Être Brut or Nature Merleau-Ponty Surveys Schelling ( Indeterminate Version)

8/12/2019 tre Brut or Nature Merleau-Ponty Surveys Schelling ( Indeterminate Version)

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tre brut or Nature: Merleau- Ponty Surveys Schelling

Josep Maria BechUniversity of Barcelona

IThe pri ma ry ai m of this pa pe r is to ex pl ai n the ch an ge th at th e m ul ti-

face ted concept ion of Nature in Merleau- Ponty ' soeuvre w en t thr ou gh whe n hedissected Schelling 's Naturphilosophie in t he fa me d lect ur es on th e conc ep t ofNatur e held during thr ee ye ar s (195 6- 195 8, 195 9- 1960) at theCollge de

France. As it is well know n, Merle au- Pont ys tho ug ht on Natur e ha d be ensteadily evolving since his philosophical debut. A former classical or naturalistconception of Nature as nature- in- itself, depic ted as a mani fo ld of objec tiveeve nt s bound by caus al links, had gra du ally unfolde d into a specificinterrogation of na ture as a rea li ty exceedingly diverse and loaded with innerdiffra ctio ns . Natur alis m ca me to be mistr us te d, sinc e the extr ao rdi na ryconfus ion about the idea of Nature held by modern thinkers ran para llel to themisunderst andings brought by their naturalism.1 Concurrent ly, the per ceivedworld ormonde peru could no longer be enclosed in a na tu re dependen t onobjectivist ontology.

By the onset of the lectur es , howeve r, the main outco me of thisdevelopment was the anc illary s ta tus of Nature . Its philosophical relevance wasdeclared subsidiary to the over ruling originary dimens ion of Being . IndeedNatu re sign al e d a pat hw a y tow ar ds ontolo gy bec a us e it ha d be en as si gn e dthe s tanding of shee t or layer of tota l Being: Ontology of na ture is the waywe prefer [to wards on tology] becausethe evolu tion of the concept of na ture isa more convinc ing propaedeut ic ,shows more clearly the need of an onto logicalmutation.2 Nat ur al being, eve n if now held the pre- emin en ce form erlyascribe d to perc eive d being, mat te re d insofar as itssens dtre ledul timately to the outs tanding notion of the new ontology: thetre brut.

Natur e was thus acknowl ed ge d as a prop ae d e ut ic, a signb oa rd , or aphilosophica l showcase , bu t it was permanen t ly subordinated to on tology. Atthe begin nin g of the lectur es , Merle au- Ponty me rely arg ue d ag ai ns t thecondescending concept ion of spiri t, his tory and human being tha t came alongwith the ne gl ec t in which th e philos op hy of na tu re wa s held, and th at m ad ethem appear as pure negat ivi ty.3 He rejec ted wholehear ted ly, as he puts it, anontology bent on silencing Nature.4 Merleau- Pon ty st at ed then that there was

1 Maurice Merleau- Ponty, R su m s de Cours. Coll ge de France (1952- 19 60). Pa ri s 1968 , p.127. Any further references to this text will be indicated byRC.2

Maurice Merleau- Ponty, La Natur e. Notes. Cours du Coll ge de France. Ed. by Denis Sglard,Par is 1995. p . 265, emphas is added. Any fur ther references to this tex t will be indica ted byN.3 N., p. 91.4 Loc. cit .

Conclusive version, sent end August


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page 2 tre brut or Nature: Merleau- Ponty Surveys Schell ing

a uniqu e prim or di al st at us to na tur e tha t was both enig ma ti c (we ar eof it,inste ad of being before it) a nd exp re s si bl e (tho ug h by indir ec t m ea n s a ndalways outs tr ipping its externaliza tion in insti tuted sign systems). His views onth e rel ati on sh ip be tw e e n th e probl e m of Nat ur e an d th e ge ne r al pro bl em ofontology wer e at tha t time clear- cut: the study of Natur e is her e an

introduction to the definition of Being.5

Still, a misgiving inevi tab ly came up . Was it wor thwhile to set out from

Nature as a way leading to ontology, to the issue of Being? Wouldnt it be morefitting to approach onto logy direc tly, since Nature cannot actual ly be exploredwithout a pre- unders tanding of natural being? In Merleau- Pontys own words :How are we to speak of Nature, otherwise than enlightened by a concept ion ofBeing?6 This perplexi ty was dispelled by his deeply- held belief that it is out ofth e qu es ti on to en te r dire ctl y into th e issu e of Being, an d th at we ca n onlya tta in it by way of deepening our connection with the world. The gis t of mat te rwas therefore tha t ontology can only be indi rec t .7 In short , philosophy mustforsake the t endency to jus tify beings from the vantage point of an over rulingBeing . Ins tead it is compelled to ques t ion Being by means of d issec t ing naturalreality.

II

Merleau- Ponty's s tandpoint al tered significantly in the lectures held duringthe years 1959- 1960. If former ly the scrut iny of Nature mere ly sought to open a

pathway to ontology, now it embraced a more far- reaching aim. The ers twhilehistoric al inquiry had brou gh t into view a de ep- root ed difficulty in thedeve lopment of ontology, and now it was a ssumed that only a sweeping changein the thinking on natural real ity might overcome it. Nature was shown earl ier tohinge on an originary dimension tha t Merleau- Ponty calledtre brut, yet atthe moment the apprai sal of this primordial reali ty appea red to be dete rminedby the understanding of Nature.

In the notes writ ten by Merleau- Pon ty a t the end of 1960, the supremacyof Nat ur e is so co mpl et e ly as se rt e d th at no tr ac e of its for eg oi ng a ncilla ryposi tion remains in s ight . The conce rn over Being emerges a s subsidiary to areflec tion on Nature, grown into the keys tone of Merleau- Pontyan ontology. Asat is fac tory opening into the ques t ion of Being is found by means of na tura lBeing, and Merleau- Pontys over riding interes t comes to be to make explici twhat being natural or naturally being means.8 Ontology, in short , developsinto philosophy of Na tu re . Besides , the primacy he a ssigns to Nature ensuresthe tra nsition to an indirec t ontolo gy, in har mo ny with the long- h eldcont e nt io n th at a dir ec t ont olo gy is impo ssi bl e sinc e Being can only beap pr oa c he d by th e int er mi ssi on of bei ng s: only st ar ti ng from bein gs doe sontology lead to Being.9

5 RC, p. 125.6 According to a manus cript of Merleau- Ponty held at the Bibliot hqu e Nationale (vol. XVI, p. 2),as refered in: Pascal Dupond, Nature et Logos,Studia Phaenomen ologica 3 (2003), p. 119.7 RC, p. 125.8 N, p. 267.9 RC, p. 125.


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Yet this concern with natural rea li ty, now prevailing over the inte res t in tre brut , which form erly was overr uling, spra ng from motive s tha t areworthwhile to explain. It should be pointed out , first of a ll, that the first set oflec tures s trengthens Natures subservience to onto logy. They bring to light , by

displaying a history of West er n me ta ph ysic s in which Desca rt es is theem bl em a ti c figur e, the key probl em set out by the mod er n de aling s withNatur e. In Desc ar te s as else wh er e , the notion of Natur e spring s from anon tologica l complex, its tr ansforma t ions express a par ticular development ofCar tes ian ontology, andit i s as such tha t Nature interest s us.It ma y eve n beth at this drift into whic h th e notion of Nat ur e is swe pt s et s ap ar t Wes te rnontology almost in its entirety.10

Merleau- Ponty was clearly disappoin ted with the problemat ic account ofnature held by modern philosophy. He also resi sted disregarding nature (ei theras the oth er side of exist en ce or as subor din at e to hum an fre ed om ) andlikewise objectifying it from a scientist viewpoint. As is well known, philosophicalmoderni ty thrives in the al te rna tive between naturant thought (tied to liberty,his to ry, ac tion , projec t, inven tion of sense, per sonal exi st ence ) and natu redthought (focus ing on the given, passivi ty, anonymity, the pas t ). Indeed it i storn bet we e n nat ur alis m and reflexive an alysis, thus echoing the well-es ta bli sh e d cle av a ge be tw e e n th e na tu ra n t (she e r int eri orit y, th e infinit epro du cti vi ty of Divin e na tu re ) an d th e na tu re d (na tu re as pro du ct , pur eex te riori ty ). Na tu ra li sm natura li zes though t and reduces it t o the st a tus of anev en t th at m ay be obj ec ti ve ly expl ain e d. The n all thou gh t is na tu re d a ndtruth becomes incomprehens ible . Refl exive ana lysi s, on the othe r hand , holdstha t thought must be grounded beyond Nature for something like truth to exist .Natured thought, from this point of view, demands naturant (cons ti tut iveor tr anscenden ta l ) though t. (No wonder, then , that early in the deve lopmentof Merleau- Pontys philosophy the received antagonism of nature with liber ty,spi ri t or history was replaced by the distinc tion betweenlogos endiatheto s a ndlogos prophorikos.)

Merleau- Pon ty was bound to conside r Na tu re philosoph ically rel evant ,above all, ou t of his uneas iness about the onto logical tension or conflic t in thetr aditio na l m ea ni ng of Nat ur e th at he ha d dia gn os e d in his e arly work. Heascribe d to post- Cart esia n thinker s the dysfunc tion he happily dubb ed

on tolog ical diplopia , for they were torn between two approaches to Nature :1) Nature is u tt e rly dete rminable and tr anspa ren t to the under st and ing , sinceonly Being act ually is, and thus appe ar an ce s are a she er restriction orimpoveri shmen t of it, and simply come out a s its inadequa te man ife st a t ion.

2) Nature is made opaque by an irreducible fac tici ty that re si st s disce rnmen tbu t emphasizes the viewpoint of the senses, which is deemed philosophicallydec is ive and accordingly must be reins ta ted . Appearances lead us into what hasusually be en unde rs to od as Being, and thus the actu al impos tu re is thesupposed Being- in- itsel f . Indeed philosophy has been torn by the twofoldcertainty that, on the one hand, being is, and appe ar an ce s are but itsmanife st a t ion and also its re st ric tion , and on the othe r hand those appea rances

ar e th e ca no n of ev er yt hi ng th at ca n be und er st o od as being, so tha t it isra the r the being- in- its elf which mus t be viewed as the ungraspable ghos t and

10 RC , p. 126. Emphasis added.


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t h e Unding.11

According to Merleau- Ponty, because of this ontologica l diplopia thescrut iny of Nature is now in a quandary. To transcend it and a t the same time toexplain its genesi s requi re s to re think Nature , with the aim of uncovering the

origina l, pre- duali stic layer of reali ty where such diplopia t akes roo ts andwhich ther ef or e can expl ai n its gen esi s altog et h er. At the sa me tim e, theproposed ontology of Nature should explici tly frame a relat ionship betweenthe human being and Being that could no t be r educed to the long- est abl ishedoppo sition betw ee n subject and object. Thus surveying the moder ndev elop m e nt of the notion of Natur e will be a me an s to get ne ar a newontology grounde d in a concept of Being capable of absorbingcontradictions.12 Merleau- Ponty ' s concern over natural real ity eventua lly ledhim to cons ider nature as it is in itsel f rather than as the o ther side of liber ty,a mov e act ua ll y a mo un ti ng toliberate nature from liber ty.As a consequence ,post -Car te si an diplopia seemed overcome . Notwi thst and ing the a ssessmen t sof bot h in- its elf- r ealis m an d na tu ra lis m, na tu ra l Being wa s not any mo r ena tu re - in- its elf and inst e ad it ca me to be Nat ur e as we pe rc ei ve it13 or,conversely, Nature insofar as we belong to it(nous en sommes) . And againstthe contentions of intellec tual ism, Nature meant now the given and the notconstructed as well , thus point ing out to a productivi tythat is not ours.

Yet Merle au- Ponty was attr ac te d by natur al reality, too, bec au seexterior ity always fascinated him. He alluded s teadily to a natural world tha talways shows through the other world(un monde qui transpara t toujours sousl'autre), like the canvas undernea th the picture, and gives it an air of fragili ty.14 The object ifying urge so uneasi ly not iced by Merleau- Ponty springs indeed froma fas cin at io n with ext eri ori ty alwa ys imp ati e nt of a n ontolo gy be nt onsilencing Nature15 and cornered in the incorporeal .16 In this respec t , the driveto perceive from the outs ide what is cur rent ly apprehended from the insidedeveloped into the impera t ive to push away the limits of what makes sense forus, shifting the nar row zone of themat i c mean ing into the wider one of non-themati c mean ing that sur rounds it.17 Merleau- Ponty was pe rmanen t ly awarethat human life is defined by its capaci ty to negate itself in object ive thought ,and that pa radox ically it owes thi s power to its primord ia l a tt achment to theworld itself. If human life can understand itself , he s tated, it is because it hasbeen thrown into anatural world.18

(In addi tion , Merleau- Ponty favored the peculiar brand of acosmism tha tunders ta nd s Nature as the other side of spirit and thus cons en ts to(self-)objectivation. In his opinion , Nature always comes forward in a wake ofhistory19 or as a presupp osition of spiri t,20 yet it only becomes actually vis ibleby means of the gratui tous and tir el es s drive which compe ls us to anchor in11 RC , p. 127.12 RC, p. 128.13 N, p. 270.14 PHP, p. 339.15 N, p. 91.16 Loc. cit.17 PHP, p . 318.18 PHP, p . 377. Emphasis added.19 PHP, p. 376.20 PHP, p. 147.


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thing s as a way to tra ns ce n d ours elv es in the m ,21 and that leads us tosur mis e, und er ne a t h the pictur e, the clos e pre se nc e of the ca nv as .22 TheMerleau- Pontian concepts of categoria l a tt itude and symbol ic behavior , aspointed out by tienne Bimbenet in his comments onSC, mark up our commonhu ma ni ty in the de ep e st layer s of action, and so consci enc e app e ar s to be

enveloped in a naturewhich in fact it already envelopes itself.23

)In the lec tu res held during the year s 1959- 1960 , however, the st ance of

Merleau- Ponty is ambivalent as regards the pi tfal ls of ontological diplopia. Onthe one hand, the presen t open ing to Being through Na tu re is now reckonedto be above it, for its naturant or inst itu ting character dispels any trace ofbo th causa li ty and finality. On the othe r hand , it does not make sense anymoreto look forward to re think Nature in order to surmount the antagonism betweenincompat ible ontologica l approaches . A pessimis t conjecture of Merleau- Pontyse em s now confirm ed: we cannot expe ct to overco me ration ally thisontologica l diplopia , and there is no othe r issue that to at ta in its comple teownership, in the way our sigh t appropr ia t e s monocula r images and achieves aunique vision ou t of them .24 This wa ne in th e e arly ont ol ogic al e up ho ri a,gradually replaced by an involvemen t with the problem of the natura l world,sug ge s t s a gai n tha t th e lec tu re s on Natu re at theCollge de France c aus ed apuzzling conversion in Merleau- Ponty 's thought . Since the subservience oftrebrut to Natur e ha pp en e d within theontological revolution tha t brou gh t theCar tes ian hegemony to an end , however, Merleau- Pontys rea lignment actua llyinst an ce s wha t an intellec tu al histori an would na me a shallow cha ng eembedded in a deep change, a s the conc lusion of the presen t e ssay will makeevident.

It should not be forgot ten, in addit ion, tha t Merleau- Ponty was trying towork out his commitment to the problem of Nature in the mains t ream of theph en o m e no lo gi ca l tr adi tio n. Eve n tho ug h ph en o me n o lo gi st s show ed so meinteres t in the other side of phenomenology, identi fied by Merleau- Ponty' s aswhat resis ts phenome nology within us,25 thei r intent ion was usually a negat iveone. They usua lly tried to make sure that all tie s with the world no t built bycons ci ou sn e s s ha d be e n brok en . By m e an s of t heepokh t he naive or natura la tt itude had to be overcome in benefi t of the transcendent a l s tandpoin t .

Yet in h is essay dedica ted to Husserl ,The Philosopher and Its Shadow,

Merleau- Ponty observed tha t the tradi tiona l character iza t ion of phenomen ologyas a full- fledged philosophy of consciousness was a t bes t a half- t ru th . Indeedin Hus se rl 's last writin gs , still unp ubli sh e d at th at mo me n t , the foun de r ofphenomen ology explored what is not const itu ted by consciousness and whichas a resul t descends towards Nature .26 This interes t for what does not belongto the philosop hy of conscious ne ss but still canno t re mai n outsidephenomeno logy , ac tual ly emerges a s the true shadow of Husse rl 's though t ,accor di ng to the m et a ph or us ed by Merle au- Ponty to take over an ide a of21 PHP, p. 328.22 PHP, p. 33.23

tien ne Bimb en et , co mm e nt a ry to La Stru cture du co mporte m e n t , Pari s 20 00 , p. 50,emphas i s added .24 RC, p. 127.25 Maurice Merleau- Ponty,Signes. Paris 1960, p . 225. Any further references to this tex t will beindica ted byS.26 S, p. 224.


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Heidegger. It const itut e s , in othe r words , theUngedachte or the un- though ttho ug ht tha t can be read be tween the lines in his a lready publi shed writings.(The as ce nd a n c y give n to th eun- thought thought that , according to Merleau-Pont y, sup pl e m e nt s th e te xt s of clas si cal think er s suc h as Hus se rl, in th epresent sta te of a ffai rs is s till more plausibly credited to Schelling . Indeed we

will at tes t tha t theUngedachte thought in Schell ing appear ed to Merleau- Pontyas a ser ies of points of d iffrac tion which blended several echoes of h is ownideas about Nature , thus ou tdoing the forma l accoun t he had to t ake up a t theCollge de France.)

For the purpose of the present essay, it is part icularly meaningful tha t inth e ab ov e- m en ti on e d es sa y on Hus se rl, Merle au - Pont y m ak e s an incid en t alallus ion to Schelling as the thinker who roughly identi fied the na tura l beingtha t a t all cos ts must find its place in [phenomenology]27, a nd ev en finds aname for it: the barbarous princ iple . (Incidenta lly, it should be noted tha t anon tology that has grown into a philosophy of na tu re seems to have littl e to dowith phenome nology.) In his defense of this recalcit rant other side, Merleau-Ponty inveighs against the shabby phenome nological account of an inter iori tyabl e to sus ta in th e very links be tw e en th e int eri or a nd the ext eri or .28 Thisimpro mp tu app ea l to Schelling ope ns an appr opri at e prosp ec t into thesignific anc e of his thou gh t for the dev elo pm e n t of Merle au- Ponty' s lat ephilosophy. The idea li st approach of the former, indeed , paradoxical ly seems toha ve en ga g e d the ta sk th at th e latt er as sig ns to a re ne we d , pos t- Hus se rli anphenomenology.

In the following sections, we will endeavor to explain the shift in Merleau-Pontys prior ities whereby Nature replacedtre brut as the main focus of h isphilosophical concern. We also will bear in mind, though, that in philosophy, ascompared with science , the poss ibility of a rationa l explanation and tha t of ana rationa l account a re very dis tinc tive ly enmeshed. Indeed our a ttempt will haveto proceed carefully from descript ion to explanation for we are convinced tha texpl an a ti on re st s on de sc rip ti on . As Alexa nd e r Bird as se rt s for the cas e ofThomas Kuhn, if a desc ription is not accura te the explana to ry theory willne ce s sa ril y be re du nd a n t, ind ee d mis ta ke n . If th er e is no phe no m e n o n, nothe or y is ne ed e d to explai n it, and any the or y tha t tries to do so will b eerroneous.29 This subordinat ion, in its turn, justi fies the comprehen sive scope ofthe following charact erizations.

III

Merle au- Ponty' s appr oa ch to Natur e res ul ts in a multilaye re d andse m a nt ic ally overlo ad e d co mp ou n d of views , arisin g from th e suc ce s si vephilosophica l concerns of his thought , and which can be specified as a sequenceof cle ar- cut conc ep ti on s. The y also ca n be co mp a re d to th e m an y axis of amul tidimens ional space in which every s ta temen t made by Merleau- Ponty about

Nature is to be meaningfully situa ted . These lines of thought a re not dimens ionsin a preci se sense because they are no t seman ti cally orthogona l to each othe r.27 S, p. 225.2828 Loc. cit.29 Alexander Bird,Thomas Kuhn,Princeton 2000, p. 49.


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Yet they can be set sharply apar t since they spr ing from a vari e ty of theore ticalint er es t s. The m an y- side d ap pr oa c h to Nat ur e in Merle au- Pont y' s thou gh t,indeed , may be charac ter ized by means of these seven concept ions :

1) Nature as the absolute other side that we carry in ourselvesFunctioning as an opera tive concept , never fully explica ted , thi s approach

to Nature envisages a horizon tha t transcends any form of lived experience butparadoxical ly cannot be dissocia ted from it. I t is a Natureinwardly connec tedwith our grasp of reali ty, thus differ ing sharply from the view we shall considernext, and whose link with experience is outward or exterior in i ts onset . Thevisible landscape under my eyes is not exterior to other moments of time and tothe pas t , it i s no t synthe t ical ly linked with them; it has them t ruly behind itsel fin simultanei ty, in i ts own interior(au- dedans de lui) , and not a s if it and they,side to s ide, were inside time(et non lui e t eux cte cte dans le temps) .30

Accordingly Merleau- Pon ty conce ives Nature as an absolute othe r side ofwhose door we do no t have the key that could open itbu t whose projectwe are readying in our depths in such a way tha t it can be said we carry it inourselves.31 And it couldnt be otherwise , for all problems of t ranscendenceare solved in the thickness of pre- object ive present .32

Merleau- Ponty emph asiz es the inward connec tion betwe en thisrec al citr an t na tu ra l ot he rn e s s a nd our live d exp er ie nc e . A thing is noteffec tive ly given in pe rcep tion , it is recovered inwardly, rebu il t and livedthro ug h by us to the ext en t tha t it is boun d to a world whos e fund am e n t als truc tures we car ry with us , being only one of its poss ible concret ions .33 Toconcur with thi s ama lgam of the fundamenta l st ructu res of a world and ourmost inward dep ths , we have only to accep t that the very pulp of sens iblebeing is nothing more than the union in it of the inside and the outs ide , thedense junct ion of Self with Se lf .34 The pr es e nt conc ep ti on of Nat ur e als oembraces the dimension of exi st ence which emerges a s the weigh t I feel a tmy back when I become a projec t35 a nd tha t ther ef or e ma ke s me feel a pas -sive36 bei ng . Besid es bein g th e grou nd th at sup po rt s our exis te nc e , in ot he rwords , thi s Na tu re is t he background where it d issolves when the cohesion ofour life gives way.

2) Nature as a transcendence that only a wake(sillage) of subjectivity canrender mea ningful

Nature is a horizon well beyond any form of lived experi ence bu t stillresi st ing a comple te dissocia tion from it. Therefore it may unfold before us as atranscendent rea li ty, ye t remaining paradoxical ly related to our inner world. In30 Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Le Visib le et l'Invi sibl e, ed . by Claude Lefor t, Par is 1964, p . 321. Anyfurther referen ces to this text will be indicated byVI.31 Maurice Merleau- Ponty,Phnomnologie de la percept ion , Pari s 1945 , pp. 376- 377 . Anyfurther references to this text will be indicated byPHP.32 PHP, p. 495.33 PHP, p . 377. The emphasis is Merleau- Ponty's .34 VI, p. 321.35 N, p. 180.36 PHP, p. 171.


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such cases this peculia r Nature is given to us as the background of inhumannature37 where things t ake root s bu t that would no t make sense for us if wedid not car ry within ourse lves the fundamenta l s truc tures of the world to whichit be longs.38 It goes without saying that all var iet ies of posit ive knowledge maybe rela te d in o ne way or a no th e r to this ide a of Nat ur e. Thus we ar e de alin g

her e with a view tacitly akin to the sa me nat ur al attitu de from whichpheno me nol ogic al reduction wished to discon nect. It points to atr anscendence (usua lly brough t to us in the form of pos itive da ta or objec tiveinfor ma ti on) tha t som eh ow beco me s revive d in us and is ann ex e d by ourexperience . But the sole criter ion tha t dec ides whether this t ranscendence is tobe ackn owl ed g e d or reje ct e d as me a ni ngl e ss , as we ha ve se en , spri ng s froman interiority able to sustain the very links(les rapports mme s) b et we e n theinterior and the exterior.39

This par ticular Nature does not belong by any means to lived experience .Actu ally it a mo un t s to its sh ee r oth er sid e , but it als o is th e pa ra d oxi ca lco mpl e me n t th at live d exp eri en c e de m an d s . In this res pe c t, Merle au - Pontyre ma rk s alr ea dy inPHP tha t wh at is give n is not the thing alone , but theexp er ie nc e of t he thin g, a tr an sc e nd e n c e in a wak e(sillage) of subjectivi ty, anature [sic] that shows throug h (transparat) a history,40 which should notam az e us if we ar e re ad y to acc ep t tha t Nat ur e tra ns ce n ds the distinc tionpast /p resen t and crea te s an inner link be tween them .41 Within this context isop er a ti ve th e ch ar ac t er is tic br an d of Merle au- Pont ya n obje ctivit y th atcoale sc e s in a singl eap er u: wha t positiv el y ha s ha pp e n e d belo ng s to ourexperi ence one way or ano the r. It is not true that being consc ious of havingperceived implies being conscious of the past ; in fact ver tical past has in itselfthe demand of having been perceived. [.. .] Having perceived is what is carriedby the pas t like a ma ssi ve Being. I perc eiv ed itsince it was (je l'ai peru

pui s q ' i l fu t ) .42

As to the bl end of simila rity and diff erence be tween this concep tion ofNatur e and the prec edi ng one, we should point out tha t trans ce nd e nc eadu mb ra t e d in t he imm an e nc e (as wa s the cas e abov e) is n ot to be mist ak enfor tr anscendence brough t in by genuine tr anscenden t means (objec tificat ionthrough overview, in Merleau- Ponty' s parlance) , yet depending on immanenceto becom e truly mea ningful. It also should be noted that the link ofcoincid en c e/ di s ag r e e m e n t be tw e e n th e pr es e nt conc e pt io n of Nat ur e a nd th e

view re po rt e d ab ov e, ac cor di ng to Merle au- Pont y, is th e prop er ba si s for astr eng thened expressive ness a s well ( as ins tanced by the sugges tive int erplayof our remembrances with documenta ry evidence , however loosely rel at ed tothem) , for both variet ies of Nature a re expressive by themselves thanks to the irdiacri tica l s truc ture. And they are compat ib le with unders tanding Nature as thevery thing to which the disagre em en t(l'cart) brou gh t by parti alcoincidence actually opens the way, since it gives access to the thing itself ,to past itself.43

37 PHP, p. 374.38 VI, p . 376.39 S, p. 225.40 PHP, p. 376.41 VI, p. 321.42 VI, p. 297.43 VI, p. 166.


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3) Nature as se diment ed inst itution

This not ion implies a break with the post- Cartesian bel ief that Nature wassynonymous with exis tence- in- itself , devoid of orientat ion and inter iori ty.44 A

species of inwardness orinteriorit is now ascribed to Nature, which amountsto de ny the exis te nc e of Nat ur e- in- itself. Natur al reality is shown asfragmented in pat t erns of sense mutual ly rel at ed to pe rcep tions and fos t ered intheir turn by the bodily imprint of alr eady experi enced mean ings. (Like theprecedent views, thi s conception remained mere ly opera t ive inSC and PHP andnever was total ly explica ted .) The most meaningful ins tance of such pat te rnsof sense and of its pe rcep tua l- phenomena l subord ina tion is organic na tu re:The [living] to ta li ty is not an appearance , but a phenomenon. Merleau- Ponty' sgrea t discovery is t hat life is a phenomena l r ea li ty, in the sense that it i srealqua phenomenon .45 But al so physica l, psychological or even soc ial natureexemplifi es an order of reali ty and a type of struc tura l int e gration that s temfrom a perceptua l disposi tion and hence are immune to the natural is t reduct ionof Nature to a manifold of objec tive even t s which are ex te rna l to each othe rbut never the less bound by causa l links .46 Thus the densi ty(paisseur) of pre-objective present47 appears to consis t of both Nature and history, e ac h of th eminextricably bound to the other.

This na tura l- cul tural s ta te of affai rs , by the way, is prec ise ly what somesociologi st s (Pier re Bourdieu prominen t ly among them) have concep tual izedwith the notion of habi tus , ultimate ly defined as his to ry become nature .This uns et tl ed sta tu s is warr an te d by the circu ms t an c e tha t it is at onc estruc tu re d str uc tu re (in- corpor at e d history, conve rt e d into na tur eandtherefore forgot ten as history, t he ac tive and effec tive presence of the wholepast in the prese nt it has actually creat ed)and st ructuring s truc ture(genera t ive principle or c rea t ive thrust , acqui red by means of prac tice, and byits elf ori en te d to pr ac ti cal func tio ns ) .48 Thus ha bi tu s implies theint eriori za tion of exteriority. It is the emb odi ed (a- theor etic al, not-re pr es e nt a ti ve ) me m or y of previo us exp eri en ce s turn ed into a ge ne ra ti vesche m e tha t provid es to ag en ts the str uc tu ri ng backgr ou nd and imm edi at eskills for making sense of current si tuations.49

The presen t concep tion of Nature a s conce r ted or even int er twined with

the not ions of insti tut ion and of history was outs tanding inPHP, where Nature isdescribe d as sedim en te d institution, and as such is the perm an en tbackground of his to ry and the founda tion of all expressive behavior. The recannot be history, in other words, if the results of creative, inst ituting agency dono t become sedimented into Nature . Witness the paradox that the human beingpushes its roots into nature every time he transforms it by means of cul ture .50

44 N, p. 27.45 Renaud Barbaras , A Phenomenology of Life , in :The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. by T. Carman and M. B. N. Hansen, Cambridge 2005, p. 219.46 Maur ice Merleau- Ponty, La stru cture du co mporte m e n t , Pari s 1942, p. v. Any fur the rreferences within this essay to this text will be indicated bySC.47 PHP, p. 495.48 Beate Krais and Gunter Gebauer, Habi tus, Bielefeld 2002, pp. 22- 23.49 Hans-Herbert Kgler, Alienat ion as epis temologica l source : reflexiv ity af ter Mannheim andBourdieu,Social Epistemolog y 11 (1997), p. 149.50 PHP, p. 231.


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And if cultur e ap pe a r s to be irrevo ca bl y grou nd e d in na tu re , it conv er s el yhappens tha t the living human body, a t fir st sight an eminently natural rea li ty,is a lso beyond any doubt a cul tural objec t, for it is bent to embody (in form ofhabitus , as we have seen sociology' s jargon st at e s it) t he sedimen ted or im -prin ted tr ace of a ll expe ri ences conforming a human exi st ence . On the othe r

hand , it a lso is t rue that Na tu re and culture are irr educ ible to each othe r. Weare thrown into a natural world, which is the already unified counterpar t of a llour bodily functions (so is na ture outs ide us), and yet our consc ious life mustacknowledge its anonymous origins in a natural her itage (nature is inside us aswell).

4) Nature as the originary dimension of actual experi ence

This notio n con si de rs th at Nat ur e is a n origin to which th e pr edi ca t emy thic is a de q ua t e . Natur e m an a g e s to e me rge in t a ngi bl e exp eri en c e bymeans of a re sili en t s taying power, even if taking the paradoxica l form of acont inuous ly renewed beginning. Thus Nature ap pears as the primordia l featureof existen t experience , and as a resul t it eludes a comple te apprehens ion. Thatby which everyth ing begins , nature or the originary , is no t behind us, in apast where we should join it, but in the gap(cart) bet we e n this pas t and thepresent , a gap which is the space of all experience.51 The gist of this concept ionof Nature is tha t it connotes passivi ty and sedimenta t ion more forceful ly thanrenewal and creat ivity.

Already in the lectures of 1956- 1957 Merleau- Ponty de fined Nature a sthe primordial, the not-buil t, the not- insti tuted52 and sugg es t e d tha t Natur ehas much to do with orig in, as shown by the Latin te rmnatura, which comesfrom nascor, to be born.53 Accordingly, Nature also denotes the original, wildan d raw dim en si on of exp eri en c e, likely to be sur mi se d by a ge ne a lo gi ca lscrutiny of the ta m ed and filter ed exp eri en ce tha t spa ns the world ofcul ture, of recent making but soothingly human. Yet there is the mute world,previous to human beings . [...] There is a truth of percept ion ,which endures.54 Such Na tu re a s origin , though , is no t to be chronologica lly conceived a s apar ticu lar beginning, which might have taken place once and forever. It shouldbe rath er tho ug ht of as an original pas t, a pa st tha t was nev er pre se nt .55 Nature is t hus to be under s tood, somewha t pa radoxica lly, a sthe cont inuous ly

renewed beginning of actual experience. The Urtmlich [ the primordia l or thearchaic] , the Ursprnglich [ the originary] does not belong to the pas t .56 Henceis Na tu re jus t ano the r name for tha t fea ture or dimens ion of expe ri ence thatcan be called pract ical because it is a lways ready to furnish the primordialand original57 a t tachmen t tha t ass is t s our involvement with things .

51 Franoise Dastur,Chair et langage. Essays sur Merleau- Ponty,La Versanne 2003, p . 82.52 N, p. 19.53 N, p. 21.54

S ta ted by Mer leau- Ponty a t theCollge de France and reported in: Xavier Tilliet te , La dmar -che ontologique de Merleau- Ponty, Mauric e Merleau- Pont y. Le philosophe et so n langage,Paris1993, p. 380, emphas is added.55 PHP, p. 280.56 VI, p. 320.57 N, p. 20.


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It should not come as a surpri se , then , that in the lec tu res of 1957- 1958Merleau- Ponty charac ter ized Nature as the oldes t of all things and a t the sametim e som e th in g alwa ys ne w.58 The mea ning of this opaqu e sent enc e isexpounded elsewhere : Nature is always new in each perception, but it is neverwithout a pas t . Nature is something which goes on , which is never grasped a t its

beginnin g, thou gh it app ea rs alwa ys ne w to us.59

This view is rein forcedbringing up (with a twist that is actual ly a happy de- contextualization) the well-known grudge of Lucien Herr against Hegel: [In the thought of Hegel] Nature isa t it s firs t day(au premier jour).60 In so doing, Merleau- Ponty s tays fai thful tohis ex tr eme his to riog raph ic crit e rion rega rding philosophica l thought , for itprese rves a sense ou tside its his to rical context , even has sense solely out sidethis context .61 Still, to grasp the full s ense of Merleau- Ponty' s reference toLucie n Herr we mu st pa y att e nt io n to th e unb rok e n quot e: He gel refu se s toNature all proper effec tiveness(Wirklichkeit). According to him, Nature is at itsfirst day(cf. Lucien Herr), wherea s Schelling allows us to think of a life of Natu -re.62 The re fo re Na tu re is a t its firs t day should be read a s an admonishmen tgiven to Hegel by Lucien Herr for conceiving Nature as devoid of any kind ofproper effect iveness. But it also must be not iced that Merleau- Ponty specif iestha t at it s firs t dayis what Nature is now, thus conceding tha t Nature lacksin ac tive e fficacy but al so emphas izing tha t it overflows with pass ive presence ,rich in it s iner tial capabili ty of making itself conspicuous . (The asser tionau premier jour i s modulated as follows: Merleau- Ponty s tates in N th at elle [scil.:la nature] l'est aujourd 'hui, w her ea s in the not es app en d ed toVI he refines :la nature est au premier jour : e lle y est aujourd 'hui. 63) The pas t ou tlivesitself indefini tely in Nature and exhibits this gif t for survival as the miracle of acont inual ly renewed beginning. By means of this paradox Nature opens it s ownway towards the future.

In shor t: the produc tivi ty of Nature is to be under s tood, according toMerleau- Pon ty, a s ine rti al and pass ive r ather than a s ac tive and spon taneous.He describe s it as a pure ability to stay that relishes in the enduringforwar dn e ss of itself, while pre te n di ng to be a continu ou s ren ew al of abeginning. (By contrast Schelling conceives Nature, as we will see, as blatant lyand unplanned ly crea tive .) Merleau- Pon ty concedes to Hege l that Nature isineffec tua l and unproduct ive . But he s ta t e s furthe r that it has gone on beingunal te rably un til now what it once was, so that a t the end thi s re sili en t self-pe rpe tua t ion is Nature 's mos t noteworthy endowment . The st range per si st ence

tha t informs the life of Nature , says Merleau- Ponty, contras t s with the ant i-Hegelian effec tiveness tha t Schelling ascribes to Nature , as we will see soon.(And again this much commented at its firs t day of Lucien Herr, pace RobertVallier,64 do es not se e m to d en ot e , as suc h, any productivity of Nature. Just thecont inuous renewal of Nature ' s beginning seems to be he re at st ake , since thisfea ture resembles productivi ty only if seen from a convenient distance . Herr 's

58 N, p. 70 . See alsoVI, p. 320.59 N, p. 160.60 N, p . 76.61 VI, p . 253. Mer leau- Ponty ' s words are :qui garde un sens hor s de son contex te hi storique ,

qui n 'a mme de sens que hor s de ce con tex te .62 Loc. cit . The quote refers to: Lucien Herr, Hegel, in:Choix dcrits, tome 2 , Paris 1934, pp.109-146.63 Cfr. VI, p. 320.64 Cfr. Robert Vallier,tre sauvage and the barbarous principle : Merleau- Ponty 's reading ofSchelling,Chiasmi International 2 (2000), p. 85.


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sentence mere ly means tha t , al though Nature is ineffec tua l, as Hegel asser t s ,thi s cons ti tut ive bar renness has not prevented Nature from remaining till now(aujourd'hui) exactly what it once was , and thus Vallie r is s till r ight when hes ta tes tha t the primordia l, the originary, is to be found in the thick ness of theliving historical presen t.65)

But if Nature isnow a t its firs t day(au premier jour), then it can neve rbe appr eh e nd e d as it is in itself, sinc e it m us t elud e us at the mo me n t webelie ve to un de r st an d it. N at ur e' s pow er of p er m a ne n c e do es not ce as e to beeffec tive even when we suppose we have succeeded in its pursui t. This elus ivestr ea k ca us e s Nat ur e to ap pe a r a s the da rk ba ckd ro p of all h um a n de m e a no r s(even those belonging to the world of culture , os tens ibly t ransparent and well-ligh ted) , for the ir reverse side remains forever opaque . The lec tures of 1959-1960 descr ibe the cul tural universe as vivified by Nature in its imper sonat ion asa brute and wild spiri t , which according to Merleau- Ponty must be recoveredbe neath all the cul tural s tuffthat it has given to i tself.66 The thought of Natureshou ld there fo re con front the pa radox of an origin whose origina ry characte rcan nev er be recov er e d. It is not anc hor e d in a point of time tha t we mus taspi re to a tt ain, with which we can imagine to coin cide, or to which we maypretend to become adequa te . This poin t of time is indeed ou t of our grasp , bu tnot beca us e we cannot move backwar ds along a time- line that proc ee dsinexorably ahead . The effec tive reason is that it absorbs its vit ality from thenatural d imension tha t makes our actua l experience par tly invisible, put ting itout of our full reach.

5) Nature as an inaugural event in mythical time

This approach to Nature contends that to under st and it a s origin doesnot involve conv er ti ng it into a thing of the pas t. Yet this is wha t we dowhenever we strive to tr ansform Nature in an orthodox objec t of knowledgewith which it s eems possible to coinc ide comple tely by means of a r eg res sionalong serial time67. An act ual origin is nev er a point in tim e rea dy to beindivid ua t e d a nd exp os e d to a retr os p ec ti ve view. Oth er wi se a mor e da ri ngregress would always be possible , on the sole condit ion of assuming an infini te lyextensible temporal ity. To locate an absolu te beginning is imposs ible , since wemay always ask about the eve nt s that prec ed ed such imagined origin.

There fo re , a true origin mus t happen in the str ange t empora l dimension thatMerleau- Ponty describes as a time before time68 and that in VI a lso na me smythical time.69 Even if it signa ls the s ta r t of a tempora l sequence , it shouldnot be und er st oo d as a fea tu re of tim e am on g oth er s. It is rat he r a sort ofprimordial inauguration where the t empo ral dimension its elf opens up forever.Nature as origin can only happen in a mythica l time , tha t is, in the sor t ofnatural insti tut ion which forms the act ive core of his tory. In Merleau- Ponty 'swords , it is t o be under s tood as an ins titut ion that produces and r e-p ro ducesitsel f, ha vi ng to be conc ei ve d in the se ns e of ph ysi s, which for the Greeksincluded hu man beings and gods , no t only animal s and plan ts.70 This elusive65 Vallier, loc. cit.66 N, p. 310.67 VI, p. 222.68 N, p. 311.69 VI, pp. 227 and 222.70 Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Notes de cour s au Coll ge de France. 19 55- 1959 et 19 60- 19 61. Ed.


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origin does not occupy a given point of time and hence is beyondobjectification. It evades rational inquiry like any other mythical construction.

This Nature as origin can only be accounted for when it has moved pas t ,telling the s tory it has already produced or scrut inizing the tradi tion it has put

forth, a req uisit e tha t ass er ts its myt hic al cha ra ct er. Inde ed the pre se ntconception of Nature shares with myth a sor t of apodic tica lly persuas ive force.The root of this irrefutabili ty, ti ed up to mythologica l cons t ruc t ions, lies in atwofold c ircumstance . On the one hand, the time subsequen t to the emergenceof Nature does no t accoun t for its origina ry characte r, which on the othe rhand is warranted only by t ime itself . Both Nature as origin and myth, then,are simul taneously indemons t rable and irr efutable . If claiming a lineage or agenealogy involves a ref erence to an origin, according to Husserl it also impliestha t such an origin may have fallen into the oblivion shared by all t rad it ions .This bl ankness even seems to be their necessa ry feature , since forget ting theorigin is a very effec tive way to preserve it as such. In shor t: only a s tory canaccount for Nature as origin (etymologically, myth means story), with theinterest ing corollary that this is precisely the case for our own birth.

Indeed both Nature and our own b ir th must remain forever hidden, even ifthey ar e to be repor te d by a story be gu n by so me on e else . (The originar ychar ac te r of our own birth cannot be conver te d into a prope r object ofknowledge , but it may be indirect ly if incomple te ly recons truc ted by unfoldingits s tory.) In both ins tances it happens to be a s tory told by a s tory tel le r, yet itmus t be refer red to the story pe r excell ence that myth incarnate s , for it is as tory about originsbut lacking either an origin or storyteller. Nature as originis thus undoubtedly mythical. Like any myth or inst itut ing act ion provided withan unlimited fecundity71 can no t be neit he r wholly de te r mi ne d nor reje ct e d.Amending the precedent conceptions of Nature, anoriginal productive principlemust account for the consequenc es of this mythical beginning.

The mythica l time (a time be fo re time) in which Na tu re a s origincomes about can also be described a s a sor t of time of sl eep conce ived a s apresent where an always new and an always the same may be found.72 Theawakening is the final proof, bu t also the only one possible, of such time ofsleep . The story the sl eepe r tells when she awakes, deciphe ring the confusedm ar ks in her body, indir ec tly elucid at e s sle ep . It m us t be re por te d as a pa st

exp er ie nc e be ca u se its only tr ac e is t he dulln es s of the body a nd thu s it c anonly be accounted for af te r awakening . For the sleeper ' s s tory to be as faithfulas possible (she shares this a im with all s tories about Nature as origin) i t mustgive voic e to th e bod y as a lively if blurr ed re me m b r a n c e of sle ep its elf.According to Merleau- Ponty, the body is our Janus- faced bond with Nature, for itbo th inser t s us in i t and ext rica tes us from it. To unders tand our originary linkwith nat ur e, the re for e, we mus t res or t to a story not unlike the Prous ti annarrat ive of an awakening , where the most faith ful trace of sleep is the torpor ofthe body.

It is worthwhile to point out that Merleau- Ponty assigns to philosophy the

sa m e unfinis he d ch ar ac t er th at , a s we ha ve se en , dis ting ui sh e s the pr es e ntof S tphan ie Mnass . Pa ri s 1966, p. 127 , emphas i s added . Any fur the r r eferences to thi s t ex twill be indicated byNC.71 NC, p. 127.72 VI, p. 320.


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conception of Nature. Philosophy should never resolve into a comple ted s tory,for a wholly expl ica ted Nature as origin would s top being product ive . Thisse e ms to be th e m ea ni ng of a rat he r cryptic re ma rk inVI: The circle is to beclos ed aft er stud yi nglogos and history, as Prous t clos es the circle at themoment the sto ry tell er decides to writ e. The end of a philosophy is t he story

[rcit] of its beginning.73

Preserving its mythical inaccessibi li ty is thus the onlyway not to drain Nature as origin of i ts expressive power.

6) Nature as what defini tely has not been insti tuted

After PHP, Merleau- Ponty contended that the scrutiny of perceived beingopened the way to a philosophy of percept ion tha t could serve as framework fora theory of t ru th ultimate ly laid out as a theory of expression. Thus he was ledto defin e m ea n ing as aninstitution f at ed to st ar t an open seri es of express iveappr opri ations and henc e origina ting a futur e. Meaning was de em e dinstituted and not cons ti tuted , since according to Merleau- Ponty experiencesacqui re meaning through the ir link with ins ti tu ting events , and form therefore athinkable success ion or a his tory, ye t on the condit ion tha t such meaning is notsedimen ted a s a relic t or a s a remainde r, for it should call a suit e or demand acoming time.74 The m ai n ups ho t of this th eor y of instit uti on was th at th escrut iny of perce ived being was car ried over to a reflec tion on nature . Thisshift involved the following steps.

First of all, to unde rs ta nd the inter dep en de nc e of expr es sio n andperc ep ti on requir ed applying to perc ep ti on wha t had be en lear ne d abou texp re s si on . Besid es , th e origin ar y grou nd of ex pr e ss io n was de te r mi n ed asnature because it was apprehended through a theory of ins ti tu tion . Pe rceivedbeing was indeed specified asthe natural in i ts differ ence from the inst ituted,an d thu s it wa s no long er tak en as th e origin ar y in its differ en c e from th ederived, or as the sensible in i ts difference from the intelligible . Merleau- Pontycont e nd e d th at scr uti nizin g Nat ur e wa s th e only way to co me to ter m s withperc ep ti on, provid ed it wer e und er st oo d as wha t mos t e mp ha ti ca lly isnotinstitu te d. Inde ed Natur e was e min en tly th e not- c ons tr uc te d, the not-ins ti tu ted , and in consequence it was al so the source of a ll expres sion, for itssense in no way has been posi ted by though t. In the wake ofPHP, perce ivedbeing had been apprehended as the correl a t e of the embodied conscience . To

account for its ontological specif ici ty became impossible, for it was deal t with bym ea n s of th e sa m e cat e go ri e s it a ct ua lly invalida t ed . Se en fro m th e va nt a gepoint of the ins ti tu tion , though ,perce ived being is no longer delivered by perception. Inst ea d it e me rg e s as nat ur al being acros s the tria d trut h-expression- ins ti tu tion . Since the fa ted spli t between subjec t and objec t has los tall validi ty, the originary sense of natural being must be brought to light . Andin r et rospec t the old concept of Nature was bu t a mere objec tificat ion of thenot - ins ti tu ted- being tha t Nature has come to be. Nature is not a severed andall-explaining being any longer, and yet justif ies the demand to make explici twhat being natural means.75

73 VI, p. 231.74 RC, p. 61.75 N, p. 267.


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The present view of Nature as not - ins ti tu ted- being can be sharply toldapa rt from the conc ep tio ns an alyz ed abov e. In so me accou nt s Natur e wa sidentified with the primordia l, the not cons t ruc ted , the not - ins ti tuted or wasviewed as a world where no thing has ye t been said, symboli zed, expressed .Othe r char ac te riz ati on s disp en se d with so muc h rawn es s, and und er st oo d

Nature (evoking a happy distinc tion due to Renaud Barbaras) as what not onlyis t he grou nd (sol) of expression bu t func tions a s its crad le(berceau) 76 aswell, hence implying tha t perception and expression intertwine . In such cases itwas acknowledged tha t Nature has a sense of its own insofar as it has not beenput forwa rd (pos) by tho ug ht a nd thu s it c ould not be, a s it w er e, neit he rti mel es s n es s - in- its elf nor th e da rk ne s s conv ey e d by th e tot al a bs e nc e ofsens e. In those accounts, far from being amorphous, formless andmean ingles s, Nature is without doub t a world .77 The pr es e nt conc e pt io n ofNatur e, on the contr ary, aims at a philosophy of per ce p ti on ca pa bl e of a nont ol ogic ally warr an t e d th eo ry of trut h. Now pe rc ei ve d bein g ac qui re son tologica l weigh t since it point s out to the final s ense of being . The meta -phenome nal character of natural real ity implies its percept ibili ty. Nature is justano the r name for perceived being when int erpre t ed a s the not - ins ti tu t ed .Nat ur al bei ng a nd pe rc ei ve d bei ng mu st go ha nd in h an d be ca us e , as th econcept ofGestalt exemplifies , holistic being only exists if perceived.

7) Nature as the required correlative to phenom en ological inquiry

This concept ion of Nature credi t s Husser l with the insight tha t somethingwhich lurks ins ide phenomen ology , ye t manages to resi st it (the barbarousprinciple reported by Schel ling), one way or another must find its place withinphenomenology.78 On Merleau- Ponty 's view, this admission helped to overcomethe cons t itu tive s trabismus of phenomenology, since reduct ion not only doesnot truly force us to lose touc h with the world but abov e all imp ar ts thegrea te s t le sson that a comple te reduct ion is impossible. 79 He int erpre t sre du cti on as a refl ec ti ve op er a ti on for mally aim ed at de ta c hi ng us from th eworld but tha t actual ly ends up by confi rming our crucial inter twiningwith t h eworld. The reduction merely puts us in touch with the unreflected life , which isthe initial , unchanging, and final si tuation of reflection.80

The phe no m e nol ogic al tra di tion held tha t reduc tio n sur mo un ts the

natura l a tti tude , ye t Merleau- Ponty under s t ands the t ask of phenomeno logyas no t so much forced to break our link with the world a s to make it dis tinc tand explicit.81 The phe no m e no lo gic al attit ud e (enco ur ag e d by the sa metheore tical consc ience tha t suppor ts the natural is t s tandpoin t of the scien ti s t)mus t give way to the natura l a tti tude that com pel s us to beli eve in the worldan d whic h, ac co rdi ng to Merle au- Ponty, con tai ns a high er- g ra de trut h tha tphilosophy must re tr ieve . Performing the reduct ion involves an unsaid effor t toprese rve and to under s t and the natura l a tti tude , for it b rings to light a pre-reflect ive and pre- thet icWeltthesis. Nature is precisely this unref lected real ityor originary horizon of passive synthes is , and in Merleau- Pontys view the76 Cfr. Renaud Barbaras , Merleau- Ponty e t la na ture,Chiasmi International 2 (2000), p. 52.77 N, pp. 19- 20.78 S, p. 225.79 PHP, p. viii.80 PHP, p. ix.81 N, p. 103.


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m ai n ta sk of ph en om e n o lo gy is to e nligh te n ourUrglaube in it. The na tura la tt itude, in short , leads us to the origina l sense of Nature , which far overs tepswhat lived experience can grasp . Small wonder, then , tha t Merleau- Ponty cameto belie ve th at to re du ce all ex pe ri en ce to its lived frac tio n is only s ma llphenomeno logy(ce n 'es t que de la pet ite phnom nologie).82

Thus in Huss erls thoug ht Natur e resolve d into theWeltall whereeverything happens and which unsurp ri sing ly embraces consc ience , though itshould be noted tha t thi s inclus ive view did not came up unt il Ideen III. In thisnotion of Nature prevail s the perceived world , prone to giving it se lfleibhaftand on whose foundat ion a re built the pure things(bloe Sachen) with whichscience dea ls and which is yet much more primor dial than the world con trivedby reason. After Ideen II the concept of const itu tion had become increas ingly away to disclos e in thin gs a rev er s e whic h we ha ve not con sti tu t ed 83 andaccord ingly refl ec tion was no longer deemed the intimate encoun ter of puresubject and pure things.84 It uncovered instead the third dimension of a pre-theoret ical layer where the spli t subjective/object ive is brought to an end85 andwhere both real ism and intellectual ism lose their unilateral character. Accord ingto Merleau- Ponty, Nature is this originary layer, level or tier as well, onwhich the objec ti fying and idea lizing conscience res ts , and which comprehendsall of what is pre- objective, pre- theoretical, pre- theticalin us.86

Three crucial featu res come toge the r in this pre- theoret ical , originarylayer: 1) conscience is always ei ther in advance or in delay when deal ing with it;

2) it shows up ei ther as already cons ti tuted or as never comple te ly cons ti tuted ; 3) it only com e s fort h whe n th e Huss erli an blu ep ri nt for th e int ell ec tu alpossession of the world87 miscarries. For according to Merleau- Ponty, in Ideen II Husse rl rehab ilit at e s a philosophy of na tu re . Indeed thi s t ex t describes afra me (membrure) of the perceived world, [through which] comes to ligh t anoutside of t he proc ed ur e s (dmarches) carrie d out by subje ct s, but ne ve r anature- cause of which we would be the ef fects ,88 which accounts for Merleau-Pontys surprising conclusion. The far-reaching aim of the Husserlian wri tingsdea ling with the cons ti tut ion of the pure thing, however, was to revea l a layermore primordial than the outcome of a subject ive ins ti tu tion . It sprang froman Umwelt shared by all of us, s trict ly unrelated to thing- ness and to objectivi ty,in which all our ini tia tives are born, and from which we depend since we haventinsti tuted it. In Merleau- Ponty 's view, this originary layer suggests an account of

Nature geared to the in-depth purpose of phenomenology.

IV

82 St at ed by Merleau- Ponty in the lec tu res of 1956 a t t heCollge de France, a s re po rt e d byXavier Tilliet te in La dmarch e ontologique de Merleau- Ponty,op. cit., p. 380.83 S, p. 227.84 S, p. 206.85 Cfr. S, p. 205.86 Cfr. S, p. 208.87 S, p. 227.88 Merleau- Ponty, Husser l e t la notion de nature, in :Parcours Deux (1951- 1961), Lagrasse2000, p. 218. The emphasis is Merleau- Ponty's .


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Merleau- Ponty found in Schelling ' s thought many echoes of h is own ideason Nature , for the re a number of issues seemed to answer some of his conce rnsor stood in na rrow affinity with them. Yet the philosophica l significance ofMerleau- Ponty ' s read ing of Schelling , as shown by the three cycles of lec tureson Nat ur e, re st s on implie d evid en c e. His confro nt a ti on with Sch elling 's

Naturphilosophie focus e d on a succ es si on of co m plex topics th at worke d aspoint s of diffrac ti on for his own thou gh t. We na m e tho se issu es point s ofdiffrac tion because the uncer tain ties tha t marred Merleau- Pontys philosophyunderwen t a sor t of epiphanic realignment when faced with the Schellingianide as on Natur e. The outc om e wa s a n incr ea s e d conc re ti on tha t, as will b erepor ted below, set off the metaphorical blur so dis tinc tive of Merleau- Pontyswritings . Indeed we speci fica lly contend tha t in Merleau- Ponty' s reception ofSchelling 's thought may be discerned the followingtwelve points of diffraction:

i) The polys em y of the ter m Nature and the ne ed for a lateralappro ac h to th e ulti ma t e grou nd of ev er yt hi ng .In Schelling 's though t , theno tion of Na tu re demanded a mul ti- l ayered seman ti c s because its mean inghad to adap t to his philosophy in progress . Being much more than the mereobjec t of physic o- nat ur al scienc es , Natur e mus t be thoug ht of as subj ec tdeploying its act ivi ty, asnatura naturans, as an ungraspable free product ivi ty,as the bir th amid darkness from which light set s for th , as a living ground, asthe impulse of an infinite development ,89 as sup er- B eing, as a bar ba ro u sprinc iple , as a proto- revela tion of the Absolute , and even as a sor t of poet icsa ssi sti ng divine ima gi na ti on . Sch elling als o affir ms th at Na tur e co me scons ti tu tive ly close to the mytholog ical figure of Protheus , fed by his ownunforesee able metamorphoses and hence unavai lable to intellec tual pursui t s.

ii) The pri mor dial surg e tha t rem ai ns fore ve r pre se n t in us, likeeverything else.90 The a spec t of the Schellingian Naturphilosophie t ha t mor efiercely awakened Merleau- Ponty 's interest was the not ion oferste Natur. Thister m point s to a primor di al Natur e or principle of the world tha t iscomparable to a supe r- Being orbersein which neve r can be though t of inadvance.91 Merleau- Pon ty saw in i t a pure and in-motiva ted surge that alsoapp ea r ed as an abys s of pas t92 on acc ou nt of its bein g th e mo st a nci en telement93 we can ever imagine , while paradoxical ly remain ing forever presentin us, like everything else. This abyssa l pas t does not have become eventua lly

past in a t rivial way, but was already past a t its very beginning,94

and it is sobla tan tly origina ry that Schelling t erms it an e te rna l pas t .Erste Natur isthus a proto- real ity which is always there when we arr ive95 and tha t can be

89 F. W. J. Schelling,Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, in: Schell ings Werke,ed. of M. Schrte r, Haup tband 2, p. 19; vol. III, p. 19. We quo te af te r t he modern r ep rint andredistr ibution in Hauptbnde o f the 1927 edi tion ofSmtliche Werke,ed. Cotta , 1856- 1861. Anyfur the r references toSchel li ngs Werkewill be indica ted by theHauptband an d als o by thevolume, abbreviated in vol . .90 N, p. 62.91 Loc. cit .92

This well-known description by Karl Lwith is quoted by Merleau- Ponty in N, p. 61.93 N, p. 61.94 F. W. J. Schelling, Die Wel tal ter , in: Schellings Werke, op. cit ., Hauptban d 4, p. 631; vol. VIII, p.254. Schellings words are : eine ewige Vergangenh ei t , al s e ine Vergangenh ei t , die nicht e rs tdazu geworden, die gleich uranfnglich und von aller Ewigkeit her Vergangenh eit war.95 N, p. 62.


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regard ed as a reali ty previous to any reflection on reali ty ( this character is t icwas not over seen by Merleau- Ponty). Since reflec tion is actual ly deriva tive, itcannot be co-surgent with reali ty.

iii) The int ert wi ni ng of past and pre se n t, crea tio n and de st ru cti on .

Sche llingian Nature has to be r epor t ed, a s it were, in the pas t t ense , for ittur ns out to be a ge ne a lo gi ca l an d imm e mo ri al pa st for hu ma n bei ng s. Thisabyss of pas t may be compared to an ancien t author who would have writt enin undecipher able hieroglyphics.96 Nature is then an origin tha t only when it hasce as e d to count as suc h can be prop erly rec or de d, and tha t the ref or e nev erbe co m e s a suit abl e obje ct of knowl ed ge . So firmly anc ho re d in th e pa st isNature that in fact , so Schelling contends,it could have been tha t it never was .For tha t reason he oft en labe ls it a metaphor and occas iona lly a mis t ake .Yet if Nature is the most anc ient of all en ti ties, itis also the mos t permanen t .Karl Lwith described succinctly this baffling circumsta nce : Primordial Nature iscont radic tory in i ts es sence : simultaneous ly affirmative and negat ive , creat ivean d de st ru cti ve , showi ng its elf con tin ually but als o hidin g its elf. It is a nunstoppable urge, without beginning or end. It is a sor t of blind force, a vital itythat cre at es itself and consu mm a t e s itself, that app ea rs and disa pp ea rsincessan tly. Again and aga in it re tu rns to its origins, and e te rna lly it beginsanew. Thus it emerges a s the immuta ble , the ineliminab le and the fundamenta l(das Bleibende, Unvertilgbare und Zugrundeliegen de) .97

iv) The first beginning of things and the deepes t laye r of the spiritualworld. Nevertheless, the essent ial trai t of Schellingian Nature is its puzzling productivity, which should be under st oo d in very ge ne ral ter ms, for theprodu ct s it bring s forth are eve ry thi ng tha t exist s. Yet the blind andunconscious pro duct ivity98 of Natur e is far high er up tha n any particul arproduc t. It is brough t to life anew and hence is ca rri ed indefini te ly ahead ,which a ttes t s tha t the theme of the living ground is outs tanding in Schelling ' sthought. His work of 1809,Philosophical Investigations of the Essence of HumanFreedom, as se s s ed this pri ma cy : All mo de r n Euro pe a n philos op hy sinc eDesca rt e s has thi s constan t flaw: nature does not exi st by its elfand it lacks aliving ground.99 He ven tu re d to res cu e this living grou nd fro m th e self-posi ting subject tha t preva il s in modern philosophy. Thus Nature was speci fiedas a ground tha t relen tlessly sec ludes itself beyond the front ie r of visibility.And since Nature is, in Schel ling 's view, the eminent first beginning of things,

hu ma n tho ug ht is forc ed to re tur n to its unc on sci ou s origin by m ea n s of anana mn e sti c proc es s, which ent ails tha t all Natur e is only the stirrup(Steigbgel), the deepest layer of the spiri tual world.100

96 Cfr. Schellings Werke, op. cit ., Hauptband 3, p. 268; vol . V, p. 246.97 Karl Lwith, Go tt , Mensch und Wel t in der Me taphys ik von Descar te s bi s zu Niet zsche,Gttingen 1967, p. 107.98 F. W. J. Schelling,Einl eit un g zu d em Ent wur f ei ne s S ys te m s d er Nat ur ph il os op hi e,in:Schellings Werke, op. cit ., Hauptband 2, p. 271; vol. III, p. 271.99

F. W. J. Schelling,Philosophische Untersuchungen ber das Wesen der menschlichen Freihe itun d di e da mi t zus a m m e n h n g e n d e n Ge ge n st n d e, in: Schellings Werke, op. ci t. , Haup tband 4,p. 253; vol . VII, p. 361, empha sis added. Schell ing 's words are:[.. .] da die Natur fr sich nichtvorhanden is t, und da es ihr am lebendi gen Grunde fehlt.100 F. W. J. Schelling,Stuttgarter Privatvorlesung en , in: Schellings Werke, op. ci t. , Haup tband 4,p. 34 9; vol. VII, p. 45 7.


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v) The unc ha ng e a bl e grou nd tha t alwa ys brea ks throu gh the imp os edorder. Sch elling also calls incipie nt Nat ur e or anfngliche Natur t h echangeles s ground that has withdrawn beyond the limit of visibility and istherefore ant ithe tic to ordered Nature . This opposi tion is not absolute becauseincipient Nature is the tangled and informal s ta te of things tha t precedes the

est ablis hm e n t of orde r and form, yet persists even in ordered and formal Nature as capable of breaking through again. Nature is withdrawn insofar as itprec ed e s orde r and form, but also bec au seit endures as the ground alwayscapable of break ing through the order brought by crea tion . In the groundabides e te rna lly the incomprehens ible source of reali ty in things, the re siduetha t the unders tanding cannot reduce even with the grea tes t effor t.101

vi) The ulti ma t e argu m e nt for not- coinci de nt , not- ad eq ua t e tho ug ht .Nature can neve r become a sui table objec t of knowledge for severa l reasons .Prominent among them is tha t Nature' s productiv ity informs the very cogni tiveacts tha t try to unders tand it. And also because Nature car ries itsel f for ward102

indefinit el y, and thus its ince ptio n can nev er be est ablis he d.103 Thesecontent ions show up in Merleau- Ponty's views on Nature, especially when in the Introduction to the lectures of 1956- 1957 he defines Nature as self-productionof sense104. According to this outlook, Nature is an enigmatic object , an objectthat is not an object a t all: i t is not completely in front of us. It is our ground; notwhat we are facing , but what supports us.105 Nature can only be reduced to thes ta tus of an appropria te objec t for knowledge by ignoring its qua li ty of produc -tive principle t ha t a t bes t can be under s tood indirec tly anda poste riori. For it isa grou nd th at uns to pp a bl y go es alon g with us, or els e a sort of ele m en t inwhich we are submerged .

vii) The task to live and to experience Nature 's productivity106 and theinsertion of the subject in Nature. We at test the living ground we call Nature inth e thickn es s of our live d exp eri en c e. It e m e rg e s as th e pre- du alis t m edi umnamed by Schelling pre- objec tive Being since it is the common ground of[t ranscendenta l ideali st ] I and primordia l Nature(erste Natur). A convincingelucidat ion of this common ground has been forwarded by Andrew Bowie. Hisaccoun t also jus tifi es Merleau- Pontys fascina tion with the no tion of pre-objec tive Being: The vital factor which has sus taine d the act uality ofSchelling's Natur philosophie i s its refusa l to see the thinking subjec t as simplyopp os e d to na tu re as a world of o bje ct s,because the subjec t is its el f part of

nature. 107

Thus Nature has reali ty for it se lf and forms one comple te whole, forits mul ti- layered character does not banish a fundamenta l uni ty. The divisionsimpo se d on it b y our ordin ar y pe rc e pt io n an d tho ug ht ar e the outc om e of th esingle formative complex of forces tha t is the inner aspec t of Nature . To fathomthis primordia l surge we must pay a tten tion to its success ive forms, for it is thespiri t that we unknowingly apprehen d in self -consciousnes s .

101 Schell ing, Philosophische Untersuchungen ber das Wesen der menschlichen Freihe it , op.cit., Hauptba nd 4, p. 250; vol. VII, p. 357.102 N, p. 185.103 N, p. 186.104 N, p. 5.105 N, p. 5.106 N, p. 63.107 Andrew Bowie, Schell ing and Modern European Philosophy, London 1993 , p. 31, emphas i sadded.


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viii) The proto-Ineinander that can be discerned in Schelling's thought. Hisassessmen t that the ta sk of philosophy is to live and to expe ri ence Na tu re ' sproduct ivi ty involves the inter-dependence of Nature and mind, as echoed byMerleau- Ponty in the lec tures: Nature outs ide us is revealed by the Nature tha twe are.108 But above all i t sugges t s what might be te rmed the Sche llingian

proto- Ineinander, s ince it prefigures the efficient tool for thought that Merleau-Ponty labe led Ineinander: a sort of circular link between Being and thought , inwhich thought submits to Being the connect ion with Being tha t Being itself hasbrought out .109 This s ta te of affairs may be outl ined in two star t ling content ions:

a) A philosophy of Nature cannot avoid to crea te Nature. This means tha t any Naturphilosophie must reproducein itself t he dynamics that const r ain Nature tocome to be outs ide us. b) In a faultl es sl y ac co m plis he d Naturphilosophie,Natu re would re- a bs or b its elf in for m of tho ug ht. Oth er wis e st at ed , theprospects of Nature and philosophy actually overlap: the idea of Nature is onlythe result of phi losophy itself110. No qua lms , there fo re, about the ground for aphilosophy of Nature: to philosophize on Nature means to crea te Natur[die Natur schaffen].111 Sch elling argu es th at the pro pe r sp ec ul ati ve pa th se tsou t from Na tu re and turns up a s spirit , and rej ec ts the syst ems of though t thatdevi se a na tu re of sor ts from the vantage point of the mind . But the though t ofprimordial Nature is baffling, for philosophy actually resul ts from the spli t ofhum an being and natur e and it would inde ed collapse if the dualitysubject /objec t were cancel led . (The t ranscendenta l i s t a ttachment of Schelling ishe re a rele ntl es s sourc e of int elle ct ua l disc om fo rt . Nat ur e is view ed as a nundefea table fact and ye t a natural philosophy must in the long run deduce th every possibili ty of Nature. Schel ling derived from Fichte the ideal of a com pletedwhole of philosophical conception and also the formal method to which for themost part he continu ed true. Naturphilosophie ough t to rev ea l the ide al asspringing from the real , not to deduce the real from the ideal .)

ix) The unreflected residue that subverts all reflect ive processes .We hav ealre ad y re ma rk ed tha t the I of tra ns ce n de n t al ide alis m ande rs te Natur orprimordial Natureshare a pro bl em of grou nd . A non- grou nd prior to alldiff erences , in othe r words , is the ground of self- conscious ness , just a se rst e Natur i s the originary uni ty from which consc iousness emerges , its own uncon -scious past. Schelling actually points out that bothers te Natur andtranscenden tal Self imply that an initially singular act ivi ty different iates itself ,pu ts limit s to its elf, media t e s its own immediacy. Yet thi s pa ra ll elism is no t

boundless . Indeed for transcendent a l Se lf to be come conscious of i tself , i t mustpro du ce its elf as a nobject for itself. Thus the act ivi ty of tran scendenta l Se lfcompels it to divide itself , originates its own contradiction, different iates itselfinto subjec t and objec t , cons tra ins it to represent itself to itself . Yet there is aresid ue in this proc es s tha t Naturphilosophie ca nn ot ta ke into ac co un t. Theabsolu tely reflec tive process achieved by transcendenta l Self miscar ries whenfaced with the unreflected rea li ty (the Merleau- Pontyanirrflechi) that taci tlysus ta in e d it along its s elf- pro du cti ve effor t. This un as s ail abl e re ma in de ramounts to the Schellingian barbarous princi ple.108 N, p. 267.109

Franoise Dastur, Chair et langage. Essais sur Merleau- Ponty, op. cit .,p. 205.110 F. W. J. Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797), in: Schellings Werke, op. ci t. ,Hauptband I, p. 708; vol. II, p. 708.111 Schelling, Erster Entwurf eines Sys tems der Naturphilosophie ,in: Schellings Werke, op. ci t. ,Hauptband 2 , p . 13, vol . III, p. 13. Mer leau- Ponty gives in N the source for this Schellingianquotation.


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x) The an ti- objectivi st distrust of ontic masks112 and th e dis mi ss al ofadequat ion as crit erion of truth.As we have report ed , Schellingian Natureenforces a produc tivity principle , ye t des t ruc t iveness is one of its essent ialfeatures as well . Only the infini te act ivity of Nature is t ruly real . The objects are

but a minor consequenc e of this liveliness , a negl igible residual overgrowth. Theobjec tive world is the domain of life, no t that of things. Firs t and foremos t,Na tu re is bound to dest roy whateve r comes up a s an objec t. Na tu re strug glesagainst everything individual.113 According to Schelling, every thinkable productbears tes timony to a self- limita tion of product ivi ty. Nothing ascer tainable inNatu re is concl usiv ely fixe d. Ever yt hi ng ha s its plac e in a co mp re h e n si veproc es s whic h can no t be tho ug ht of in obje ctiv e ter m s. The re for e,the verycondi tion of objec tivi ty is reflect ive divi sion be tween the whole (includinghuman beings a s pa rt of the organi sm which the tot ali ty of Nature tu rns out tobe) . This suspicion about ont ic masks was powerfully expressed by Merleau-Ponty when he pointed out tha t Schellings barbarous principle meant in fac tan excess of Being over the consciousness of Being.114

xi) The absolute pri macy of an inn er or organi c necessity.We hav ealready expounded tha t Merleau- Ponty rejec ts the Cartesian approach to Natureas syn on ym o u s with exist en c e in its elf, witho ut orie n ta tio n a nd witho utinteriority.115 His s truggle against this t radi t ion brought him to free Nature fromthe ontology of the object , as we will see at the close of his essay, credi ting itins te a d with it a sort of int eri orit y or inw ar dn e s s(interiorit). Yet hesomehow echoes Schelling when he replaces the exte rna l necessi ty tied to theModern t radit ion by the internal necessi ty of Nature. The philosophies endorsinga tra ns ce n de n t al Self arg ue d tha t to exist as an objec t a mo un te d to beingex te rna lly de termined . Thus the objec t no t only lacked thickness bu t also waspass ive throughout, since all de terminat ions were ext rins ic to it. The idea ofNatu re as ext eri orit y impli es im me di at e ly th e ide a of Nat ur e a s a sys te m oflaws.116 Schel lings Nature, on the contrary, is the domain of interior, inherent ,or organic causali ty. Indeed Nature appea r s anima ted by an inner necessi tyt an tamoun t to autonomy. By as ser ting the primacy of int eriori ty, there fo re,Schelling liberates Nature, so to speak, from the inside.

xii) The un- thought thought of sedimen t ed culture and the on tologi calrehabilitation of sensibil ity.Schel ling championed the irreducible specifici ty of

Nature on the twofold bas is tha t Judith Schlanger has mas terly clarified and tha tdramatical ly parallels Schelling 's thought with Merleau- Pontys . On the one handSchelling rejec ted the author ity usual ly given to the reflec tive or conceptua lele m en t of knowl ed g e bec a us e he did not wa nt to we ar aw ay th e pr ecio usfragili ty of the sensible being nor the intuit ive wisdom it fosters.117 On the othe rha nd, he ha d at his disp os al a ver y rich pre- notion of Nat ur e, for me d by awhole set of an tecedent cul tural images. Yet these two ingredients reinforcedeach other, a fact tha t enhances the para llel with Merleau- Pontys doct rine: the112 VI, p p. 28 2- 28 3: The invisible isthere w ithou t being an objec t, is pure transcendence ,without ONTIC MASK. 113 Schelling, Ers ter Entwurf eines Sys tems der Naturphilosophie , op. ci t.,Hauptband 2, p. 6;vol. III, p. 6.114 N, p. 62.115 N, p. 27.116 Loc. cit .117 Judith Schlange r, Schelling et la ralit finie, Paris 1966, p. 50.


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richness and power of his intui tive asse ts led Schelling to think tha t forsakingthem would impoverish philosophy irretr iev ably. And conversely, the need for Naturphilosophie to re tain previous cul tura l images of Nature coerced Schellinginto transposing intuit ive capital in thought.118

V

The many- sided topics repor ted in the foregoing sec tion guided Merleau-Pontys reading of Schelling's Naturphil osophie and worked as points of d iffrac -tion for his ideas on Nature. It is plausible to s ta te that the specific diffractivepower of Schelling' s though t counte rbalanced the diffr ac tive blur whichmarred Merleau- Ponty 's doctrines . Displaying an optical simile , the outcome ofSchelling's Naturphilosophie could be compared to the neut rali zing effec t that ,in an achromati c lens, the divergent half- lens made of flint gl as s produces onthe convergent half- lens made of c rown glass . By way of appos ing the two half-lenses , as is well known, opticians obta in a compound lens called achromat icbec au s e the light em ergi ng from it for ms ima ge s withou t the blur du e tounwanted pri smat ic colors . Bringing together lenses of different materia l withreve rse focal powers, there fo re , helps to remove pa ras it ic chromat ic haloes ,since the low dispe r sion value of the crown glas s coun terba l ances the highe rvalue of the flint glass . We contend tha t Schelling ' s Natur philosophie broughtab ou t a simila r cou nt e ra c ti ng effe ct on th e multipl e inn er diffrac tio ns th atcharac ter ize Merleau- Ponty' s thought . For his lec tures on Schelling intens ifiedand deepened his own philosophical involveme nt with the idea of Nature.

As w e hav e se en , at the be ginni ng of the lect ur es on the conc ep t ofNa tu re held a t t heCollge de France, t he reference to Nature appa rent ly aimedat balanc ing an ontologica l tradi tion s trongly biased towards a negat ive accountof

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Être Brut or Nature Merleau-Ponty Surveys Schelling ( Indeterminate Version)