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Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance: The Case of YugoslaviaAuthor(s): Garth Massey, Randy Hodson and Dusko SekulicSource: Social Forces, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Dec., 1999), pp. 669-693Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3005571 .
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Ethnic Enclaves and Intolerance:
The Case of Yugoslavia*
GARTHMASSEY,Universityof WyomingRANDY HODSON, Ohio State UniversityDUSKO SEKULIC,Flinders University,Australia
Abstract
Differencesn ethnictolerance mongmajority nd minority thnicgroupscanbeunderstoodnpartas theresult f structuralfactorsnvolving opulationrrangementsandthedistributionfpower, speciallys thesearemanifestn ethnicenclaves.Thecurrent rticlebuildsonAllport'sontact ypothesisncombination ithpropositionsfoundin Blalock'sheoryofminority-groupelations nd Blau's tructuralheoryofheterogeneityndinequalityoshowwhy patial rrangementsnd their orrespondingpowerrelationsnfluencentergroupeelingsof tolerance. modelof tolerance ithin
and outside nclavessproposed nd testedusing urveydata(N = 13,442) rom theformerYugoslaviaollectedn1989-90,ust before hecountry'sissolution.ntoleranceisgreatestnethnic nclavesorbothminority ndmajority roupmembers.Majoritygroup members ivingin enclavesdominatedbya minoritygroupare, throughacombinationfresentmentnd restraint n theirpower,more ntoleranthan nanyothersituation.Minoritygroupmembersiving n enclaves nd experiencing othnascentowerandanxietyn theirminoritytatus remore ntoleranthanwhen ivingdispersed mong majority opulations.Greater ttentionto the roleof enclavess
importantfor dvancingocial cienceunderstandingsfethnicand racial eparatism
andintegrationn multiethnicocieties. n thecaseof the ormerYugoslavia,oliciesthatseekharmonyby acceptingthnic eparationmaybesowingfutureonflict.
The turmoilof shifting political andscapes ollowingthe collapseof the Soviet
Union and the demise of CommunistPartyhegemony n EasternEuropeand the
Balkanshasraisedmany questionsaboutthesociologicalunderstandingf ethnic
*Wewould iketo thank woanonymouseviewersor theirusefulcommentsn earlierdrafts
of the article.Thisresearchwassupportednpart bygrants romtheNationalCouncilorEurasian nd EastEuropean esearch,heInternational esearchndExchanges oard,andtheMershonCenter t OhioStateUniversity.leasedirectcorrespondenceo GarthMassey,Department f Sociology,University f Wyoming, aramie,WY82071.
? The Universityof North CarolinaPress SocialForces,December1999, 78(2):669-691
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670 / Social Forces 78:2,December 1999
conflict(Brubaker&Laitin1998;Connor 1994;Wiliams 1994).The 1991-95war
in the formerYugoslavia, s well as violent conflictsin severalrepublicsof the
formerSovietUnion,haspittednationality gainstnationality,ometimesresulting
in atrocities against noncombatants that seem explicable only in terms ofprimordialhatreds,historicalmemory'scall for retribution,and the search or
security hroughculturalexclusivity. ociologistsaregivingrenewedattention o
cultural nd historicalactorsn caseswhereconflictappearso be drivenbyethnic
animosities.In the face of these new realities,earlierapproaches ocusing on
economic dislocation,class nequality, nd neocolonialunderdevelopmenteem
insufficient o informefforts o mediateamongcompetinggroupsand to generate
negotiated ettlements o fractionalwarfare.
Basedon theirexamination f national olerancen the finalyearsof theformer
Yugoslavia,owever,Hodson,Sekulic,andMassey 1994)conclude hatthe claim
of widespreadatent ntolerances a weakexplanationor thedevelopment f war
inYugoslavia. his assessment as beensupported ythe workof Calhoun 1997),
Cohen (1995), Denitch (1994),Silberand Little(1996),Woodward 1995),and
otherswho haverecognized hat the manipulationof historicalresentmentsby
leaders was an essential contributor to rising fears and the development of
exclusionary political formulas.This is not to say that ethnic divisions and
intolerancewerenonexistent.Rather hanbeingwidely shared, ntoleranceand
receptivity o a volatile politicsof identityseem to have been greatest n ethnicenclaves(Anderson1991;Denitch 1994;Gilliland1996).It is these enclaves hat
providethe motivationandthe focus forthe currentanalysis.
Muchof the armed mobilizationandfightinginYugoslavia manated rom
and occurredaround enclaves.Enclaveswereoftenstrongholdsof politicaland
militaryauthorityn a war thatselectively argeted ivilianson the basisof ethnic
identity (Denitch 1994;Silber& Little1996).We recognize hat a complexityof
factorsinfluence the developmentof civil conflict(Calhoun&Pfaff1998)and
that the developmentof the warinvolvedmilitaryand strategicconsiderations
beyondlevels of animosity n localareas.Wenevertheless eek to address everal
importantquestionsaboutthe roleof ethnictolerance n enclavesas one factor
that facilitated he developmentandspreadof conflict:Can the distributionand
concentration of people and power based on national identity help explain
differencesntolerance or others?Areethnicenclaves omehowradically ifferent
frommore ethnicallymixed areaswith regard o levelsof tolerance?Can ageneral
model of intolerance n enclavescontribute o the understanding f intergroup
relations n ethnicallyheterogeneous egionsand nations?
Theanalysispresentedhere offersan alternativeo thepopularview of ethnicintoleranceas basedon primordialhatredsand latentresentments see Forbes
1997).We posit insteada structural asisfor intolerancehat focuseson enclaves
of ethnic minorities.We arguethat the concentrationor dispersalof similarly
identifiedpeoplecan be a foundation or sentimentsof prideand fear, orthe felt
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EthnicEnclaves ndIntolerance 671
need forsecurity,nd forthe willingnesso mobilize o attainpolitical oals Hechter
1987).
Ouranalysis eeksto illuminate he situationof differentlydentifiedgroups
whosemembershavemore or less contactwith one another,whosepower s readilytied to national dentity,andthat recognizes imilarityof nationalityasa viable
basisforparticipationn politicalsociety.The dataprovidea measureof national
tolerancea short time before the civilwar in Yugoslavia, he analysisof which
suggestswhyleadersnthe warpursuedpolicies hatmadeenclaves central actor
in both military trategy nd long-termpoliticalagendas White 1996).
The Structural Basis for Intolerance
The past several decades of researchin the social sciences have laid a solid
foundation for a structuralmodel of intolerancein ethnic enclaves.Gordon
Ailport's(1954) original insightsinto group contact and prejudicestimulated
decadesof importantresearch ndthinking.HerbertBlumer's ssays n the 1950s
also pointed to the importanceof spatialarrangementshat couldgenerate ear
and athreat o [the] status,securityand welfareof the dominantethnicgroup
(Blumer [1958] 1988:190).HubertBlalock's ndPeterBlau'smacrosociological
approaches, mphasizing elativepower n termsof both numbersandcontrolofresources, lso contribute o an understanding f group fear,resentment, nd the
search orsecurity n waysthatgo beyondAilport'smoreinterpersonal pproach
(seealso Oberschali 993,1996).We utilize henotions of population omposition
andintergroup ontact, s well as relative ower, ompetition, ndgroupsolidarity,
to developa generalmodelappropriateo explaining ntolerance n and outside
enclave ituations.Wethenspecify hismodelin termsof testablehypothesesand
test it usingthe case of the formerYugoslavia.1
Thestudyof ethnicrelations equires careful xamination f the distribution
of ethnicgroupmembers n multiethnic ocieties.This is especialiyruein periodsof transitionwhenpoliticalarrangementsnd the distribution f powerare n flux,
when theeconomy sfaltering, ndwhenthedependabilityf political, conomic,
andsecurity tructures s uncertain.Allthese conditionspreceded he civil war of
the early1990sinYugoslavia.
CONTACTAND DOMINANCE
GordonAilport's(1954) contacthypothesis,an analysis hat focuses ontruly
structural eatures f ethnic relations(Pettigrew1986), begins by rejecting heseemingly impletruismthatfamiliarity reedscontempt.Rather,Allportargues,
contactand interactionbetweenmembers of differently dentifiedgroupsare
critical o recognizing imilarities nd to accurateknowledgeof theother, ence
to trustand tolerance(see also Hechter& Kanazawa1997).Levelsof prejudice
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672 / Social Forces 78:2,December 1999
and tolerance n this model are largelya function of opportunities or contact,
which stem, in turn, from demographic circumstances (i.e., the population
composition of an areasharedbytwo or more groups).2Allport'sworksuggests
that wherepeople are isolated n enclaves here is lessopportunity o build trustand forgecrosscutting dentitiesand interests o mitigateethnic intolerance.
The natureof the contact s, of course, critical (Hewstone& Brown 1986;
Pettigrew1971).Tolerances fosteredwhen groupsare pursuingcommon goals,
when they are of roughly equal status, and when the interaction has wide
institutional upport Allport1954).SinceAllportproposedhis contacthypothesis
therehavebeen significant efinements e.g.,Amir1969),andseveralweaknesses
in the originalconceptualizationhave been recognized(Brewer& Miller1984;
Hardinget al. 1969),but thebasicmodelhasgeneratedan enormousamountof
supportive researchand continues to inform inquiries into prejudice and
intolerance e.g., Forbes1997).
Inmanyexisting ituationshelimitedamountof intergroup ndinterpersonal
contactand the natureof thatcontactwouldpredict trained thnicrelations.What
Allportdidnot explorentheseproblematicituationssthe constellation f power
and the social-psychologicalimensionsof humanrelationshipshatare illedwith
distrust, ear,and the search or security.Theworkof HerbertBlumer,PeterBlau,
and HubertBlalockhelpsfillthis gapin the analysisof ethnic relations.
Blalock 1967) andBlau(1977) both recognize,as didAilport, hattoleranceis greatestwhereheterogeneitys highest,barringa situationwherenumerically
similar ethnic groupsare in competitionover a zero-sumvalue (Olzak 1983).
Important, oo, is the role of official upport or intergroup ontact,as in socialist
Yugoslavia rior o thedeathof Tito.
Into an increasingly insecure and competitive environment, however,
distinctionscast as ethnicdifferences anbecomethebasisfor distrustand fear
(Blalock 1967;Hewstone&Brown 1986).This was particularly rue in prewar
Yugoslavia Bringa1995;Gilliland1996). Suchdistinctionsandfearscanfuelthe
experienceof feelingthreatened, speciallywhenone grouphas clearnumerical
superiority,sin anethnicenclave Blalock 967). t isthese arger tructuralactors
of intergroup relations and power that are missed by Allport's theory of
interpersonal ontact.And it is these factors hat becomeparticularlyalient at
timesof societalchange.
THE CONCEPTOF ETHNIC ENCLAVES
Individuals dentifiedas having specificethnic, racial,or national dentitiesareoften found in enclavesor communitieswith high concentrationsof similarly
identified individuals. In cities these may carry the suffix of town (e.g.,
Germantown ),nd in ruralareasheyare ownsorvillages, ftenwith distinctive
names reflecting he languageor dialectof the inhabitants.Such enclaves are
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EthnicEnclavesndIntolerance 673
distinctareas n thattheyaresurroundedby people of anotherethnicity, ace,or
nationality.
The conceptof ethnicenclaves, ntering he sociologyexiconwith RobertParks
contributions o thestudyof cities (Faris1967),was latereclipsedby the idea of aghetto containinga high concentrationof a minoritypopulation,usuallyas the
consequenceof practicesof discriminationand exclusion and fostering both
geographicand social isolation (Massey& Denton 1993).While Portesand his
colleaguesdesignateethnic enclavesas places of ethnic employment (Portes&
Jensen1987;Portes&Manning 1986;Sanders&Nee 1987),we adopt the more
generalnotion of ethnic enclaveasaplaceof residencewithahigh concentration
of similarlydentified ndividuals nd families. nAmerican ociology,residential
ethnic enclaves have been nearly synonymous with urban neighborhoods
(Abrahamson 1996), although the concept is equally applicable to areas
encompassing everal owns andsurrounding uralareasand even one or more
cities.
POPULATIONARRANGEMENTSAND INTOLERANCE
The conceptualizationdevelopedin our analysisrequiresa refinementof the
definition f who isminority ndwhoismajority.Weretainhestandardociological
notion that majority/minority tatus is determinedby the relativepowerof aparticular roup (Feagin&Feagin1993).Inthiscasewe recognizepowerasbeing
exercised n a politicallyunified areaby people with a common identity.For
socialistYugoslavia hat areawas the republic, or example,Serbia,Croatia,or
Slovenia.. hus,forexample,Serbs n Serbiaaremajoritygroupmembers.Their
majority tatus does not changeso long astheyarelivingin Serbia,evenif theyreside n anenclave hatisnumerically ominatedby Croatsor BosnianMuslims.
Similarly, minoritysanynumericallynferior roupwithina republic ominated
byanothergroup,forexample,Serbs n Croatia.What doeschange s thelevel of
powerheldbyagroup.Themajoritye.g.,Serbs)are ndisputably ominantwhentheyarenumericallyuperiorn arepublic, utwhenthey ive in aminority non-
Serb)enclave, heyarecorrespondinglymuch weaker.
In our analysiswe investigate he average evel of toleranceseparately or
majorityandminoritygroups ivingin threedifferentocal situations: 1) where
the majoritygroup is numericallydominant, (2) where the majoritygroup is
numericallynferior ndaminoritygroup snumericallyuperior i.e.,in anethnic
enclave),and(3) whereno grouphasnumericaldominance i.e.,in anethnicallymixedarea).Correspondingly, minoritygroupcan be found where hemajority
is numericallydominant, n their own minorityenclaves,or in ethnicallymixed
areas.Ourprimaryocus sthecomparison f howeachgroup'sevelof intolerance
variesacross hesethreesituations.
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674 / Social Forces 78:2, December 1999
We use the following terms to designate these different living situations. A
dominantmajority efers o the ethnicmajority hat is numericallydominantin
both the larger geopolitical region and the immediate locale, for example, whites
in Minnesota or ethnic Japanese in Kyoto. Minority group members living in a
region and locale that is numerically dominated by another group constitute a
localminority,uch asethnicAlbaniansivingin Croatian-dominatedagreb.An
enclavedmajority roup s madeupof members f thedominantgroup nthelarger
geopolitical areawho live locally as a numerical minority. This situation describes,
for example, Anglos in a predominantly Hispanic community in the United States.
An enclavedminority roupis aminoritygroupwhose membersarenumerically
dominant in their enclave. They form a numerically dominant group in the
immediate locale but not in the larger surrounding geopolitical area,as in the case
of Native Americans living within the boundaries of a reservation.
In the first of these situations, where a local majority holds clear numerical
superiority and its power is commensurate with this, the dominant population is
comfortable being intolerant toward a minority population with which it has little
contact. Especially in cases where ethnic stratification resigns a minority to
economic and political positions of subordination, any minority aspirations may
be ridiculed and dismissed by the majority. Normative barriers against majority
members having contact with minorities further heightens discrimination against
minorities (Blau 1977). A numerically dominant group may thus develop confidentintoleranceowardothergroupsaspartof thelegitimizationf itsprivileged osition
and discriminatory actions (Brass 1985).
As Allport recognized, members of a local minority, our second possible
demographic situation, will have high levels of interethnic contact. This may
facilitate a realistic appraisal of the other, but for the local minority it can also
lead to a sense of caution and well-reasoned acquiescence. Local minorities may
thus mix an appraisalof their less-than-equal treatment with a realistic evaluation
of their inabilityto alter the situation. They thus can be expected to hold relatively
tolerantattitudesandto displayaquiescentntoleranceoward hemajority roup.
Enclavedmajorities, residents of enclaves who belong to the ethnic group that
dominates the larger geopolitical area in which the enclave exists but who are
themselves a numerical minority in the enclave, present a third possible situation.
We hypothesize that intolerance will be most strongly manifest in such enclaves.
Majority group members living in minority enclaves may hold exaggerated
sentiments of victimization, based on the perception of being treated as a minority,
despite their political and economic dominance. Indeed, their majority status in
the wider area can be expected to give them a feeling of rightful power, but theirdaily recognition that they area numerically inferior (and often culturally solated)
group may fuel a sense of potential victimization. It is predicted that such enclave
residents will be fearful about their local status and will evidence higher levels of
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EthnicEnclaves ndIntolerance 675
defensiventolerancehan membersof their ethniccohort living outside minority
enclaves.
Though numericallyand often legally nferiorwithin the largergeopolitical
area,membersof anenclavedminority,hefourthpossible ituation, anharboracombinationof pridein numbersand potential,evenincipient,power. ncipient
power, uchas thatexperienced y minoritypopulationswho hold localnumerical
superioritynan enclave,mayfoster trong eelings f intoleranceoward theother.
Enclavedminorities may displaya potent mix of prideand local strengthwith
resentment, senseof injusticeabout imits on theirpower,andanxietyaboutthe
intentionsof the dominant groupin the surroundinggeopoliticalarea.The mix
of anxiety ndaspirationsanreinforceneanother,reating situation f expectant
power hat manifests tselfascontestingntoleranceoward he dominantmajority.
Threeotherpossiblesituationsalsoexist. Membersof a majoritygroup may
live n areaswhere here s no clearmajority. imilarly,members f minoritygroups
maylive in suchethnicallymixedareas.Finally,herearegroupsthatnowhere n
a countryhave a majority tatus.In the formerYugoslaviauchgroups ncluded
Roma(Gypsies),Jews,andRomanians.Levelsof ethnic tolerance orallbut the
lastof these situationsarepredicted n the followinghypotheses,whicharetested
in subsequentanalysis.
Hypotheses about StructurallyDetermined Intolerance
Theprinciple uiding heformulation fourhypothesess that he leveloftolerance
is structurallynfluenced n predictableways by the majority-minoritytatusof
groups. Eachhypothesis expressesthe more generalidea that the numerical
proportion fdifferentlydentified ersonsand theirspatial elation o othergroups
is a significantdeterminantof a group's evelof ethnic/national olerance.Our
generalmodel canbe stated n a seriesof hypotheses hat canbe testedwithdata
from the formerYugoslavia.Thedependentvariable, strengthf identity o aparticularacial,national,or
ethnicgroup, impliesfeelings hatracial,national,or ethnicidentitiesaresalient
(e.g.,thathomogamousmarriages repreferred rthatpoliticalrepresentations
bestprovidedby membersof one'sown racial,national,or ethnicgroup).Weuse
the term intoleranceo denotegreater upport orthis sentimentand toleranceo
denote lesssupport or this sentiment.3
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676/ Social Forces 78:2,December1999
CONFIDENTAND QUIESCENTINTOLERANCEAMONG DOMINANT MAJORITIES
AND LOCALMINORITIES
If intergrouprelationshave these psychologicalconsequences extensiveassociations ith personswhohavedifferent ackgroundsndexperiencere
likelyomakepeoplemore olerant)he heoremsmplyhat tructuralonditions
promoteolerance, idenperspectives,ndstimulatentellectualctivitiesmong
members f smallminoritieswhilehavingoppositenfluences n members f
largemajorities.Blau1977:22)
Therewillbe a general endency ordominantgroupattitudes owarda minority
groupwithwhom theylive in close proximity o be more negative hanminority
groupmembers' ttitudes oward hosein themajority.Majority roupprejudiceand intoleranceagainstminoritiescangiveexaggeratedmportance o cultural
markers fromeatingcustomsand conversational abits o dialectandeyecolor)
that distinguishmajoritiesromminoritiesandthatfueltheirprejudicesBlalock
1967). This argument eadsto the hypothesisof moderate intoleranceamong
majorities,consonantwith havingthe dominantrole in a situationof clearly
recognizedunequalpower.
Hypothesis: Dominantmajoritiesillbemoderatelyntolerantowardminority
groups.
Blau'spropositions,followingAllport'searlier formulations,also apply to
minoritieswho liveamongthenumerically ominantmajority.Minoritiesn this
situationarelikelyto be quite tolerant.When minorities arewidely dispersed
amongthe dominantpopulation,onlywithgreatdifficulty antheybe solidaristic
with othergroupmembers.In order to survivethey must be accommodating,
deemphasize ifferences,ndemphasize imilarities etween hemselves nd those
amongwhomthey ive.FollowingCoser's1975)description f cosmopolitanole
sets, Blau(1977)seesmembersof minoritiesasbeing less oyaland committed
to their owngroups.... theyare alsoexpected o ... reduce heir ethnocentrismand increase heirtolerance 96).
Hypothesis: Minorities remore olerantwhen heyaredispersednmajority-
dominatedreashanwhen ivingnminority nclaves.
DEFENSIVEAND CONTESTING NTOLERANCE N ENCLAVES
In the aftermathof thewar in Bosnia,much has beenwrittenaboutthe Serbian
CCstrongholdsf Pale,BanjaLuka,and elsewhere Ignatieff1995;Zimmermann
1995).Croatian nclavesn Herzegovina nd Muslimenclavesn the Sandzak rea
were also knownas strongholds f nationalism. hese areaswere the sourceof
some of thestrongestesistanceo politicalnegotiations ndconcessionshatwould
have led to politicalaccommodationratherthan war. These enclaves,and the
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678 / SocialForces 78:2,December 1999
tolerance.Though minoritygroup members'opportunities or contactwiththe
majority opulationwillbe somewhatdiminishednmixedareas han n majority-
dominatedareas,contactwill stillbe substantial, nd the level of toleranceamong
minority group members living in mixed areasshould be similar to that ofminorities n areasdominatedby a majoritygroup.Forpersonsof the majority
group, ivingand interacting n a regularbasiswithothers n mixed areas hould
tempertheirintolerance.Experiencesof shared ivingwill make both minority
andmajoritygroupmembers esssusceptible o the forcesof insecurity, nxiety,
and fearthat canencouragenegativeattitudes owardothers n less horizontally
differentiated reas Blau 1977).
Hypothesis: In nationallymixed areas toleranceamong majoritygroup
memberswillbe higherhan hat oundamongmajority roupmembersivingelsewhere.
Hypothesis: In nationallymixed areastolerance among minority group
memberswillbehigherhan hat oundamongminority roupmembersiving
elsewhere.
These ixhypothesesanbe testedby comparingoleranceevelsamongmajority
groupsand minoritygroups iving nvariouspartsof theformerYugoslavia. ather
than focusingon the particular ulturalcontent of a national, racial,or ethnic
identity,we treateachgroupsolely n termsof itsminority/majoritytatusandthenumerical relationship between groups in majority-dominatedareas, ethnic
enclaves, and nationally mixed areas. The six enumeratedhypotheses predict
differencesn tolerance mongmajority roupmembersacrossdifferent ituations
andamongminoritygroupmembersacrossdifferent ituations.Consistentwith
Ailport's ontacthypothesisand withBlalock's nd Blau's nalysesof intergroup
power, however,we also expect majorities o be consistently ess tolerant than
mmorities.
ResearchDesign and Measurement
Inthewinterof 1989-90 he Consortium f SocialResearchnstitutes fYugoslaviaconducted interviews in workplacesand households in all the republics of
Yugoslavia, tilizinga multistage andomcluster amplingdesign.Thecompleted
surveyincluded 13,422 adults age 18 or older distributedacrossrepublicsand
autonomousprovinces (KosovoandVojvodina) n accord with the size of the
population of each.The occupational,educational,andagedistributionsof the
sample closely approximate hose reported n the lastYugoslav ensusof 1981.
The sampling design, however,resulted n a disproportionatenumber of male
respondents.To adjust he sample o be representative f the genderdistribution
of Yugoslav dults,malerespondentswereweighted7691 and femalerespondents
wereweighted1.4007.Thequestionnaire athered widerangeof information nd
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EthnicEnclaves ndIntolerance 679
includedquestionsallowing heconstruction f indicesof concepts mportant or
the studyof toleranceand enclaves.
ETHNIC/NATIONALTOLERANCE
Respondentswere asked heir evel of agreementon a five-pointLikert calewith
sixpropositionsmeasuring thnicnationalism: 1) Nationality houldbe a central
factor n choosinga marriagepartner; 2) Nationallymixedmarriages re more
unstable hanothermarriages;3) Every ationshouldhave tsowin tate; 4) People
canfeel completely afeonlywhenthe majority elongto theirnation; 5) Among
nations t is possible o createcooperation,but not fulltrust; 6) Without eaders
everynationis like a manwithouta head.All items have item-totalcorrelations
above 4 exceptthe lastitem,which scalespoorly (61.5%of the responses o thisitemaregrouped n the strongly gree ategory).Accordingly,his temwas dropped
fromthe scale.The remainingtemswerereverse cored o thathigh scores ndicate
greater olerance.Theresulting ive-itemscale hasa reliabilityndexof .72.
REPUBLICDIVERSITY
Oursixhypotheses ocus on the geographicevel of the local area theopcaina
(roughly quivalento a U.S.countyor parish).To control or the effectof national
diversityat the republic evel,we use an indicatorof the nationaldiversityof the
republic,as measuredby the index of qualitative ariation Bohrnstedt& Knoke
1988:76-77):
k 2
i=1
(K -1)/K
where K = the number of categoriesand p = the proportion of casesin the ith
category.
The indexranges rom0, indicatinghatallcasesare n asingleethniccategory,
to 1, indicating hat the casesarespreadevenlyacrossethnicgroups.
MAJORITY/MINORITYTATUS
The majority/minority tatus of personsis measured n two ways.The first is a
continuousmeasureof thepopulationpercentage f nationalgroupswithin each
republic.The percentageof the population representedby a particulargroupmeasures hepotentialpowerbaseof thatnationalgroup n a republic see Blalock
1967). In ethnic competition theory, group size is consideredan important
determinant f thepotential orgroupmobilization Nielsen 1985;Olzak&Nagel
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680 / Social Forces 78:2,December 1999
1986;Olzak &West 1991). Republic-level umericaldominance hus represents
potentialpowerwhichmayinfluencea group's evelof tolerance.
A group's population percentagewithin each republic, however, does not
differentiate etween he situation n therepublicasa wholeandlocal situations.In the followingdiscussionwe treat he opcina(pluralopcine)as the local unit of
measurementor potential thnicenclaves.Test ituations ncludeareasof majority
numericaldomination,enclaveswhereminoritiesarenumerically ominant,and
mixed regionswhere there are no clear numerical majorities.To depict these
situations, we classifysix mutually exclusive situations of possible majority/
minoritystatus.We alsospecifya seventh esidual ategory epresentingecondary
minoritieswhohaveno homerepublicnwhich heyare hemajority. hiscategory
servesas a baselineandincludessuchgroupsas Roma,Jews,Romanians, talians,andHungarians.The seven ivingsituationsare as follows: 1) republicmajority/
opcinamajority dominantmajority), 2) republicminority/opcinaminority local
minority), 3) republicmajority/opcina inority enclavedmajority), 4) republic
minority/op6inamajority enclavedminority), 5) republicmajority/op6ina ixed,
(6) republicminority/opcinamixed, (7) secondaryminority not amajority n
any republicor opcina.
The cutoffpointfordeterminingmajority rminoritydominancenanopcina
is 50%of the population n anyone ethnicgroup. Opcinewith lessthan50%of
the populationin any one ethnicgroupare consideredethnicallymixed.Eachsituationis treatedasa dummyvariable n the followingregressionanalysis see
Table2) with the sum of the meansof thesesevenvariables qualing1.
ADDITIONAL STRUCTURALFACTORS
Fouradditionalets of characteristicsanbeexpectedo influenceoleranceoward
othernationalities:demographic actors,socialstatus,socialparticipation,and
religiosity.Demographicactors nclude ex,age,birthresidence,urrent esidence,
andnationallymixedparentage ndmarriage.Modernizationheorysuggestshat
olderpeopleandruralresidentsare lesstolerant,whileyoung peopleand urban
residentsaremore cosmopolitan i.e.,involved n the processof modernism).
(For a contrasting view based on the ethnic competition model, see Olzak
1983:367-68.)
Respondentswereasked f theyhad been bornin avillage,ocalvillagecenter,
opcinacenter, egional enter,macroregionalenter, rrepublic rprovincecenter,
and they werealso asked a similarquestionabouttheircurrentresidence.The
modalbirthresidencesvillage,with themedianbeingbetweenocalvillagecenterandopcinacenter.The modal current esidencesalsoavillage,but thepercentage
currently ivingin opcinacenters s higherand thepercentage urrently ivingin
macroregionalenterssdramaticallyreater,ivaling illageas the modalcategory.
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EthnicEnclaves ndIntolerance 681
Nationallymixed familystructures re predictedby modernization heory o
lead to greater olerance(Bonacich& Model 1980). Our measureof nationally
mixed parentage s based on comparing he nationalitiesof each respondent's
mother and father.A nationallymixed marriage s ascertainedby comparingarespondent's ationalitywith the nationalityof his or her spouse.Approximately
8%of respondentsare the offspringof nationallymixedfamilies,and8%arein
nationallymixed marriages.Genderand maritalstatusare includedas controls;
these are coded as dummy variables, with male = 1 and married= 1.4
Approximately 1%of respondents re marriedor cohabiting.
Twoaspectsof socialstratification education nd employment arecentral
to modernization nd ethnic competition heories.More highlyeducatedpeople
areexpected o be moretolerant,according o modernization heory.Education s
codedas yearsof schooling ompleted nd averagesustover 10years.Occupational
position s coded as fourbinaryvariablespecifyinghe categories f unemployed
persons, employed persons, peasants,and retiredpersons.According o ethnic
competitionheory,personswho areunemployed anbe expected o have ncreased
intolerance owardothernationalgroupsbecauseof intensifiedcompetitionfor
jobs: Economic ontraction n combinationwithhigh immigration lows raises
levelsof ethnic competition,which in turn increasesrates of ethnic collective
action Olzak 1992:37).Direct measuresof economic competitionbetween the
various thnicgroupsnYugoslaviaver abormarketpositionsorpolitical r socialresourceswerenot available.ngeneral, uchdirectmeasures f ethniccompetition
havebeen difficult o operationalize see Belanger& Pinard1991).
Participationn politicalorganizationsnd involvementn thebroader ocietythroughreading he news are predictedby modernization heoryto increase he
levelof national oleranceanddiluteallegiances uilt narrowly n ethnic dentity.
Weusethreesourcesof information n political nvolvement:membershipn the
Leagueof YugoslavCommunists LYC), fficeholdingn workplace rganizations,
and officeholding n community organizations.Membershipn the LYC an be
expected o implya greater ommitmentto explicitlyarticulatednationalgoals,amongwhich wastolerance or differentnationalities ndsupport orapluralist,
multinational tate.TheCommunistPartymembershipvariables coded yes=
1 orthosewho reporteithercurrently eingmembersof the LYC rhavingbeen
members n thepast.About34%of respondents eported itherbeingin the LYC
currently 1989-90)or havingbeen members n the past.
The othertwo measures f political nvolvementarebasedon participationn
politicalorganizationsntheworkplace rcommunity.n 1952,Yugoslaviadopted
acomplexpolitical ystemwhereby ll citizenswereto berepresentedothat their
workplaces nd in theirneighborhoods.Thoughthe CommunistPartyremained
hegemonic, local governmentand workerself-managementwere the sites of
political involvement for millions of Yugoslav citizens (Rusinow 1977).
Respondentswere asked f they occupiedan electedpositionattheirworkplace.
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682 / Social Forces 78:2,December 1999
Positiveanswerswerecoded 1.Workplace rganizationsncludedboth tradeunions
and workerself-management ouncils.Respondentswerealso asked f theyheld
an electedpositionin a communityorganization.Later n the interview heywere
asked f theywere active n anycommunityorganizations.A positive response oeitherquestion esultedna codeof 1forparticipationncommunity rganizations.
Communityorganizationsncludeyouth organizations,he SocialistAlliance,and
electedparliamentary odies fromthe commune to the federation.About 18%
and 20%of respondents,respectively, eportedactive participation n workor
communityorganizations.
Literacy ndnewspaper eadingprovidegreater ontactwiththeworldand are
expectedto increasenationaltolerance,according o modernization heory.In
addition,newspapers ndtelevisionweredirectlyunderLYC ontrolprior o 1989,andthe officialpositionof the LYCwasto support oleranceamongnationalities.
Other media such as radio and magazineswere only slightlyless controlled.
Regularly eading he news canthus be expected o increasenationaltolerance.
Respondentswere asked whetherthey read a newspaperdaily (4), weekly(3),
monthly (2), or never(1). Later n the questionnaire, espondentswereasked o
identify heir hreemostcommon eisureactivities. ome dentified reading ews
as their most importanteisureactivity 4), andothersreportedt as theirsecond
or thirdmost importantactivity(coded 3 and 2, respectively)or not at all (1).
Responsesto thesetwo questionswere summed to createa scale of reading henewsranging rom 2 to 8.
Levelof religiositys consideredanimportantnegative nfluenceon tolerance
by modernization heorists.Respondentswere askedquestionson a three-point
scaleindicating heir evelof belief in God,life afterdeath,andthe ideathat God
createdpeople. Theywerealsoaskedhow oftenthey attendedreligiousservices
(never,monthly,weekly,ordaily)andif theirchildrenattendedreligious chools.
All items scaledpositivelywith item-totalcorrelations bove 4. Theresultingive-
item standardized calehasa reliabilityndex of .86.
Results
Table1reportsthe aggregateolerance evelsfor eachrepublicandautonomous
province n the formerYugoslavia. osniaandVojvodinawere he unitsof greatest
tolerance,with levels of toleranceapproaching4 on a 5-point scale.The range
betweenrepublics s considerable,withthenadiroccurringn Kosovoat 1.71.
Tolerance lsovariesbynationalitywithinrepublics.Personswho identifiedasYugoslavsreamong hemost tolerant f allpeople (see Sekulic,Massey& Hodson
1994),with tolerance scores above 4.00 everywhere xcept in Serbia.Minority
populationsin republicsalsoevidencerelativelyhigh levels of tolerance,adding
support o the ideathat smallnumbersresult nproportionallymorecontactwith
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EthnicEnclavesand Intolerance 683
TABLE : ToleranceLevelsby RepublicandNationality:Yugoslavia,1989-1890
RepublicsMonte- Mace-
Nationality Croatia Bosnia SerbiaVojvodinaKosovo Slovenia negro donia
Croatian 3.46 3.62 4.05 3.28(1,921) (332) (77) (43)
Muslim 3.67 3.84 3.22 3.42
(37) (830) (191) (60)Serbian 4.05 3.88 3.23 3.74 1.91 3.50 3.38
(304) (522) (2,793) (797) (91) (39) (35)
Albanian 1.67 2.66 1.68(863) (30) (167)
Slovenian 2.59
(1,158)
Montenegran 3.42 3.43
(76) (715)Macedonian 2.74
(718)Yugoslav 4.27 4.25 3.85 4.07 4.16
(244) (312) (180) (189) (60)
Hungarian 3.81(147)
Other 3.92 2.10
(35) (55)Al 3.62 3.88 3.29 3.83 1.71 2.67 3.45 2.53
nationalities (2,588) (2,020) (3,317) (1,314) (983) (1,294) (909) (973)
(N= 13,422)
Note.Numbersnparenthesesre ample izes.Onlycellswith30 or morerespondentsre
reported.
majoritiesand,in terms of power relations,greateroleranceby wayof reasoned
timidity.Such olerancestypicalof Serbsn Croatia4.05)andCroatsnVojvodina
(4.05).The lowest evelsof tolerance reevidenced n Kosovo or both themajority
Albanians ndthe minoritySerbs.Herethe regionalhistoryof ill will andconflict
appears ominantoverconsiderations f minority/majoritytatus.Even n Kosovo,
however,minoritySerbs resomewhatmore olerant1.91)thanmajorityAlbanians
(1.67). Relativelyow levelsof tolerancealsoprevailn Macedonia. nMacedonia,however,majorityMacedonians remore tolerant 2.74) than minorityAlbanians
(1.68).Thismaybe a consequence f the fact hatAlbanians o not feelthemselves
to be a minoritybut see themselvesas members of the dominantgroup in an
ethnicallyhomogeneous erritory hat spreads romAlbania hroughKosovo nto
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EthnicEnclaves ndIntolerance 685
TABLE : Regression f Tolerance n Demographic,SocialStatus,Participa-tion, Religiosity, ndNationalCompositionVariables: ugoslavia,1989-1990
Unstandardizedoefficients
Independent ariables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3)
DemographicvariablesAge 40.63 14.56 .003*** .003*** .003***Married .71 .45 -.092*** -.074*** -.074***Male .49 .50 -.160*** -.162*** -.164***Urbanismorigins) 2.30 1.62 -.005 -.003 -.006
Urbanismcurrent) 3.30 1.81 .033*** .031*** .031***
Mixedparentage .08 .28 .166*** .105*** .118***Mixedmarriage .08 .28 .479*** .360*** .357***
Social tatus
Education 10.07 3.96 -.001 .002 .004
Employedbaseline) .60 .43 .000 .000 .000Unemployed .12 .32 -.295*** -.294*** -.296***
Peasant .15 .36 .060* .072* .077*Retired .13 .34 -.038 -.035 .031
Social articipation
Communistarty .34 .45 .030 .017 .016Work rganization .20 .40 .089*** .090*** .084***Civic rganization .18 .38 .053* .047 .051*Read ews 4.56 1.30 -.028*** -.025*** -.023***
ReligiosityReligiositycale .00 1.00 -.308*** -.308*** -.306***
NationalompositionDiversityndex .48 .19 1.365*** 1.062*** 1.033***
Majoritytatus 57.67 30.48 -.004***
Dominantmajority .64 .48 -.260***Localminority .06 .23 .134**
Enclaved ajority .01 .10 -.390***Enclavedminority .07 .26 -.127**
Majorityn mixedarea .01 .12 -.162*
Minorityn mixedarea .06 .25 .129**
Secondary inorities
(baseline) .14 .35 .000
Constant 2.621 2.947 2.889
R2 .2326*** .2394*** .2456***
(N= 13,422)
* p < .05 ** p < .01 * p < .001 (two-tailed-tests)
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686 I Social Forces 78:2, December 1999
reported in the lower right-hand corner of Table 2 and in Figure 1. True or
secondaryminoritieshavingno republics ropcina n whichthey aredominant
serveas thereference ategory or thisanalysis.Theincrease n explained ariance
betweenmodel2 and model 3 is statisticallyignificant t the .001level, ndicatinga better fit with the data. Moreimportant, he categoricalmeasureof majority/minority tatusallowsusto examinepatterns f tolerance crossdifferent tructural
settings, ncluding enclavesandnationallymixed locales.
Aspredictedby hypothesis1,majoritygroups iving as majorities dominant
majorities)are intolerantof other nationalities -.260). Conversely, ssuggested
by hypothesis2, local minoritiesliving in majority-dominated reas are fairlytoleranttowardother nationalities .134). Wherea minority ives in a minority-
dominated ndave(asanenclavedminority),minority olerance f othersslowest(-.127), supportinghypothesis4. Hypothesis3,predictinghe condition nwhich
majoritygroupmemberswillbe leasttolerant, s alsosupported.Specifically,he
toleranceof majoritygroupmembers ivingasanenclavedmajorityn an opcina
dominatedby anothergroupis evenlower(-.390) than wherethe majority ives
locallyas a dominantmajority contrastsignificantat the .001level).
Hypothesis5 predicts hatrepublic-levelmajoritiesiving n mixedopcinewill
be more tolerantthan when living elsewhere.Consistentwith this hyjothesis,
majoritygroupmembersaremost tolerant n nationallymixedopcine.Pepublic-
level minoritiesliving in nationallymixed opcineare about equallyas tolerant(.129) as local minorities(.134).Average olerance evelsin both situationsare
considerably reaterhanamongminoritiesivingasenclavedminorities contrasts
significant at the .001 level). This pattern provides only partialsupport for
hypothesis6, whichpredicts hatminority olerancewill be greatestn ethnically
mixed areas. nstead,weobservehatminorityolerancesequally igh n ethnicallymixed areasand where minority members live in majority-dominatedareas.
Conversely,minoritytolerance s lowestin minorityenclaves.
Table 3 presents standardizedtolerance levels for the sevenstructurallydifferentiatediving arrangements valuated eparately y republic.These mean
tolerancelevelshave been standardizedby adjusting olerance evels to reflect
averagepopulationcharacteristics cross the formerYugoslaviaas specifiedin
model 1 of Table2. Theregion-specificoefficientsn Table3 reinforcehepatternsfound in model 3 of Table2. Majority tatus n a republic essenstolerance,and
this effect s amplified mean figures ortolerancearesmaller)wherethemajority
lives as a numeric minority in an opcina dominatedby another nationality.
Minority groupmembersare most tolerantwhenlivingin majority-dominated
opcineor in nationallymixedareas;whenconcentratedn localeswherethey arethe dominantgroup,theirtolerance owardothersdecreases.
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EthnicEnclavesndIntolerance687
FIGURE1: ToleranceCoefficientsorMinorityandMajorityPopulations nOpcinewithVariousDemographicConditions:Yugoslavia, 989-1990
0.3 -
0.2 REPUBLICMINORITYOPULATIONS
0.134 0.129
0.1 -Local MixedMinority Opcine \
0-\
0) 1 127
_-1 REPUBLICMAJORITYOPULATIONSo -0.162 Enclave
3 M yMinority-0.2 xed
-0.260 Opcine \
Dominant\-0.3 Majority \
-0.4- -
~~~~~~~~~EnclavedMajority
-0.5DemographicConditions
Note.Thetolerance oefficientsre rommodel3 of Table .
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690/ Social Forces 78:2,December 1999
Condusions
Socialist ugoslavian thebrink fwarprovidesnunprecedentedpportunityo
examinehe structuralasesof nationalolerance.t is a troublingxample f thechallengesacing state ystemhat riesboth o recognizeationalitysa culturalidentityandto prohibit ationalitys abasis orpolitical ction see Greenfeld1992).
Slavnationalityroupsnarodi)hafed t restraintsnengagingn a politicsof identity whileharboring rievancesn being reated quallywith nationalminoritiesnarodnosti),sspecifiedn the constitutions f socialistYugoslavia.More mportant,heyexperiencedear nd/orhatredoward thernationalitiessdetermined,t least npart,by the demographictructure f their haredivingarrangements.
Yugoslaviaost tspoliticalenter ndbeganheplungentoeconomicuin nthe lastyearsof Tito's eignandin the decade ollowing isdeath.The ossofsuperordinateoalsweakenedhepositiveffects f contact mong thnic roupsfosteredyearlieroliticalnd ocial eformsndworkerelf-managementesigns.Grievancesccumulated,ndpeoplebecamemorecognizant f othergroupmembers'eelings f resentmentndaggravation.nenclaves uch eelingswereseizeduponby eaders rging oliticalmobilizationoth o seekredressor heir
group's wn resentmentsndin fearof resentments eldby others.Thishelpsexplainwhy,oncefighting ommenced,onflict ftenescalatedmostquicklynthespecific reaswe have dentifieds enclaves.
DuringandfollowingYugoslavia'sarof dissolution, reviously ispersedminoritiesave ought ecuritynenclavesnwhich heyfeelafebut nwhich he
potentialor intolerancenda divisive politicsf identity regreatest. houghpolicymakersnd hoseresponsibleor heimplementationf theDaytonPeaceAccordsmayhope hat hehundreds f thousandsfrefugees illreturno theirprevious omes,heprovisionsormakinghishappen reextremelyeak nd tsimplementationsprovingo belargelympossible. tbest, he accords roposecompensationndrestitutionor osthomes, arms,ndbusinesses. any efugeeswillnotinthe foreseeableuture ereturningo theethnically ixedopcineromwhich hey ledorweredriven.nBosnia,Croatia,ndSerbiahewarhasmade tmore ikely hatpeoplewillhenceforthiveamong o-ethnics.
In the states ndregions f theformerYugoslavia,heprevalencefdispersedminoritiesndnationallymixedregions,hetworesidentialituationseadingothe greatest ntergroupolerance, as beenconsiderablyeduced.Remaining
endaves re eekingo beincorporatedithin errymanderedationaloundariesor, rustratednthiseffort,ontinueo fester sdestabilizingntities. heresultingincreasen localresidentialomogeneitysa formulaorgreaterntolerancendmaywork o sow heseedsof future onflicts.One essonof theYugoslavragedymaywellbethat trongerntegrationistolicies revital orcreatinghe ong-termconditions fpoliticaltabilityn modern tates.
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EthnicEndaves ndIntolerance691
Notes
1. Forthe developmentof similararguments boutthe role of populationconcentrations
in determining acialattitudesamongAmericans, ee Quillian(1996) and Taylor 1998).
2. Pettigrew 1986) cautions hat racial ompositionandgrouppercentagesn an area ..
cannot be used as surrogatemeasures for actual intergroupcontact and interaction
(189). Researchon racial integrationin the U.S., however, suggeststhat changes in
neighborhood omposition,and not interpersonal ontactper se, are critical o changing
attitudestoward others (see Hamilton & Bishop 1976).
3. The tolerancescalefor this articlemeasures oyaltyto one'sown group and distrust
of other groups. Other possible indicatorsof intolerance,such as respect for minority
rights,were not available n the surveydata.
4. People currently unmarriedbut cohabiting are also coded as married under the
assumption hat their living arrangements remore consequential or theirattitudesof
tolerance han the legaldistinctionbetweenmarriageand cohabitation.
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