Slovakia, Romania or Croatia. Consequently, comparison as a

motif plays a significant role. The element of comparison, however, is understood as a

discursive element and not as a juridical juxtaposition. It is the element of comparison

in itself that is important for this analysis.

3.1.3.2.3 Discrimination

certain benefits that could be regarded be their compatriots, who do not receive them, as

a discriminatory act. The benefits can take up different forms such as financial aid,

working permit, health care or gratuitous education. For this reason, several Romanian

politicians, among them President Ion Iliescu (1990-1996 and 2000-2004) and Prime

-2004), condemned the Law as discriminatory, because it

gave only Romanian citizens who defined themselves as ethnically Hungarian

privileges while refusing them to that their fellow citizens, who did not define

own conception of what discrimination is. Generally, I consider discrimination to be an

unjust treatment by a third party: C treats A better that B, although, according to the

rules or laws, it should not do so. This can be manifested in a negative way, e.g.

denying benefits, or in a positive way, such as granting surplus benefits.

3.1.3.2.4 NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) does not play a crucial role as

Europe does, but, nevertheless, it is present in both discourses. It has the connotation of

law, order, security and peace. If Europe is the leading figure for economic prosperity

and institutional stability to be copied and perhaps attained, NATO is the supra instance

that can calm down adversaries and bring them to reason. Furthermore, NATO

65

membership transmits a certain sense of security and confidence that might not be

viewed with favour by those states that are not yet members. This is of importance

when bearing in mind the time span of this analysis (2001-2003). Hungary received full

NATO membership in March 1999 while Romania only in April 2004. NATO is also a

- omania and

Hungary. This slogan refers to the Central and Eastern European states prior to their

integration either in NATO or the EU. The fact that the slogan was used as reference to

e to the fact that

there is a correlation between the two: an antithesis to the Warsaw Pact and the Council

of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

3.1.3.2.5 History

Historic events and processes in Romania and Hungary have been and still are

often used and sometimes abused for political purposes. In other words, historic data

was transformed from its original time context, the past, to the present and by doing so

reproduced by the actors of the respective public discourses. This abuse is usually used

in disputes that concern Transylvania and the Hungarians in Romania. A good example

is the Treaty of Trianon from 1920, which forced Hungary to secede Transylvania and

some adjacent territories to Romania107. There are therefore different points of view in

Hungary and Romania about the historic connection between the Hungarian state and

the Hungarians in Romania. This category is not aiming at the pursuit of an ultimate

truth, of who might have been right or wrong. It rather tries to find out which historic

arguments have been brought forward by journalists and politicians and hence what role

history plays in the respective narratives.

3.1.3.2.6 Legal aspects

Arguing with laws and juridical aspects, just like disputing with historical facts

and their interpretation, shows a specific attitude and way of discussion. It presupposes

a frame of mind that respects the rule of law and expects others to do likewise. The

Status Law as such does not play a vital role in this. It is the arguments themselves that

matter108. The Romanian historic narrative argues that Transylvania belongs to Romania

because of ethno-historic rights. The Hungarian historic narrative retorts that

107 See Table 4 108 See Chapter 2.

66

Transylvania belongs to Romania due to the Treaty of Trianon, an international legal

act, which both parties signed and respected109.

3.2 Interviews

Next to the newspaper articles I have also included interviews within the

framework of this work. This had different goals. The first one concerned the

verification of the information that was already available. As I had previously

mentioned, there is no such thing as a neutral or completely objective newspaper. Hence

I interviewed at least one journalist from every newspaper about his or her views

concerning the respective newspaper. The second reason was the verification of the

information that I already had about the Hungarian Status Law. Despite profound

reading beforehand I wanted to receive first-hand information from those who

narrative. The third reason relates to the aspect of time. I wanted to know whether the

journalists have changed their minds in the course of events or perhaps after the political

tensions have calmed down. Interviewing them from September 2003 onwards110, there

was a time span, which enabled them to recapture the events of the years 2001 and

2002. This proved to be a very useful source of information about the Hungarian

Status Law. Finally, regarding the synchronic analysis, the role of transcultural

characteristics was essential for a full understanding of the journalistic narrative.

3.2.1 Criteria for the journalists

Sampling the Hungarian journalists for interviewing was done according to the

number of articles published. I picked those journalists who wrote the highest number

of articles relating to the Law in the years 2001 and 2002. This also meant including

cumulative articles that had two or more authors. For that I have set a statistical table of

all the articles published to see who were the most active journalists. Statistical data by

itself is not enough. A high number of published articles is obviously an indicator of a

strong presence in the discourse, but it also depends on the style of the article. The

interested in politics and others may want to read articles by certain journalists only.

109 Idem. 110 The first interview was on the 11th September 2003 and the last one on the 2nd February 2004.

67

Schlehe

2003)

Table 7: Journalists from Magyar Hírlap and the number of articles they published about the Hungarian Status Law

Journalist 2001 2002 111

Bernát, Anikó - 1 1 Biczó, Henriett 1 - 1 Bilkei-Gorzó, Borbála 1 - 1 Bodnár, Lajos 2 1 3 Bogdán, Tibor 31 10 44 Dobozi, Pálma 1 1 2 Dusza, Erika 1 - 1 Dzindzisz, Magdaléna 1 1 2 Erdei, Éva 1 - 1 Gergely, László - 1 1 Haiman, Éva - 2 2 Havas, Iván 1 - 1 Joób, Sándor - 1 1 Kántor, Barbara - 1 1 Kecskés, Ferenc 1 - 1 Kordos, Szabolcs 1 - 1 Kósa, András - 3 3 Locsmándi, Andréa - 1 1 Márk, Edina - 1 1 Molnár, Norbert - 22 22 Nagy, Iván Zsolt 33 27 60 Nagy, Szilvia 4 5 10 Németh, Szilárd - 1 1 Neumann, Ottó 1 - 1 Rockenbauer, Nóra 3 1 4 Scipiades, Erzsébet 1 - 1 Szarka, Klára - 2 2 Szép, Zsuzsa 1 2 3 Szilágyi, Béla - 1 1 Szombathy, Pál 1 1 2 Újvári, Miklós 5 7 12 Varga, Gergely 2 1 3 Zipernovszky, Kornél 4 8 12

The table showed clearly a small number of dominant journalists whom I tried to

contact (light grey background). This meant, that I had five journalists from Magyar

Hírlap (MH) and three from Népszabadság (NSZ).

111 Data from 2003 is not included but it showed a similar pattern in both newspapers.

68

Table 8: Journalists from Népszabadság and the number of articles they published about the Hungarian Status Law

Journalists112 2001 2002

Aczél, Endre 1 3 4 B.T.T. 1 - 1 Bednárik, Imre 1 4 5 Csónyi, Vilmos 1 - 1 Czene, Gábor 1 - 1 Danó, Anna - 1 1 Deményi, Péter 1 - 1 Eörsi, István 1 1 2 Farkas, József György 1 - 1 Ferencz, Gábor - 1 1 Füzes, Oszkár 4 3 7

1 - 1 Gömöri, Endre 1 1 2 H.Sz. - 1 1 Hovanyesz, László 1 - 1 I.B. 1 - 1 I.E. 1 - 1 K.J.T. - 1 1 Kácsor, Zsolt - 1 1 Kis, Tibor 18 19 37

1 7 8 Kun, J. Erzsébet - 1 1 L.K. 2 - 2 M.L.L. - 1 1 Máté, József 4 3 7 Mihálovits, András - 1 1 Miklós, Gábor - 2 2 Nagy, Emese - 1 1 Pócs, Balázs 3 1 4 R. Hahn, Veronika 1 - 1 R.R. 1 - 1 S.L. - 1 1 Seres, Attila - 3 3 Sz.J.P. 4 4 8 Sz.L.L. 6 - 6 Szabó, Brigitta 1 - 1 Szabó, József 2 4 6 Szilvássy, József 13 27 40

3 - 3 T.M. - 1 1 Tenczer, Gábor 1 - 1 Tibori Szabó, Zoltán 67 29 96 Várkonyi, Iván - 1 1 Zelmanovic, Djordje 1 - 1

112 Some of the journalists use their initials. Since none of those using this abbreviation played an important role I decided to leave the initials as they were.

69

From those working for Magyar Hírlap I could interview three and Tibor Bogdán, who

is working in Bucharest, was kind enough to thoroughly answer my questions via

email113. Hence I interviewed Norbert Molnár, Iván Zsolt Nagy and Miklós Újvári.

archive, I relied heavily on the data available from the editorial boards in Romania.

Further, unlike the Hungarian newspapers, the Romanian articles do not always contain

name and I could not put together statistical data to determine the most

journalist from every Romanian paper who had an important role within the newspapers

hierarchy:

Both of them are heads of the political section in their respective newspapers and were

usually responsible for articles concerning the Hungarian Status Law.

In a similar way to Magyar

(light grey background). Table 8 shows three journalists that dominate the narrative:

Tibor Kis, József Szilvássy and Zoltán Tibori Szabó. Consequently I interviewed all

three of them.

3.2.2 Interviewing method

The semi-structured interviews were structured as a discussion with open and

closed questions in order to gain qualitative as well as quantitative data (Weller 1998;

367). Due to the nature of the topic, i.e. journalistic narratives in the light of the

Hungarian Status Law, the interviews were thematically focused. The idea was to give

my interview partners the possibility to express themselves freely (open questions)

while gathering comparable data (closed questions). In other words, the questions that

regarded their personal biography, e.g. place of work, previous employment and

education, was fixed and took a small part of the time available. The other part

regarding questions such as the policy of the respective newspaper or their personal

view concerning the Status Law, took more time since the journalists had a free hand

and could express themselves at length (Schlehe 2003).

Language was an important aspect of the interview. I insisted interviewing the

journalists in the same language in which they published their articles. Hence there

remained a linguistic continuity between the articles and the interviews. Due to my

command of Hungarian and Romanian I did not need a translator. Furthermore, I

decided not to record the interviews. The reason for this lies in my assumption that

113 By September 2003 Kornél Zipernovszky did not work for MH anymore.

70

some of the journalists might not talk as freely as I would have liked them to.

Considering the difficulties I had in persuading some of them to be interviewed and

reassuring them that the information would be used for strictly scientific purposes, my

decision proved to be correct. After each interview I prepared a protocol containing the

information gathered during the session. This protocol was later used to adjust, correct

or add information to the general data already gathered and for comparison with the

1. Personal questions. These concern predominantly tertiary education. My

assumption was that all journalists are part of the academic elite in the sense that

they are all university graduates. With one single exception this turned out to be

true114. Furthermore, I asked about their working contract, to find out whether

they were full employees of the newspaper or not. The reason behind this

q

Journalists with a permanent contract can have a greater influence on the

editorial board than those who are freelance journalists. Another question

ary endeavours. Basically, whether he or she had

worked or was still working for another newspaper.

2. Questions concerning the respective newspaper. The first question in this

newspapers have a certain, at times very subtle political tendency. Reading some

of the articles beforehand, I had already noticed a certain orientation in every

newspaper and this question was aimed at the verification of the data previously

obtained. The

discourse and hence among politicians. Regarding the fixed set of criteria I have

put up for choosing the newspapers, it was important to find out whether the

journalists concurred with them a

3.

concerning the Status Law. This information is essential, since it will be

compared with the results that were provided by the analysis of the articles.

In the following chapter I shall apply the theoretical and methodological

approaches to the data obtained from my research: ethnic denotations, narratives and

interviews.

114 The only journalist who was not a graduate actually studied for three years and then quit.

71

4. Results

In this chapter I will present the results of the three analyses: the diachronic

analysis, the synchronic analysis and the interviews. There will be a short summary

following at the end of each subchapter.

4.1 Diachronic analysis

The diachronic analysis in this subchapter regards the variation of the discourse

as one of its prime objectives. This means that the turns and movements of the

respective journalistic narratives will be analysed over a long period of time. Since all

four newspapers ha

discursive event of the Hungarian Status Law that brings all four newspapers to a

common denominator115. This diachronic approach carves out the sector mentioned and

takes a look at different

results will be presented as a whole and not as segments. The minor discursive event of

the Orbán-

The bulk of data, which has been gathered for this section, encompasses

newspaper articles over a range of three years116. Due to the previously set criteria for

choosing articles, the number of articles analysed varies very strongly between the

Hungarian newspapers on the one side and the Romanian ones on the other.

Nevertheless, despite the relatively low number of Romanian printed publications, the

data was enough to take a diachronic view of the narratives represented

Siegfried Jäger, Katja Keweritsch and Abduraman Maho Awes, who took a long-term

approach to analysing the press (Jäger 2001, Keweritsch 1999, Maho Awes 1983). By

long-term I mean a period of at least two years. Unlike other works concerning the

Hungarian Status Law (Császár 2002, Bakk Bodo 2003), this thesis will not require

graphs to show how many articles were published each and every week. The idea is to

during that respective period.

The results are divided linguistically and hence politically: first, the two

Hungarian newspapers and then the two Romanian ones. Each linguistic section is then

divided into two elements of analysis: ethnic denotations and motifs. The ethnic

115 See Figure 3. 116 See Table 9.

72

therefore ethnicity. Although every denotation encompasses a different group of people,

the denotations are often used synonymously. The motifs, on the other hand, disclose

the narrative each newspaper uses to describe the co-ethnics. The six motifs chosen for

this part of the analysis are a result of a selective pre-reading and of a close observation

of the discourse during the years 2001 and 2002. The selected motifs are not exhaustive.

However they reflect the narratives from different perspectives117. A comparison

between the Hungarian and the Romanian newspapers will conclude this subchapter.

Table 9: Period of analysis

Newspaper Period of analysis Number of articles 24.12.2001-08.09.2003 30

Magyar Hírlap 10.01.2001-03.02.2003 227 Népszabadság 12.04.2001-23.12.2002 265

12.09.2001-19.07.2003 25

4.1.1 The Hungarian articles

Since the Hungarian articles were more numerous than the Romanian ones, I

shall consequently refer to them first and afterwards deal with the Romanian ones. For a

better overview of the available data I shall begin the analysis with the ethnic

denotations that have been utilised in Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap and then

continue with the motifs.

4.1.1.1 Ethnic denotations

Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty

Spivak wrote the following lines:

referred to, what the convention of words sets up as thing or thought, by a particular arrangement of words. The structure of reference works and can go on working not because of the identity between these two so-called component parts of the sign, but because of their relationship of difference. The sign marks 118

Further,

117 For a different set of motifs see Császár 2002. 118 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1997, p. xvi.

73

119

These short quotations reflect the nature of ethnic denotations: they are signs within the

discourse used by producers of texts, e.g. journalists, politicians or researchers, to try to

model, capture, symbolise and therefore create groups on an ethnic basis. With each and

every denotation there are connotations,

notion or he carves an ethnic group out of the myriad of possibilities. In other words,

ethnic denotations are signs, or signifiers for that matter, that are utilised to create the

signified, i.e. ethnic, groups. These groups, however, exist only through the signifiers

and their disposition in the respective discourse. These denotations are therefore either

nother aspect lies in the positions of power in which the

denotations are being placed and for which they are being used. Subsequently, there are

no ethnic groups as such. There are only ethnic groups, which exist through the sign, i.e.

the ethnic denotation.

Consequently, this category is very important to anthropology. Ethnicity and

identity are interwoven in these denotations, as ethnic denotations are politically highly

discursive. Writing about peoples or ethnic groups is not only an attempt to define them

but it also puts an inclusive and exclusive boundary around that group. One must bear in

mind that there is a certain balance in journalism between literary diversity, which is

meant to curb repetitions, and the more professional approach, which is trying to

achieve a certain consensus among authors by using fixed, technical terms. This

consensus means that everybody means the same thing by the same denotation. Thus,

red.

4.1.1.1.1 General features

Careful reading of the Hungarian newspapers has brought forward a

considerable sum of ethnic denotations in both Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap. This

data is represented in Table 10 below. There are some 126 different denotations, which

all describe different groups, but have one common denominator: they all encompass

people who consider themselves or are considered by others to be Magyar, i.e.

always mentioned, e.g. külföldiek [foreigners], the context surrounding it delivers the

119 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1997, p.xvii.

74

neighbouring states. In order to enable a better overview, here a few explanations on

this table:

- The first column represents a serial number for better reference.

- The second column gives the original denotation in Hungarian in alphabetical

order.

- In third column is the English translation of the respective Hungarian

denotation.

- The forth column indicates the number of appearances the respective denotation

had in Népszabadság (NSZ).

- The fifth column indicates the number of appearances the respective denotation

had in Magyar Hírlap (MH).

- Colours. Denotations that appeared only in Népszabadság, have been marked in

red, while those denotations that appeared only in Magyar Hírlap, have been

marked in blue. Denotations that appeared in both newspapers have been left

black.

- The table itself encompasses 23 denotations that explicitly refer to Transylvania

or Romania. They have a dark grey shade and are written in italics. These

denotations have been picked out and placed together in Table 10a, which will

be discussed separately in the following segment. Consequently, they will not be

analysed in this segment of the thesis.

75

Table 10: Hungarian denotations, which encompass the Hungarians of Romania

Hungarian denotations English translation MH NSZ

1 kisebbségek Magyar minorities that live in the indicated states 1

2 Államon kívüli magyarság Magyardom outside the state 1 3 Általános magyarság General Magyardom 1

4 Magyars who live outside their homeland 1

5 Anyaországtól elszakadt honfitársaink

Our compatriots who are separated from the homeland 1

6 Európai Unió tagjai lesznek

Magyars living in countries that will with time become members of the European Union

1

7 Magyars that live in detached territories 1

8 Magyar community that lives in Transylvania 1

9 Magyars who live in Transylvania 1 10 Erdélyi magyar kisebbség Transylvanian Magyar minority 3 11 Erdélyi magyar közösség Transylvanian Magyar community 2 2 12 Erdélyi magyar népesség Transylvanian Magyar population 1 13 Erdélyi magyar társaság Transylvanian Magyar society 1 14 Erdélyi magyarok Transylvanian Magyars 7 14 15 Erdélyi magyarság Transylvanian Magyardom 7 27 16 Erdélyiek Transylvanians 2 1 17 Etnikumú magyarok Ethnical Magyars 1 1

18 Határainkon túl ékisebbségek

Magyar minorities who live beyond our borders 1

19 Magyars who live beyond our borders 2

20 Magyardom that lives beyond our borders 1

21 Magyars who live outside the border 2 1

22 Magyar communities, which live beyond the border 1 2

23 emberek People of Magyar nationality who live beyond the border 1

24 arok Magyars who live beyond the border 5 9 25 Those who live beyond the border 1 1

26 Határon túl rekedt magyar kisebbségek

Magyar minorities that stuck fast beyond the border 1

27 Határon túl rekedt magyarság Magyardom that stuck fast beyond the border 1

28 Határon túli kisebbség Minority beyond the border 6 3 29 Határon túli közösségek Communities beyond the border 1 1 30 Határon túli magyar emberek Magyar people beyond the border 1 31 Határon túli magyar kisebbségek Magyar minorities beyond the border 1 6

32 Határon túli magyar közösségek Magyar communities beyond the border 5 5

33 Határon túli magyarok Magyars beyond the border 148 117 34 Határon túli magyarság Magyardom beyond the border 29 38 35 Határon túli személyek Persons beyond the border 1

76

36 Határon túli tartalék Reserves beyond the border 1 37 Határon túliak Those beyond the border 30 10 38 Helyi magyarság Local Magyardom 1 39 Kárpát medencei magyarok Magyars of the Carpathian Basin 3 40 Kárpát medencei magyarság Magyardom of the Carpathian Basin 1

41 Kárpátmedencei magyar kisebbségek

Magyar minorities of the Carpathian Basin 2 1

42 Magyar közösségek Magyar communities beyond the border that live state of minority 1

43 magyarok Magyars who live beyond the border as a minority 1

44 Kisebbségek Minorities 2 9 45 Kisebbséghez tartozó személyek Persons belonging to the minority 1

46 Kisebbségi magyar közösségek Magyar communities in state of minority 1

47 Kisebbségi magyar közösségek tagjai

Members of Magyar communities in state of minority 1

48 Kisebbségi magyarok Magyars in state of minority 12 49 Kisebbségi magyarság Magyardom in state of minority 5 50 Kisebbségi sorba jutott magyarság Magyardom that has become minority 1

51 Magyars who live in the destiny of a minority 1

52 Magyars in the surrounding countries 2 5 53 Közösségek Communities 1 54 Külföldi állampolgárok Foreign citizens 1 55 Külföldi magyarok Magyars from abroad 1 56 Külföldiek Foreigners 1 57 Compatriots that live abroad 1 58 Magyars living abroad 2 2 59 Magyardom that lives abroad 1 1 60 Külhoni magyarok Magyars outside the home land 1

61 Magukat magyarnak valló személyek Persons who consider themselves Magyars 1

62 Magukat magyaroknak vallók Who consider themselves Magyars 1 63 Magyar etnikumhoz tartozók Those who belong to Magyar ethnic 1

64 Magyar etnikumhoz tatozó állampolgárok Citizens who belong to Magyar ethnic 1

65 Magyar etnikumú román állampolgárok Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnic 1

66 Magyar kisebbség tagjai Members of the Magyar minority 1 67 Magyar kisebbségek Magyar minorities 7 32

68 Magyar kisebbséghez tartozó személyek

Persons who belong to the Magyar minority 1

69 Magyar közösség Magyar community 1 5

70 állampolgárok Romanian citizens of Magyar nationality 1 2

71 Magyar Nemzet Magyar nation 1

72 Magyar nemzethez tartozó csoportok Groups that belong to the Magyar nation 1

73 Of Magyar nationality 2 1 74 Citizens of Magyar nationality 1

77

75 Those of Magyar nationality 3

76 Magyar önazonosságot valló román állampolgárok

Romanian citizens who declare their Magyar identity 1

77 Magyarok Magyars 3 5

78 Magyarok akik önhibájukon kívül kerültek a határainkon túlva

Magyars not guilty for falling beyond our borders 1

79 Magyaro

Persons of Magyar nationality, who live 1

80 magyarok borders 1 1

81 magyarok borders 1

82 Magyarország szomszédos

Magyar minorities who live in 1

83 Magyars who live outside Hungary 1 84 Magyarság Magyardom 6 9 85 Nem magyar polgárságú magyarok Magyars who are not Magyar citizens 1 86 Nemzet Nation 1 87 Nemzet külhoni fele 1 88 Nemzet részei Parts of the nation 1 89 Nemzeti kisebbség National minority 3 90 Nemzeti magyar kisebbség National Magyar minority 1

91 Magyardom that lives outside the 1

92 Magyar minority that lives within the country 1

93 Magyar communities that live there 1 94 gyar származású polgárok Citizens of Magyar origin who live there 1 95 Magyars that live there 3 96 Ottani magyarok Magyars from there 1 3 97 Ottani magyarság Magyardom from there 2

98 Magyars who live territory 1

99 kisebbség National Magyar minority that lives in Romania 1

100 Magyars who live in Romania 1 101 National minority that lives in Romania 1

102 állampolgárságú személyek

Persons, who live in Romania, consider themselves to be of Magyar nationality not Hungarian citizens

2

103 Romániai magyar kisebbség Romanian Magyar minority 5 5 104 Romániai magyar közösség Romanian Magyar community 2 3 105 Romániai magyar nemzeti kisebbség Romanian national Magyar minority 1 106 Romániai magyarok Romanian Magyars 12 18 107 Romániai magyarság Romanian Magyardom 16 25 108 Státusmagyarok Status Magyars 5 3

109 S Magyars who live in the neighbouring states 24 7

110 Szomszéd országok magyar származású lakosai

Inhabitants of the neighbouring countries of Magyar descent 1

111 Magyar communities and those of 1

78

közösségek és magyar nemze

Magyar nationality that live in the neighbouring countries

112 magyarok Magyars who live in the neighbouring countries 15 12

113 Szomszédos államok magyarsága Magyardom in the neighbouring states 1

114 kisebbségek Magyar minorities that live in the neighbouring states 1

115 Persons of Magyar nationality who live in the neighbouring states 1

116 Szomszédmagyarság

Magyardom that lives in the neighbouring states 3

117 Szomszédos országbeli magyarság Magyardom of the neighbouring countries 1

118 magyar kisebbségek Magyar minorities who live in the neighbouring countries 5

119 Persons of Magyar nationality who live in the neighbouring countries 1

120 magyarság Magyardom that lives in the neighbouring countries 2

121 Szomszédos orszánemzetrészek

Parts of the nation which live in the neighbouring countries 1

122 magyarok Minority Magyars who live in scattered settlements 1

123 Magyars who live in scattered settlements 1

124 Magyardom that lives within its territory 1

125 Trianoni határokon kívül rekedt magyarság kisebbsége

The minor part of Magyardom that remained outside the Trianon borders 1

The main features of this table will be discussed first and afterward I shall turn

to some of the differences between the two Hungarian newspapers. Hence, the general

characteristics of the table are:

1. Abroad. There are different expressions, which are used to symbolise the notion

of abroad: határ [border] in Nos. 18-37, 78-81 and 91, külföld [abroad] in Nos.

54-59, ott/ottani [there/from there,] in Nos. 93-97 and szomszéd [neighbour] in

Nos. 109-120. The denotation határon túli magyarok is the most common

denotation of them all. The semantics of describing a group of people as being

something abroad bears evidence to the ambiguity of the relationship between

the Hungarian state and the Hungarians in the neighbouring states: political

separation on the one hand and cultural and linguistic unity on the other. Határ,

külföld, szomszéd and ott describe a group of people, who are somewhere apart,

beyond, separated from the core, which is the position of the author, in this case

the journalists publishing in Hungary. This is somewhat confusing when

journalists from Romania, Ukraine or Slovakia write from their home state about

79

referring at the same time to fellow Slovak or Romanian citizens with ethnic

Hungarian background.

2. Trianon. Although mentioned explicitly only in one denotation (No. 125), there

are many that imply a connotation to that Treaty from 1920: Nos. 5, 7, 26, 27,

neighbouring states were prior to 1920 in Hungary120. Consequently, the Treaty

of Trianon has created a situation in which there are Hungarians in all of

fact that Hungarians live in the neighbouring countries in a state of minority is

obviously not their fault. Relating to sors [destiny], önhibájukon kívül [not their

fault] or rekedt [got stuck] suggest that those groups would have liked the

situation to be different but cannot do anything about it. While Trianon has a

connotation of the revisionist period between 1920 and 1945, the listed

denotations, with the exception of No. 125, try to recall the reason for the

was T

historic events they are relying on.

3. Nation. Referring to the co-ethnics as a nation, expatriates or parts of a nation, or

for that matter of the homeland, is a very common motif: Nos. 23, 57, 60, 71-75,

79, 86-

somewhat indistinct manner, since its usage does not include the structure of a

stat

being the cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation. This means that the nation is

conceived as an entity that is beyond the existent political borders, and therefore

the element of the state is excluded. This is a debate that has gathered

momentum with the significant enlargement of the European Union (EU) in

2004 and 2007121. According to some, e.g. Krisztián Ungvári, the Hungarian

cultural and linguistic nation will be reunited in a EU without the political

considered as a substitute for ethnic minority, relying on the Hungarian

120 See Chapter 2 for further detail. 121 Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Slovenia have joined the EU in 2004 while Romanian joined in 2007. Thus, over 80% of all co-ethnics and 96% of all Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin are members of a single supra-national political entity: the European Union.

80

definition of minorities. This usage refers to the Hungarian law concerning the

national and ethnic minorities within Hungary from 1993. This very progressive

law only made linguistic differentiations between ethnic and national minorities:

the latter have a mother-nation, which the first ones do not (Küpper 1998). In

other words, when applying this logic to the Hungarians that live in Romania,

Slovakia or Serbia, they are not just a local ethnic phenomenon, but they are part

of a greater whole, namely the Hungarian nation. Thirdly, there is the notion that

refers to the personal belonging to a nation. On the personal level, this notion of

means of expression, identification and/or segregation.

4. Self- tion is rare and is

represented only in denotations Nos. 61 and 62. These two denotations are an

indicator to the fact that the journalists use their own categories and do not relate

to the self-definitions initiated by those personally affected122. Had the

journalists used more of these denotations they would have given up the position

of power they exert in the discourse in question. However, I still consider these

denotations to be concealed etic ones. By using denotations 61 and 62, the

journalists transmitted an impression that the denotations are more neutral and

more authentic than the other denotations. Nevertheless, if the group they are

referring to consists of people who consider themselves to be Magyars or

Hungarians, it is still an etic definition because it is not the ones involved, i.e.

the Hungarians or Magyars, that speak but the journalists who carve out a group

that they say considers itself to be a group with distinct characteristics. It is not

those who perform their ethnicity that talk. Hence, there are people who consider

themselves Magyars and who are defined by the journalists as a group. It is still

the journalists that decide and not those who are denotated.

5. Reserves. This denotation, No. 36, used by Hungarian prime minister Orbán in a

radio interview in January 2001 and repeated in Magyar Hírlap has a clear

economic reference. Orbán was trying to push the debate surrounding the

Hungarian Status Law into the economic segment of the political discourse. The

denotation határon túli tartalék [Reserves beyond the border] suggests that

Hungary has a depot of labour force beyond its borders, which it can plug on in

to whom Orbán was referring, stand there waiting for the mother nation to call

122 When the journalist writes from abroad, he does refer to himself indirectly.

81

them. Orbán was trying to show that the Status Law is a necessity to the

Hungarian economy due to the brain drain from Hungary to the West. His idea

was to get skilled personnel from the neighbouring states that speaks Hungarian,

is highly qualified and is willing to work for a better wage in Hungary.

Experience after 2002 has shown that the benefits granted by the Status Law and

the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) have not instigated a wave of

emigration from the neighbouring states to Hungary123.

6. Carpathian Basin. The denotations with reference to the Carpathian Basin, Nos.

39-41, pay tribute to a specific political correctness. The Kingdom of Hungary

up to 1920 encompassed roughly the geographical territory of the Carpathian

Basin. Consequently, there was a certain superposition between the political and

the geographical borders. This coincidence is used to name the territory of the

defunct kingdom in geographical and not in political terms124. This usage also

avoids probable political controversies. The basin in question hence becomes

synonymous with a territory that includes all the Hungarian lands and that is

inhabited by Hungarians in Central Europe.

7. Status Hungarians. This denotation, No. 108, is mentioned only in a single form

but eight times: three times in Népszabadság and five times in Magyar Hírlap.

Astonishingly, it is the only direct reference to the Status Law in the entire table.

I assume that most denotations were common before the debate over the

Hungarian Status Law was set loose and therefore the journalists did not need

any specific denotations to correlate the Status Law with the Hungarians in the

neighbouring states. Apparently, the journalists took it for granted that the

readers knew whom they meant.

8. Abroad versus Nation. There is a hidden contradiction when using elements that

-

117 and 119-121). The problem lies in the discord between the concept of nation

or Magyardom and the political reality in Central and Eastern Europe. Abroad

suggests segregation and division while nation and Magyardom suggest unity. If

the journalists talk of the Magyar nation, then it should be used in a way that

excludes the political reality of a cultural and linguistic group that is dispersed in

different states. The modern nation, the way I understand it, includes some 123 Interview with Norbert Molnár. 124 Another possibility would be István, who was the first Hungarian king.

82

relation to the political structure of a state. There cannot be a political nation

without a state. This state of affairs, however, reflects a stubborn problem in the

Hungarian political discourse regarding the co-ethnics (Ahn 2006).

The two Hungarian newspapers analysed in this section, Népszabadság and

Magyar Hírlap, also reveal a set of differences in the ethnic denotations they have used

in the course of the discourse:

1. Neighbours125. There is a basic difference between the two Hungarian

newspapers in relation to the usage of szomszéd [neighbour]. From the 13

denotations that include szomszéd, Magyar Hírlap used only two exclusively,

while Népszabadság used nine. The two denotations, which were common to

Magyar Hírlap made an extensive use of these denotations while Népszabadság

used other, e.g. Nos. 116 and 118. As a result, the journalists at Magyar Hírlap

laid an emphasis on the fact that the co-ethnics live in the neighbouring

states/countries while those at Népszabadság took a larger variety of possible

denotations into consideration. This bears evidence to the fact that the journalists

at Magyar Hírlap shared a more common perception of denoting the co-ethnics

while the journalists at Népszabadság had a more differentiated perspective.

2. Abroad126. The three denotations 33, 34 and 37 make up over half of the

denotations used in the Hungarian newspapers at stake between 2001 and 2003.

Bearing in mind the fact that Népszabadság has not only used more denotations

exclusively than Magyar Hírlap, 52 denotations at Népszabadság in comparison

to 23 at Magyar Hírlap, but has used these also more frequently, two of the three

denotation mentioned above are an exception: No. 33 and 37. These frequently

used denotations show a tendency among Magyar Hírlap journalists to stick to a

restricted set of denotations, which has an official character. The Government

Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, for example, bears the Hungarian name

Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala127. Both denotations use the expression

határon túli, which means beyond the border or abroad. Using abroad frequently

also shows that Magyar Hírlap journalists are more conscious or more aware of

istence. There is less appeasing and perhaps deceiving

talk about the Hungarian nation and a stronger emphasis on the political reality: 125 Denotations Nos. 110-122 126 Denotations Nos. 19-38 127 See also www.htmh.hu.

83

the co-ethnics are citizens of different adjacent states and not part of a nation

composed of an ethnic group with its state.

3. Minority128. The journalists at Népszabadság make an extensive use of kisebbség

[minority]. Using minority in this context stresses the numerical inferiority and

the consequential political vulnerability of the co-

neighbouring states. Népszabadság uses 16 denotations exclusively while

Magyar Hírlap uses only six of them exclusively. It is, however, denotations 44

and especially 68, which are used by journalists from both newspapers, that

reveal the quantitative difference. Apparently, the journalists at Magyar Hírlap

are not keen on underlying the co-ethnics state of minority. Furthermore, writing

about a group and defining it as a minority has political connotations: minority

rights. This is again a hidden indication of the law concerning the national end

ethnic minorities in Hungary. In other words, if the co-ethnics form minorities in

they deserve. According to my assessment, this point of view is represented in

Népszabadság articles more dominantly than in Magyar Hírlap.

4. Nation and ethnic129. There is a high number of denotations regarding national

belonging and ethnicity. Both Hungarian newspapers have used them with a

significant frequency. However, reference to the co-

and ethnicity has been more common in Népszabadság than in Magyar Hírlap.

Népszabadság has used 14 denotations exclusively in comparison to Magyar

-ethnics by using terms such

-border belonging. In other

words, the co-ethnics form a part of a larger whole: the Hungarian nation. Hence

the co-ethnics are not separated groups in different states. Furthermore, by using

the terms such as national, the co-ethnics gain a certain political prestige: being

part of a larger nation puts the co-ethnics in a stronger position than other ethnic

groups or minorities which cannot do the same, e.g. the Roma (Gypsies).

4.1.1.1.2 Denotations regarding only Romania and Transylvania

Taking a deeper look at 22 denotations, which refer to Transylvania or Romania

only, is important because of the semantic fields that engulf these denotations130. These

wo discourses intersect: The public discourse in 128 Denotations Nos. 1, 18, 26, 28, 31, 41-51, 66-68, 82, 89, 90, 92, 114, 118, 122, and 125 129 Denotations Nos. 17, 23, 63-65, 71-75, 79, 86-90, 111, 115, 119, and 122 130 See Table 10a.

84

Hungary concerning the Hungarians in the neighbouring states and the public discourse

in Romania concerning the minorities in Romania. The discourses overlap in the sectors

regarding the Hungarians in Romania131.

Table 10a: Hungarian denotations, which refer explicitly to Hungarians in Romania

Hungarian denotations English translation MH NSZ

1 Magyar community that lives in Transylvania 1

2 Magyars who live in Transylvania 1 3 Erdélyi magyar kisebbség Transylvanian Magyar minority 3 4 Erdélyi magyar közösség Transylvanian Magyar community 2 2 5 Erdélyi magyar népesség Transylvanian Magyar population 1 6 Erdélyi magyar társaság Transylvanian Magyar society 1 7 Erdélyi magyarok Transylvanian Magyars 7 14 8 Erdélyi magyarság Transylvanian Magyardom 7 27 9 Erdélyiek Transylvanians 2 1

10 Magyar etnikumú román állampolgárok Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnic 1

11 állampolgárok Romanian citizens of Magyar nationality 1 2

12 Magyar önazonosságot valló román állampolgárok

Romanian citizens who declare their Magyar identity 1

13 Magyars who live on Romanian territory 1

14 kisebbség National Magyar minority that lives in Romania 1

15 Magyars who live in Romania 1

16 kisebbség National minority that lives in Romania 1

17 Romániába

állampolgárságú személyek

Persons who live in Romania, consider themselves to be of Magyar nationality are not Hungarian citizens

2

18 Romániai magyar kisebbség Romanian Magyar minority 5 5 19 Romániai magyar közösség Romanian Magyar community 2 3

20 Romániai magyar nemzeti kisebbség Romanian national Magyar minority 1

21 Romániai magyarok Romanian Magyars 12 18 22 Romániai magyarság Romanian Magyardom 16 25

As with Table 10, the red colour is used for denotations used only in Népszabadság

(NSZ) while blue is used for those denotations that appear only in Magyar Hírlap (MH).

Those denotations, which are represented in both papers, were left black. The numbers

in the last two columns, NSZ and MH, represent the number of appearances in each

newspaper.

131 See Figure 3.

85

Before analysing a few differences between the two Hungarian newspapers, I

denotations concerning Transylvania, then moving forward to those concerning

Romania and ending with a few characteristics of this table:

1. Power and hegemony. Using Erdély [Transylvania] to describe a certain ethnic

group is not just a geographical localisation. It is a nationalisation of geography

(Donnan Wilson 2001). Bearing in mind that Transylvania was a sovereign

Hungarian principality for a considerable time in the 16th and 17th centuries,

Erdély is a symbol of power. The Renaissance principality has kept up the light

of Hungarian culture and language during the period of division in those

centuries, while the Ottomans reigned in central Hungary and the Habsburgs

ruled in the western and northern parts132. Despite the loss of its extended

autonomy by the 17th century, Transylvania remained a principality in which

three groups dominated political and economic life: Hungarians, Transylvanian

Saxons and Seklers133. This internal political situation did not change

significantly until Transylvania became a part of Romania. However, Erdély is

not used against the Transylvanian Saxons, but against competing claims over

Transylvania from the Romanian side (Puttkamer 2003). In all, using Erdély

casts aside the Treaty of Trianon, by which Hungary had to give up Transylvania

to Romania.

2. Superiority. Erdély also encompasses a trait of supremacy. As already

mentioned, Hungarians, together with the Hungarian-speaking Seklers and the

Transylvanian Saxons, were economically, politically, academically and even

ecclesiastically the dominant groups in the sovereign principality of

Transylvania. In contrast, Romanians, or Vlahs, as they called themselves up to

the second half of the 18th century, were mainly farmers and shepherds, who

were not allowed to settle in the Hungarian or Saxon towns. According to some

estimation, Romanians formed the majority of the population by the end of that

century (Hitchins 2003). Consequently, Erdély represents a time when

Hungarians were dominant in Transylvania and therefore has an aura of

superiority.

3. Exclusion. By using denotations that refer to Erdély to describe the Hungarians

in Romania, the journalists avoid mentioning Romania: if the term Erdély is

132 See also Table 4 for further details. 133 See Chapter 2.

86

used, then there is no need to use Romania as a geographical or political

reference. Consequently, the political connotation that goes with Romania,

which was often one of ethnic oppression and discrimination (Andreescu 2001),

is put aside and only the historical, illustrious Hungarian term is valid. Here

language is changing the political perception.

4. Synonym. When discussing the Hungarians in Romania using Erdély could

imply that one is referring only to a certain group of Hungarians within

Romania. While Romania is a political name and has only been existent since

the middle of the 19th century, Erdély, on the other hand, ceased to be a political

entity 150 years ago. However, Erdély has remained a geographical term and a

synonym for all the territories Hungary lost to Romania after World War I.

Subsequently, Erdély also includes other regions in Romania with a considerable

Hungarian popula

5. Authenticity. Erdély has become a symbol of genuine Hungarian culture in the

seventies of the 20th century. In that period of socialist Hungary, young people

initiated a movement, which was later to be known as the Táncház [dancing hall]

of this movement practiced a revival of Hungarian folklore, mainly in dance

(hence the name), dress and music. Realising that many folkloristic elements

were still commonly practiced in Erdély, many travelled to Transylvania in order

Erdély as a genuine

Hungarian piece of land where old traditions are kept and practiced. In other

words, a different Hungary, which was not corrupted by the urbanising,

proletarian-socialist system at home (Kürti 2001).

6. Romania as territorial point of reference. One of the significant issues in the

Romanian discourse concerning the minorities within Romania is the issue of

approving territorial autonomy to the Seklerland, where Romanians form a

minority. Those journalists, who use the term Romania, avoid distinguishing

between different zones in Romania. Hence, Romania becomes a general point

of reference without a hint to any aspirations of territorial autonomy in

Seklerland in particular or to Transylvania as a whole.

7. Representation in the whole of Romania. Using the denotation romániai

magyarok [Romanian Magyars], suggests that Hungarians are considerably

87

represented in every jude [county] of the 40 counties in Romania. According to

the latest statistics, this is not the case134.

8. Simplicity. No other geographical name from Romania with Hungarian

cover all the areas concerned and do not have to produce a detailed list. Again, it

counties.

9. Nemzet [nation]. The derivations nemzeti [national] and nemzetiség [nationality]

in combination with the numerical category kisebbség [minority] are used only

in connection with Romania and not once with Transylvania. I assume that the

journalists take for granted the idea that the Hungarians of Transylvania

represent a nation. Not so in Romania as a whole, where there seems to be a

need to distinguish between at least two nations: a Hungarian and a Romanian

one.

10. Magyar/Magyardom. The ethnonym and its derivation are used for different

trajectories. Magyar is used together with a classifying social quantification:

állampolgarok [citizens], kisebbség [minority], közösség [community],

személyek [persons], népesség [population] or társaság [society]. The

quantification shows what the author intended: political correctness (citizens),

peril of extinction (minority), social interaction (community), individualism

(persons), national consciousness (population) or complex social structure

(society). Magyardom, on the other hand, symbolises an entity, which is beyond

just the physical presence of the people. It refers to literature, culture, mentality

and even stereotypes, which are supposed to characterise the Hungarians and

distinguish them from others, i.e. Romanians.

A close analysis of Table 10a reveals that there are four principal differences

between Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap:

1. Erdély versus Romania. There are two sets of denotations, which are common in

Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap alike: erdélyi magyarok [Transylvanian

Magyars] and erdélyi magyarság [Transylvanian Magyardom] on the one hand

and romániai magyarok and romániai magyarság [Romanian Magyars and

Romanian Magyardom] on the other (Nos. 7, 8, 21 and 22 respectively). At

Népszabadság they have a ratio of 41:43. In Magyar Hírlap they have a ratio of

14:28. This clearly indicates that the journalists of Magyar Hírlap prefer to use

134 See www.udmr.ro for further details.

88

refers to the neighbouring states, which in this case means Romania135. The

usage of Erdély in this context reveals a more national narrative at

therefore uses Romania more frequently than Transylvania.

2. Emic approach. Unlike Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap presents two denotations

(Nos. 12 and 17), which bear evidence of the co-

Denotation 12 is about Romanian citizens who declare their Magyar identity 136. Again,

not

present in Népszabadság. However, it does not solve the basic problem of

denoting the previously mentioned: the narrative creates a group by denoting a

group of people and then it goes on to suggest that that very group wants to

denote itself in the same way. The problem is that the created group cannot

articulate itself because it exists only through the denotation used in the

e is no significant difference

defines itself, both denotations would be a part of a discourse, which shows that

journalists are in the position to exert power upon a specific group of people in

Romania. Nevertheless, the denotations used by Magyar Hírlap at least show

certain awareness to the position the groups in question might be taking.

3. Nemzet [Nation]. Népszabadság uses nemzet and its derivation nemzeti

[national] more often than Magyar Hírlap. If we exclude denotation 17, which is

a clear reference to the legal definition of the Status Law, then we find that there

are three denotations with nemzeti (Nos. 14, 16 and 20) which are used solely in

Népszabadság and one denotation which is used in both papers: No. 11. Using

Romania are a nation or a national minority. Denoting Hungarians as a nation

has the connotation of an ethnic group which has an equal status to that of other

major groups, in this case the Romanians. Subsequently, the conclusion is that

there are at least two nations in Romania: a Romanian and a Hungarian one.

135 See Appendices 1 and 3. 136 See Appendix 1.

89

Secondly, Hungarian law differentiates between national and ethnic minorities

within Hungary, who have the same rights and vary only by name. Furthermore,

conclude that the reference to the term nemzeti should evoke the same important

position for Hungarians in Romania, as is the case with the national minorities in

Hungary: the status of state-building factors137.

4. Magyardom/Magyars. Magyarság [Magyardom] is used more frequently in both

papers than magyarok [Magyars]: For Népszabadság they have a ratio of 52:34

while in Magyar Hírlap the ratio is 23:20. Although the difference in Magyar

Hírlap may not be large, the Status Law, about which this discourse is

concerned, clearly refers to Hungarians (Magyars) and not to Magyardom138.

Therefore, Népszabadság is referring to more than just the people they consider

to be Hungarians. According to this extended use of Magyardom,

anguage et

concerned with people than with abstract constructs.

4.1.1.2 Motifs

The motifs chosen for this discourse analysis represent a visualisation of the

low. Their existence is an indicator to the means of argumentation and

description used by the journalists to make their case139. Although not exhaustive, they

among the four newspapers. For the analysis below I shall always start by describing the

4.1.1.2.1 Europe

n Status

Law is not compliant with European norms. With few exceptions, the authors do not

mention the European norms with which the Status Law is supposedly not compliant140.

It was only after Romania appealed to the Council of Europe and Hungary asked the

Venice Commission141 to analyse the Status Law in comparison with similar laws that

137 See Appendix 6. 138 See Appendices 1 and 3. 139 See also Chapter 3. 140 See also Voigt 2005. 141 The Venice Commission is an advisory body to the Council of Europe in matters of human and minority rights.

90

Romanian politicians started explaining what they consider faulty about the Law. It was

the principle of non-interference that worried them. The European Convention on

Human Rights (ECHR), which concerns minority rights, states that ethnic minorities

should be protected by the state in which they live and not by other states that share

similar ethnic or linguistic features142

view,

concerns about the Status Law. On a specific issue there is a consensus between both

sides and it is manifested in the declarations made in Bucharest as well as in Budapest.

Both sides seem to agree on the fact that Hungary should help Romania in its efforts to

become a member of the European Union (EU). However, the Romanian politicians do

not mention why Hungary is so keen on supporting Romania. Apparently it was

common sense in Hungarian politics to support the EU membership aspirations of

Slovakia (after 1998) and Romania (after 1996). Out of 2.5 million Hungarians living in

eighbouring states, those living in Slovakia and Romania make up over

80% of the co-ethnics143. Taking for granted that their judicial and economical status

states should receive full EU membership. One exception to this general consensus is

Hungarians in the neighbouring states cannot be a partner of the Hungarian

government144.

The most frequently

Adrian 145 and the Hungarian secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh146.

This is remarkable since they have different political duties. Nevertheless it is Németh

Romanian politician who attacked the Status Law most fiercely. It is further noteworthy

that it was Németh who announced the Orbán-Nastase Memorandum in Hungary once it

142 See path: 22.09.2006 http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/Basic+Texts/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights+and+its+Protocols/ 143 See Table 5. 144 NSZ25.01.2002, path: 11.08.2003 wysiwyg://120/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 145 NSZ26.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://130/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 146 NSZ19.04.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://128/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

91

was signed, and not one of his superiors, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán or Foreign

Minister János Martonyi.

Romanian and various European representatives. The tenor of the argumentation is the

question as to whether the Hungarian Status Law conforms with European law.

Unfortunately, neither the journalists nor the politicians explain to which European law

they are referring. Furthermore there is a blur between the different European

organisations and institutions, e.g. the Council of Europe (CE) or the Organisation for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Thus, Europe and its various institutions

have been transformed from a geographical expression encompassing different political

entities to become a symbol used for various political purposes.

Members of the Hungarian cabinet, especially Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and

Foreign Minister János Martonyi, have constantly insisted throughout the debate that

the Hungarian Status Law corresponds with European law147. The Alliance of Free

d the Status Law from the very beginning, was

hardly referred to in Magyar Hírlap148: March 2001 and then January 2002149. It is also

remarkable that Magyar Hírlap does not make any reference to the leading opposition

party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), before this party won the elections in

April 2002. Unlike in Népszabadság, secretary of tate in the Hungarian Foreign Office,

Magyar Hírlap referred to Prime Minister Orbán at one point when he stated that

the co-ethnics are a European issue150. This statement indicated the characteristics of the

Orbán government through the year 2001: informing only the Western States, the

European Union and other European institutions. This was considered essential while

informing the neighbouring states was not. By informing all EU member states and

ignoring the neighbours, as Orbán151 and Martonyi152 declared, the Orbán government

has shown both Romania and Slovakia how little they think o

my opinion they, i.e. Orbán and Martonyi, have considered Hungary to have a strong

enough stand diplomatically in the European institutions to be able to pull through the

Status Law without taking the neighbouring states into consideration.

147 MH10.01.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://288/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php and MH11.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://713/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 148 MH01.03.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://353/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 149 MH22.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://687/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 150 MH26.10.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://154/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 151 MH03.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://646/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 152 MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://693/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

92

represented through the declarations made by President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister

with EU law153, Iliescu considers the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN),

which enables the co- -

154 of state, Ion Iliescu, [the CHN] is an un- European gesture.]

It is interesting to note that the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

European laws, although the position of other Romanian parties in this issue is

documented155.

European side. This side, however, is heterogeneous and represents the views of

different European institutions. Both the report put forward by the Venice

Commission156 157 have been interpreted by the

two governments in their own favour and as supporting their respective political stand

against the other side. Apparently, it was not so important what the reports on the

Hungarian Status Law said and how it stood in comparison to other laws of status. It

European Commission at that time, Romano Prodi, has emphasized the quintessence of

all reports: the two states have to negotiate in order to achieve a consensus on the Status

Law158.

4.1.1.2.2 Comparison

The narrative presented by Népszabadság in this motif is almost entirely from

the Hungarian point of view. If we exclude the two short interviews with Hungarian

politicians from Romania who are members of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians

153 MH14.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://433/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php and MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://676/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 154 MH19.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://548/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 155 MH15.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 156 MH20.10.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://132/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php and MH30.10.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://171/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 157 MH14.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://226/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 158 MH25.07.2001, path: 14,.02.2003 wysiwyg://794/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

93

it becomes obvious that Népszabadság has used the element of comparison only from

the Hungarian perspective. Considering that the Romanian politicians kept repeating the

-European character, one would have expected them to bring some examples

for similar laws that could be used as a counterpoint to the Hungarian stand. This,

however, did not take place and it is not clear whether it is because the Romanian

politicians did not react to the Status Law with by comparing it to similar laws or

because Népszabadság has not published their views. Subsequently, the arguments put

forward by different journalists and politicians include the following various arguments:

1. Other states also have similar laws159. This is to demonstrate that having such a

law is common practice in Europe. Hence, Hungary is acting just like any other

state in the region and the Status Law itself is not unusual.

2. The Hungarian Status Law grants much less than similar laws160. This argument

It

says indirectly that the other states, in this case most probably Slovakia and

Romania, grant their own co-ethnics across the border, e.g. Slovaks in Hungary

and Romania or Romanians in Hungary or Moldova, more than Hungary does

for its co-ethnics. In other words, the other states are in no position to complain

since they are doing much more for their own co-ethnics than Hungary161.

3. Romania did not complain about the Slovak and Croatian laws of status162. This

claim is an old one and dates back to the beginning of the nineties, when

exodus. The line of thought is, if Romania did not bother about Germany

granting i

bother about the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) that includes less

benefits and privileges than a citizenship? Or, why bother with the Hungarian

Status Law, when Romania did not bother with the similar laws of other states?

There is an undertone and even accusation of unjust treatment of the matter

Románia nem ellenezheti a magyar törvény alkalmazását, miután a hasonló

159 NSZ14.05.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://416/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 160 NSZ25.04.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://273/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 161 See Halász Majtényi 2002. 162 NSZ29.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://165/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

94

szlovák és horvát jogszabályok ellen nem emelt semmilyen kifogást. 163

Romania cannot oppose the application of the Hungarian law [i.e. the Hungarian

Status Law] since it has not raised any objections against the Slovak and

Croatian laws].

4. Romania did not lead any consultations with the Republic of Moldova before

passing its own naturalisation law164

that Hungary did not conduct any consultations with the neighbouring states.

naturalisation law vis-à-vis Ukraine and especially Moldova. The government of

Moldova accused Romania for trying to undermine the stat

granting Romanian citizenship to all those living in Moldova, whose ancestors

were Romanian citizens between 1920 and 1940. Practically, this means that

Consequently, with this argument, Hungary is saying that Romania does not

practice what it preaches.

5.

group. Hungarian students of Romanian ethnic background are entitled to study

free of charge a 165. The Romanian

state, however, does demand an act of identification that clearly shows that the

holder is a Romanian co-ethnic holding a foreign passport. The statement behind

this argument is, that Romania should not complain about the Certificate of

Hungarian Nationality (CHN) for its co-ethnics in Romania, since Romania is

demanding the same thing from foreign students. Again, Romania is practicing

something, which it condemns when done by others.

Népszabadság also adds the translated texts of the two most crucial laws in this

debate: the Romanian Naturalisation Law166, passed through Romanian parliament on

the 15th March 2000 and the Slovak Status Law, passed through Slovak parliament on

the 14th February 1997. The fact that the texts appear as a supplement to the articles is a

very important step towards a differentiated point of view and therefore a better

understanding of the complex situation. It enables the reader a short comparison

between all three laws and hence to make up his own mind.

163 NSZ07.09.2001, path: 06.08.2003 wysiwyg://73/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 164 NSZ23.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://116/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 165 NSZ28.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://150/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 166 NSZ23.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://116/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

95

The use of this motif in Magyar Hírlap is restricted to positions represented by

Hungarian politics. The Romanian side is not represented at all. The only non-

Hungarian voice to be referred to in respect of this motif

(EPP). This European party stated that Germany grants its co-ethnics in other countries

much more than the Hungarian Status Law does, namely German citizenship.

Roughly, the main difference in all statements made in this regard is whether the

comparison is aimed at the neighbouring states or at other states, which did not

complain about the Hungarian Status Law. Comparisons with Portugal167, Germany or

any other European state168, are an attempt to take the debate about the Hungarian

Status Law out of its Central European context and give it a European perspective.

Magyar Hírlap offers a short list of comparable information only a year after the Status

Law came into effect169. The essential comparison made by Hungarian politicians is

between the Hungarian Status Law and the comparable laws in Slovakia and Romania.

On one occasion the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán even announced that the

Slovak Status Law had inspired the Hungarian government while drafting the

Hungarian Status Law170

different point171. According to him, the difference between the various laws of status in

co-ethnics that makes it so different from the laws of status in the surrounding states172.

The main features of the Hungarian standpoint, as Magyar Hírlap presents it, can

be summed as follows:

- Other states also have their laws of status so there is no justification to the

aggravation surrounding the Hungarian Status Law.

- Neither Romania nor Slovakia has consulted Hungary when these states passed

their similar laws.

- Referring to the Slovak Status Law as a guideline to the respective Hungarian

law, Prime Minister Orbán and other members of his party173, the Young

ludicrous.

167 MH10.01.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://288/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 168 MH25.01.2003, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://113/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 169 Idem. 170 MH24.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://405/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 171 MH19.02.2003, path: 09.11.2001 wysiwyg://215/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 172 The ratio between Slovaks in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovakia is approximately 1:30. The ratio between Romanians in Hungary and Hungarians in Romania is circa 1:180. See also Table 5, Demeter Zayzon 1999 and Gyurgyík 2003. 173 MH28.11.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://817/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

96

- The Romanian Status Law is mentioned a single time when journalist Tibor

Bogdán compares the Romanian law with the Hungarian one174.

4.1.1.2.3 Discrimination

It is difficult to define discrimination. In the context of this work I understand

discrimination as a condition of unfair treatment of a group of people by the given

ups receive certain benefits,

which other groups do not, although there is no legal justification to that preferential

treatment. Furthermore, the actual perception of the groups involved does not play a

significant role. The political elite set off the accusation of discrimination and utilised

the situation for their own purposes. In other words, it is not those affected that contest

the situation that led to discrimination. According to my knowledge there have not been

any public demonstrations in Romania in this sense, be it by Hungarians or Romanians.

The elites involved are an external factor claiming injustice in the name of people

whose position in this matter is hardly representative.

e Romanian

side saying that the Status Law is discriminative and the Hungarian side saying it is not.

This already indicates that Népszabadság is trying to put forward arguments from both

sides. It is noteworthy that the Romanian side hardly says what exactly it considers to

be discriminatory in the Status Law. There are only a few cases where Prime Minister 175. He

considered the Hungarian Status Law to be discriminatory because it grants only the

Hungarians from Romania a working permit for Hungary while Romanians from

Romania are not entitled to it. To him, this was a bias on ethnic grounds that did not

those working permits or none at all. The Hungarian side, especially Foreign Minister

János Martonyi, insisted on the Status Law not being discriminative176.

Unfortunately, Népszabadság does not comment on the change of mind that

occurred in Romania after the

signed the Orbán- 177. The same is true after the new

Hungarian government was in office following the general elections in April 2002.

174 MH25.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://580/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 175 NSZ30.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://340/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 176 NSZ14.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://252/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp, NSZ18.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://273/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp and NSZ24.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://303/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 177 See Appendix 2.

97

After both prime ministers signed the ONM, the Romanian side started talking about

178. Népszabadság did not discuss this change of attitude manifested in

the discourse. On the other hand, the new Hungarian government formed by a coalition

of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)

did not acknowledge that the Hungarian Status Law had a discriminative side, but

admitted that it did discriminate families with a single child179.

Magyar Hírlap presents a different narrative in this context. Unlike

Népszabadság, the journalists from Magyar Hírlap offered more room to Romanian

minister János Martonyi is the only representative from the Hungarian political

spectrum that expresses his views180. According to Martonyi, the Hungarian Status Law

is discriminative. However, he added, it is the destiny of minorities to be discriminated

in one-way or the other. In an extensive interview he said that minorities have to be

discriminated, in order to be protected:

Martonyi elismerte, hogy a törvénytervezet pozitív diszkriminációt hoz létre, zza. 181 [Martonyi admitted that the planned law [i.e. the Hungarian Status Law] creates a positive discrimination, but in his opinion this aims only at counter-balancing the disadvantages, which arise from being a minority.]

It is noteworthy that Magyar Hírlap does not present any comments by Zsolt Németh,

the secretary of state in the Hungarian Foreign Office, who supported the Status Law

vehemently.

On the other hand, Magyar Hírlap has presented the views of various Romanian

politicians who expressed their concerns regarding any discriminating aspects of the

allegation constantly182 -

discrimination laws as a reason for his rejection of the Status Law, although he did not

178 NSZ11.07.2002, path: 14.08.2003 wysiwyg://35/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 179 NSZ10.08.2002, path: 14.08.2003 wysiwyg://81/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

-) to parents who sent at least two of their children to Hungarian speaking schools. Practically this meant that families which had only one child or did not send both children to such a school received nothing. 180 MH31.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://482/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 181 MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://693/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 182 MH24.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://405/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php and MH 22.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://569/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

98

go into detail explaining which ones he was referring to183. Two days beforehand

support its co-ethnics but should not practice social and economic discrimination while

doing so184. Romanian President Ion Iliescu took a different point of argumentation.

According to Iliescu it is the Romanian people that consider the Status Law to be

discriminatory185. It is unclear whether he considered himself in this context as part of

the Romanian people or as their speaker. The nationalist mayor of Cluj-Napoca,

Gheorghe Funar, presented a polemic anecdote by saying that the Status Law was a

racist law186 ic Alliance of

Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), is referred to only a single time. Moreover, their

comments were given after the Hungarian prime minister and his Romanian counterpart

had signed the Orbán- 187 and the Status Law had come

i

to abolish the discrimination in the labour regulations set up by the Status Law188.

Indirectly the UDMR suggested with this statement that all other accusations put

forward by the Romanian side were irrelevant.

Furthermore, Magyar Hírlap presents the views of people who represent

different European institutions: the European Commission (EC), the Council of Europe

(CE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the

categories: those who consider the Hungarian Status Law to contain discriminating

aspects, i.e. EC, CE and the OSCE on the one hand, and the EPP on the other. While the

EC speaks of disadvantages189 and later of the premise of non-discrimination within the

European Union190, the CE is more direct and explains why it rejects the Hungarian

Status Law191: it differentiates between citizens of another state and it grants working

permits to ethnically selected citizens of other states. Interestingly, Magyar Hírlap does

183 MH28.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://826/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 184 MH30.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://832/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 185 MH02.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://641/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 186 MH12.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://723/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 187 See Appendix 2. 188 MH18.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://643/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 189 MH26.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://591/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 190 MH21.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://409/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 191 MH27.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://597/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

99

4.1.1.2.4 NATO192

This aspect of the discourse is closely interwoven with the notions of Europe and

the European Union but nevertheless it has its own unique characteristics. During the

discourse the expression euroatlanti integráció [Euro-Atlantic integration] was used on

a number of occasions. This clearly indicates that the two supranational organisations

are regarded as complementary: the EU for financial and judicial stability on the one

side and military and political security on the other. It becomes more difficult to assess

uro-Atlantic

values193. Regrettably, it is not clear what he means by those values and the interviewer,

Zoltán Tibori Szabó, did not put any further questions in this direction.

Roma

integration in NATO. Despite the frequent repetition, neither side explains what is

behind this constant support. There is only one hint in the articles194 from which I can

conclude the following:

-

region will be politically more stable. One just has to bear in mind the

Yugoslavian wars that lasted from the first conflict in Slovenia in 1991 until the

1999 war in Kosovo.

- Furthermore, if Romania becomes a member of NATO the Hungarians in

- By supporting Romania in its endeavour, the Hungarian government wanted to

support the more moderate political forces within Romania and to show the right

wing elements, like the Greater Romania Party (PRM), that Hungary is not anti-

Romanian and does not wish Romania any harm195.

Népszabadság also brings another interesting facet: the element of threat. This is

manifested in two interviews: one with Romanian president Ion Iliescu and the other

with Hungarian prime minister Orbán. Iliescu exclaims that NATO has caused political

tension in the region by admitting Hungary in the first round of extension (1999) but

refusing Romania:

192 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 193 NSZ05.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://213/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 194 NSZ16.06.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://1066/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 195 See also Andreescu 2001.

100

csatlakozásra Magyarországgal együtt Romániát is, mivel ezzel újabb feszültséget támasztott a térségben. 196 not ask Romania together with Hungary to join in, thus having caused new tensions in the area.]

Unfortunately, Iliescu does not continue explaining what kind of tensions he meant and

the interviewer does reveal any further details. In the other interview with Orbán197, the

Hungarian prime minister threatens Slovakia by blocking its application for

membership in the NATO if it does not change its policy towards the Hungarian Status

Law. Although this threat is directed at Slovakia, which also was not a member of the

NATO at the time of the interview, it does bear an undertone of intimidation towards

Romania. Again, there is no further comment from the interviewing journalist. Both

-à-vis Romania. This position

is contested by one of the journalists who said that Romania has a stronger political

stand because it cottoned up to the United States (US) by granting the US military

privileges beyond NATO standards198.

The comments made by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán form the key

accusations put forward by certain Romanian politicians. They accused Hungary of not

informing its neighbouring states about the Status Law, although it affected their

noteworthy: the Hungarian government has informed all NATO embassies about the

content of the Status Law199. This reply contains the following issues:

- Romania was not a NATO-member until March 2004, i.e. it was not informed

by the Hungarians.

- It also means that, according to Orbán, only those states that are members of

NATO, are important enough to be informed. In 2001 it also meant that with the

exception of four states, namely Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, all other

EU states were informed, since they were also NATO-members. Consequently,

states that did not have anything to do with the disputes in the Carpathian Basin,

e.g. Turkey or Canada, were considered to be more important than the

196 NSZ22.09.2001, path: 06.08.2003 wysiwyg://109/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 197 NSZ15.02.2002, path: 11.08.2003 wysiwyg://291/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 198 NSZ28.09.2001, path: 06.08.2003 wysiwyg://124/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 199 MH03.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://646/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

101

neighbouring states, e.g. Slovakia or Romania, on whose territory the Hungarian

Status Law was about to be applied.

- Finally, since none of NATO-members is reported to have had any comments on

the Status Law, the Hungarian government could conclude that they had no

objections. 200. According to him,

-

(1920). This utterance is historically false. The isolation Orbán was referring to is the

Petite Entente, which was initiated after World War I by France and Great Britain. It

consisted of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes (later Yugoslavia). The aim of this Entente was to ensure that both Germany

as well as Hungary were kept in check in Eastern Europe. This isolation ceased by the

end of the thirties with Nazi Germany taking over power in Central Europe and

ionist ambitions.

The only other Hungarian politician to be represented is Foreign Minister János 201.

-

endeavours to become a member of NATO202.

The Romanian side is somewhat underrepresented in this section. Magyar Hírlap

mentioned only two Romanian politicians who had commented on the debate by

-chairman of the National Liberal

Party (PNL), admitted that Romania needed a good relationship to Hungary and its

support to become a member of NATO203. Unfortunately, the author of the text, Tibor

Bogdán, did not go into further detail. The other Romanian politician, Foreign Minister

Hungary and Romania204. This comment can be understood as a soft intimidation: if

both sides will not behave, the common supra-

200 MH23.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://766/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 201 MH06.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://693/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 202 MH27.03.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://508/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 203 MH25.06.2001, path: 14.02.2001 wysiwyg://580/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 204 MH02.08.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://854/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

102

trying to say that Hungary could be rebuked by NATO despite being a member state,

and Romania not205.

4.1.1.2.5 History

The element of history or historical consciousness is well represented in

e Hungarian

than on the Romanian side. Nonetheless, the Hungarian side represents the entire

(SZDSZ)206 to the right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)207. There are a

few key issues that politicians kept repeating and hence became part of the motif in

1.

Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh. He kept on repeating numerous times that

Hungary bears a historical obligation towards the Hungarians living in the

neighbouring states208. This obligation is laid down in the Hungarian

Constitution209 and dates back to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Other politicians,

e.g. Romanian prime ministe

correct the borders drawn under that Treaty. Some journalists accused Orbán of

completing the effects of Trianon through the labour market policy manifested

tion that the Hungarian

labour market consists of 14 million employees, hence referring to the

Hungarians in the neighbouring states210. This accusation consists of the

threatening danger that with the privileges granted by the Status Law the number

of Hungarians in the adjacent states will decline rapidly, since many will leave

home and start looking for a better paid job in Hungary. This could then

diminish the size of the Hungarian minorities substantially211. Orbán himself

considered the Status Law as a process towards unifying the different parts of

the Hungarian nation212. There is a very fine nuance between unifying the

205 Half a year later the Washington Post published an article about the calming effects the NATO extension in Central and Eastern Europe will have on the interstate relationships. See: MH27.03.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://508/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 206 NSZ27.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://140/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 207 NSZ13.03.2002, path: 13.08.2003 wysiwyg://55/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp and NSZ04.04.2002, path: 13.08.2003 wysiwyg://142/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 208 NSZ19.04.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://128/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 209 See Appendix 6. 210 211 NSZ13.06.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://942/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 212 NSZ10.01.2002, path: 08.08.2003 wysiwyg://599/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

103

Hungarian nation and unifying the different parts of the Hungarian nation. The

first version could be regarded as revisionist expostulation while the other could

be interpreted as a cultural or economical endeavour. Unfortunately, the

journalists who wrote the article did not comment on this very carefully chosen

declaration. Németh went even further to exclaim that the historical moment

(meaning the years 2001-2002) is favourable for a unification of the Hungarian

nation across existing boundaries. By adding határok [borders, boundaries], he

Union (FIDESZ), which ruled Hungary from 1998-2002, is also accused for

abusing Trianon for its own political purposes213. Another aspect of Trianon is

the ping-

the recognition of the borders as they were laid down in Trianon. The Romanian

prime minister frequently asked the Hungarian government to do this while the

Hungarian side constantly refused to do so214. Orbán explained the refusal by

pointing out that the bilateral agreement signed by both states in 1996 clearly

territorial claims215.

2. Revisionism. Some journalists and politicians use the terminology of the

interwar period, such as Petite Entente or revisionism216. This reveals one of

and the Hungarians living in the neighbouring states, i.e. how to discuss this

relationship without using the language of revisionism? Furthermore, how to

talk about this relationship without provoking fears in the neighbouring states?

The fears that are occasionally provoked are usually taken a step further by

nationalistic forces that abuse the situation for their own political agenda.

tried hard to avoid stirring up anti-Hungarian sentiments in those states, but has

not always been successful217.

is very little critique on the abuse of historical data and historical symbolism used by the

213 NSZ17.05.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://516/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 214 NSZ26.11.2001, path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://315/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 215 NSZ30.11.2001, path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://368/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 216 NSZ27.06.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://140/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp and NSZ12.01.2002, path: 08.08.2003 wysiwyg://636/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 217 See Sitzler 1992.

104

political elite218. Trianon and revisionism are two slogans heavily loaded with

symbolism, which bear implications upon the historical consciousness on both sides.

narrative, is the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences. Hence, I shall introduce the

Romanian and the Hungarian perspectives on this issue, since both are well represented

in Magyar Hírlap:

- The Status Law as a historic obligation. The Hungarian state, according to

Foreign Minister Zsolt Németh219 as well as other state officials220 and members 221, has an eighty years

old obligation towards the co- A magyar állam 80 éves adósságot 222 [The Hungarian state pays off with

has been paid off by the Hungarian Status Law, which legally binds the co-

ethnics to the Hungarian state. Trianon has been regarded as an act of injustice

committed against Hungary, as the journalist Ferenc Kecskés wrote223. FIDESZ

officials also added that the Status Law is necessary in the light of ongoing

efforts in Romania to assimilate the Hungarians. They added that these

Romanian assimilation efforts are intended to eliminate the consequences of

Trianon224.

- Revisionism. Members of the nationalistic Greater Romania Party (PRM)

accused the Hungarian government of trying to re-establish the old kingdom of

greater Hungary225. The nationalist mayor of Cluj-Napoca, Gheorghe Funar,

repeated this accusation226. In another article Magyar Hírlap published a

underlines this accusation even further227. Romanian prime minister Adrian

t become a terrain

for revisionist thoughts228. Although he does not mention Hungary explicitly, the

218 NSZ12.05.2001, path: 01.08.2003 wysiwyg://377/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 219MH21.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://466/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 220MH19.06.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://548/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 221MH21.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://654/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 222MH21.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://466/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 223MH24.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://400/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 224MH07.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://209/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 225MH15.05.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 226MH12.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://723/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 227MH24.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://788/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 228MH28.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://826/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

105

context of the article and the historical background leave only one party possible

of revisionist claims: Hungary.

- Borders. In the heat of the debate Romanian prime m

the Hungarian government to include a confirmation of the current political

borders between the states within the framework of the Status Law229. This

demand was utterly refused by the Hungarian side arguing that the current

border had been confirmed by the bilateral agreement from 1996230.

- Imperialistic attitude. In a parliamentary debate Romanian president Ion Iliescu

accused Hungarians of an imperialistic attitude and therefore being guilty of the

tensions between Hungary and Romania. According to him, this attitude hailed

from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy when Hungarians were

parliament from the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)

retorted by pointing out the fact that the Dual Monarchy had lasted for only 51

years. He added that that would not be enough to create such a lasting attitude231.

A last disturbing anecdote is presented in a synopsis of an article published in the

Romanian daily

way that the current political situation between Romania and Hungary resembles 1940.

Despite the polemics there is a parallel aspect: both in 1940 as well as in 2001 Hungary

and Romania could not solve their disputes by themselves and therefore went to seek

justice at a higher instance. In 1940 it was Hitler at Vienna232 and in 2001 it was the

European Parliament and the Venice Commission.

4.1.1.2.6 Legal aspects

The main feature of this specific aspect of the narrative presented by

Népszabadság is the question of extraterritoriality. This aspect is repeated often and

both sides are well represented. While the Romanian side argued that the Hungarian

Status Law has an extraterritorial character233, the Hungarian side kept denying it and

saying that the Law is valid in its present form. The Romanian foreign minister, Mircea

standpoints:

229MH26.11.2001, path: 14.02.2001 wysiwyg://278/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 230MH30.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://316/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/popup_index.php 231MH28.11.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://294/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 232 See Table 4. 233NSZ14.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://252/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

106

234 application to have an extraterritorial character.]

And,

vény nem diszkriminatív, nincs területen kívüli 235

Regrettably, neither side explained exactly what it meant by using this word, nor

have the journalists at Népszabadság done so. Apparently, the journalists took it for

granted that the readers would immediately understand the meaning of

extraterritoriality. At this point I can only assume that the Romanian side saw the

Hungarian Status Law as an act that trespassed on the judicial competence of the

Hungarian state. Hence, according to my understanding of the Romanian line of

argument, they accused the Hungarian parliament for passing a law that granted

Romanian citizens certain rights without prior arrangements with the Romanian

authorities. In the multitude of texts published, which tackled this issue, Népszabadság

has quoted the chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

(UDMR), Béla Markó, as often as the Romanian forei

secretary of state, Ciprian Diaconescu. The Hungarian government, especially foreign

minister, János Martonyi, and his secretary of state, Zsolt Németh, said the Status Law

did not have an extraterritorial character, since it granted rights to foreign citizens only

in Hungary and not in the neighbouring states. However, the Hungarian side never

mentioned the financial aid for families, who sent at least two children to Hungarian

speaking schools. Interestingly, neither did t

narrative conveys the impression that neither side really wanted to have a debate on the

judicial correctness of this law; there was no Hungarian-Romanian commission of

experts that would have analysed the Status Law and drawn conclusion. As mentioned

above, both sides opted for a debate that ran through the various European institutions.

Another aspect within this segment is Romanian prime minister, Adrian

he Hungarian Status 234 Idem. 235 Idem.

107

-law so to speak236

threat in 2001 until the Orbán- 237. He started

again after the elections in Hungary (April 2002) were completed. The threat, however,

was never put into practice. In December 2001, after the signing of the ONM, the threat

did not make any sense, due to the benefits now granted to all Romanian citizens. After

the new socialist-liberal government took office in Budapest, they started negotiating

with the Romanian side about amending the Status Law. As the negotiations continued,

Magyar Hírlap, unlike Népszabadság, mentions only once the aspect of

extraterritoriality238

extraterritoriality forward. Interestingly, it is done so in May 2002, long after the Status

Law came into effect (01.01.2002) and the Orbán-Nastase Memorandum has been

signed (24.12.2001). This comment is directed as a reminder of the debate at the new

Hungarian government in Budapest.

Hungary. This issue was discussed controversially in Romania as well as in Hungary. In

Romania it was the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) that

supported the working regulations for Romanian citizens in Hungary, as they were laid

down in the Orbán- 239. Béla Markó, chairman of the

UDMR emphasised that the working permit for Hungary would sanction the legal status

of many seasonal workers there240. Other Romanian parties that objected to the working

regulations laid down in the Status Law241 ceased to criticise after the ONM has been

signed and every Romanian citizen was granted a yearly working permit for the period

of three months.

On the other hand, in Hungary, Magyar Hírlap presents only the comments made

by the opposition, mainly the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)242 and the Alliance of

Free Democrats (SZDSZ)243. The socialists were complaining about a possible invasion

of labour migrants from Romania, which could upset Hungarians. István Csurka,

chairman of the right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) opposed the ONM

236NSZ30.07.2001, path: 05.08.2003 wysiwyg://335/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp 237 membership in May 2004. 238MH11.05.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://587/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 239 See Appendix 2. 240MH27.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://449/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 241MH19.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://398/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 242MH26.12.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 243 Idem.

108

as well. Csurka objected the fact that the Hungarian state could grant benefits to foreign

citizens who are not co-ethnics244. The fact that Magyar Hírlap does not represent a

counter-

understood as a

the Status Law and the Orbán-

Hírlap was keen on showing that the opposition parties were wrong, since there was no

invasion of migrant workers245.

bonding. Secretary Zsolt Németh from the Hungarian Foreign Office stressed that the

Hungarian Status Law is a legal bond between the Hungarian state and the co-ethnics246.

Hungarian foreign minister János Martonyi added that it is not only a legal bond as

Németh said, but also the first law of its kind247. Béla Markó from the UDMR

underlined this opinion248. The only counter-comment made on this was by Romanian

prime minister Adrian Nastase concerning minority politics. Referring to the Hungarian

Status Law he declared that neither Romania nor Hungary should become fields of

experimentation in law249.

4.1.2 The Romanian articles

Unlike the Hungarian articles, there are few Romanian articles and their author

is not always indicated. In congruence with the previous subchapter, I shall first take a

narratives.

4.1.2.1 Ethnic denotations

The ethnic denotations in the Romanian newspapers are different from the

Hungarian ones in two main aspects: firstly, there is the difference between the

ethnonyms ungur [Hungarian] and maghiar [Magyar], which does not exist in

Hungarian. Second, the perspective from which the Romanian journalists write is

politically and ethnically a Romanian one, since there are only a few Romanian co-

244MH03.01.2002, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://523/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 245MH02.04.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://525/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php, MH18.04.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://551/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php, MH22.04.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://556/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php, MH25.10.2002, path: 24.02.2003 wysiwyg://757/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php and MH16.12.2002, path: 14.03.2003 wysiwyg://44/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 246MH01.03.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://353/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 247MH19.04.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://394/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 248MH02.01.2001, path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://506/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 249MH28.07.2001, path: 14.02.2003 wysiwyg://826/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

109

ethnics who live in Hungary or other adjacent states. This is because of the Romanian 250. Consequently, Romanian journalists usually write from

Romania for a Romanian readership. Otherwise the analysis follows the same pattern as

with the Hungarian denotations251.

4.1.2.1.1 General characteristics

Table 11, which is presented below, follows the same pattern as its counterpart,

Table 10. However, it also needs a short preliminary explanation:

- The first column represents a serial number for better reference.

- The second column gives the original Romanian denotation.

- The third column is the English translation of the respective Romanian

denotation.

- The forth column indicates the number of appearances the denotation had in

- The fifth column indicates the number of appearances the denotation had in

- Colours. Denotations that appear

marked in blue. Denotations that appeared in both newspapers, have been left

black.

- The table itself encompasses six denotations that explicitly refer to Transylvania

or Romania. They have a dark grey shade and are written in italics. These

denotations have been picked out and placed together in Table 11a, which will

be discussed in the following segment. Consequently, they will not be analysed

in this segment of the thesis.

250 See Figure 3. 251 See subchapter 4.1.1.1.

110

Table 11: Romanian denotations, which encompass the Hungarians in Romania

Romanian denotation English translation A RL 1 Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos 1 1 2 Magyar community in Romania 1 3 Magyar communities 2

4 Ungariei Magyar communities outside Hungary 1

5 Etnici maghiari Ethnic Magyars 2 5 6 Etnici maghiari de peste hotare Ethnic Magyars beyond the boundaries 1

7 Etnici maghiari din statele vecine Ungarici neighbouring states 1

8 ne Ungariei neighbouring countries 1

9 Etnici unguri Ethnic Hungarians 2 10 Etnici unguri de peste hotare Ethnic Hungarians beyond the boundaries 1 11 Magyar ethnos 2 12 1 13 Maghiari Magyars 3 14 Maghiari de peste hotare Magyars beyond the boundaries 2 1

15 Maghiari din statele vecine Ungariei states 2

16 Magyars from outside Hungary 2 17 Maghiari din România Magyars from Romania 1 2 18 Maghiari din str in tate Magyars from abroad 1 19 Maghiari din Transilvania Magyars from Transylvania 2 20 Magyars outside the borders 1 5 21 Maghiari 2 8 22 Maghiari în statele vecine Magyars in the neighbouring states 1 1 23 Magyars from abroad 1 24 Maghiarime Magyardom 1 25 Transylvanian Magyardom 1 26 Minoritate maghiar în România Magyar minority in Romania 1 27 Minorities 1 28 Magyar minorities 4 1 29 Magyar minorities outside the border 1 30 Persoane de etnie maghiar Persons of Magyar ethnos 1 31 Population of Magyar ethnos 1 1 32 Unguri Hungarians 1

33 Hungarians in the countries in which they live 1

Apparently, due to the comparatively small size of the available articles from

both Romanian newspapers, the denotations for the Hungarians in Romania are far less

y six exclusively. The common

denotations amount to seven. Nevertheless, the Romanian articles show certain specific

features:

111

1. comunitate

[community] a few times (Nos. 3 and 4) but România Lib

referring to something that is of local character and perhaps of less significance

than a minority or a group, which would mean protection by law, either national

or international. Secondly, community also means a group on a local and social

level spread throughout the country, and not a bulk of settlement. This is

surprising when considering that about 50% of all Hungarians living in Romania

are settled in the Seklerland252 where they make up a considerable majority of

the population.

2. Ethnos. By ethnos I mean the various derivations, e.g. ethnic or ethnical, which

can be traced back to the Greek origin ethnos. This term is used more frequently

30 and 31). Denotations that combine Magyar with ethnos indicate that the

people referred to are specified: not just Hungarians or Magyars, but specific

ones, those that are of ethnic character or form an ethnic minority. It implies a

distinction between Hungarians from Romania and those from Hungary who do

not need the supplement ethnos. In other words, ethnos could be understood as a

reference towards a minority.

3. Hungarians/Magyars. Unlike in English, there is a crucial difference in

Romanian between unguri [Hungarians] and maghiari [Magyars]. The first

ethnonym refers to the country, which is called Ungaria [Hungary] and can be

traced back to the Latin Hungarus. The other ethnonym is based on the

magyarok [Magyars]. During the socialist era in

Romania, the denotation unguri meant the Hungarians living in Hungary while

the other one, maghiari, meant the Hungarians living in Romania. Hence the

linguistic differentiation aimed at separating those Hungarians from Hungary

proper from those living in Romania. Despite this situation, the Hungarians in

Romania insisted on being one and the same ethnic group together with the

inhabitants of Hungary. After 1990 the name unguri has been losing ground to

maghiari unguri in 4 out of 27 denotations (Nos. 9, 10, 32 and

maghiari instead of

252 Seklerland consists of the Romanian counties of Harghita, Covasna and geographically in the centre of Romania. See also Map 2.

112

unguri

denotation.

4. Ethnic Hungarians/Magyars. This denotation, which is frequently repeated in

and 10), is most probably taken from the CNN (Cable News Network) jargon.

Just as CNN reporters were talking about ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during the

troubles in that Yugoslav (later Serb) province back in 1999, to distinguish

between the Albanians from Kosovo and the Albanians from Albania proper, so

does the denotation etnici maghiari [ethnic Magyars] sound like in Romanian.

This obviously raises the question, whether there are also people who are un-

ethnic Magyars. Using ethnos and its derivations also emphasises a lack of

statehood. This brings back the discussion conducted in Hungary about a

concept for the Hungarian nation and the relationship between the Hungarian

state and the co-ethnics253. Furthermore, the table shows clearly that the

journalists from România Libe

instead of minority or ethnos. This bears evidence to the fact, that they refer to

the Hungarians living in Romania as equals to the ones in Hungary and try do

avoid further specification, which could be interpreted as degrading or

Hungarians as a single people spread across different countries without any

differentiation between them. This is in congruence with the light in which

Hungarians in the eight states of the Carpathian Basin often see themselves: a

single ethno-linguistic group living in different political entities.

5.

living in Romania by using the word minority (Nos. 27-29), while those writing

acting on two levels. On the first one they draw a line of separation between

minority and majority. Hence there is a boundary to overcome if there should be

any communication or cooperation between the two groups. On the second level

minority means that the group referred to is in a numerical disadvantage and

therefore in a weaker political position.

6. National/Ethnic minority. Neither side has used these possible denotations. It is

perhaps because the term was abused in former times. The last reference to

minorities in communist Romania was , which means

253 See subchapter 4.1.1.

113

the co-inhabiting minorities. Hence they divided people into ethnic groups with

primordial attitude, clear-cut boundaries and a hidden threat: co-tenants could

also be expelled. By avoiding this terminology the boundaries between the

groups become more flexible and permeable.

7. Persons, people. These two terms enable journalists to avoid using group related

terms such as minority or ethnonyms in the plural form (Nos. 30-31). Using

these forms concurs with the Orbán- ase Memorandum (ONM) from

December 2001 and other modifications in the Status Law254. These speak of

people considering themselves to be Magyars and not of Magyars per se or any

minorities.

8. Borders, boundaries, outside, abroad and neighbourhood. This semantic field

enhances the image of the Hungarians/Magyars not being in Hungary, but in a

Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin and avoid a Romanian centrist

attitude. On the other hand it could also be interpreted as an attempt to specify

the Hungarians abroad as a separate group that is foreign to the countries in

which they live.

9. Status Law. Apparently, the Status Law has not been mentioned in any of the

denotations255. This is surpr

4.1.2.1.2 Denotations regarding only Romania and Transylvania

Although few, the six denotations with clear reference to Transylvania and

Romania form an important part in this analysis. The reason is that the Status Law as an

intersecting segment of the Romanian discourse is an internal one, i.e. within the

political boundaries of the Romanian state.

Table 11a: Romanian denotations, which refer explicitly to Hungarians in Romania

Romanian denotation English translation A RL 1 Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos 1 1 2 Magyar community in Romania 1 3 Maghiari din România Magyars from Romania 1 2 4 Maghiari din Transilvania Magyars from Transylvania 2 5 Maghia Transylvanian Magyardom 1 6 Minoritate maghiar în România Magyar minority in Romania 1 254 See Appendices 2 and 3. 255 Compare to státusmagyarok [Status Magyars] in Table 10.

114

1. Ardeal [Transylvania]. Apparently the reference to the Romanian denotation of

Transylvania, Ardeal, is completely missing. This is even more surprising when

bearing in mind that the vast majority of Hungarians from Romania live in that

region. I assume that Ardeal is avoided since it is derived from the Hungarian

name for Transylvania, Erdély, while Transilvania is of Latin origin, to which

the Romanian language is closely related.

2. Magyars/Hungarians. The six denotations do not use the ethnonym ungur

[Hungarian] a single time; they always use maghiar [Magyar]. As mentioned

previously, this indicates certain awareness among Romanian journalists to the

ungur.

3. Romania/Transylvania. Most journalists in both papers take it for granted that

when they talk of Magyars or minorities they mean the Hungarians living in

Romania. The explicit references to Romania as a state or to Transylvania as a

region are seldom. Writing for the Romanian public, the journalists take it for

granted that it is the Hungarians in Romania that are of importance to the

readers.

4. Maghiarime [Magyardom]. This derivation of maghiar is a somewhat awkward

one. Unlike the Hungarian term magyarság, which literally means the same, it

does not have the same connotation. However, unlike magyarság, maghiarime

has a slightly derogatory connotation in Romanian and the equivalent to it for

Romanians is hardly ever used: românime [Romaniandom].

4.1.2.2 Motifs

As with the Hungarian papers, I shall analyse every motif in both newspapers.

The analysis will follow the following pattern: România L

second.

4.1.2.2.1 Europe

The European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CE) or Europe as a term play

an important role in the general public discourses of Hungary and Romania, as well as

in the specific ones analysed here about the Hungarians in Romania. Despite being very

different, the EU, the CE and other related institutions on the European level will be

considered as one semantic field for the purpose of this thesis. In the 16 articles from

115

images: conformity, sideshow and supra instance.

The first image handles the role the EU played for the states that aspired

membership in the EU. Since the EU was the centre of economic and political power in

Europe, it was able to issue certain demands or expectations towards the candidate

states if they wanted their application for membership to be viewed with favour. This

important, their attitude in solving international disputes. That is why journalists kept on

quoting politicians making remarks about the Status Law, which have to do with its

n-

politicians kept on repeating that the Status Law lacked conformity with European law

but never specified which European laws they meant. On the other hand, members of

Status Law did concur with the European law system. In other words, conformity or the

The second image relates to the scene of the discourse and the way politicians

from both states took up Europe as their battleground to carry out their disputes. This is

an aspect that the journalists took for granted, since not a single journalist from

România

affected Hungary and Romania256

conveyed in their articles an image, that politicians and civil servants from both states

were busier lobbying in Brussels and Strasbourg than actually travelling to the other

and various commissions to be a sideshow for the political dispute.

This situation, however, does lead to the third image of the EU as a supra

instance. The journalists convey the image of the EU as a judge or a referee who has to

decide which party is right. By doing so, it became evident that the political

representatives from both sides were not keen on meeting or trying to convince each

other, but rather anxious to receive a positive response from the supra institution EU or

other related institutions, such as the Venice Commission. The big exception to this

tendency was a short period of time in December 2001, when the Hungarian side

256 This is a simplification since the Status Law affected six of H

116

territory on January 1st 2002. This intermezzo has lead to the Orbán-

Memorandum (ONM).

both sides of the dispute and therefore quoted Romanian and Hungarian politicians

alike. Furthermore, the a

towards their counterparts after the parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2002.

The new coalition in Budapest decided to step forward and pick up the dialogue with

the Romanian side257.

In a

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the Council of Europe

(CE), as a supra instance, something to be admired, respected and hopefully someday

becoming a member in it258

full members of the EU. It is considered to be a common feature for both sides and

hence a solid basis for the art of future relationship between the two states. Furthermore,

259 [Romania, and Transylvania along with her, like Hungary, is a part of Europe. And they all go there together.]

At this point there is no such endeavour from the Romanian side. This is perhaps due to

chances were still unclear.

The critique on the Status Law, which Romanian politicians expressed in the

articles, especially Prime Minister

argumentation. He did not say that he objected to the Law, but rather that the Law was

against European principles and norms and, since he considered himself to be a

European, objected to the Law not as a Romanian, but rather as a European. This switch

of identity from Romanian to European, which can also be observed with president

Iliescu, requires an explanation. Arguing about the Law from a Romanian political

257 RL28.05.2002 and RL08.07.2002. Both printed: 04.02.2004. 258 A24.12.2001 and A06.03.2003. Both printed: 28.01.2004. 259 A02.09.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

117

angle could be regarded as nationalistic. Arguing from a European perspective has the

advantage of leaving the nationally charged Central and Eastern European arena and

moving to a higher point and, in a figurative way, standing above old rivalries and

misunderstandings260. It is also a more neutral position that cannot be attacked that

easily. Furthermore, arguing about who is more European actually brings both sides

closer since they both have the same field of dispute: their common goal for becoming

members of the EU.

Romanian side criticised the Law for not being

European or not having a European character. Unfortunately, not one journalist explains

what this lacking element of European-ness is supposed to be. Unlike the articles in

ations of the Venice Commission and other

points. One article out of the 12 that contain the motif Europe is unique, since it is the

only article in which a Romanian politician, Toro T. Tibor from the Democratic

Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), criticised the EU for not criticising

-à-vis the Republic of Moldova261.

4.1.2.2.2 Comparison

concerning the element of comparison were

published before the Orbán- 262. Quoting different politicians from

Hungary saying that having a law such as the Status Law is a common practice in

Europe while various politicians from Romania were saying exactly the opposite, the

journalists do not take sides openly. This is interesting when bearing in mind president

minority protection system in both states:

El a ad -a bucurat întotdeauna de drepturile ce decurg din acest statut, singura statului. 263 ar minority in Romania has always - à-

260 There is, of course, also the issue of European nationalism. However, it does not play a decisive role in this controversy between Romania and Hungary. 261 A14.01.2003. Printed: 28.01.2004. 262 RL19.09.2001, RL07.10.2001 and RL16.10.2001. All printed: 04.02.2004. 263 RL19.09.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. All diacritical signs added by me.

118

Iliescu added that there is no comparable law in Europe to the Hungarian Status Law

while the Hungarian state secretary in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh, said that it is a

common European practice. Obviously one of them had to be wrong. There is of course

no law which says exactly the same but there is a series of laws in different European

considered to be ethnically similar.

comparison regarding the Status Law. The first one264 quoted Romanian prime minister

position, but the time of the declaration is crucial, since the newly elected Hungarian

government has ju

pressure on the Hungarian side and make it clear that the Romanian side still wants the

Status Law to be modified, despite the Orbán-

article265 quoted a right wing member of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in

Romania (UDMR), Toro T. Tibor, who compared the Romanian policy of dual

citizenship regarding the Republic of Moldova with the Status Law. Furthermore, he

demanded a similar attitude towards Hungary from the Romanian government.

Implicitly, he suggested a dual citizenship, Romanian and Hungarian, for the

Hungarians that live in Romania. However, the idea of dual citizenship for the

Hungarians in Romania was avoided by the leading members of the UDMR for a long

time.

It is noteworthy that there is not one single comment in the Romanian papers

referring to statements made by Romanian politicians on the policy of dual citizenship

for the Moldavian citizens. I assume that this is due to the unpopularity of this policy in

Romania.

4.1.2.2.3 Discrimination

divided into two groups: those mentioning the reason for discrimination and those that

do not. The first group shows that Romanian politicians were complaining about the

discrimination of Romanian citizens with a Romanian ethnic background. They were

referring to the fact that, according to the Law, only those entitled to a Certificate of

264 A28.05.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004. 265 A14.01.2003. Printed: 28.01.2004.

119

Hungarian Nationality266 (CHN) have the right to apply for a Hungarian working

permit267.

Unl

show a more detailed picture of the Romanian complaints regarding discrimination

created by the Status Law. The articles speak of discrimination regarding the working

permits for Hungary, the economic bias due to the better possibilities Hungarians from

Romania will have and of the cultural consequences the Status Law will have in

Romania. Unfortunately they do not contain further detailed specifications as to which

aspects the politicians are referring exactly. In May 2002

new Hungarian government to avoid any discriminating legislation:

posibilitatea 268 Understanding [Orbán- authorities to reassess the possibility of adopting an adequate internal legislation aimed at blocking the extraterritorial and discriminating passages, which are part of the Status Law and which have not been applied due to the understanding between the Romanian and Hungarian governments.]

This statement, in my opinion, is directed at the Romanian constituency and not at the

Hungarian side. The parties that won the elections in Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist

Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), have declared their

intention to modify the Status Law and to negotiate it with H

would not take any steps towards discriminating Romanian citizens. Therefore, with this

strong stand against Hungary.

4.1.2.2.4 NATO

Organisation (NATO)269

266 According to the Orbán-reasons of simplicity I shall be always using the abbreviation CHN. 267 RL27.12.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. 268 A09.05.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004. 269 RL19.09.2001 and RL27.10.2001. Both printed: 04.02.2004.

120

e Status Law might hurt

mber in

1999, but not Romania270:

271 [President Iliescu has declared that for keeping the stability in the region, either both states [Romania and Hungary] should have become members of the Alliance [NATO] or none should have been accepted.]

The fact that Hungary would help Romania to become a full member of NATO

was mentioned in two out of the th 272.

member in NATO whereasRomania was not. However, he did not go further to explain

what kind of advantage (economic, military, political) Hungary would have in this

case273.

4.1.2.2.5 History

Two of them related to the fact that both sides, Romania and Hungary, had a long

common and difficult history274. Returning to the previously mentioned different

historic perceptions in both states, with this the journalists were trying to avoid taking

sides in the historic debates. By pointing at the length of Romanian and Hungarian

history, the journalists have gallantly made a diplomatic statement. The following

and his new Hungarian counterpart, László Kovács, is a representative example of this

kind of presentation:

270 Compare subchapter 4.1.1.2.4 271 RL19.09.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. 272 A08.07.2002 and A06.09.2002. Both printed: 28.01.2004. 273 A24.12.2001. Printed: 28.01.2004. 274 A24.12.2001 and A17.03.2003. Both printed: 28.01.2004.

121

-ungare se -a lungul istorie. 275 [Both minister - Hungarian relationship proves to be a stabilising factor in this region so heavily burdened throughout history.]

Another important element in the Hungarian historic debate, Trianon, was mentioned

only once when Prime Minister Orbán said, that the Status Law was a partial reparation

to the Hungarians living in the neighbouring states after what they had suffered due to

the injustice committed at Trianon276. In one of the articles277, the journalist wrote about

and their encounter with the local sedentary population. This comment is a parable at

the Theory of Continuity, since Hungarian historians claimed for a long time that the

the Carpathian Mountains and arrived in Pannonia in 895/896 A.D.. Hence my

conclusion, that the journalist was pointing out very different aspects:

- History was repeating itself,

- He compared the Huns to the Hungarians.

- He compared the local sedentary population to the Romanians and

- continuing the parable, the Hungarian side in the historic dispute indirectly

admitted through the canvas that the Romanian side was right, and that the

Romanians, or their ancestors, had settled in Transylvania before the Hungarians

and the Sekler278.

4.1.2.2.6 Legal aspects

extraterritoriality. The articles contain statements from representatives of different

parties in Romania who share the same fear of extraterritoriality by the Status Law.

However, not a single article explains what extraterritoriality exactly means, because

presumably politicians and journalists alike consider the term to be understood by the

general public without further explanation. I understand the term extraterritoriality in

the context of this discourse as the unacceptability of passing a law in state X that has

275 A17.03.2003. Printed: 28.01.2004. 276 A15.04.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004. 277 A24.12.2001. Printed: 28.01.2004. 278 See also Chapter 2.

122

an implication in state Y. In other words, Hungary cannot pass a law that concerns the

citizens of another state, in this case Romania.

The next important issue that derives from objecting to extraterritoriality is the

Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). This certificate is necessary for all

formalities concerning the benefits that derive from the Status Law. The Romanian

political objection does not refer to the certificate as such, since it does not hold any

political implications concerning the Romanian state279. They objected to the handing

out of the CHN on Romanian territory by non-governmental organisations or by the

Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). According to the Orbán-

om Romania

could apply for this certificate in Romania but would have to collect it in Hungary.

Interestingly, bearing in mind the regulations of international law, this is an agreement

that goes beyond the actual problem, since every state has the right to hand out its

official documents at the embassy or consulate general.

The fact that the year 2001 was the 5th anniversary of the bilateral agreement

signed between the two states was mentioned only once280. Obviously, the jubilee did

not play a significant part in the discourse. Furthermore, it was only the Romanian side

that was present in the articles. Not a single Hungarian politician was mentioned in this

Romanian side,

281 d that the Venice Commission effects.]

the Orbán- e a breakthrough in the

deadlock between the two states, which lasted from July to December 2001. The eight

rnments on various

279 However, Romania did object the Hungarian -Hungarian text on the inside. See also Appendix 3. 280 RL27.12.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. 281 RL20.10.2001. Printed: 04.02.2004. All diacritical signs added by me.

123

-

measures282. Another aspect mentioned is the bilateral agreement the two states signed

back in 1996. The new Hungarian socialist foreign minister Kovács insisted that the

changes in the Status Law should follow the general outlines of the bilateral

agreement283.

the general European motif that the politicians kept repeating in order to demonstrate

the

concerning the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality. I assume this was a non-issue for

the journalists.

4.1.3 Summarising the diachronic analysis

In analogy with the results, the conclusions will be divided into two segments:

the first one will be a general comparison of all four papers regarding the ethnic

denotations they have utilised and the second segment will be a broad-spectrum

evaluation of the motifs used by the analysed newspapers.

4.1.3.1 Ethnic denotations

other:

- With a ratio of almost 4:1 the Hungarian papers have used considerably more

denotations than the Romanian papers. Bearing in mind that the ratio between

the Hungarian articles and the Romanian ones is about 10:1 and the popularity

of the denotation hatáon túli magyarok [Magyars beyond the border] among

Hungarian journalists, I could draw the conclusion that the Romanian

denotations are just as diverse as the Hungarian ones.

- While Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság make an extensive use of the term

historiography and public discourse. There is hardly any correlation between the

282 A09.05.2002 and A06.03.2003. Both printed: 28.01.2004. 283 A12.12.2002. Printed: 28.01.2004.

124

rse over the ethnic minorities within

Romania.

- The dominance of hatáon túli magyarok [Magyars beyond the border] or

határon túli magyarság [Magyardom beyond the border] does not have a

parallel among Romanian denotations. They are more balanced in the number of

appearances than the Hungarian ones.

-

self-definition. Those denotations, e.g. magukat magyarnak valló személyek

[Persons who consider themselves Magyars] or

[Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos], are rare and are seldom

repeated.

- Astonishingly, the Romanian denotations show the same ratio between general

denotations regarding the Hungarian co-ethnics and those regarding only the

Hungarians that live in Romania. This is unusual due to the fact that the

Romanian discourse mainly refers to the Hungarians within Romania and not in

other states surrounding Hungary. On the other hand, the Hungarian newspapers

are almost obliged to use denotations that encompass all the Hungarians in

- Since the Hungarian language uses a single ethnonym for people called in

English Hungarians, magyarok [Magyars], there can be no comparison to the

differentiation between ungur [Hungarian] and maghiar [Magyar], which is

possible in Romanian. Practically, from a Hungarian point of view, this lack of

variety in Hungarian bears evidence to the unity of the cultural-linguistic

Hungarian nation.

4.1.3.2 Motifs

The analysis of the six motifs chosen for the diachronic analysis has shown

differences vary from one motif to another. While there might be some congruence on

certain issues, there are different perspectives on other ones. Consequently, I shall

compare the four newspapers motif by motif starting with the Romanian newspapers

and then continuing with the Hungarian ones:

- Europe. The three images of Europe, conformity, sideshow and supra instance,

are portrayed clearly by România Lib

keen on representing both the Hungarian as well as the Romanian side.

125

Consequently, the paper quoted Romanian and Hungarian politicians alike.

itutes,

such as the OSCE or the CE, as a supra instance, an entity to be admired and

enable both sides to put forward their ideas and concerns about the Status Law in

narrative in this context were Romanian prime minister

Hungarian secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh. Magyar

and Romanian sources, but also includes various European representatives. The

ten

minister Viktor Orbán and his foreign minister János Martonyi, have been the

most frequently quoted politicians

Europe.

- Comparison. -

on the other hand, has only quoted two politicians in this matter: Romanian

is not one single comment in the Romanian newspapers referring to statements

made by Romanian politicians on the policy of dual citizenship granted by the

Népszabadság regarding this motif is almost entirely from the Hungarian point

of view, except for two short interviews with Hungarian politicians from

represented by Hungarian politics. Consequently, the Romanian side is not

represented at all. The only non-Hungarian voice to be referred to in regard of

-

motif, who were saying that the Status Law was discriminatory for Romanian

citizens with a Romanian ethnic background. Going a step further and giving

126

for Hungary, the economic bias due to the better possibilities Hungarians from

Romania will have and of the cultural consequences the Status Law will have in

Romanian side saying that the Status Law is discriminative and the Hungarian

side saying it is not. Subsequently, Népszabadság is trying to represent the

Hungarian as well as the Romanian arguments. On the other hand, Magyar

Hírlap has presented various Romanian positions in this respect, predominantly

by Romanian prime minister Ad

narrative presents the views from different European institutions: the European

Commission (EC), the Council of Europe (CE), the Organisation for Security

Party (EPP).

-

to have accepted Hungary as a member in 1999, but refusing

Hungarian

explained what is behind this constant support. Népszabadság also introduced a

different facet: the element of threat. Both Romanian president Ion Iliescu and

Hungarian prime minister Orbán discussed this element by saying that

comments made by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán form the key issue

government has informed all NATO embassies about the content of the Status

-

minister.

- History. Unlike România L

127

side than on the Romanian one. Nonetheless, the Hungarian side represents the

entire political spectrum in Hungary. Consequently, there is hardly any critique

on the abuse of historical data and historical symbolism that was used by the

political elite: Trianon and revisionism. The key issue in M

narrative is the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences. Both the Romanian and

the Hungarian perspectives are well represented in Magyar Hírlap: The Status

Law as a historic obligation, the accusation of revisionism by the right wing

Greater

Hungarian imperialistic attitude.

-

extraterritoriality, although extraterritoriality is never explained. Basically, it is

non-

aspects is the Orbán-

legal aspects is also the question of

János Martonyi, are repeatedly quoted. Another aspect within this segment is

r-law to

mentions only once the aspect of extraterritoriality. Interestingly, it was done in

May 2002, long after the Status Law came into effect and the Orbán-Nastase

Memorandum had

working permit for Hungary and those who oppose it: Socialists, liberals and

right-

of legal bonding. Hungarian secretary of state in the Foreign Office, Zsolt

Németh, stressed that the Hungarian Status Law is a legal bond between the

Hungarian state and its co-ethnics. Hungarian foreign minister János Martonyi

added that it is also the first law of its kind. Béla Markó from the Hungarian

party in Romania (UDMR), underlined this position. The only counter comment

concerning minority politics. Referring to the Hungarian Status Law he declared

that neither Romania nor Hungary should become fields of experimentation in

law.

128

4.2 Synchronic analysis

The synchronic analysis is focused on selected articles from all four newspapers,

which relate to the Orbán- nd December 2001.

This memorandum opened the way for Hungary to implement the Status Law on

Romanian citizens a Hungarian working permit for three months p.a. and administrative

restrictions regarding the handing out of the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN)284. The ONM has eased the tensions between Hungary and Romania. For the

Hungarian newspapers I chose articles from the first week that followed the ONM and

from the Romanian newspapers, whose data basis is more restricted, also one from 7th

January 2002.

4.2.1.1 A 24.12.2001285

This article by Bogdan Chirieac, stylistically a report that gradually turns into an

essay, is a disguised polemic text with connotations to different aspects of the

Romanian-Hungarian relationship. The text itself consists of a title, an introductory

segment and six other segments. Published on Christmas Eve, it is an immediate

reaction to the Orbán-

also contains fragments of an interview with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Chirieac then adds his personal view regarding the Status Law and the ONM.

Printr- 286 Orbán the Law of Hungarian Certificate emptied of essence]287

284 According to the Orbán-reasons of simplicity I shall be always using the abbreviation CHN. Compare also Appendices 1 and 2. 285 See Appendix 7 for a scanned copy of this article. 286 Due to difficulties with computer programmes, the Romanian articles are printed without the diacritical signs. When quoting, I added the signs for a better understanding, since the signs obviously do appear in the printed edition. See also footnote to 4.3.4.1 287 All quotations are from the respective article. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

129

Although the author repeats the name of this law again in the first segment, there is no

statutului. is

customary name288

is a far-reaching conclusion. Furthermore, by reducing the Status Law to just a law

concerning the Certificates of Hungarian Nationality289 (CHN), Chirieac focuses on the

Therefore, this false name for the Status Law carries a connotation of patriotism, which

Chirieac gives in the first segment an account of what the ONM has changed for

the implementation of the Status Law. His main concern is the abolition of elements,

which he describes as discriminating. The term discriminare [discrimination] is used

five times in this article, which again emphasises the injustice done by the Status Law to

Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnic background. Again, it is an appeal to patriotic

sentiments. Furthermore, he discusses three other points, which need a more detailed

observation:

- Consulting the neighbouring states. The Status Law, according to Chirieac, has

passed through parliament in Budapest without prior consultations with the

states involved. Austria, he continues, has very subtly but firmly managed to

convince the Hungarian side to exclude Austria from the list of beneficiary

states. The fact that Chirieac insists on an Austrian subtle and firm attitude, is in

direct contrast to Romanian reaction which was very loud and not that effective.

However, he added, Austria was already a member of the European Union (EU)

and therefore had a better negotiating position. Slovakia, on the other side has

joined Romanian in rejecting the Status Law. Serbia and Ukraine have accepted 290. Chirieac does not

a

and Slovenia.

288 For the official name in English see Appendices 1 and 3. 289 According to the Orbán- 290 On a seminary in Slovakia back in 2002, fellow Slovak students told me that they consider the ONM to be a Romanian treason in the common Slovak-Romanian cause against the Status Law.

130

- The European dimension. Chirieac argues against the Status Law since,

according to him, it does not stand up to European standards, although he does

not explain what these standards exactly are. After having reminded the reader

that all three states, i.e. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, have applied for

membership in the EU, Chirieac demonstrates the contradiction between

principiile europene. European principles.]. The

spiritual European.

demonstrated in the diachronic analysis, Europe and the European Union are

used as synonyms, which stand for a specific legal and social system. This

system is often described as a target to be achieved by the candidate states.

Chirieac used this image to manifest his discontent with the Status Law.

- Hungarian politics. The first segment starts off with a declaration that the Status

-wing nationalistic voters for the

forthcoming elections of April 2002. Although of deep insight, Chirieac

discredited with this sentence the entire Hungarian foreign policy towards the

co-ethnics since the political changes of 1989/1990 including the Hungarian

constitution291. The issue of electoral tactics was repeated again to justify

c

(FIDESZ) win the elections, modifying the Status Law, as the ONM demands,

will be a minute issue.

The second and the third segments entail details from the ONM. In the forth

segment, however, Chirieac gives an account of what he saw in Budapest when the

Orbán-

Transylvania, where they were by the locals, who were already sedentary.

The verb întâmpina has two meanings: The first one is to contest or to object and the

second one is to welcome292. Understandably, it is up to the viewer to decide wheteher

the locals objected or welcomed the Huns. I assume that Chirieac was referring to the

first meaning. This small detail has an enormous symbolic background. The Hungarians

291 See Appendix 6. 292 -

131

descendants. On the other Hand, Romanian Theory of Continuity suggests that the

arrival293. This results in two images:

1. The Huns represent the Hungarians and the locals, probably, Dacians, represent

the Romanians. The Romanians contest the Hungarians in Transylvania, who

have just dismounted.

2.

Transylvania, e.g. to ap

The forth segment is a preparation for the fifth segment, which consists of a

had remained of the Status Law after the discriminatory elements had been taken out.

- When the Status Law passed through parliament he did not even think it might

entail discriminatory elements. From this point on Orbán talks only of

differences created by the Status Law and not of discrimination.

- Orbán continues by adding that there has been a dialogue with the Romanian

side and they have reached a mutual agreement, the ONM. This declaration

suggests equal footing between Hungary and Romania. Indirectly, by pointing

out the consultations for the ONM, Orbán suggests that there have not been talks

prior to the passing in parliament of the Status Law.

- Orbán used a metaphor to conclude his answer: the materials used for its

construction and the soil it had been built upon are not the only indicators for

doing well, then it is also good for Hungary. Hungary is also content with its

he does not retort by pointing out other aspects of the ONM, which are favourable to

Hungary: the consulates can still hand out the CHN and all other financial benefits, such

being very diplomatic in flattering Romania and avoiding sensitive issues.

293 See Chapter 2.

132

The sixth segment is a show down and a conclusion. Chirieac writes about

structure:

- Hungary is a strong adversary: Hungary has the stronger international lobby and

is an excellent candidate for joining the EU.

- Romania has succeeded in imposing its will just like in 1996, when the two

states signed the bilateral agreement. Romania refused to sign the agreement lest

Hungary withdrew its demand of territorial autonomy for ethnic minorities, i.e.

the Hungarians in Romania.

- Chirieac admits that the European Union played a decisive role in bringing

Orbán back to his senses. According to the author, the EU does not differentiate

between the candidate states and had enough foresight to want to integrate both

states.

- -membership, which results in a

disadvantage for Romania.

Chirieac contradicted himself in this segment. On the one hand side he was trying to

show that Hungary was diplomatica

the European Union and its NATO membership. On the other hand he said that the EU

did not differentiate between the candidate states and he did not give any details as to

-membership was so diplomatically useful. Romanian

diplomacy, he continued, was successful when it showed steadfastness and continuity

Venice Commission. He added: both countries have had a centuries long relationship,

which did not exist prior to 1864294. Moreover, Hungary was a European power up to

1526 and from 1867-1918295, something Romania had never been.

mean t

primarily a patriotic feeling and the fact that the PSD achieved this diplomatic success

Chirieac also makes a mistake when he writes that the CHN cannot be used in Romania 294 state in 1864. 295 With Austria in the Dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

133

territory.].296 It is my assumption that Chirieac, in his patriotic euphoria did not read the

text properly, the signing of which he had witnessed.

4.2.2 Magyar Hírlap (MH)

The six articles from the Magyar Hírlap stretch over a period of ten days: from

Christmas Eve 2001 until 2nd January 2002. Although different journalists wrote them,

they all relate to the Orbán-

prime ministers on 22nd December 2001.

4.2.2.1 MH 24.12.2001297

This report by Miklós Újvári was published two days after Prime Minister

the ONM. The author quotes statements by

Union (FIDESZ), Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Alliance of Free Democrats

(SZDSZ) and Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). It follows the structure of a

title, an introductory segment and a main text consisting of eight segments. The author

describes the discursive event, i.e. the ONM, in a general manner while the leitmotif of

the article is about the working permit the Hungarian government is willing to grant to

Szabadon jöhet a román munkás

opening section starts off with a sentence that sums up the quintessence of the ONM

akik évente több hónapot is itt dolgozhatnak. [From January onwards, the Hungarian labour market will be open to annum.]

Ez volt az ára, hogy Románia hozzájáruljon a státustörvény életbe lépéséhez.

296 Compare with Appendix 2. 297 Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://438/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

134

effect.]

The article could have almost stopped at that. The essence of the ONM has been

segment the author does

and Orbán, but rather quotes the Hungarian socialist politician Csaba Tabajdi. Tabajdi is

against the ONM, because, according to him, it opens up the Hungarian labour market

to millions of Romanians who are seeking work. This declaration is actually not an

answer to the question as to why he objected to the ONM. The problem that the

Hungarian labour market will be open to approximately 21 million Romanian citizens is

not clearly explained. I presume that both the author and Tabajdi did not go into detail

to explain these circumstances due to the clarity of the facts, at least from their point of

view: Romanian labour is cheaper and it would cause wage dumping on the Hungarian

job market. This could become fatal for the Hungarian labour market and it could

eventually crumble. The fact that Romanian labour in general is cheaper than Hungarian

labour is not mentioned in the article. It is taken for granted. Tabajdi, as a high

representative of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which opposed the Status Law

for a long period of time and changed its position in the last minute, symbolises the

ambiguous relationship the MSZP has with the Status Law. In my opinion the MSZP

voted for the Status Law not to appear unpatriotic in the Hungarian public and lose

voters. However, it has not ceased to criticise the Status Law.

The author refers to the ONM by different names: megállapodás (eight times)

megegyezés and kompromisszum (each only once). The first two mean agreement whilst

the latter means compromise. Due to the nature of the ONM, it is the third denotation

that suits it best, since the ONM was a transitory solution to be reassessed after the Law

has been modified by the Hungarian parliament in the course of the following six

months298. Hence I conclude that the usage of different synonyms of the lexeme

agreement is somewhat euphemistic. They suggest that the ONM has ended the political

strife that has been going between Hungary and Romania since the Status Law was

passed by parliament in June 2001.

ue regarding the labour market. I consider

298 See Appendix 2: Section 1; Paragraph 11.

135

a. Consequently, the working permits

are the main issue not only in the ONM but also in this article. The quotations from

entioned in segment four with the

information that in the deal the two politicians have struck the Certificate of Hungarian

Nationality (CHN) will not be handed out to family members who are not Hungarians,

e.g. spouses or partners. Interestingly, both MSZP and the Alliance of Free Democrats

(SZDSZ) criticise the ONM for the working permits and not for any other aspect that

definitely concerns the Hungarians of Romania: they have to travel farther to obtain the

CHN, non-Hungarian spouses or partners will not benefit from the Law and the

competition they could face with their Romanian expatriates on the Hungarian labour

market.

Furthermore, it is the working permits that draw a line between the two large

ZP, on the one hand and the

small parties SZDSZ and Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) on the other. The

comments from the latter ones refer to more general aspects. While István Szent-Iványi

from the SZDSZ rejects any working permits for foreign citizens to avoid

who are not of Hungarian background.

Not a single expert in economics is quoted and not one representative of the

Hungarian labour unions is mentioned. This is striking when considering the fact that it

is the labour unions that should fear cheap foreign labour most. Therefore it is my

conclusion that the article aims at politically interested readers. It is the reaction of

political representatives that is important and not that of those affected. Accordingly,

not a single representative of the Hungarians in Romania is mentioned. Újvári, as he

told me during the interview almost two years later, objected to the ONM from the

beginning on for it showed the incon

in the fact that the ONM was applied in Romania but not in other neighbouring states,

such as Serbia and Slovakia.

136

4.2.2.2 MH 24.12.2001a299

This article is unmistakably a clear-cut point of view: the authors of the text

Orbán-

Egy papír ára (MH-álláspont) -viewpoint)],

consent and hence for the ONM. Without mentioning any specific authors, the article

was most probably written by members of the political section of the editorial board at

Magyar Hírlap300 and can therefore be considered as an essay aiming to support readers

who object to the ONM. They write in the first person plural and have no intention of

the mistakes (from their point of view) the government has made and eventually goes

on with the hazardous impact the ONM would have on Hungary.

- A

than the Hungarian one]. The authors add that it is an old statement, although

reference to the Treaty of Trianon, where the Hungarian diplomacy has failed

dismally. The authors continue by adding that in the case of the ONM it is not

román fél csupán kihasználta azt a

leh

Romanian side has simply used the opportunity, which Budapest, the Hungarian

government offered him on a tray.] This current Romanian supremacy, the

authors added, is self-made by the Hungarian side and no foreign power can be

blamed for it.

- The authors then continue with a critique on what the Orbán government has

done wrong in enforcing the Status Law. They do not criticise the Status Law in

itself, they only point out what they conside

faults: no consultations with the neighbours, no discussions with the European

Union (EU) and the blinding, self-

299 Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg//462/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 300 Interview with Zsolt Iván Nagy.

137

a

-delusion ...] The

authors suggest that Hungary should have consulted the neighbours before

taking action and not to get carried away with self-deluding ideas over

its role in Central Europe. Even so, when the

government realised that Romania and Slovakia would object to the Status

postponed the application until matters had calmed down and only then started

negotiating. The arrogance presented by the Hungarian government could not

have gone unpunished, i.e. the incapacity to implement the Law in Romania.

Consequently, the only option the Hungarian side had was to haggle at any price

to be Maradt tehát az alku a jelek szerint bármi

áron. apparently at any price.] It is this weak

standing point that allowed Romania to go on with its demands, which the

authors consider unfavourable for Hungary.

- Next to the Hungarian government, it is the ONM that is in the line of fire. The

critique focuses on two main issues: the opening of the Hungarian labour market

to approximately 23 Million Romanian citizens301 and the fact that according to

the ONM spouses will not be granted a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN). According to the journalists, the ONM is just a piece of paper without

n be later waved at international conferences.]

common point of view, there is no quotation or reported comment from other

actors in the field of this discourse, e.g. representatives of the trade unions or

quintessence in regard to the ONM:

Miközben tehát most már bizonyos, hogy a kormány elérte a célját, s a törvény január elsején életbe lép, csupán az nem világos: miért jó ez így Magyarországnak? Vagy akár a határon túli magyaroknak?

301

138

[While in the meantime it is certain that the government has achieved its goal and the law will come alive (sic!) on January first, the only thing remaining unclear is: why is it good for Hungary this way? Or, for that matter, to the Hungarians beyond the borders?]

The first of the two questions suggests that it is not evident how the Hungarian

g what

advantages the ONM will bring to the co-ethnics, because, at the end of the day, it is the

co-

of my interviewees told me302 ng

minority issues, is focused on the minorities within Hungary and not the co-ethnics. By

minorities in Hungary he was referring to social, ethnic and sexual minorities. This

e co-

refer in the second question to the co-ethnics in general, although the ONM regards only

the citizens of Romania. The second question could be understood as an answer to the

first question: if the ONM is not good for Hungary, then maybe it is at least good for the

co-

életbe lép

implementation in a somewhat awkward manner, since the correct term would have

been hatályba lép, to come into effect. Coming alive suggests a connotation of creation,

birth and artificiality. It creates an image of the Status Law as the Hungarian

between Hungary and Romania, the ONM.

Another aspect is the strong feeling of anger in the article. The authors convey

the impression that they are cross with the Hungarian government for numerous

reasons: it has put Hungary in an uneasy political situation, it has damaged the positive

image Hungary had within the EU, it has endangered the Hungarian labour market and

it has discriminated the co- -Hungarian spouses. They also do not fail to

mention that the Hungarian government should have known better in time, when it

excluded Austria. The Austrian government objected to the application of the Status

Law on its territory, since it violates, among others, the European Charta of Human

Rights.

302 Interview with Norbert Molnár.

139

In all, the title and the two questions at the end of the text can also be read

Hungary? Or, for that matter, for the co-ethnics?

4.2.2.3 MH 27.12.2001303

304

political scene after the Orbán-

be considered somewhere between a report and an essay. The target group is not quite

clear. Presumably readers that would like to see what the different Hungarian parties

have to say about the ONM. The article is divided into nine segments of which some

have their own title (segments four to nine). The segments two to eight represent

different actors within the discourse. The second and third segments represent the main

content and their actor: organisations and parties that support the ONM, Romani

main Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR),

neighbouring states (except Austria). The article tries to represent different facets of the

ONM whereby it includes opinions pro and contra the ONM. The first segment is the

introductory one and shall be discussed together with the title.

The title and the introductory segment of this specific article used a military

language to describe the political rows that followed the ONM. The title goes as

follows:

Státustörvényvita: háború karácsonykor (A nap témája) [Dispute over the Status Law: War at Christmas time.

The introductory segment that follows it continues with similar language:

magyarországi munkavállalásáról.

303 Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://449/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 304 The authors are: Pál Szombathy, Iván Zsolt Nagy, Ottó Neumann and Gergely Varga.

140

citizens was brought under crossfire.]

War, shooting and crossfire indicate a martial vernacular aiming to demonstrate the

severity of the political dispute regarding the ONM. This semantic field also makes

obvious the tough standing different actors within the discourse took up, e.g. opposition,

government or labour unions. It also suggests uncompromising positions between the

different participants. Especially the title, War at Christmas time, contains an extreme

contrast: Christmas symbolises joy, happiness and peacefulness in the Christian sense

while war is diametrically opposed to it with its connotations of sorrow, grief and

disturbance. Furthermore, and again from a Christian perspective, Christmas can be

regarded as a holy time in which wars are forbidden or at least interrupted.

Consequently, those who wage war can be regarded as sinners who have broken a

divine peace. The introductory segment also refers to expostulations made by members

of the leading opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), and does not

refer to the ONM as such. This means, that the authors take it for granted that the reader

already knows what the ONM is about. Finally, the title is contradictory to the content

of the article since the article refers to the dispute over the ONM and not over the Status

Law.

The second and the third segment, i.e. the ones following the introductory

objection to the ONM. The MSZP representative states that the ONM is against the

detail to explain which laws exactly are violated by the ONM:

Orbán érdekeivel, és súlyosan sérti a törvényeket. the Hungarian nation and gravely violates the law.]

The SZDSZ, o

diplomacy by claiming that Károly Grósz was the last Hungarian prime minister to be

humiliated by the Romanians in such a manner. This comparison between Orbán and

Grósz is particularly poignant since Grósz was the last prime minister of the old

socialist regime. The poignancy lies in the fact that Orbán presented himself on several

141

Foreign Council in the Hungarian parliament, István Szent-Iványi, who is member of

the SZDSZ, has suggested excluding all paragraphs regarding working permits from the

Status Law as well as from the ONM. This demand was put forward by the SZDSZ

before the Law was passed by parliament305.

According to the structure already presented, i.e. introduction and the

presentation of the two main opposition parties, one could have expected the

The governi

fourth segment, but only as one of three voices: the MKDSZ306, FIDESZ itself and the

organisation close to FIDESZ, condemns the opposition for spreading hatred in the

country, especially against Romanian citizens. Only then FIDESZ is allowed to present

its case, but instead of protecting the ONM and justifying its necessity, the FIDESZ

representative starts a personal attack against Szent-Iványi. He accuses him of putting

his own political interests as a leading figure of SZDSZ first instead of his obligation as

from the Pri -

Romanian councils which will meet to discuss the remaining ambiguities und unsolved

details of the ONM. The whole presentation of the political narratives is out of

proportion. Before reaching the seventh segment, where the authors represent their

opinion more directly, the journalists have already made a statement by

-à-vis FIDESZ. Orbán and FIDESZ, as the

ily under political accusations, do not get

enough space in the article to present their case properly. Properly in this sense would

mean counter-arguments and a balanced amount of text.

The fifth segment is the first segment in Magyar Hírlap in the debate over the

ONM in which representatives of the Hungarians of Romania express their concern

regarding the ONM. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR),

ONM for legalising co-ethnics who work illegally in Hungary. They are further grateful

Without explicitly pointing his finger at it, Béla Markó, chairman of the UDMR,

305 The SZDSZ was the only party in parliament to vote against the Law. 306 Hungarian Christian-Democratic Union.

142

admitted that the Status Law had created tensions between the UDMR and the other

government parties in Bucharest. The ONM had eased these tensions.

The following segment, like the one before it, is a novelty, since it is the first

segment in which representatives of different labour unions state their views on the

ONM. They express their dissatisfaction with the ONM due to their concerns over the

working permits for Romanian citizens. Political parties, especially the MSZP, have

previously claimed to represent the Hungarian labour class by suggesting that the ONM

political and somewhat theoretical scene and move towards a more concrete level of

application. They are the ones who are directly endangered by the ONM, and not the

-

term advantages:

ng in mind its selfish short- labour market.]

citizens regardless of

ethnic background and the denial of the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) to

spouses and partners who are not Hungarians. In the seventh segment the authors rely

their arguments on statistics supplied by the Central Statistics Office (KSH), which

be good for the Hungarian economy. In other words, the authors have tried to put the

aspects of the ONM that regard labour migration into professional perspective. They

continue by saying that Romanian work seekers came to Hungary in large numbers

before the ONM was signed. Indirectly they are indicating that those who are warning

of a great labour immigration should take a closer look and realise that the influx of

labour seekers has already taken place. It is their status that is about to change, and not

their geographical position.

The eighth segment relates to the CHN and the medical care Romanian workers

can receive in Hungary. The authors describe the changes the ONM has brought to the

143

CHN regulations and does not refrain from attacking the government, and hence the

ONM, once again:

Románia ellenezte bevezetésüket, és ebben (is) [Romania opposed their introduction and it has won in this matter (as well).]

Although the authors do not oppose this step openly, the previous sentences reveal their

concealed discontent with the ONM. They report on the cabinet communiqué, that puts

the new regulation in a different perspective: practically, anybody in Romania can

obtain the CHN. According to the Status Law, Romanian applicants, regardless of their

command of the Hungarian language, can declare themselves as ethnically Hungarian

and be members of any Hungarian association, political party or Church307. If the

would not have brought this issue. Hence the remaining question: if any Romanian

citizen can obtain the CHN, why did the authors bother about the matter at all? In the

last phrase of the eighth segment the journalists reveal a certain anxiety regarding the

Beari

on external experts, also assume that many Romanian work seekers would apply for the

CHN just to benefit from superior medical care in Hungary:

Szakér román kórházak helyett itt kezeltethetik majd magukat. [According to experts it is not excluded that many will apply for a Hungarian working permit just to get their medical treatment here and so to avoid the Romanian hospitals, which are in a tragic condition.]

The ninth segment, although it consists of statistical data, nevertheless gives a

few hints about the aut

all states. For example, Croatia is said to have an unemployment rate of 22% while

Slovenia with a population of about two million has 97,824 registered unemployed.

These figures are not comparable and it is unclear from where the authors have taken

them. This segment is an attempt to display the potential of labour immigration in

Hungary from its neighbouring states. Basically, the authors have tried to relate

307 See also Appendices 1 and 3.

144

unemployment rates with labour migration. The two are correlated, but not in the

simplistic manner suggested by the authors. High unemployment rates in Ukraine do not

necessarily generate a labour emigration towards Hungary. If we consider the unofficial

data regarding Romanian labour migration, by 2005 there were presumably one million

Romanians in Italy and at least half a million on the Iberian peninsula. Together they

make a sum higher than the number of Hungarians in Romania308. The way the figures

are represented implies a threat to the Hungarian labour market. This threat arises from

these figures is contradictory to the statements made in the seventh segment, where the

authors tried to calm down the hysteria regarding illegal work and relied on data from

the KSH.

The article also includes two photographs: one in the third segment, which is

about the SZDSZ, and one in the seventh where the authors argue against the MSZP

with statistical data from the KSH. The first picture shows István Szent-Iványi from the

SZDSZ with another man and a background consisting of a SZDSZ poster. The two

men do not have eye contact and do not seem to communicate. Although without a title,

the poster on the photograph clearly suggests that the men are related to the SZDSZ.

Orbán happily exchanging folders, presumably copies of the ONM. The second picture

can be understood as the representation of an action that actually took place in

Budapest. These two pictures create a misbalance between the political actors. The

SZDSZ is one of the opposition parties but is not the main one. The picture gives the

SZDSZ an optically important role within the text although it does not relate to the

context of the article. The second photograph, also without a title, almost certainly

haggled well and blackmailed Hungary to the limi

4.2.2.4 MH 29.12.2001309

(SZDSZ) political ambitions. Unlike other articles, which tried to a certain extent to

represent more than one political point of view, the authors of this publication have

produced a text in which the SZDSZ or rather one of its MPs, Bálint Magyar, has the

308 See Table 5. 309 Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://501/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

145

first as well as the last word regarding the ongoing debates about the Orbán-

Memorandum (ONM) and the Status Law. This intention is amplified when bearing in

SZDSZ: javaslat a

státustörvény módosításáról [SZDSZ: a suggestion for modification of the Status

Law], already reveals the main speaker in the article. The structure of the article consists

of a title, an introductory segment and three segments following it. The target group is

the interested SZDSZ voter.

The introductory segment starts off with a critical stand against the ONM and

-proposal. This counter-proposal is a contradiction in itself. The

SZDSZ, as the authors remind the reader, was the only party in parliament not to vote

-proposal suggests that the ONM is

unacceptable, since it excludes privileges promised to the co-

children by the Status Law, which the ONM now excludes. If the SZDSZ was against

the Law in the first place, then why does it condemn the government for modifying it?

regarded as part of the general political debate about the Status Law and uses the ONM

to start an attack on Prime Minister Orbán. This attack includes his politics vis-à-vis

Romania and his stand regarding the Hungarian labour market:

A román-magyar egyetértési nyilatkozat semmiféle, a román munkavállalókkal szembeni korlátozást nem tartalmaz, ezzel veszélyezteti magyar állampolgárok [The Romanian-Hungarian communiqué of understanding [ONM], does not include any restriction for Romanian employees, and thus it endangers the

The structure of the article is an essay about how the SZDSZ positioned itself in

the discourse and which arguments it has used: it attacks the government for not

protecting the Hungarian workers position on the Hungarian labour market, it goes on

with its counter-proposal, continues with a direct attack on Orbán and concludes with an

demonstrate this pattern:

- Due to its dissatisfaction with the ONM, the SZDSZ has initiated its own

proposal as to how to modify the Law. Bearing in mind that the SZDSZ

opposition to the Status Law throughout its various stages of development, this

146

counter-proposal aims not o

(FIDESZ) but also at the largest opposition party, the Hungarian Socialist Party

(MSZP), which criticised the ONM but did not bring in its own counter

onsequent

action in its political agenda. Furthermore, the electoral campaign for the 2002

elections has just started so that this tough stand against the Orbán government

could also be interpreted as a signal to the voters that the SZDSZ remains true to

its politics.

- The SZDSZ vehemently criticises the ONM for excluding benefits, which

otherwise would have been part of the Status Law. It further suggests other

benefits, which are not included in the Law and refer to the basic principle of

towards the co-ethnics: They, i.e. the co-ethnics, should

receive support on their home ground. This goal combined with the better

economic opportunities in Hungary for most of the co-ethnics, has become a

difficult task, which the Status Law has tried to solve: how to support the co-

ethnics by granting benefits in Hungary without initiating an exodus? The

be it for the Hungarians in Romania or for all Romanian citizens, is the wrong

means to support the co-ethnics. The co-ethnics should be supported by offering

oktatás, nyelvtanulás, könyvkiadás, a nyomtatott és elektronikus

sajtótermékekhez való kedvezményes hozzáférés révén.

more fortunate, if the possibilities of the Hungarians of Romania would have

had better possibilities in their native country through education, language

training, book printing, and through favourable obtainment of printed and

electronic media products.]

- The SZDSZ starts a personal attack on Prime Minister Orbán suggesting that he

plays the kemény fickó [tough guy] but is hihetetlenül puha [unbelievably weak]

when it comes down to negotiations with the EU and Romania. The comparison

to Károly Grósz is there once again310.

- To boost its own political integrity, the reader is reminded that back in 2001, the

SZDSZ proposed its own version of a law that would allow the co-ethnics to

310 See previous article 4.2.2.3

147

parties, however, turned down this proposal. In combination with the fact that

Hungary had to modify the Status Law, e.g. through the ONM, thus the SZDSZ

is showing that the party was right by not approving the Status Law in the first

place.

-

last segment. This last segment includes a statement made public by the

Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) at a press conference. The statement

accuses the socialists, i.e. MSZP, and the SZDSZ for being anti-Hungarian in

by MIÉP is used by the SZDSZ to retort and say that the there is already a

FIDESZ-MIÉP coalition and that MIÉP is a FIDESZ pitbulja -

-

2002 elections. In other words, this pseudo attack on the SZDSZ (and MSZP) is

turned against MIÉP by degrading it to a dog or a thug. This was confirmed a

few weeks later, i.e. in 2002, when Orbán declared in a radio broadcast that he

could very well imagine a coalition between FIDESZ and MIÉP, should the

elections turn out favourably for these two parties.

In the introductory segment the authors tell the reader that the SZDSZ has

initiated a modification of the Law. This modification refers to two issues: first, spouses

well and second, the local Hungarian organisations should be given a free hand to

wards the

Status Law and has continued to do so regarding the ONM. However, the SZDSZ is

using the ONM for electoral propaganda and this specific article to lay down its politics

regarding the Status Law. It is unclear why Magyar Hírlap has published such a one-

sided article. It would have been understandable if an SZDSZ party member or MP had

written it. Bearing in mind the fact that the authors of the article are unknown, since it

says only MHO-információ [Magyar Hírlap Online information], it is difficult to make

any further assessment. Obviously, this article would not have fulfilled the criteria of

the claim of neutrality previously mentioned in Chapter 3.

148

Finally, segment two also includes a small, untitled photograph, presumably

Bálint Magyar, whose statements compose the larger part of that segment. This

photograph has the shape of pictures used for job applications or passports. Unlike the

previous MH-article, where the photos represent action and interaction, this one is static

and visualises the

face in contrast to the faceless authors, who are not even mentioned. Not forgetting the

pro-SZDSZ structure and line of argumentation, the article can also be compared to an

electoral advertisement: Slogan, text and a photograph, which shows the politician in a

favourable light.

4.2.2.5 MH 30.12.2001311

This article can be regarded as an answer to the previous article, where only the

Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) was represented312. Therefore, it is directed at the

ew in this short article, which

contains a title and two short segments. The first segment repeats the title and continues

The title is repeated in the text and the text is a detailed explanation of the title. The

title, and therefore the first sentence in the first segment, reveals the tenor of the article,

namely an attack or, if one takes into consideration the previous article, a counter-

attack:

Pokorni: tudatosan keltenek félelmet a magyar munkavállalók körében [Pokorni: they deliberately awaken fears among Hungarian workers]

Pokorni, in the name of FIDESZ, postulates three claims with this title: the suggestion

presumption that somebody has

spread fear among Hungarian labourers and the accusation that it has been done

deliberately.

SZDSZ and Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) have claimed to fight for the Hungarian

311 Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://470/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php 312 See 4.2.2.4

149

313. It seems to be a common political issue for all three parties,

although it is usually the syndicates and trade unions that represent organised labour

vis-à-vis employers and government. Consequently, it is my assumption that the claimto

being expressed in the name of working Hungarians is politically motivated and has no

real basis. Political parties are supposed to represent their voters. In this case, however,

all three parties FIDESZ, MSZP and SZDSZ have tried to occupy a strong position

within the discourse from which they can claim to speak for people that they do not

necessarily represent.

The claim to knowing that there is fear among Hungarian labourers is obscure

since there is no explanation as to how FIDESZ found out about these fears of the

working class, if they exist at all. Furthermore, Pokorni fails to explain what working

Hungarians are actually afraid of. Thus, this accusation demands prior knowledge of the

political debate surrounding the Orbán-

permit for all Romanian citizens regardless of their ethnic background. These working

start a considerable cheap labour migration from Romania to Hungary. Hence the idea

that Romanian migrant workers might become too big a challenge for the Hungarian

labour market.

The third part, the accusation of deliberately spreading fear, is the basis of

formation has the following structure: general attack on an unknown third party by

using a conjugation in the third person plural keltenek [wake or awake] or állitják

[declare, claim or assert], a direct attack on Kovács and finally offering suggestions to

concurrence with the other four parties and that socialist party leader Kovács approved

of the ONM. Since he does not go into detail as to which four parties he was referring, it

can be assumed that the fifth one would be SZDSZ, which also did not vote for the

Status Law314. In other words, Pokorni is saying that Kovács has changed his mind

within a very short period of time, which is supposed to suggest unreliability and

political opportunism. Pokorni continues with the following expostulation:

A legnagyobb kormánypárt elnöke politikai hecckampánynak nevezte a megállapodás körüli vitát.

313 See previous articles. 314 The five parties are: FIDESZ, MSZP, FKGP, MDF and MIÉP.

150

[The chairman of the largest party in government [i.e. Pokorni] called the debate surrounding the agreement [i.e. the ONM] a teasing political campaign.]

Pokorni then goes on to suggest a solution: the number of Romanian migrant workers

should be monitored and the Országos Munkaügyi Tanács [National Labour Council]

development, especially that of Romanian workers.

Pokorni, instead of using the term megállapodás [agreement], uses the term

nyilatkozat [declaration] twice. This usage needs a contextual explanation:

- -

and

These fragments presented by Pokorni show the following characteristics:

- They refer to the countries and not to specific persons, in this case the two prime

magyar-román [Magyar-Romanian] or a két

ország [the two countries] Pokorni transfers the responsibility for the ONM from

the personal to the national level. This means that the ONM is not the result of

cal

parties, but between Hungary and Romania, two sovereign states.

- The two fragments also transmit the notion of negotiations, as if the two states

had negotiated the issue and have reached a solution acceptable to both sides.

This notion aims at the accusations made by other parties, especially SZDSZ,

that the ONM is a proof of the fact that Hungarian diplomacy has succumbed to 315. Pokorni therefore displays the ONM as the result of a

negotiation between the two states that has taken place on equal footing.

The conclusion of this article is that it is trying to compensate the strong pro-

SZDSZ article previously discussed. By compensation I mean representing the criticised

315 See previous article.

151

ce defend itself.

This compensation, however, is only a half-hearted one: in size it is a third as long as

the previous article and it does not include a photograph. Consequently, when

comparing these two articles, Magyar Hírlap, despite the declarations made by some of

the interviewees316, definitely has a tendency to represent SZDSZ more strongly than

FIDESZ.

4.2.2.6 MH 02.01.2002317

This article by Miklós Újvári is an interview with the chairman of the

Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), Béla Markó. It consists of a

title, an introductory segment followed by nine questions and the respective nine

answers. There is also a photograph of Markó. The title of the article is a testimony to

n-

(ONM):

Markó: a megegyezés elemi érdekünk volt [Markó: the agreement was of basic interest to us]

The introductory segment continues with three declarations, which are to become the

leitmotif of the interview:

- Markó does not think that the ONM will harm the Hungarian labour market.

Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)

that the ONM will cause an invasion of migrant workers from Romania to

Hungary.

- The ONM is in the interest of the Hungarians in Transylvania and therefore he

supports it. Although Markó does not go into detail as to why the ONM is good

for the Hungarians in Romania, I assume that it is the fact that the ONM ended

the political dispute between Romania and Hungary.

- The Status Law requires further negotiations with Hungary due to possible

linguistic requirements for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). The

Law per se does not mention any knowledge of the Hungarian language as a

preliminary requirement to obtain the CHN, but the issue seems to be of

316 Interviews with Iván Zsolt Nagy and Miklós Újvári. 317 Path: 19.02.2003 wysiwyg://506/http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Popup_index.php

152

importance to those who process the applications318. For the Hungarians in

Romania it is mainly UDMR.

The questions put forward by Újvári vary from general problems regarding the Status

the Hungarian labour market (Nos. six, seven and eight) and one personal question (No.

question five relates to the probable Hungarian language tests.

Markó displays in this interview his agency to perform different roles or

identities. He does not transfer them in time and space since he is talking to Újvári

within a limited framework of time and space, so it is not a case of différance in the

classical sense. Nevertheless, the answers he presented reveal the various roles he plays

in the political arena in the contested fields of ethnicity and politics. The following

Nekem a saját közösségem érdekére is kell gondolnom, és az erdélyi [I have to think also of my own community, and the Transylvanian interest was that this strained situation should be brought to an end.]319

The small word is

previously mentioned performance in those contested fields. With is he admits that he

has other obligations, which he has to attend to. However he does not go into detail

explaining them so the reader has to deduct them from other sources in this text.

Due to the multiple layered performances I shall dissect them into four main

features, which will be discussed. These four features obviously intersect at various

points, but Self:

1. Markó as a politician from Romania representing the Hungarians in Romania

vis-à-vis Hungary. Hungary in this case is the Hungarian media embodied by the

author of the present text, Miklós Újvári. This role is represented in the

introductory segment and in the answers one, two, three, five, six, seven and

eight. From this position Markó analyses the situation created by the Status Law

and the ONM. Arguing from this particular position, the ONM is for the good of

318 See also Appendix 2 319 My emphasis.

153

- The Status Law and the ONM have transformed many benefits into a single

comprehensive, juridical form. Both legislative measures are a proof to

-ethnics in general and the Hungarians of Romania

Magyarország és a Magyarországon kivül

-ethnics relationship.] However, both

towards the co-ethnics already laid down in the Hungarian constitution320.

- The ONM will legalise the status of those Romanian citizens already in Hungary

and engaged in illegal work. Nonetheless, there will not be many Romanians

who will use their working permit for Hungary for two reasons: it is limited to

the period of three months per annum and the permit is useful only for

migrating, seasonal, unskilled labour and not for highly qualified scientists who

might be seeking permanent residence.

- The ONM and the Hungarian Status Law entail quite a few [filters]. In

other words, Markó is indicating that the Hungarian authorities might make it

difficult for Romanian migrant labourers to actually obtain the working permit.

t 321.

- As an UDMR politician he is quite astonished at the heated debate in Hungary

e körül olyan nagy viták lesznek Magyarországon.

think that there would be such big debates in Hungary about it [Status Law]]

This astonishment, if taken at face value, can only be understood when bearing

in mind that he speaks in the name of Transylvanian Magyardom emphasising

that the only thing that matters is that there is an agreement. This leads me to the

conclusion that the Hungarians of Romania did not really care about the content

of the ONM as long as the two governments reached any agreement that would

allow the Status Law to be implemented on Romanian territory. Practically,

Markó is saying that the Hungarian public should not take the ONM literally.

2. Markó as an UDMR politician representing the Hungarians in Romania vis-à-vis

Romanian government. This performance is present in the sixth answer where

Markó talks about the Hungarian-Romanian relations that have turned sour

320 See also Appendix 6. 321 Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

154

during the previous months without actually going into detail about the reason

behind it. He continues by saying that the ONM is in the interest of the

Hungarians in Transylvania and that they supported it. Furthermore, by using the

plural mi [we] and jártunk [we went] he includes himself as part of the group

just mentioned: the Hungarians of Romania. They went to both governments to

Éppen ezért mi egyé

megállapodást, és közben is jártunk ennek érdekében a mindkét kormánynál.

[This is why we harmoniously supported this agreement and we attended both

governments in this matter] He is disguising his high-ranking position as a

Romanian politician of ethnic Hungarian background that was caught between

stubbornness and political opportunism.

3. Markó as chairman of the UDMR. This performance is evident in the

introductory segment as well as in the answers four and five. The introductory

tests applicants will have to pass to be granted the CHN. The Status Law does

not mention any tests322 and according to Markó the UDMR does not intend to

Markó szerint a tegnap életbe lépett státustörv

még egyeztetni kell Budapesttel, például hogy kell-e magyarul tudni a

magyarigazolványokhoz, mert az UDMR vizsgáztatást nem vállal.

to Markó, there should be consultations with Budapest about the Status Law that

came into effect yesterday, e.g. whether one needs to know Hungarian in order

to obtain the CHN, since the UDMR does not intend to introduce tests]. In the

4. Markó as a Romanian citizen of ethnic Hungarian background. This

question, if he, i.e. Markó, will also apply for the CHN. At this point Markó is

trying to avoid any national pathos or display of pride and insists that he will

apply for the CHN after a while when the rush has ebbed. He will not apply

-

rather because of its symbolic character and the struggle for it. This struggle is

represented again in the plural mi

322 See Appendix 1.

155

unmistakably personal and in the singular, ön323 [you]. Consequently, if Markó

did not want to apply for the CHN to use its benefits, did not need it to show his

-

have been an explanation as to what the symbolism is exactly about. My

estimation is that Markó intended applying for the CHN simply to justify the

struggle for it.

Markó whether the Hungarians of Transylvania really need this seasonal working

permit and if it had not been better to take the whole issue with the working permits out

of the

the first question but does not answer the second one directly. He goes on to explain that

there are many who work illegally in Hungary and that the working permit could

legalise their status. On the one hand Markó says that there will be only a few who will

go to work in Hungary and on the other hand he does not condemn the ONM for the

political hysteria it has caused in Hungary. In other words, he is in favour of the ONM

and its regulations concerning working permits.

the interview I conducted with Miklós Újvári a year and a half after this article was

published, he admitted to supporting the SZDSZ position on the labour issue, which

meant that he was against granting working permits of any kind on an ethnic basis.

Furthermore, he said that the ONM showed a lack of a clear political line in the Orbán

government because the Status Law referred to almost all neighbouring states while the

ONM involved only Romania. This meant that the co-ethnics outside Romania could

benefit from the Law in specific matters, e.g. CHN for spouses of ethnically mixed

marriages. Upon my question, if he challenged Orbán with this issue, he said he did and

that Orbán had no intentions of signing similar agreements with other states.

4.2.3 Népszabadság (NSZ)

The six articles by Népszabadság stretch over a period of nine days: from 22nd

December to 31st December 2001.

323 Ön is comparable to French vous and German Sie, which are polite addressing forms. It also has a plural variation: önök.

156

4.2.3.1 NSZ 22.12.2001324

This article, whose authors are mentioned as munkatársainktól [from our work-

fellows], represents two extremes of the Hungarian political spectrum: the liberal

Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the nationalist Hungarian Justice and Life

consists of a title and three short segments. The first two represent the SZDSZ while the

third one the MIÉP. István Szent-Iványi represents the SZDSZ while Béla G

represents the MIÉP. The title of the article is a description of the text that follows it:

Az SZDSZ és a MIÉP a munkavállalásról [The SZDSZ and the MIÉP about the labour engagement]

The choice of the lexeme munkavállalás [labour engagement] already indicates the

specific aspect of labour migration. In fact, the journalists do not even mention the

ONM since they presume that the reader already knows which labour engagement they

are writing about.

Szent-Iványi presents different objections to the working permits that could be

-Hungarian

debate:

Nem tartom szerencsésnek egyetlen államra, Romániára kiterjeszteni a szabad [I do not consider the extension of free labour engagement on single state,

Thus Szent-Iványi does not start arguing with the dangers such a labour regulation

ha

working force could be a danger to any state when it comes to labour migration. In other

words, he is suggesting that the Romanian labour market is in such a poor situation that

phrase he already suggests a solution, which is repeated by all SZDSZ politicians: the

paragraph regarding the working permits for three months per annum should be

cancelled. Once again, the ONM is not mentioned explicitly. The politician then throws

324 Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://119/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

157

in the co-ethnics and says that the working permit is too short to have any positive

effect for them.

The second segment holds Szent- one of

two possibilities to avoid discrimination, the ONM could be regarded by Ukraine and

Yugoslavia as precedence and the impact of the ONM on the Hungarian labour market

has not been analysed before signing the memorandum. Szent-

argumentation revels a certain pattern: reminding of the problems the neighbours have

in the first instance and then going on to discuss the difficulties for Hungarians and co-

ethnics.

The third segment c

against granting the benefits of the Law to Romanian citizens for a specific reason:

amelynek kedvezményeket kivánunk nyújtani. offer benefits anyway.]

román

állampolgárok [Romanian citizens] he also includes the 1.5 million Hungarians who

live in Romania. They are also citizens of Romania just like members of all the other

ethnic groups. By using a cultural circle, or Kulturkreis, which is an concept that goes

back to ethnographers such as Leo Frobenius and his ideas of Diffusionism and

Kulturkreislehre

Romanians and not a political, geographic or economic one. Indirectly he is saying that

Romanians are not on the same cultural level as Hungarians. Non-Hungarian citizens of

Romania should recei

önhibájukon kivül kerültek a határainkon túlra

borders]. This is an explicit hint on the Treaty of Trianon, when Hungary, due to its

heavy territorial losses after the First World War, also lost approximately one third of

mention the situation on the Hungarian labour market, which is otherwise a popular 325.

325 See articles from Magyar Hírlap.

158

The unknown authors of this article have chosen representatives from two

parties that do not share the same views about the co-ethnics except for their rejection of

the working permit the Orbán-

SZDSZ and MIÉP. By relating only to these parties the authors suggest that the other

parties of the political spectrum in Hungary approve of the ONM. Consequently it is a

one-sided article despite its pretence to represent two very different parties.

4.2.3.2 NSZ 22.12.2001a326

This article, also published on 22nd December 2001, has a more sophisticated

structure than its predecessor; it consists of a title, a subtitle and short introductory

chronic mode of relating in order to describe the events that occurred the day before,

and those yet to happen. Therefore, this article can be regarded as a compromise

describes what the two state secretaries in the Foreign Office, the Hungarian Zsolt

Németh and his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, agreed upon the previous

day, the 21st, and what was yet to be done on the 22nd. The article also includes two

photographs: one of each state secretary. The title and the subtitle bear witness to this

style of writing:

Ma Budapestre várják Adrian Nastase román miniszterelnököt. [Agreement on the Status Law.

on 21st December:

Tegnap este Budapesten létrejött a megállapodás a magyar és a román tárgyalódelegáció között. [An agreement has been reached yesterday evening in Budapest between the Hungarian and the Romanian delegations.]

Subsequently, the first segment is about the formal side of the agreement whilst the next

two segments join in with information regarding the content of the agreement. The

326 Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://124/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

159

prime ministers will sign the agreement that very evening.

resembles a dramatic rise or a crescendo: it starts off in the second segment with issues

that are described as unproblematic, continues with more difficult matters and finishes

with a climax:

-

that the agreement consists of three parts, of which two were easily solved by

the delegations. These less problematic aspects of the agreement are the mutual

support regarding the Euro-

membership, and aspects referring to the bilateral agreements and the common

councils of coordination.

- The second phase is described in the third segment. The negotiations took so

long because they were about the Hungarian Status Law. These parts of the

agreement were mainly formal-administrative decisions. In short, Hungary

-

discriminatory modalities.

- The peak, which was previously mentioned in the introductory segment, is

A tegnapi tárgyalások legfontosabb eredménye

working permits for three months per annum. These permits are to be granted to

Nationality (CHN) or not.

There are a few aspects in this article that are not very clear. One of these

aspects is the aura of mystery surrounding the flow of information from the delegations

to the press.

- The text of the agreement has not yet been made public.

- Németh has informed the press about some of its main points. He did so by

using the telephone. Hence, there was no press conference in the usual sense of

the term.

-

ellentétben nem vett részt a sajtókonferencián.

Diaconescu did not participate at the press conference.]

160

This leaves the reader in a bit of confusion: was there a press conference or not? How

satisfying answers. Maybe Zsolt and Diaconescu were instructed to wait for the prime

move: he did not publish the text, because it was not signed and therefore could not hold

a press conference, but he called the press, so that the content could reach the wider

repr

name and decide in the name of their respective state. In other words, the text suggests

that the

Diaconescu on the other and not between Hungary and Romania. This impression is

also supported by the fact that the two foreign ministers, Martonyi (Hungary) and

with Prime Minister Orbán. During the entire legislation Németh has been the one who

shared the same political ideas as Orbán and not Martonyi, who preferred negotiations

and a more moderate foreign policy.

it is not mentioned in the text, that Romania had agreed to implement the Hungarian

Status Law on its territory. The two photos, one of Németh on the 21st sitting at a desk

showing a paper and the other of Diaconescu walking away, has a symbolic meaning:

two adversaries after the fight. Németh smiling and showing a draft of the agreement

like a trophy, while Diaconescu could be regarded as the one who has lost the fight and

is having to leave the arena. Furthermore, Németh announces that this agreement, later

to be called the Orbán-

Status Law obsolete. This statement will be challenged in the weeks that followed the

ONM.

cs describes it, reveals a display of

différance. In those two days, the 21st and 22nd December 2001, Németh plays different

roles in Hungarian politics of which he is aware of:

- On the 21st

willing to concede to the Romanian side at the negotiations table.

161

- Although it is not his duty, Németh does inform the press about the agreement,

which has neither been signed by those who are entitled to it, nor has it been

published.

- The phone call to the press is somewhat of a break of confidence and collides

- Subsequently, at the end of the article, Németh announces that the prime

ministers will almost certainly sign the agreement he has drafted with his

counterpart, Diaconescu. By saying that, indirectly, he gives his superior the

order to sign the agreement.

It is therefore my conclusion that Németh has used these roles to show the public that he

is the one behind the Orbán-

minister. My interview partners later supported this view327.

4.2.3.3 NSZ 24.12.2001328

This article by Zoltán Tibori Szabó is an overview of the reactions in Romania

group is a general one: readers who want a broad overview on the course of events. This

report is composed of a title and an introductory segment, which is followed by five

other segments. Published two days after the Orbán-

signed, Tibori Szabó was already able to catch quite a few comments, which represent

different positions on the Romanian political scene.

The title of the article is somewhat of a provocation:

[Bucharest speaks of victory]

Writing abo

reader the impression that the two states were in some form of struggle with one another

and that Bucharest, i.e. Romania, was the victorious one. This is repeated in a modified

form in the introductory segment:

-román nyilatkozatot 327 328 Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://134/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

162

[The Hungarian-Romanian communiqué is appraised as a victory in Romania]

On the other hand, if this were a victory, it would mean that Hungary lost the battle.

Unfortunately, throughout the entire article Tibori Szabó fails to tell the readers who

exactly in Romania is talking of victory. All the organisations and persons the journalist

is referring to do not explicitly talk of victory but rather of a success that Romania has

achieved in th

In the first segment Tibori Szabó gives a few details about the communiqué the

Romanian government has announced. He then continues with two high-ranking

government that it is obliged to modify the Status Law within the coming six months,

regardless of the forthcoming election results, while Prisacaru mentions two aspects

which played an important role in the diachronic analysis: extraterritoriality and

discrimination. According to Prisacaru the Orbán-

changed the situation in a positive way: the Status Law will not discriminate Romanian

Interesting at this point is the difference between the official communiqué that talks of

megkülönböztetés [distinction] while Prisacaru talks of diszkrimináció [discrimination],

which is a harsher word to use. However, neither the communiqué nor Prisacaru give

any details as to what they exactly mean by distinction or discrimination.

The second segment is reserved for Béla Markó, chairman of the Democratic

Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). He appreciates the ONM and does not

forget to remind the reader, that the UDMR had an essential part of the ON

development. The ONM, Markó added, is important for the application of the Status

Law, its benefactors and the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. At this point he has

demonstrated his different roles in this discourse: as a Hungarian in Romania, as a

pol -à-vis the Romanian

political dispute with a neighbouring state, i.e. with Hungary329. Unlik

Prisacaru, whose remarks formed a textual flow with the information about the

separate segment in which the author has placed them. In other words, Markó has a

329 See also subchapter 4.2.2.6

163

segment of his own which puts his remarks in an advantageous position. Finally, Markó

criticises those who say that the ONM will lead to a wave of emigration. Although he is

not specific about it, it can be assumed that he means Hungarians from Romania

emigrating to Hungary. The statement obviously aims at those Hungarian politicians in

Hungary and in Romania who criticised the Status Law in general and the working

permits in particular.

The next segment, the third one, is connected to the title and to the introductory

this segment, Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, a senator from the National Liberal Party (PNL),

accomplishment,

if the ONM will be applied as the communiqué suggests. The author mentions only a

single detail of the ONM, which Ionescu-Quintus himself, among other aspects,

considers to be important:

- és EU- betagolódásának támogatására membership]

This aspect of the ONM reveals again, as already mentioned in the diachronic analysis,

the importance of NATO and EU membership to Romanian politics.

In the fourth segment Tibori Szabó leaves the political arena and refers to news

bulletins and press agencies. He does not mention any names and relates to them in the

third person plural, e.g. vélekedtek [they have expressed] and kiemelték [they have

pointed it out]. These anonymous speakers emphasise a specific aspect of the ONM,

which has not been mentioned by others: In future Hungary will not be able to grant the

using this denotation the anonymous speakers do not object to the Hungarian

political associations they object. This could be a hidden attack on the UDMR as at the

beginning of the nineties, when right wing discourse in Romania accused the UDMR of 330.

Tibori Szabó allows these Hungarian associations to express their views in the

following and last segment. Just like in the previous segment, the author does not

330 See also Andreescu 2001.

164

seem somewhat opaque. Their most interesting statement is related to xenophobia in

seeking work will only increase the anti-Transylvanian sentiments in Hungary, which

have already been witnessed in former times.

The remarks made by all speakers in the text, whether they were mentioned by

permit the Hungarian public a short insight into the reaction of Romanian politics to the

ONM. Obviously, Tibori Szabó could have captured more reactions to be represented in

this article, e.g. the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM), and could have also

mentioned the names of the circles represented in the fifth segment. The missing names

are a blot in this text.

4.2.3.4 NSZ 24.12.2001a331

about the Orbán-

while the second half is an account of the main points of the ONM. I shall refer mainly

to the first half since the second half is less essential for the discourse analysis.

However, the second half has an interesting remark that should be noted: the author

official language. Unfortunately, there is no explanation as to why the two sides did not

draft a bilingual memorandum in Hungarian and Romanian. I can only assume that it

was because of the time pressure to finish the draft before the Status Law came into

effect. A bilingual version could have taken more time and could have been a source of

misunderstandings. The first half of the text consists of a title, a subtitle, an introductory

segment and five other segments. There is also a photograph of the two prime ministers.

An interesting aspect of this article is the numerous quotations, which is unusual.

Presumably the author wanted to demonstrate the accuracy of the coverage. The

ions

and need facts.

The title represents a more or less neutral standpoint:

331 Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://139/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

165

Státustörvény: közös memorandum [Status Law: common memorandum]

This is then overruled by the subtitle:

Orbán és Nastase megegyezése a romániaiak magyarországi munkavállalásáról [Orbán a Hungary]

The subtitle reduces the title and consequently the ONM to an agreement upon labour

politics. The introductory segment continues where the subtitle stopped by adding more

information regarding the Hungarian working permits for all Romanian citizens. Orbán

is a positive reaction to the ONM: The Status Law will be applied from 1st January 2002

and Hungary has reached a consensus with all neighbouring states except Slovakia.

These statements are self-made compliments, which are directed at an unseen third

party: the critics, perhaps the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which has

constantly rejected the Status Law and has criticised the ONM. Interestingly, Orbán

does not mention the labour market regulations, which are so dominant in the subtitle

and in the first half of the introductory segment.

The first segment turns back in time and reminds the reader that the ONM was

two ministers and politicians from the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

(UDMR). That bit of information about the UDMR-

an indicator for the importance of the UDMR in this matter. It is also an

applicability on Romanian territory.

pointing out that the ONM enables the application of the Status Law from 1st January

2002 onwards without causing any friction between the

previous statements:

166

[The Status Law is valid only in Hungary332]

There is no indi

Romanian prime minister rejected the Status Law all along and contested its

extraterritorial character. However, it is Orbán who has the last word in this segment,

when he sees a bright future for the Hungarian-Romanian relationships, despite all

hardships in the past

regulation, which says that all those Romanian citizens who can work in Hungary for

three months p.a. can also extend their permit. For the UDMR this is a big step, and I

Hungarians (VMSZ) from Yugoslavia, were not keen on Hungary letting Hungarian

migrant workers stay too long in Hungary. The reason for this is their fear of a massive

brain drain to better-paid jobs in Hungary. Consequently, agreeing to the ONM is a

political sacrifice by the UDMR. Orbán closes this segment by stressing that the Status

He makes the following points:

- The ONM does not take anything away from anybody; it rather gives more to

everybody. In his consideration, the Romanian work seekers will not impede the

chances of the co-ethnics on the Hungarian labour market. When referring to the

Romanian work seekers he uses the verb felemelés [elevation]. By this he

indicates that the Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnic background have been

background.

- The Hungarian labour market regulates itself and it is not up to the Hungarian

government to decide how many workers are needed. With this statement Orbán

is already refusing any responsibility, should the Hungarian labour market face

- The aim of the Status Law is to ensure the co-ethnics

332 Kedvezmény actually means benefit, but the expression kedvezménytörvény [law of benefit] has become a synonym to státustörvény.

167

wave from the adjacent states to Hungary. This statement should reassure the

Hungarian parties and organisations in the neighbouring states, which have been

fighting emigration since the nineties.

will support Romania in becoming a member in NATO. It is striking, since the usual

discussions about this aspect refer to -Atlantic integration and not

just NATO333.

table and looking at each other. The picture transmits the impression of a mirror image,

since they do the same things, e.g. holding a paper in their hands and staring at each

other. This is probably the table where the two men sat down to sign the ONM. It is a

symmetry cannot disguise the dissymmetry in the

article. It is Orbán who presents his point of view in almost all segments and hence has

signature on the ONM makes Orbán look good and he is actually smiling on the photo.

4.2.3.5 NSZ 27.12.2001334

year 2001. Consisting of a title and 13 segments, it offers harsh critique all along. Due

to the nature of the text, which jumps to and fro and does not handle every aspect

mentioned in a linear form, I shall analyse this article by going from one issue to

reader that was pro-Status Law but anti-Orbán-

regard to the Status Law in general and the ONM in particular. The title already suggest

Képtelen ár [Impossible price]

333 See subchapters 4.1.1.2.4 and 4.1.2.2.4 334 Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://144/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

168

This title suggests that someone has paid much too high a price. At first sight it is

képtelen

meanings and consequently different connotations. It can mean unreasonable but also

ONM itself.

Kis puts forward different aspects, which he criticises. They range from the

- Home policy. Kis said that the ONM had been signed on the grounds of political

tactics with regard to the forthcoming elections. According to him, Orbán was

obliged to reach an agreement with Romania to avoid embarrassing questions

kedvezménytörvényt, mint megoldatlan problémát az orra alá lehessen dörgölni

a választási kampány során.

Law being regarded as a non-finished business during the electoral campaign, so

that the issue will not be rubbed under his nose.] Orbán further wanted to show

the voters his resoluteness a

wholly fixed on Orbán and there is not a single word about other political

parties, such as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) that criticised the ONM

only half-heartedly.

- Labour market regulations. With irony and bitterness Kis talks of eighty million

work seekers who would be coming to work in Hungary, if Orbán followed the

political line of non-discrimination. Kis indicates that other neighbouring

countries such as the Ukraine and Serbia will not tire of trying to achieve the

same benefits that Romania has achieved for its citizens. According to him, this

would have a disastrous effect on the tax payers and the Hungarian labour

market, especially on those counties which are close to the respective states and

Az igazi vesztes azonban

will be the Hungarian tax payer, the Hungarian employee]

- Foreign policy. Kis condemns Orbán for being arrogant and ignorant in foreign

policy, since Orbán thought that he could have it his way without any

169

ing seriously, to forbid

according to Kis, has shown Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia that Hungary can be

blackmailed. This would lead to other agreements a la Orbán-

Memorandum, which would be harmful for Hungary. At this point Kis

-elected, the

advantageous position for making demands on Budapest.

- Co-ethnics. Kis reminds the reader that Orbán signed the ONM not for the good

of the Hungarians in Romania but to improve his chance of being re-elected:

Orbánék a nagy nehezen benduló konzultációkon sem a kisebbségek érdekeit

praktikusabb dolgot, nevezetesen: saját választási szempontjaikat.

people335 did not consider the minoritie

the consultations, which began so wearily. Rather something completely

different, something much more practical, namely: his own electoral

considerations.] Kis added that due to the ONM the benefits the Status Law was

supposed to grant have been reduced at the expense of the Hungarians in

Romania.

Unfortunately, the author fails to take into consideration other factors, which are of

e

politics. The fact that he compares him twice to former socialist prime minister Gyula

policy towards Romania and the signing of the bilateral agreement back in 1996. That

agreement is just a façade, since it did not tackle the most essential problem between the

two states: the minority issue. Kis reminds the reader that the Young Democrats

(FIDESZ) wrote Horn off as a traitor at that time, for not standing up for the

the FIDESZ prime minister who was labelled a traitor for giving away the Hungarian

- 335 Orbánék means literally those who belong to the Orbán family or clan. In this context it means his subalterns, such as State Secretary Zsolt Németh, who drafted the ONM with his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu.

170

the role played by representatives of Hungarian parties from the neighbouring states,

e.g. Miklós Duray from the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) in Slovakia and László

played a decisive role in the debate surrounding the Status Law. This is striking, since

behind the enforcement of the Status Law.

Kis does not leave any doubts as to his political position. Although he does not

criticise the Status Law, he is unable to acknowledge the benefits it brings to many co-

ethnics: free education in Hungary, medical care, railway tickets free of charge for the

the pronominal nálunk twice to position himself in the discourse. Nálunk could mean

-turvy policy regarding the Status Law and the

Status Law the parliamentarians did not expect the ONM. Nevertheless, I do think that

Kis is trying to cover up for the MSZP in this case, because the MSZP also voted for the

Law and it knew that there have not been any consultations with the neighbouring

states.

4.2.3.6 NSZ 31.12.2001336

The [author] of this article is given with hírösszefoglalónk [our news

recapitulator]. I therefore assume that different persons gathered the news. The report

consists of a title, a subtitle, an introductory segment and five other segments. The

target group is the wider public without any specific political preference. Four of the six

parties represented in the Hungarian parliament give their comments on the Orbán-

The title of this article, together with the subtitle, is already a hint at what will

come next:

Mit írt alá Orbán? Értelmezési vita a magyar-román egyetértési memorandumról

336 Path: 07.08.2003 wysiwyg://165/http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp

171

[What did Orbán sign? Debate over the Hungarian- interpretation]

The introductory segment follows suit and refers to two political parties which represent

the two ends of the debate over the Status Law in general and the ONM in particular:

According to the SZDSZ, the Orbán government, by signing the ONM, has put the

Hungarian health service at risk. At this point the SZDSZ takes it for granted that

numerous Romanian citizens will use the opportunity of a better medical treatment in

Hungary, which could result in the hea

criticises those who object to the ONM:

A Fidesz elnöke szerint a megegyezés bírálói félelmet akarnak kelteni a munkavállalók körében t to arouse fear among employees]

It is unclear whether the SZDSZ relies on any statistical data. If it does, then it is not

th the Romanian one.

The five segments that follow the introductory one include the points of view of

another two parties: Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) and the Hungarian

Socialist Party (MSZP)337. The parties are then represented as thus:

1. Segment: MSZP and SZDSZ.

2. Segment: MSZP and SZDSZ

3. Segment: MIÉP

4. Segment: FIDESZ and MSZP

5. Segment: FIDESZ

Representatives from both parties, i.e. MSZP and SZDSZ, complain about the

danger for the Hungarian medical system should migrant workers from Romania flood

cheaper labour from Romania could be hazardous for the Hungarian labour market. To

put it differently, both parties want to represent the interests of the Hungarian working 337 The fifth and the sixth parties represented in parliament, the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), are not mentioned at all. However, when FIDESZ talks of the five-party-agreement they mean these two plus FIDESZ, MSZP and MIÉP.

172

without prior consultations and a general debate in Parliament. László Kovács, the

e

other parties, although FIDESZ insists they did. According to Kovács, the so-called

Five-Party Agreement, which took place before the ONM was signed, was merely an

informal meeting led by Prime Minister Orbán:

supán tájékoztatást adott a nyilatkozatról. communiqué.]

MIÉP appears only in the third segment where its chairman, István Csurka,

makes his comments on the opposition parties SZDSZ and MSZP. He considers their

criticism to be magyarellenes [anti-Hungarian]. MSZP and SZDSZ, said Csurka, are

trying to abuse the taciturn situation in relation to the Status Law for their own electoral

propaganda. He added that Orbán had no other opportunity but to sign the ONM. This

little passage is a demonstration of how the two parties, FIDESZ and MIÉP, drew closer

sympathetic words to Orbán, MIÉP was not a coalition party and that MIÉP initially

criticised the ONM for granting benefits to people whom Hungary need not support, i.e.

Romanian citizens of Romanian ethnics background.

FIDESZ, being represented in the introductory, the fourth and the fifth segment,

has the last word in this article. Perhaps words

two different and contradictory positions within the FIDESZ. Zoltán Pokorni, the

work

in Hungary, while Prime Minister Orbán announced that only those Romanian citizens

who have the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) will be able to work in

Hungary. Pokorni insists that the other four parties agreed to the ONM and that Kovács

had no objections to the working regulations. Kovács, as mentioned above, denied this.

Pokorni further suggests that the National Labour Council should monitor the number

of migrant workers from the neighbouring states. Unfortunately, he does not go on

explaining what purpose the monitoring would have. It can only be assumed that

Pokorni would like to show that the number of migrant workers will be very limited and

that MSZP and SZDSZ were wrong.

173

ing is a clear indicator

for the forthcoming elections of April 2002. The speculations about an invasion of

to Romanians. Hungarian politicians, and at this point also the journalists, have simply

overseen the fact that from the day on when the Status Law and hence the Orbán-

visa for the European Union (1st January 2002). As it turned out to be, Romanians did

prefer to immigrate into other countries, e.g. Italy, Spain and Portugal, than go to work

in Hungary. The states in Southern Europe offered better paid jobs, good infrastructure

and perhaps languages, which are easier for Romanians to understand.

first one from 27th December 2001 and the second from 7th January 2002. Despite this

time span the second article refers mainly to the Orbán- emorandum, which

was signed almost three weeks before.

4.2.4.1 RL 27.12.2001338

This article is a report about the content of the Orbán-Nastase Memorandum

of a title, an introductory segment and four other segments. While the first segment

two adds further details, which an official Romanian note made available. Segment

three is Romanian prim

Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán concludes the article in the fourth segment. The

s aspects:

teritoriul Ungariei 339 [Deposing the application of the Magyar Certificate [CHN] and its issuing will 340

338 See Appendix 7. 339 understanding, I have modified the texts orthographically and corrected the letters a, i, s and t when necessary.

174

This title is an indicator for one of the core problems of why Romanian politics objected

to the Status Law: extraterritoriality341. The introductory segment gives some

chronological information about how and when the two prime ministers signed the

ONM and continues immediately with the restriction that spouses, who are not of

Hungarian ethnic background, cannot apply for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN). The first segment picks up the issue and gives more details, which concern the

issue of ethnic discrimination342:

[Thus the discrimination of Romanian citizens of non-Magyar ethnic origin has

The issue of discrimination is mentioned two more times in this article: when regarding

the medical care Romanian workers can now receive in Hungary and when Orbán

comments on the ONM. It is interesting at this point that the first two times, when the

author refers to Romanian information sources he refers to dicri

since discrimination could have a negative connotation and suggests injustice while

differentiation is more neutral and does not necessarily have a negative connotation.

This distinction shows the difference between the Hungarian and the Romanian point of

only to a

limited group of citizens in Romania.

The author turns the aspect of extraterritoriality indicated in the title only after

he started the first segment with the new regulation regarding the CHN for non-

Hungarian spouses of CHN holders. He continues in this segment with the other issues,

which have been resolved by the ONM:

- Extraterritoriality. The CHN can be applied and issued only on Hungarian

territory. The author does not go into detail and therefore he does not mention

that the CHN could be, theoretically speaking, applied for at the respective

Hungarian consulates in Romania.

340 Due to the difference in Romanian between maghiar [Magyar] and ungur [Hungarian], I shall translate each ethnonym accordingly. 341 See also subchapter 4.1.2.2.6. 342 See also subchapter 4.1.2.2.3.

175

- Support for Hungarian associations. Hungary can no longer support Hungarian

controversial be

for the Transylvanian Saxons. Romania accepted German assistance for the

Transylvanian Saxons on the basis of a bilateral treaty, but has continuously

jeopardised Hungarian efforts to support the Hungarians in Romania. According

to sustain their respective co-nationals or co-ethnics. Despite the illegal nature of

this support, Hungary did assist the co-ethnics in Romania arguing that the

discrimination between Hungary and Germany. Practically, the Hungarian

support was illegal but tolerated. Due to the ONM Hungary had obliged itself to

go the official way.

- Medical care in Hungary. Romanian citizens working in Hungary could apply

for medical treatment in Hungary.

- Extension of working permits. According to the ONM, the seasonal working

.

- Minority issues. Unlike Hungarian newspapers, Romanian newspapers do

mention the existence of a Romanian minority in Hungary343. The ONM will

plan a mutual accord which will grant this group preferential treatment in

Hungary.

The second segment refers to a note by the Romanian government, which has

two main issues: the positive effect of the ONM on Romanian-Hungarian relations and

months. If the ONM had not been signed, the Status Law would have caused a serious

deterioration of the bilateral relations as from the 1st January 2002 onwards. That was

the date the Status Law came into effect:

[The Romanian side considers that this solution is conceptualised in order to relax the situation starting of the 1st of January 2002]

343 The Romanian minority in Hungary consists of around 11,000 people. See also Demeter Zayzon 1999.

176

segments respectively, display a clear-cut difference in their comments to the ONM.

-Hungarian

a

regular annual meeting of both prime ministers and possible joint Romanian-Hungarian

cultural projects in the near future, Orbán has other things on his mind: he accepted the

Romanian wish to eliminate all discriminative aspects of the Status Law and that those

who work in Hungary have to solve their problems with their employers. In the first part

more eloquent and courteous. Since it is not a quotation, I am not sure whether Orbán

which problems is he

referring to? Neither Orbán nor the author give an answer to that.

The author of this article has applied a very simple and codifies way to give the

reader a balanced account of what has happened: information about the changes the

ONM has brought about and the reaction of the two prime ministers involved. However,

the article shows a very one-

at lea

saying it, the author suggests that the Romanian side gained much more from the ONM

than Hungary. Actually, the article does not give evidence of what Hungary did gain

from the ON

on its territory. In all, the text suggests that Romania has convinced Hungary to change

its plans without having to give back something instead.

4.2.4.2 RL 27.12.2001344

This brief article is a combination of an account with elements of a report. The

structure of the article consists of a title and two segments. The lack of the introductory

segment is usually an indicator of an account, but the descriptive information and the

quotations by Béla Markó, Chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in

344 See Appendix 7.

177

readers who are interested in UDMR politics and requires prior knowledge in this field.

The title of this article is confusing for those who are not familiar with

abbreviations used in Romanian politics:

CRU al UDMR despre Legea statutului

CRU stands for

Representatives], which is a body that represents the top UDMR officials in the

According to the author 50 representatives from 16 counties345 have come together to

discuss two issues: regulations for obtaining the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN) and the protocol with the other governing party, presumably the Social

Democratic Party (PSD). However, there is not a single hint in the entire text as to

The author states, when he presents the two issues, that the CHN, according to

the regulations of the Status Law, can only be o

territory. The first segment continues with a few details about the Orbán-

Memorandum (ONM), which has changed the regulations for obtaining the CHN. The

second part of the first segment consists of a quotation by Markó, in which he

appreciates the ONM for having lifted the obstacles for the application of the Status

applied.

he adds that the

-Hungarian

relations, in politics as well as in economy. The second segment concludes with

applications for the CHN: giving information and transferring data necessary for the

issuing of a CHN.

This article leaves quite a few questions unanswered:

- What were the CRU

345

178

- Since the Status Law and hence the ONM have come into effect already a few

days beforehand and the CRU has come together to exchange views, where are

the first comments about the new situation?

- Why are there no comments about the ONM from the other 50 delegates?

-

Where are the counter-statements?

Furthermore, the author writes about the ONM as a memorandum signed by the prime

ministers of the two respective states, while

prime ministers as the leading figures of the ONM, Markó, by talking about

governments, includes himself

There is also a small inconsistency in the text: the order of Hungarian names. In

Hungarian, the last name is always mentioned first. Hence, my name in Hungarian

would be Márton Mihai and not Mihai Márton. The author mentions two Hungarian

and Viktor Orbán. This difference, which I assume is incidental, nevertheless shows the

reader that the author is aware that Hungarians write their names in a different order

than Romanians and that he is trying to apply his knowledge346.

4.2.5 Summarising the text analysis

The Orbán- ning point in the

Hungarian-Romanian political relationship after the Status Law was passed by

parliament in Budapest on 19th June 2001. If the Romanian political elite kept calm

before that date, it was very busy protesting and complaining after 19th June.

and reports regarding the ONM. The results of the 15 articles analysed above show

spe

respective country. I shall discuss the results according to the main issues presented in

the articles, such as working permits, discrimination etc.

First, the Hungarian-Romanian comparison:

346 In the Hungarian texts I have analysed for this thesis all Hungarian names are written according to the Hungarian fashion and other names in the other order.

179

-

main issue. The ONM grants every Romanian citizen the possibility to work in

Hungary for at least three months p.a. These permits became a strong argument

for the opposition parties in Budapest to attack the government. According to the

articles, with one exception, neither the journalists nor the politicians have

bothered to ask experts on this matter. This issue is present in Népszabadság and

Magyar Hírlap alike. While Magyar Hírlap constantly relied on statements made

by members of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), who objected not only

to the ONM but also to the Status Law, Tibor Kis from Népszabadság in his

essay, although in an exaggerated manner, talked of eighty million foreign

workers who could come to seek work in Hungary. There is an element of threat

that goes through the Hungarian papers. It is the threate of cheap labour from

Romania that could bring the Hungarian labour market to a collapse. The

Romanian papers, on the other hand, celebrate these working permits as the end

of the discrimination initiated by the Status Law, which would have granted

working permits only to those Romanian citizens who possess a Certificate of

Hungarian National (CHN), practically the Hungarians in Romania. This

element of discrimination on the Hungarian labour market is especially present

- Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN). This aspect of the ONM seems to

irritate both Hungarian and Romanian politics. According to the Status Law,

those who want to benefit from it, have to apply first for the CHN. Only with

children, even if they do not consider themselves to be Hungarian, could also

claim them. The ONM changes this aspect and only those who declare

themselves to be of Hungarian background could obtain the CHN. It is the

and children

in ethnically mixed marriages will not be able to share the benefits, which the

owner of the CHN can claim. Magyar Hírlap is predominantly engaged in this

debate. This is particularly evident with the travelling benefits, e.g. free railway

tickets to Budapest. The Romanian newspapers consider this to be a just

measure, since only those who possess the CHN should benefit and not their

entire non-Hungarian kin.

- Medical treatment in Hungary. The ONM grants Romanian workers the benefits

of the Hungarian health care system. Interestingly, this aspect is not mentioned

180

newspapers spoke of the Hungarian medical system collapsing due to a massive

influx of workers from Hungary, all wanting to benefit from it. Magyar Hírlap

does not forget to mention that the Romanian hospitals are in a catastrophic

nd of

discrimination between migrant workers in Hungary. The ONM would grant all

Romanian citizens who work in Hungary the benefits of a medical treatment.

- Extraterritoriality. This aspect played an important role in the Romanian

the Status Law. Be it the financial support for

Consequently, issuing the CHN would have to take place in Hungary. Both

Romani -be state of

brought into Romania, a detail, which is untrue. The Hungarian newspapers, on

the other hand, hardly discussed the issue. While Népszabadság practically

ignored it, Magyar Hírlap reminded its readers of the discriminating effect it

would have on the applicants, since they would have to pay their trip to

Hungary, where the CHN were to be issued.

Second, the Romanian-Romanian comparison:

- Status Law. While the two articles from Româ

underline which aspects of the Orbán- e

that the ONM is a successful act of self-defence by Romania against the

Hungarian attack, i.e. the Status Law.

- tion the

congruence with the information I received in the interview with Simona

Popescu347. Although very small in number when compared to the Hungarians in

Romania (approximate ratio of 1:150), nevertheless, it gives the bilateral

347 See subchapter 4.3.4.1

181

relations a notion of parity: both states have co-ethnics or co-nationals who live

in the other state and try to act in their interest.

-

the reactions surrounding the ONM: the details are more accurate and the tenor

government for its succes

the illusion of competition between Hungary and Romania by using historic

arguments.

Third, the Hungarian-Hungarian comparison:

- Political orientation. All newspapers were chosen according to their claim of

neutrality, although every newspaper has a specific political tendency or

narrative. My suggestion that Népszabadság was closer to the Hungarian

Socialist Party (MSZP) while Magyar Hírlap has shared common political

perceptions with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) turned out to be true.

These tendencies were manifested in each newspaper respectively: while the

P was

constantly criticised, Népszabadság avoided criticising the MSZP too sharply

and the SZDSZ was underrepresented.

- Hungary as an economic magnet. Apparently, journalists have taken up this idea

from the political scene. Consequently, Hungarian journalists took it for granted

that Hungary is a magnet for work seekers from the entire Carpathian Basin.

There is not a single thought about migrant workers from Romania who could

seek their fortune in other countries rather than in Hungary. Consequently, the

ironic comments against Orbán in Magyar Hírlap about Hungary being a

medium-size regional power also apply to the journalists that wrote it.

-

constant critique of Orbán himself and his FIDESZ-led government. Magyar

Hírlap uses an entire article for the benefit of the SZDSZ to criticise the prime

minister and does not offer a balanced representation. In some of its articles

Népszabadság offers plain critique without granting FIDESZ any possibility to

state its case.

182

4.3 Analysing the interviews348

Interviewing journalists who write about the Hungarian Status Law requires a

passport, good travel possibilities and patience. This somewhat banal exclamation is the

result of my search for interview partners in five different cities of which only one is in

Hungary, namely Budapest.

Table 12: Interviewees

Journalist Venue Newspaper Published Date349 Time (min.) Bogdán, Tibor (Bucharest) MH Budapest - - Ciobanu, Rodica Bucharest A Bucharest 28.01.04 30 Kis, Tibor Paris NSZ Budapest 30.10.03 45 Molnár, Norbert Bratislava MH Budapest 11.09.03 40 Nagy, Iván Zsolt Budapest MH Budapest 16.09.03 25 Popescu, Simona Bucharest RL Bucharest 04.02.04 60 Szilvássy, József Bratislava NSZ Budapest 11.09.03 50 Tibori Szabó, Zoltán Cluj-Napoca NSZ Budapest 26.09.03 120 Újvári, Miklós Budapest MH Budapest 17.09.03 35

Just like the Status Law itself, interviewing journalists took place mainly in the adjacent

states: four in Romania and two in Slovakia. When possible, I dispatched an email to

the respective journalist containing a short synopsis of my thesis, a request for an

interview and my curriculum vitae. Those whose email address I could not find I

contacted by the phone. With one exception, Tibor Bogdán, who had to cancel the

interview at short notice, I met all eight journalists350. The interviews are listed in

alphabetical order of the newspapers and within each paper in alphabetical order of the

4.3.1.1 Rodica Ciobanu

time of the interview. She considers the paper to be liberal although it has not been so

up to 1995. Until then it had strong nationalistic and socialistic undercurrents, which

348 As already mentioned, I conducted the interview in the language the respective journalist published in. 349 Date: dd.mm.yy. 350 Bogdán was kind enough to answer some questions on the phone and the rest via email.

183

(PCR) official daily. Being nationalistic and socialistic was not a contradiction in

Romanian history351. These tendencies faded after 1995. From all those who used to 352. Ciobanu considers

writing. However, there are occasionally conflicts between reporters and editors. These

conflicts are usually settled by mutual consent of the parties involved. In the worst case

both the journalists and editors can stop an article from being published. This piece of

information is unique. No other journalist admitted any conflicts between themselves

and the editors, although I assume that there are conflicts, just like in any other

company. Ciobanu continued by pointing out the fact that all employed journalists have

where college degrees can be bought for a price raging from $300 to $500. According to

itical class; Politicians read it, comment on it

353. He has not stopped retorting to political articles since.

Ciobanu regrets not being able to read Hungarian and has therefore based her

information on Romanian sources only. This means that she had access to translated

information only, which was very fragmentary in the case of the Status Law. She added

closely and documented the number of Certificates of Hungarian Nationality (CHN)

handed out to co-ethnics in Romania. Some articles, she said, tried to show the Status

Furthermore, she explained that Hungarian villages in Romania had a better

infrastructure and were financially better off in comparison to Romanian villages. This

was because of the money earned by Hungarians from Romania who took up seasonal

work in Hungary. She compared the situation to Romanian labour migrants in Spain.

After th 354, the political tension between Hungary and Romania had

cooled down. This was, according to her, because the Status Law did not grant the right

of settlement to those who held the CHN anymore.

351 See Chapter 2 and Verdery 1991. 352 In 2006 the entire editorial board has changed, including Rodica Ciobanu. 353 See footnote regarding PSD in Table 2. 354 See Appendix 3.

184

Ciobanu has confirmed some of my assessments

-

- Its articles have an impact on the political class,

-

newspaper monitored the handing out of CHNs shows a particular interest,

- The newspaper still has slight nationalistic and socialist tendencies and

- The aspect of discrimination plays an important role.

Another interesting aspect is the question concerning the so-called ethno-

business or ethno-corruption. She confirmed the wide spread corruption in Romania and

among members of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) too.

As she told me, together with some other colleagues they were wondering how Béla

high-ranking party members had became so

wealthy. She said that before each and every election a large sum of NGOs (non-

governmental organisations) is founded. These NGOs receive great sums of money,

which they transfer to other NGOs until their track is lost. The Ministry of Finance, so

Ciobanu, is either unwilling or unable to monitor the flow of money. The NGOs close

down soon after the elections. According to her, this is a system of money laundering

for political parties, in which the UDMR is no exception.

4.3.2 Magyar Hírlap

4.3.2.1 Tibor Bogdán

influential position on the flow of information from Romania to Magyar Hírlap. He

Hungarian daily published in Romania in the socialist era and became unemployed for

two years due to political disciplinary measures (1982-1984). Afterwards he worked at

worked for Magyar

Hírlap as chief correspondent in Bucharest. Bogdán also worked for the Hungarian

Kossuth Rádió (1990-

TV355 in Bucharest. Finally, he is also head correspondent of Radio România

In

According to Bogdán Magyar Hírlap used to be more conservative in the first

half of the nineties and by the end of that decade it turned slightly to the left and has

355 A Hungarian tv channel concerning mainly the co-ethnics.

185

also gained a liberal touch. By conservative he means politically close to the Hungarian

Democratic Forum (MDF) and by liberal he means close to the Alliance of Free

Democrats (SZDSZ). In the first years of the 21st century Magyar Hírlap had become

even more liberal and very close to SZDSZ. However, he emphasised, these shifts had

Bogdán is saying that despite the shifts, Magyar Hírlap has remained a daily newspaper

that is true to its credo.

According to Bogdán, Magyar Hírlap follows a politics that gives journalists

their freedom of writing. Bogdán, according to his personal experience at Magyar

Hírlap, has never experienced any restraints in his work and bears testimony to the fact

that Magyar Hírlap follows its non-

which subjects the journalists should write about and not the editorial board. According

to my assessment, this is a clear case in which the circle of texts closes: publicly

debated issues influence the content of the newspaper articles and vice versa356. Magyar

ers, says Bogdán, is neither stronger nor weaker than any

i.e. the rightists read Magyar Nemzet while the leftists read Magyar Hírlap357. I assume

that Bodgán includes the liberals in this category. According to Bogdán, this

support anyway. In other words, he is saying that conservatives, for example, read

Magyar Nemzet because they want

perspective. Consequently, if leftists and liberals read Magyar Hírlap than the

newspaper does not have such an impact on the readers because they are already in

congruence with the transmitted narrative. Although the number of readers has gone

down in recent years, numerous politicians, from the coalition and from the opposition

alike, read it regularly. This has become evident in times of political strife, when

politicians quoted passages from Magyar Hírlap that suited their political purpose.

Bogdán emphasised the fact that Magyar Hírlap had the ability to annoy both the

coalition and the opposition at the same time. This state of affairs was something good

for a newspaper, which was trying to remain independent of political influence.

356 See also Figure 2. 357 This is a slight contradiction because I would have expected the liberals to read Magyar Hírlap.

186

Bogdán considers the Hungarian Status Law to be a political mistake, because its

preparation and implementation came too late. The Law has become somewhat of an

in opposition (before

1998), promised the co-ethnics the Hungarian citizenship, should FIDESZ come to

power. After winning the elections they realised it was not easy. FIDESZ had to take

majority

may break out, FIDESZ renounced its initial idea and came up with a law, whose aim

was to grant kedvezmények [benefits] to the co-ethnics. However, says Bogdán, FIDESZ

out of it: FIDESZ and the social-liberal coalition that followed in office had to modify

the Status Law drastically. Except the sum of 20000 HUF p.a. for childre

allowance and the free of charge trips, the Law does not contain essential social

benefits, health care, medicine etc. any more. Bogdán says that Romanian foreign

-2004) is absolutely right by saying that they managed to

kiherélni [empty] the Law of any substance. In all, the Status Law was inapplicable in

its first version and is senseless in its current form. Thus it has become superfluous.

The Status Law, according to Bogdán, was undoubtedly harmful to the

Romanian-Hungarian relationship. It has also complicated the Democratic Alliance of

feelings, whose help they appreciate. It also caused headaches to the Hungarian side,

mainly FIDESZ. The Law and the following Orbán-

been the second defeat Hungarian diplomacy suffered by the Romanian side in the

ongoing political skirmishes since the late eighties. Bogdán added that the Venice

Commission supported the Romanian side in many concrete issues. Consequently, the

not according to the co- expectations. This has changed the relationship between

the two sides completely: Hungary is the one justifying itself while Romania is the

accusing one.

4.3.2.2 Norbert Molnár

Hun

Narancs. He studied history in Bratislava but gave up after three years. Later he worked

187

with the Hungarian section of Slovak Radio. At the time of the interview he told me he

had been working with Magyar Hírlap for quite a few years. Molnár also presents

information bulletins concerning Hungarians in Slovakia at DUNA TV.

Magyar Hírlap, said Molnár, has a daily circulation of approximately 40,000

copies, which makes it Hun

serious newspapers and did not take tabloids into consideration, e.g. Blikk, which have

a much higher selling rate. He added that the same publisher owns Magyar Hírlap as

well as Népszabadság and that the supervising state authorities have started an

investigation into the matter to prevent a cartel. The authorities assume that the

publisher would have too great an influence on the Hungarian press. Molnár added that

more with the minorities living within Hungary than

-ethnics. The

minorities within Hungary, in his opinion, also included groups such as social and

sexual minorities, e.g. homosexuals.

According to Molnár, Magyar Hírlap does not set any rules, how the articles

should be. In other words, the editorial board gives journalists a free hand to write

however they please without any political preferences. Molnár himself admitted that he

represents views which are also common to the liberal party in Hungary, the Alliance of

Free Democrats (SZDSZ). He said that he got the job at Magyar Hírlap because the

newspaper already knew his previous work and that he represented liberal standpoints.

Consequently, Magyar Hírlap is a politically liberal paper because they employ people

who represent those specific views. Upon my question whether Magyar Hírlap had an

evasive since, according to Molnár, it was unclear as to how influence could be

measured. Molnár added that politicians from all parties read the big newspapers

regularly. Magyar Hírlap is also among these papers, together with Népszabadság and

Magyar Nemzet.

Magyar Hírlap, said Molnár, was constantly against the Status Law from the

fact that brought the newspaper and the party even closer. Molnár said that a law was

worth anything only when it can be applied properly. To put it differently, he was

saying that the Status Law is not applicable in practical life due to the disapproval of

neighbouring countries (Slovakia and Romania). He added that the Hungarian

government could have had the chance to support the co-ethnics if it had not made such

a fuss and pushed the Law so undiplomatically. Furthermore, he said that it was

188

Hungarian politicians from Slovakia who planned the Status Law anyway. Miklós

Duray, one of the Hungarian Coaliti

who according to Molnár represents Hungarian nationalistic and separatist ideas in

Slovak politics. Together with other politicians they contacted Zsolt Németh, state

secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Office at that time, and the Hungarian foreign

minister himself, János Martonyi. They drafted the first version of the Status Law.

Duray also had close relations with former prime minister Viktor Orbán (1998-2002)

and even joined him at an electoral rally Viktor, a Felvidék358 veled

van -Hungary is with you]. Molnár added vehemently that Duray did

not speak for him.

applied for a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN)359. The reason for this low

percentage, Molnár added, lay in the very similar standard of living between Slovakia

and Hungary, not to mention the Hungarians in Slovenia and in Austria who had an

even higher standard of living than the Hungarians in Hungary proper. Subsequently,

economic effect that the Hungarian government might have had in mind had failed in

Slovakia and Slovenia. However, Molnár appreciated the support granted to the

educational system, although the investments were concentrated on real estate rather

than on teaching materials, which would have been more efficient. The local parties,

e.g. SMK in Slovakia or the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)

in Romania, founded organisations, whose aim was to administer the flow of money

to find solid proof, Molnár insisted that large sums of money had been embezzled in

these organisations.

In all, Molnár considered the Status Law to be superfluous and as a symbolic

gesture of the Hungarian government towards the co-ethnics. Upon my question as to

what he thought of the modified version of the Law he answered with a single word:

eufemizmus -liberal government in Hungary (2002-),

he added, had not managed to bridge the gaps with Slovakia and the political climate

between the two states had not improved. While Slovakia insisted on discussing

minority issues within the frame of the bilateral agreements and on the basis that every 358 Felvidék is a geographical denotation, which roughly covers present-day Slovakia. Unlike Erdély, Transylvania, which was a principality in medieval times, Felvidék does not belong to the politically

over that area. 359 September 2003.

189

state is responsible for the ethnic minorities that live in it, Hungary persisted on the

-

ethnics.

4.3.2.3 Iván Zsolt Nagy

The third journalist from Magyar Hírlap to be interviewed, Iván Zsolt Nagy, first

Budapest. He worked eight years for Magyar Nemzet (1992-2000) and then changed to

Magyar Hírlap. Knowing the different political tendencies of both newspapers, I asked

him how he managed this big change. Nagy said that in April 2000, Napi

Magyarorszag, a newspaper smaller than Magyar Nemzet, took over Magyar Nemzet.

main coalition party at that time. The name remained the same, but the absolute

majority of the journalists were now from Napi Magyarország to ensure that Magyar

Nemzet followed the same political route. It is unclear, said Nagy, from where Napi

information has proved my suspicions for excluding Magyar Nemzet from this analysis

due to its constant advertisement for FIDESZ. Nagy quit, since he did not approve of

-FIDESZ policy. Magyar Hírlap offered him to become the head of

the Foreign Affairs Section and he took the job. Consequently, he is responsible for all

articles in that section that do not have an author.

Magyar Hírlap, Nagy said, was a liberal newspaper and it was the journalists

themselves who bore the responsibility for their articles. Personally he agreed with the

liberal policy Magyar

much larger than selling rates might suggest. This means that despite being one of the

smaller newspapers among the big ones, e.g. Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet,

Magyar Hírlap can compete with both.

Nagy considers the Status Law to be superfluous. However, he does think that

the Hungarian state should pay attention to the co-

symbolic gesture could prevent a minority from being assimilated. By that he was

referring to the Status Law as a symbolic gesture of the Hungarian government towards

the co-ethnics. Furthermore, he added that there were a few issues the Status Law that

could have been more efficient:

1. Support for the Hungarian schools abroad. According to Nagy, it would have

been better to invest the money in the quality of the education offered than in the

190

allowance granted to families who send their children to Hungarian-speaking

schools. This allowance, as he added, came in laggingly anyway. Nagy

suggested

in general and in the real estates that went with it. He added that schools, which

had a good reputation in Romania, were more attractive to parents than any

schools, which might appeal to ethnic or linguistic affiliation. He himself

graduated from the German-

parents, although they both spoke Hungarian as their mother tongue, thought

that the German school offered the best available ed

2. Mobility problem. Many pupils of ethnic Hungarian background, especially in

the Transylvanian countryside, would rather go to Romanian speaking schools

than to Hungarian ones. The reason was simple: Romanian schools were often in

the next village while the Hungarian school could be up to 30 km away. Nagy

continued by suggesting investments in school busses, which could easily

transport the children to the next Hungarian-speaking school and back. He

considered such an investment to be much more efficient than just granting the

3. Labour market politics. The Status Law had hardly changed anything on the

Hungarian labour market. Every person that was seeking work in Hungary had

to prove first that no qualified Hungarian citizen was willing to do the job he

was applying for. Those who had the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN) on the basis of the Status Law did not have to go through this procedure.

However, they still had to go to other bureaucratic trouble: forms, applications

Law had come into effect only 400 co-ethnics had applied for a long-term

working permit on the basis of the CHN. In comparison, 8000 seasonal workers

ha

economic effect had been practically zero. The bilateral agreements that also

referred to labour market regulations, the Orbán-

among them, had more serious consequences than the Status Law.

In all, Nagy concluded that the importance of the Status Law had been

constantly declining. The next step in the Hungarian-Romanian relations, the agreement

191

of 23rd September 2003, was about to substitute the ONM and practically a part of the

Status Law360.

4.3.2.4 Miklós Újvári

Miklós Újvári wrote his first articles for Magyar Hírlap back in 1994. He has a

degree in German Studies from the University of Szeged. In 1996 he started as a full-

time employee with the newspaper. Between 2000-2003 Újvári lead the Foreign Politics

section at Magyar Hírlap and from 2003 onwards, i.e. at the time of the interview, he

headed the napi témája -1.5 pages in

the daily edition and contains 3-4 articles that concern an acute issue. Furthermore, he

specialised on other issues, e.g. European Union and war coverage.

According to Újvári, Magyar Hírlap is a liberal paper that publishes quite a few

articles about minorities in Hungary. Despite the

the economic section is rather to the political left. He added that Magyar Hírlap wants to

compete with two other newspapers in this sector: the dailies Napi Gazdaság [Daily

Economy] and Világgazdaság [World Economy

owners also possessed 51% of the Népszabadság stocks. He added that Magyar Hírlap

had a strong influence on political life in Hungary and that there were many politicians

who wanted to publish articles in the newspaper. Most of then were from the Alliance

of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) but also a few

(MDF).

The heads of the various sections usually wrote their own articles and hence

Nevertheless, journalists were allowed to express their views freely, which meant that

the journalists represented views that could be considered to represent most political

parties. Újvári added that it did not matter which political direction each and every

journalist followed. What mattered was their basic liberal Zeitgeist. However, Magyar

Hírlap had a very bad relation to the largest conservative party, FIDESZ. Things went

so far, emphasised Újvári, that in 2001, when FIDESZ was in power, Magyar Hírlap

reporters were excluded from the Party congress. FIDESZ even tried to buy Magyar

360 The agreement was signed exactly one week after the interview took place. See Appendix 4.

192

Former Hungarian governments did not follow a consequential political stand

regarding the co-ethnics, said Újvári. When the socialists ruled (1994-1998), the

Hungarian government supported Béla Markó, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians

-

2002) they s 361. This taciturn

policy has been very harmful to the UDMR, whose various wings were busy fighting

each other.

Újvári objected to the Hungarian Status Law for various reasons:

- The Status Law and the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) that went

with it created discrimination among citizens in the areas where Hungarians

lived. He was referring mainly to the financial benefits and the working permit

for Hungary.

- He considered the CHN to be a bad symbol, since it carried the Hungarian coat

of arms, which symbolised the old kingdom362 nem

racionális, hanem érzelmi döntés

Hungarian government.

- ne 2003 was better than the first

version from June 2001, but he added that there was still some room for

improvement.

Furthermore, Újvári accentuated his disapproval of the Orbán-

(ONM). The reason was once again the Hungarian government

ONM applied to Romania but not to other states with a substantial Hungarian minority,

e.g. Slovakia or Ukraine. I asked him whether he challenged Prime Minister Orbán with

this problem and he answered affirmatively. Orbán, however, said that the government

had no intentions of extending the ONM to other states. Újvári added, that from

November 2003 onwards Hungary would be obliged to introduce a visa for Ukrainian

and Yugoslav citizens. At this point possessing a CHN would have the advantage of less

bureaucratic hurdles, the visa fees would be less and they would be issued for a longer

period of time.

Politically, Újvári considered the MSZP to be opportunistic, since it argued

against the Status Law but eventually voted for it. At this point he also criticised

Népszabadság, which was also against the Status Law until the MSZP changed its mind.

361 These two men, although they both represent the UDMR, have a very bad relation, which has not been helpful for the interests of the Hungarians in Romania. 362 The old kingdom, which was disintegrated at the Treaty of Trianon, included almost all the territories in which Hungarians live nowadays.

193

From that point on, when it was clear that the MSZP would vote for the Status Law,

Népszabadság stopped its criticism. Subsequently, Újvári admitted that he approved of

but nevertheless demanded that the Hungarian state should support the co-ethnics. He

added that the CHN gave the co-ethnics something real, something they could touch and

not just another empty promise from Budapest. The CHN was therefore a symbolic

bond between Hungary and the co-ethnics.

4.3.3 Népszabadság

4.3.3.1 Tibor Kis

Tibor Kis studied International Relations and Journalistic Studies in Moscow.

He has been working for Népszabadság since 1975 and has never worked for another

deputy chief editors, of which there are three. Kis works for the section publicisztika

[political journalism], which is under the supervision of the chief editor himself. There

are between eight and ten journalists working in that section. The deputy editors choose

the current theme and then decide which qualified journalist will write about it. The

deputy chief editors work on a weekly turn and they have specific ideas about which

arról ír,

amire a lapnak szüksége van hese

limits, the journalist may write what he pleases.

Kis estimates the majority of his colleagues to be politically left, which makes

Népszabadság on the whole a left-wing/liberal daily. However, this does not mean that

Népszabadság did not take a tough stand against the socialist governments of Gyula

Horn (1994- -2004) and criticised them.

Nonetheless, Kis considers Népszabadság to be a newspaper in which the information,

the news has the top priority. According to his assessment, Népszabadság is trying to

become a source of reference and a mass paper at the same time. He added that many

politicians read Népszabadság and very often they felt vilified. Nevertheless, Kis

emphasised that unlike Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság was not bound to any political

party. He exemplified with an encounter he had with former minister Géza Eszenszky

from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). During a public discussion, the former

minister challenged Kis personally from the high table about an article Kis wrote about

that minister and then started an argument.

194

Back in 2001 Kis considered the Status Law to be a good idea and he revised

this position step by step. He told me that the government, which was led at that time by

Union (FIDESZ), published information that was simply false:

konzultációk nem voltak, tájékoztatások voltak

there have been notifications]. Kis referred to the dispute between Hungary and its two

neighbours Slovakia and Romania about this lack of information about the Status Law.

While FIDESZ insisted that there have been consultations with those two states,

Slovakia and Romania denied having had any. Therefore, Kis said that the Hungarian

government informed the neighbouring states but did not lead any negotiations or

consultations with them.

Kis, however, at least considered the cultural grants to be very useful:

scholarships, fellowships and investments in Hungarian language education facilities in

the neighbouring states. According to him the Status Law had three major goals:

1.

campaign. The idea behind it was to show that FIDESZ has done something for

the co-ethnics. For this goal one has to bear in mind that almost a third of all

Hungarian citizens have relatives in the adjacent states. FIDESZ has tried to

plug on that sentiment to gain more votes.

2. The Status Law was very important for the FIDESZ clientele, especially in

Romania and Slovakia. Important, because through the money that flowed for

a

havereknek

high-ranking politician of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) of Slovakia, and

Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).

3. To top it all, FIDESZ was able to refinance itself with the money the Hungarian

government sent abroad. The idea was to transfer government money to different

organisations close to FIDESZ abroad and these organisations would transfer the

money back on FIDESZ bank accounts. This money was then used to finance

etnokorupció

[ethno-corruption] to describe these dubious affairs363.

363

f the Status Law. Upon my question whether he has any proof to this alleged so-called ethno-corruption, Kis had to admit that he does not have any. However, during the interview I conducted with Béla Markó on 26th about ethno-corruption in the party. He admitted that there was and that it had become worse since the Status Law had came into

195

Concluding two and a half years after the Status Law has been passed by

jelentéktelen

it hardly serves the co-ethnics, who were supposed to be the principal benefactors.

4.3.3.2 József Szilvássy

József Szilvássy not only works as a journalist for the Hungarian daily

Hungarian daily, Új Szó. Since he spoke Czech fluently, he was sent to Czechoslovakia

back in 1968 and has stayed there ever since. In 1990 he was elected by the journalists

of Új Szó to become their new chief editor. Szilvássy is the only journalist who at the

time of the interview was working as a chief editor and as a journalist. Therefore, his

to 210000 copies. The Friday edition usually supersedes 220000364. Szilvássy considers

all parts of the political spectrum are reading it. He added that many politicians did not

like the newspaper but nevertheless they still read it.

section. Szilvássy also emphasised that there were no political directives at

a tény tiszta

quotation by Szilvássy can also be interpreted that there are no misunderstandings

between journalists and editorial board. He added that each and every journalist was

responsible for his own articles in which he made his statements.

honorary president of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR),

Miklós Duray, high-ranking politician from the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) of

Slovakia and state secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Office, Zsolt Németh. The

compromise was made for the sake of Hungarians who live in Slovakia and the Ukraine.

According to the laws of these two states, citizens who own another citizenship cannot

become civil servants. By granting the Hungarian citizenship, which was the initial idea,

many Hungarians in Slovakia and the Ukraine who are state employees could have lost effect on 1st January 2002. I take it for granted that if the chairman of a political party admits such doings in his party, there should be no doubt about their existence. 364

196

their job. Furthermore, Szilvássy assumed that the governments of Slovakia and

over the Status Law. He saw two main problems that occurred in the debate over the

Status Law. Both of them concerned sovereign authority:

1. The neighbouring states had to give their consent to foreign states granting

benefits to their citizens. In the context of the Status Law it would mean that

Hungary should have negotiated with its neighbouring states about the benefits it

wanted to grant the co-ethnics prior to passing the Status Law.

2. Minority protection had to be a task, for which the respective state was

responsible and not any foreign state. This would be in concurrence with the

bilateral agreements that Hungary signed with its neighbours.

Szilvássy considered the support Hungary had granted the co-ethnics in the

domain of education and training to have a very positive effect. However, he regarded

the co- to be a romantic idea, since

the Hungarian medical care system would collapse instantly should the co-ethnics come

in large numbers. Furthermore, he assessed the labour market regulations, i.e. the

possibility to work in Hungary, to be without any effect in Slovakia, but very important

for other regions, which have a high unemployment rate such as Carpathian-Ukraine365

and Transylvania. According to his information, the only ones who seek work in

Hungary were the Hungarians who live close to the border. They would drive across the

border into Hungary every morning and would come back in the evening. However,

these people crossed the border in search of work long before the Status Law had come

into effect and therefore do not need it.

The Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN), Szilvássy said, was mainly

used by four categories of people: pupils, students, pedagogues and pensioners. The

Hungarian Ministry of Education regarded the first three groups as inlanders when

granting admissions to colleges and other institutions of tertiary education. Szilvássy

emphasised the importance of training co-ethnic pedagogues in Hungary.

In all, Szilvássy has mixed feelings about the Status Law: there are some

benefits to the co-ethnics but much of it is just a symbolic gesture.

365 This region is the most western one in Ukraine. Most of the Hungarians in Ukraine live in that region.

197

4.3.3.3 Zoltán Tibori Szabó

Zoltán Tibori Szabó has three college degrees: he graduated in Mechanical

Engineering from the Polytechnic of Cluj- -Bolyai

University in Cluj-Napoca and Media Management in California, USA. Back in 1989,

escu was overthrown, he founded with some friends Szabadság, a

Hungarian daily newspaper. He was elected chief editor, which he accepted under the

condition that he would resign from that post when the newspaper finally had trained

enough young, qualified personnel to take over the job. Consequently, the newspaper

started sending young journalists to the West for training and experience. Tibori Szabó

scientist you always know how much you do not know. This is not compatible with

journalism, where you have to react fast and take the risk of not knowing everything.

From 1990 onwards he started working for Népszabadság parallel to his job at

Szabadság.

At the beginning of the nineties there were many journalists at Népszabadság

who were politically left, said Tibori Szabó. Nevertheless, there was a very open and

liberal atmosphere at Népszabadság, which enabled freethinking and writing. Tibori

sz

journalists at Népszabadság represented all sides of the political spectrum. There were

Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). The atmosphere was no longer as liberal as it

used to be. However, the journalists had complete freedom to write what they thought

was right. Political tendencies in the newspaper therefore depended on each and every

Népszabadság has a great influence on Hungarian politics but also on the Romanian

presa

[Hungarian press], where the surfer could read articles from Népszabadság,

which had been translated into Romanian366. Hungarian politicians reacted very fast to

articles in Népszabadság published about them and often wished to publish themselves.

Upon my question regarding Hungarian politics towards the co-ethnics, Tibori

Szabó told me the following little anecdote: In 1990 he went to Hungary as a journalist

from Transylvania and asked all parties about their intentions in regard of the co-

ethnics. They all answered that they will do their utmost possible to ease the co- 366 This was true at the time of the interview. However, in April 2006 that specific section of the homepage did not contain any Hungarian newspaper articles at all. Apparently the translation service has been closed.

198

situation. A short time later, as an interpreter for the Swiss newspaper La Suisse, he

asked the same parties the same questions and received from all sides the same answer.

Only this time around it was different: all parties told him that Hungary had enough

troubles of its own and that the country cannot take care of the co-

too.

Despite his critical stand against the Status Law, Tibori Szabó still thinks that

there are a few aspects that have helped the co-ethnics. The Hungarian government

would have achieved much more if it had not made so much noise about the Status Law.

He hoped that the Hungarian government would keep its promise and pay the chil

education allowance it had promised. According to his information there had been

serious delays in the payments. Financial support in general, he added, was only useful

when it helped the co-ethnics there where they lived, and not in Hungary. Otherwise

neighbouring states.

Money, however, was not always essential for supporting the co-ethnics. Tibori

Szabó gave an example of how Hungary could help with simple gestures: The

S -

ethnics to use the library free of charge. When Tibori Szabó went to Budapest to look

for some books at the OSZK, they asked for his passport and whether he was a co-

ethnic. Upon that he was able to use the library free of charge. There are, however, also

bad examples. He met an elderly lady at the National Museum in Budapest, who

possessed a Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN), that according to the Status

Law otherwise would have guaranteed her free entry to the museum. She was obliged to

possessed the CHN had to pay. Tibori Szabó admitted that the CHN had more of a

symbolic than financial or practical meaning and that many elderly kept the CHN as

-

Tibori Szabó also spoke of dual citizenship. According to him the whole issue of

kettösállampolgárság [dual citizenship] was initiated by FIDESZ after losing the 2002

elections. Their idea was to grant Hungarians in the Vojvodina the Hungarian

citizenship, because Hungarians from Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania no

longer needed a visa. It became clear that Slovakia and Slovenia (together with

Hungary) would join the European Union (EU) and therefore the Status Law would

become obsolete in those states. Furthermore, since Romanian citizens no longer needed

a visa for the EU and the situation calmed down after the Orbán-

199

Hungarian politics focused on the two remaining states with a Hungarian minority,

which at the time did not have a chance to join the EU: Serbia and Montenegro and

Ukraine.

In congruence with the information I received from Norbert Molnár and Tibor

Kis, Tibori Szabó also talked about ethno corruption. According to his information the

Hungarian government transferred about HUF 10 billion to Romanian accounts, at the

allowance and to support other projects initiated by the Status Law. Unfortunately, this

money was administered by those members of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians

in Romania (UDMR) who sympathised with FIDESZ. These people embezzled a great

deal of that money. When Tibori Szabó wrote an article about this grievance, the chief

editor in Budapest called him and asked him whether he had proof of these accusations,

in case one of the mentioned persons would sue Népszabadság. Tibori Szabó reassured

that he had UDMR members who would be willing to testify and so the article was

published.

4.3.4.1 Simona Popescu

Simona Popescu graduated from the College of Journalistic Studies in

Bucharest. She worked for two other newspapers since 1990: Dreptatea (1990) and

Evenimetul Zilei (1991-1992). In 1992 she joined România Liber

onwards she headed the departments Anchete speciale [special investigations] and

[home affairs]. After the opposition had won the elections in December

1996 and Victor Ciorbea had become Prime Minister, Popescu worked for half a year as

newspaper, said Popescu. Politically independent meant in the context of România

any specific political party and remain strictly pro-democratic.

Although the newspaper was positioned somewhere in the middle of the political

spectrum, she added, the paper did show conservative facets. Popescu considers the

newspaper to have an important role in Romanian society. According to her, România

-Communists out of office at the 1996 elections. At this point

she referred specifically to former Romanian President Ion Iliescu (1990-1996; 2000-

2004), who is still honorary president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), heir of the

former Romanian Communist Party (PCR). Popescu indirectly considers it România

200

-

the nightmare for those from the PSD]. Members of the PSD did admit, she added, that

they can have new ideas f

democratic parties. This definition excludes the PSD and the Greater Romania Party

(PRM).

groups: those between 30 and 40, who had a clear perception of democracy, and the

board considers to be a very important issue. Popescu emphasised the fact that România

journalistic styles without hindrance and a journalist could develop his skills. Since all

editors were below the age of forty, some even under thirty, they were free of

communist indoctrination; they were willing to speak up and to practice their profession

in the liberty they want.

The Status Law, said Popescu, was a good law for the Hungarians, because it

helped them maintain their possibilities to develop and to sustain their rights. She

considers the Status Law to be a bridge between Hungary and the co-ethnics. At a given

moment she was even jealous of the Hungarians in Romania, because the Romanian

government did not allocate the same resources for the Romanians who lived in

appealed to a different resource: solidarity with the Romanians abroad. However,

Popescu considered that the Status Law would become ineffectual when both states

joined the European Union.

more articles and were against the Status Law. However, she considered these two

newspapers to be very close to the government and hence to the PSD. She went even as

oficiosul -official newspaper]. Both

affairs, Popescu concluded, had treated the matter is a strictly informative manner.

201

4.3.5 Conclusions from the interviews

One of the predominant aspects revealed by the interviews was the trans-cultural

notion. The Status Law with its attempt to emphasise and underline ethnic and political

borders was revealed as a construction by the same persons who discussed the issue in

the public discourse surrounding the Status Law: the journalists, who write in

Hungarian. Unlike Rodica Ciobanu and Simona Popescu, who lived in their native

country, wrote in Romanian and worked for a Romanian newspaper, most of the

Hungarian-speaking journalists had at least one point where they cross the political

border: either the newspaper was abroad, e.g. Zoltán Tibori Szabó of Norbert Molnár, or

they themselves had moved to work in another country, e.g. Iván Zsolt Nagy or József

their validity and raise questions: who is Hungarian, who and what defines it? These

thoughts questioned the very basic supposition of human sciences that cultures had

borders. According to Welsch, cultures should no longer be regarded as entities with

rigid boundaries. Since cultural boundaries had become more permeable, one should

speak of the trans-cultural aspects or simply transculturality (Welsch 1999). The

application of this trans-cultural concept to the results of the interviews meant a revision

of the binary Hungarian-Romanian structure of the discourse presented previously367.

Therefore it was diff

Consequently, the only differentiation I can rely on is the language used in the article. In

other words, by say

Hungarian. The same is valid for their Romanian counterparts. The polyglot and often

multi-

practical problems, which has also been demonstrated by the Romanian-Hungarian

political debate over the Orbán-

The interviewed journalists had an ambivalent attitude towards the mechanism

of cultural segregation initiated by the Status Law. They constantly challenged the

Status Law for the differentiation, discrimination or any other synonym for the strife it

provoked on the political level. However, none of them, and this also included the

Romanian journalists, opposed the idea that Hungary should support the Hungarians in

the neighbouring states.

367 See Figure 3.

202

-

dailies in Hungary or Romania, if not the most important one.

- They all agreed that journalists had the freedom to write whatever they please.

Obviously they were referring to the political aspects of their text and within the

frames of judicial restrictions.

- The claim of neutrality had proved to be wishful thinking from the point of view

of a discourse analysis. My supposition that each of the four papers had a

specific political tendency in regard of the Status Law has proved to be correct:

Democrats (SZDSZ), Népszabadság was closer to the Hungarian Socialist Party

out to be the slightly conservative paper with strong democratic notion and

steadfastness for fighting against corruption and mismanagement in Romanian

liberal newspaper, there had been articles, which clearly supported the social

democratic-

- If at all, some journalists criticised other papers, but never the one they were

strongest competitor among the liberal papers, and Simona Popescu criticised

- None of the journalists, who worked for different papers, e.g. Zoltán Tibori

Szabó, József Szilvássy or Norbert Molnár, considered it to be a problem or to

hinder their work. All three agreed that they could very well separate their

activities from one another.

The interviews have granted me an insight which otherwise would have

remained secret to me. This especially includes the background information concerning

ethno corruption, which was mentioned by Rodica Ciobanu, Tibor Kis, Norbert Molnár

and Zoltán Tibori Szabó. This means that three out of four papers had discussed the

matter. Another background information referred to the network consisting of Zsolt

Apparently, together with the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT), they are the

people behind the Hungarian Status Law. The two prime ministers, Orbán an

started interacting after the Law was transferred from the administrative to the executive

political level.

203

5. Final conclusions

Writing the closing stages to a thesis completes the circle of presentation,

information, justification, research, argumentation and conclusion. In other words, the

congruence makes the thesis complete: a scientific study with the capacity to promote

further investigation and research into its specific field. Or as a tool for epistemological

research, as Foucault and Bourdieu/Wacquant once put it (Bourdieu Wacquant 2006;

Foucault 1976).

Analysing discourses involves a tedious search for meanings, both obvious and

hidden ones. The search is only brought to a preliminary end when the researcher can

make certain statements that he has concluded from studying the discourses in question.

These statements include different perspectives within clearly defined frames of time

and space. By taking a threefold perspective on the two intersecting discourses368, i.e. a

diachronic analysis, a synchronic analysis and an interview analysis, I have visualised

chosen sectors of the Hungarian and Romanian press in the years 2001-2003 regarding

the discursive event of the Hungarian Status Law. The extensive results have shown

specific characteristics in each and every newspaper. In this chapter I shall go one step

beyond and interpret the obtained data, thereby answering two questions, one regarding

the co-

role in their respective discourses.

5.1 Ethnic denotations

In the preliminary remarks I set out to analyse how journalistic texts constructed

the co-ethnics in the light of the Hungarian Status Law369. By constructed I meant the

way in which journalists used ethnic denotations to create, define and re-position ethnic

groups that can be subsumed as co-

their respective newsp

order to demonstrate this I have chosen to separate the two sets of results into two

subchapters.

368 See Figure 3. 369 See Chapter 0.

204

5.1.1 General features

Denoting groups of people on an ethnic basis is a common feature in all four

newspapers and is therefore essential for this thesis. The ethnic denotations analysed in

this work reveal the thoughts behind the text and enable a better understanding of the

ry system of

thus conclude that each denotation represents a different ethnic group with specific

boundaries. These boundaries are neither given nor natural; they are the result of an

intended and contested debate in the field of ethnicity. Therefore, I consider competing

ethnic denotations, i.e. various denotations that engulf more or less the same group of

people, to be proof of the discursive construction of ethnicity.

In the following tables (Table 13 and 14) I have juxtaposed the sum of all

Hungarian denotations with the Romanian ones. They are a statistical summary of

Tables 10 and 11. It further allows a direct comparison between the representatives of

the Hungarian discourse on the one hand, i.e. the newspapers Magyar Hírlap and

Table 13: Ethnic denotations by country/language

Country / Language Number of denotations Denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania Ratio

Hungarian newspapers 125 22 5.7:1 Romanian newspapers 33 6 5.5:1

Although not extensive, the table above permits certain conclusions regarding the two

discourses involved370:

1. Number of Hungarian denotations. There is a substantial numeric gap between

the 125 Hungarian denotations and the 33 Romanian ones. It is a clear indicator

fo the intensity and diversity present in the Hungarian discourse regarding the

Hungarians in the neighbouring states. Bearing in mind that the debate is almost

90 years old, the possibilities to talk about and denote Hungarians outside of

Hungary has become very diversified. This diversity permits a very subtle and

exact way of talking about the co-ethnics. Contrary to this abundance of

denotations, the Romanian side has been more strict and rigid. Unlike the

Hungarian discourse, which is strictly about Hungarians, the Romanian 370 See Chapter 1.

205

discourse since Trianon (1920) took three major minorities in Romania into

consideration: Hungarians, Germans and Jews. After World War II there were

few Jews left in Romania and many Germans had also left or were deported to

the Soviet Union. The German exodus at the beginning of the nineties completed

this process. However, during the last years the aspect of denotation within the

Romanian discourse shifted towards the Roma (Gypsies). The government

ordered to change the orthography from Romi (plural form) to Rromi to make

sure that the two stems Român (Romanian) and Rrom (Gypsy) are not confused.

2. Hungarian denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania. The number of

denotations used for creating Hungarians in Romania is high. It is not reached

by denotations regarding Hungarians from any other state, not even Slovakia or

Serbia. Therefore, this number, 22, is clear evidence of the significant role

Hungarians in Romania play in the Hungarian discourse. On the other hand,

when comparing it to the other 103 denotations that do not have any

geographical reference to Romania, this number seems quite small. Bearing in

mind that the Hungarians of Romania make up about 60% of all co-ethnics, I

conclude that the Hungarian discourse is focused on the co-ethnics as a whole

and does not over-represent the Hungarians of Romania. Thus, the Hungarian

discourse clearly shows its concern to all co-ethnics, which indicates its full

awareness to all territories that used to be part of the defunct Hungarian

kingdom and still inhabit co-ethnics, regardless of their numeric size.

3. Number of Romanian denotations. When considering the Romanian results I

subtracted the six denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania from the

total sum of 33 Romanian denotations. As a result, I obtained 27 denotations

that, with few exceptions, obviously regard Hungarians also in countries other

than Romania. This result is not surprising when considering the geographical

distribution of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. However, bearing in mind

that the Romanian discourse is focused upon minorities within Romania, this

number is strikin

that there are co-ethnics also in other countries, not just in Romania.

Consequently, these ethnic denotations show a break in the political borders of

the Romanian discourse.

4. Equal proportions. The ratios demonstrated in Table 13 show a striking

similarity between the Romanian and the Hungarian denotations. Therefore, it is

shown that the Romanian journalists are not just aware of the other Hungarian

206

minorities in the Carpathian Basin, but follow suit with their Hungarian

colleagues in the importance they place on the two categories, i.e. Hungarians in

Romania and Hungarians outside Hungary in general. Thus, I conclude, that

Hungarian and Romanian journalists have a very similar sense of proportion

regarding the Hungarian minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. In other

words, language and political borders do not play a significant role in this

respec.

The following table (Table 14) shows five different aspects, which represent

some of the newsp

symbols plus (+) if the feature is available and minus (-) if the feature is not present in

Table 14: Ethnic denotations: General features

Feature Magyar Hírlap Népszabadság Dominant denotation + + - - Nation + + - - Emic denotations + + - - High variety of denotations in relation to amount of articles + + + +

Variety of ethnonyms - - + -

The table shows clearly specific differences between the Hungarian and the

Romanian newspapers but also some differences between the two Romanian

newspapers:

1. The most striking difference concerns a dominant denotation. Apparently

present in the Hungarian articles it is completely missing in the Romanian ones.

The Hungarian denotation határon túli magyarok (Magyars beyond the border),

which is omnipresent in the Hungarian narratives and thus in the Hungarian

public discourse, does not have a comparative denotation in the Romanian

newspapers. This phenomenon bears evidence to the consensus among

Hungarian journalists regarding the co-ethnics on the one side, and the plurality

explained by the length of time that has elapsed since the Treaty of Trianon

(1920), in which the Hungarian public has been aware of the co-

situation, thus allowing a specific denotation to become so dominant in

Hungary. Subsequently, the fact that the Romanian public has shown little

207

concern with the co-ethnics in the last eighty-five years could be an explanation

for the lack of a comparable dominant ethnic denotation in Romania in general

2. The next feature, nation, refers only to the usage of this word in connection with

ethnic denotations371. Thus, again, it is only the Hungarian newspapers that use

it. Using the term nation together with ethnic denotations gives minorities the

Hungarian journalists the co-ethnics can form nations within the states they live

in, thus using the term nations for groups of people constituting that state and for

groups within that frame. For the Romanian journalists it is impossible, since all

ethnic groups in Romania form part of the Romanian nation. This opposed

understanding and usage of the term nation is one of the main dividing elements

between the Hungarian and the Romanian narrative.

3. Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság are the two newspapers to use denotations that

have an emic character372. The Hungarian journalists thus try to incorporate a

more differentiated perspective upon ethnicity, which is more descriptive and

less essentialist. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, by using those denotations

journalists do not give up their position of power, which enables them to denote

people. However, by using such ethnic denotations the Hungarian journalists

display their awareness of the fact that ethnicity is not given, but rather

chosen373. This is completely missing in the ethnic denotations used by their

Romanian counterparts. This permits the conclusion that the Romanian

journalists consider ethnicity as given and static, i.e. essentialist.

4.

regarding the Hungarian Status Law than the Hungarian newspapers at stake, the

proportion between the number of articles published and the variety of ethnic

denotations used is very close. Thus I conclude that each journalistic narrative,

be it Romanian or Hungarian, is the result of a conglomerate of ideas that flows

newspapers is accidental and not planned. One of my interviewees told me that

the newspaper he is writing for used to be a workshop of ideas back in the

nineties and that the journalists still represent the entire spectrum of Hungarian

371 For a different aspect of nation see subchapter 5.1.4 372 See also subchapters 4.1.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.1.2 373 See denotations 63, 64, 76 and 104 in Table 10.

208

politics with slight tendencies towards the political left374. The variety of

analysed for this thesis.

5.

two ethnonyms for the co-ethnics: ungur (Hungarian) and maghiar (Magyar).

The difference between the two lies in the way they were used in communist

Romania during the seventies and eighties; Unguri (in plural) were the

maghiari (in plural) were

those citizens of Romania who were ethnically Hungarian. Hence there were two

ethnic entities and the idea that there is a cultural or ethnic nation beyond any

political boundaries, as many Hungarians propagated it, was linguistically

smashed. The term ungur has loss ground significantly after 1990 and the fact

communist narrative. The Hungarian journalists do not use two ethnonyms since

the Hungarian language has only a single ethnonym for Hungarians, namely

magyarok (Magyars). However, there are two ethnonyms for Romanians in

Hungarian: román (Romanian) and oláh (Vlach). While the first one is the

ethnonym from the late 18th century, the last one is much older and is used

nowadays in an offensive, insulting manner (Mitu 2006; 269-280).

In the following table (Table 15) I have gone one step further and differentiated

between all four newspapers.

Table 15: Ethnic denotations by newspaper.

Newspaper Published Number of denotations regarding all co-ethnics

Denotations regarding only Hungarians in Romania Ratio

Magyar Hírlap Hungary 64 14 4.57:1 Népszabadság Hungary 96 17 5.65:1

Romania 25 4 6.25:1 Romania 17 4 4.25:1

The table enables the following conclusions:

374 Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

209

1.

notations. In other words, România

thin

and outside Romania. Consequently, this diversity of denotations used by

approach vis-à-vis the Hungarians in Central and Eastern Europe.

2. Denotations in the Hungarian newspapers. Magyar Hírlap, in comparison to

Népszabadság, has a clear line and a stronger emphasis on Hungarians in

Romania than on Hungarians in general. This has two reasons: firstly, Magyar

peop 375.

Secondly, as some of the articles analysed for this thesis have shown, Magyar

Hírlap rather quotes the Hungarian-Transylvanian daily Krónika, which is

ngarian, than Új Szó, which is

closer to the Hungarians of Romania than to those of Slovakia. This is especially

evident in the following denotation, which is used only by Magyar Hírlap:

Persons, who live in Romania, consider themselves to be of Magyar nationality

not Hungarian citizens376. On the other hand, Népszabadság has more

denotations than Magyar Hírlap, thus showing the diversity of views represented

by its journalists. As one of my interviewees exclaimed377, the range of political

views represented among the journalists working for Népszabadság is very wide.

These political views in turn influence the usage of denotations, especially in the

realm of ethnicity, which is of importance for this work.

3.

regarding the two categories of denoting, while România Libera has the lowest

of all. Subsequently, the Hungarian newspapers show a smaller difference

between their respective ratios. This difference in ratios can be explained

through the difference of perspective between the Hungarian and the Romanian

newspapers. For the two Hungarian dailies, regardless of narrative and political 375 See Table 5. 376 See Table 10, Denotation 102. 377 Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó.

210

views, all co-ethnics by definition are outside the borders of the Republic of

Hungary. For the Romanian newspapers the co-ethnics are inside as well as

outside Romania. Thus, the Romanian newspapers have the possibility to

differentiate between here, i.e. in Romania, and there, i.e. in other regions of the

Carpathian Basin, which the Hungarian newspapers do not.

5.1.2 Specific Hungarian features

The Hungarian newspapers have displayed a series of common features despite

their distinct ways of constructing the Hungarians in Romania with different ethnic

denotations. Subsequently, I will start with these common features and then move

The following features are common to both newspapers:

1. The complexity of the term nation. Nemzet [nation] has two important roles in

the Hungarian newspapers: erasing the difference between majority and minority

-ethnics. The

first role is an old one, reminiscent of the 19th century, dating back to the

Hungarian Nationalities Law from 1868 (Vladár 1943: 156-165). That law

guaranteed all nationalities, i.e. ethnic minorities, of the Kingdom of Hungary

Hungarian Nation. Consequently, the law used the same substantive for two

different meanings. This ambiguity has remained in both newspapers, since they

refer to the co-ethnics often as nationals or national minorities, e.g. Romániában

[National minority that lives in Romania] but also as part

of the Hungarian nation, e.g. nemzet külhoni fele 378.

-à-vis the

co-ethnics, lies in the dual nature of this relationship: Hungary as a state is

responsible for its citizens, e.g. Külföldi állampolgárok [Foreign citizens] but

Hungary as a cultural-linguistic nation is responsible for all those who consider

themselves to belong to this nation, e.g. Kárpát medencei magyarok [Magyars of

the Carpathian Basin]379. Hence, the ethnic denotations bear evidence to

2. A common semantic field. Both newspapers have used lexemes, which together

form a specific semantic field with the leitmotif abroad: Határ [border], külföld

378 See Table 10. 379 Idem.

211

[abroad], ott/ottani [there/from there] and szomszéd [neighbour] transmit the

image of the co-ethnics being somewhere else rather than in Hungary. These

terms reflect again the ambiguity of the co-ethnics as part of the larger cultural-

linguistic Hungarian nation but at the same time political citizens of other states.

3. The position of the speaker. Two of my interviewees, Zoltán Tibori-Szabó from

Népszabadság and Tibor Bogdán from Magyar Hírlap have an indistinct position

of speaking withi 380. They both consider

themselves as co-ethnics and write about the Hungarians in Romania from

Romania for a Hungarian newspaper published in Hungary. Consequently, when

they write about határon túli magyarok [Magyars beyond the border], whom do

they mean? They practically talk in the third person of the group they identify

with. According to my assessment, by writing in that specific way they perform

différance by positioning themselves culturally, linguistically and geographically

in the Hungarian nation although they write from Romania to which they belong

politically.

pattern, whose features from Tables 10 and 10a can be summed up as thus:

1. Realistic political approach. Magyar Hírlap used Romania as a geographic point

of reference more often than Erdély [Transylvania]. This demonstrates Magyar

therefore the Hungarians that live there are part of the Romanian political

term state more frequently than nation, when describing the co-ethnics.

citizenship and statehood are the primary means of identification while ethnicity

and nationality are secondary. Furthermore, the frequent use of határon túl

[beyond the border] strengthens the image of the co-ethnics as groups that live

rders and hence are not part of the nation-state.

2. Neutrality. Magyar Hírlap displays a politically more neutral attitude within the

discourse concerning the relationship between the Hungarian state and the co-

ethnics. The clearest evidence of this effort i

380 This is also the case for József Szilvássy from Népszabadság and Norbert Molnár from Magyar Hírlap, both writing from Bratislava, Slovakia.

212

definition as an ethnic denotation381. It is unique in all four newspapers. By

using this specific denotation, Magyar Hírlap has tried to express its neutrality,

since the denotation is laid down in the Status Law itself. Magyar Hírlap has

also used denotations, which reflect an emic approach382. By using denotations

standpoint in the discourse383. Furthermore, Magyar Hírlap displays a balanced

usage between magyarok [Magyars] and magyarság [Magyardom]. This

underlines again the fact that the newspaper has a strict and specific interest only

in the people the Status Law affects.

3. cts:

the number of denotations used and the emphasis on ethnicity rather than on

nation. Magyar Hírlap has used far less denotations to describe the co-ethnic

than Népszabadság. This means that there is a consensus among its journalists

about the denotations to be used. It shows a common line of thought and a

professional attitude towards the termini. Furthermore, in comparison to

Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap used the adjective ethnic more often than

national. By avoiding national and using ethnic, Magyar Hírlap tried to avoid

the duality of the term nationalpreviously demonstrated. In addition, Magyar

Hírlap showed its modern attitude and receptiveness, since using the adjective

ethnic is a modern development after 1990.

These conclusions show Magyar Hírla

correctness and modern terminology. Additionally, the newspaper is eager to represent a

more balanced debate with less polemics and national pathos. Therefore, the co-ethnics

are represented in Magyar Hírlap in a more consequential manner, as people who live

Hírlap, the co-ethnics are first citizens of other states and then a part of a larger cultural

and/or linguistic Hungarian nation.

Népszabadság, unlike Magyar Hírlap, has a different conception regarding the

co-ethnics. As Tables 10 and 10a reveal, Népszabadság has a distinct patter that

concentrates on three major points:

1. Nationalism. Népszabadság constructs the co-ethnics from a more national

perspective, which is manifested in two specific facets of the ethnic denotations 381 See denotation 17 in Table 10a. 382 See denotation 12 in Table 10a. 383 See also subchapter 4.1.1.1.1.

213

the newspaper has used: Erdély [Transylvania] is used more often than Románia

[Romania] when describing Hungarians in Romania and the term nation is used

more often than the term state. By using Transylvania more often than Romania

Népszabadság has made a clear statement: The Hungarians in Romania do not

live in the state called Romania but rather in the area previously known as the

Principality of Transylvania384. The different connotations Erdély [Transylvania]

and Románia [Romania] have in Hungarian are used for this linguistic trick385.

The political reality of the Romanian state and Transylvanian ethnic majority,

i.e. the Romanians, are thus put aside. Furthermore, Népszabad

create the illusion that Transylvania is a remote place, which has nothing to do

with Romania. The second facet regarding nation and state goes back to the

ambiguous relationship between the Hungarian state and the co-ethnics

regarding the question as to whether Hungary is a state or a cultural and

linguistic nation, regardless of political boundaries. By using nation more often

than state when discussing the co-ethnics, Népszabadság has clearly opted for

the cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation and not for Hungary as a state.

2. Historic awareness. A close look at the ethnic denotations used in Népszabadság

-ethnics in general

and the Hungarians in Romania in particular. This awareness is twofold: the

connotation of the Treaty of Trianon and the frequent use of magyarság

[Magyardom] instead of magyarok [Magyars]. From the Hungarian national

point of view, Trianon represents an injustice and a heavy burden for Hungary as

well as for the co-ethnics. Denotations such as kisebbségi sorba jutott

magyarság [Magyardom that has become minority] or Trianoni határokon kívül

rekedt magyarság kisebbsége [The minor part of Magyardom that remained

outside the Trianon borders] bear evidence to this awareness of Trianon386.

Talking of Trianon is also a way of remembering it. Thus, Népszabadság is

trying to keep the memory of Trianon alive by using ethnic denotations that

relate to that treaty. The second issue is less polemic and regards the minute

difference between writing about Magyardom, as in államon kívüli magyarság

[Magyardom outside the state], and Magyars, as in Erdélyi magyarok

[Transylvanian Magyars]. While Magyars relates to physical persons,

Magyardom relates to a wider context. Magyardom includes all that is related to 384 See also Table 4. 385 See subchapter 4.1.1.1.2. 386 See Table 10.

214

the Magyars, e.g. language, art, customs, religion etc. Therefore,

-ethnics to the

larger, history laden, cultural-linguistic Hungarian nation. To put it differently,

by talking of Magyardom Népszabadság leaves the political borders suggested

by Magyars and enters a different realm, one of culture and language.

3. Inconsequentiality. The variety of ethnic denotations used by Népszabadság

ncy in regard of a clear line of representation.

There are many denotations that practically contradict each other, e.g.

anyaországtól elszakadt honfitársaink [Our compatriots who are separated from

the homeland] and magyar román állampolgárok [Romanian

citizens of Magyar nationality]387. This bears evidence to the fact that the

journalists at Népszabadság represent different parts of the political spectrum388.

However, an interviewee told me that Népszabadság is trying to become a

source of reference389. According to my understanding, a newspaper that wants

to become a source of reference should have a clear-cut vocabulary in order to

avoid ambiguity and to demonstrate a comprehensive terminology. The ethnic

denotations used by Népszabadság do not fulfil such high standards. However,

this contradictory situation clearly shows the freedom of writing practiced at

Népszabadság but also the lack of terminological coordination.

more to the political right than

the first superficial impression might suggest. They show that Népszabadság has strong

undercurrents towards historic-national talk, despite the diversity of the denotations, as

was manifested in the denotations with connotation to the Treaty of Trianon. This

means that the co-ethnics are discussed controversially in Népszabadság and that they

form a national issue for the journalists who work for that newspaper.

5.1.3 Specific Romanian features

The co-ethnics play a different role in the Romanian newspapers. Unlike the

Hungarian newspapers, the Romanian ones refer to ethnic groups, which are within as

well as outside Romania. Although around 60% of all co-ethnics live in Romania, the

Romanian newspapers do not fail to refer to the co-ethnics in general. This awareness is

387 Idem. 388 Interview with Zoltán Tibori Szabó. 389 Interview with Tibor Kis.

215

an indicator to the fact that the discourse about the minorities in Romania is taken by

There is an interesting numeric parallel between the Romanian and the

Hungarian denotations: the ratios between general denotations referring to all co-ethnics

and denotations referring to Romania and Transylvania alone are very close. In other

newspapers in discussing the Hungarian co-ethnics in general as in discussing the

largest group of co-ethnics, i.e. the Hungarians in Romania390. It is clear evidence to

Basin. This result is contradictory to what the Romanian journalists have told me, since

according to my interviewees the Hungarian Status Law has not played a significant 391.

Despite the differences between the two Romanian newspapers, there are some

common facets in the ethnic denotations they use:

1. Ethnic instead of national. Both newspapers use denotations such as c

[Romanian citizens of Magyar ethnos] or etnici

maghiari [Ethnic Magyars]392 but never the term national. Accordingly, the co-

entitled to be nations. Using the term nation could suggest a different political

entity within the frame of the Romanian state. Therefore, both Romanian

newspapers share a common political idea: the Hungarians in Romania are an

ethnic phenomenon and the Hungarians are part of the Romanian nation.

2.

single time as reference for the ethnic denotations they use. This could be a hint

political belonging, and less on juridical definitions of identity and ethnicity.

3. Abroad as a semantic field. In congruence with the Hungarian newspapers,

demonstrate the co- borders, e.g. Etnici

maghiari de peste hotare [Ethnic Magyars beyond the boundaries], maghiari din

statele vecine Ungariei

m Ungariei

390 See also Table 5. 391 Interviews with Rodica Ciobanu and Simona Popescu. 392 See Table 11.

216

maghiari [Magyars from abroad]393. This semantic field again

-

as people who consider themselves to be ethnically Hungarian and who live

4. Ardeal. As already mentioned, the territory called Transylvania in English has

two names in Romanian: Transilvania and Ardeal394. The latter is not mentioned

a single time in the ethnic denotations used by the two Romanian newspapers. It

is my assumption that this is aimed at a specific counter-balance: the existence

of people who are not Romanians in Ardeal should be compensated by using

only Transilvania with its connotation to the Roman and therefore Romanian

claim to that territory.

On the other hand, the

nation in the

denotations and still using the ethnonym ungur [Hungarian] as well as maghiar

[Magyar]:

1. The first aspect becomes evident when analysing the ethnic denotations used by

community or minority, e.g. c [Magyar communities] or

minority m [Magyar minorities]395. Not using nation is a clear

one.

2. The other aspect regarding the different ethnonyms, e.g. etnici maghiari din

vecine Ungariei [

or m

borders]396 397. Hence, according to

e an ethnic and not a national issue. On

carries old animosities sparked off during the nationalist era of Romanian

393 Idem. 394 See footnote to Table 3. 395 See Table 11. 396 Idem. 397 See subchapter 4.1.2.1.

217

communism. These animosities are subtly presented, unlike the polemics of

outright nationalistic newspapers, such as România Mare.

representation. Therefore it is difficult to assess what the co-ethnics mean to this

displays certain characteristics that could be regarded as

nationalistic. However, due to the large variety of denotations, this line is blurred and

therefore inconsequent.

The term minority and political correctness are the two main features in

România L

1. minority to categorise the co-ethnics a single

time: [Magyar minority in Romania]. This

shows that the newspaper tried to avoid quantification, which could be

interpreted differently. By avoiding the term minority and referring only to

regarding minority rights and therefore questions regarding national issues.

2. The other as

use of the ethnonym maghiar [Magyar] and avoiding ungur [Hungarian]. The

reference to the ethnonym used in the Hungarian language bears evidence to

en mindedness. Consequently, România

information I have received from the interview398.

information I have gained from the interview399. According to the interviewee, România

about what the Hungarian government might grant Hungarians in Romania. România

398 Interview with Simona Popescu. 399 Idem.

218

ethnic denotations

professional attitude and rejection of polemics.

5.1.4 Nation and ethnicity

the ethnic denotations they use, I chose their concept of the nation as the basis for a

comparison among all four of them. For this purpose I shall use two simplified

categories: the German concept of the nation and the French one. The first of the two

categories refers to Sprach- und Kulturnation, i.e. linguistic and cultural nation. This

19th century concept has evolved from the situation the German speaking states were in:

one language, many states. Those who spoke German and shared German culture were

thus Germans and part of one nation, thereby ignoring citizenship. On the other hand,

the French concept evolved from the ideas of the French Revolution (1789) and the

thought that the state consisted of the sum of its citizens regardless of linguistic or

cultural background (Sundhaussen 2003). Practically, modern nations include elements

of both concepts, since every state has at least one official language and cultural or

linguistic background is not the only criterion for obtaining citizenship. In the following

segment I will show how journalists from all four newspapers used these two concepts

when denoting the co-ethnics.

1. This

denotations used, considers political borders to be identical with national ones.

In other words, the concept that every state is also a nation, which was

specific narrative is manifested in two domains: using the attribute ethnos in the

denotations and using two different ethnonyms. The attribute ethnos is used

differentiates between Magyars and ethnic Magyars, hence creating two

different categories of Magyars, regardless of citizenship or geographic

localisation400. The aspect of the two ethnonyms is manifested in the use of

unguri (Hungarians) and maghiari (Magyars)401. This differentiation between

Hungarians and Magyars goes back to socialist times when unguri (Hungarians)

meant the Hungarians in Hungary proper while maghiari (Magyars) referred to

400 Compare Table 11, Denotations 8 and 10. 401 Compare Table 11, Denotations 9 and 16.

219

the Hungarians living in Romania. Therefore, Magyars were part of the

Romanian state/nation and Hungarians were not; they were part of the

Hungarian state/nation.

2. Magyar Hírlap. This Hungarian newspaper also follows the French concept of

nation külföld (abroad) more

frequently in their denotations than their colleagues from Népszabadság. By

using abroad frequently they emphasised the political reality that the co-ethnics

live in other states than Hungary regardless of any nationalistic or anachronistic

rhetoric. On the other hand, the term nemzeti (national) is used more rarely than

in Népszabadság. This, again, bears evidence to a political realism, since using

the attribute national could imply the status of statehood for the Hungarian

Erdély (Transylvania) upon

Románia (Romania) in relation to the total amount of denotations used402. This

means that Magyar Hírlap considers the co-ethnics to be an integral part of the

states they live in, as the French concept of the nation suggests.

3. denotations

of the nation. This means, that the journalists writing for Népszabadság consider

Hungary to be a cultural and linguistic nation and not necessarily a political one.

szomszéd

(neighbour)403. Using szomszéd instead of külföld (abroad) suggests that the

cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation and disregarding the geopolitical

aspects. Furthermore, the frequent use of szomszéd together with nemzet (nation)

or nemzeti (national) when denoting the co-ethnics emphasises this intention

even further. The attribute national also promotes the co-

juxtaposing them to other ethnic groups in the neighbouring nations, e.g.

Romanians or Slovaks. In other words, the German concept of the nation is

consequently applied, i.e. also on the neighbouring nations. Finally,

journalists used the geographic localisation Erdély

(Transylvania) more often than Románia (Romania). This preference indicates a

402 Compare Table 11a, Denotation 8,9,22 and 23. 403 Compare Table 10, Denotations 116, 118 and 120.

220

long history as a Hungarian principality and as an integral part of Hungarian

culture and heritage. By using Transylvania, which is no longer a political entity,

the political borders are ignored and the old Hungarian principality becomes a

part of the cultural and linguistic Hungarian nation while at the same time the

Romanian presence is neglected.

4.

newspaper follows the German concept of the nation. This is especially evident

in the frequent use of the ethnonym magyar (Magyar) without any quantitative

attributes such as comunitate (community) or minoritate (minority) to it404.

Furthermore, by using short and general denotations such as maghiari (Magyars)

or etnici maghiari

they refer to Magyars in general without differing between Hungarians in

Hungary proper or the co-

idea of a cultural and linguistic nation, which is not limited to any state

boundaries. As my interviewee told me, Romania should offer to the Romanian

in the neighbouring states the same opportunities as the Status Law provides for

the co-ethnics405

e.g. Bulgaria or

Serbia.

5.2 Motifs

For the objectives of this thesis I chose six motifs in order to have a common

platform upon which I could conduct a comparative analysis among all four

newspapers406. In the following table (Table 16) I have juxtaposed the six motifs and

how they were manifested in each newspaper. I shall compare the Hungarian

newspapers first and then continue with a comparison of the two Romanian ones.

Each time I shall commence with the similarities between the two respective

newspapers and then continue with the differences. Finally, I will show which features

are common to Romanian as well as Hungarian newspapers.

404 Compare Table 11, Denotations 3 and 28. 405 Interview with Simona Popescu. 406 See subchapters 3.1.3.2 and 4.1.2.2

221

Table 16: Comparing the motifs

Motifs Magyar Hírlap Népszabadság

Europe Judicial authority

Judicial authority Goal/Aim Judicial authority,

side show Comparison Moldova Croatia European context European context Discrimination Families Employees Status Law Status Law

NATO Supra authority Support for Romania Goal/Aim

History Obligation, Trianon

Obligation, Trianon Difficult common past Little significance

Legal aspects Legal bond Extraterritoriality Orbán-Memorandum Extraterritoriality

5.2.1 Motifs in the Hungarian newspapers

The Hungarian newspapers showed common features in two of the motifs and

differed substantially in the other four:

1. Common features: Europe and History. Europe plays the same role in Magyar

Hírlap as it does in Népszabadság. The role of a judicial authority is in both

newspapers the most dominant feature when discussing Europe. This bears

evidence to the fact that both newspapers regard the Status Law as a judicial

aspect to be discussed and decided on the European supra level. It also means

that the journalists from both newspapers do not consider bilateral negotiations,

e.g. a joint Hungarian-Romanian judicial commission, to be an option. Thus,

according to Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság, judicial disputes are to be solved

only through European mediation. The fact that the Orbán government in

institutions to discuss the Status Law remains to be analysed from a political

perspective. It is the fact that the journalists took this attitude of both

governments for granted that is disturbing. I assume that the journalists of

Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság shared the same idea, i.e. that bilateral

negotiations between Hungary and Romania would have remained futile and that

both sides would have accepted only a European verdict. The other common

aspect, i.e. history, with the two elements of obligation and the Treaty of

Trianon, show the common concern in both newsp

relationship with the co-ethnics: the co-ethnics need help and Hungary is finally

in the position to comply with the co-

alike consider this as one of the corner stones of Hungarian foreign policy. This

222

obligation, which is also mentioned in the Hungarian Constitution407, has two

aspects: firstly, it is a constant reminder of the Treaty of Trianon where

-ethnics became an

issue and secondly, a constant reminder of the democratic and peaceful means

Hungary applies when supporting the co-ethnics. This second aspect is

important since it stands in perpendicular contrast to the politics of Revisionism

practiced between 1920 (Treaty of Trianon) and 1945 (Paris Peace Treaty). This

is a very delicate issue; it means on the one side that Hungary is willing to

support the co-ethnics without any territorial demands against its neighbours, but

on the other it has to mention Trianon as the reason behind this support. Finally,

the fact that the constitutional obligation and the Treaty of Trianon occupy such

an important position when discussing the motif of history in Magyar Hírlap and

on: the

Hungarian nation is spread across different political borders and the mother-state

is obliged to support the other parts, i.e. the co-ethnics.

2. Comparison. Magyar Hírlap kept comparing the Hungarian Status Law with the

Romanian laws regarding the citizenship and naturalisation of Moldavian

citizens. The idea behind this comparison was to demonstrate that Romania

grants Moldavian citizens much more than Hungary did for the co-ethnics,

namely a full citizenship. This comparison should be understood as an answer to

Romanian complaints regarding the Hungarian Status Law and the Hungarian

Magyar Hírlap are saying that Romania intruded Moldavian internal affairs in a

much stronger way than Hungary ever did in Romania with its Status Law. On

the Hungarian Status Law with the response to the Croatian one, which like the

Romanian laws, grants Croatian citizenship to ethnic Croats in neighbouring

states. Unlike the Hungarian Status Law, which caused serious political strife,

the Croatian law went unnoticed. I assume that the significant numerical

difference between the number of Hungarians in Romania (approximately 1.5

million) and the number Croatians (approx. a few thousands) is the cause for this

very different reaction. The journalists at Népszabadság tried to show that the

thus displayed anti-Hungarian sentiments still lurking in Romanian society.

407 See Appendix 6.

223

3. Discrimination. MH: Families, more bourgeois. NSZ: Employees, perhaps its

left-wing orientation. Regarding the use of the term discrimination with regard

to the Status Law, the two Hungarian newspapers displayed a different set of

concerns. Népszabadság, which according to my interviewees has slight

tendencies to the political left, showed significant concern in respect of the

,

Népszabadság positioned itself close to the working class and pretended to speak

in their name. This positioning can also be understood in the light of the newly

flared competition to another Hungarian daily, Népszava, which is more left-

wing and pro working class than Népszabadság. Magyar Hírlap, on the other

hand, is more concerned with the reduced benefits for the co-

after the signing of the Orbán-

bout the difficulties ethnically

mixed families might face after the ONM came into effect. This concern with

the co-ethnics is in contrast to the information I received from my interviewees,

who said that Magyar Hírlap is mostly concerned with minorities within 408. I

assume that the comments made by Magyar Hírlap regarding discrimination by

the Status Law and the ONM are an attempt to show that the newspaper is not

unpatriotic and has an interest in the co- -being.

4. NATO. This motif shows clearly the difference between Magyar Hírlap and

as a common supra authority to solve regional problems between the member

endeavour to become a NATO member state. Thus, Magyar Hírlap considers

NATO, as it did with Europe, as a sideshow for solving bilateral differences,

instead of a direct dialogue between the respective states. Furthermore, Magyar

Hírlap practically considers Romania as a full NATO member state, which it

was not until 2004, thus placing Romania in a position of parity with NATO

member Hungary. Népszabadság, on the other

effort for Romania, is saying that for justified reasons Hungary is in a stronger

political position (Hungary became a full member in 1999), which enables

Hungary to support other states in the region that are not as advanced as

408 Interview with Norbert Molnár

224

lack of it is a display of Hungarian superiority over Romania. Concluding, both

because it would promote stability in the region and would stop any sabre-

rattling by right-wing extremists from both sides.

5.

fact that the Hungarian Status Law is the first (and so far the last) legal bond

between the Republic of Hungary and the co-ethnics. Thus, as already laid down

in the Constitution of Hungary, the Hungarian state has recognised the fact that

there are groups of peopl

themselves to be Hungarian by ethnic categories. The Status Law, from Magyar

oncept of nation. Népszabadság, on

vehemently against these accusations, thus positioning themselves as champions

of the German concept of the nation. According to Népszabadság, the Status

Law does not

to support the co-ethnics and does not undermine Romanian law. Therefore, that

Status Law is a logical consequence of the concept of a cultural-linguistic

Hungarian nation.

5.2.2 Motifs in the Romanian newspapers

The Romanian papers, like the Hungarian ones, had two motifs with common

features and four with differing characteristics:

1. C

The journalists have thus promoted Romanian-Hungarian issues to an

international level. By doing so they have taken Romania and Hungary out of

their specific regional context in exchange for a virtual one dominated by other

actors, i.e. European institutions. Avoiding the specific regional context shows

to resolve problematic

issues on a bilateral level. Practically, this means that unlike the Hungarian

newspapers, there is no comparison between the Hungarian Status Law and

similar laws, e.g. the Croatian or Slovak ones. Furthermore, the Romanian laws

225

regarding the naturalisation of Moldavian citizens are not mentioned at all.

Discrimination, the second common motif, refers solely to the discrimination of

Romanian citizens who are ethnically Romanian. Neither of the two explains

what they mean by discrimination, so I can only assume to what they are

referring. Bearing in mind the main benefits of the Status Law, e.g. money for

families who send their children to a Hungarian-speaking school, working

permits for Hungary and other benefits within Hungary, the accusation of

discrimination is very difficult to understand. Firstly, should Romanian families

send their children to a non-Romanian school, they would most probably choose

a German-, a French-or an English-speaking educational institution and not a

Hungarian one. Secondly, without thorough knowledge of the Hungarian

language, taking up a job in Hungary, which requires some minimum

qualification, is highly unlikely. Finally, the benefits within Hungary, e.g.

education and medical check-up, also depend on having a command of

Hungarian. My conclusion is that the notion of discrimination used by the

unskilled, seasonal labour where knowledge of Hungarian is not essential and,

perhaps, the assumed reaction of Romanian neighbours who might feel jealous.

2.

to various European institutions, e.g. the Venice Commission or the Council of

Europe, then it has to solve bilateral problems on the European level. I consider

arguments blindly because like this any direct negotiation with the Hungarian

side becomes obsolete: Why negotiate with Hungary when Europe (whatever

may be understood by this term) can solve the problem for us? This escape from

diplomat

to fight on its own in order to obtain favours from the political powers in

1940, when Hungary and Romania we 409.

between Romania and Hungary at the various European institutions is just a

prospects of

409 See Chapter 2

226

becoming members in the European Union (EU). The answers of the European

institutions also supported this attitude and encouraged both sides to take up the

Romanian politicians use Europe as an image of judicial authority in order to

justify their actions. This means that politicians from both states used Europe as

recognised this attitude and

with the other side, but have failed to include any criticism of this behaviour.

3. NATO. This motif, together with the two motifs history and legal aspects,

org

Romania was not yet a member creates an imbalance of political and military

and is more conscious of the military implications political actions have. Thus,

in a political controversy between Romania and Hungary, e.g. the one regarding

states were in, although not a single politician from Hungary or Romania ever

discussed the use of military force to achieve political objectives as an

alternative to diplomatic means. I assume this is reminiscent of the martial talk

and the rhetoric of threat used in communist times, which aimed at creating an

image of a Romania that stands alone and is constantly being threatened by

external and internal enemies410. On the other hand, the journalists with

full member in NATO. This endeavour, according to my estimation, resulted

from the same reason as with other former states in Eastern Europe: Soviet /

Russian domination. By joining NATO, Romania would be definitely outside

membership.

410 In 1990, during the incidents in Tîrgu Mures, the state ordered a partial mobilisation. Rumour had it that Hungary was trying to destabilise the Romanian state and would try to take back Transylvania by using military force. See also Andreescu 2001.

227

implications for its immediate neighbours.

4.

abo

competition between Romania and Hungary. This competition focused mainly 411. However,

ries as equivalent in length and characterised the

common past as difficult412. This notion of a common past is contradictory to

context was Europe; here it is the regional framework, one shared with Hungary.

Placing both histories as equivalent solves this ambivalence. The comparison

-à-vis Hungary.

If both histories are equivalent, then Romania should not be afraid or intimidated

compensate the lack of military allies. The

displayed a completely different relationship to the motif of history, practically

the Status Law was not seen as a historic event, but rather as a Hungarian affair.

This impression was enhanced by the information I obtained during my

interviews413

past and, as previously shown in respect of nation and ethnicity, is more

interested in the fate of Romanians in the neighbouring states rather than with

the ethnic groups within Romania.

5.

ed the Orbán-

victory. Therefore, the ONM was taken out of its judicial context and transferred

This motif, then, fits into the pattern

an ongoing competition between Romania and Hungary and Romania should be

vigilant when dealing with its neighbours, especially Hungary. The reality of the

Status Law that has come into effect on Romanian territory is thoroughly

411 See Chapter 2 412 See subchapter 4.1.2.2 413 Interview with Simona Popescu

228

Law is described as a judicial framework with several difficulties, especially

regarding the problem of extraterritoriality, a term all four newspapers have

f

the practical problems surrounding the Status Law and the ONM: How should

Hungarians from Romania apply for the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN)? Who is entitled to the CHN? Can the CHN be handed out in Romania or

controversy between Romania and Hungary concerning the Status Law as a

national fight against foreign intrusion. The legal aspects concerning the Status

Law remained within the legal / judicial framework.

5.2.3 Common motifs

(NSZ) or with Népszabadság and Magyar Hírlap (MH). In this segment I will analyse

these common motifs from either a dual or a triple perspective.

1. Europe: A judicial authority (RL, NSZ and MH). Journalists from all three

newspapers realised that Hungarian and Romanian politicians are either unable

or unwilling to start bilateral negotiat

implementation. Furthermore, they realised that Europe served as a substitute

platform for this lack of neighbourly initiative. Europe, as a judicial authority,

has thus become a supra entity, which it did not want to play in this Hungarian-

Romanian dispute. Unfortunately, this evasive comportment, performed by

politicians from both sides, was not criticised. Only after the various European

did institutions prevail upon Hungary and Romania to solve their problem

through bilateral talks that both prime ministers started negotiations that led to

the Orbán-

should have decried this behaviour and called for direct bilateral talks before the

European institutions responded. The fact that the journalists did not criticise

thinking.

2.

their respective narrative although from a different perspective. While

229

men

political ambitions. Nevertheless, it was apparently important to journalists from

played an important role for both newspapers.

3.

extraterritorial aspects, however from opposite standpoints. While Népszabadság

did not consider the Status Law to have any extraterritorial aspects, România

extraterritorial features. Interestingly, it is these two newspapers that discuss

and Népszabadság both share the same concept regarding nation and ethnicity.

ed it.

with the Hungarian newspapers. Apparently, despite certain parallels in the concept of

interviewee told me, a certain number of Scîntea414. I assume that these employees were in

and thus continue one of the communis

socialism combined with nationalism.

5.3 Journalistic narratives

5.3.1 Comparative analysis

The following segments accentuate the main differences between the newspapers thus

414 Scîntea was founded in the 19th century, Scîntea also interview with Rodica Ciobanu.

230

below) and then will continue by an

There are three features that are shared across linguistic and political borders: a

clear political preference, a reference to Romanian journalistic sources and the element

of competing prestige between Hungary and Romania.

have indicated certain tendencies415, the interviews with journalists who work for

Népszabadság did not reveal any current preferences towards the MSZP. However, it

-Democratic Party (PSD), Magyar

Hírlap the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and Népszabadság the Hungarian

surrounding the Status Law.

to the idea of the Status Law and even demanded a similar law for Romanians in the

neighbouring states, e.g. Hungary and Bulgaria, in order to improve their schooling and

cultural self-assumption as Romanians416.

Table 17: Comparing narrative aspects

Aspect Magyar Hírlap Népszabadság Procurement of the Status Law

Restrained, different standpoints

Positive and few standpoints Confronting Restrained,

differentiating Political preferences SZDSZ MSZP PSD Hardly political

Relation to other newspapers Krónika Romanian press Népszabadság Little or no

relation Relation to the other state417 Superiority Superiority Conflictual on

equal footing Result oriented

Variety of perspectives

Hungarian, Romanian and European

Hungarian and some Romanian Romanian Romanian, rarely

Hungarian

The second common feature, the reference to Romanian journalistic sources, is

shared by all four newspapers, although very differently. While the Romanian sources

refer mainly to each other and perhaps to Curentul and , 415 Interviews with Rodica Cioban, Miklós Újvári and Norbert Molnár. 416 Interview with Simona Popescu. 417 Romania for the Hungarian newspapers Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság and Hungary for the

231

Népszabadság refers to Romanian newspapers such as Evenimentul Zilei and Libertatea,

which are closer to the tabloid scene than Curentul and . I assume

that this is because of Evenimentul Zilei Libertatea

was used by Népszabadság to demonstrate how much Romanians oppose the Hungarian

Status Law. In other words, Népszabadság wanted to demonstrate how difficult the

situation

and support, i.e. the Status Law. Magyar Hírlap, on the other hand, referred to and even

quoted Krónika

language newspapers from Romania. This is a fine but crucial difference. By quoting

Krónika Magyar Hírlap allowed those affected directly by the Status Law to have their

word heard in a newspaper, which is written and published for Hungary418. Again,

contrary to declarations made by journalists from Magyar Hírlap419, this newspaper is

more concerned about the co-ethnics than Népszabadság or the Romanian newspapers.

competing prestige between the two countries. While the Hungarian newspapers display

Hungary are equal in respect of historic prestige and thus current political esteem.

find out how the differences regarding the Status Law would be resolved without

comparing the two countries.

The newspapers from each country shared one common feature: Perspectives

from their own country. This means that the Hungarian newspapers Magyar Hírlap and

Népszabadság referred mainly to political sources from Hungary and the Romanian

single time to politicians from Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (1998-2002),

international perspective. Népszabadság, when quoting foreign sources rarely

mentioned European actors. Consequently, Magyar Hírlap tried to show the Status

co-ethnics.

418 The Romanians in Romania are affected only indirectly. 419 Interviews with Norbert Molnár and Miklós Újvári.

232

5.3.2 Individual analysis

In this segment I will take an individual look at each of the four newspapers and

subsume their respective characteristics.

undertone in its articles. This is particularly apparent in the article chosen for the

synchronic analysis and in the ethnic denotations regarding Romania and Transylvania.

In the article mentioned 420, the journalist has constantly insisted on a Romanian

also in favour of the socialist-led government at that time (2000-2004). The author goes

as far as to congratulate the Romanian government under Prime Minister Adrian

- 421. This

congratulation is unique in all 547 articles taken into consideration in this thesis. This

combination of national, martial talk and emphasised support for the socialists, is

reminiscent of the national-military way in which public events used to be represented

in socialist times: Nationalism combined with support for socialism422. This talk has

survive 423.

and Hungary. The journalists convey the impression that the two states or nations are in

constant competition: the schedule for joining the European Union, Romanian

as to which side had the longer and more heroic past. However, according to my

estimation, this competition is a result of the urge to position Romania on the same level

of international acceptance and integration as Hungary, an equal footing with Hungary,

that is

constantly being compared with Bulgaria. Acco

prestigious to be compared with Hungary, despite any historical animosities. Indirectly

420 See subchapter 4.2.1.1 421 Idem. 422 See also Verdery 1991. 423 Interview with Rodica Ciobanu.

233

The remarks made by Rodica Ciobanu during the interview have included the

statement contradicts the article mentioned previously424, where the journalist clearly

compliments the government for its achievement in diplomacy. However, this does not

views, especially since the PSD, with the exception of President Ion Iliescu, has avoided

nationalist talk to prevent any frictions with its coalition partner, the liberal Democratic

Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR).

narrative.

Romanian political spectrum. Therefore, the journalists did not attack the Status Law

directly, but rather indirectly. The only exceptions were comments made by Béla

Markó, the chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and

considered the debate to be a regional one, although both Romania and Hungary have

appealed to Eur

lack of Hungarian, while those Hungarian journalists, who write about the co-ethnics,

usually speak the relevant language, e.g. Romanian or Ukrainian. As my interview

partner told me, her knowledge regarding Hungary stems from the translated

information available, which is not very extensive425.

5.3.2.2 Magyar Hírlap

Magyar Hírlap, which according to some interviewees stands close to the liberal

Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)426, reveals specific aspects that show the diversity

of views represented in Hungarian politics. However, the diachronic analysis has

tried to represent both Hungarian and Romanian views, when discussing the element of

comparison only Hungarian views were represented. Furthermore, considering historic

Hungarian character and attitude. Regarding legal aspects, Magyar Hírlap is the only

newspaper of the four selected for this thesis to represent also the right-wing extremist

424 See subchapter 4.2.1.1. 425 Interview with Rodica Ciobanu. 426 Interview with Norbert Molnár and Miklós Újvári.

234

concerning the Hungarian Status Law and the ongoing debate about it between Hungary

and Romania. Whether it is the European Union, the Venice Council, the Council of

Europe or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the debate is

embedded i

ambition to provide its readers with more than just the national perspective, which can

be often very narrow-

question and the Hungarian-Romanian relations in an international framework.

Indirectly, Magyar Hírlap thus positions itself on a European level which it considers to

contain an air of superiority427.

s very one-

sided. Its focus is concentrated primarily on the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor

common for newspapers that consider themselves not to support any political party, to

criticise the government. However, there is hardly any negative comment regarding the

major opposition parties, the socialist-democratic Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)

and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). This striking lack of criticism

a -sided, strong stand

against FIDESZ and its passive support for MSZP and SZDSZ.

According to the Orbán-

application of the Status Law in Romania, the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality

(CHN) can be granted only to those who declare themselves as Hungarian. In ethnically

mixed marriages this practically means that the spouse will not be entitled to the CHN

strong emphasis on this aspect and has considered it to be discriminating towards the

non-Hungaria

significant number of ethnical mixed marriages in Romania and to the necessity of

granting family members similar benefits to the CHN-holder himself.

Prime Minister Orbán is quoted and presented more often than the

representatives of any other party, even of the SZDSZ, to which Magyar Hírlap

a similar, although weaker, emphasis on his counterpart, the Romanian prime minister,

lead the government and hence to be responsible for the governments activities. On the

427 See subchapter 3.1.3.2.1.

235

other hand, when considering all the politicians represented

narrative, there is a significant over-representation of SZDSZ politicians in comparison

represented by the SZDSZ428. In conclusion, Magyar Hírlap is not an S

newspaper, but, as one of my interviewees said, it represents views which are close to

those found in the SZDSZ429. This makes Magyar Hírlap a liberal newspaper with a

moderate narrative and with a sense of political correctness.

5.3.2.3 Népszbadság

Repeated statements by various interviewees (journalists and others) have

to be more national than one would have expected. This is not surprising when bearing

in mind that nationalism and socialism, or social democracy for that matter, are not

unavoidably contradictory430.

ides,

i.e. the Hungarian and the Romanian side, although to a different extent, due to the

emphasis on the Hungarian side. Nevertheless, there is a solid representation not only of

different political views from Romania but also of different Romanian newspapers. It is

an attempt to reflect the variety of different opinions within the Romanian discourse,

which does not take place in Magyar Hírlap or in the Romanian newspapers. This

correspondents abroad, Zoltán Tibori Szabó, has. He wrote about half the articles

concerning the Status Law, which is unparalleled in Magyar Hírlap. In his articles,

Tibori Szabó often represents comments made by different Romanian newspapers thus

breaking

politicians. However, Tibori Szabó often represents Romanian newspapers, which do

not view the Status Law with favour. This leads to a one-sided representation of the

Romanian press, since not all newspapers condemned the Status Law, e.g. România

Bearing in mind the political constellation in the Hungarian legislative period

1998-

major pa 428 Interview with Tibor Bogdán. 429 Interview with Norbert Molnár. 430 See also Verdery 1991.

236

Union (FIDESZ) and the main opposition parties, the social-democratic Hungarian

Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). There is

harsh critique against the conservatives while there is only mild protest against certain

activities and statements made by social-democratic representatives. The liberals are

rarely mentioned and the other smaller parties are hardly or not mentioned at all.

Consequently, a

Hungary concerning the Status Law is between the conservatives and the social

democrats while neglecting other parties. This is contradictory to certain remarks from

lists who said that Népszabadság changed its course after the

social democrats voted in favour of the Status Law: from criticising the Status Law to

supporting it431 432, I could

not detect any such c

In congruence with the arguments presented in Magyar Hírlap, Népszabadság

also emphasised the discrimination of spouses due to the regulations set for the

Certificate of Hungarian Nationality (CHN) by the Orbán- emorandum, i.e.

granting the CHN to non-Hungarian spouses. This element is completely missing from

with the discrimination of non-Hungarian spouses while the Romanian newspapers are

concerned with the discrimination of Romanian workers. This clearly manifests the

-

Two of the three journalists I interviewed from Népszabadság have emphasised 433. Each of these

editors is in charge for a week and then the next one takes over. Having considered a

long period of time, I have thus concluded that there is little, if any, difference between

the different editors. Motifs and ethnic denotations have not revealed any specific

pattern, which could indicate editorial influence in this sense434.

Népszabadság, like Magyar Hírlap, transmits a specific image of Hungary, an

image apparently taken for granted by most Hungarian journalists: life is better in

Hungary than in Romania. Taking this for granted is particularly demonstrated in two

fields: the health care system and

431 Interview with Miklós Újvári. 432 Interview with Tibor Kis. 433 Interviews with Tibor Kis and Zoltán Tibori Szabó. 434 Clearly, the difference could be manifested in other domains, e.g. choosing topics or other discourses.

237

system is better than the Romanian one. While Magyar Hírlap went into detail

describing how catastrophic the situation is in Romania, Népszabadság took it for

granted that its readers know this already. Bearing in mind how corrupt the Romanian

efficiency. However, it is this doubtlessness that is striking, especially when considering

the serious problems facing the Hungarian health care system: increasing corruption and

labour market, suggests that Hungary is a magnet for skilled as well as unqualified

labour from the entire region. This argument, which was put forward in the heat of

debate about the Orbán-

Romanian labour seekers would flood the Hungarian labour market435. I conclude from

these comparisons a certain need in the Hungarian discourse to position Hungary in a

superior status vis-à-vis Romania, which has more severe problems with its economy

and infrastructure than Hungary. In other words, these complaints are actually

compliments for Hungary and mak

states. Interestingly, from the same day that the Hungarian Status Law came into effect

Romanian citizens no longer needed a visa for the states of the Schengen Treaty. This

has given rise to an unprecedented emigration wave from Romania. However, the

emigrants chose southern European states, e.g. Italy and Spain, and only a small number

of agricultural seasonal workers still sought work in Hungary.

narrative is very one-sided. This means

that the newspaper has preferentially represented views from Romanian politicians

while ignoring the Hungarian ones. According to my interview partner, the Hungarian

Status Law is an issue that concerned only Hungarians, both in Romania and in

all Romanians, there was no need to take foreign views into consideration436.

ean

Romanian-Hungarian quarrel over the Hungarian Status Law, which has been fought

out mainly in various European institutions, e.g. the Venice Commission, is a sideshow

435 See also subchapter 4.2.3.5. 436 Interview with Simona Popescu.

238

-

complaining about each other on the European meta-level, is considered futile and

counter-productive. The urge for a bilateral dialogue is viewed as a far better solution.

-sided, due

to the lack of Hungarian representation, but it nevertheless shows a newspaper with the

clear ambition of pursuing political neutrality.

Romanian co-ethnics, has been brought up only during the interview437. According to

my interviewee, Romania should support its own co-ethnics just like Hungary does for

positive attitude towards the Hungarian Status Law. There was even frustration due to

f initiative in this sense. This positive aspect

towards the Status Law was not represented in the Hungarian articles, especially those

for Népszabadság by Zoltán Tibori Szabó, who quoted passages from different

Romanian newspapers that objected to the Status Law. According to my estimation,

there are two possible reasons for this: First, the Hungarian journalists ignored this

aspect in order to show clear-cut frontiers between the Hungarian and the Romanian

side: the Romanian press represents the national Romanian side while the Hungarian

side tries to demonstrate various positions within the two discourses. Secondly, they

referred to laws similar to the Hungarian Status Law, e.g. the Slovak or Croatian

ones438. Whether because the Romanian newspapers regarded the issue to be a strictly

similar laws as incomparable to the Hungarian Status Law due to the specific

Hungarian-

5.4 Closing remarks

There is no such thing as the ethnic group. Groups are part of an ongoing social

and cultural struggle between different actors in the discourse that are in a position to

exert power. Journalists writing for newspapers that have a high circulation are actors in

such a position. The ethnic denotations used by journalists from Hungary and Romania

437 Idem. 438 Compare Halász Majtényi 2002.

239

to discuss/create/re-define groups that can be counted as co-ethnics, are tools of power

within the discourse in question. Furthermore, the people they refer to also use these

tools for exerting ethnicity and, consequently, positioning themselves in the ethno-

political struggle evolving around ethnic and minority issues. This aspect, however,

requires other questions and another research into the field.

There is also no such thing as a neutral newspaper. Each and every newspaper

shows distinct tendencies within its narrative. I have shown that the Hungarian

n

obligation towards the co-ethnics and thus refer to the Treaty of Trianon (1920). The

revealed the possibility of combining national talk with supporting a socialist-led

government. Magyar Hírlap has shown that there is more to the public discourse in

Hungary concerning the co-ethnics than just polemics. Népszabadság, in congruence

that left-wing papers can have a nationalistic undercurrent

Romanian press by avoiding the usual nationalistic standpoints and trying to take a

more moderate and less panic-stricken attitude.

Methodologically, discourse analysis is an efficient method to proceed with due

to the segmentation it offers. In other words, the researcher can concentrate on specific

topics within the discourse, which he can then emphasise by going into further detail

and explaining the mechanism behind it. However, the method has three drawbacks:

firstly, it cannot encompass all the aspects of a single discourse. Secondly, when using

mainly an interpretative method, the results vary due to the

knowledge and disposition. Thirdly, due to the context of this work, the specific aspect

of language is crucial when comparing texts from two completely different languages,

thinking in a third one and writing in a fourth. Increasing the number of researchers and

extending the time available for a more extensive analysis can tackle the first two

shortcomings and deliver more specified results. The third one can only be overcome by

to use and erase our language at 439 This constant switch is obviously tedious and unsatisfactory at times.

Nevertheless, I do think that discourse analysis in different languages is still a useful

method to reveal and comprehend mechanisms of power in social and cultural studies in

order to obtain satisfactory results.

439 Spivak 1997, p. xviii.

240

The Status Law seems to be the last significant debate in the Hungarian-

Romanian relationship for quite a while. Neither the bilateral agreement of 1996, nor

the failed Hungarian referendum for a dual citizenship in 2004, nor the forthcoming

Romanian Status Law seem to have stirred up so much attention as the Hungarian

Status Law. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is the first specific Hungarian law

relation with its co-ethnics and that it has come into effect at a

European or, to use a common phrase from the articles, a Euro-Atlantic platform has

opened up for both sides upon which they can put forward their arguments.

Furthermore, mass media in Romania and Hungary after complete liberalisation in the

mid-nineties has had the opportunity to carry the political debates into discourses. When

considering the modest practical effect the Hungarian Status Law has had since 2002, I

neighbouring states to co-operate together for the benefit of their respective citizens,

thus including the co-ethnics. All in all, mainly four groups harvested the benefits of the

Status Law: students who could study in Hungary, teachers who now had the

opportunity of further qualification on Hungarian educational institutions, elderly co-

ethnics who cherished the Certificate of Hungarian Nationality as a national symbol of

their Hungarian-ness and families with children that attend Hungarian-speaking schools

and are thus entitled to

Regarding ethnicity in politics that concern the co-ethnics, political elites in the

Carpathian Basin after 1990 have often abused ethnicity for either obtaining or

maintaining positions of power within their respective political system. By elites I not

only mean the Romanian and Slovak political classes, but also the local Hungarian

politicians in those countries, who have performed their role as representatives of an

ethnic minority in order to obtain a larger share of the national cake. Ethnicity,

therefore, is more than the personal performance of an individual within the frame of his

world. And it is one among many such interpretat 440 Furthermore, ethnicity

remains an instrument of battle in the struggle over financial and political resources.

When I applied for a fellowship to be able to finance my PhD, I was asked what

the purpose of my work was, besides the academic challenge. I replied that this work

should enhance understanding and mutual awareness between Hungarians and

440 Brubaker 2006, p.15.

241

Romanians. As I have said in the preliminary remarks by quoting Gábor Miklós from

the Hungarian daily Népszabadság, the political situation is very difficult441. Signs of

understanding are rare and organisations such as the Liga Pro Europa are exceptions442.

It is small steps, such as academic work made available in a shared foreign language

such as English or the first common session of both governments on 20th October 2005

in Bucharest, that give hope for a better understanding and tolerance in the near future.

Therefore, this thesis is not just an academic research, but also an attempt to mediate

between discourses, political views and ethnic perspectives in the region.

441 See Chapter 0. 442 See also www.proeuropa.ro

242

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században. Budapest. Schlehe, Judith 2003 Formen qualitativer ethnographischer Interviews. In: Beer, Bettina (ed.): Methoden und Techniken der Feldforschung. Berlin. Schöpflin, George 2004 Citizenship and Ethnicity: The Hungarian Status Law. In: Kántor, Zoltán et alii. Sitzler, Kathrin 1992 Ungarn: Im Spannungsfeld von Demokratie und Geschichte. In: Mommsen, Margareta (ed.): Nationalismus in Osteuropa: gefahrvolle Wege in die Demokratie. München. Sökefeld, Martin 1999 Debating Self, Identity, and Culture in Anthropology. In: Current Anthropology Volume 40, Number 4: 417-447. 2004 Abgrenzung, Ausgrenzung, Gewalt: Wie viel Identität verträgt der Mensch? In: Poser, Hans Reuer, Bruno (eds.): Bildung Identität Religion. Fragen zum Wesen des Menschen. Berlin. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 1997 London. Stellrecht, Irmtraud 1993 Interpretative Ethnologie: Eine Orientierung. In: Schweizer, Thomas Schweizer, Margarete Kokot, Waltraud (eds.): Handbuch der Ethnologie. Berlin.

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Stewart, Michael 2004 The Hungarian Status Law: A New European Form of Transnational Politics? In: Kántor, Zoltán et alii. Sundhaussen, Holm 2003 Staatsbildung und ethnisch-nationale Gegensätze in Südosteuropa. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 10-11: 3-9. Szabó, M. Attila Szabó, M. Erzsébet 2003 Erdélyi helységnévszótár. Cluj [sic!]. Van Dijk, Teun A. 1997 The Study of Discourse. In Van Dijk, Teun A. (ed.): Discourse Studies. London Verdery, Katherine 1991 National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Berkeley. Verseck, Keno 1998 Rumänien. München. Vladár, Gábor (ed.) 1943 Magyarország hatályos törvényei kiegeszitve a törvényeket módositó jogszabályokkal. Budapest. Voigt, Katrin 2005 Der Schutz nationaler ungarischer Minderheiten durch ihren Ursprungsstaat aufgrund des ungarischen Statusgesetzes und dessen Vereinbarkeit mit dem Völkerrecht. Frankfurt am Main. Weller, Susan C. 1998 Structured Interviewing and Questionnaire Construction. In: Bernard, H. Russell (ed.): Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Walnut Creek. Welsch, Wolfgang 1999 Transculturality. The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today. In: Featherstone, Mike (ed.): Spaces of Culture. City, Nation, World. London.

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7. Appendices Appendix 1: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (1st

version, 19.06.2001) Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries Parliament

promote the preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary prescribed in paragraph (3) of Article 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary,

-keeping with the basic principles espoused by international organisations, and in particular by the Council of Europe and by the European Union, regarding the respect of human rights and the protection of minority rights;

obligations of the Republic of Hungary assumed under international law;

o the development of bilateral and multilateral relations of good neighbourhood and regional co-operation in the Central European area and to the strengthening of the stabilising role of Hungary;

countries form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole and to promote and preserve their well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country;

-ordinating body functioning in order to preserve and reinforce the awareness of national self-identity of Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries;

Hungarian nationality** living outside the Hungarian borders in other parts of the world; Herewith adopts the following Act: CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS Scope of the Act Article 1 (1) This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine, and who

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a) have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary renunciation, and b) are not in possession of a permit for permanent stay in Hungary. (2) This Act shall also apply to the spouse living together with the person identified in paragraph (1) and to the children of minor age being raised in their common household even if these persons are not of Hungarian nationality. (3) This Act shall also apply to co-operation with, and assistance to organisations specified in Articles 13, 17, 18 and 25. Article 2 (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled, under the conditions laid down in this Act, to benefits and assistance on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, as well as in their place of residence in the neighbouring countries on the basis of the Certificate specified in Article 19. (2) The provisions of this Act shall be applied without prejudice to the obligations of the Republic of Hungary undertaken in international agreements. (3) The benefits and assistance claimable under this Act shall not affect other existing benefits and assistance ensured by legislation in force for non-Hungarian citizens of Hungarian nationality living in other parts of the world. Article 3 The Republic of Hungary, in order to a) ensure the maintenance of permanent contacts, b) provide for the accessibility of benefits and assistance contained in this Act, c) ensure undisturbed cultural, economic and family relations, d) ensure the free movement of persons and the free flow of ideas, and taking into account its international legal obligations, shall provide for the most favoured treatment possible with regard to the entry and stay on its territory for the persons falling within the scope of this Act. CHAPTER II BENEFITS AND ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE FOR PERSONS FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS ACT Education, Culture, Science Article 4

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(1) In the field of culture, persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled in Hungary to rights identical to those of Hungarian citizens. Accordingly, the Republic of Hungary shall ensure for them in particular: a) the right to use public cultural institutions and the opportunity to use the services they offer, b) access to cultural goods for the public and for research, c) access to monuments of historic value and the related documentation, d) the research for scientific purposes of archive materials containing protected personal data, if the neighbouring state where the Hungarian individual living outside the borders has a permanent residence is a party to the international convention on the protection of personal data.* * Act VI of 1998 on the promulgation of the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on 28 January 1981 in Strasbourg. (2) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to use the services of any state-run public library, and to the free of charge use of the following basic services: a) visit of the library, b) on-the-spot use of certain collections determined by the library, c) use of stock-exploring instruments, d) information on the services of the library and of the library system, e) in the case of registration, borrowing of printed library material in accordance with the regulations of the library. (3) Further benefits with respect to the availability of services offered by state-run museums and public cultural institutions to persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be laid down in a separate legal rule. Article 5 Hungarian scientists falling within the scope of this Act may become external or regular members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Distinctions and Scholarships Article 6 (1) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure that persons falling within the scope of this Act, in recognition of their outstanding activities in the service of the Hungarian nation as a whole and in enriching Hungarian and universal human values, may be awarded distinctions of the Republic of Hungary and may receive titles, prizes or honorary diplomas founded by its Ministers.

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(2) In the process of determining conditions for state scholarships, the possibility to receive such scholarships shall be ensured for persons falling within the scope of this Act. Social Security Provisions and Health Services Article 7 (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act who, under Article 15, work on the basis of any type of contract for employment in the territory of the Republic of Hungary shall pay, unless otherwise provided for by international agreements, health insurance and pension contribution of an amount equal to that laid down in the relevant Hungarian social security legislation to the authority designated for this purpose in a separate legal rule. Those contributions shall entitle such persons to health and pension provision specified by a separate legal rule. (2) Persons falling within the scope of this Act who are not obliged to pay health insurance and pension contributions as stipulated in paragraph (1) shall have the right to apply for reimbursement of the costs of self-pay health care services in advance. Applications shall be submitted to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose. (3) In cases requiring immediate medical assistance, persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to such assistance in Hungary according to the provisions of bilateral social security (social policy) agreements. Travel benefits Article 8 (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to travel benefits in Hungary on scheduled internal local and long-distance lines of public transport. With regard to railways, such benefits shall apply to 2nd class fares. (2) An unlimited number of journeys shall be provided free of charge for: a) children up to six years of age, b) persons over sixty-five years of age. (3) A 90% travel discount shall be provided on means of internal long-distance public transport for: a) persons identified in paragraph (1) four times a year, b) a group of at least ten persons under eighteen years of age travelling as a group and falling within the scope of this Act, and two accompanying adults once a year. (4) The detailed rules of travel benefits shall be laid down in a separate legal rule. Education

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Article 9 (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education applicable to Hungarian citizens, shall be entitled to participate, according to the conditions specified in this Article, in the following programmes of higher education institutions in the Republic of Hungary: a) undergraduate level college or university education, b) supplementary undergraduate education, c) non-degree programmes, d) Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) or DLA programmes, e) general and specialised further training, f) accredited higher education level vocational training in a school-type system. (2) Students participating in state-financed full-time training programmes specified in paragraph (1), shall be entitled to formula funding on the one hand, and financial and other benefits in kind on the other, both being part of the appropriations of budgetary expenditure for students, as well as to the reimbursement of detailed health insurance contributions provided by Act LXXX of 1993 on Higher Education. The detailed conditions of these forms of assistance and further benefits shall be regulated by the Minister of Education in a separate legal rule. (3) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may pursue studies in the higher education institutions of the Republic of Hungary in the framework of state-financed training in a fixed number to be determined annually by the Minister of Education. (4) Students from neighbouring countries participating in education programmes not financed by the state may apply for the partial or full reimbursement of their costs of stay and education in Hungary to the public benefit organisation established to this end. Student Benefits Article 10 (1) Registered students of a public education institution in a neighbouring country who are pursuing their studies in Hungarian language, or students of any higher education institution who are subject to this Act are entitled to benefits available under the relevant regulations to Hungarian citizens with student identification documents. (2) Entitlement to benefits specified in paragraph (1) shall be recorded in the Appendix of the Certificate (Article 19) serving for this purpose. The detailed rules of access to these benefits shall be laid down in a separate legal rule. Further Training for Hungarian Teachers Living Abroad Article 11

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(1) Hungarian teachers living abroad, teaching in Hungarian in neighbouring countries and falling within the scope of this Act (hereinafter referred to as "Hungarian teachers living abroad") shall be entitled to participate in regular further training in Hungary, as well as to receive the benefits specified in paragraph (2). Further training and the benefits shall be applicable to a fixed number of teachers determined annually by the Minister of Education. (2) For the duration of further training and to the extent stipulated by a separate legal rule, persons identified in paragraph (1) shall be entitled to request the Hungarian educational institution providing further training to a) reimburse accommodation costs, b) reimburse travel expenses, and c) contribute to the costs of registration. (3) The detailed rules of further training for Hungarian teachers living abroad shall be regulated by a separate legal rule. Article 12 (1) Hungarian teachers living abroad, falling within the scope of this Act and those teaching in higher education institutions in neighbouring countries (hereinafter referred to as "Hungarian instructors living abroad") shall be entitled to special benefits. (2) Benefits available to Hungarian teachers and instructors living abroad shall be identical with the benefits related to Teacher Identity Cards issued to teachers of Hungarian citizenship on the basis of legislation in force. (3) Entitlement to benefits specified in paragraph (1) shall be recorded in the Appendix of the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" serving for this purpose. The detailed rules of access to these benefits shall be regulated in a separate legal rule. Education Abroad in Affiliated Departments Article 13 (1) The Republic of Hungary shall promote the preservation of the mother tongue, culture and national identity of Hungarians living abroad also by supporting the establishment, organisation and operation of affiliated Departments of accredited Hungarian higher education institutions in neighbouring countries. The financial resources necessary for the realisation of these goals shall be set out as targeted appropriations in the budget of the Republic of Hungary. The Minister of Education shall decide on the allocation of the available resources according to a separate legal rule. (2) The Republic of Hungary supports the establishment, operation and development of higher education institutions (faculties, study programmes, etc.) teaching in Hungarian and seeking accreditation in neighbouring countries. Financial resources required for the

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realisation of these goals may be applied for at the public benefit organisation established for this purpose. Educational Assistance Available in the Native Country Article 14 (1) Parents falling within the scope of this Act and bringing up at least two children of minor age in their own household may apply for educational assistance for each of their children if: a) the child attends an education institution according to his/her age and receives training or education in Hungarian, and b) the education institution specified in point a) is in the neighbouring country of residence of the parents. (2) Parents falling within the scope of this Act may receive assistance for books and learning materials (hereinafter referred to as "assistance for learning materials") if the child of minor age living in their own household attends an educational institution in the neighbouring country of residence of the parents and receives education in Hungarian. (3) Applications for assistance for education and learning materials may be submitted to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose. In the process of evaluating the applications, the public benefit organisation shall request the position, formulated with the consent of the Hungarian Minister of Education, of the recommending body (Article 20) in the neighbouring country concerned whether instruction and education in Hungarian are ensured in the education institution in question. (4) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may apply for assistance for their studies at the higher education institutions of neighbouring countries from the public benefit organisation established for this purpose. Employment Article 15 (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act may be employed in the territory of the Republic of Hungary on the basis of a permit. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorisation of employment of foreign nationals in Hungary, with the exception that the work permit can be issued for a maximum of three months per calendar year without the prior assessment of the situation in the labour market. A separate legal rule may allow for the issuing of work permits for longer periods of time under the same conditions. Article 16 (1) The persons concerned may apply to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose for the reimbursement of expenses related to the fulfilment of the legal conditions for employment. These expenses include, in particular, the costs of proceedings for the prior certification of the necessary level of education, of specialised training and of compliance with occupational health requirements.

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(2) The detailed rules of the proceedings for the issuing of work permits and the registration shall be regulated by a separate legal rule. Duties of the Public Service Media Article 17 (1) Public service media in Hungary shall provide, on a regular basis, for the gathering and transmission of information on Hungarians living abroad and shall transmit information on Hungary and the Hungarian nation to Hungarians living abroad. The purpose of this information shall be: a) the transmission of Hungarian and universal spiritual and cultural values, b) the forming of an unbiased picture of the world, of Hungary and of the Hungarian nation, c) the preservation of the awareness of national identity, of the mother tongue and culture of the Hungarian minority communities. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the production and broadcasting of public service television programmes for the Hungarian communities living abroad through the establishment and operation of an organisation devoted to such purposes. The financial resources necessary for such programmes shall be provided by the state budget. Assistance to Organisations Operating Abroad Article 18 (1) The Republic of Hungary shall support organisations operating in neighbouring countries and promoting the goals of the Hungarian national communities living in neighbouring countries. (2) The organisations specified in paragraph (1) may apply to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose and operating in a lawful manner if their goals include, in particular, the following: a) the preservation, furtherance and research of Hungarian national traditions, b) the preservation and fostering of the Hungarian language, literature, culture and folk arts, c) the promotion of higher education of Hungarians living abroad by facilitating the work of instructors from Hungary as visiting lecturers, d) the restoration and maintenance of monuments belonging to the Hungarian cultural heritage,

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e) the enhancement of the capacity of disadvantaged settlements in areas inhabited by Hungarian national communities living abroad to improve their ability to preserve their population and to develop rural tourism, f) the establishment and improvement of conditions of infrastructure for maintaining contacts with the Republic of Hungary, g) the pursuance of other activities promoting the goals specified in paragraph (1). CHAPTER III RULES OF PROCEDURE OF APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS AND ASSISTANCE "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" and "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" Article 19 (1) Benefits and assistance specified in this Act may be received by presenting either the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" or the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality", both of which may be issued under the conditions specified in Article 20 at the request of persons of both Hungarian and non-Hungarian nationality. (2) From the Hungarian central public administration body (hereinafter referred to as "the evaluating authority") designated by the Government of the Republic of Hungary for this purpose: a) persons of Hungarian nationality falling within the scope of this Act may request a "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" with a photo, b) a "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" with a photo may be requested by spouses of non-Hungarian nationality living together with persons specified in point a) and children of minor age being brought up in the same household, provided that: the applicant meets the requirements set out in points a) and b) of paragraph (1) of Article 1 and the recommending authority specified in Article 20 has issued the recommendation; and neither an expulsion order nor a prohibition of entry or stay, issued by the competent Hungarian authorities on the basis of grounds determined in a separate Act, is in effect against the applicant in Hungary; and no criminal proceedings have been instituted against the applicant in Hungary for intentional criminal offence. (3) In addition to the requirements specified in paragraph (2), the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality " shall also be conditional upon whether the person of Hungarian nationality entitling the dependants in question to submit an application for the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" is already in the possession of, or entitled to, a "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality". The withdrawal of the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" shall entail the withdrawal of the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality ". Article 20

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(1) The evaluating authority shall issue the "Certificate of Hungarian Nationality" if the applicant is in the possession of a recommendation which has been issued by a recommending organisation representing the Hungarian national community in the neighbouring country concerned, and being recognised by the Government of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organisation, and which: a) certifies, on the basis of a declaration made by the applicant (or in the case of a minor by his/her statutory agent), that the applicant is of Hungarian nationality, b) certifies the authenticity of the signature of the applicant and c) includes the following: ca) the application, photo and address of the applicant, cb) the personal data to be recorded in the Certificate (Article 21), cc) the name and the print of the official seal of the recommending organisation, the name and signature of the person acting on behalf of the recommending organisation, cd) place and date of issue of the recommendation. (2) The recommendation required for the issuing of the "Certificate for Dependants of Persons of Hungarian Nationality" shall certify, instead of the information specified in paragraph (1) point a), the family relationship between the applicant and the person of Hungarian nationality falling within the scope of this Act. (3) The Government of the Republic of Hungary shall recognise an organisation representing the Hungarian community in the given neighbouring country as a recommending organisation if it is capable of: a) representing the Hungarian community living in the given country in its entirety, b) providing for the organisational and personnel conditions for receiving and evaluating applications for recommendation. Article 21 (1) The period of validity of the Certificate a) shall expire on the day of the eighteenth birthday in the case of minors, b) shall be five years in the case of persons between 18 and 60 years of age, c) shall be indefinite in the case of persons over 60 years of age. (2) If the period of validity of the Certificate expires, the proceedings specified in Articles 19-20 shall be repeated upon request. (3) The Certificate shall be withdrawn by the evaluating authority if

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a) the recommending organisation has withdrawn its recommendation due to the submission of false data by the bearer of the Certificate in the application process, b) its bearer has been granted an immigration or permanent residence permit, c) its bearer has acquired Hungarian citizenship, d) its bearer has been recognised as a refugee or temporarily protected person by the authorities responsible for refugee matters, e) its bearer has been expelled from the territory of the Republic of Hungary, or a prohibition of entry or stay has been issued against him/her, f) criminal proceedings have been instituted against the bearer in Hungary, g) the Certificate has been used in an unauthorised way or has been forged, h) the family relationship entitling the bearer to use the Certificate for Dependants has ceased to exist, i) upon request by the bearer of the Certificate. (4) The recommending organisation shall also be notified of the final decision on the withdrawal of the Certificate. (5) The Certificate shall contain the following data of the entitled person: a) family and given name (also the maiden family and given name in the case of women) as it is used officially in the neighbouring country of residence (in Latin script), and in the case of persons of Hungarian nationality in Hungarian as well, b) name of the place of birth as it is used officially in the neighbouring country and in Hungarian, c) date of birth and gender, d) mother's name as it is officially used in the neighbouring country of residence (in Latin script) and in the case of persons of Hungarian nationality in Hungarian as well, e) passport photo, citizenship or reference to stateless status,

g) date of issue, period of validity and number of the document. (6) Notes and certifications required for access to benefits and assistance available under this Act shall be recorded in the Appendix to the Certificate. (7) In order to ensure the authenticity of the Certificate and to supervise the granting of benefits, the evaluating authority (for the purpose of the application of these provisions: the data handling organ) shall keep records of the data of the Certificates, the identification marks in the Appendices, the foreign address of the bearers, the family

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relationship entitling the bearer to the document, the number and period of validity of the permit entitling to stay as well as the data specified in paragraph (3). The data contained in the records may be handled by the data handling organ until the withdrawal or the expiry of the period of validity of the Certificate. The data contained in the records may be forwarded to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) for statistical purposes. Bodies responsible for providing and keeping records of benefits and assistance may also receive those data for the purpose of verifying entitlement and preventing abuse, and so may Courts in charge of criminal proceedings, law enforcement bodies, national security services and the alien policing authority. (8) For the purpose of evaluating applications and examining the existence of reasons for the withdrawal of the Certificate, the evaluating authority may request information from the following organs: a) the Central Registry of Aliens on whether the applicant is subject to proceedings under the law on aliens, or on any order of expulsion or prohibition on entry to and stay in Hungary against the applicant, as well as on the details of the residence permit entitling the applicant to stay in Hungary, b) organs responsible for naturalisation on issues related to the acquisition Hungarian citizenship, c) the Central Registry of Refugees on recognition as a refugee or temporarily protected person, d) the Criminal Records Office on criminal proceedings in process. Article 22 (1) Proceedings of the evaluating authority shall be governed by the provisions of Act IV of 1957 on the General Rules of Public Administration Procedures. The costs of public administration procedures shall be covered by the State. (2) The applicant may institute proceedings in Court against a final administrative decision on the appeal against the first instance decision regarding the issue or withdrawal of a Certificate by the evaluating authority. The Court may alter the administrative decision and its proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. (3) The detailed rules of procedure of the evaluating authority and the order of registration of the issued Certificates, as well as the data content and form of the Certificates, shall be regulated by a separate legal rule. Use of Benefits on the Territory of the Republic of Hungary Article 23 (1) Hungarian persons living abroad shall be entitled to use the benefits set out in Article 4, paragraph (1) of Article 7, Article 8, Article 10, paragraph (2) of Article 11 and Article 12 under the conditions determined in the aforementioned Articles by presenting their Certificates (Article 19) during their lawful stay in the Republic of Hungary.

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(2) The state-run organisations and institutions granting the benefits specified in paragraph (1) and economic organisations providing travel benefits shall receive the financial resources necessary for granting these benefits out of the central state budget. Application Procedures for Assistance Available in the Republic of Hungary Article 24 (1) The Government shall establish public benefit organisation(s) in order to evaluate the applications of and distribute assistance for persons (organisations) falling within the scope of this Act. (2) The founding document of the public benefit organisation, taking into account the provisions of Act CLVI of 1997 on Public Benefit Organisations, shall contain the goals of the activities and the range of applications to be evaluated by it and shall determine its main decision-making body as well. (3) Applications for publicly advertised assistance under this Act may be submitted to the respective public benefit organisation competent according to their subject matter. (4) Data and documents required in the advertisement by the respective public benefit organisation shall be attached to the applications. (5) In the case of a favourable decision, the applicant and the public benefit organisation shall conclude a civil law contract containing the conditions of assistance and the amount thereof, as well as determining the purpose of the use of assistance and the rules of rendering accounts thereof. (6) The financial resources required for the activities of such public benefit organisation(s) shall be provided, on an annual basis, in a separate group of appropriations of the central state budget. Application Procedures for Assistance Available in Neighbouring Countries Article 25 (1) Requests (applications) for assistance regulated in this Act may be submitted by persons (organisations) falling within the scope of this Act to lawfully operating non-profit organisations established in the neighbouring country of their permanent residence (registered office) for this purpose (hereinafter referred to as "foreign public benefit organisations") (2) The civil law contract concluded between the public benefit organisation established in Hungary and the foreign public benefit organisation established for the evaluation of applications and the granting of assistance shall contain the required range of data, which are to be supported by documents, declarations, planning or documentation, etc. (3) The public benefit organisations operating in Hungary shall evaluate the application based on the data specified in the civil law contract as laid down in paragraph (2) and on the opinion of the foreign public benefit organisation.

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(4) Assistance shall be granted to applicants by the Hungarian public benefit organisation on the basis of a civil law contract. This contract shall determine the conditions of the assistance and the amount thereof as well as the purpose of the use of such assistance and the rules of rendering accounts thereof. Central Registration of Assistance Article 26 (1) For the purpose of co-ordinating the entire system of assistance, a central registry of applications for assistance and the relevant decisions made by public benefit organisations established for their evaluation shall be set up. (2) The Government shall designate the central public administration organ responsible for managing the records. (3) The organ managing the records shall handle the following data: a) name, permanent address (registered office) and document number of those submitting applications for assistance, b) the type of assistance sought, c) the amount of assistance granted. (4) Data specified in paragraph (3) may be handled by the organ managing the records for ten years from the date of the granting of assistance. (5) Data from the records shall be made available to public benefit organisations established in Hungary and in the neighbouring countries for the purpose of evaluating applications for assistance, as well as to the central public administration organs of Hungary responsible for providing the financial resources for assistance. CHAPTER IV FINAL PROVISIONS Article 27 (1) This Act shall enter into force on 1 January 2002. (2) From the date of accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, the provisions of this Act shall be applied in accordance with the treaty of accession of the Republic of Hungary and with the law of the European Communities. Article 28 (1) The Government shall be empowered to regulate by decree: a) the provisions on the assignment of the national public administration organ entitled to issue, withdraw and register the Certificates, as well as on the assignment of its

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superior organ, on the definition of their competencies and on the rules of procedure of the issuing, replacement, withdrawal and registration of such Certificates, b) the detailed rules of travel benefits for persons falling within the scope of this Act, c) the detailed rules related to the provision and use of student benefits for persons specified in paragraph (1) of Article 10 of this Act. (2) The Government shall ensure the establishment of Hungarian public benefit organisation(s) evaluating applications and allocating assistance under this Act. The Government shall also ensure the co-ordination of the activities of public benefit organisations already operating for this purpose, the appropriate modification of their founding documents and the reallocation of resources in this framework. Article 29 (1) The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall determine in a joint decree, with respect to educational assistance with the consent of the Minister of Education, the detailed rules on registering the Certificates, as well as the requirements of the content and form of the Certificates. (2) The Minister of Economic Affairs shall: a) determine, in a joint decree with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the rules of procedure and registration related to work permits for Hungarians living abroad and designate the public administration organ responsible for carrying out these duties, b) be empowered to regulate by decree the conditions for issuing work permits for a period longer than the one specified in Article 15 of this Act with regard to employees falling within the scope of this Act, or for a particular group of employees, in consensus with the Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs in cases involving professional sportspersons. (3) The Minister of Foreign Affairs shall be empowered to substitute his own declaration for the recommendation specified in Article 20 of this Act in cases deserving exceptional treatment on grounds of equity in the course of proceedings of the evaluating authority designated in Article 19, and furthermore in cases where the proceedings specified in paragraph (1) of Article 20 are impeded, to ensure the smooth conduct of administrative proceedings. (4) The Minister of National Cultural Heritage shall determine by decree the detailed rules of benefits available to Hungarians living abroad with respect to the use of the services provided by museums and public cultural institutions. (5) The Minister of Education, with the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, shall determine by decree the detailed rules on further training for Hungarian teachers living abroad, as well as detailed rules on the benefits set out in Article 9, Article 11 and 12, paragraph (1) of Article 13 and Article 14 of this Act, including the extent of such assistance. Source: http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=03&news007_id=1149 Date: 22.05.2006

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Appendix 2: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the

Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania (Orbán- -Memorandum)

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania (December 22, 2001) The Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania,

Guided by a joint effort to strengthen their bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual understanding and good-neighbourly co-operation, Bearing in mind the provisions of the European and international documents in the field of the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

treatment of national minorities by their kin States, setting forth the conditions in which the involvement of the kin State is legitimate, as the respect of the territorial sovereignty, pacta sunt servanda, the principle of good neighbourliness, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the principle of non-discrimination, Taking into account the Statement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE and, also, the position of the European Commission concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries, who invited the States concerned to reach a bilateral understanding respectful of the current European standards, In accordance with the Treaty on understanding, co-operation and good-neighbourliness between the Republic of Hungary and Romania, in particular the provisions concerning the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, acknowledging that providing effective equality in rights and chances for the national minorities living in their respective countries and creating conditions for them to prosper in their land of birth, constitute an indispensable contribution to the stability of the region and to the creation of a future Europe, based on values as cultural and linguistic diversity and tolerance, Reiterating their strong will to maintain the rhythm of development of bilateral economic relations and decided to give stronger impetus for the increasing of commercial exchanges between their States, With a view to the 2002 Prague Summit and welcoming the progress of Romania in meeting the accession criteria, the Republic of Hungary supports the decision for Romania to become a member of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Reiterating their mutual permanent and substantial support for their integration with the European Union, Determined to solve all open issues on their agenda and further their co-operation; Have agreed as follows:

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I. Concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries: 1. The present Agreement sets forth conditions of implementing the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries with regard to the Romanian citizens. 2. All Romanian citizens, notwithstanding their ethnic origin, will enjoy the same conditions and treatment in the field of employment on the basis of a work permit on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorisation of employment of foreign citizens in Hungary. When work permits are issued for a maximum of three months per calendar year, there is the possibility of their prolongation and the Romanian citizens enjoy some facilities on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, which are the following: Romanian citizens working on the territory of the Republic of Hungary on the basis of any type of contract of employment shall have the right to apply to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose for the reimbursement of the costs of self-pay health care services in advance. By exchange of letters in the first week of January 2002, the Parties shall include amendments also in the Agreement on seasonal workers. These amendments shall concern supplementary advantages reciprocally granted in case the work permit is issued only for three months (and not for six months as provided in the Agreement on seasonal workers). A mutual obligation of non-discrimination on ethnic criteria during the implementation of the Agreement shall be also included. 3. The Romanian citizens of non-Hungarian ethnic identity shall not be granted any certificate and shall not be entitled to any benefits set forth by the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. 4. The entire procedure of granting the certificate (receiving of applications, issue, forwarding) shall primarily take place on the territory of the Republic of Hungary in the county public administration established by the Hungarian authorities and respectively at the Office of the Ministry of Interior, and at the Hungarian diplomatic missions. 5. The Hungarian representative organisations or other entity on the territory of Romania shall not issue any recommendations concerning the ethnic origin or other criteria. The organisations or other entities on the territory of Romania can provide with information with a legally non-binding character in the absence of formal supporting documents. 6. The administrative document which entitles to benefits, issued by the Hungarian

7. The certificate shall contain only the strictly necessary personal data and the entitlement to benefits (name, forename, citizenship, country of residence etc.) and shall include no reference to the ethnic origin/identity. 8. The compulsory criteria on which certificates are granted shall be the following:

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Relevant application, Free declaration of the person of belonging to the Hungarian minority in the State of

citizenship, founding on his/her Hungarian ethnic identity, Knowledge of the Hungarian language, or

The person should have declared himself/herself in the State of citizenship to have

Hungarian ethnic identity, or Optionally, the person should either belong to a Hungarian representative organisation

(notably membership of the UDMR), or be registered as ethnic Hungarian in a church. 9. The Parties shall start the negotiations in the frame of the Committee on national minorities of the Intergovernmental Hungarian-Romanian Commission of an Agreement on the preferential treatment of the Romanian minority on the territory of the Republic of Hungary and of the Hungarian minority on the territory of Romania, in order to preserve their cultural identity in accordance with the provisions of the

High Commissioner on National Minorities. 10. The Republic of Hungary shall not grant any kind of support to Hungarian political organisations of Romania unless previously informing the Romanian authorities and obtaining their consent. 11. On the basis of common experiences of the Parties, the Government of the Republic of Hungary shall initiate the review and the necessary amendments of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries in six months after the signature of this Memorandum of Understanding. By the 1st of January 2002, the authorities of the Republic of Hungary shall take the necessary measures in order to implement the provisions of the present Agreement by means of norms of application and shall further on take also into account the recommendations of the Committee on national minorities which shall further on examine the questions concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. II. Concerning their bilateral relations: 1. On the occasion of the anniversary of 5 years of active partnership between Romania and the Republic of Hungary, the Parties shall convoke a special session of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission. In order to work out a plan to make concrete steps forward in their bilateral co-operation, Parties will, in the Committees of the Hungarian-Romanian Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Active Co-operation and Partnership and at its plenary session scheduled for the first quarter of 2002, survey the full range of the bilateral relations and make recommendations for measures to be taken. 2. In order to carry out the Recommendations made in the Protocol of the Committee on national minorities of the Hungarian-Romanian Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Active Co-operation and Partnership, signed at its 4th session on October 19, 2001, which will be approved by the two Governments, who will take the necessary measures for implementation.

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3. The Parties give priority to the development of railway and road system connecting the two countries and to the enlargement of the border crossing infrastructure program linked to it. 4. The Parties will start talks with a view to elaborate the operational modalities of a future Joint Financial Fund designed to guarantee the investments of their small and medium size enterprises in the other country respectively. 5. In the field of the Euro-Atlantic integration process the Parties will share their relevant experiences. 6. The Parties express their interest to take all the necessary measures in order to modernise and develop their bilateral legal framework. Done at Budapest, on the 22nd of December 2001, in two original copies, each of them in the English language. Source: http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=06&country_id=Romania&id=209 Date: 22.05.2006

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Appendix 3: Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Law

of Status, 2nd version, 23.06.2003) Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (23.06.2003)

outside Hungary and to promote the preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary as provided for in Article 6 Paragraph 3 of the Constitution,

keeping with the fundamental principles espoused by international organisations, and in particular by the Council of Europe regarding respect for human rights and protection of the rights of minorities;

obligations of the Republic of Hungary assumed under international law;

-neighbourly relations and partnership and regional co-operation in the Central European region in particular with a view to bilateral treaties concluded by the Republic of Hungary with neighbouring countries to maintain good neighbourly relations and cooperation, and to guarantee the rights of minorities and for the need to strengthen the stabilising role of Hungary;

ngarians living in neighbouring states in their home-state, to promote their ties to Hungary, to support their Hungarian identity and their links to the Hungarian cultural heritage as expression of their belonging to the Hungarian nation;

ative and based on the proposals of the Hungarian Standing Conference, as the consultative body working to preserve and reinforce the identity of Hungarian communities living in neighbouring states;

by law for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin living outside Hungary in other parts of the world; Parliament has adopted this Act: Chapter I GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 1. (1) This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin who are not Hungarian citizens and who reside in the Republic of Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or Ukraine (hereafter referred to as neighbouring states).

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(2) Unless otherwise provided for by treaties, this Act shall also apply to spouses living with persons identified in paragraph (1) and to minor children residing within a common household (hereafter collectively referred to as immediate family members) even if these persons do not declare themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin. (3) The Act shall not apply to persons a) who have lost their Hungarian citizenship due to a voluntary renunciation; b) whose Hungarian citizenship has been revoked because it had been obtained under fraudulent circumstances; c) who have been granted an immigration permit or a permanent residence permit on the territory of the Republic of Hungary or who have been granted refugee or temporarily protected person status. Section 2. (1) The Republic of Hungary wishes to contribute to the well-being and prosperity of Hungarians living in neighbouring states and to the preservation of their cultural and linguistic identity by providing benefits and grants to persons covered by the scope of this Act and their organisations as laid down in this Act. (2) The provisions of this Act shall be applied in conformity with the obligations of the Republic of Hungary assumed under treaties and in keeping with the generally recognised rules of international law, in particular the principles of the territorial sovereignty of states, pacta sunt servanda, friendly relations amongst states and the respect for human rights, including the prohibition of discrimination. Section 3. (1) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled, under the conditions laid down in this Act, to benefits and grants on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. (2) Persons falling within the scope of this Act and declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin shall be entitled to cultural and educational grants at their place of residence in neighbouring states in order to assist them in preserving their cultural and linguistic identity. Unless otherwise provided for by treaties, this Act shall be applied to the awarding of grants claimable on the territory of neighbouring states. (3) The benefits and grants provided for in this Act shall be without prejudice to the benefits and grants provided by legislation in force for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin but not of Hungarian citizenship living outside Hungary in other parts of the world. Chapter II BENEFITS AND GRANTS CLAIMABLE BY PERSONS FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS ACT Culture and sciences

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Section 4. (1) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure within its territory to persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2): a) access to public cultural institutions and services thereof, b) access to cultural goods for researchers and members of the public, c) access to historic monuments and related documentation, d) access for the purposes of scientific research to archive materials containing protected personal particulars, if the neighbouring state in which the ethnic Hungarian has his/her domicile is a party to the international convention on the protection of personal particulars 1/. (2) Persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be entitled to have access to the services of any state-run public library, and the following basic services free of charge: a) visits to the library, b) on-site use of certain selected collections held by the library, c) use of cataloguing tools, d) information on the services of the library and of the library network, e) borrowing privileges for printed library materials upon registration and under the conditions laid down in the library regulations. (3) Further benefits with respect to access of persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) to services offered by state-run museums and public cultural institutions shall be laid down in a separate law. (4) The entitlement to benefits available under paragraph (1)-(3) shall be certified by the

Section 5. (1) Hungarian scientists falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1) of this Act shall have the right to become external or regular members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. (2) Scientists identified in paragraph (1) are entitled to their research in Hungary to benefits as laid out in a separate law. Distinctions and scholarships Section 6.

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(1) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure that persons falling within the scope of this Act, in recognition of their outstanding and exemplary activities in the service of all Hungarians and in enriching Hungarian and universal human values, are entitled to distinctions bestowed by the Republic of Hungary and to titles, prizes or diplomas established by its Ministers. (2) Eligibility criteria for state scholarships shall be set in a way that persons falling within the scope of this Act can receive such scholarships. Social Security Benefits and Health Services Section 7. [Abrogated] Travel benefits Section 8. (1) Persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) shall - in accordance with the purpose of this Act and to strengthen their attachment to the Hungarian culture - be entitled to travel benefits on scheduled domestic local or long-distance public transport on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. With regard to railways, such benefits shall apply to second-class fares. (2) An unlimited number of journeys shall be provided free of charge for: a) children under six years of age and b) persons over sixty-five years of age. (3) A ninety-percent travel discount shall be provided on domestic long-distance public transport for a) persons identified in paragraph (1) four times a year, b) groups of at least ten persons under eighteen years of age travelling as a group and falling within the scope of this Act, and two accompanying adults once a year. (4) The detailed rules related to travel benefits shall be laid down in a separate law. (5) The entitlement to benefits available under paragraph (1)-(3) shall be certified by the

Education Section 9. (1) Persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), in accordance with the provisions of a separate law, shall be entitled to take part in a) undergraduate-level college or university education,

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b) supplementary undergraduate education, c) non-degree programmes, d) doctoral (PhD) and Doctor of Liberal Arts (DLA) programmes, e) general and specialised further training, f) accredited institutional tertiary vocational training in Hungarian language at institutions of higher education in the Republic of Hungary. (2) Students falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) and participating in state-financed full-time training programmes specified in paragraph (1), shall be entitled to formula funding on the one hand, and in-cash and in-kind benefits on the other, both being part of the appropriations of budgetary expenditure for students, as well as to the reimbursement of detailed health insurance contributions. Types of grants and additional benefits shall be regulated by the Minister of Education in a separate law. (3) Persons falling within the scope of this Act shall be entitled to pursue studies at institutions of higher education in the Republic of Hungary within the framework of state-financed training in a fixed number to be determined annually by the Minister of Education. (4) Students falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) and participating in non-state-financed training shall be entitled to apply for the partial or full reimbursement of the costs of their stay and tuition in Hungary. The terms and conditions of reimbursement shall be regulated in a separate law. Student benefits Section 10. Minors falling within the scope of Section paragraphs (1) and (2)pursuing their studies in institutions of primary, secondary and tertiary education are entitled to student benefits on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Entitlement to benefits shall be

Student Pass shall be issued by an agency laid down in a separate Law. The agency authorised to issue Student Passes shall maintain a record of the information supplied on

access to these benefits shall be laid down in a separate law. Grants to teachers and instructors Section 11. (1) Instructors teaching in an institution of primary and secondary education falling within the scope of Section paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be entitled to take part in regular further training in Hungary in a fixed number determined annually by the

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Minister of Education. Furthermore, unless otherwise provided for by treaties, teachers and instructors falling within the scope of this Act shall also be entitled to take part in accredited and recognised regular training courses held by Hungarian institutions in a neighbouring country, and to receive the benefits specified in paragraph (2). (2) For the duration of the further training and to the extent stipulated by a separate law, persons identified in paragraph (1) shall be entitled to request from the Hungarian educational institution providing the further training a) reimbursement of their accommodation costs, b) reimbursement of their travel expenses, and c) a contribution to their costs of enrolment. (3) Detailed rules on the further training for teachers specified in paragraph (1) shall be laid down in a separate law. Section 12. Instructors and teachers teaching in an institution of primary, secondary and tertiary education falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) are entitled to

al appendix to it (the Teacher/Instructor Pass) that serves this purpose. The agency authorised to issue such cards shall maintain a record of the

of ethnic Hungarian carexpiry. Detailed rules on access to these benefits shall be laid down in a separate law. Affiliated training and education programmes in neighbouring states Section 13. (1) The Republic of Hungary shall promote the preservation of the mother tongue, culture and identity of ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states by facilitating the establishment and operation of departments affiliated with accredited Hungarian institutions of higher education in neighbouring states. The financial resources necessary for the realisation of these goals shall be set out as targeted appropriations in the budget of the Republic of Hungary. The Minister of Education shall make a determination on the allocation of available resources pursuant to the provisions of a separate law. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall support the establishment, operation and development of institutions of higher education (faculties and departments) using Hungarian as the language of instruction and seeking accreditation in neighbouring states. Applications for the financial resources necessary for the realisation of these goals may be submitted to the public benefit organisation established for this purpose. Educational grants available in neighbouring states

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Section 14. (1) Minors pursuing their studies in the Hungarian language or in the subject of Hungarian culture in an institution of primary, secondary and tertiary education falling within the scope of Section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2) with the participation of a non-governmental organisation established in a neighbouring state with the purpose of maintaining Hungarian education and culture are entitled to educational grants as well as grants for the purchase of books and learning materials, and students of higher education, to study grants. (2) On the basis of a bilateral agreement, recipients of such grants may also include

(3) The detailed rules related to awarding grants and disbursing funds specified in paragraphs (1) shall be laid down in a separate law. Employment Section 15. Employment on the territory of the Republic of Hungary of persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be governed by the general rules concerning the issuance of work permits to foreigners in Hungary. Derogation from the general rules may be provided for by treaties. Section 16. [Abrogated] Tasks of the public service media Section 17. (1) The Hungarian public service media shall ensure that information on ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states is collected and transmitted on a regular basis, and that information on Hungary and the Hungarian people is transmitted to ethnic Hungarians. This information shall serve the following objectives: a) to transmit Hungarian and universal intellectual and cultural values, b) to form a balanced picture of the world, of Hungary and of the Hungarian people, c) to preserve the identity, mother tongue and culture of ethnic Hungarian communities. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall ensure the production and broadcasting of public service television programmes for ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries through the establishment and operation of an organisation devoted to such purposes, in accordance with the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. The financial resources necessary to this end shall be made available by the central state budget.

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Grants to organisations in neighbouring states Section 18. (1) The Republic of Hungary shall provide grants to organisations in neighbouring states working to facilitate the preservation of the identity, mother tongue and culture of Hungarian kin-minority communities. (2) In order to obtain such grants, the organisations specified in paragraph (1) may submit applications to foreign organisations (Section 25 paragraph (1)) established for this purpose provided they promote in particular the following goals: a) the preservation, furtherance and research of Hungarian national traditions, b) the preservation and fostering of the Hungarian language, literature, culture and folk arts, c) support of higher education for Hungarians in neighbouring states by facilitating the availability of instructors from Hungary as visiting lecturers, d) the restoration and maintenance of monuments that form part of the Hungarian cultural heritage and preservation of the heritage of the countryside. Chapter III RULES RELATED TO PROCEDURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF BENEFITS AND GRANTS

Section 19. (1) The entitlement of persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) to certain benefits available

(2) From the Hungarian state agency (hereafter referred to as the evaluation authority) designated by the Government of the Republic of Hungary for this purpose a) persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1) declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin, in the case of minors through their legal guardians, shall be

b) unless otherwise provided for by treaties, persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (2), in the case of minors through their legal guardian, shall be entitled to

(3) Persons specified in paragraph (2) subparagraph a) shall upon applying be entitled to

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a) are proficient in the Hungarian language, or b) are ba) registered by their state of residence as persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian ethnic origin, or bb) registered members of an organisation uniting persons of Hungarian ethnic origin and operating on the territory of their state of residence, or bc) registered by a church operating on the territory of their state of residence as persons of Hungarian ethnic origin.

-submitted their application due to changes in the information contained therein; b) are subject to restrictions on their entry into or stay in, or to expulsion from, the territory of Hungary; c) do not hold the certificate specified in Section 20 paragraph (2). (5) Unless otherwise provided for by treaties, immediate family members shall upon

a) certify with an official document their family relationship as specified in paragraph (2) subparagraph b) with a person of Hungarian ethnic origin as specified in paragraph (3), and b) apply for the card on the basis of their family relationship with a person of Hungarian

-submitted their application due to changes in the information contained therein; b) are subject to restrictions on entry into or stay in, or to expulsion from, the territory of Hungary; c) do not hold the certificate specified in Section 20 paragraph (3),

relationship with a person of Hungarian ethnic origin da) who does not hold the certificate specified in Section 20 paragraph (2); evaluation authority; or

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Section 20. (1) Applications for ashall contain a) the applicants' application, passport-size photograph and address, b) personal particulars to be recorded on the card (Section 21 paragraph (5)), c) the designation of the Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate participating in the process, d) the place and date of the issuance of the certificate. (2) The Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate operating in the state of residence of the applicant shall issue a certificate to the applicant once the conditions set forth in Section 19 paragraph (3) are satisfied. (3) The Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate operating in the state of residence of the applicant shall issue a certificate to the applicant upon the presentation of evidence of the applicant's family relationship with a person falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1). (4) Evidence that the conditions set forth in Section 19 paragraph (3) subparagraph b) and Section 19 paragraph (5) subparagraph a) are satisfied shall be supplied in the form of the relevant official documents. If evidence that the conditions set forth in Section 19 paragraph (3) subparagraph b) are satisfied cannot be supplied, the Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate shall be entitled to request information from non-governmental organisations established by ethnic Hungarian communities living in neighbouring states. (5) If the fulfilment of conditions for the issuance of the certificate cannot be verified either by official documents or the information requested, the Hungarian diplomatic mission or consulate shall not issue the certificate but shall forward the request to the evaluation authority in any case. Section 21.

a) shall expire on the eighteenth birthday of minors holding such cards; b) shall be valid for five years for persons between eighteen and sixty years of age; c) shall be valid indefinitely for persons over sixty years of age. (2) After the expiry of such cards the issuance process shall be repeated upon applying. If during the period of validity set forth in paragraph (1) subparagraphs a) and c), the Appendix to the card becomes unsuitable to certify entitlement to benefits as a result of

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five years having passed after the issuance of the card, the card shall be replaced upon applying in order to ensure continued entitlement to benefits. (3) The evaluation authority shall revoke the card a) if the bearer has provided false information when applying for the certificate or the card; b) if the bearer has been granted an immigration permit or a permanent residence permit; c) if the bearer has been granted Hungarian citizenship; d) if the bearer has been recognised as a refugee or temporarily protected person by the authorities charged with asylum matters; e) if the bearer has been expelled from, or is subject to restrictions on entry into or stay on the territory of the Republic of Hungary; f) if the card has been forged or used in an unauthorised manner;

the bea h) upon the bearer's request. (4) [Abrogated]

contain the following information: a) the bearer's surname and given name (as well as the maiden surname and given name in the case of women), as officially used in the neighbouring state of residence (written in Latin script), as well as in Hungarian for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin; b) the bearer's place of birth in the official language of the neighbouring state of residence, as well as in Hungarian; c) the bearer's date of birth and sex; d) the bearer's mother's name as officially used in the neighbouring state of residence (written in Latin script), as well as in Hungarian for persons of Hungarian ethnic origin; e) a passport-size photograph of the bearer, his/her citizenship or reference to stateless status; f) the bearer's signature; g) the date of issue and expiry and the document number, as well as

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h) an explanatory note that the card does not serve as an official identification document or travel document and does not entitle the bearer to exit or enter a country. (6) Entries and certifications required for access to benefits and grants available under this Act shall be recorded in the Appendix to the Card, as well as in the Appendices thereto (Student Pass, Teacher Pass and Instructor Pass) serving the purposes specified in Section 10 paragraph (2) and Section 12 paragraph (3). The document identification number and date of expiry of the independent Appendix shall be recorded in the heading of the Card Appendix. (7) In order to ensure the authenticity of the Card and to supervise the granting of benefits, the evaluation authority (or the information processing agency for the purposes of the provisions of the Act) shall maintain records of the information contained in the Cards, the document identification number of the Appendix to the Card, the address of

-state, the family relationship entitling him/her to the Card, the number and date of expiry of the permit authorising the stay [on the territory of Hungary], and the information specified in paragraph (3). The information contained in the records shall be processed by the information processing agency not later than the revocation or expiry of the Card. The information contained in the records may, in accordance with the international convention on the protection of personal particulars, be forwarded, for statistical purposes, to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), for the purposes of verifying entitlement and preventing abuse, to the bodies responsible for granting and maintaining records of the benefits and grants, to diplomatic missions and consulates, to Courts carrying out criminal proceedings, to law enforcement agencies and the alien policing authority. The information processing agency may release information in its records to the agency exercising official functions with regard to the issuance, replacement, revocation and record-keeping of Student Passes, Teacher Passes and Instructor Passes. (8) For the purpose of evaluating applications and examining the existence of grounds for revoking the Card, the evaluation authority may request information from the following bodies: a) the Central Alien Policing Registry, on whether the applicant is subject to alien policing proceedings, on any expulsion from or any restrictions on entry into or stay on the territory of Hungary, as well as on the details of the residence permit authorising the stay in Hungary; b) bodies responsible for naturalisation, on issues related to the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship; c) the Central Refugee Registry, on recognition of refugee or temporarily protected person status. Section 22. (1) Proceedings of the evaluation authority shall be governed by the provisions of Act IV of 1957 on the General Rules related to Public Administration Procedures. The costs of public administration procedures shall be borne by the State. (2) The applicant may institute proceedings in Court against a final administrative decision on appeal against the first instance decision regarding the issuance or

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revocation of a Card by the evaluation authority. The Court may alter the administrative decision and its proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (3) Detailed rules related to procedure of the evaluation authority, and the order of registering the Cards issued, as well as the content and form of the information contained in the Cards, shall be laid down in a separate law. Access to benefits on the territory of the Republic of Hungary Section 23. The financial resources necessary for providing these benefits shall be made available by the central state budget to the state-run organisations and institutions granting the benefits provided for in this Act as well as to the profit-oriented organisations granting travel benefits. Application procedures for grants available in the Republic of Hungary Section 24. [Abrogated] Application procedures for grants available in neighbouring states Section 25. (1) Applications for grants available under Section 13 paragraph (2) and Section 18 paragraph (2) shall be submitted to non-profit organisations established for this purpose in the neighbouring state of registered office, registered and operating in accordance with the legislation of that state (hereafter referred to as foreign organisations). (2) The civil law contract concluded by and between the public benefit organisation established in Hungary and the foreign organisation for the purpose of evaluating applications and disbursing grant funding shall contain the information, supported by documents, declarations, project documentation, etc., necessary for the evaluation of applications. (3) The public benefit organisations operating in Hungary shall evaluate the application on the basis of the information laid down in the civil law contract, as specified in paragraph (2), and of the opinion rendered by the foreign organisation. (4) Grant funding shall be disbursed to applicants by the Hungarian public benefit organisation on the basis of a civil law contract. This contract shall contain the conditions of the grant and the amount thereof as well as the purpose of the use of such funding and the rules related to rendering accounts thereof. Central registration of grants Section 26.

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(1) For the purposes of co-ordinating the entire system of grant funding, a central registry of applications for grants and the relevant decisions made by public benefit organisations established for their evaluation shall be set up. (2) The central state agency charged with managing the registry shall be designated by the Government. (3) The agency managing the registry shall process the following information: a) name, permanent address (registered office) and Card number of the person (or organisation) submitting a grant application, b) the type of grant sought and c) the amount of funding provided. (4) Information specified in paragraph (3) shall be handled by the agency managing the registry for a period not to exceed 10 years from the date on which the grant is awarded. (5) Information from the registry may be made available, in accordance with the international convention on the protection of personal particulars, to public benefit organisations established in Hungary and in the neighbouring states for the purpose of evaluating grant applications, as well as, in a manner not suitable for the identification of specific individuals, to the state agencies of the Republic of Hungary charged with providing the financial resources for grants. Chapter IV FINAL PROVISIONS Section 27. (1) This Act shall enter into force on 1 January 2002 2/. (2) From the date of entry into force of the Act on the promulgation of the international treaty on the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, the provisions of this Act shall be applied in accordance with the acquis communautaire of the European Union. (3) Pursuant to international agreements, the provisions set forth in Section 10 and Section 14 shall also apply to pupils enrolled in primary and secondary educational institutions in a neighbouring country where the language of instruction is Hungarian as well as to students enrolled in an institution of higher education in a neighbouring country and pursuing studies in Hungarian language or in the area of Hungarian culture. (4) Pursuant to international agreements, the provisions set forth in Sections 11-12 shall also apply to teachers of primary and secondary educational institutions of neighbouring states using Hungarian as the language of instruction or teaching Hungarian culture, as well as to instructors of Hungarian culture at an institution of higher education. (5) Detailed rules related to awarding grants and disbursing funds specified in paragraphs (3)-(4) shall be laid down in a separate law.

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Section 28. (1) The Government shall be empowered to regulate by Decree a) the provisions on the designation of the state agency authorised to issue, revoke and

on the assignment of the state agency under which it is located administratively, on the definition of their competencies and on the rules related to procedure for the issuance, replacement, revocation and registration of such Cards; b) the detailed rules related to travel benefits as laid down in Section 8, paragraphs (1)-(3) for persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 8 paragraph(4); c) the detailed rules related to student benefits and grants for persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 10; d) the detailewithin the scope of Section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2) on the basis Section 11 paragraphs (1)- e) the detailed rules related to the disbursing funds for persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2) as laid down in Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 14 paragraph (3). f) the detailed rules related to application for grants available in the neighbouring countries, on the basis of Section 25. g) the detailed rules related to benefits available in Hungary and assistance available in the neighbouring countries for nationals of Member States of the European Unions that do not fall within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1) and (2), on the basis of Section 27, paragraph (2). (2) The Government shall be empowered, on the basis of Section 3 paragraph (2), to conclude international agreements for the purpose of providing benefits in the neighbouring countries, as identified in Section 14 paragraphs (1) and (2), and for the purpose of implementing Section 27, paragraphs (3) and (4). (3) The Government will provide for the establishment of Hungarian public benefit organisations to evaluate grant applications and award grants provided for in this Act. The Government shall also ensure the co-ordination of the activities of public benefit organisations already operating for this purpose, the appropriate changes to their founding documents and the reallocation of resources within this framework, as well as the maintenance of cooperation with non-governmental organisations established by ethnic Hungarian communities living in neighbouring countries. Section 29. (1) The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall lay down in a joint decree with the consent of the Minister of Education in the case of educational

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grants Hungarian c (2) The Minister for National Cultural Heritage shall lay down in a decree with the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs the availability of services of state-run museums and establishment of public education, and the detailed rules related to benefits entitled to on the basis of Section 4 paragraphs (1)-(3) and of further benefits as laid down in paragraph (3) for the persons falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraphs (1) and (2). (3) The Minister for Education shall lay down with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the detailed rules on the benefits falling within the scope of Section 5 paragraph (2) for research in Hungary for external members or members of the executive board of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences falling within the scope of Section 1 paragraph (1). (4) The Minister of Education shall lay down with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a decree the detailed rules related to benefits for persons falling within the scope of Section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2) they are entitled to during their participation in higher education in Hungary, in accordance with Section 9. (5) The Minister of Education shall lay down with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a decree the detailed rules related to the use of the framework amount of assistance as laid down in Section 13 paragraph (1). (6) The Minister for National Cultural Heritage shall lay down with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the detailed rules related to assistance for institutions operating in neighbouring countries with the purpose of promoting the self-awareness, mother tongue and culture of Hungarian ethnic communities living in neighbouring countries as laid down in Section 18 paragraph (1). (7) The Minister for Education shall lay down with the consent of the Minister for Foreign Affairs the detailed rules related to higher-level education on the subject of Hungarian culture and of instruction on the subject of Hungarian culture. Section 30 In the context of application of this Act, Hungarian culture shall be understood as to include the Hungarian language, literature, history, cultural history and Hungarian science. 1/ Act VI of 1998 on the promulgation of the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on 28 January 1981 in Strasbourg. 2/ The Act LVII of 2003 entered into force on 11 July 2003 Source: http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=03&news007_id=1157 Date: 22.05.2006

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Appendix 4: Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of

the Republic of Hungary on implementation of the amended benefit law in Romania (23.09.2003)

Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on implementation of the amended benefit law in Romania (September 23, 2003) The Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary,

Guided by a joint effort to strengthen their bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual understanding and good-neighbourly co-operation, Bearing in mind the Treaty on understanding, co-operation and good-neighbourliness

September 1996, in particular the provisions concerning the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, acknowledging that providing effective equality in rights and chances for the national minorities living in their respective countries and creating conditions for them to prosper in their land of birth, constitute an indispensable contribution to the stability of the region and to the creation of a future Europe, based on values as cultural and linguistic diversity and tolerance, Led by the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary, signed in Budapest, on the 29th of November 2002, Taking into account the prospective membership of the two countries in the European Union, Willingful of promoting the European values and standards, Guided by the willingness to promote the preservation and development of the cultural and linguistic identity of the persons belonging to Romanian and Hungarian national minorities living in the two countries, in order for the citizens to have better knowledge on the culture and language of the other State, in conformity with the international treaties on the matter, in force between the two States, Bearing in mind the provisions of the European and international documents in the field of the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and the recommendations of the European institutions, in particular the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the European Commission,

treatment of national minorities by their kin States, setting forth the conditions in which the involvement of the kin State is legitimate, as the respect of the territorial sovereignty, pacta sunt servanda, the principle of good neighbourliness, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the principle of non-discrimination,

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Have agreed upon conditions with regard to implementing the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries concerning Romanian citizens, as follows: Article 1 The Romanian citizens of non-Hungarian ethnic origin shall not be granted any Certificate and, on this basis, shall not be entitled to apply for any benefits set forth by the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. Article 2 The Parties note that the entire procedure of granting the certificate (receiving of applications, issue, distribution) takes place on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, including the Hungarian diplomatic and consular missions as to the receiving of applications. Article 3 The Parties acknowledge that non-governmental organisations established by the ethnic Hungarians on the territory of Romania shall not issue any recommendations concerning the ethnic origin or other criteria, as far as the procedure of granting the Certificate is concerned. Article 4 The Romanian Party notes that Romanian citizens which are pupils in elementary schools and high-schools and learn in Hungarian language, as well as the students studying in Hungarian language in higher educational institutions or attend classes in the field of Hungarian culture may enjoy, on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, benefits for the support of their studies, on the basis of their pupil/student quality in Romania. Article 5 The Romanian Party notes that Romanian citizens teaching in Hungarian language or in the field of Hungarian culture in elementary schools and high-schools or in higher educational institutions may enjoy, on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, benefits for teachers and professors for the support of their teaching activities, on the basis of their teacher/professor quality in Romania. Article 6

legislation, distributes, by contest, on the basis of projects, educational benefits, for educational institutions or for individuals for the purpose of scholarships, on a non-discriminatory basis. Article 7 The Hungarian Certificates for Romanian citizens shall be used only on the territory of the Republic of Hungary;

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Article 8 The Government of the Republic of Hungary strives to take the necessary steps in order to bring the Certificates into conformity with the Recommendations of the European institutions, including those of the European Commission of December 2002. Article 9 The Government of the Republic of Hungary agrees that the Hungarian citizens of Romanian ethnic origin living in the Republic of Hungary shall be granted, in accordance with the Romanian relevant legislation regarding the support for the Romanian minorities living abroad and on the basis of reciprocity, the same level of facilities as those granted to Romanian citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin living in Romania, in accordance with the legal framework in force between Romania and the Republic of Hungary on this matter. Article 10 On the entry into force of this Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries and Issues of Bilateral Co-operation, signed in Budapest, on the 22nd of December 2001 shall terminate its validity. Article 11 This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the latter notification regarding the fulfilment of the domestic procedures necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement. Signed in Bucharest, on the 23 September 2003, in two original copies, each of them in the English language. Source: http://www.htmh.gov.hu/en/index.php?menuid=06&country_id=Romania&id=211 Date: 22.05.2006

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Appendix 5: Excerpts from the Romanian Constitution. Sovereignty ARTICLE 2 (1) The national sovereignty shall reside within the Romanian people, that shall

exercise it by means of their representative bodies, resulting from free, periodical and fair elections, as well as by referendum.

Unity of the people and equality among citizens ARTICLE 4 (1) The State foundation is laid on the unity of the Romanian people and the solidarity of its citizens. (2) Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, without any

discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin.

Right to identity ARTICLE 6 (1) The State recognizes and guarantees the right of persons belonging to national

minorities to the preservation, development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.

(2) The protection measures taken by the Romanian State for the preservation, development and expression of identity of the persons belonging to national minorities shall conform to the principles of equality and non-discrimination in relation to the other Romanian citizens.

Official language ARTICLE 13 In Romania, the official language is Romanian. Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339&par1=1&idl=2 Date: 23.05.2006 Equality of rights ARTICLE 16 (1) Citizens are equal before the law and public authorities, without any privilege or

discrimination. (2) No one is above the law. Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371&idl=2&par1=2 Date: 23.05.2006

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Appendix 6: Excerpts from the Hungarian Constitution Article 6 [Peace] (1) The Republic of Hungary renounces war as a means of solving disputes between nations and shall refrain from the use of force and the threat thereof against the independence or territorial integrity of other states (2) The Republic of Hungary shall endeavor to co-operate with all peoples and countries of the world. (3) The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary. (4) The Republic of Hungary shall take an active part in establishing a European unity in order to achieve freedom, well-being and security for the peoples of Europe. Article 68 (1) The national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary participate in the sovereign power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the State. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities and ensure their collective participation in public affairs, the fostering of their cultures, the use of their native languages, education in their native languages and the use of names in their native languages. (3) The laws of the Republic of Hungary shall ensure representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the country. (4) National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to form local and national bodies for self-government. (5) A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present is required to pass the law on the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Article 70A [] (1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect the human rights and civil rights of all persons in the country without discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origins, financial situation, birth or on any other grounds whatsoever. (2) The law shall provide for strict punishment of discrimination on the basis of Paragraph (1). (3) The Republic of Hungary shall endeavor to implement equal rights for everyone through measures that create fair opportunities for all. Source: http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000_.html Date: 07.09.06

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Appendix 7: Articles from

analysis -

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- 1. RL27.12.01 Depunerea cererii si eliberarea legitimatiei de maghiar se vor efectua numai pe teritoriul Ungariei Primul ministru Adrian Nastase si premierul ungar Viktor Orban au semnat sambata, la Budapesta, un Memorandum de Intelegere privind aplicarea Legii statutului, care prevede ca legitimatiile de maghiar sa nu poata fi acordate etnicilor romani care fac parte din familii maghiare. Astfel a fost eliminata discriminarea intre cetatenii romani de origine etnica nemaghiara, care ar fi aparut daca membrii de familie ai persoanelor de etnie maghiara ar fi obtinut o legitimatie si ar fi beneficiat, in baza acestui act, de facilitatile acordate de lege pentru maghiari. Depunerea cererii si eliberarea legitimatiei de maghiar se vor efectua numai pe teritoriul Ungariei, acest document neputand fi adus sau depozitat in Romania. Organizatiile reprezentative ale maghiarilor din Romania sau alte entitati vor putea furniza doar simple informatii in scopul acordarii legitimatiei de maghiar, dar in cazuri exceptionale si numai la cererea expresa a consulatului. S-a exclus in totalitate posibilitatea ca organizatiile reprezentative ale maghiarilor din Romania sau alte entitati sa emita recomandari pe baza carora autoritatile de la Budapesta ar fi decis daca solicitantul beneficiaza de diferite avantaje. Ungaria nu va mai asigura nici un fel de sprijin organizatiilor politice maghiare din Romania, decat cu informarea prealabila a autoritatilor romane si dupa obtinerea consimtamantului din partea acestora. Memorandumul semnat sambata isi propune sa elimine discriminarile intre cetatenii romani, in special in ceea ce priveste acordarea unor avantaje de natura sociala si economica, prin extinderea tratamentului preferential si oferirea posibilitatii pentru toti cetatenii romani de a-si prelungi permisul de munca sau de a beneficia de rambursarea cheltuielilor pentru plata serviciilor medicale etc. Documentul mai prevede modificarea, in perioada urmatoare, a Acordului privind muncitorii sezonieri, prin extinderea acestor avantaje in cazul in care perioada de munca de depaseste trei luni si demararea negocierilor pentru elaborarea unei Conventii privind acordarea unui tratament preferential minoritatii romane din Ungaria, precum si minoritatii maghiare din Romania, in special prin extinderea avantajelor in domeniul cultural-educational. Partea romana considera ca aceasta solutie este conceputa in scopul detensionarii situatiei incepand cu 1 ianuarie 2002. "Necesitatea amendarii Legii statutului ramane insa in continuare o prioritate, pe care partea ungara trebuie sa o duca la indeplinire, cel mai probabil dupa depasirea contextului electoral din Ungaria", se arata intr-o Nota privind evaluarea intelegerii romano-ungare. Primul ministru Adrian Nastase a apreciat, la finalul ceremoniei de semnare a Memorandumului, ca acest document exemplifica modul in care, prin exercitarea vointei politice, s-a solutionat o problema delicata in relatiile cu Ungaria. El a anuntat ca, impreuna cu Viktor Orban, a decis "sa relanseze ideea summit-ului anual la nivel de prim-ministri" si sa marcheze implinirea a cinci ani de la semnarea tratatului politic de baza dintre Romania si Ungaria prin dezvoltarea unor proiecte economice si culturale comune. "Memorandumul ne ajuta sa nu ajungem, la 1 ianuarie 2002, intr-o situatie care sa creeze tensiune si prevede ca, in termen de sase luni, sa aiba loc o modificare a legislatiei, inclusiv a legii aflate in discutie", a spus Nastase. Premierul ungar Viktor Orban a afirmat ca partea ungara a acceptat obiectiile Executivului roman privind eliminarea diferentierilor pe criterii etnice intre intreprinzatorii romani, dar a precizat ca persoanele aflate pe piata muncii din Ungaria trebuie sa-si rezolve problemele cu angajatorii. (C.P.)

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2. RL07.01.02 Breviar CRU al UDMR despre Legea statutului Sambata, la Tg. Mures a avut loc Reuniunea Consiliului Consultativ al presedintilor teritoriali ai UDMR. Au fost prezenti 50 de reprezentanti din 16 judete. Pe ordinea de zi au figurat doua puncte: discutii pe marginea obtinerii legitimatiilor de maghiari, ce vor fi eliberate in conformitate cu Legea statutului maghiarilor din afara granitelor Ungariei, si problema protocolului cu partidul de guvernamant. S-a facut, de asemenea, o informare reciproca intre presedintii organizatiilor teritoriale ale UDMR in legatura cu Memorandumul de aplicare a Legii statutului maghiarilor din afara granitelor Ungariei semnat de cei doi prim-ministri ai Guvernelor Romaniei si Ungariei, Adrian Nastase si Viktor Orban, in luna decembrie 2001. Marko Bela a apreciat ca, "prin aceasta intelegere, pe de-o parte s-au eliminat piedicile in ceea ce priveste aplicarea Legii statutului in cazul maghiarilor din Romania si din acest punct de vedere suntem de acord cu continutul acestui acord si cu dispozitiile incluse in memorandum". Marko Bela a mai spus ca aceasta intelegere ar putea sa contribuie nu numai la aplicarea Legii statutului intr-un climat pozitiv, dar si la dezvoltarea in general a relatiilor romano-ungare, atat la nivel politic, cat si in plan economic. In ceea ce priveste activitatea care ar putea fi desfasurata in cadrul UDMR privind aplicarea Legii statutului, conform intelegerii dintre cele doua guverne, aceasta activitate ar fi una de recomandare privind solicitarea legitimatiei de maghiar, o activitate de informare, de transmitere de informatii privind unele criterii de indeplinire a unor conditii de abordare a acestei legitimatii. (St. C.)

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C U R R I C U L U M V I T A E Mihai-Paul Márton Date of birth: 14th October 1972 Place of birth: Cluj, Romania

mihai_marton@yahoo.de Qualifications

2002-2007 PhD at Bremen University, Germany. Title of PhD-Construction and Journalistic Narrative. A Discourse Analysis of Selected Hungarian

2002 Graduation from Hamburg University, Germany: Magister Artium (M.A.). Das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Minderheiten im heutigen Ungarn

1994-2002 Student of Social Anthropology (main subject), Economics, Finno-Ugric and Uralic Studies (subsidiary subjects) and Constitutional Law at Hamburg University.

Scholarships

2003-2006 PhD fellowship from the Evangelisches Studienwerk [Protestant Study Foundation]

2003 Residential scholarship at the Europe Institute, Budapest, Hungary.

Publications

2005 Márton, Mihai

Diskurs in der Presse. Ein ungarisch-rumänischer Vergleich. In: Krüger, Paula Meyer, Imke K. (eds.): Transcultural Studies. Interdisziplinarität trifft Transkulturalität. Bremen.

2004 Márton, Mihai

Teaching Cultural Uniformity in Hungary. Review of Joachim von Slowaken, Rumänen und Siebenbürger Sachsen in der Auseinandersetzung mit der ungarischen Staatsidee 1867-1914. http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=59971075872134

2003 Márton, Mihai

Reflections of a stranger. In: Adeleke, Kofo (ed.): Nigeria: People, Environment & Development. Lagos.

Bremen, 18th December 2007

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ERKLÄRUNG

Hiermit erkläre ich, Mihai-Paul Márton, geboren am 14.10.1972, dass,

- Die Arbeit ohne unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt wurde,

- Es keine anderen, als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt wurden

und

- Die den benutzten Werken wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als

solche kenntlich gemacht wurden.

_________________ (Mihai-Paul Márton)

Bremen, den 18.12.2007