EUCAM WP13 Afghanistan

7/28/2019 EUCAM WP13 Afghanistan

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working paper 13

Marlene Laruelle,

Sebasen Peyrouse

and Vera Axyonova

February 2013

The Afghanistan-

Central Asia relaonship:

What role for the EU?


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EUCAM 2 013

ISBN (Onl i ne): 978-84-614-6870-6

EUCAM-SD

This working paper is published as part of the EUCAM-Security and Development project that is implemented by FRIDE

and the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland. The EUCAM-SD is a key component of the EUCAM pro-

gramme and focuses on the links between security challenges in the Central Asian region and the need for development in

the broadest sense, including governance, poverty reduction, ethnic tension and social equality. The project aims to offer

new insights and creative thinking on Europes role in promoting security and development in Central Asia. EUCAM-SD is

supported by the Wider Europe Initiative of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Abstract

As the 2014 NATO drawdown from Afghanistan ap-

proaches, the EU increasingly focuses on preventing po-

tential spillover effects on Central Asia. The Union wishes

to further its cooperation with the wider region. But to

succeed, it will have to develop a clearer strategy to avoid

condoning the repressive policies and opaque interests of

the Central Asian governments. The EU should focus on

a few well-chosen areas and prioritise the involvement

of local actors, in particular civilian stakeholders, who

are the only vectors of long-term sustainable solutions.

This paper addresses the Central Asia-Afghanistan rela-

tionship, analyses the impact of post-2014 changes to the

security context and looks at the EUs opportunities to

foster regional dynamics.


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The Afghanistan-Central Asia

relationship:

What role for the EU?

EUCAM Working Paper No. 13

Marlene Laruelle, Sebastien Peyrouse

and Vera Axyonova


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Table of Contents

Introduction 5

1. Te multiaceted linkages between Central Asia and Aghanistan 5

1.1. A shared history, dissociation and new interactions 5

1.2. Economic cooperation 6

1.3. Te actors o the Central Asia-Aghanistan relationship 8

2. Assessing and preparing to react to the post-2014 situation 9

2.1. Security assessments o the post-2014 impact 9

2.2. Central Asias preparation strategies 9

2.3. Russian, Chinese and U.S. engagement post-2014 11

2.3.1. Russia 11

2.3.2. China 112.3.3. Te United States 11

3. Niches or European engagement 12

3.1. Te EUs dissociated aid strategies 12

3.2. Security programmes: victims o distrust between

Central Asians and Aghans 13

3.3. Developing joint programmes in the civilian sphere 14

3.4. Enhancing education exchanges 15

Conclusion 16


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The Afghanistan-Central Asia relationship: What role for the EU? 5

Introduction

As the 2014 NATO drawdown from Afghanistan approaches,the international community increasingly considers thepotential role for regional solutions. These do not implythe nave notion of neighbourly harmony, but new civilianpatterns for improving peace and stability in the region asa whole. Pakistan is quite rightly considered Afghanistans

most strategic neighbour and the main challenge to thecountrys long-term security. But other neighbours also playan increasingly signicant role for the countrys future. Theirlevel of economic engagement, their potential leverage ondomestic Afghan issues and their own perceptions of thestrategic balance among regional actors will be important toreaching a stable solution.

The position of the Central Asian states towards Afghanistanis less well-known in comparison to those of India, Iran,China and Russia. Central Asian countries are most oftenseen as the victims of the Afghan situation, rather than as

actors at the same level as other neighbours. It is importantto understand not only the risks, but also the opportunitiespresented by Central Asias proximity to Afghanistan.More than 2,000 km of joint borders unite Afghanistan withTurkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Afghanistan, theTajiks, Turkmens and Uzbeks have served as mediators withtheir northern neighbours, especially since the intensicationof Soviet inuence in the 1950s. Today, despite a revivalof insurgency in recent years, the northern provinces areremote from the unstable dynamics of the Afghan-Pakistaniborder and are still the most secure areas for the delivery ofinternational aid.

The U.S. and the European Union (EU) are looking for newpartners to share short-term agendas (such as transit-in-reverse of ISAF material from Afghanistan through CentralAsia) and long-term plans (including integrating Afghanistaninto the wider economic region and developing new regionalsecurity platforms). Central Asian republics are among themain candidates.

The U.S. construes its Central Asia policy through an Afghanlens and in connection with a broader agenda that also

includes South Asia. Europe, on the other hand, has longdissociated Central Asia from Afghanistan, and maintainsdifferent degrees of involvement with separate agendasfor each region. However, preparations for the post-2014context are pushing the EU to reconsider its approach andlook for ways better to coordinate its engagement in Central

Asia and Afghanistan, at least at the narrative level. The June2012 review of the EU Strategy for Central Asia evidencesa more structured security orientation and emphasisespotential threats to Central Asia stemming from post-2014Afghanistan. It notes Central Asian fears of a new wave ofinsecurity from the south and it seems to support, or at leastit does not criticise, the way local governments formulate therisk of spillover. Although security seems to be the keyword,

the review also states that the EU will help strengthen actionsaround borders with Afghanistan, in close coordination withCentral Asian states and international actors. By doing so,the EU hopes to foster regional dynamics, deepen bilateralpolitical dialogue and transform the Afghan neighbourhoodinto an opportunity for developing economic cooperation inthe wider region.1

This paper addresses the Central Asia-Afghanistanrelationship after NATOs 2014 withdrawal and Europesrole in the region. The rst part discusses the multifacetedlinks that exist between Central Asia and Afghanistan. Itgives a brief historical overview and assesses their growingeconomic relationship, as well as the diversity of the actorsinvolved. The second part analyses the impact of post-2014changes on Central Asias security environment. It does sofrom three vantage points: the likelihood of spillovers fromAfghanistan; the Central Asian governments perceptionsof the challenges ahead and their preparedness to addressthem; and the roles of Russia, China and the United States inthe region. The third part examines the EUs role in buildingcooperation mechanisms between Central Asian states andAfghanistan, and examines Europes opportunities in light ofthe changing regional context.

1. Te multifaceted linkages

between Central Asia and Afghanistan

1.1. A shared history, dissociation and new interactions

Afghanistan and Central Asia share a long commonhistory. The north of present-day Afghanistan is linked toTransoxiana or Turkestan, the region to the north of theAmu Darya River, which more or less corresponds to theterritories of contemporary Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Amu Darya has not historicallyseparated two different spaces. The broader region beganto disintegrate in the eighteenth century and was dividedaltogether in the nineteenth century with the advance of theTsarist and British colonial empires. The Emirate of Bukharawas the last direct historical link between Central Asia andAfghanistan; the last emir, Alim Khan, eeing the advancingBolsheviks, took refuge in Afghanistan in 1920.

The deep political, social, economic and culturaltransformations introduced by the Soviets in Central Asiabetween 1917 and 1991 put an end to the regions similitude

with Afghanistan. But relations between the two zonescontinued. In the 1920s and 1930s, tens of thousands ofCentral Asians, mainly Turkmens and Uzbeks, ed the civil

1 Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy for CentralAsia, 25 June 2012, p. 2 and 16, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/20120628_progress_report_en.pdf

Marlene Laruelle is a EUCAM researcher, FRIDEassociate and Director of the Central Asia Program atGeorge Washington University.

Sebasen Peyrouse is a EUCAM researcher, FRIDE

associate and Research Professor at George Washington

University.

Vera Axyonova is a EUCAM associate researcher, PhDfellow at the University of Bremen and researcherat the Centre for Intercultural and European Studies

(CINTEUS), Fulda University.


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6 EUCAM Working Paper No. 13

war and Stalinist collectivisation and settled in Afghanistan. In1953, when Mohammad Daoud Khan became Afghanistansprime minister, the country started developing closer tieswith the Soviet Union. For over two decades, Moscowwas Kabuls main commercial partner and political ally,providing Afghanistan with substantial military and politicalaid, fostering economic development in infrastructure andindustry and promoting social transformation through its

support for literacy programmes, womens emancipationand agrarian reform. After the 1973 coup, President DaoudKhan tried to loosen the Soviet grip on the government inan attempt to diminish the power of Afghan communists.This gave rise to another coup in 1978, carried out by localcommunists who formed a pro-Soviet regime and askedMoscow for help. In December 1979 the Soviet Unionintervened. Moscow gave a major role, in particular in therst years of the intervention, to Central Asian soldiersand advisors (mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks) to the pro-Sovietgovernment of Mohammad Najibullah.

The Soviet-Afghan war had a substantial impact on CentralAsian societies. The Tajiks were the most affected, as theirinteraction with Afghanistan was the most intense. Most Tajikreligious or political dissidents, and the main gures of theperestroika years and the rst ten years after independence,had served in Afghanistan in the 1980s. When Tajikistanplunged into civil war in 1992, the Islamist opposition foundrefuge and support with the Northern Alliance of AhmedShah Massoud, even though he also had direct links withthe central government in Dushanbe.

Uzbekistan, the second most connected Central Asiancountry to Afghanistan, received a small wave of refugees

during the Afghan civil war, mainly ethnic Uzbeks. Thecountry maintained complex relations with local warlordssuch as General Abdul Rashid Dostum. Some Islamistopponents to Islam Karimovs government sought refuge inAfghanistan and, under the banner of the Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan (IMU), fought alongside the Taliban in thesouth of Afghanistan and in Waziristan. They also attemptedto inltrate Central Asia, notably with two incursions intothe Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan in summer 1999and summer 2000. In the subsequent decade, as the IMUbecame more international, these Uzbeks were followed byhundreds of Kyrgyz, Uyghurs, Chechens, Dagestanis and

Tatars. The Soviet Union always had to cope with illegaltrade of opiates coming from Afghanistan, but the scopeof cross-border drug-trafcking into Russia has increasedsince the 1990s.2

1.2. Economic cooperation

In the 1990s, economic relations between Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and neighbouringAfghanistan were limited. The Afghan civil war had put anend to the ofcial trade exchanges that had persisted afterthe Soviet era. Aid from Central Asia and Russia was entirelydirected to the Northern Alliance of Ahmed Shah Massoud.When the Taliban came to power in 1996 in Afghanistan,diplomatic relations between both zones were severed.

2 A. Latypov, On the Road to H: Narcotic Drugs in Soviet CentralAsia, Central Asia Program, Central Asia Research Papers 1, August2012, available at: http://www.centralasiaprogram.org/images/Re-search_Paper_1,_August_2012.pd.

Only Saparmurat Niyazovs Turkmenistan, in the name ofperpetual neutrality, continued state-to-state commercialrelations with the Taliban, trading gas, electricity and food.Meanwhile, the trafcking of opiates grew in scale acrossthe entire region. Ofcial trade resumed after the arrival ofthe international coalition in Kabul and the establishment ofHamid Karzais regime at the end of 2001. From 2007-2008on, it underwent a signicant boom.

Afghanistans position in imports, exports and the total trade ofCentral Asian states in 2010 in millions of Euros3

Despite sharing only 137 km of borders with Afghanistan,Uzbekistan is Afghanistans most important CentralAsian trading partner. It benets from a Soviet legacy ofinfrastructure that connects it to its southern neighbour. Asearly as 2002, Tashkent reopened the Khairaton Bridge onthe Uzbek-Afghan border the former Friendship Bridge,which served as a major transit route for Soviet troops. In2003, the Airitom Customs Complex started operations inTermez, speeding up the process of registering freight anddelivering it to Afghanistan.4

Uzbekistan plays a central role in two sectors in Afghanistan:electricity and transportation. Since 2009, Uzbekistans state

electric corporation, UzbekEnergo, has delivered between90 and 130 megawatts a year to Kabul, thanks to a line builtwith funds from the Asian Development Banks Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) project.5The Uzbek authorities claim that their country providesan uninterrupted supply of 1.2 billion kWh of electricitya year to Afghanistan, with Kabul receiving electricity24 hours a day, at an average rate of 6 cents per kWh. 6In transportation, Uzbek rms have helped restore motorroads between Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul and contributed to

3 Sources: European Commission rade statistics, 2011, available at:http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries-and-regions/; B. Anderson and Y. Klimov, Uzbekistan: radeRegime and Recent rade Developments, University o Central AsiaInstitute o Public Policy and Administration, Working Paper4, 2012,available at: http://www.ucentralasia.org/downloads/UCA-IPPA-WP4-Uzbekistan%20and%20Regional%20rade.pd; Aghanistan CentralStatistics Organisation, available at: http://cso.gov.a/Content/les/im-portsbycountry(1).pd.4 V. Paramonov and A. Strokov, Economic Relations BetweenUzbekistan and Aghanistan: Current State, Problems, andRecommendations,Afghanistan Regional Forum 5, February 2013.5 USAID, Import o Power rom Uzbekistan, ajikistan and urkmeni-stan, Aghanistan Inrastructure and Rehabilitation Program, 2011,available at: https://www.irp-a.com/?pname=open&id=291&type=html&c=5.6 Uzbekistan exports 1.2bn kilowatt-hours electricity to Aghanistan ayear, Uzdaily, 20 February 2012, available at: http://www.uzinoinvest.uz/eng/news/uzbekistan_exports_12bn_kilowatt_hours_electricity_to_aghanistan_a_year.mgr.

Imports Rank Exports Rank Total trade Rank

Kazakhstan 0.5 (0.0%)


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reopening 11 bridges along the route.7 The Uzbek nationalrailway company, Ozbekistan Temir Yollari, built 75 km ofrail lines between Hairaton and Mazar-i-Sharif. This trackhas been in operation since mid-2011 and has a theoreticaltransit capacity of up to 30,000-40,000 tons per month.8The short-term objective of the new railroad is to increasethe role of Uzbekistan in the northern supply route for theinternational coalition in Afghanistan, and with the NATO

2014 drawdown approaching, it will also enable Uzbekistanto take part in the reverse supply chain.9 Tashkent hopes tobecome a key actor in Afghan transport. Ozbekistan TemirYollari is preparing new tender bids for two sections, onelinking Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and then to Torkham at thePakistani border, and another connecting Mazar-i-Sharif toHerat. However, competition from Chinese and Indian rmswill be tough.10

Tajikistan, with about 1,300 km of common borders withAfghanistan, is the second most important player in CentralAsia-Afghanistan trade. Again, electricity is at the heart of theeconomic partnership.11 Dushanbe hopes to take advantageof the CASA-1000 (Central Asia-South Asia) project,designed to export Tajik and Kyrgyz surplus hydroelectricpower to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project is fundedby the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and theUS Agency for International Development (USAID), with theprobable future participation of Russia. The stakes for theTajik authorities are considerable: CASA-1000 will nancethe connection of the Sangtuda power station to Kunduz andon to Baghlan and Pul i-Khumri, with the aim of linking itwith the line running to Kabul.12 This line enables Dushanbeto compete with Tashkent as a cheaper electricity exporterto Afghanistan during the summer months. But the viability

of the CASA-1000 programme is called into question bythe probable delays on some of the main dam projects, aswell as the difculties in collaborating between Bishkek andDushanbe.

Aside from electricity exports, trade exchanges betweenTajikistan and Afghanistan are developing on a small scale.The border post of Nizhnii-Pianj, rebuilt with internationalaid, in particular from the U.S., is supposed to cater to themajority of the freight between both countries, but trafcis limited to roughly 40-50 individuals and 10-20 trucksdaily. Moreover, now that security in Kunduz province has

7 J.C.K. Daly, Uzbek Aghanistan proposal relevant and timely, UPI, 5November 2009, available at: http://www.upi.com/op_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2009/11/05/Outside-View-Uzbek-Aghanistan-proposal-relevant-and-timely/UPI-71691257429600/.8 F. Mashrab, Aghan rail link marks a break-out moment, Asia imes,11 January 2012, available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NA11Ag01.html.9 J. Kucera, Pakistans gain in Aghan transit deal Central Asias loss?,Eurasianet, 17 May 2012, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65416.10 Te tender bids have not yet been put out, but it is likely that both In-dian and Chinese construction companies will respond to them, mostprobably with competitive prices and capabilities.11 Islamic Republic o Aghanistan Ministry o Economy Inter-Minis-terial Commission or Energy (ICE) Secretariat, Energy Sector StatusReport July September, 2010.12 World Bank, Central Asia South Asia Electricity ransmission andrade Project (CASA 1000), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P110729/central-asia-south-asia-electricity-transmission-trade-project-casa-1000?lang=en.

deteriorated, the crossing is very isolated.13 Further east,several smaller bridges, rebuilt or renovated by the AgaKhan Development Network (AKDN), have enabled borderpopulations to set up small trade mechanisms that can helplift them out of poverty.14

Turkmenistan, which shares a 750 km border withAfghanistan, is also an important partner for Kabul. Electricity

exports are again the main driver of bilateral trade: Ashgabatclaims to supply 400 kilowatts to its neighbour.15 In 2007,the Turkmen authorities put back into service a Soviet-era2 km cross-border railway between Kushka and Turgundi(Towraghondi).16 Turkmenistan has renovated its own roadsfrom Mary to Serkhetabat and from Turkmenabat, on theborder with Uzbekistan, to Atymyrat and Kerikichi, on theborder with Afghanistan. And the country has given theTurkmen minority in Afghanistan nancial and technicalassistance, in the form of medical and educational aid,allowing them to cross the border to receive treatmentin Turkmen hospitals and offering several state-fundedscholarships, as well as renovating some irrigationinfrastructure in Afghanistan.

Despite having no borders with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan alsosees itself as a key economic partner for Kabul. It is the onlyCentral Asian country that has an Assistance Programme forthe Reconstruction of Afghanistan, which includes modestprojects related to water supply, infrastructure developmentand the delivery of cement and construction commodities. 17Astana has, for instance, nanced the renovation of theKunduz-Talukan road and the construction of a school and ahospital, spending a total of $2 million. More importantly, asits exports began to take off in 2002, Kazakhstan positioned

itself as a major actor in Afghanistans wheat market.Today, about 20 per cent of Afghan our imports come fromKazakhstan, and during the years of the Pakistani ban oncereal exports, Kazakhstan even became Afghanistansmain supplier of wheat.18

The volume of Central Asian trade with Afghanistan cannotbe to those of Pakistan or Iran. Nonetheless, some CentralAsian countries are strong actors in terms of electricitysupply, transportation and food security.

13 J. Boonstra, Te quiet rontier, the FRIDE blog, 21 May 2012,

available at: http://ride.org/blog/the-quiet-rontier/.14 S. Peyrouse, Economic rends as an Identity Marker? Te Pamirirade Niche with China and Aghanistan, Problems of Post-Commu-nism, 59(4) (JulyAugust 2012), pp. 3-14.15 Aghan and urkmen relations and cooperation to be ollowedby others, Bakhtarnews, 2 October 2012, available at: http://www.bakhtarnews.com.a/eng/politics/item/4277-aghan-and-turkmen-relations-and-cooperation-to-be-ollowed-by-others.html.16 See, or instance, the urkmen propaganda on the repairing o a 2km long section o the railway crossing the territory o Aghanistan.State News Agency o urkmenistan, A Gi rom the urkmen Peopleto Aghan Brothers, urkmenistan: Te Golden Age, 8 February 2008,available at: http://turkmenistan.gov.tm/_eng/2008/02/08/a_gi_ront_he_turkmen_people_ to_aghan_brothers.html.

17 S. Kozhirova, Te Current Kazakh-Aghan Relations. A GrowingCommitment,Afghanistan Regional Forum 6, March 2013.18 USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, 2012 Grain and Feed Annual A-ghanistan, GAIN Report, Global Agricultural Inormation Network, 24March 2012, available at: http://gain.as.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/2012%20Grain%20and%20Feed%20Annual%20_Kabul_Aghanistan_3-12-2012.pd.


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1.3. Te actors of the Central Asia-Afghanistanrelationship

People-to-people contacts between Central Asia andAfghanistan involve a series of actors, of whom many haveconicting interests. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistanhave sizeable ethnic minorities on the Afghan side of theborder. The non-Pashtuns of the northern regions are oftenseen as part of one single political entity: the NorthernAlliance and its various constituents. But in fact, each ofthe three ethnic groups consists of several sub-groups withcontradictory strategies, resulting in a complicated situation.

The Tajiks, about 8 million people, are the second-largestethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns.19 They haveheld privileged positions in the countrys power structuressince 2001, in repayment for their struggle against the Tali-ban, thus making them direct competitors of the Pashtuns.The political struggle in Kabul is rstly ethnic Tajik versusPashtun and secondly between moderate versus extrem-

ist Islamic rule. For their part, the Uzbeks number between1.5 and 3 million and Turkmens between 200,000 and500,000. These two groups are perceived as less confron-tational, with more peripheral ambitions. The Afghan Turk-mens have always been excluded from the Kabul-based de-cision-making process. They were politically neutral duringthe Taliban years and the Taliban and Pashtun groups do notsee them as a threat. The Uzbeks are also relatively autono-mous economically. But unlike the Turkmens, they have oc-cupied senior positions in various Afghan governments andtheir claims are more demanding. They call, for example,for regional autonomy, recognition of the Uzbek language in

local bodies and participation in economic decision-making.Unlike the Tajiks, however, the Uzbeks are not regarded asa direct challenge to Pashtun domination.

For Central Asian states, the fact of having co-ethnics onthe other side of the border only gives them leverage in theAfghan domestic situation through local warlord networks.Dushanbe has multiple networks at different levels inthe Afghan government, the central administration andlocal authorities, especially in the Mazar-i-Sharif district.Uzbekistan has a particular connection with the NationalIslamic Front (Jumbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan), headedby General Abdul Rashid Dostum. And Ashgabat has goodrelations with former mujahedeen commander Ismail Khan,traditionally in control of the Herat region.

Co-ethnic interactions are only one part of the bilateralrelationship. Ofcial visits between Central Asian authoritiesand their Afghan counterparts grew steadily throughoutthe 2000s, bolstered by the creation of bilateral tradingcommissions. Leaders now meet regularly at NATO or UNgatherings, at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)meetings or at Moscow-led platforms. The Central Asianembassies in Kabul are major sites for bilateral informationcollection and network building, especially for business

interests.

19 Tere are no reliable population statistics or Aghanistan, since thecountry has not conducted a census, and the matter o ethnic distri-bution is particularly sensitive and stands at the core o the countryspolitical balance. Te gures given here are the most standard averageestimates.

As in the Soviet period, the Central Asian security servicesoversee a large part of the relationship with Afghanistan.These services have networks in Afghan intelligencecircles that date back to the Soviet period and are oftenRussian-speaking.20 Directly responsible for border securityand customs committees, Central Asian law enforcementagencies are prominent actors in both ofcial and illegaltrade with Afghanistan.21 For example, Tajik and Afghan

security services shared intelligence about IMU incursionsfrom the non-controlled enclaves on the Pianj River in 201022and during clashes in Khorog in July 2012.23

Veterans from the Soviet-Afghanistan war sometimesact as intermediaries in commercial relations, but not asmuch as it used to be in Russia. Central Asian veteransare well represented in security services and presidentialentourages, mainly in the Security Councils in Tajikistan,Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.24 The Soviet legacy has alsobeen revalorised by some senior Russian-speaking Afghanofcials, the majority of whom are in military, aviation andacademic circles.

There are few private actors in the Central Asia-Afghanistanrelationship. Those involved in bilateral trade in metalproducts, fuel, cement, our, fruits and vegetables have todevelop close connections with the security services, whichoften provide them with private militias in order to ensurethe security of their transactions. Frequently, these businesspeople are directly linked with the ruling networks, beingformer members of the Central Committees of the localCommunist Parties.

Civil society interaction is largely absent. However, a growing

number of international community-led humanitarianprojects straddle both regions, especially in Tajikistanand Afghanistan. In 2012, for instance, the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societiessigned cross-border agreements between TajikistansGorno-Badakhshan region and Afghanistans Badakhshanprovince on disaster management and risk reduction.25Hundreds of Tajik engineers, nurses and doctors alreadywork in the Tajik-speaking zones of Afghanistan in projectsnanced by the international community.26

20 Authors interviews with ajik experts on Aghanistan, Dushanbe, 16May 2012.21 A. Latypov, Barygi, narkobarony i narkodeltsy: Narkoprestupnost irynki narkotikov v adzhikistane, raCC, available at: http://traccc.gmu.edu/pds/Latypov_RUS_FINAL.pd.22 Authors interviews with OSCE ocers, Dushanbe, June 2010. Du-shanbe, Ozodagon, in ajik, 19 October 2011; FBIS SOV, 19 October2011.23 S. Peyrouse, Battle on op o the World: Rising ensions in ajiki-stans Pamir Region, Wider Europe, August 2012.

24 Anonymous interviews with Central AsianAfghantsy, Almaty, Du-shanbe, Bishkek, May-June 2012.25 Interview with Eric Michel Sellier, IFRC Country Representative orajikistan, Dushanbe, 16 May 2012.26 E. Sadovskaia et al., rudovaia migratsiia v stranakh sentralnoi Azii,Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Afganistane i Pakistane (Almaty: European Com-mission, IOM, 2005).


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2. Assessing and preparing to react

to the post-2014 situation

Central Asias relationship with Afghanistan is increasinglyshaped by preparations for U.S./NATO withdrawal in 2014.External actors are also taking this into account whenplanning their bilateral and regional involvement. The main

drivers of the forthcoming reframing of relations involvesecurity assessments, preparedness for potential newthreats and the engagement of Russia, China, and the U.S.in the region.

2.1. Security assessments of the post-2014 impact

The progressive withdrawal from Afghanistan entails theneed to reassess the Central Asia-Afghanistan relationship.Despite some profound differences, the ve Central Asianstates share similar concerns regarding the post-2014

situation. All local experts believe that Karzais successorwill not be able to withstand insurgency attacks. Theybelieve that the Taliban will take power back, or at leastbe able heavily to inuence the political process. Theyalso expect that patterns of civil war will re-emerge. Theirassessment of post-2014 Afghanistan is pessimistic. Theyalso think that the international community is refusing openlyto discuss an alternative plan to address the potential failureof the Afghan central state. Alike Russia, the Central Asiangovernments are critical of the West, in particular the U.S.,for having committed multiple strategic errors, and believethat the decade-long intervention has largely been amistake. At the same time, however, they complain about

the Wests departure, which they see as another error, giventhat the work is not nished. Lastly, they fear losing theirrent-seeking mechanisms linked to the Western presence inAfghanistan.27

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in particular are most atrisk of domestic repercussions resulting from a deterioratingsecurity situation in Afghanistan. For Tajikistan, the mainspillover threats include the possible return to power of theTaliban in Kabul or a renewed civil war that would involveAfghan Tajiks. Either scenario could lead to Taliban/Pashtunattacks against Tajik symbols of power and would have a

negative impact on ofcial relations between Dushanbe andKabul. Tajikistans growing social Islamisation would alsobe affected. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), theonly legal Islamic opposition in Tajikistan, could nd itselfconfronted with Salast movements, especially if thesemovements receive additional foreign support.28 Narco-trafc is already a major cause of domestic tensions amongTajikistans elites, and was probably the root cause of theviolent clashes in Khorog in July 2012. A potential reducedopium production in Afghanistan (the Taliban alreadyattempted this during their years in power in the 1990s) couldlead to more intense battles between Tajikistani networks forcontrol of transit and revenues. Increased production wouldserve to reinforce Tajikistans role in the drug transit and

27 On Central Asias position o the NAO withdrawal, see M. Laruelle,What does Central Asias no-show at the NAO Chicago SummitMean?, Wider Europe, 8 June 2012.28 Interview with Muhiddin Kabiri, IRP leader, Dushanbe, 19 May2012.

would further increase the corruption of the countrys elites.Kyrgyzstan has no border with Afghanistan and very fewco-ethnics there. Even so, it could be indirectly affected byIslamic insurgency and drug-trafcking. In recent years, localIslamic insurgents, mostly Uzbek and Kyrgyz young menfrom the southern part of the country, have been trainingin Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz armed forces do not have thecapacity to manage sustained attacks from insurgents.

However, the major actors involved in the Islamisationof Kyrgyzstan Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat arehomegrown and have no connection to Afghan issues andsocial tensions in the country are expressed primarily throughethnic rather than radical Islamic violence.29 As in Tajikistan,a reduction in drug-trafcking is likely to trigger increasedconict over the control of routes, especially among southernelites. An increase would provide criminal organisations withnew nancial benets and create incentives to keep thecountrys institutional capacity weak.

Uzbekistan faces different challenges. Islam Karimovsregime has historically been the main target of the regionsIslamic insurgency. A few thousand Uzbek jihadistsassociated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU) have been trained in Afghanistan and Waziristan.These ghters have maintained close connections withthe Taliban, and could therefore benet from their returnto power. But the Uzbek army is better prepared than itsTajik or Kyrgyz counterparts. Also, unlike the situation in thetwo neighbouring countries, drug-trafcking in Uzbekistandoes not directly contribute to state failure. It seems tobe better monitored by law enforcement agencies and isprotected by some high-level senior ofcials who havelinks to the security services. The largest risks for domestic

instability stem not from spillovers from Afghanistan,but from potential mismanagement of the presidentialsuccession and from regional elites discontent withtheir access to state resources. The same applies toKazakhstan: the country experienced terrorist attacks in2011, but this did not precipitate state failure. Astanas mainchallenges are the need to address homegrown Islamisationamong impoverished young people, especially in westernKazakhstan, and ensuring the continuous improvementof living standards so as to circumvent political protest.Again, these matters have no direct relation to the future ofAfghanistan.

2.2. Central Asias preparation strategies

Each Central Asian state conducts its relationship withAfghanistan bilaterally, without involving its neighbours.However, three overall patterns can be identied in theirstrategies: a defensive strategy focused on conventionalsecurity; a growing appreciation of soft security risks; andan effort to reshape each states geostrategic positioning.

Given the negative assessment of Afghanistans futureprevalent in Central Asia, preparations for the post-2014situation are mostly defensive. Tajikistan, Turkmenistanand Uzbekistan plan to reinforce security at their southernborders. They present themselves as fortresses under

29 N. Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Over-coming the Causes and Legacies o Violence, Central Eurasia ProjectOccasional Paper Series 3, March 2011.


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siege. This perception will probably have repercussions forthe transit of people and goods, which is likely to aggravatethe already precarious cross-border cooperation in theFerghana Valley and between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.Local decision-makers ignore debates on the utility ofimpermeable borders, except in Tajikistan, where someexperts do not believe Islamic-based spillover fromAfghanistan can be avoided, regardless of the measures

taken at the borders.30

All ve Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan that do not border Afghanistan, are likely toreinforce domestic control over the population. In the nameof the struggle against terrorism, they will probably enhancethe already numerous mechanisms limiting public freedomsand increase the discretionary powers of law enforcementagencies. The terrorism epithet is applied without distinctionto political opposition and all religious expression that doesnot conform to the ofcial standards endorsed by the spiritualboards and committees for religious affairs. Lastly, thenarrative of foreign interference, be it from states or non-state actors, will serve as a pretext to intensify repressionto control social discontent. The Kazakh authorities havealready used this to justify their repression of the riots inZhanaozhen in December 2011.31 This repressive approachis underpinned by the fear of an Arab Spring scenario, inwhich revolutionary protests could lead to a sudden changeof government.

Central Asian states have also begun to discuss soft securityrisks, albeit to a far lesser degree. Their biggest concernare possible refugee ows from Afghanistan should therebe renewed mass violence. Central Asian states remember

the difculties they faced in the rst years of independence,when they had to cope with ows of Tajik refugees eeingthe civil war. The three neighbouring states of Uzbekistan,Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are particularly likely to haveto deal with refugee inows. Kazakhstan too could attracta growing number of Afghans, in particular graduates whohave worked for the international community during the lastdecade and who might be drawn to the countrys regionalpower status and economic dynamism. The refugee problemis the only soft security issue on which ofcial Central Asianactors request greater foreign involvement.32

Local authorities are equally concerned about the economicimpact of renewed civil war in Afghanistan. If this were tohappen, major gas, electricity and transportation projectscould be partially stopped or impeded, and the growingprivate businesses in cement, food, chemicals and fuels toAfghanistan could be disrupted.

The post-2014 situation also entails a global geostrategicreadjustment for all Central Asian states. Each of them

30 Tis is what transpired in the debates between ajik experts at theinternational conerence Aghanistans Stability And Regional SecurityImplications For Central Asia, organised by the Central Asia Program(George Washington University), and EUCAM (Europe-Central Asia

Monitoring), with the support o the NAO Science or Peace andSecurity Program, Dushanbe, 17-18 May 2012.31 A. Kourmanova, Lessons rom Zhanaozen. Bringing Business, Gov-ernment and Society ogether, Voices from Central Asia 6, September2012.32 Anonymous interviews with Central Asian experts on Aghanistan,Almaty, 11 May 2012, Dushanbe, 16 May 2012, Bishkek, 22 May 2012.

uses Afghanistan as one of its key foreign policy tools inrelations with neighbouring countries and the great powers.Kazakhstan, for instance, presents itself as a responsiblestakeholder in the international community. It foresees anincrease in its humanitarian aid and its civilian projects forreconstruction and development, modelled on the strategyadvanced for Afghanistan during its OSCE chairmanshipin 2010.33 Kyrgyzstans own geostrategic position has no

Afghan prisms other than that of resolving the Manasdeadlock. The maintenance of an American military basewith a civilian status would be useful to state nances,but it would go against Kyrgyz public opinion and wouldanger Moscow, risking potential economic retaliation.34Turkmenistan is preparing to cite its perpetual neutrality,as it did in the 1990s, and will cooperate with the regime inKabul, whatever its ideological orientation. It intends both tomove forward on its energy projects with Afghanistan and toremain hermetically sealed against any kind of spillovers.

The stakes are higher for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Shouldthe Taliban return to power, the Uzbek authorities wouldhave to choose between confrontation and conciliation.Confrontation would involve the Uzbek minority in Afghanistanengaging in the Northern Alliances successor formation. Orthe Uzbek authorities could choose conciliation, in the hopethat the Taliban will concentrate on domestic issues and willnot openly seek to topple the Uzbek regime by supportingits domestic Islamist opposition. If that were to happen,some Uzbek experts suspect that the Uzbek minority inAfghanistan could break with the Tajiks and negotiate astatus of autonomy with the Pashtuns. Tashkents main goalis to maintain its electricity exports and railway investmentsin Afghanistan, regardless of who is in charge in Kabul. The

Uzbek authorities also want to capitalise on their changeof geopolitical status. They hope to build on the nancialand strategic gains obtained from the Northern DistributionNetwork, which grants them a central role in the region,and secure long-term engagement from the U.S. This couldcompensate for potential German disengagement if theTermez base is closed.

Dushanbe thinks that the porousness of Tajik and Afghansocieties makes Afghanistan a key engine of Tajikistansown future (in)stability.35 If the Afghan Tajiks nd themselvesin conict with the new government in Kabul, the local

authorities will have a difcult time trying to cooperate withthe Taliban. A new civil war would likely see their territoryagain providing a support base for the insurrection of AfghanTajiks. Dushanbe also fears a possible Tashkent-Kabulalliance that would ank Tajikistan on both sides. 36 Thegeopolitical and electricity competition between Tajikistanand Uzbekistan could also intensify, as Afghanistan is usedas a foreign policy tool by both countries. The Tajik authoritiesalso worry about the likelihood of Iran becoming a more

33 S. Kozhirova, Te Current Kazakh-Aghan Relations. A GrowingCommitment,Afghanistan Regional Forum 6, March 2013.34 E. Zhuraev, Te Problem o Not Knowing Aghanistan: A Reection

Based on the Case o Kyrgyzstan,Afghanistan Regional Forum 4, Janu-ary 2013.35 S. Olimova and M. Olimov, Te Withdrawal o NAO Forces romAghanistan: Consequences or ajikistan,Afghanistan Regional Forum7, March 2013.36 Anonymous interviews with ajik experts on Aghanistan, Dushanbe,14 May 2012.


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proactive neighbour once NATO leaves Afghanistan.37 Lastly,Moscows pressure could drastically increase and Tajikistancould acquire a status as Russias quasi-institutionalisedprotectorate, a site of growing proxy tensions with the UnitedStates.

2.3. Russian, Chinese and U.S. engagement post-2014

2.3.1. Russia

Upon Vladimir Putins return to power in May 2012, Moscowis increasingly adopting a Russia rst strategy, and hasbegun to provide a better denition of its priorities.38 Moscowwill only get involved in those areas that it considers crucialto its security and domestic development. Other sectorswill be marketised, left to the private sector or to marketcompetition. The ght against drug-trafcking passingthrough Central Asia from Afghanistan is one of Moscowssecurity priorities. Another is the control of labour migrationfrom Central Asia. The Kremlin is also concerned about therisks of interaction between its own Islamic networks andthose in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

To support its domestic development, Russia is prioritisingthe creation of a Eurasian Economic Space and promotinggreater regional coordination in key sectors such ashydrocarbons, electricity, transport and cereals production.This strategy, which is still in the making, is built on theassumption that Russia will partially retract its interestin states that resist its inuence, such as Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan. Instead, it will privilege regional structures withfewer members Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan but a higher degree of cohesion. Examples of this include

the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and theyet incomplete Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Space.

The Russia rst strategy raises several questions. First, itsimplementation is still shaky. It is insufciently formulatedand coexists with other, older patterns, which conceive ofCentral Asia as a regional entity in which Moscow can setstandards. Many in Russian decision-making circles donot seem ready to abandon all inuence over Uzbekistan(Turkmenistan is deemed less crucial) and are waiting forTashkent to dene a new, more peaceful relationship withthe former hegemon. What is more, the Russia-rst strategy

has no chance of succeeding if it is not accompanied by aserious assessment of Russias own domestic challenges,including drug consumption, integration of migrants andlong-term solutions for the north Caucasus.

There is a large gap between Moscows power projectionand its actual political will and capacities on the ground.Can the CSTO really guarantee Tajik and Kyrgyz security,as Moscow becomes more and more hesitant about anymilitary intervention in Central Asia? Will the Kremlin riskRussian soldiers lives in order to defend Central Asiasincumbent leaders against public discontent? Can theEurasian Economic Space really benet the Central Asianeconomies, or is it only good for Russia? The Central Asian

37 M. Laumulin, V. Niyatbekov and G. Yudasheva, Debating the Impacto the Iranian Nuclear Crisis in Central Asia, Iran Regional Forum 1,June 2012.38 A. Matveeva, Selective Engagement: Russias Future Role in CentralAsia, Central Asia Policy Papers 3, July 2012.

governments are not sure whether the answers to all thesequestions would favour them and are uncertain aboutMoscows role in post-2014 regional security. Traumatisedby the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the CentralAsian elites do not think that Russia is ready to replace theinternational coalition. Instead, they think it will conceptualiseits relationship with Kabul in a purely defensive way.

2.3.2. China

The Chinese stance on the post-2014 situation is confusingto the Central Asian authorities. Chinas investmentsthroughout the region and in the northern provinces ofAfghanistan are appreciated, although Beijing is alsocriticised for targeting only minerals and hydrocarbons. Onsecurity, the majority of the Central Asian elites are eithersceptical or actually afraid of Chinas involvement on theground. For the time being, bilateral military aid is connedto the supply of electronic material and textiles for CentralAsian uniforms, and to training sessions for a few dozenCentral Asian ofcers in Chinese military academies. Chinais even less involved in military issues in Afghanistan andtries to avoid making denite commitments in terms ofsecurity engagement as requested by Kabul.

Debates about Afghanistan are central to the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation (SCO) and regional securityis alluded to in most of its public statements. But theorganisation has little impact on the ground. Its has nocoordinated structure between its member states that isrelevant to Afghanistan, not even on humanitarian aid orcrisis preparedness or refugee ows, not to mention theunlikely prospect of shared border management. At the

regional level, the SCO is only active in the ght againstalleged Uyghur extremism and in monitoring personssuspected of terrorist activities.39 The Chinese authorities arenot interested in developing the security aspect, which couldturn out to be a quagmire. They try to keep their distancefrom potential internal succession conicts in Central Asianstates, as well as from those between the Pashtun-backedTaliban, the Karzai government and the northern warlords inAfghanistan.

2.3.3. The United States

The U.S. has made a ten-year nancial commitment toAfghanistan for the period 2014-2024, and has signed aStrategic Partnership with Kabul, which includes a militarypresence in Afghanistan for the next decade, in the formof intelligence operations, special forces and trainingactivities.40 But this continued involvement cannot mask theU.S.s expected future disengagement. U.S. priorities ininternational security have clearly been reoriented towardthe Asia-Pacic region and the Greater Middle East.41The latter includes Afghanistan and Central Asia. But the

39 A. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: Te New Great Power Contest inCentral Asia (Oxord: Oxord University Press, 2012).40 Oce o the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Te U.S.-Aghanistan Strate-gic Partnership Agreement, WhiteHouse.gov, 1 May 2012, available at:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/2012/05/01/act-sheet-us-aghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement.41 U.S. Department o Deense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Pri-orities or 21st Century Deense, January 2012, available at: http://www.deense.gov/news/Deense_Strategic_Guidance.pd.


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situation in the Middle East has changed after the ArabSpring, the civil war in Syria and renewed Israeli calls forgreater support. This will probably lead to Afghanistan andCentral Asia becoming a secondary priority.

The sense of future American disengagement is also visiblein the State Departments 2011 new Silk Road narrative.Announced with great pomp as a strategic vision for the

whole Central Asia-South Asia region, the new Silk Roadrapidly raised doubts: rather than a concrete strategy, it isessentially a way of thinking.42 No specic budget has beenallocated, nor have any commitments been made in termsof diplomatic personnel. The launching of the NorthernDistribution Network was supposed to be accompaniedby a revival of American investments in the Central Asianeconomies, but this has not been the case.43 Neither has itenabled any kind of regional economic cooperation, since theonly transit is nanced by international actors. Above all, itserves as a rent-seeking mechanism for the local elites. Thetraditional U.S. commitment to promoting democratisationhas experienced the same setbacks as that of its Europeancounterpart. It is regularly compromised by the need to workwith local governments on security or energy agreements,and its impact on the ground is difcult to assess.

The main U.S. commitment to post-2014 Central Asia isessentially security-oriented. The Central Asia Counter-narcotics Initiative (CACI) is designed to provide trainingand equipment to set up counter-narcotics task forces forthe entire region.44 Another U.S. initiative involves openingtraining facilities in Batken and near Dushanbe to combatdrug-trafcking and terrorism.45 At the bilateral level, theU.S. plans to increase military aid to some states of the

region, such as Tajikistan.46 So, the long-term impact ofU.S. engagement in Central Asia is questionable, focusingmainly on conventional security and ghting poorly denedspillovers from Afghanistan. There is no hard commitmentto improving economic conditions and good governancein the region. In addition, chances are small that newprogrammes like the CACI will have more success in ghtingdrug-trafcking than previous ones did.

Central Asias governments see an intrinsic associationbetween the regions preparedness for post-2014 on theone hand, and the countries domestic situations and risk

assessments regarding their own regime security, on theother hand. From a regional perspective, Russia, Chinaand the U.S. have demonstrated insufcient commitment topost-2014 security. The Central Asian governments expectexternal actors to give generous amounts of aid to meet their

42 See G. Pyatts contribution in Discussing the New Silk Road Strategyin Central Asia, Central Asia Policy Forum 2, June 2012.43 G. Lee, Te New Silk Road and the Northern Distribution Network:A Golden Road to Central Asian rade Reorm?, Central EurasiaProject Occasional Paper Series 8, 2012.44 U.S. State Department Bureau o International Narcotics and LawEnorcement Afairs, Te Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative(CACI): Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, 21 February 2012, avail-

able at: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/s/184295.htm .45 D. ynan, Pentagon looks to plant new acilities in Central Asia,Eurasianet.org, 8 June 2010, available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61241.46 J. Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications forU.S. Interests (Washington DC: Congress Research Service, May 31,2012).

requirements: they want material but not training, short-termhelp but no long-term development. In the case of the West,this aid must come with no political strings attached, and inthe case of Russia and China, with no geopolitical ones. TheCentral Asian states, therefore, feel disappointed by currentcommitments and fear disengagement by the main externalactors in preparing for the post-2014 situation.

3. Niches for European engagement

In this troubled situation, how realistic are the EUs plans fordeveloping Central Asia-Afghanistan cooperation? Like theother external players, the EU must take into account thedifcult regional context. Central Asian governments havenever approved the U.S. narrative on a Greater Central Asiaand do not desire the systematic integration of Afghanistaninto the region, whose unity is already debatable. Tajikistansees maintaining cultural links with the Tajiks on the otherside of the border as important. But the rest of the CentralAsians do not identify with the Afghans. The Central Asian

states see Afghanistan more as a destabilising factor thanas the sixth republic of Central Asia. They would preferto limit interactions to a few shared security mechanisms,regional platforms and economic activity. European actorscannot compel regional integration without the will of localstakeholders. Europe must also take into considerationthe fact that regional intra-Central Asian tensions couldintensify because of Afghanistan, as already evidenced bythe growing competition between Tashkent and Dushanbeto export electricity to Kabul.47

3.1. Te EUs dissociated aid strategies

To date, the EU and its member states have differentiatedbetween Central Asia and Afghanistan both at the levelof policy planning and of programme implementation.Historically, the ve Central Asian states have been viewed asone of the post-Soviet regions, while Afghanistan has eitherbeen aligned with South Asia or treated as a special case.Thus, the current European Commissions development aidis guided by separate documents: the Regional AssistanceStrategy for Central Asia and the Country Strategy Paperfor Afghanistan (2007-2013). Nevertheless, the EU hasidentied several shared priorities, albeit at a very generallevel, in all six countries. Among the key EU objectives inboth Afghanistan and Central Asia are the promotion ofstability, economic development and good governance.Looking more closely at the EUs priorities and programmes,overlapping areas remain limited for the moment.

While European assistance to Afghanistan is largelygoverned by the policies of individual states, supportfor Central Asia is mainly shaped at the EU level andchannelled through the European Commission. The EUclearly prioritises Afghanistan in terms of funding. TheCommissions current Indicative Programme (2011-

2013) for Afghanistan allocates 600 million to support

47 V. Panlova, Dushanbe podelilsia s Kabulom otonami. SShApodderzhivaiut proekt novogo Shelkogo puti, Nezavisimaia gazeta,28 October 2011, republished at http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1320009180.


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a number of country-specic priorities.48 By comparison,over the same period only 321 million were allocated tobilateral and regional programmes in the ve Central Asianstates.49 EU amounts are complemented by large Europeannational disbursements. Over 2011-2013, the EU envisagessupporting Afghanistans police and justice reform with 160million.50 For the same period, only 10 million was allocatedto regional rule of law programmes in Central Asia, along with

a total of 39 million of bilateral support for judicial reformin Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.51 What is more,assistance to Afghanistan seems to be much more focused.The three major areas for support are rural development,social sector, and governance and the rule of law. Regionalallocations for Central Asia are also divided into three focalsectors, but they include a variety of issues, which are furthercomplemented by various different priorities for each state.

EU assistance documents attach signicant value toeconomic (or rural) development, governance and socialsectors, both in Afghanistan and Central Asia. However,regional cooperation gures are much more prominently inthe case of Central Asia. The Country Strategy Paper andthe Indicative Programme for Afghanistan regard regionalcooperation only as a non-focal area for support. For 2011-2013, it has been allocated 15 million (only 2.5 per cent oftotal EU assistance).52 Regional allocations to Central Asiawere far more signicant, at 105 million for 2011-2013, athird of the total assistance.53 These allocations primarilywent to support intra-regional cooperation programmesamong the Central Asian states, in which Afghanistan is notusually included.

In both cases, EU mainstream support is agreed on with

local governments, but aid delivery mechanisms differin Central Asia and Afghanistan. In the latter, Europeanassistance is partly disbursed through multi-donor trustfunds: the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF),administered by the World Bank, and the Law and OrderTrust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), managed by theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Thisis due to the need to coordinate the many donors effortsand to avoid direct allocations to weak state structures. In

48 European Union, Aghanistan: state o play, European Union Exter-nal Action Service, September 2011, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/aghanistan/documents/content/state_o_play_septem-

ber_2011_en.pd.49 European Commission External Relations Directorate General,Central Asia DCI Indicative Programme 2011-2013, European UnionExternal Action Service, 2010, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/cen-tral_asia/docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pd.50 European Union, Aghanistan: state o play, European Union Exter-nal Action Service, September 2011, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/aghanistan/documents/content/state_o_play_septem-ber_2011_en.pd.51 European Commission External Relations Directorate General,Central Asia DCI Indicative Programme 2011-2013, European UnionExternal Action Service, 2010, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/cen-tral_asia/docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pd.52 European Union, Aghanistan: state o play, European Union Exter-nal Action Service, September 2011, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/aghanistan/documents/content/state_o_play_septem-ber_2011_en.pd.53 European Commission External Relations Directorate General,Central Asia DCI Indicative Programme 2011-2013, European UnionExternal Action Service, 2010, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/cen-tral_asia/docs/2010_ca_mtr_en.pd.

Central Asia, European bilateral support is commonly madeavailable through inter-governmental nancing agreements,while regional assistance is provided to larger infrastructure,energy and security programmes led by internationalorganisations.

European actors participate in the Regional EconomicCooperation Conferences on Afghanistan (RECCA) and

closely follow the Istanbul Process initiated by Ankara. At theministerial conference in Kabul in June 2012, it was decidedto bolster the dialogue process by strengthening politicalconsultation and developing Condence Building Measures(CBMs) in the Heart of Asia.54 The EU has indicated itsintention to support the implementation of CBMs in severalareas, including disaster management, counter-narcoticsand commercial opportunities. All Central Asian countriesapart from Uzbekistan have expressed their willingness tolead CBMs. Some EU member states will also support thesemeasures in the spheres of counter-terrorism (France andUK), cooperation among chambers of commerce (Germanyand UK) and regional infrastructure (Germany).55 Whilethese commitments are welcomed, so far they are no morethan vague promises. It remains to be seen whether anyconcrete action will follow.

3.2. Security programmes: victims of distrust betweenCentral Asians and Afghans

A signicant share of EU regional assistance to CentralAsia goes to border management, counter-terrorismand counter-narcotics, to help deal with Afghanistan-associated security concerns. The EU nances the Border

Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), whichaims to introduce Integrated Border Management (IBM)methods and improve regional cooperation by providinginfrastructure, equipment and training to national borderagencies as well as organising joint events. The EU alsosupports the related Central Asia Drug Action Programme(CADAP). This programme focuses on drug addictionprevention and treatment, and provides European expertisethrough trainings, seminars and study tours for CentralAsian institutions on issues surrounding drug policies.The OSCE, which is 70 per cent funded by EU memberstates, has established a Border Management Staff College

in Tajikistan.56 Finally, several European states fund theCentral Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre(CARICC), which was created to coordinate joint actions forcombating illicit drug-trafcking. European countries alsoparticipate in the Central Asia Border Security Initiative(CABSI), a platform organised by Austria for dialogue andexchange between local actors and international donors.

54 According to the Kabul Ministerial Conerence Declaration, theHeart o Asia countries include Aghanistan, the ve Central Asian re-publics, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia,urkey and the United Arab Emirates.55 Istanbul Process: A New Agenda or Regional Cooperation inthe Heart o Asia, Heart o Asia Ministerial Conerence Ka-bul: Conerence Declaration, 14 June 2012, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/620128/publicationFile/169405/120612-HeartOAsia-Konerenzerklaerung.pd.56 Security and peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, border security andcrisis management are usually among the key areas or joint PP ac-tions.


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All these programmes and initiatives are in some wayassociated with the Afghan factor. But Kabul is almostnever a stakeholder in them. The OSCE has led someattempts to organise joint Tajik-Afghan and Turkmen-Afghanborder guard trainings, but with very limited results. The mostrecent CABSI conference, in April 2012, included Afghanrepresentatives.57 But there is no common programmaticapproach linking Central Asia and Afghanistan. CARICC,

for instance, brings together the ve Central Asian states,Russia and Azerbaijan, but excludes Afghanistan. BOMCAis practically separate from analogous EU initiatives inAfghanistan the completed BOMBAF (Border Managementin Badakhshan province) and its on-going successor,BOMNAF (Border Management Northern Afghanistan) even though they are all implemented by UNDP. TheEU Strategy review acknowledges the need to developsynergies between assistance programmes for Central Asiawith those for Afghanistan and ensure improved coordinationof EU programmesworking on both sides of Central Asianand Afghan borders (BOMCA and BOMNAF).58 However, itremains to be seen how this can be achieved in practice.

The UNDP and OSCE staffs on the ground are taking stepsto enhance inter-institutional and inter-regional cooperationthrough information-sharing and joint events. However,contact building between Central Asian and Afghan borderofcials is still in its infancy and often suffers from a lack ofinterest on both sides. European efforts to facilitate regionalcooperation through border security assistance, therefore,seem of little efcacy in their present form. Lack of trustbetween Central Asian and Afghan border guards seemsto be the main hurdle, so solutions to this issue should becentral to current projects.

Future European security cooperation with Central Asiashould not only concern potential threats emanating fromAfghanistan. It should also, where possible, include Afghanactors in existing cooperation structures, or at least createconsultation mechanisms. Here, the coordination of jointactions at CARICC and the established dialogue platformswithin BOMCA and CABSI could include Afghan stakeholdersmore at the regional level. This could also be achieved bythe planned institutionalisation of EU-Central Asia securityfora, similar to those held in 2008 and 2009, in the form ofa regular High Level Security Dialogue. As proposed in the

Progress Report and Implementation Review of the 2007EU-Central Asia Strategy, this new platform is expected toaddress common threats and challenges associated withAfghanistan.59 To coordinate these discussions with theEUs political dialogue with Kabul, it would be logical toinvolve Afghan stakeholders in this exercise, thus creatinga shared agenda between dialogue fora in Central Asia andAfghanistan. The existing regular meetings between theEU Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia andthe EUSR for Afghanistan set a good example for ensuringproper coordination of European efforts.

57 Ministerial Conerence o the Central Asia Border Security Initiative

(CABSI), Ministerial Declaration 16-17 April 2012, available at: http://www.bomca.eu/images/stories/cabsi_Declaration%20en_2012.pd.58 Progress Report on the Implementation o the EU Strategy or Cen-tral Asia: Implementation Review and Outline or Future Orientations,available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/docs/20120628_progress_report_en.pd, p. 17.59 Ibid., p.16.

3.3. Developing joint programmes in the civilian sphere

To boost Central Asia-Afghanistan cooperation, Europe willhave to go beyond state-to-state relations and try to involvecivilian actors. The EU Council Conclusions on Central Asiain 2012 emphasised that close cooperation of Central AsianStates with Afghanistan is an important element in promotingsecurity as well as encouraging cross-border trade andpeople-to-people contacts.60

One good example of an attempt to promote cross-bordertrade in the region is the Framework and Finance for PrivateSector Development in Tajikistan programme, co-funded byGermany and the United Kingdom and implemented by theGerman Society for International Cooperation (DeutscheGesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit/GIZ).The programme aims to alleviate poverty and encourageeconomic growth through strengthening the private sector.It includes a component that focuses on enhancing cross-border economic cooperation between Tajikistan and its

neighbours, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. The currentproject phase, from July 2010 to December 2013, involvessupporting measures for improving the framework conditionsfor bilateral economic activities, including policy dialogueand legislative reforms. It assists in the development ofmechanisms that directly benet enterprises on both sidesof the border, through consultancy, business support eventsand the creation of cross-border markets.61 Other successfulexample is the Aga Khan Foundation, which promotescross-border development operations on a modest scale,especially between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Giving assistance to local businesses working on bothsides of the frontier through the EUs Central Asia Invest(CAI) programme could extend and add to this experience.Launched in 2007, CAI seeks to strengthen the CentralAsian private sector, especially small and medium-sizedenterprises, as part of the EUs agenda for economicdevelopment and the ght against poverty. The programmecurrently works on the macro and meso levels, seeking toimprove the policy environment by contributing 1 millionto the OECDs Central Asia Competitiveness Initiative andproviding grant support (8.4 million in total) to CentralAsian Business Intermediary Organisations (BIOs).62The OECD initiative includes Afghanistan, but the CAI

component targeting BIOs focuses exclusively on post-Soviet Central Asia. The next phase of the programmecould incorporate support for local Afghan-Central Asianpartnerships, especially in agro-business, food processingand construction. As a grain producing country, Kazakhstanplays a key role in regional food security in the whole ofCentral Asia and Afghanistan. Cross-border initiatives on

60 Council o the European Union, Council Conclusions on CentralAsia, 3179th Foreign Afairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 25 June2012, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/oraf/131149.pd.61 Framework and Finance or Private Sector Development in ajikistan,Component 3: Cross Border Economic Relations, GIZ Presentation atthe ajikistan Development Coordination Council Special Session onCross-Border Cooperation, 6 March 2012.62 European Commission, Central Asia Invest: Making Small Busi-ness Grow, 2011, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/sme-development/documents/euaido7a-1011-brochure_central_asiai_invest_programme_en.pd.


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wheat storage, transport and distribution could be a driverfor improving regional food security.

Water management and the sustainable use of renewableenergy sources is another sphere in which Afghanistanand Central Asia could benet from enhanced cooperation,facilitated by the EU or its member states. Differentcountries conicting requirements from trans-boundary

rivers some needing to use water for irrigation, others forhydropower generation have contributed to intra-regionaltensions between upstream and downstream countries.The EU has established a regional water dialogue withthe ve post-Soviet states to address the issue. To avoida potential conict of interest, Afghanistan, which sharesthe Amu Darya River basin with Tajikistan, Turkmenistanand Uzbekistan, should be included in this process. At thesame time, the northern Afghan provinces are in acuteneed of electricity and water supply, which is vital to theireconomic development. Central Asian states can offera way to meet Afghan electricity demands. The EU andits member states can provide substantial know-how onintegrated water management and environmentally-friendlytechnical solutions for water and electric energy supply.The existing EU-Central Asia Platform for Environment andWater Cooperation and the EU-Central Asia Working Groupon Environmental Governance and Climate Change couldgradually incorporate Afghanistan and help identify the bestways to achieve cooperation. The Regional EnvironmentalCentre for Central Asia (CAREC), supported by the EUand its member states, could also be used to integrateAfghanistan into regional structures dealing with water andenvironment issues.

Some short-term joint Afghan-Central Asian watermanagement projects already exist. In 2010, the East-WestInstitute and the Irrigation and Water Engineering Group ofWageningen University conducted a one-year project calledAfghan-Central Asian Water Cooperation on Managementof the Amu Darya: Connecting Experts and Policymakers inthe Low Lands. The project resulted in the establishmentof the Amu Darya Basin Network, which brings togetherinternational water management experts, practitioners,policy-makers and researchers. With European support,this kind of projects could be expanded to programme level,comparable to the European Commissions EURECA 2009

(EU Regional Environment Programme for Central Asia).Regional programmes on collective water management andsustainable energy generation that benet both Central Asiaand Afghanistan could be funded through the DevelopmentCooperation Instrument (DCI) thematic programme forEnvironment and Sustainable Management of NaturalResources.

Exchanges between Central Asia and Afghanistan fosteredby the EU or member states could be extended to civil societyalso. This could be done by supporting joint civil societyprojects through the European Instrument for Democracyand Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Non-State Actors and

Local Authorities in Development (NSA-LA) programme, bothof which are already in operation in Afghanistan and CentralAsia. Cross-regional exchange between womens NGOs,which are particularly strong in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstanand are growing in Tajikistan, could be especially promisingin helping to address gender issues in Afghanistan.

Finally, funds from the EUs Instrument for Stability (IfS)could be made available for civil society partnership projectsin the border regions of Tajikistan and Afghanistan towork on conict prevention and strategies for coping withthe consequences of potential crises. The IfS has bothshort-term (crisis response) and long-term (programmed)components. Funds under the short-term component havealready been allocated to projects in Afghanistan, and also to

Kyrgyzstan to help the country deal with the consequencesof the 2010 political crisis and inter-ethnic clashes in thesouth. Under the long-term component, the IfS ThematicStrategy Paper and Indicative Programme for 2012-2013mentions Afghanistan in relation to the post-2014 situationand Central Asia in relation to counter-radicalisation andregional initiatives. However, the regions are again onlysupercially linked to each other, if at all. Possibilities forinter-regional civil cooperation on the ground need to beincorporated into IfS planning.

3.4. Enhancing education exchanges

There are promising opportunities for European actors tosupport education, science and cultural exchanges betweenCentral Asia and Afghanistan, building on the foundation ofthe legacy of Soviet-Afghan proximity and existing people-to-people contacts, especially through ethnic Tajik, Turkmenand Uzbek minorities in northern Afghanistan. Central Asiafaced challenges in reforming its educational and sciencesystems after the break-up of the Soviet Union, which wereaggravated by the lack of nancial and human resourcesand restrictive state policies. But Central Asian countries canstill offer a good (and affordable) alternative for educating

and training Afghan specialists abroad. Programmes fornancing studies in the West are reserved for a privilegedminority of Afghans, and, for the moment, India and Pakistanare the main destination countries for Afghan students wholeave the country at their own expense. Afghan studentscould be encouraged to go to Central Asian countries, inparticular Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Tajikistanin case of Tajik-speaking Afghans. The cultural similaritieswith Central Asian societies could help families feel morecomfortable in sending young women abroad.

Kazakhstan has already begun to implement a $50 million

(37.5 million) scholarship programme to benet Afghanstudents, while Turkmenistan provides scholarships to theTurkmen minority of Afghanistan. Attracted by the relativelylow cost of education and the language similarity, manyAfghans go to Tajik universities at their own expense.European funding could supplement these options andprovide new opportunities for both Afghans and CentralAsians. Central Asia also hosts several internationaluniversities and colleges that could open their grantprogrammes to Afghan students, as is already the case ofthe American University of Central Asia in Bishkek. Manyuniversities, however, are oriented towards humanities andsocial sciences, whereas Central Asia and Afghanistan arein desperate need of engineers and medical specialists.Recruiting European experts in these elds to teach atinternational universities in Central Asia and creating moreopportunities for scientic and technical exchange betweenCentral Asian, Afghan and European institutions couldhelp share international know-how to the benet of all the


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countries involved.

The EUs Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asiahas included the promotion of education reform as one ofits key priorities and so the Union is well placed to supporteducation and scientic initiatives in the wider region.The EUs Erasmus Mundus, a cooperation and mobilityprogramme in the eld of higher education, is particularly

relevant for establishing university partnerships and offeringscholarships to students and academics. However, theprogramme has very complex procedures and focusesprimarily on facilitating bilateral exchanges between Europeand third countries, rather than among third countriesthemselves, which might make it difcult fully to incorporatethe aforementioned proposals. In addition, EU memberstates own programmes should also be considered fordeveloping education and scientic links between CentralAsia and Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The 2012 Review of the EU Strategy for Central Asia seeksto address the potential changes that will emerge after 2014.It stresses the need better to articulate the relationshipbetween Central Asia and Afghanistan in the years ahead,particularly with regard to security and development. Butconcrete proposals on how to do this are largely absent. Instreamlining a new and effective policy that links Afghanistanand Central Asia where appropriate, the EU needs toaddress ve major obstacles:

The EU talks of common challenges such as

Afghanistan, terrorism and drug-trafcking,63

aconfusing narrative that does not help to dissociateissues from one another. As such, it indirectlyvalidates the ofcial Central Asian discourseabout the region as a victim of potential spilloversfrom Afghanistan. This approach neglects thatradicalisation in this case, Islamic is mostly ahome-grown phenomenon in Central Asia, andthat drug-trafcking is largely a state-sponsoredbusiness. Overestimating the security risks couldfurther push Central Asian governments to adoptstrategies that are harmful to long-term developmentand democratisation. The EU should develop a

more realistic narrative by emphasising CentralAsias home-grown security threats and challenges.

Central Asian governments are mindful that Afghaninstability is an important source of revenue. LosingWestern military aid and the current transactionalrelationship surrounding the transit of equipmentto and from Afghanistan would penalise the elitesin ofce. In this environment, high-level securityfora run the risk of ending up as talk shops forCentral Asian governments rent-seeking strategies.Whereas the EU will assure Central Asian leaders

that it will not disengage post-2014, it should set abroader agenda with Central Asian states that goeswell beyond managing the drawdown.

63 Progress Report on the implementation o the EU Strategy or CentralAsia Implementation Review and outline or Future Orientations, p. 29.

The EU has no clear-cut solution to counter thelack of political will towards regional cooperation.Initiating effective cooperation between CentralAsian countries and Afghanistan will be difcult.Distrust runs deep and is longstanding. With thepossible exception of Kazakhstan, the CentralAsian states are not interested in coordinatingeconomic and humanitarian aid to Kabul. Each

of them has developed an individual relationshipwith Afghanistan and has trade and/or investmentinterests. The quickly deteriorating relationshipbetween Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over Afghanelectricity imports shows that Afghanistan can bemore of an object of discord than of agreement. It isin the EUs interest to speak more openly about theregions complex realities.

The EU has repeatedly stated that security is themain concern in Central Asia and Afghanistan andit spends considerable amounts of resources onborder security projects like BOMCA/BOMNAF.However, this kind of programmes alone cannotadequately tackle drug-trafcking. Securing borderswith checkpoints, barbed wire and watchtowers is notenough to make the frontier impenetrable. In CentralAsia and Afghanistan, all border points, even thosethat the international community has equipped best,remain porous, because corruption has renderedthem permeable. Progress on border efciencyrequires the political will to ght corruption over thelong term. Thus, to be effective, international effortsto combat drug-trafcking in Central Asia must berst political in nature. Such an approach is unlikely

to obtain the support of Central Asian ruling elitesand the international community is not well-placedto impose it. Nonetheless, support for border controlneeds to move increasingly from technical projectsto political debate and from supporting hardware toproviding training and guidance for reform.

The EU is vague about cooperation with otherexternal actors. If security is a real concern, thenthe role of Russia as a partner in Central Asia mustbe clearly addressed. But the EU and its memberstates are divided over which projects to share with

Moscow. Hopes of developing security cooperationwith China in the region are even more far-fetched.More importantly, it is necessary to improvecoordination between EU and U.S. strategies inCentral Asia and Afghanistan. Both are experiencingnancial difculties and facing growing pressure athome to limit costly undertakings abroad, as well ashaving to manage on-going tensions in the MiddleEast. The EU and the U.S. have everything to gainby bolstering the transatlantic partnership in CentralAsia and Afghanistan; not by throwing money at theproblems but by streamlining their approaches andpolicies.

It will be hard for Europe, as for any external actor, to setup mechanisms of trilateral EU-Central Asia-Afghanistancooperation. Probably the most realistic way in which theEU can help connect Afghanistan and Central Asia is bysupporting locally-based initiatives, such as cross-border


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trade or community-based activities, and by trying to fosterwater negotiations and joint education programmes. Butmost calls for greater integration between Afghanistan andCentral Asia will remain unanswered as long as local actorsprefer to remain on the margins and lack the political will tobuild integrated cooperation mechanisms.

If Central Asia and Afghanistan are the victims of anything, it

is of the multiple pompous narratives and grand geopoliticaldesigns that have framed the involvement of external actorsin the region, from the war on terror to nation building.Concepts such as these have been instrumentalised andinternalised by the local elites to their own advantage.The European Union aims to be a normative actor in itsvalues and a pragmatic one in its objectives. Hence, itis in its best interest realistically to assess the post-2014challenges and nd ways to promote constructive relationsbetween the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. TheEU must focus on areas in which the long-term involvementof local actors can be boosted, in particular that of localcivilian stakeholders, who are the only vectors of long-termsustainable solutions.


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Established in 2008 as a project seeking to monitor the implementation

of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has grown into a knowledge

hub on broader Europe-Central Asia relations. Speciically, the project

aims to:

Scrutinise European policies towards Central Asia, paying speciic

attention to security, development and the promotion of democraticvalues within the context of Central Asias position in world politics;

Enhance knowledge of Europes engagement with Central Asia

through top-quality research and by raising awareness among

European policy-makers and civil society representatives, as well as

discuss European policies among Central Asian communities;

Expand the network of experts and institutions from European

countries and Central Asian states and provide a forum to debate on

European-Central Asian relations.

Please follow our work on www.eucentralasia.eu. If you have any

comments or suggestions, please email us at [email protected]

FRIDE is a European think tank for global action, based in Madrid, which

provides fresh and innovative thinking on Europes role on the international

stage. Our mission is to inform policy and practice in order to ensure

that the EU plays a more effective role in supporting multilateralism,

democratic values, security and sustainable development. We seek

to engage in rigorous analysis of the dificult debates on democracy

and human rights, Europe and the international system, conlict and

security, and development cooperation. FRIDE beneits from political

independence and the diversity of views and intellectual background of

its international team.

Founded in 1971, the Karelian Institute is a unit of the Faculty of Social

Sciences and Business Studies of the University of Eastern Finland.

It engages in basic and applied multi-disciplinary research, supports

the supervision of postgraduate studies and researcher training, and

participates in teaching. It focuses mainly on three thematic priorities:

Borders and Russia; Ethnicity and Culture; and Regional and Rural

Studies.

Documents

EUCAM WP13 Afghanistan