Europe Since Napoleon c ontents cuam intro ductory i. the reconstruct ion of europ e ii. fr ance an d bonapart ism 1815—71 iii. france as a repu bl ic iv. gar i bal di an d the li

Q3Q6

EUROPE S INCE

N APOLEON

IHJZABETH LEVETT

WITH

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Sm RIC HARD LODGE , LL.D .

P rofessor of History in the Un iversity of Edinburgh

BLAC K IE AND SON LIM ITED

50 OLD BA ILEY LONDON

GLASGOW AND BOMBAY

PREFAC E

Th is brief h istory of the n i neteen th centu ry waswri tten before the presen t European s i tuation arose ,and therefo re wi th no special reference to the eventsof to- day . I hope , however, that i t may supply arap id outl i ne of past events s i nce the great Napoleon icstruggle

,which wi l l th row some l ight upon the

presen t . I t i s i ntended , primari ly , for young peoplewho have had no oppo rtu n i ty of fo l lowi ng Eu ropeanpo l i t ics duri ng a long period of years , th rough thenewspapers .I t makes no claim to be founded on first—handauthori ti es , save i n a few i so l ated cases , but I havetried to use the best secondary h istorical works , andto bri ng i t i n to harmony wi th the most recen t investigations .

"

I have consciously emphasized the b iograph ical and personal s ide of h istory

,and have

traced the growth of nat ions rather than the i n tricac iesof diplomatic h istory , which do not adm it of severecompression , and are apt to obscu re the mo re pote n taction of national feel i ng. I t i s hoped that manyomissions may be pardoned

,i n cons ideration of the

space at my d isposal .The bibl iography (Append ix D) does not aim atbei ng exhaustive ; i t i ncl udes , however, most of theeasi ly - accessi b le books on the various subjects

,as

i i i

i v PREFACE

wel l as some of the first-hand authori t i es,and some

of,the more weighty secondary works .My very s i ncere thanks are due to M iss Lodge

,

Vice-Pri nc ipal and Tutor of Lady Margaret Hal l ;to M r. E rnest Barker, Fel low and Tutor of NewCol l ege ; and to M iss M . 0. Davis and M iss GraceHadow (Lady Margaret Hal l) , who have ki nd ly readparts of my manuscript , and have given me muchval uable and pract ical advice . To M r. Barker I am

i ndebted for much of the material of Chapter V I I . I

am also espec ial ly gratefu l to M iss C . M . Craven (S t.H i lda ’s Hal l) , who has compi led the i ndex , and hasread th rough the whole book both i n manuscript andi n proof.

OXFORD , 4 October , 1914.

A few very sl ight changes have been made i n thetext

,i n notes , and i n the Append ices ; such changes

have general ly been i nd icated by the date , 1919, buti n the mai n I have left the book as i t stands , hold i nggood up to 19 14 , un ti l such time as i t may be possi bl eto summarize the resu l ts of the G reat War.

S eptember , 1919.

C ONTENTS

CuAm

INTRODUCTORY

I . THE RECONSTRUCT ION OF EUROPE

I I . FRANCE AND BONAPART I SM , 1815—7 1

I I I . FRANCE As A REPUBL IC

IV. GAR I BALD I AND THE L IBERAT ION OF ITALY

V. B I SMARCK AND THE MAK ING OF THE GERMAN EM P IRE 88

VI . GERMANY smog 187 1

V I I . AU STR IA -HUNGARY

VI I I . Russm

IX. THE BALKAN P EN INSULA

X . S PA I N AND PORTUGAL

XI . THE SMALLER C OUNTR IES OF EUROPE

X11. THE CONST ITUT ION S OF EUROPE

X I I I . SOME TENDENC I ES OF THE N INETEENTH C ENTURY

CONCLUS ION

APPEND IX A.— Genealogical Tab les

B .— European Ru lers during the N ineteen th C entury

C .-G lossary of some Pol i t ical and other Terms used

in th is bookD .

- B ib l iographyE .

— Summary of Forms of Government in Europe

INDEX

LIST OF MAPS

EUROPE I N 1815 in colour

THE FRANCO -GERMAN WAR

ITALY ( 1815—7 1)

GERMANY

AUSTR IA -HUNGARY

THE C R IMEAN WAR

THE TURK ISH EM P IRE I N 1815

THE BALKAN PEN INSULA IN 1912

EUROPE I N 1912 in colour 24 1

SWITZERLAND

INTRODUC TORY NOTE

The taunt most frequent ly cas t in the teeth of teachersof h istory is that the i r subject is of no practical importance , that i t deals with musty and ob solete precedents ,and that no practical statesman looks to the past for

guidance in deal ing with modern problems . Recent eventsand the l ight which they have thrown upon the spi ri t andthe asp i rations of Germany show how l i tt le real foundationthere is for this taunt . It has sudden ly become obviousthat the teaching of history, systematical ly fostered anddirected , may exercise a decis ive influence upon pub l icop inion , and through this influence may determine the

pol icy of a great state and the fate of a continent . It is ,

of course , imposs ib le to attr ibute the present Europeanstrugg le to any one man , but if an individual had to b e

s ing led out to b ear the chief respons ibi l i ty it wou ld b ethe former P rofessor of H istory at Ber l in , Heinrich von

Trei tschke . That such an influence can poss ib ly b e

attributed to a teacher is at once an encouragement anda caution to the profession .

That a certain view of past events , sedu lously incu lcated ,could make history as we l l as e lucidate it , is not real ly anew experience . Rather more than a century ago whenFrance was , as she promises once more to b e , the teacherof history to Europe , i t was general ly accepted thatC har lemagne, as the very name imp l ied , was a Frenchman , and that h is widely- extended rule was F rench rule .

1X

X INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Hence was drawn the obvious conclusion that France,in

claiming to dominate Europe , was on ly reasserting r ightswhich had their roots in the past , and that Napoleon was

justified in seeking to revive the empire of C harlemagne .

In the reaction which fol lowed the overthrow of Napoleon , Germany gave birth to the most zealous , the mostlearned , and the most influential historical scholars of

Europe . A Teutonic school of history supplanted that ofFrance , and England produced some of the most doci leand thorough-going discip les of that school . It was laiddown with al l the enthus iasm of discoverers of a new

doctrine that the foundations of European institutions andcivi l ization were to b e found , not in Latin or Romance ,but in German orig ins , that C harlemagne was not aF renchman b ut a German , that he must be cal led Karlder Grosse or C harles the Great , and that h is capitalshou ld b e written as Aachen and not Aix - la - Chape l le.Every compi ler of a textbook in this country hastened toemp loy German spel l ings for the names of persons andof places that had for generations been fami l iar in the i rF rench forms . This change i n nomenclature was real lya re-reading of the history of Europe.This al tered out look on the pas t had a direct bearing

on practical po l i t ics . In Germany it served a patriot ic

purpose , and aided in fostering that demand for Germanunity which had been generated in the Wa r of Lib eration .

Bu t i t did not stop with that achievement . The legend of

C harlemagne , transformed by this new interpretation , just ified a German headship in Europe as it had formerly b eenemployed to justify a F rench Empire. The history of the

Ho ly Roman Emp ire , that standing i l lustration of Germanincompetence and German disunion , was recast by Von

Syb el and others , to create the impression that Germanywas the rightfu l inheritor of the imperial power of Rome ,and that it had on ly ceased to ru le Europe b ecause itsenerg ies had been diverted for a time to the distracting

INTRODUCTORY NOTE xi

task of guiding the world in the direction of re l ig iousreform . The task of Luther having b een performed ,German rulers were entit led to resume the role once playedby the Karol ings , by the O ttos , and by the Hohenstaufen .

The enforced recognition of the fact that historicalteaching and reading can have such farreach ing resu ltsis b ound to g ive a new stimu lus to the study of the past .The conclus ion to b e drawn is not that some antidotemust b e found for views which seem fraught with suchdanger to other states , or that history must necessari ly b epropagandist . It is rather that history , and especial lyrecent history, shou ld b e so careful ly studied that theGerman po int of view may b e understood , and that itsstrength and its weakness may b e al ike appreciated . The

isolation of B r itain , at once its strength and its weakness ,shou ld enab le the people of this country to engage in sucha study without that b ias and prepossess ion which compe la one- s ided and partial view. It has been a weaknessof our educational system that we have neg lected thehistory o f al l countr ies b ut our own , and that ou r instructedh istor ical survey has general ly ended with the batt le of

Waterloo . It is high time that this defect shou ld b e

rect ified .

The two greatest pol itical events i n European historysince 1815 have undoubted ly b een the union of Italy andthe history of Germany. Both were great achievements ,and both were accomp l ished in face of enormous d ifficu lties . There are some instructive s imi larit ies and sti l lmore instructive contrasts between the two movements ,and the methods adopted by the leaders in both countriesmay b e open to we l l-founded cr i ticism on moral grounds .

But there is one very obvious contrast between the two .

In Italy there was a strong popu lar des i re for unity, andthe various stages in the process of conso l idation , in sp iteof sundry imperfections , were just ified by the approval ofthe popu lar wi l l . P iedmont , even with ass is tance from

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

fore ign powers , cou ld never have forced upon Italy sub

miss ion to the House of S avoy . In Germany there was

an equal pass ion for union and much historical justification fo r P russ ian headship. But P russ ia de l ib erate lyrefused in 1848 to accept the offer of headship from the

German peop le . B ismarck , the founder of modern Germany , preferred to found the German Empire upon the

foundation of force , or of “ b lood and iron ” as he termedit. Three successive wars , against Denmark , against Austria , and against France , were de l iberately waged to erectthe imposing ed ifice o f modern Germany. The worshipof b rute force , inspired by the conditions under whichGe rman union was achieved , has al ienated countrieswhich by orig in , by past al l iances , and by var ied ob l i

gat ions , were inc l ined to welcome and to support a unitedGermany.

There is at the present time an obvious and a we l l

justified demand for b ooks which wi l l enab le Engl ishreaders to understand the growth of the modern statessystem , and especial ly the growth of the state with whichwe have b een forced into an internec ine struggle . M issE l izab eth Levett , whom I first met as a b ri l l iant studentin the S choo l ot Modern History at Oxford , has writtena clear and terse nar rative of the events of the last hundred

years , which may b e commended as a usefu l introduct ionto further study, and as a vo lume that even the wel linformed reader may peruse with interest and profit.

RICHARD LODGE .

October . 1914 .

CHRONOLOG ICAL TABLE

1815 . Congress of Vienna.

Battle ofWaterloo.

Second Treaty of Paris.Ban ishment of Napoleon.

1819. Ca rlsb ad Decrees.

Beg inn ing of German Zol lverein .

1820. Revolutions in Spa in , Portugal ,and Naples.

Death of George I I I .Assass ina tion of Due de Berr i.

1821. Congress of La ibach .

Revolution in Piedmon t.Murder of Patriarch of Constan tin0ple.

Death of Napoleon.

1822. Congress of Verona.

Independence of Greece procla imed .

Cann ing succeeds Cas tlereagh as

Foreign Secreta ry.1825. Dea th of Alexander I of Russ ia .

Death of Ferd inand IV of Naples.Hunga r ian D iet mee ts agai n.

1827 . Death of Cann ing.Ba ttle of Navar ino.

1830. R is ings in Germany.Revolution in France.

Revolution in Belg ium.

Ris ings in Poland and in I taly.1831. Access ion of Char les Albert.1832. Reform Bill passed in Great

Bri ta in .

Dea th of the Duke of Reichstadt(Napo leon ’

s only son ) .

1833. Trea ty of Unkiar-S kelessi.

1835. Dea th of Francis I of Austria.

C arl ist War con tinues in Spa in.

1839. Wa r between Turkey and Mehemet

Al i .

Death of Frederick Wil l iam I I I ofPruss ia.

Marr iage ofQueen Victor ia .

Treaty between G rea t Br itain ,

Russ ia , and Austria aga instM ehemet Al i.

Louis Napoleon '

s land ing in

France ; beginn ing of his im

prisonmen t.Body of N apoleon I b rough t backto Pa r is .

1846. Pol ish R ising in Gal ic ia .

Pius IX becomes Pope.

Escape of Louis Napoleon from

prison.

The Span ish Ma rriages

1847 . Hungarian D iet draws up Schemesof Reform.

C ha r les Al bert adopts Liberal Reforms in Piedmon t.

Reform Banquets in Paris.

Revolutions in the Two S icil ies ,

France. Germany, Austria . Bo

hemia , Hungary, Croa tia , Nor

them and Centra l I ta ly.Battle of C ustozza.

Wa r between Austr ia and Piedmon t.

C hartist Demonstration in London .

General Gran t of Liberal Constitutions , bo th before and afterRevolutions.

Louis Napoleon elected Pres identof French Repub l ic.

1849. Gar ibald i s Defence of the Roman

Repub l ic.

Ba ttle of Novara .

Abd ication of Cha rles Albert .

Hungarian R is ing put down .

Cap itulation of Vi lagos.

x iv

1850.

185 1.

185 2.


Per iod of Reaction begins.

Conven tion of O lmutz.

Louis N apoleon’

s Coup d '

Iij tat.

Louis N apoleon b ecomes Emperorof the French .

1854-6. The Cr imean Wa r .

1855 .

1856.

1858.

1859.

1860.

1861.

1862 .

1866.

1867 .

Death of Tsa r Nicholas .

Congress 01 Paris.

C avou r'

s Meeting w ith NapoleonI I I at Plomb ieres.

War of I tal ian Liberation beg ins.

N apoleon I I I j o ins Victor Em

manuel in Wa r aga inst Austria.

Ba ttles of Magen ta and Solferino.

Truce of Vi lla franca.

Lombardy ceded to Piedmon t.Death of Ferd inand I I of the TwoS icil ies.

Tusca ny. Pa rma , Modena , and

the Romagna annexed to Piedmon t.Savoy and Nice ceded to France.

WilliamlI b ecomesKing of Pruss ia .

Pol ish Ris ing put down .

Formation of Rumania .

Emancipa tion of Ser fs in Russiacompleted .

N ew Kingdom of I taly procla imed

under Victor Emmanuel (on lyVenetia and Rome rema in out

s ide).Bismarck b ecomes Ch ief Pruss ianMin ister .

Pol ish Insurrection aga in .

Pr ince George of Denmark electedto Th rone of G reece.

Pruss ia and Austria invade S ch leswig-Holstein .

The Seven Weeks’ War b etweenAustria and Pru ssia.

Battle of Sadowa.

Peace of Prague.

Formation of a North -German

C onfederation .

Compromise (Ausgle ich ) b etweenAustr ia and Hunga ry.

1870—1. Franco-Pruss ian War .

Battles of Worth , G ravelotte, andSedan.

1877 .

1878.

1880.

1881.

Russ ia declaresWa r on Turkey.

Siege of Plevna .

Congress of Berl in.

Treaty of Ber l in .

G rowth of Nih il ism in Russ ia .

Germany adopts a ProtectiveTa r iff .Murder of the Tsa r Alexander I I

187 1. Cap itula tion of Par is (Siege 20

Septemb er , 1870, to 30 Janua ry,

King of Prussia declared German

Emperor .

Outb reak of the “Commune

(March to May) .

187 2 . Tr iple Al liance b etween Empe rorsofAustria , G ermany, and Russ ia .

1873. Beginn ing of the Kulturkampf inGermany.

Death of Napoleon I I I .187 5. C onstitutiona l Laws drawn up for

French Repub l ic.

1876. The“Andrassy Note presen ted toTurkey.Bulgarian Massacres.Abdul Ham id b ecomes Sultan .

Servia andMontenegro r ise aga in stTurkey.Con ference of Powers at Constant i~

nop le

Arab i Pa sha ’

s R i smg in Egypt.Battle of Tel -el—Keb ir .

Bri tish Protectorate set up in

EgyptTr iple All iance b etween Austria ,

G ermany , a nd I taly.

C onference a t Cons tan tinople .

I ta l ian E xped i tion to Marsowah .

Bri tish E xped ition to Kha rtoum .

1886. U n ion of Bulgaria and Ea sternRumel ia .

1886—7 . Boulanger ’s Great Influence inFrance.

1887 . I ta lian Fa ilure in Abyssm i a.

1890. Fal l of Bismarck.1891 . Understand ing between France

and Russ ia .


1894. Armen ian Massacres.

Br itish Remonstrances.

1897. War between Greece and Turkey .

1897-8. Dreyfus Case " in France.

1898. Death of Bismarck.1899. Peace Conference at the Hague.

1899—1901. War in the Transvaa l.

1901. Death ofQueen Victoria.

1902. C omm iss ion cons iders Reforms in

Macedon ia .

1903. E n ten te be tween G rea t Brita in and

France.

XV

1904—5 . Russo -JapaneseWar.

1905 . Treaty between G rea t Br i ta in and

Japan .

Norway b ecomes an Independen tKingdom.

1906. Algec iras Con ference to d iscussaffa irs in Morocco.

1907 . Thi rd Duma meets at S t. Petersburg.

1908. Austria -Hungary annexes Bosn iaand Herzegovina .

Prince Ferd ina nd of Bulgar iatakes titl e of Tsar .

1908—9. Revolution in Turkey.

The Kingdom of God is made v is ib le to h im to

whom a l l Kingdoms are so many Mans ions of Joy ,and a ll Ages b ut the s tree ts of h is own C i ty .

"

THOMAS TRAHERN E ,Chrzstz

’

an E th z'

cks , p . 554.

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EURO P E S IN C E

N A PO L EON

INTRODUCTORY

He was as g rea t as a man can b e w i thou t v ir tue .

— De Tocquew'

lle.

THE h istory of the n i neteen th cen tu ry m ight verywel l be cal led “What Came After Napoleon ”

Nearly one hu ndred years have passed s i nce thebattle of Waterloo

,and yet the influence of Napoleon

has not passed away ; i n fact , we may sti l l see i t atwork al l over Eu rope .To understand th i s we must look a long way back .

I n the days of the Roman Empi re al l Weste rn Eu ropewas under one governmen t ; the Emperor in Romewas obeyed i n B ri ta i n and i n Spai n

,i n Germany and

i n Gaul , i n Constan ti nople and i n I ta ly i tsel f, to saynoth i ng of h is domi n ions outs ide Eu rope . But eventhen B ri tai n and Gaul and Spai n real ized that theywere separate countries , and when the Roman Empi re fel l each people took up i ts own l i fe

,and new

nations arose— in great confusion and with muchbattle and bloodshed , but sti l l w i th some elementsof strength and i nd ividual i ty .

Throughout the centu ri es the nations had grownstronger and stronger ; thei r races had become more

( 0 565 ) 1 2

2 I NTRODUCTORY

clearly marked , the i r languages and l i te ratu res hadbecome d ist i nct , the i r patrioti sm grew keener ; anda l though the Holy Roman Empi re of the M idd leAges lasted down to the year '

1806,i ts power had

faded away to a mere shadow.

Besides the growth of the great nations of Europe,

there had been another development . Germany andI taly had broken up i nto a number of smal l States

,

so that i n what is now cal led Germany there wereseveral ki ngs and i n n umerable pri nces and dukes andbishops , each acti ng l ike a k i ng i n h i s own domai ns ;wh i le I ta ly , d ivided i n to many provi nces , was for themost part ru led by foreigners (see p . A glanceat the map wi l l show the cond i t ion of Europe at theend of the e ighteenth centu ry bette r than any descr ipt i on .

Meanwhi le,al l th rough the seventeenth and eigh

teenth centu ri es men had been debati ng a veryd i fficul t question . Were the peoples of Europe togovern themselves

, to work out thei r own h istory , toprocu re the i r own p rosperi ty , s ide by s ide wi th thei rown l i be rty ; or were they to t rust thei r k i ngs andemperors to give them al l that was good for them ,

to make thei r laws,arrange thei r taxes , and look

after them l ike ch i ld ren ? Were they to adm it, i n thewords of the Lai bach Congress , that changes i n theadm i n ist ration of States ought on ly to emanate fromthe i n tel l igen t and wel l-weighed conv iction of thosewhom God has rendered responsi bl e for powerTh is was what i s cal led benevol en t despotismth i s was what Charles I bel i eved in

,what Lou is XIV

and Josep h I I acted upon . But i n B ritai n i t had beensettl ed by the Great Rebel l ion and the Revo l ut ionof 1688 that B ri ti sh subj ects must learn to governthemselves

,even i f at first they were too ignorant to

do so w ith any great success. Th is, too, was the

THE \VORK OF NAPOLEON 3

essent ial mean i ng of the French Revolution ; th is waswhat the wisest men i n France had been aim i ng at.

“

As Can n i ng said,they must i ns ist upon the right

of nations to set up over themselves whateve r fo rm of

government they thought best, and to be left free tomanage thei r own affai rs so long as they left othernations to manage the i rs ” . Un fo rtu nately , Francehad not kept to the latte r part of th i s bargai n .

The Convent ion i n 1792 , Napo l eon and the D i rectory i n 1796, had led arm ies agai nst the i r neighboursi n order to spread French ideas of l i berty and goodgovernment . This was i n tole rable . The FrenchRevo l ution had been bad enough to watch ; but i tcou ld not be endu red that Napo leon shou ld marchh is arm ies i n to Ho l land and Germany , i n to I taly andAustria

,i n to Spai n and i n to Russia

,forci ng the

smal ler or weaker nations to support h im ,or con

queri ng them ,and sett i ng up new governmen ts of

h is own maki ng, with one of h i s brothers as ki ng.

True,he often d id much good

,especial ly i n Germany

and I taly,where he swept away usel ess and co rrupt

i nst i tutions , and where h i s conquests had the unex

pected resu l t of rous i ng national sp i ri t . Eu rope ,however, could not suffer such i n te rference , for, a l

though Napo leon ’s v ictori es resu l ted i n a great outbu rst of patrioti c feel i ng, yet he h imsel f igno red thequestion of national i ty al together. He cou ld not seewhy Germans and French

,I ta l ians and Span iards ,

could not l ive happ i ly unde r the same rule . He

a imed at maki ng a great Empi re for h imsel f,which

should cut right across the d ivid i ng l i nes of national i ty ; as he said h imsel f, Je n

’ai pas succédé aLou isX IV

,mais aCharlemagne

Th i s i s not the place to tel li

the story of howB ri tai n fought Napoleon , year after year, battle after

4 INTRODUCTORY

battl e , sometimes wisely , often foo l i sh ly , win n i ngalways by sea , los i ng general ly by land , un ti l at l ast ,i n Wel l i ngton , she found the one man who cou ldovercome the great Empero r by poundi ng harde rThe great st ruggle wen t on , un ti l , as Pi tt hadprophes ied , “ England saved hersel f by he r exer

t ions , and Europe by her example”

. The Battl e ofWaterloo l eft Napo l eon hel pl ess . H is army was defeated , he had lost h is ho ld on France

,h i s influence

i n Pari s had been u nderm i ned .

“ Had I had anEngl i sh army I shou ld have conquered the un iverse

,

”

he said long afte rwards , and he complai ned bitterlythat he

,had been deserted by the cou ntry for wh ich

he had done so much . He was beaten , however,and B ri tai n and the other Powers sen t h im to S t.Helena , where he and h is su ite were al lowed to l i vewith some degree of freedom .

After the ban ishmen t of Napol eon , Europe had a

harder problem than she had ever befo re tried tosol ve . The map had been as i t were rubbed out ;

we l l - known l i n es and bou ndari es had (po l i t i cal lyspeaking) d i sappeared , and a reconstruction had tobe attempted . The detai l s wi l l be found i n the nextchapter on

'

the Congress of Vien na ; here we musttry to see where i n the d iffi cu lty l ay.

When the long period of war and terro r wasover

,a reaction was bound to set in . Napol eon had

stood for usu rped m i l i tary despo t i sm of one nat ionover anothe r ; of one man over a consenti ng nation .

Would the reaction be i n favou r of the peop le, of

the rights and l i bert i es upon wh ich Napo l eon hadtrampled

,or would i t be i n favou r of the ru l i ng or

ban ished sovere igns ? This was the question on wh ichthe futu re development of Europe depended

,and to

understand i t properly one must first understand what


6 mmooucroav

contai ned some provi s ions for securi ty of person and

property,equal i ty before the law , mi n iste rial respon

s ib i l ity , freedom of the press , Parl iamen tary contro lof taxation , and other necessary priv i leges . Mostof these Consti tutions were i n tended to be rigid ,because the i r framers wanted to preven t the Ki ngfrom changi ng them . But i t i s a very d iffi cu lt matterto make a new Consti tution , and i n spi te of the i r goodpo i n ts those that were tried genera l ly worked verybad ly , and were frequently changed , as wi l l be seeni n the h isto ry of the separate countri es .Hence i t i s eviden t that the settl emen t of Europei n 1815 , by the gatheri ng of emperors , ki ngs , andambassadors who formed the Congress of Vien na ,was a h igh ly impor tan t question . Unfortunately forEurope , men

’s terro r and d isgust at the late v iolen tchanges carried them too far ; even Napoleon

’s goodwo rk was part ia l ly u ndone , and yet the l i nes of themap were agai n d rawn with an absolute d isregardof the feel i ng of the smal le r nations , and the ideaof “ self—government seemed almost to have d isappeared .

Si nce 1815 Europe has been stead i ly but su relyun ty i ng the tangle l eft by the Congress of Vien na ,al lowi ng first one nation , then another , to struggleforth towards i ndependence

,national u n i ty , and some

form of democratic government . The aim of th is bookwi l l be to take a few of the more typical st ruggles andshow what progress has been made .

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 7

CHAPTER I

THE REC ON STRUCTION OF EUROPE

I love no peace wh ich is not fe l low sh ip ,And wh ich inc ludes not mercy.

M rs . B rown ing.

IN October, 1814 , Vien na seemed to be fu l l of ki ngs ,and everywhere one heard the cry : Peace ! Peace !”

The ki ngs professed to fee l l i ke brothers , to seek on lythe good of Europe as a who le , to wish to secu re heragai nst any possi b l e plans of Napol eon . The beautifu l c i ty

,with i ts narrow streets

,magn ificen t houses ,

and splend id Prater, was ab laze with banquets andbal ls

,am id wh ich the actual work of the Congress

seemed to s i n k i nto the backgrou nd . And yet a

closer observer remarked : “ Al l Eu rope i s now atplay round a large green table ; ki ngdoms are thestakes

,and a d iplomatic shake of the d ice may wi n

a hund red thousand or a m i l l ion heads That wasthe troub le . The ki ngs ta lked of peace

,of maki ng

a settl ement wh ich should be permanent, of keep i ng

a just balance of power, and yet each one was i nten tupon atta i n i ng h is own ambi tion . The Congress hasbeen blamed for d isregard i ng the happi ness of thepeoples of whom they were d ispos i ng so l ightly ; buti n truth the d ifficu lties were almost i n superable . Peacehad to be made at any cost

,and each power cou ld

poi n t to some previous and separate treaty or prom isewh ich had to be considered .

Vien na , i t was said , was fu l l of ki ngs . There werethe two emperors , Francis I I of Austria and Alexander I of Russia ; there were the ki ngs of Prussia ,W ii rtemb erg, Bavaria , and Denmark ; there weren umbers of German dukes and pri nces ; there werefamous representatives for almost al l the other coun

8 THE RECONSTRUCTION oF EUROPE

tri es of Eu rope— Castlereagh for Great B ri tai n , Mette rn ich for Austria , Tal leyrand for France , Consalv i forthe Pope . But i t was never i n tended that these represen tatives should d iscuss the settlemen t on free or

equal terms ; the fou r Al l i es— Bri ta i n , Prussi a , Austria ,and Russ ia— who had sent Napo l eon to E lba weredeterm i ned to arrange matters as seemed best to them .

The pri nciple on which they were p repared to act wasto a im at justice and fa i r compensation as betweensovere ign and sovereign , and strong safeguardsagai nst a mi l i tan t pol icy i n France , but who l ly toignore the i n terests of subj ect races , except i n so far asthe Congress was genu i ne ly stri v i ng to secu re peace .Very much of the success of the Congress was due toLord Castle reagh

,who , although he d id not always

contrive to get h i s vi ews adopted , was the on ly mancapable of ho ld i ng the Al l i es togethe r i n peace ; to

h im , as much as to Wel l i ngton , i s due the glory of

Waterloo . I n sp i te of h i s I ri sh paren tage,he was i n

many ways a typ ical E ngl i sh gentleman — stra ight,

brave and decided , handsome , but wi thout eloquence ,speaki ng the truth always

,fi l led with determ i nation

that whatever he set h is hand to should be we l l done .He was an extraord i nari ly successfu l d i plomati st ,partly because h i s en t i re straightfo rwardness was incred ibl e to men of Tal leyrand ’s stamp , partly becauseh is country was l ess self- seeki ng than any of the nat ionsrepresented at Vien na . Ma fo i

,c ’est magn ifique

”

,

Tal l eyrand muttered,as Castle reagh appeared at the

Congress weari ng nei ther u n iform nor medal nor

o rder , save the broad blue ri bbon of the Garter overh i s plai n c iv i l i an d ress . The story i s typ ical of Castlereagh

,of h is s imp l ic i ty and d is i n terestedness . Yet he

had h i s weakness . He was no statesman , he had , no

sense of tendenc ies , of popular Op i n ion , no fa ith innational efforts for freedom . His remark on I taly

THE WORK OF THE CONGRESS 9

shows th i s very p la i n ly :“ I should p refer see i ng the

I tal ians awai t the i nsensi ble influence of what is go i ngon elsewhere than hazard thei r own i n terna l qu iet byan effort at th i s moment he wrote i n 1815 ; andagai n : “ I am su re i t i s better to retard than to

accelerate the operation of th is most hazardous p ri nc ip le [of freedom]which i s abroad Hence one

could not expect that Castle reagh shou ld fo resee thed i ffi cu lties that the Congress was creati ng .

The ch ief changes effected may be summarized veryb riefly wi th the help of the map .

F rance was left wi th a lmost exactly the same boundar ies as i n 1789 ; the Tsar and the B ri ti sh envoyswou ld not al low Pruss ia to an nex Alsace- Lorrai ne ,because they fo resaw that such a loss wou ld makeLou is XVI I I— who had been resto red i n 1814

— 5 0

unpopular that he would be unable to mai nta i n h isth rone .P russ ia was eno rmously strengthened . She hadlaid cla im to the who l e k i ngdom of Saxony , whoseki ng had been cons isten tly on Napo leon ’s s ide ; buta compromise was effected , and on ly half the ki ngdom became Prussian ; part of Poland (the provi nce ofPosen ) was added , togethe r with Swed ish Pomeran ia ,on the Baltic coast , and the greate r part of Je romeBonaparte ’s ki ngdom of Westphal ia .

Austr ia gave up the Flem ish Netherlands and someof her rights i n Germany

,and gai ned i n compen sa

t ion I l lyria ; the Tyro l , and o the r val l eys of theEastern Alps ; Lombardy and Venetia i n I taly ; Dalmatia ; and Gal icia , fo rmerly part of Poland . Thepri ncipal German S tates became a Confederation ,which was very l i ttle improvement upon the o ld“ Ho ly Roman Empi re ” .

South I taly , which had been for a t ime u nderNapo leon ’

s brother- in- law , Murat, was given back to

10 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

its Bourbon ki ng Ferd i nand ; the free const i tutionwh ich S ici ly had obtai ned was suppressed ; the Statesof the Chu rch were l eft u n touched ; Genoa was forc iblygiven over to P iedmont .R uss ia gai ned what was left of Poland— the largestshare

,for, as the Tsar had sa id : “ Avec

hommes on ne négoé ie pas beaucoup Fi n land alsoand Bessa rabia were secu red to her.N orway was gi ven to Sweden , i n sp i te of muchres istance ; H ol land and B elg ium were un i ted i n toone ki ngdom under the Pri nce of O range .Turkey was left almost u n touched ; Switzer land

became a neutral Confederation , and three canton s

(Geneva, Valai s , Neufchatel ) were added to it.Spa in and P ortuga l were left u nchanged i n exten t ,and Ferd i nand V I I remai ned i n possess ion of h i sth rone (see p .

Great B r ita in,which had born e so much of the

expense of the war,bes ides taki ng her ful l share i n

the defeat of Napol eon , gai ned very l i ttl e ; i ndeed ,Napo l eon i n S t. Helena used to mock at what hethought was her b l i ndness to her own i nterests . Shekept Mal ta

,Hel igo land , and the I on ian I s lands i n

Eu rope , and of her fore ign conquests Cey lon , Demerara , and the Cape , wh ich had been taken fromHo l land .

The question i n wh ich B ri ta i n was ch iefly i n terestedat th is time was the abo l i t ion of the s lave trade .Castlereagh wo rked hard for i t at the Congress , publ ish ing one of Wilberforce ’s books i n Vien na , andaddi ng h is own arguments to prove that slave labou rwas very expensive

,but he cou ld on ly gai n a vague

undertaki ng that i t shou ld come to an end gradua l ly .

This summary looks rather l i ke a mean i nglesstangle of names , but there are a few important factscon nected wi th i t wh ich must be remembered i f the

RESULTS O F THE CONGRESS 11

h istory of Europe i n the n i neteen th centu ry i s to beu nderstood .

( i) P russ ia was made far the strongest power i nGermany ; the acqu is i t ion of the ki ngdom of

Westphal ia gave her a frontie r touch i ng thatof France , and the refusal Of the powers togrant her Alsace - Lorrai ne left he r wi th a

stand i ng cause of discontent u nti l the p rovi nces were won back by the Franco- Prussianwar (see p .

(11) A ustr ia , which al ready was an extraord i narym ixtu re of races (see p . added sti l l moreto her d iffi cu lties by the add i tion of Gal ic ia ,Dalmatia , and the I ta l ian provi nces .

( i i i ) I taly was left i n an imposs i ble cond i tion ,d ivided among eight states , on ly one of wh ichhad an I tal ian ruler (see p .

( iv) Holland and B elg ium were very unequal lyyoked together ; Ho l land was Protestant , andTeuton ic; and had cast off the Catho l i c rule ofSpai n i n the hero i c struggle of the sixteenthcen tury under Wi l l iam the S i lent ; Belgi umhad remai ned Roman Catho l i c , and had helonged sometimes to Spai n , sometimes toAustria ; the Belgians used French for al lthei r publ ic bus i ness , a French d ialect wasgeneral i n eastern Belgium

,and they were

far mo re l i ke the French than l ike the Dutch .

(v) N orway and Sweden were i n much the samepos i t ion . No rway was perhaps the o ldest democracy i n E urope ; Sweden was ru led by a

sem i feudal monarchy ; No rway , moreover,had general ly made common cause with Denmark agai nst Sweden .

(vi) R uss ia had advanced more and more i nto the

12 THE REC ONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

affai rs of Central Eu rope , and she was notprepared to treat her new prov i nces— Fi n landand Po land— with the generos i ty wh ich alonecou ld have reconci led them to an nexation .

An attempt had been made to keep F rance in

el leck by strengthen i ng the powers on herfron ti e r ; i . e . Ho l l and and Belgi um had beenun i ted , Prussi a had become the neighbou r o fFrance on the Rh i ne

,the Swiss Con federat ion

had been strengthened , the l i ttle ki ngdom of

Piedmon t and Sard i n ia had been encou raged .

This became very impo rtan t i n later years ,when al l E u rope was afraid of the growi ngpower of Napo l eon I I I .

Wh i le the Congress was i n progress,news came

that Napo l eon had escaped from E lba,and was mak

i ng a desperate attempt to regai n h i s Emp1re . Therep resen tatives at Vien na declared that Napo l eonBonaparte had placed h imself outside the pal e of c ivi land soc ia l relations , and as an enemy and d i stu rbero f the peace of the world , had made h imself an out

l aw They then hastened to get the fiual act o r

treaty of the Congress signed , and broke up the i rconferences . After Waterloo the agreemen t was re

newed,wi th some addi tional cond i tions to ensu re that

France should pu rsue a peacefu l po l i cy .

The ch i ef European powers were now tho rough lyconv i nced that they must keep Eu rope at peace , butthey were not agreed as to how i t was to be done .Alexander I , i n particu lar, was not satisfied with thesteps taken by the Congress of Vien na . I n September, 1815 , he publ i shed a Man ifesto ,

stati ng that he ,the Ki ng of Prussia , and the Emperor of Austria haddecided henceforth to regu late the i r pol icy by Chri stian pri nc ip les

,and thus to p reven t fu rthe r outbreaks


I4. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

The ch ief meeti ngs of the powers may be summarized thus

Congress of A t’

x -Za- C/mpel le, 1818, which metto d i scuss the affai rs of France . I t agreed towithdraw the fo re ign arm ies wh ich had oconpi ed France , and to recogn ize her aga i n as oneof the Great Powers , though B ri ta i n refusedto al low her to j oi n the fou r Al l i es

,who had

i ndeed combi ned agai nst France,and would

have no reason for exi st i ng i f France jo i nedthem . Mettern ich also took the opportu n i tyto pe rsuade the German ru le rs to take strongmeasures agai n st al l L i be ra l th i nkers andwri te rs i n G ermany .

s gress of Troppau ,1820, wh ich d iscussed the

r is i ngs i n S ic i ly . Mettern ich tri ed to makethe Al l i es agree that revolutions must on lycome from above that is , that changes i ngovernment cou ld on ly be made by the Kingand h i s m i n i sters . England natu ral ly refusedto agree to th i s , but Mette rn ich won the Tsarcomplete ly over to h is s ide .

Congvess of La ibach , 182 1, wh ich took the samel i n e ; Austria agreed to help Ferd i nand i n putt i ng down the ri s i ngs i n S ic i ly and Naples .Congress of Verona ,

1822 , i n wh ich B ri ta i n ,under the influence of Can n i ng, refused to

sanction the attempt to help the Ki ng of

Spai n agai nst h i s rebel l ious subj ects .

After th is summary , i t wi l l be wel l to cease d i scuss i ng Europe as a whole, and to tu rn to the h istoryof the separate countri es , which is far more i n teresti ng, and which makes the work of the Congresses fareas i er to understand.

FRANCE AND BONAPARTI SM 15

CHAPTER I I

FRANC E AND BONAPARTISM . 1815—7 1

“ The name wh ich we b ear ob l iges us to he lp a suffer ing peop letha t ca l ls upon us .

— P r in ce Lou is N apoleon , 1831.

“ The peop le , possess ing the supreme power , shou ld do for i tse l fa l l tha t i t is ab le to do ; wha t i t cannot do wel l , i t mus t do throu gh itse lec ted represen ta t ives .

—M on fesquz°

eu . Quoted by Lou is Afapoleon i n 1833.

IT has been said that the n i neteen th cen tu ry i nFrance was on ly a cont i nuat ion of the Revo l ution of

1789 . Duri ng more than fifty years there was a longstruggle for a government wh ich shou ld be consistentwi th the Revo l ution . Hence the i nterest of h isto ryat th is time l ies rather i n pol i ti cs than i n biography .

The one real ly i n terest i ng personal i ty i s Pri nce Lou isNapol eon , afterwards Napo l eon I I I , but for the firstth i rty years of the period he was comparatively un

importan t ; h is l i fe must, therefo re , be left for alate r part of the chapte r, but i n many ways i t may beseen how events were l ead i ng up to h is revival of theEmpi re .When Napo l eon was ban ished to E lba i n 1814 , theBou rbon royal house was resto red i n France . Thenation was ti red of the great Empero r and of h isupstart fam i ly ; of h is costly and deadly enterprisesagai nst other coun tri es . I t was ti red , too , of pol i t ica lexperiments , of Republ ics and Di rectories , of Consu lates and Empi res . The on ly form of government whi ch seemed welcome was a consti tutionalmonarchy. I t was decided to restore the Bourbons ,but u nder cond i tions ; the Ki ng was henceforth toru l e l ike a .B ritish Sovereign , by the free choice of

the people , and al so with the restrictions of a wri ttencharter.

16 FRANCE AND BONAPARTISM

The first difficu lty was the question of the hei r tothe th rone. After Lou i s XVI and Marie Antoi nettehad been executed

,thei r ch i ld ren had been retai ned

as prisoners ° The sto ry of the l i ttl e Dauph i n ’s deathi n the gloomy pri son of the Templ e i s wel l known .

Although h is s i ste r, Madame Royale (afte rward theDuchess of Angouleme) , su rv ived , she cou ld not succeed to the th rone of France on accou n t of the Sal i cLaw .

Therefore the brother of Lou is XV I came to theth rone as Lou i s XVI I I , i n the n i neteenth year ofou r reign as he said

,for he ignored Napol eon al to

gether, and the Dauph i n was counted as Lou is XV I I .

Supported by the Al l i es , he seemed l i kely to establ i shh imsel f peaceful ly, u nt i l Napo l eon came back fromE lba ( 1 March , and the famous Hundred Daysbegan . Lou is fled , and Napoleon entered Paris oncemore . But when al l was over, and Napo leon hadbeen safely d i sposed of i n S t. Helena , Lou i s wasbrought back aga i n by the Al l i es

,and bound h imsel f

to ca rry out the Charter wh ich he had p rom ised whenhe was first made Ki ng . This Charte r guaranteedthe fou r great rights of the B ri t i sh Consti tution

(a) Equal i ty before the Law .

(6) Personal Freedom.

(0) Freedom of Consc ience or Rel igious Liberty .

(d) Freedom of the Press .

That i s to say , i f th i s Charte r was observed , no one

cou ld henceforth be u nj ustly impri soned or unjustlytried ; every man would choose h is rel igion exactly ashe pleased , and the expression of Opi n ion i n booksand newspapers wou ld be enti rely free . The King ,however

,had the so l e right of bri ngi ng forward n ew

legislat ion th rough h is m i n isters ; he also had t he

r ight of veto. The B ri t i sh system of two Houses

LOU I S XV I I I 17

of Parl iament was adopted , with many othe r B ri ti shcustoms ; on ly a sma l l n umber of the popu lation

(about had votes , which depended upon theamount of property held by men over th i rty years ofage . Later on there was much d iscontent wi th theCharter.Lou is XVI I I soon found that i t was very unplea

sant to owe h is throne to the Al l i es . The Al l i es cons idered that France had been wrong i n rece iv i ng backNapoleon , and thus upsetti ng the peace

'

of Europe .Certai n penalt i es were therefore imposed upon her,and agreed to i n the second Peace of Pari s . Savoywas given back to I taly

,and some border fortresses

to Germany ; France was obl iged to pay an i ndemn ityof the Al l i es were to garri son a l i n e offortresses on the fronti e r

,and Wel l i ngton with an

army of occupation was to remai n i n France ; the fou rAmbassadors of the Al l i es i n Pari s were to watch overFrench i nternal affai rs . Happi ly

,Wel l i ngton ’s tact

and the goodwi l l of the Tsar made these condit ionsl ess i rksome than they m ight have been .

Louis XV I I I ’s re ign began wi th a strong reactioni n favou r of the Monarchy

,the Church

,and the old

i deals . Unfortu nately th i s took the form of v iol en tpersecut ion of the Bonaparti sts . Hatred rose so

h igh that a terri bl e movement known as the “WhiteTerror ” spread over southern France. There weremassacres i n Marsei l l es and other towns

,and every

where the Bonapart ists were attacked,imprisoned ,

the i r houses sacked , and thei r fam i l i es treated withthe utmost i nsul t and cruel ty . Though the movemen t was not so widespread , i t was almost as bad asanyth i ng that had taken place du ri ng the Revo l ut ion .

The émigrés (or nobles who had been i n exi le) didthei r best to encou rage the White Terro r and to

persuade the K i ng to act i n i ts sp i ri t. However, Lou is( 0 5 55 ) 3


XVI I I , l i ke Charl es I I , had no des i re to go on h i stravels agai n and

,when left to h imse l f, was i ncl i ned

towards a moderate and sensi b le po l i cy . Neverthe

l ess,he rejoiced when the elect ion s of 1815 retu rned

h im an u l tra-Royal i st chamber, which he n icknamedthe “ Chambre I ntrouvable ” (or U nd iscoverable

because he thought i t wou ld have beenimposs i ble to find a Lower House so devoted to theKi ng ’s cause . Thi s “ Chambre I n trouvabl e how

eve r,made a v igo rous attempt to d rive the Ki ng much

further than he was wi l l i ng to go i n the d i rection of

absol uti sm and hosti l i ty to the Bonaparti sts ; he therefore got rid of i t i n 1816, and a more moderate assemb lycame together.The extreme parti es i n i t were cal led the Left andthe Right , and between the two were several moremoderate sections . The extreme Right would haveresto red Chu rch and Ki ng to the pos i tion they hadheld before the Revo l u tion ; they cons idered theCharte r as mere weak truckl i ng to the people , becausethe Ki ng ought real ly to be abso l u te . The extremeLeft

,on the othe r hand , was composed of men who

wou ld have resto red Napoleon Bonaparte, or of othe rswho wanted a real Republ i c . Between these extremeswere al l the more sens i bl e men , some of whom leanedtowards the Monarchy , some towards the Repub l i c ;most of them , however, wou ld have been i n favour ofsome extens ion of the franch i se .Such was the state of parti es u nder Lou is XVI I I .There were few events of i mportance i n h i s reign .

I n 1820 the murder of the Duke of Berry , the probabl e hei r to the th rone , caused much i ndignation , andcons iderably strengthened the Royal i st party.

I n 1823-

4 the successfu l i nvas ion of Spai n by theDuke of Angou leme , i n order to resto re Ferd i nandVI I to h i s fo rmer posi t ion (see p . agai n i n

CHARLES X 19

creased the ki ng ’s popu lari ty . I n 1824 , when Lou isXVI I I d ied

,the Monarchy seemed firmly establ i shed ,

al though there was considerable d iscontent amongthe poorer classes . The Church was once agai ntryi ng to ty ran n ize over men ’s l ives , by en forci ngattendance at church

,and by gai n i ng more and

more influence over education .

Lou is was succeeded by h i s brother, Charl es X , aman of no tact and l i ttl e common sense He wasregarded as the head of the émigrés , who had learntnoth i ng and forgotten noth i ng ” du ri ng the i r exi le .He ent i rely refused to acknowledge that he was ki ngby the consen t of the people , and tried i nstead to

rev ive the old ideas of D ivi ne Right . He appo i n tedh i s m i n isters from the most u ncompromis i ng Royalists i n the ki ngdom ; he tri ed to re- establ i sh themonasteries and the J esu its i n France ; he en ragedParis by d isband i ng the National Guard

,of which

the ci ty was justly proud .

France took some share i n help i ng the Greeks i n theirfigh t for freedom , and the French fleet was engagedi n the Battle of Navari no (see p . I n a sho rtwar with the Dey of Algiers , France captu red the ci ty ,and establ i shed her most flou rish ing colony , Algeria .

But although these m i l i tary successes were somesl ight conso lat ion to the nation

,they cou ld not make

Charles X popular. At last the d isconten t wh ich hadsmouldered u nder Lou i s XVI I I bu rst i nto a blaze .I n 1829 the ki ng appoi n ted a most u npopu lar m i ni ster, Pri nce Po l ignac . At the general e lect ions nextyear a large majori ty was retu rned agai nst the Government , but the m i n isters refused to res ign , and advi sedthe Ki ng to publ ish th ree O rd i nances

,which were i n

d i rect contrad iction to the Charte r,a l though he had

the righ t to i ssue O rd i nances for the sake of publ icsafety


The first ord i nance abo l i shed the l i berty of thepress wi th regard to newspapers ; the second d issolved the Chamber of Deputies , which had on ly j ustbeen elected ; the th i rd made several al terations i nthe system of election .

At once the storm began . The journal i sts i ssueda protest

,sayi ng : The Governmen t has to -day for

feited that characte r of l egal i ty wh ich makes obed i encea duty . We , for ou r part , shal l res i st it.

” Thenewspapers appeared as usual , and the electo rs of

Pari s dec ided that revol ution was the on ly methodleft to them . Next morn i ng, 28 J u ly

, al l the streetswere barricaded , to prevent charges of the troops ;the Hote l de Vi l l e

.

was captu red by the ci t i zens ; thetricolou r was hoisted , the tocs i n sounded— the Revo lu

tion had begun . The Ki ng was at S t. Cloud,a palace

a few m i les down the Sei ne . When he rece ived thenews from Pari s , he mere ly sen t a message that therevol t must be put down by m i l i ta ry fo rce . Theso ld i e rs , however, had received no cons ideration fromthe Ki ng

, and were general ly i n sympathy with thec i ti zens ; the i r attack , therefore , was very half- hearted ,and many of them deserted . The Ki ng refused atfirst to give way ; when he d id , i t was too late , andon 31 J u ly he fled from S t. Cloud . Next day heabd icated i n favou r of h is grandson Hen ry

,late r on

Count of Chambord , and the royal fam i ly , with afew fol lowers , made its way qu ite u nmo l ested toCherbou rg, whence they embarked for E ngland .

The French nat ion seemed nei ther to regret them ,

nor to have any feel i ng agai nst them . The greatobject was to establ i sh some new government wh ichshould not attempt to uphold the obnoxious O rd inances . The d istu rbances i n Pari s came to an end .

Lafayette,now a very o ld man , was made ch ief of

the rev ived National Guard , and for a time absolute



t ion were to be h i s ru les of l i fe , and these wereparticu larly l i kely to gai n h im favou r wi th the pros

perous m iddle classes . The Charter was revi sed i nsuch a way as to deprive the sovere ign of much of h i spower

,and to make parl iamentary governmen t more

of a real i ty i n France . Lou is Ph i l i ppe accepted theamended Charter, and France seemed to be on theh igh road to consti tutional monarchy model l ed on theBri t i sh p lan .

I t i s true that the Ki ng sti l l had enem ies : ( 1) theLegitim ists , who wished to set Charles X

’

s grandson ,Hen ry

,Count of Chambord , on the th rone ; (2) the

Republ icans,who were opposed to any form of

monarchy . But there were also two far strongerpowers wh ich eventual ly led to the deth ronement ofLou is Ph i l i ppe , and the overth row of the “ J u lyMonarchy ”

,as i t was cal l ed . These forces were :

( 1) the growth of Bonaparti sm , or the worsh i p of theEmpero r ’s memory , and the desi re to re i n state h isfami ly i n France ; and (2) the growing opposi tion of

the worki ng classes , who , i ndeed , had every reasonfor th e bi tte rest d i sconten t .I n o rder to expla i n the growth of Bonapart i sm , i ti s necessary to leave the events of Lou is Ph i l ippe ’sre ign for a wh i l e and to go back to the h isto ry of

the Bonaparte fam i ly afte r 1815 . When Napo l eonBonaparte marri ed Joseph i ne Beauharnais

,she had

a daughter, Ho rtense , by a former marriage . Thisdaughter was marri ed to Napoleon ’s brother , Lou isBonaparte , whom Napo l eon made K i ng of Ho l land .

Thei r two sons were very con fus i ngly named Napo l eonLou is and Lou i s Napo l eon ; however, the e lder d iedwhen qu i te a young man

,and the younger

,Pri nce

Lou is Napo l eon (born is the one who concern sus . At first i t was thought probable that one of theseboys would succeed Napo leon

,but i n 1809 Napo leon

EARLY LIFE OF PR INC E LOU I S NAPOLEON 23

d ivorced Joseph i ne , married the Pri ncess Marie Lou iseof Austria , and a son ,

general ly known as the Kingof Rome , was born to them . Although Queen Hor

tense was both grieved and di sappoi nted at the d ivorceof her mothe r, she never lost her reverence and loya l tytowards the Empero r, and she brought up her sons toregard h im as the most magn ificent hero the worldhas ever produced . When he was on ly th i rteen ,Pri nce Lou is Napo l eon wrote to h is mother : WhenI do wrong I th i n k of th i s great man

,and I seem to

feel h is shade wi th i n me tel l i ng me to keep mysel fworthy of the name of Napo l eon I n 1815 the who l efam i ly of Napol eon had been ban i shed from France ,and obl iged to settl e i n E ngland

,Swi tze rland , Rome ,

Germany— in fact, al l over Eu rope , and they were notal lowed to t ravel or to meet one another wi thout passports s igned by the fou r Al l i es . Queen Hortense andLou is Napoleon had taken refuge first i n Augsburg ,and later on i n the castle of Arenenb u rg , on the sho resof Lake Constance . The boy had a cu rious characterand a curious l i fe . His father had hated Napo l eon ’saggress ive schemes

,and denounced war as organ ized

barbarism ”

; he was a calm ,s i len t

,modest

,but u nam i

able man , wi th a love of ret i rement, and a strong vei nof melancho ly i n h is d ispos i t ion . Queen Hortensewas a beautifu l

,ambitious woman , with a sp i r i t of

adventu re and a pass ion for great ach ievemen ts ,which led her to idol ize Napo l eon . She was anem i nently sympatheti c mothe r , but her son real i zedlater on that he had never had any d isc ip l i n e i n h i sl i fe . He combi ned many of the qual i t i es of bothh is paren ts , and th i s perhaps i s the secret of thestrange contrad ict ions i n h i s l i fe . He was natu ral lyreserved and nervous , general ly shabby and carelessof h is own personal d ign i ty ; yet he had forced h imself to become an adept i n swimm i ng

,rid i ng, and


other sports , and Queen Victoria speaks i n herletters of the extreme fasc i nation of h is man nerswhen he chose . He was extraord i nari ly ki nd- hearted ;once he sent a l l h i s pocket money to the Greeks whowere figh ting for i ndependence ; h is love for I taly wasvery real

,and dated from the wi n ters wh ich he spent

i n Rome as a boy ; i n 1831 he ri sked much i n order to

jo i n the I tal ian ri s i ngs i n Romagna ; he i s said , thoughwithout much proof, to have become one of the Carbonari (see p . Although he seemed du l l andu nprepossessi ng at first s ight , he was real ly the mostromantic of men , and h is l i fe was devoted to creat i ngan enthus iasm

, to real i z i ng an ideal for which he wasnot real ly fitted , and wh ich he had not the stead i nessof character to upho ld . He i s sa id to have been earlyimpressed by the idea of h is desti ny , of h i s

“ starwh ich was to l ead h im to greatness , but as Napo l eon

’sson (who was brought up i n Austria) d id not d ie ti l l1832 , i t can hard ly have been t i l l afte r that date thatPri nce Louis Napo l eon seriously hoped to becomeEmperor .However, he seems to have set h imsel f del i be ratelyto revive the en thusiasm for Napo l eon

,by persuad i ng

h imse lf and the French nation that the Emperor hadbeen the great champion of the peoples agai nst the i rtyrants , that he had everywhere upheld the cause of

national i ty and freedom . There was a l i ttle foundation for th is idea , though not much ; but i n persuadi ngh is fel low coun trymen of i ts truth

,Lou is Napoleon

was giv i ng them a new en thusiasm,a legend

,perhaps

,

but i n any case a big idea,Wh ich appealed to the

ch ival ry and love of adven tu re i n nate i n most F renchmen . The reign of Lou is Ph i l ippe was du l l

,and

without attraction ; i t was a compromise , and no onerea l ly fe l t any devot ion to the Ki ng who was not

Ki ng by right of bi rth,to the Consti tution wh ich was

GROWTH OF BONAPARTISM 25

not real ly a Republ ic,or to the Governmen t wh ich

produced no mi l i tary successes . Hence i t was com

paratively easy to sti r up the o ld feel i ng for theBonaparte fam i ly , and Lou is Ph i l i ppe , who desp isedh is rival

,encouraged the feel i ng , u nder the m istaken

idea that the more men adm i red Napoleon the morethey would upho ld the monarchy agai nst the republ ic .Thus i n 1832 the bronze statue of

’

N apoleon was re

placed on the V endéme Co l umn ; the Arc de Triomphe ,commemorati ng Napo l eon ’s v ictori es, was fin ished ;several of the newspapers were open ly Bonapartisti n thei r sympathy ; the theatres presented plays on

the l i fe of Napo l eon ; final ly , i n 1840, the body of

Napol eon was brought from S t. Helena , carriedth rough the crowded streets of Paris , and bu riedwith the utmost pomp under the dome of Les Inval ides , where many of h is o ld so ld i ers were pass i ngthei r last days . I n speaki ng of th is stri ki ng sign aFrench wri te r has said : When s i lence and the n ightagai n took possess ion of the c i ty , there were two

Kings i n Pari s , one at the Tu i leri es , and one at theInvaHdes

Meanwhi le Lou is Napo l eon had done h i s part. I n1833 he publ i shed h is fi rst po l i t ica l wri ti ngs , R éfverz

'

es

P ol i tiques ; i n 1836he made a desperate and unwiseattempt to gai n possession of the c i ty of Strasburg ,and was exi led to America ; i n 1837 he retu rned to

Switzerland,and when Lou is Ph i l i ppe th reatened the

Swiss wi th war if they d id not expel h im ,he went to

London , where he constan tly talked of what he woulddo when he was Emperor ; i n 1839 he publ i shedanother book

,D es [ dées N apoléon iennes ; and i n

1840 he made a second attempt to upset the“ J u ly

Monarchy ” by land i ng with a few fol lowers atBoulogne

,and try i ng to rouse the army . He fai l ed ,

and was condemned to perpetual impri sonment i n

26 FRANCE AND BONAPARTI SM

the castl e of Ham ; but he had gai ned h is object, hehad drawn the eyes of al l E urope to h im , and he hadroused sympathy i n France . F rom th i s t ime onwardsthe people “ began to l ive agai n , and to th i nk of

someth i ng more than gett i ng rich ” . Lou is Napo leonemployed h is imprisonment i n wri t i ng articles on

h isto ry and on a number of projects wh ich he wishedto see carri ed out, such as the Panama Canal ; i n 1846he managed to escape and wen t agai n to England ;thus when the Revolution of 1848 broke out he wasfree to take advantage of it.But i t i s now time to consider the othe r cause of

the Revolution— the terri ble poverty and the i n tensebi tte rness of feel i ng among the worki ng classes . I nFrance

,as i n B rita i n , a great I ndustrial Revo l ut ion

was bound to take place , but i t came rather later i nF rance . Roughly speaki ng , the I ndustri al R evolu

t ion means the change from manufactu re on a smal lscal e to manufactu re on an immense scale ; the sp i nn i ng wheel or the hand loom i n the worker ’s own

home was replaced by huge factori es , where hundredsof wo rkmen were crowded togethe r, superi n tend i ngcompl icated mach i nery . The eas ie r work was u ndertaken by women and ch i ld ren , under the most unheal thy cond i tions

,and at starvation wages . The

Revol ut ion i n France had abol i shed al l t rade corporations and gu i lds ; ne i ther masters nor men wereal lowed to combi ne for the i r common i n terests , andthus the men had no protection agai nst low wagesor i l l t reatment , and the masters had no agreemen tamong themselves . Every man d id what was rightor wrong i n h i s own eyes , without regard to others .The state of the worki ng classes i n France at th ist ime has been descri bed by Lou is B lanc

,a wel l

known wri ter , soc ial refo rmer , and po l i t ic ian . I n twobooks, the H z

’

lw‘ozy of Ten Yea rs ( 1830—40) and the

THE INDUSTR IAL REVOLUTION 27

Organ ization of Labour , he descri bes the generalm isery

,the low wages , the horrors of ch i ld labour

i n the factori es,the hatred of new mach i nery , the

efforts of the workmen to gai n better wages by stri kes .The masters , he says , were en t i rely unsympathetic ;when men were on ly earn i ng n i nepence for a day ’swork of eighteen hours , the manufactu rers assertedthat they had “ accustomed themselves to a rtificia l

wants ” , and that that was why the i r wages wereinsufficient° He descri bes the peacefu l process ionsof workmen i n Pari s

,the strikes i n Rouen , the refusal

to pay taxes , and the terri bl e stri ke of 1831 i n Lyons ,where thousands of men were ei ther out of wo rk , oron ly earn i ng starvation wages

,and where a perfect ly

o rderly and reasonabl e strike was put down by v io

lence and force,i n stead of be i ng sett l ed by conces

sions . An enormous proport ion of the men cal ledout for m i l i ta ry serv ice were found to be deformed or

infirm ; whi le as to education ,“no one was taught

moral pri ncip les u n ti l he was a mu rdere r ” , and thenmen tried to refo rm h im ! Lou is B lanc ’s account ofthese troubles was rather one - s ided and perhapsexaggerated , but very much of i t was true , and theworki ng classes were begi n n i ng to real ize that noth i ngwas bei ng done for them , that al l the advan tages ofthe Revo l ution of 1830 had gone to the m idd le classes ,the manufactu rers

,the merchants , and the govern

men t offi cial s .Such were the complai n ts brought agai nst the Ju lyMonarchy by the wo rki ng classes . Side by side withth is d iscon ten t went much d i scussion of Social i stschemes . Social i sm had i ts b i rth du ri ng the R evolu

t ion of 1789, and i ts cen tral idea was the abo l i t ion of

private property , and the establ i shment of the Stateas the on ly owner of p roperty. I t was thought thatth i s change would ensu re a more equal d iv i s ion of


wealth . Many of the Social i sts , however, saw that itwou ld be very d i ffi cu l t to abo l i sh abso l ute ly al l privateproperty ; they therefo re proposed that each manshou ld own h is own private necess i t i es or l uxu ri es

( i . e . house , fu rn i tu re , &c . ) and al so h i s wages , whi lethe State should own al l land

,ra i lways

,facto ries , and

shops , together with al l the capi tal wh ich would otherwise have been saved and retai ned by private i nd iv idua ls . Wages were to be paid by the State i n p ropo rtion to the work done , and i t was thought that ifevery ci ti zen had a vote , the Governmen t would beobl iged to pay fai r and j ust wages .Some of the most famous F rench wri ters on Socia li sm were Babeuf, who d ied i n 1796; S t. Simon , whod ied i n 1825 ; Fouri e r and Lou is B lanc , who l ivedsomewhat later. I n detai l s the i r schemes vari ed , butthei r general idea has been expla i ned above . Thech ief diffi cu lties about these plans were : ( 1) that theState would have to decide every man ’s proper workfor h im

,and though Fou ri e r thought th is wou ld be

easy , i t i s general ly a very d ifficu lt task ; (2) that theState would probably manage the facto ri es and workshops very bad ly, as i t wou ld have such an enormousamount of busi ness on hand ; (3) that i f the Sta te hadto find work for every man who asked for it, i t m ightgive work wh ich wou ld not pay , and then the countrywou ld speed i ly be bankrupt .Sti l l , the prospect of fa i r and reasonabl e wages wasvery attract ive , and the Social i sts had many fol lowerswho were to play a great part i n the Revo l ut ion of

1848. Neither S t. S imon nor Fou rie r had any ideaof sti rri ng up a revol ution ; th ei r schemes were toopeacefu l and theoret ical to have any great influence.

But Lou is B lanc was a practical man,and a revolu

tion ist ; i n h i s Organ ization of Labour he had workedout a plan by wh ich the State m ight take over the


30 FRANCE AN D BONAPARTISM

Liberals,who were Protestan t or anti - rel igious . The

Liberal party was v ictorious , and France was agai nfound on the los i ng s ide . Thus the fore ign pol icy of

th is re ign was as u npopu lar as the domestic .At home the great question was the reform andextens ion of the franch ise . Out of a poss i bleo r of men over twenty-one

,on ly

had votes , and even these votes were frequentlybri bed ; the country was be i ng governed by a smal lm i nori ty i n the i n terests of a m i no ri ty

,and under a

Ki ng who gave h is subj ects no m i l i tary or d ip lomaticglo ry to d istract the i r atten tion from po l i t ical questions . Thus the Revo lution

,which had been pre

pared for so many years , by so many causes , wasprovoked at last by the refusal of the Government torefo rm the franch ise .The agi tation began when the Governmen t forbade

th e hold i ng of a Refo rm banquet ” , at wh ich theclaim for an extended franch i se wou ld have beenmade . On 22 February

,1848, the Pari s mob , jo i n ed

by the National Guard,paraded the streets

,shout i ng

“Vive la Réforme ! A bas Gu izot l” and final ly attackedG u izot

’

s house . The Ki ng asked the u npopula r m i ni ster to res ign , and gave h is place to Mole , who was ,however

,qu i te i ncompeten t to deal wi th such a cri s is .

The crowds came i nto confl ict with the po l ice , andsevera l i nd ividuals were shot down by the troops ,who were under a most u npopular general . Thevio l ence of the populace i ncreased every hour— theyobtai ned arms

,erected barricades

,and attacked the

Palai s Royal and the Tu i le ri es . Loui s Ph i l i ppe madeone last d isp i ri ted attempt to wi n them back to thei rloyalty to the th rone , but without success ; he therefore abdicated (24 February) i n favou r of h is grandson ,

the Count of Pari s , whom he left to the regencyof h is mother

,the Duchess of O rl eans .

THE R EVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 31

Although the deputies were wi l l i ng to accept th isarrangement

,the Repub l ican and Soc ia l i st parties

,

headed by Lamarti ne,Lou is B lanc , and Led ru-Ro l l i n ,

wou ld have no more of monarchy , and they set upa Provis ional Government at the Hotel de Vi l le .The Regency was abandoned , the Republ ic wasproclaimed , and Lamartine

’

s qu ick wit and readysympathy p reven ted

'

fu rther bloodshed . The Soc ialists could now carry thei r ideas i n to practice , and on

25 February the pri nc ip le of the “ Right to Wo rk ”

was accepted,and an address was issued by Lou is

B lanc,begi n n i ng , The Government agrees to guar

antee the existence of the workmen by labou r,and

work to al l c i t izens ” A committee of labou r wasset up at the Palace of the Luxembourg, with LouisB lanc at i ts head , to d iscuss al l ki nds of labou rquestions .On 9 March , when 4000 tradesmen came to com

plai n of the ru i n that had overtaken them ,i t was

decided to set up “ National Wo rkshops ”,givi ng

work to a l l who asked and had no other means of

l ivel i hood . Lou is B lanc declared afte rwards that heopposed the “ National Wo rkshops ”

,and i ndeed the

scheme as put i nto practice was ent i rely u n l ike B lanc ’splan for the organ ization of labou r. The idea , however

,seems to have origi nated i n h is writ i ngs . With i n

a month there were wo rkmen , from al l partsof France , dependent on the State . The numbersafterwards rose to over Of these

,on ly

cou ld work on one day,and thei r work cons isted i n

excavat i ng the Champs de Mars —a task wh ich wasof no use to anyone— or i n s im i la r publ i c works ; theothers were paid for do i ng noth i ng . As they wereal l armed , they consti tuted a grave danger to Pari s ,and to any governmen t wh ich shou ld d isplease them .

Meanwh i l e i t had been dec ided that manhood suffrage


shou ld be establ i shed immed iately , and on 26Apri la general election took place . The majori ty wasmoderate i n po l icy and strongly ant i -Social i st , for themass of the people outside Pari s , and especial ly thepeasants

,were conservative i n thei r v i ews . Among

the deput i es was Pri nce Lou is Napo l eon , el ecteds imu l taneously by th ree consti tuenc ies

,i nc l ud i ng

Paris . However, al though he was not cons idereddangerous , he was not al lowed to take h is seat , andhe had the good sen se to be wi l l i ng to wait , bel i evi ng ,as he said , that My dest i ny wi l l none the less befu lfil led

”.

The Assembly met on 4 May to cons ider the maki ngof a Consti tution . After a few days , however, anarmed mob col l ected and tried to fo rce the adoptionof Social i st p ri ncipl es by attacki ng the Assembly .

The attack fai led , and it was eviden t that theNational Workshops ” were not greatly i nvolved i n

it. Neve rtheless , the Assembly decided upon thei rd isso l ut ion . On 2 1 J u ne a tactless order was giventhat a l l the workmen shou ld be d ischarged with i nth ree days

,and that the able- bod ied shou ld be forced

to en l i st. Th is very natu ral ly roused the fu ry of thewo rkers , and a terri bl e i nsu rrection broke out . Forth ree days the eastern and poorer quarter of Parisfought a desperate figh t with the west ; fire and bloodshed and every ki nd of violence marked the strugg l e ;9000 of the troops were ki l l ed ; but i n the end theSocial i sts were defeated

,and thei r numbers , al ready

reduced by casual ti es du ri ng the figh ting, were st i l lfu rther l essened by depo rtat ion . Paris had learnt alesson wh ich made i t u n l i kely that the experiment ofNational Workshops would eve r be tri ed agai n .

This terri bl e ep isode d rove Lou is Napo leon out ofmen ’s m i nds for a t ime . Although the Duke of Well ington decla red that France wan ted a n ew Napo leon ,

ELECTION OF LOU I S NAPOLEON 33

he added,

“ I can not yet see h im . Where i s h e ?P unch seems to have been more far- see i ng, for du ri ngth i s summer a mock adverti semen t appeared : Wan !

P laces,69°C .

—As Emperor or Pres iden t, i n a placewhere a large stand i ng army i s kept, by a youngman of I mperial pri ncip l es , who can be wel l- recommended— by h imsel f. I s wi l l i ng to rev i ve the glori esof the Empi re , and to make Europe general ly uncom

fortab le .— Address

,Lou is Napol eon , London .

”No

one , however, real ly expected that he would attai nh is ambit ion . I n September the Pri nce was agai nelected by five departments , and th is t ime he took h isseat

,say i ng that he had retu rned to work for France

as a ci tizen of the Republ ic . Although he was greetedwithout enthus iasm i n the Assemb ly, and even con

s idered too stup id to be dangerous,and although

some of the papers treated h im with u nspari ng rid icu le and cal umny

,h is popu lari ty i n Pari s and

th roughout France i ncreased dai ly .

I n November the new Consti tu t ion was madepub l i c . France was to have a thorough ly democraticRepubl ic

,the Assemb ly was to be elected by man

hood suffrage , and the Pres ident was also to beelected i n the same way— by a vote of the who lenation . I t was feared that the people wou ld not

upho ld the Republ ic ; that thei r conse rvat ive in

stincts wou ld l ead to some ki nd of resto ration of

the Monarchy . Lamarti n e , i n a wonderfu l speech ,persuaded the Assembly to take the risk .

“ Thed ie i s cast , he ended ; “ let God and the peoplepronounce ! Someth i ng must be left to Providence . ” The Assembly took the ri sk

,and on 10

December LOU IS Napo l eon was e lected first Presidentof the French Republ ic by over five mi l l ion votes ,whi le the nex t cand idate had on ly one and a halfm i l l ions .

( 0 555 )


The magic of a great name , the force of sympathy ,and the worsh i p of a strong , determ i ned man hadenabled Lou i s Napo leon to fu lfi l h is dest i ny ; h i s starhad led h im to the h ighest pos i t ion i n France . I t wasthought that he wou ld not rest satisfied with bei ngPresident , elected fo r fou r years on ly

,but that he

would go on to make h imsel f Emperor. Undoubted lyi f h e had done so immed iate ly afte r h i s el ect ion

,he

would have been suppo rted by the vast majo ri ty of

the nat ion . But he had prom ised publ ic ly to res ignat the end of the fou r years

,and he was always con

v inced that , theoretical ly , a republ ic was the bestform of government . He the refore took the oath to

be fai th fu l to the Republ ic and the Consti tution , andoutl i ned h i s futu re po l i cy by declari ng that

,

“ God

help i ng us , we wi l l at l east do some good , even i f weare unable to accompl ish great th i ngsThus ended the th i rd French Revo l ut ion . I t i s oneof the most remarkable phases i n the h isto ry of themodern world . The Revol ution touched almost everycoun try i n Eu rope . I t was the product not on ly ofspecia l causes of d isconten t

,but of a great movement

i n favou r of the l i be ral and democratic i n sti tut ionswh ich had been tramp led underfoot i n 1815 . I t hasbeen said that the Congress of Vien na gave Europeth i rty years ’ peace ; i t i s t rue , and yet the revo lutionsof 1848 are also due to the reactionary po l i cy of theCongress . That I ta ly fe l t the impu lse was shownboth by an attempt to expel the Austrians and by theextraord i nary estab l i shmen t and defence of the RomanRepubl ic ; Austria had to struggle wi th revo lution athome as wel l as with war and i n su rrection i n I ta ly ;al l Germany was sti rred by the movement towardsu n ion and the reviva l of the German Empi re , coupledwith a vehement demand for manhood suffrage . Theeffects of th is great wave of revo l ut ion wi l l be descri bed

LOU I S NAPOLEON AS PR ESIDENT 35

i n deal i ng wi th the d i fferen t countries . Spai n alone,

which had an a lmost conti nuous revo l ut ion ever si nce1830, was for the t ime hard ly touched by th is newSpi ri t of un rest. Even B ri ta i n , wh ich had less causefor d iscontent than a ny other European nation , fearedCharti st riots i n the London streets , and armed herci t izens as special constables . I t was at th is t ime

(Apri l , 1848) that Pri nce Lou is Napo l eon was seenon h is beat with a t ru ncheon .

The Pri nce Pres iden t entered upon h is office withthe best of i nten tions , but h i s pol i t i cal d ifficu lties weremany and h is experi ence s l ight° His first decidedaction , the send i ng of the French exped i tion u nderGeneral Oud inot agai nst Rome (see p . seemsi nconsistent ; that the Pres iden t of a newly fo rmedrepubl ic shou ld send an army agai nst a st i l l newerrepubl ic i s su rpris i ng

,to say the least of it. But

there is some excuse . Lou is Napo l eon never took theside of the mob , and he bel ieved that Mazz i n i andGaribald i were on ly lead i ng a mob ; he was genu i nelyafraid that the v ictorious Austrians wou ld i n terfere i nRome , and set up a worse tyran ny than i t had yetsuffe red ; he was al so conv i nced that P ius IX wasreal ly endeavou ri ng to govern on l i beral p ri ncip les

,

and ought to be resto red . But to the outs ide world ,and to I taly , i t certa i n ly looked as i f the FrenchM i n isters m ight have al lowed the Roman ci tizens to

judge for themselves , as the Pari s ians had done .I n home affai rs h i s po l i cy was not very clear ; heseemed to favou r the Monarch ist party

,and al lowed

the Church to regai n much of her former influence .

By the Loi Fal loux the Chu rch gai ned the d irect ion of un ivers i ty education ; the franch ise was agai nrestricted by the requ i remen t of th ree years ’ cont i nuousres idence as a qua l ification ; the Press was restrai nedOnce more ; the Pres iden t h imsel f went about maki ng


Speeches on the necess i ty for a reform of the Constitution .

I n December,

185 1, he showed h is hand moreplai n ly . By a coup d

’

éla i he d isso l ved the Assembly,

arrested the ch ief party leaders , re- establ i shed manhood suffrage , and i nduced the new Assembly to

extend h i s term of office as Pres iden t for ten years .Some v io l en t res i stance was put down by the t roops ,and a few days later a plébz

'

scz'

te, or d i rect vote of al lthe e lectors , gave h im a huge majori ty and approvedh is coup The changes i n the Consti tut ional l gave mo re power to the President , and l eft theAssembly almost useless . Not satisfied , however ,with th is

,Lou is Napo l eon ventu red on a second

coup d’

état, and on 2 December,185 2 , he asked for

another plébzlvcz'

te,which gave h im the t i tle of

Emperor, as Napo l eon I I I . Almost e ight m i l l ionshad voted for h im th i s t ime .The question arises : Had Lou is been s i ncere whenhe swore to serve the Republ ic? I t i s not n ecessaryto suppose that he was al ready i n tend i ng to becomeEmpero r

,though he may wel l have been th i nki ng of

it ; h i s many d ifficu lties with the Assembly had dri venh im to the coup d ’

éta t, and he always mai n ta i ned thatas h is th rone was based upon a popu lar vote , therewas noth i ng i l l egal i n the means by which he hadatta i ned it. Like Chatham ,

he seems always to havehad the feel i ng : I know that I can save the coun t ry ,and that no one else can As early as 1831 he hadsaid : I f the Rh i n e were a sea

,then would I have

a pure and s imple republ i c ” . I n t imes of danger hethought an empi re was more l ike ly to preserve peace .Most unfo rtu nately h is fore ign pol icy d id not corre

spond i n the least wi th h is ideal of a peacefu l empi re .Two mot ives d rove h im i n to wars— a genu i ne des i reto help weaker nation s, and an arden t longi ng to wi n


38 FRANCE AND BONAPART I SM

chooses to act as the champion of another has no rightto th row over the rol e as soon as i t becomes incon -a

ven ien t. I ta ly had good reason fo r th i nki ng hersel ft ricked

,and al though the v icto rious Emperor was

rece ived wi th the u tmost enthus iasm i n Pari s whenhe retu rned

,th i s added populari ty was sho rtl ived .

Oppos i t ion to the Empi re began to make i tsel f fe l t .The clerical party cou ld not forgive the I tal ian war ;the trad i ng classes were opposed to the free - tradepo l i cy wh ich brought about the treaty of 1860 b e

tween France and Great B ri tai n . The Empero r’sfo re ign po l i cy was somewhat fan tastic

,and always open

to attack ; i n 1860 he jo i ned B ri tai n i n a war to fo rcethe Ch i nese to open thei r po rts to Eu ropeans ; i n 1863he undertook an u n necessary and absurd scheme toset up a Lati n Empi re i n Mexico , u nder the ArchdukeMaxim i l ian of Austria

,a scheme wh ich he afterwards

abandoned when h is help was most needed ; he alsoattempted to co lon i ze Anam and Coch i n -Ch i na . I nEu rope he was ob l iged to stand by and see the variousd iffi cu lties i n I taly , i n Po land , and i n SchleswigHo l ste i n settl ed without h is adv ice , for Eu rope u nan imous ly rej ected the idea of another Congress .At home

,however, he real ized that he must retai n

the suppo rt of the peop le , and therefore mo re freedomof d iscussion was granted to h i s Assembly

,and the

newspapers were a l lowed to pub l i sh debates . I n1863, after the e lections , a smal l but powerfu l Oppos ition appeared , wi th Th iers at the head . Napo l eonI I I feared the revival of the old Republ ican party

,

and therefore tu rned agai n to the question of thewo rk i ng classes . His i ndustria l po l i cy i nc ludedsevera l wise and necessary laws ; he a l lowed the es

tab l ishment of co- operative societ i es,he gran ted the

workers the right to organ ize stri kes and to fo rmt rade un ions

,he made no objection to the foundi ng

RELATIONS W ITH PRUSS IA 39

of an “ I n ternat ional Association of Workers andi n many ways he encouraged th ri ft among the poo r,and gave h is he lp to schemes for improvi ng the con

d itions u nder wh ich they worked . The Labour party,

however, had by th i s t ime fal len u nder the influenceof the Social ist write r , Karl Marx (see p . andwas not d isposed to be satisfied with the very rea limprovements which the Emperor was offeri ng . Theoppos i t ion to the Empi re grew rapid ly. The sho rtand who l ly decis ive war of 1866(see p . i n wh ichPruss ia had defeated Austria

,came as a great su rprise

to Napol eon I I I . He had expected to be able to mediatei n the quarrel , and now he sudden ly became awarethat victorious Pruss ia was on ly wai t i ng a favou rab leopportun i ty to fal l upon France , and that B ismarck ,the “ I ron Chance l lo r ” , could outwi t h im and out

manoeuvre h im at every tu rn . Th iers,Ju les Favre

,

and O l l iv ie r l ed the Oppos i tion at home ; Napo leonwas obl iged to make more and mo re concess ions ,unti l , i n 1869 , when the e lections had gone seriouslyagai nst h im , he agreed to establ i sh a Parl iamentaryEmpi re , i n wh ich the real power should l i e with theChambers and not with the Emperor. Neverthe lessthe Republ icans sti l l clamoured for the destructionof the Empi re . I n May

,1870, the Emperor asked for

anothe r wh ich was given i n h i s favour,

but i t was evident that he was face to face with greatd i fficu lties . I t was thought that a successful warm ight d istract attention and restore the feel i ng of

loyalty . Moreover, a war was i nevi tab le . Bismarckwanted i t as a means of drawi ng the North and theSouth of Germany together

,and what B ismarck

wanted he common ly con trived to get . Napo leonh imse l f knew that he was not ready for war

,that h is

army was inefficien t, and i ts a rms out of date . He

knew, too , that the nation d id not want war. He had


tri ed to make al l iances wi th Austria and I taly i n v iewof the com i ng danger

,but had had very l i ttle success,

though he firmly bel i eved that the i r hel p would begiven when need arose . However, he was at themercy of di sconten ted parti es i n Pari s ; the Empressand the Cle ri cals thought that war was the on ly wayof preserv i ng the i n terests of the Empi re and theChu rch . Thus , al though the respons i bi l i ty for thewar must rest wi th B ismarck , i t can not be den i ed thatat l east one section of op i n ion i n Paris d id i ts best toprovoke it, and welcomed i t wi th a l i ght heart .B ismarck ’s part i n the negot iations i s explai ned atgreater length i n Chapte r V . The immed iate causeof the war was the d iscuss ion as to whether a German pri nce should be al lowed to accept the th rone ofSpai n . The pr i n ce had al ready withd rawn

,but the

French ambassado r, Benedett i , acti ng upon verypers isten t and impruden t orders from Paris , foo l i sh lytried to press the Ki ng of Pruss ia to promise that hewould neve r give h i s consen t to any such plan i n thefutu re . The Ki ng i n fo rmed h im

,pol i tely but firm ly ,

that he was go i ng too far i n aski ng such a promise ,and refused to gran t h im another i n terview on thesubject ; he then tel egraphed h is rep ly to B ismarck .

B ismarck sl ightly altered the fo rm of the telegram ,

made i t read l i ke a stud ied i nsu l t to France , thoughwithout addi ng anyth i ng to what the Ki ng had wri tten ,and then publ i shed it. Both nations were moved to

fu ry — Germany at the “outrageous arrogance of

B enedetti’

s demand , France at the publ ic s l ight toher ambassador . Both nations prepared for host i l i t i es .The Chamber i n Pari s was almost u nan imously i nfavou r of war ; on ly ten members opposed the vote forthe mobi l i zat ion of the army . Once more France wasled , agai nst her wi l l , by the strong feel i ng i n Paris ,On 19 J u ly war was declared . The two combatan ts

PR EPARATIONS FOR WAR 4 !

were very unequal ly matched . France had no al l i esat al l . I ta ly was i n ten t upon gai n i ng possession of

Rome , and therefore would not help France , eveni f any grati tude were sti l l owi ng to Napo leon I I I .Garibald i

,i t i s true , with some vo l u n teers , fought

for France ; but he had no support from the I tal ianGovernment . B ismarck had succeeded i n secu ri ngthe neutral i ty of Russia , Austria , Great B rita i n , andDenmark. Pruss ia

,however, had the support of al l

the German States ; for the first t ime i n i ts h istorythe German nation was figh ting as one , havi ng putaside i ts jealousies . The French army was inefficient,though large ; i t was bad ly equ ipped , unused to

modern cond it ions of war, badly commanded , far tooself- confiden t, though its real spi ri t had been sappedand drai ned by the luxu ry and corruption wh ich hadspread so rap id ly under the Empi re . S i nce 1866anattempt had been made to render the French armymore fit to cope with Pruss ia

,and superio r types of

arms had been i ntroduced , but the change was notsuffi ciently complete to be of much service.The German m i l i ta ry forces were , on the otherhand , a perfect weapon , wielded by three men of

po l i t ical and m i l i tary gen i us— Bismarck,Roon , and

Mol tke . The d isci pl i n e was hard and efficient ; theequ ipment as up

- to-date as poss i bl e ; the p lan of

campaign had long been determ i ned . The whol earmy could be mobi l ized with almost i ncred ible ra

p id ity ; i t had recently been through a short buttri umphan t campaign agai nst Austria ; i t was infin itely better organ ized than the French army . TheGerman officers actual ly knew far more of the geography of France and had far better maps than theFrench themselves . I t was smal l wonder

,then

,that

the Germans were able to pred ict success for themselves , though they were amazed later on to find how

42 FRANCE AN D BONAPARTISM

much trouble a spi ri ted though d isorgan ized nationcou ld give .The war was en ti re ly a land war. Pruss ia at thatt ime had no fleet big enough to do anyth i ng butdefend her coasts

,and France cou ld make no use of

hers . The struggle d iv ides i n to two phases : theconfl ict on the German fronti e r, i n wh ich the Frenchfi rst ta lked of i nvad i ng Germany but found they werenot even able to check the German advance ; and thelater strugg le wi th i n France to d rive out the Germansand to preserve Paris .The first phase began on 2 August . Three greatGerman arm ies were rap id ly massed upon the m idd leRh i n e

,under Ste i nmetz

,Pri nce Frederick Charles

,

and the Crown Pri nce of Pruss ia . The origi na l planof Napo leon I I I had been to i nvade Germany fromthe south , whi l e ho ld i ng the fortresses of Metz andStrasbu rg. But h is arm ies d id not assemble as heexpected ; they moved slowly and thei r numberswere i ncomplete . He was obl iged to fal l back upona defens ive campaign

,fo r which he had not been

prepared,for publ i c op i n ion i n France had prophes ied

that he wou ld be at Berl i n with i n a fortn ight .The German commanders , on the i r s ide , had two

obj ects i n v i ew— to defeat the French army i n thefie ld , and then to march on Pari s and occupy it. Theone danger wh ich Mo l tke feared was that the Frenchwou ld reach the scen e of action fi rst, and wou ld defeatpart of the German forces before the others cou ldcome up . This very nearly happened

,and un

doubted ly would have happened if Napo leon I I I hadhad anyth i ng of h is uncl e ’s gen i us . Ou 28 J u ly theFrench troops far outmatched those wh ich had yetarrived from Prussia . But the French had no certai ni n tel l igence , and l i stened too read i ly to rumours ; thecountry was h i l ly

,almost mounta i nous (on the south


east lay the Vosges) , and patches of forest al ternatedwith open h i l l tops . Troops of Germans m ight bely i ng i n ambush at every corner. I n any case

,the

French on ly effected a sl ight success,at S aarb rticken

( 1 August) , and i n the fo l lowi ng days they were qu iteu nable to susta i n th i s success . The Germans wonsmal l engagements at Weissenburg and Spicheren

,

and important battl es at worth and Gravelotte . Thebattle of worth i s remarkable as showi ng the usewh ich may be made of rai lways i n modern warfare .The defeated French army managed to el ude theGerman pu rsu i t , which was not very ski l fu l , reachedthe rai lway at Lunevi l le

,and was no more heard

of un ti l i t tu rned up agai n i n the reserve army atCha lons

,havi ng i n the meantime been up to Pari s

and down aga i n by trai n !At Gravelotte ( 18 August) General Bazai ne wasdefeated

,though not very dec is ively , and reti red

wi th i n the strong fortress of Metz . He has beenmuch blamed for th is move , and was condemned bycourt martia l after the war, but he may wel l havethought that i t would be usefu l to keep one Germanarmy fu l ly occup i ed with the s i ege of Metz , and thusto gai n a breath i ng space for F rance . Meanwh i le ,al l the German troops not needed for the s i ege wereput u nder the command of the Crown Pri nce ofSaxony , and wen t off i n search of the French armyat Cha lons u nder General MacMahon ; MacMahon ,

on h is s ide , advanced to re l i eve Bazai ne and Metz .The Emperor at th i s t ime was with the army at

Cha lons , but he made no attempt to i n terfere wi thMacMahon

’

s plans . He was i n a most awkwardposi tion , accompanyi ng h is own army to defeat , butwi thout the power to influence or change the planof attack . That he loyal ly accepted the posi tion i sfreely testified by h i s generals . Ou 1 September the


46 FRANCE AN D BONAPARTI SM

nor a stone of ou r fortresses Although h is proudboast proved to be utterly vai n , France redeemed herm i l i ta ry reputation by the res istance she made . Not

on ly Paris,but Metz

,Strasbu rg , Be l fo rt , and numbers

of smal l er fortresses held out for vary i ng periods,

thus delay i ng the concen tration of the German arm ies .A striki ng epi sode i n the s iege of Paris was theescape of Gambetta i n a bal loon ; he made h i s wayto Tou rs

,and put h imsel f at the head of a De lega

t ion of the Government , and thenceforward carri edon the war

,and kept up relations wi th fore ign powers

as best he m ight . He did a marvel lous work i nrais i ng and i n sp i ri ng another army , but the generalswere jealous of h is constan t i n terference , and h i ssuccess was not lasti ng. I t has been said

,however,

that whethe r he d id right or wrong i n h i s warpo l i cy , no one el se at that t ime wou ld have doneanyth i ng.

Meanwh i l e the s i ege of Paris conti nued . TheGermans cou ld not take i t by assau l t or by bombardment , and were obl iged to s i t down to sta rve i t out.I n the rear they were harassed by the rap id ly gatheri ng corps of the new army, and by i rregular troopsof the i nhabitan ts . An army of about hadbeen gathered

,by Gambetta ’s efforts , on the Lo i re .

The Germans were thus i n a peri lous posi t ion . On

28 October,however

,Bazai n e capi tu lated at Metz ;

he had by no means exhausted h is mean s of res is

tance , and h is action i n cap itu lat i ng at that t ime isgeneral ly condem ned as treachery . This su rrenderset free the German army of Pri nce Frederick Charles ,and al l hope for Pari s was at an end . The Frencharmy of the Lo i re was defeated

,the “ Delegation

Governmen t was obl iged to ret i re to Bordeaux . A l

though res istance con t i n ued i n the prov i nces , notab lyunder Chanzy , who commanded men at Le

EN D OF THE WAR 47

Mans,and Bou rbaki , who was carry i ng on a terrible

wi nter campaign around Belfort , the real cen tre of

the struggle was Paris . The i nhabi tan ts had sufferedvery severe ly from an exceptional ly co ld win ter, andprovis ions were gett i ng very low . After Ch ristmasDay

,the bombardment became more and more severe

,

and French attacks on German pos it ions were general ly repu lsed with great loss .On 18 January

,the Ki ng of Prussia was pro

cla imed as German Emperor, at Versai l l es ; on thel gth , one last desperate effort of the French at Mon tVa l eri en was beaten back ; on 23 January , Ju lesFavre wen t to Versai l les to negot i ate a peace ; on

the 27th the bombardment ceased , and on the 28th

the arm istice began . The operations of Chanzy andBou rbaki were thus suspended and the war was atan end . The mob i n Pari s was , however , h igh lyi nd ignant at the su rrender ; they greeted the general sas “ Cowards ” and “ Trai tors and the scen es ofconfusion were amazi ng ; everyone was struggl i ng to

get out of the ci ty at once , and many succeeded i ngetti ng past the sentries . The terms of peace wereat last arranged , between B ismarck and the Frenchrepresentatives Th iers and Favre (see p . 1 Francewas to recogn ize the new German Empi re and to cedeto i t the who le of A lsace and Lo rrai n e (except Bel fort) ,and to pay a war i ndemn i ty of I nretu rn for the exception of Belfort, B ismarck i ns istedthat the German army should make a tri umphal en tryi n to Paris . Accord i ngly

,on 1 March

,the victors

entered Paris from the west , marched to the Arc deTriomphe , which celebrated Napo l eon

’s v ictories,and

down the Champs E lysees to the Place de la C oncorde . They seemed surprised to find that theParis ians had hung the great square wi th blackflags and drap eries of crape ! Then the troops were

48 FRANCE AS A R EPUBLIC

withd rawn,the siege of Pari s was at an end ; but the

ci ty was soon to suffer wo rse ca lam iti es , which belongto anothe r chapte r. The treaty of peace was con

firmed on 10 May , at Frankfort .

CHAPTER I I I

FRANC E AS A REPUBLIC

I t is the Repub l ic tha t d i v ides us least . — Th z'

ers .

France has not los t , and w i l l not lose cou rage . S he is lab ou r ingshe is hoping ; and wh i le endeavou r in g to find her proper pa th , she

looks forwa rd to the day when revo lu t ion s w i l l b e a t an end , and

when l ib er ty w i th order w i l l for eve r crown the lon g and pa in fu leffor ts of her mos t fa i th fu l servan ts of every age and per iod .

Gu z’

zot.

IMMED IATELY afte r the cap i tu lation of Paris , a hastyel ect ion for a National Assembly was held , and thenew members met at Bo rdeaux , on 12 February . Thegreat majo ri ty of the deput i es were Monarch i sts

,

partly because the cou ntry d istricts were sti l l conservative , and partly as a protest agai nst the warpo l i cy to wh ich i t was bel i eved that Gambetta andthe Republ ican party

.

were comm itted . The i n terestof the n ext few years cen tres i n the fact that althoughthe majori ty of the French and of thei r represen tativeswere Monarch ists , yet a Republ ic was fi rm ly establ ished in . France

,and has lasted longer than any

form of government s i nce 1789. The weakness of

the Monarch ists lay i n thei r d i su n ion . There were ,as Th iers said

,th ree heads and on ly one crown .

That is , they cou ld not decide between the Countof Chambord

,grandson of Charl es X

,the Count of

Pari s,grandson of Lou is Ph i l ippe

,and the Pri nce

I mperia l,son of Napo leon I I I . Hence the party

THE COMMUNE IN PAR I S 49

was spl i t i n to th ree , and the Republ ic was on thewhole agreed to as a temporary compromise .However, Pari s had not much time i n wh ich to

cons ider such questions . Discontent had been verybitter at the time of the cap itu lation , and the revolu

tionary elemen ts i n the c i ty had got thoroughly ou t

of hand . Ou 18 March , the Commune was p roc laimed i n Paris . The government of the ci ty wasseized by a group of men who, backed up by theNationa l Guard , tri ed to carry ou t the i r theo ry thatFrance shou ld be d iv ided i n to a number of selfgovern i ng Communes , own i ng no cen tral autho ri ty.

Sim i lar attempts were made i n other ci ti es,but came

to noth i ng. There were two mai n causes for theCommun ist outbreak— hatred of the moderate party ,and a determ i nation that Paris shou ld not be outvotedor outweighed by the provi nces . I t was carri ed out

by al l the tu rbulen t e lements of the ci ty,and scenes

of the utmost brutal i ty and v io lence took place . Theremai ns of the French army

,from Sedan and Metz

,

with the garrison of Paris,gathered at Versai l les

,

and for nearly two months the amazi ng sight wasseen of Frenchmen besi egi ng Frenchmen i n their own

cap ital , befo re the eyes of the victorious Germans , whoremai ned encamped on the h i l l s round Pari s . TheC ommun ists were gu i l ty of the cold- blooded mu rderof many em inen t c it i zens , i nclud i ng the Archbishopof Pari s ; they shot down sco res of hostages

,and

when i t was eviden t that they cou ld hold out no

longer, they set fire to most of the publ ic bu i ld i ngs i nParis . The Tu i le ries and the Hotel -de-Vi l le wereburn t to the grou nd

,and Notre Dame was on ly saved

by accident from thei r senseless rage, When theFrench so ld iers at last took possess ion of the c ity ,thei r vengeance was equa l ly terribl e

,i f mo re deserved .

I t i s various ly reckoned that from to

( 0 5 55 ) 5


Pari s ians were ki l l ed by the v ictors . Pari s had donehersel f a greater i nj u ry than the whole German armyhad infl icted on her.At last , however, France settl ed down once more .Th iers

,who had been head of the Government for

some months,was made Pres iden t of the Republ ic

,

August,187 1. Although personal ly he was i ncl i ned

towards monarchy , the gene ral confidence i n Th iers ,and the des i re for comprom ise , made the Republ i cposs i ble , and the Republ icans , i n sp i red by Gambetta ,i ncreased i n numbers . Even tual ly Th iers boldly declared for a permanen t Republ ic , whereupon i n 1873the Monarch ists combi ned and drove h im from office .

From th is t ime forward the h isto ry of France i s aconfused and con fus i ng story of very rapid changesof m i n istry , with equal ly con fus i ng changes of po l icyamong the various groups i n the Chamber. W i th i nthe twen ty- s ix years from 1873 to 1899 there were no

fewer than th i rty- seven d i fferen t Cabi nets , no mi n istryexcept Waldeck-Rousseau ’s ( 1899— 1902) lasted for aslong as th ree years , and at any t ime one cou ld po i n tto fou r or five qu i te d isti nct parti es i n the Chamber.I t w i l l therefore be necessary to summarize partypo l i t ics with i n th is period as much as possi ble , andthe quest ion of fore ign pol icy wi l l be treated separately .

After Th iers ’

s res ignation , one of the generals of thelate war

,Marshal MacMahon , was made Pres ident .

Thereupon began a dete rm i ned effort on the part ofthe Monarch ists to combi ne thei r forces . The generalpo l i cy of the new m i n istry was to strengthen theChu rch , to remove as far as poss i ble al l Republ icanofficials , and to rev ive enthus iasm for the Bou rbonfam i ly and for the Pope . I t was decided that theCount of Chambord shou ld be asked to accept theth rone , and that , as he had no ch i ld ren

,the C ount of

Paris should be recogn ized as h is hei r. He m ight

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE R EPUBLIC 5 1

perhaps have become “ Hen ry V i f he had been wi l li ng to compromise a l i ttle , but he enti re ly refused thefirst demand made upon h im ,

that he should give upthe wh i te flag of the Bou rbon ki ngs for the trico lou r.I t sounds a tr ifle , but the French nation had becomethorough ly attached to thei r national flag, and no

mi n i ster wou ld have dared to abol ish it. Probably,

too,the Count of Chambord ’s refusal was symbo l i c ;

he d id not want the th rone,and th is was one way of

sayi ng that he wou ld make no sacrifice, no comprom ise i n order to atta i n it. From th is t ime forwardthere was very l i tt l e chance that the Bou rbons wouldregai n thei r ki ngdom ; and after 1879 , when the Pri nceImperial was ki l led figh ting i n the B ri t ish army i nZulu land , there was equal ly l i ttl e chance that theBonaparte fam i ly wou ld agai n play a lead i ng part i nFrance .MacMahon i n troduced several consti tutional changesi n the Republ ic . By a law cal led the Septennate , i twas decreed that the Pres ident shou ld always ho ldofi‘i ce fo r seven years

,i nstead of fou r ; at the same

time the Pres iden t was no longer to be Prime M i nister , and therefore need not be affected by changesof party po l i cy . Thus the Pres iden t became morel ike a B ri t ish ki ng , to some exten t above party, whi lethe Prime M i n isters changed wi th amaz i ng rap id ity .

I n 1875 the fo rmal Consti tut ion of the Republ icwas d rawn up and accepted ; the President was to beelected by the Chamber and the Senate s i tt i ng to

gether, he was to hold office for seven years , and wasto be re- el igibl e .One of the most importan t questions st i l l to bedecided was the pos i t ion of the Chu rch . What wasto be the att i tude of the new Republ ic towards re

l ig ion as a who l e, and towards the Roman C atho l i cChu rch i n parti cular? Was Christian i ty to be offici

5 2 FRANCE AS A R EPUBLIC

al ly abo l i shed , as u nder the first Revo l ution ? Wasthe Church to be separated from the State and al lowedto go on i ts own way , with ne i ther help nor h i ndrancefrom the State ? O r was the State to try and mai ntai n a comprom ise , l i ke the Concordat wh ich Na

po leon I had made wi th the Pope , by wh ich theChurch was both control led and protected by theState ? I t was a very d ifficu lt problem ,

al l the mored iffi cu lt because i t was so closely con nected witheducat ion , and education was a cause very dear tothe Republ icans . Gambetta ’s words , Apres le pai n ,l’

éducation expressed the common feel i ng th roughout F rance . Educat ion , however, to a very largeextent

,lay i n the hands of the Church . The Jesu i ts

were the best teachers i n France,and there were

many othe r rel igious orders wh ich spen t most of thei rt ime i n educational work . Almost al l gi rls receivedthei r education i n convent school s , and even i n u n ivers i ty teach i ng the influence of the Church was verystrong. The question therefo re a rose : Was th i s qu i tefa i r to those paren ts or students who d id not wan t arel ig ious education , o r who d id not want a RomanCatho l i c education ? O ne must remember that i n theattacks made on the Chu rch there were two partiesthose who wanted as far as poss i ble to destroy re

l igion , and those who on ly wanted to make the lawsperfectly fai r and j ust to everyone , even though i tmean t lessen i ng the influence of the Chu rch .

I t was i n 1877 that Gambetta ended one of h i sspeeches wi th the words that have s i nce becomefamous , Le Clérical i sme , voi la l

’

ennemi ByClerical i sm he mean t that devot ion to the i n terests ofthe Chu rch that made men ignore thei r opponents ’

views,that determ i nat ion to put the Church first i n

every quest ion,regardless of what others cal l ed

justice , together wi th the des i re to upho ld the Pope'

s



statesman . He was too rash,too impetuous , too fond

of domineer i ng and i n terferi ng i n other people ’s bus iness ; he cou ld do good wo rk when al l the respons ib i l ity fel l on h im ,

but he cou ld not work wi th others .I n 1883 J u les Ferry was made Prime M i n ister.U nder h im the Consti tut ion was agai n revised , anda further attempt was made to render i t more “ rigid ” ;i t was declared that the republ ican form of government should never be upset , or even cal led i n question .

O f course , the re is no power that cou ld force theFrench nation to accept th i s ru le , but on the who lethey seem to prefer a republ ic , and the refore i t hasnever been seriously chal lenged . I t was also enactedthat no member of a former re ign i ng house should beel igi ble for the pres idency ; the Republ ic d id not wantto run the ri sk of another Napo l eon I I I .The years 1886—9 were en l ivened by the strangeand tremendous popu lari ty of General Boulanger, theM i n iste r forWar, who became the ido l of the so ld i ers ,and had dreams of bei ng a successo r of the greatNapo l eon . The Government was exceed i ng ly un

popular,i t was thought that al l the m i n isters both

gave and took bri bes ; and France was always readyto welcome a hero . Bou langer was a dash i ng, picturesque figu re , who caught the fancy of the people .For years afterwards

,i n a lmost every cottage one

m ight see a portra i t of h im on h is great black ho rse .The Royal i sts supported h im because they hoped hewou ld resto re a Bourbon ki ng ; Pari s and the peoplegeneral ly were wi l l i ng that he shou ld do what hep l eased . However, i n 1887 , Carnot, the grandson of

the man who had “o rgan ized victory ” i n 1793, was

made Pres ident , and h is personal popula ri ty d ivertedattention to some exten t from the royal i st hero . I n1889 the Government decided to arrest Boulanger,but he fled from the country , and soon afterwards

THE PANAMA CANAL 55

committed su ic ide i n Belgium . He has been cal leda “ sham Napo leon ” , and that i s a very fai r descript ion of h i s character.Under Carnot various reforms were carried out i nthe army

,and wi th regard to the worki ng classes .

I n 1892 the Pope , Leo XI I I , sen t an E ncycl i ca l (orpubl ic letter) to al l French Roman Catho l i cs , bidd i ngthem accept the Republ ic as a sett led form of government ; many moderate Monarch ists therefore abandoned the i r v i ews , and the feel i ng between Churchand State became mo re fri end ly for a t ime .But th i s sati sfactory state of affai rs was not to lastlong . I n 1892 the Panama Cana l scandal was the onesubject of i n terest. The great engi neer de Lesseps ,who had plan ned the Suez Cana l , afterwards u ndertook a far more di ffi cu lt task— the construction of thePanama Canal

,which was to con nect the Atlan tic

and the P acific Oceans . The proj ect was eagerlytaken up , and hund reds of the th rifty French poorerclasses i nvested thei r scan ty sav i ngs i n the PanamaCanal Company . The d iffi cu l ti es proved to be enormous ; the U n i ted States was hosti le to the wholescheme ; were spent on the work , andi t was calcu lated that £30,ooo ,ooo more wou ld beneeded . Even when the canal was opened , i t wasnot l ikely to pay for a long time . I t was suspectedthat the vast sums of money had not been spen t onthe canal

,and that the m i n isters and members of both

Chambers knew on ly too wel l where they had gone .The shareho lders , who were los i ng both thei r i n terestand thei r savi ngs , i ns i sted on an i nvestigation . Onem i n ister was condemned

,and sentence passed on de

Lesseps h imsel f, though , as he was over n i nety andvery infirm

,i t was not carri ed out . Publ ic Opi n ion

was not, however, sat isfied ; i t was general ly thoughtthat m i n isters were sh ield i ng themselves , and the


unpopu lari ty of the Governmen t i ncreased yet mo re.U nfortu nately the prevalen t corruption , i nstead of

l ead i ng to a determ i ned and v igo rous protest, on ly

d rove the best men out of po l i t i cs , d isgusted wi ththe p resent state of affai rs and sceptical as to the i rpower to improve matters . The ord i nary Frenchmanof to- day is even more d i sposed than the o rd i naryE ngl i shman to grumble at the government , wi thoutcons ideri ng that he h imself helps to fo rm that governmen t ; he does not even give ven t to h i s feel i ngs bywri ti ng letters to the newspapers !I n 1894 Pres iden t Carnot was assass i nated atLyons , and h is successo r, Casim i r - Pe

’

ri e r,res igned

i n seven months , because he cou ld not accept thepo l icy of the Chambers .The next Pres ident

,Fé l i x Faure

,was a new type

a successfu l bus i ness man , with a keen eye fo r praot i cal advantages . He set h imsel f to i n crease theceremon ial s ide of h is office , to make h imself a moreimpress ive figu rehead , and to grati fy the French loveof splendour and d isplay . I n 1896 he arranged amagn ificent recept ion for the Tsar when he vis i tedParis— the fi rst vi s i t that had been paid by any Eu ropean sovere ign to the ofli c ia ls of the Th i rd Republ ic .I n 1899 Faure d ied , and was succeeded by Pres identLoubet .Duri ng these years the great cause of exci tementwas “ the Dreyfus Affai r wh ich even now i s not

forgotten i n Pari s . I t had its origi n i n a strong anti

]ewish feel i ng , which had become very promi nen t i nParis about 1890 th rough the influence of some of thenewspapers . The Jews were hated at first, not b ecause of the i r rel igion , but because i t was thoughtthat the great J ewish financiers were us i ng thei rweal th to corrupt the Governmen t ; they were hated ,too

,by the Social i sts s imply on account of the i r weal th ,

THE DREYFUS CASE 57

wh ich,i t was thought , was a means of oppressi ng the

poo r ; final ly , the Clericals jo i n ed i n the crusade , b ecause they thought Jewish influence was an ti- rel igious .I n 1894

—5 Dreyfus , a Jewish captai n i n the French

army,was accused of havi ng so ld valuable i n fo rma

tion to the German Government . French tria ls arecarri ed on very d i fferently from those i n th i s country ;much of the procedure is secret , evidence i s used bythe j udges wh ich is not necessari ly shown to theprisoner, and the accused i s held to be gu i l ty un t i lhe i s proved to be i n nocen t Mo reover, th i s wasa trial by cou rt martial , and when D reyfus wasdegraded and sentenced to imprisonmen t for l i fe i nthe Devi l ’s I sle

, off South America , there was veryl i tt le agi tation or sympathy on h is behal f, al thoughthere was much i nd ignation i n th i s country when themethods of trial were late r on d isclosed . Gradual ly

,

however,more i n formation leaked out about the

secrets said to have been so l d to Germany , and ,though the Governmen t d id i ts best to hush up anyfurther evidence

,publ i c opi n ion gradual ly grew i n

favour of Dreyfus , and the Government was ob l igedto gran t a new trial . I t was no longer a s implequestion of whether a man had been unj ustly con

demned ;“ l

’

affa ire Dreyfus became the one issuei n po l i t ics on which men took s ides . Al l the antiJ ewish party were agai nst D reyfus , almost al l thearmy , most of the Clericals and Royal ists , togetherwith some who wished to defend the Republ ic th roughth ick and th i n . On Dreyfus ’s s ide were the Jews

,the

Radicals , the Social i sts , the Protestants , and , i ngeneral , al l those who w i shed to bri ng about a realimprovement i n the adm i n istration of j ustice i n France .Duri ng the second tria l the exc i temen t al l over Eu ropewas i ntense

,and Paris went almost mad wi th party

feel i ng. Great wri te rs l i ke Zola and Anatol e F rance

58 FRANCE As A REPUBL IC

fan ned the flame by defend i ng Dreyfus,wh i le Royal ist

and Catho l i c wri te rs used the i r pens agai n st h im . At

last he was found gu i l ty , but the j udges declared thatthere were “ exten uati ng ci rcumstances ” , and he waspardoned . Afte r a th i rd exam i nation of the who l ematte r he was re i n stated i n the army and promoted .

No one was real ly satisfied wi th the final resu lt , butFrance was glad to drop the question wh ich had raisedso

'

much bi tte rness, and is sti l l a very tende r poi n t, bothwi th arden t pol i t i c ians and with those who are keenfor the honou r of France .The end of the Dreyfus case coi nc ides wi th the end

of the n i neteen th cen tu ry , and wou ld make a goodpo i n t at wh ich to stop , were i t not that one greatquest ion , men tioned earl i e r i n th is chapter, has beendecided s i nce the year 1900.

The relations of Chu rch and State yet remai ned tobe deal t with , and the final so l ution of the questionhas been the complete separation of the two.I n 190 1 the ch ief subject of d iscussion i n the Chamber of Deputi es was the “Assoc iations Law ”

,which

was aimed at the rel igious orders . I t was thoughtthat the J esu i ts had used thei r influence agai nstDreyfus . The rel igious orders had enormously increased i n n umbers , i n sp i te of the hosti l i ty of theRepubl ic ; the i r property was val ued at £4o,ooo,ooosterl i ng ; most of the o rders had not been “ authorized

” under the earl i er laws , and were consequentlyl iabl e to be d isso lved at any moment . Throughoutthe debates i t was noticeable that the most earnestchampions of the Church were not the Clericals , butthe Liberal s

,who had always stood for tole rance , and

who especial ly d is l iked the refusal to al low the rel i

gious orders to conti nue thei r work of teach i ng. Thisrefusal , they thought , was a d i rect i n terference wi thl i berty .

CHURCH AND STATE 59

However, i n 1903Emi le Combes was made PrimeM i n ister , and h is mai n po l i cy seems to have been inSpi red by hosti l i ty to the Chu rch . The AssociationsLaw had been passed i n 1901 ; Combes set to workto put i t i n force as strictly as poss i b le . Severalthousand private schools were abol ished , because theteachers i n them were said to be members of therel igious orders ; many of the orders were d issolvedand part of the i r property confiscated ; many of thecommun i ti es vol un tari ly left France and wen t to England or other countri es , where they could carry on thework of education u nmolested .

At the same time Combes quarrel led with PopeLeo XI I I about the nomi nation of the French bishops .I n the m idst of the quarrel the Pope d ied

,and was

succeeded by Pius X , a much less dip lomatic man ,who vigorously opposed C omb es ’

s po l icy .

I n 1904 the Pope protested agai nst the i n tendedvis i t of the Pres iden t to the Ki ng of I taly , i n languagewhich was obviously offens ive to France ; l ater on i nthe same year he attempted to deprive two bishopsof the i r sees without any reference whatever to theFrench Government . Th is brought the matter to acris i s

,and diplomatic relations were broken off ; that

i s to say,there was no longer any agreement between

the Papacy and the French Republ ic ; ambassadorswere no longer sen t from the Vatican to Pari s , norfrom Pari s to the Vatican .

Next year, 1905 , came the decis ive Act of Separation i n France . Henceforth the State was to makeno payment or grant of any ki nd to any re l igion or

Church , though l i berty of consc ience and freedom ofworsh ip were to be secu red ; pens ions were to bea l lowed to those pri ests or m in iste rs who had prev ious ly been paid by the S tate ; the property of a l lrel igious bod ies was to be transferred to new “Asso

60 FRANCE As A R EPUBLIC

c iations for Wo rsh ip wh ich were to be set up i neach d istrict , wh i l e a formal

“ I n ven to ry ” was to betaken i n each chu rch

,to dec ide to whom its property

real ly belonged . As the Pope forbade al l RomanCatho l ics to form these “ Associat ions th is part ofthe law was never properly carri ed out . The “ In

ventories”

,however, were taken , am id cons iderable

oppos i t ion i n Pari s and i n some of the country d istr icts . Thus the fina l separation of Church and Statewas complete . The most remarkable fact about th ischange was the general i nd i fference with wh ich i twas regarded ; the bette r men on both s ides objectedto the man ne r i n wh ich i t was carri ed out

,but the

majori ty of the people ca red noth i ng for the greatquestions i nvo l ved . The refusal to al low rel igiousi nstruct ion i n the schoo l s seems to be i ncreas i ng th isi nd i fference

,though there are a l so unden iabl e s igns

that the Chu rch has gai n ed i n vigou r and independence from its enfo rced separation from the State .With th i s problem to some exten t solved , one mayleave the i nte rna l affa i rs of France to give a briefoutl i n e of her fo re ign po l i cy s i nce 1870.

The key to French h isto ry s i nce the Franco- PrussianWar may be descri bed as m i ngled hatred and fear ofGermany. O n the one hand was a keen desi re forrevenge and a longi ng to recover the lost prov i ncesof Alsace- Lo rra i ne ; on the othe r was B ismarck

’s fearthat France had not been sufficien tly defeated , and h isi ntent ion to strike another blow if h is fal l en enemyshowed any s igns of recoveri ng strength .

Thus i n 1875 a second war was on ly j ust averted .

The new Republ ic seemed to B ismarck to be growi ngtoo strong, and France had always Sp i ri t enough to

attack any foe, however superior i n fo rces . However,the Emperor Wi l l i am and the Crown Pri nce wereboth i n favou r of peace ; Queen Victori a used her per


62 FRANCE AS A REPUBLIC

moting greater mutual knowledge and i n te rest andcloser fri end ly i n tercou rse . France has now establ i shedhe r right to the who l e of North-west Africa

,from

Tun is southward to the Congo,with the exception of

some relat ively smal l B ri ti sh and othe r states on thecoast . This terri tory i ncludes some extremely un

prom is i ng stretches of cou ntry , such as part of theDesert of Sahara , and i t wou ld seem to add veryl i ttl e to the weal th or importance of France . Butthe French peopl e have very l i ttl e gen i us for co lon ization , and , as has been sati r i ca l ly remarked , th i svast accession of te rri to ry i s “

no doubt a sati sfactionto a peopl e wh ich p refers to pursue i ts po l i cy of

colon ial expans ion without the aid of em igration ” .

Algeria , the most valuabl e part of French foreignpossess ions , i s not accounted a co lony , but an i n tegra lpart of France , send i ng members to the Chamber ofDeputi es .Thus France at the presen t day seems to stand i na secure pos i t ion ; there is l i ttl e or no fear that theRepubl ic wi l l be overth rown ; there i s appreciab lyless fear of Germany

,now that France can coun t

upon B ri tai n and Russia as her al l i es , al thoughRuss ia has been very much d iscred i ted by her defeati n the Russo- j apanese War ( 1904Probably the ch ief dangers wi th which France i sth reatened are due to the decl i n i ng bi rth rate , whichmakes i t impossi bl e for her to have flou rish ing colon i esof the B ri ti sh type ; to the d istaste wi th wh ich manyof her best men look upon pol i t i cal l i fe , as corruptand al together too precarious ; and to the d isconten twh ich exi sts among the worki ng classes, and wh ichhas shown i tsel f i n recen t years by ve ry extensivestrikes . There is no reason , however, why theseth reatened dangers shou ld not pass away . Francehas had cen tu ri es of autocrat ic rul e

,and the feel i ng

FUTUR E OF FRANCE 63

for sel f-government must grow slowly ; as i t grows ,corruption and autocratic methods ought to drop awayfrom a Repub l i can form of government , which is atleast i n tended to be “ by the people and for thepeople ” .

CHAPTER IV

GAR IBALD I AND THE L I BERATION OF ITALY

In the end , a coun try t rue to i tse l f and de term ined to c la im G od’

s

g ift to b rave men , w i l l overma tch a me re a rmy , however so l id its

force .— M eredz

’

tlz, Vi ttor ia , p . 7 1.

IN 1807 a l i ttl e boy was born i n N ice . He was theson of poor fisher fo l k , who had never done nor

thought anyth i ng great . Yet he was fated to beheard of i n every co rner of the world , to be lovedby men of every nation , and above a l l to restore h i sown country to Liberty , I ndependence , and Peace .For I taly was i n a sad pl ight du ri ng the years i nwh ich the boy Joseph Gari bald i grew up . I taly isthe most beaut i fu l country i n Eu rope

,the land of

great poets and pai nters , of so ld ie rs and of sai n ts ,the land of a pictu resque , roman tic , and brave people.But I taly had never had a peacefu l Government u nderone ru ler s i nce the days of the Roman Empi re . Someof her poets have bewai l ed her fatal gi ft of beauty ” ,which has attracted race after race of conquero rs forthe last thousand years . Many causes contri butedto the d isu n ion of I taly , but the two ch ief were : fi rst ,the long con nection with Germany i n the M iddleAges , when the Ho ly Roman Emperor claimed to

be Ki ng of I ta ly ; and secondly , the existence of

the Papacy i n Rome,wh ich made i t imposs i ble for

a strong national k i ngdom to ari se . Thus, when

64 GAR IBALD I AND THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

Garibald i grew to be a man , and first real i zed thatI taly was h is cou ntry , th is i s what he saw .

I n the south,where Naples and the is land of S ic i ly

Map to i l lus tra te the Un ion ofITALY1815 187 1E nghsh Mxles

0 50 100 1

50 200

formed the ki ngdom of the Two S ic i l ies , was a Ki ng ,Ferd i nand I I , ha lf Span i sh and hal f F rench by descen t

,afterwards n icknamed Bomba The people

hated h im , he was a fo re igner, and was enti rely underthe sway of Austria . His government ought not tohave been bad

,because the laws and i nsti tutions were

THE COND ITION OF ITALY 65

fai rly good . But the laws were constan tly broken,

no j ust ice was done , pun ishments were bruta l andcapric ious , the people were ignoran t and very poo r,nei ther trade nor agricultu re was flou rish ing , ch ieflyowi ng to the fool ish i nterference or the n eglect of thegovernment.North of the Two S ici l ies lay the States of the Chu rchor Papal terri tory , with Rome , the fo rmer m istress ofthe world , as thei r capi tal . For cen tu ri es the Popehad ruled these States both i n temporal and i n eccles iastical matters ; he was , one m ight say

,both Ki ng

and Pope , wi th the whole system of government depend i ng on h im alone . Here men were bu l l i ed andth reatened by the pri ests who taught them

,governed

them,and pun ished them .

“We don'

t l i ke youngpeople to th i nk un less we know the subj ect of the i rthoughts ” was the pri nciple on wh ich these cl ericalru lers acted . U nder such a governmen t freedom i nthought , i n pol i t i cs , i n rel igion , even i n ord i nary l i fe ,was unknown ; and although the Romans were on thewho l e attached to the Papacy

,yet year by year the i r

respect for rel igion decreased,and thei r desi re for

l i berty and progress grew stronger.Northwards agai n came the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany , which was fai rly wel l governed , and where , i nFlorence , Mrs . Brown i ng l ived und istu rbed duri ngmany years of I taly ’s struggle for freedom . Butal though the Tuscans had l i tt l e to complai n of, theyhad noth i ng to rouse them to energeti c or independent action

,and thei r patriots were u npractical and

wanti ng i n determ i nation .

Three smal l states lay to the north of Tuscany ; ofthese

,Lucca

,the smal lest

,had a to l e ran t but fool i sh

and capricious Duke ; Parma was wel l governed bythe ex-Empress

,Marie Lou ise

,Napoleon ’s widow ,

and was i n a very flourish ing cond it ion ; Modena,( 0 5 55 ) 6


u nder i ts Duke Francis,was considerably oppressed

.

Franci s was wel l -mean i ng,but so suspic ious of new

ideas or patriot i c lean i ngs that he even forbade h ispeopl e to read Dante !I n the north were two much larger d ivis ions . Piedmont with the i sland of Sard i n ia was ru led by a

nat ive pri nce,and represented the un ion of the

ancien t ki ngdoms of Savoy and Sard i n ia , with Turi nas i ts cap i tal ; i ts government was s impl e , honest ,and wel l - i n ten tioned

,but not very progress ive ; i t

was i n sp i red al ternately by hatred of France and of

Austria,and two of i ts ki ngs , Charles Fel i x and

Charl es Albert,d id l i ttl e to help i t forward . Charles

Fel ix open ly said : The first duty of a loyal subjecti s not to complai n wh i l e Charl es Albert gai ned then ickname of “ Re Ten ten na ” , the waveri ng ki ng .

Eastward from Piedmont , the old ki ngdom of Lombardy and the provi nce of Venetia had been givenover to Austri a ; the famous I ron Crown of Lombardywas taken to Vien na

,and Austria tried to make her

new subjects fo rget that they were I tal ians . I t i son ly fai r to say that th is was the best governed partof I taly ; i n finance , i n j ustice , i n re l igion , i n education

,i n local government the adm i n istration was j ust

and en l ightened,and Lombardy prospered under

Austrian ru l e . But i n po l i t ical matters i nj usti ce wascommon ; men who d i ffered from the Austrian statesmen suffered long and cruel imprisonment and eventortu re , and at last the feel i ng agai nst the foreignrulers grew so strong that the nobles of M i lan re

fused to speak to an Austrian officer,and no I ta l ian

lady wou ld recogn ize an Austrian i n society .

Thus I taly was so d ivided,by race , by geography ,

and by government,that i t seemed a lmost impossi b le

to hope for her u n ion . Yet al l over I ta ly a desi refor change was growi ng up ; secret soc iet ies, such as

EARLY LIFE OF GAR IBALD I 67

the Carbonari , kept up a ferment of smal l revol utions ,and i n every ci ty of I ta ly the young men were leagui ng together to figh t agai nst the i n tolerable oppres

s ion . U nfortunately,they d id not agree among

themselves ; some thought that I taly should becomea group of sma l l republ ics ; some wished for a u n i tedmonarchy ; some thought that the Pope (especial lyPius IX) might put h imself at the head of thereform i ng movemen t and give I taly free institu

t ions .I t is because Garibald i , with h is strong simple and

fine character, became the hero of these d i fferen tparties

,that he has been chosen for the central figu re

of th i s chapter.

Young Garibald i grew up as a sai lor ; he saw andthought much of the m ise ry of I taly , and someth i ngof the new ideas of l i berty . Lo rd Byron

,wi th a

brave l i ttl e band of E ngl i shmen , was help i ng theGreeks to gai n thei r i ndependence (see p . andthus Garibald i first heard of the E ngl i sh as the friendsof freedom . He al so l earnt to know Mazzi n i , a greatth i nker who was tryi ng to rouse the young I tal iansto figh t for God and the people and for a free andun ited I taly . When Garibald i was eighteen

,h is

father took h im to Rome,and there , he says , he fi rst

began to dream of the Rome of the futu re , the cen treof a great nation . He was about twen ty—eight whenhe first jo i ned i n a ri si ng wh ich was mean t to helpI taly ; but i t fai led , and he was obl iged to flee fromthe country°

He went to South America i n 1836, and there fortwelve years he l ived a wi ld adventu rous l i fe

,figh ting

for Monte Video and other smal l states of SouthAmerica ; l earn i ng to be a splend id so ld ie r, rid i ngover the great pla i ns on the hardy prai ri e horses ;


now and then go i ng back to the sea wh ich he lovedso wel l ; gatheri ng together a band of devoted compan ions

,who adopted the famous u n iform of the red

sh i rt ; always ready for figh ting , but th i nki ng alwaysof I ta ly

,plan n i ng how he m ight help her, maki ng

friends wi th the I tal ian exi l es . At l ast h is chancecame .

Between 1834 and 1848 th i ngs had changed for thebetter i n I ta ly . I n almost every state the people ’sre i te rated demands had been met by some measu reof reform ; the i r ideas had become mo re practical ,and there was real reason for hope .Pius IX (P io Nono) had become Pope i n 1846, andh is l i beral sympath i es and partial reforms had wonfo r h im a populari ty wh ich was almost worsh ip .

U nfortu natel y he was a weak man,who cou ld not

ho ld firm ly to any one pol icy,and ul timately he

dece ived the hopes of I taly . Yet h is influence wasgreat

,for he conv i nced al l moderate men that u n i ty

and i ndependence d id not mean the destruction of

Cathol ic ism , to wh ich the majori ty of I tal ians weredevoted ly attached .

I n the south , Sic i ly had made a tol erably successfulrevo l ut ion , and Ferd i nand I I had been obl iged to

grant a Consti tution (Jan ., 1848) to the Neapol i tans.

I n P iedmont , Charles Albert had been carry i ng out

a steady pol i cy of reform . Although he was superstitious and often u ndec ided

,he had i n h im many of

the elemen ts of a noble ki ng.

“ I bel ieve ”,he said

,

that we best please God by uti l i z i ng every d iscoveryi n science and art to serve the greatest good of thepeop le . ” Hence the laws were improved

,rai lways

begun , trade encouraged , and both the un ivers i t i esand elementary education rece ived a new impulse.I n February , 1848, the Ki ng gran ted h is subj ects


70 GAR IBALD I AN D THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

of Piedmon t was ri fe among the othe r states,and

Charl es Albert was deserted by the Pope and byFerd i nand I I . He was a poor general , though indomitab ly brave , and cou ld not mai n tai n the advantages he had won .

News of these even ts had reached Garibald i i nSouth America , and he and h is band of fo l lowers sawonce mo re a chance to hel p I taly . S o they took sh ipand crossed the Atlan t ic , go i ng , as Garibald i said ,towards the atta i nmen t of the passion and desi re ofthe i r l ives Gari bald i ’s land i ng at N ice

,h i s hearty

welcome , and h is retu rn to h is o ld mother were perhaps the last en ti re ly happy moments of h is l i fe .P iedmon t rej ected h is offer of help , and short ly afterwards Char les Albert was utte rly defeated i n the batt leof C ustozza (25 J u ly , Gari bald i now offeredh is serv ices to Lombardy , and , even afte r the K i nghad concluded an arm ist ice

,carried on the war among

the I ta l ian Alps ; but at last he was obl iged to giveup , and retreated i n to Swi tze rland .

A few months ’ cessat ion of host i l i t i es ensued,but

i n March,1849 , the Ki ng cou ld bear the hum i l iati ng

s i tuat ion no longer ; he cou ld not accept Austria ’sterms ; the Austrian commander- in - ch ief

,Radetsky ,

was treat i ng M i lan w ith barbarous severi ty ; none ofthe Eu ropean powers wou ld he lp Piedmont to obtai nhonourab le terms . Charles Albert d id the on ly th i nghe cou ld— he renewed the war

,putti ng the command

i nto the hands of‘a Po l i sh general , for he was on ly

too consc ious of h is ow n defects as a m i l i ta ry leader .But i n vai n . The I ta l i an army was utterly defeatedat Novara (23March) . Al l day Charles Albert soughtre lease from h is troubles i n the hottest of the figh t,u nti l at length he cri ed ,

“ Even death has cast meoff He was obl iged to beg for a truce

,and then he

DEATH OF CHARLES ALBERT 7 1

abd icated,as he had always i n tended to do i f defeated .

Si lently and i n d isgu ise he wen t i n to exi le , l eavi ngbeh i nd the sad promise that , i n case of furthe r war ,the Austrians may be su re of find ing me , a simplesold i er i n the ranks of the i r enem ies But beforefour months were ended he was dead . His waveri ngs were al l forgotten , h i s i ndecis ion and m istakesno more mentioned , the unj ust outcry agai nst h is“ treachery ” ceased

,he was i ndeed “ sh riven i n can

non smoke ” , and I ta ly remembers on ly that hewould have d ied for her

,and that he d id i n fact

renounce everyth i ng for her .Happi ly the new Ki ng

,Victo r Emmanuel I I , was

loyal to the cause of free government , bes ides bei nga stronger man than h i s father ; so that i n spi te of thedefeat

,and wh i le the rest of I ta ly suffered a crue l re

action , i t was fel t that P iedmon t had ach ieved a moralv ictory .

Meantime South I ta ly was strugg l i ng wi th evenworse d iffi cu lties . Si nce the granti ng of the C onstitution there had been smal l i solated ris i ngs on

behalf of Charles Albert, but Ferd i nand put themdown wi th great severi ty . Nevertheless the movement grew , and a “ Soc iety of U n i ted I taly ” wasformed . Sici ly was (s i nce January , 1848) i n p racticei ndependen t of Naples

,and after the news of the

battle of C ustozza the Ki ng tried to reconquer theis land . He wanton ly bombarded the ci ty of Messi na ,and so won for h imsel f the we l l - known n ickname ,Bomba . Resistance con t i n ued th rough the wi nter,but i n vai n . On 11 May

, 1849, Palermo su rrendered ;the Bourbo n Ki ng once more re igned i n S ic i ly ; andthere ensued that terri bl e t reatment of po l i t ica lprisoners wh ich was exposed i n M r . Gladstone ’sfamous “ Two Letters ” (see p .

Ven ice, as has been said , had obl iged the Austrians

7 2 GAR IBALD I AND THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

to wi thd raw,and had proclaimed a Republ ic , under

the leadersh i p of Dan ie l Man i n . This man had amost remarkable power over the people . “ I knowthat you love me , he said , and by that love I com

mand order He kept contro l over the ci ty duri nga s iege that lasted from the August of 1848 to 22 Au

gust , 1849 ; then when cap itu lat ion was abso l utelyi nevi table he went i n to exi l e

,to conti n ue h i s work for

I ta ly as a wri ter and th i nker. Thus Ven ice was oncemo re u nder Austrian ru le .The hardest figh t, however, had been fought i nRome . Duri ng the autum n of 1848 Gari bald i hadbeen gatheri ng a legion of devoted men from al l partsof I ta ly , and even from Mon te Video . Some of thesemen were so ld i e rs , but more of them were students ,artists

,shopkeepers

,or artisans . They had at first

no defin ite object,but d ri fted towards Rome , where

they thought they m ight help the cause of. Republ ican ism ,

which was growi ng dai ly stronger under theinfluence of Mazz i n i ’s wri ti ngs .On 15 November the Pope

’s u npopu lar m i n iste r,Ross i , was assass i nated , and the Pope i n terror fledto Gaeta , which was i n Neapol i tan terri tory . I n Feb~

ruary , 1849, Gari bald i en thus iastical ly assisted i n theproclamation of the Roman Republ ic

,wh ich speed i ly

i nv i ted Mazz i n i to become its most honou red ci tizen ,and made h im ch ief of the Tri umvi rs to whom theGovernment was confided . Garibald i was en trustedwith the defence of the fron tier towards Napl es , wherehe won two V i ctories

,and h i s force rap id ly grew to

1000 men .

Al l m ight have gone wel l i f the European powershad been con tent to leave the Papacy to i ts fate . Butthere was much sympathy with Pio Nono . Francefel t that some help must be given to the Chu rch , thatAustria ought not to be i ts on ly champion . There

THE S IEG E OF ROME 73

fore the French Republ ic sen t troops agai nst theRoman Republ ic ,with o rders to occupy Civ i taVecch ia .

At fi rst thei r general , Oud inot, professed fri end lyi n ten t ions

,but after a t ime i t became apparen t that

he i n tended to resto re the Pope . This the RomanRepubl ic was determ i ned not to tolerate , and War wastherefore i nevitable .Gari bald i and Mazz i n i now devoted al l the i r energies to prepari ng for a s iege . They were very d i fferen t men— Mazzi n i a th i nker and a poet, a dreamerand an ideal i st, whose bel ief i n Republ ican ism wasstronger than any othe r feel i ng ; Gari bald i essen tial lya man of action , impatien t of theories , which i ndeedhe did not u nderstand . But for the t ime they forgotthei r d i fferences

,and together i nsp i red the magn ificen t

defence of the ci ty . I n J une Oudinot attacked Rome,fearfu l lest he shou ld be antic ipated by the Austrian s ,or the Span iards or the Neapol i tans

,who were al l

musteri ng for the fray . The French attack was unex

pected and not en ti re ly i n accordance wi th the ru lesof honou r usual ly observed i n war

,and the French

army outnumbered the defenders . Ou 1 J u ly theFrench entered the ci ty , i n o rder to restore the Popeto h is u nwi l l i ng subj ects— “ one of the meanestdeeds ”, says an E ngl ish h istorian ,

“ that ever d isgraced a great nation ”

Garibald i i nv i ted those who wou ld not su rrender tofol low him , prom is i ng them hunger and th i rst andvigi l , but never terms with the enemy

”. For th ree

weeks he and h is wi fe An i ta (a Portuguese gi rl whomhe had married i n South America) and a body of twoor th ree thousand men marched th rough the wi ldestparts of the ‘Apen n i nes

,pu rsued by French and

Span iards and Austrians . Gradual ly the men fel l off ;Garibald i made terms for some of them

,some escaped

to Ven ice . At last, almost alone, he watched h is

74 GAR I BALD I AND THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

fai thfu l wi fe d ie i n a hut i n the forests near Raven na .

Then al l was over . Gari bald i escaped as best hem ight , and wen t once mo re i n to exi l e .The whole movement had fai l ed , and the real reason

of the fai l u re seems to l i e , not i n the many faul ts andm istakes of Charles Albert , but i n the fact that I ta lywas as yet aim i ng on ly at i ndependence and not atu n ity . There were , as Cavou r said ,

“too many songs

about free i ng I taly ”

,too l i tt le determ i nation to figh t

s ide by side and wo rk for the u n ion of I taly , si nki ngthe natu ral jealousi es of Lombard and P iedmontese,of Tuscan or Neapol i tan . The sp i ri t of the people ,however, was roused , and I taly cou ld no longer bed i s regarded i n Eu rope .At fi rst , however, the reaction was terri ble . I nRome the Pope , who had retu rned i n 1850,

d is re

garded a l l advice,and abandoned h i s subj ects to a

clerical tyran ny wh ich was worse even than'

they hadsuffered befo re . I n the Two S ic i l ies Ferd i nand gaveup al l p retence at consti tutional ru le , and h is barbarous treatment of po l i t ical p ri soners (which M r .

Gladstone saw with h i s ow n eyes) won for h is tyran nythat te rri bl e description the negation of God erectedi nto a system of governmen t ” . I n Lombardy therewere ho rrors beyond words . I t i s true they were dueto Radetsky h imsel f, and not to the Austrian Government

,but when a governor cou ld flog women for

po l i t ica l offences i t was smal l wonder that the I ta l iancry was : We do not ask Austria to be humane andl i beral i n I taly , we ask her to go.

”

For the next ten years ( 185 1—61) Cavou r i s thegreatest man i n I taly . I t i s he who bri ngs I ta ly i n topubl i c notice , and who endeavours to gai n by d iplo~

macy what can not yet be won by fighting. He andVictor Emmanuel worked together for P iedmont,l essen ing the power of the Church by abo l ish i ng

POLICY OF CAVOUR 7 5

about ha l f the monasteries , and taki ng care to keepthe army as large and as wel l organ ized as poss i b le .I n 1854 he i ns isted upon send i ng I ta l iantroops to figh t s ide by side w i th the B ri ti sh andFrench arm ies i n the Crimea (see p . thoughPiedmont had l i ttle or no i n terest i n the war withRuss ia . But partly to gai n the al l iance of France ,part ly to preven t Austria from jo i n i ng the Al l i es

,

and partly for the general reason of gai n i ng moreconsiderat ion for h is country i n European Congresses ,Cavour sen t the men , and they proved a we l l - organized , effic ien t, and successfu l cont i ngen t of the A l l i edarmy . The state of I taly was d iscussed at the eu

su i ng Congress of Pari s , but although Cavou r d idh is utmost he cou ld obtai n no practical resu l ts . He

therefore gave fai r warn i ng of h i s i n ten tions i n amemo randum to France and B ri ta i n , to the effectthat i f d ip lomacy cou ld do noth i ng revo l ution wou ldbe tried . For Cavou r was convi nced that another warwould be necessary , but he never accepted CharlesAlbert’s maxim , I tal ia fara da se ( I ta ly wi l l do herown work) . He therefo re devoted h imsel f to w1nn1ngthe a l l iance of Lou is Napo l eon , now Napo l eon I I I ,Empero r of the French . The character of the Em

pe ror has been d iscussed elsewhere (p . Herei t i s suffi c ien t to say that he had a genu i ne sympathywi th I ta ly , a genu i ne des i re to help i n the expu ls ion ofAustria , but he constan tly wavered i n h i s sympathybecause the influence of the Clerical party i n Francewas strongly agai nst h im

,and the Empress Eugen ie

was anxious to do noth i ng that m ight al i enate thePope .I n 1858, however, i n a secret meeti ng at Plombieres ,Cavou r managed to obtai n a p romise of help fromthe Emperor, who undertook to attack Austria as theal ly of Piedmont, with the u nderstand i ng that the


Austrian possessions i n I taly and some of the PapalStates should be added to Victo r Emmanuel ’s ki ngdom , whi le Tuscany and Umbria were to fo rm aki ngdom of Central I ta ly . Napo l eon was to rece iveSavoy

,the oldest provi nce of the North I tal ian ki ng

dom , and perhaps N ice ; Victor Emmanuel was togive h i s daughter Cloti lde i n marriage to Pri nceJerome Napo l eon , the Empero r

’s cousi n , thus u n i ti ngone of the o ldest royal fam i l i es i n E u rope with thenew dynasty of the Bonapartes . These cond i tion swere not express ly agreed to , but they were understood to be the price of Napo l eon ’s help . HenceforthCavour wai ted on ly ti l l Austria shou ld give h im areasonable pretext for maki ng war. The pretext camei n Apri l , 1859, when Austria , after refus i ng to adm i tthe Piedmontese rep resen tative to a Congress , sen ta peremptory demand that Pi edmont should d isbandher arm ies with i n th ree days , on pai n of invas ion .

Th is was what Cavour wanted ; Austria had offeredan unpardonable i nsu l t , and by 26Apri l war hadbegun

,wh i l e F rance formal ly declared war on 29

Apri l . Victo r Emmanuel an nounced the news toh i s countrymen thus : People of I taly ! Austria hasi nvaded Piedmont because I have espoused the causeof our common country i n the Counci ls of Eu rope .

For mysel f,I have but one ambition

,— to be

the foremost sold ie r i n the army of I tal ian I nde

pendencefi’

I n th i s war both the Ki ng and Cavou r were anx

ious to have Garibald i ’s help . He had spen t somewretched years i n ex i l e— in Tangier

,i n E ngland

,and

i n New York. I n 1853 he had retu rned to the islandof Caprera , where he l ived for some time qu ietly tendi ng h is farm . I n 1858 Cavou r had taken cou nsel withh im i n Tu ri n

,and he had been i n structed to raise

a volu n teer force . Men of every class and from a l l



French aid . When he had sadly decided that thei n famous treaty ” must be s igned , Cavou r came toh im almost mad with d isappo i n tment , spoke v io l en t ,abusive wo rds to h is sovereign , and res igned h is officeo f Prime M i n iste r . Al l popular feel i ng of grati tude toNapol eon natu ral ly van ished , and I taly watched h isretreat to France i n contemptuous s i l ence . Thi ngs ,however, were not qu i te so bad as they seemed .

Central I ta ly worked stead i ly al l th rough the autum nof 1859 to bri ng about the un ion with P iedmont ;Cavou r retu rned to office i n January , 1860, andwo rked for the same end . Napo l eon agreed to abideby the resu l t of a plébz

'

scz'

te (or general vote of thepeopl e) on the question of u n ion , on cond ition thatSavoy and N ice should be ceded to h im . By overwhelm i ng majo ri t ies the Romagna

,Bologna

,Modena

,

and Tuscany were added to Victo r Emmanuel ’s ki ngdom . Savoy and N ice gave a s im i lar deci s ion i nfavour of an nexat ion to France

,but i n th i s case the

votes were noto riously not free . Cavou r has beengreatly blamed for maki ng th i s sacrifice . Nice wasthe home of Gari bald i ; he fel t i ts loss b itte rly , andnever qu i te fo rgave Cavou r for h is act ion . Yet i ti s d ifficu lt to see what el se cou ld have been done .France was dete rm i n ed to obtai n some recompense ,and , at least , Cavou r had rid h imself of the debt ofgrati tude ; Napo l eon I I I was wel l paid for h is help ,and hencefo rth I ta ly cou ld treat h im as she chose .I nd i rectly P iedmon t owed much of th is success i nCentral I taly (and late r on i n S ic i ly) to the sympathyof the B ri t ish m i n i sters , Palmerston , Lo rd JohnRussel l

,and Gladstone , who ,

un l i ke the Queen andCourt , were wi l l i ng to brave much if they

i

cou ld

th ereby help I ta ly .

Whi le these negot iations were goi ng on i n theno rth , Ferd i nand I I had d ied (May , and was

GAR IBALD I AND THE THOUSAND 79

succeeded by h is son , Francis I I , as Ki ng of the TwoS ic i l ies . He determ i ned to fo l low in h is father ’s footsteps , refus i ng the advice of Napo leon I I I that heshou ld either grant a Consti tution or al ly h imse lfwith Victo r Emmanuel . The is land of S ici ly hadbeen forci bly kept qu iet s i nce 1849, but there wasmuch h idden d isconten t and much ta lk of getti ngGari bald i to come and del iver the S ic i l ians (themselves a non -m i l i tary people) from thei r fore ign ru lers .Garibald i declared h is wi l l i ngness to he lp i f therewere any chance of success , and i f the S ici l ians wou ldbegi n the revo l t . Mazz i n i , therefore , used al l h is influence to sti r up the is land , and severa l smal l ri s i ngs ,such as those of Riso ,

the p lumber , and Rosal i noPi lo,

took place . Al l th rough Apri l , 1860,there was

the utmost suspense . Wou ld the i n su rgents be ableto hold out u nti l Garibald i cou ld co l l ect arms andmen enough to go? Would the Ki ng and Cavoural low h im to attack a power with wh ich they werenot at war? And lastly , would Gari bald i th i nk i trather h i s duty to remai n

,and figh t Cavou r i n Par

l iament over the question of the cession of Nice ?But a l l these d ifli cu l ties were at length so lved . Newscame of conti n ued ri s i ngs . Gari bald i easi ly col lected1000 men , the n umber he wan ted ; with more t roub l ehe procured firearms for them . His E ng l i sh fri endspersuaded h im to d rop the question of Nice . TheKing and Cavou r were on ly too wi l l i ng that he shou ld

go , i f he cou ld go as an i ndependen t adventu re r , wi thout publ ic support from the Ki ng and Government .And thus began the famous adventu re of Gariba ld iand the Thousand ”

. O n 5 May the l i ttl e band embarked ; on 11 May they landed u nder the s i len tp rotection of two Bri t i sh vessels at Marsala

,i n S ic i ly ;

on 15 May Garibald i had won a battle at C a latafim i ;on 27 May he had entered Palermo ,

i n sp i te o f an


army of Neapo l i tans who m ight have barredh is way . Never had such a rap id conquest

,by such

a handfu l of men , been known i n the pages of h istory .

But now pol i t ical d ifficu lties began . Garibald i hadproclaimed h imsel f D ictato r of the i s land

,i n the name

of Victor Emmanuel , which , i ndeed , was at first thebest th i ng he could do . But when the conquest wascomplete , he stead i ly refused to al low the i sland to bean nexed to the ki ngdom of Piedmont. He wanted toconquer Naples , and perhaps Rome , i n h i s own waybefore he had to subm i t to C avou r’s orders . Cavou r

,

on the con trary , was determ i ned that no attack shou ldbe made as yet on Rome , because he knew that F rancewould agai n defend the Papacy . The summer of 1860was a time of bi tter j ealousy between the m i n i ster andthe so ld i er. Happi ly Garibald i was always loyal toVicto r Emmanuel , and the jealousy had less i l leffects than m ight have been expected .

On 8 August , i n sp i te of the K i ng’s advice , Gari

bald i crossed to the mai n land of I taly and won thebattl e of Reggio . Fo rty thousand Neapol i tan troopsfel l back befo re h i s advance . On 7 September heen tered Naples i n t ri umph , and Franc is I I fl ed to

Gaeta . I t ought , perhaps , to be said that the Neapol i tan sold ie rs owed thei r defeat more to the incom

petence of the i r officers than to any lack of cou rage .M i l i tary capaci ty had never been encou raged i nNaples

,and i t i s sa id that each officer was mo re

i ncapable than h is subord i nates , un ti l the generalswere almost a publ ic joke .By th is t ime i t was eviden t that no persuas ion wouldi nduce Gari bald i to give up h is mad scheme of attacki ng Rome , and Victo r Emmanuel , therefore , made useof some hosti l e moves on the part of the Pope to jo i ni n the war

,havi ng obtai ned a p rom ise of neutral i ty

from Napoleon . He occupi ed Umbria and the Marches,



every moment of h i s l i fe , for h i s country , and for thecause of truth and freedom .

Cavou r was succeeded as Prime M i n ister by Ricaso l i

,an abl e and honou rable man , who had done good

work i n Tuscany . But from the t ime of C avou r’

s

death party and po l i t ical d ifficu lties became moreacute i n I taly . I t was , for example , far eas i e r to conquer the South than to govern it. The people werem iserably poo r

,unenterpri s i ng , and often i ncapab le ;

those who were d i sconten ted became brigands,h id

i n the mounta i n s,and made travel l i ng almost im

poss i bl e . Matters improved somewhat when a systemof smal l d iv i s ions for local governmen t was set up ,

but there has always been j ealousy and d ifficu ltybetween the North and the South .

A harder probl em sti l l was how to secu re Rome .Mere conquest wou ld not do , because i t was thoughtthat the Roman Catho l i c powers of Europe wou ldnever al low the Pope to be d ispossessed of h i s domi n ions or tu rned out of I taly . I t had been held forcentu ri es that the Tempo ral Power ” was necessaryto the Papacy— that i s , that the Pope cou ld not beproperly i ndependen t u n less he actual ly ru led overa State as Sovere ign ° Cavou r had real ized that th isp roblem cou ld on ly be so l ved by “ mo ral fo rces ” ;that unt i l men were conv i nced that the TemporalPower was a m istake , Victo r Emmanuel cou ld notre ign i n Rome . He had therefore spent the lastmonths of h is l i fe i n t ryi ng to spread the idea of“ a free Church i n a free State ”

,for he did not wish

the State to i n terfere wi th the Church , any more thanhe wou ld have al lowed the Church to take the placeof the State . U nfo rtu nate ly , the more the Papacywas th reatened , the more vehemently i t held to i ts oldclaims .The years that fo l lowed 1861 fo rm an unsat i sfacto ry

ATTEMPTS ON ROME 83

chapter i n the l i fe of Gari bald i . He cou ld not fo l lowpo l i t i cal arguments ; as was once said of h im

,

“ He

had a heart of gold , but the brai ns of an ox C on

sequently he had set h is heart upon gett i ng to Romeat any cost , and he was sometimes encou raged , somem

times deserted,sometimes necessari ly opposed by the

Ki ng and h is m i n isters .I n 1862 he made a foo l i sh attempt i n S ic i ly , was

opposed by the royal troops at Aspromonte,wounded ,

and taken prisoner. The sympathy that he arousedwas unbounded , and he received a free pardon . Two

years late r he vi s i ted London , and there are manypeop le who sti l l remember the extrao rd i nary scenesof en thusiasm wi th wh ich he was greeted .

About the same time a treaty was made by wh ichthe French agreed to evacuate Rome with i n two

years i f Victo r Emmanue l wou ld u ndertake not to

attack i t at present . A very unpopu lar clause i n thetreaty arranged that the capital shou ld hencefo rth beFlo rence , and not Turi n .

I n 1866B ismarck,who was worki ng for the un i ty

of Germany (see p . and was very hosti le to

Austria,made an al l iance wi th I ta ly

,by which

Venetia was to be added to the ki ngdom,i n retu rn

for I tal ian help to Prussia . Napo l eon I I I was favourab l e to th is arrangement , though he d id not open ly

jo i n i n it. War between Austria and Pruss ia beganon 20 June , 1866. Gari bald i was agai n given thecommand of vol untee r troops . U nhappi ly , taly wasdefeated on l and at C ustozza , and on sea off Lissa , onthe Dalmatian coast . The Prussians

,however, were

complete ly victo rious at Kon iggr'

atz (or Sadowa) , andmade peace without consu l ti ng I taly . The I tal ianswere greatly i nsu l ted by an agreement that Austriashould cede Venetia as a gi ft to Napo l eon , and thathe i n tu rn shou ld pass i t on as a gi ft to Victor


Emmanuel ; they wou ld far rather have cont i n ued thed i sastrous war. At last a compromise was arranged .

Venetia was granted i ts i ndependence by Napo l eon,

and immediately voted by enormous majori ti es to bean nexed to the I tal ian ki ngdom .

Garibald i , meanwh i le , had h is eyes sti l l tu rnedtowards Rome . I n 1867 he i nvaded the PapalStates , but h i s foo l hardy attempt was crushed byFrench troops . He was defeated at Men tana

,and

d id h i s cause far more harm than good . Eventual lythe Governmen t sen t h im back to Caprera .

At last the long-awaited oppo rtun i ty came . I n1870 the Franco—Pruss ian war broke out (see p .

the French troops evacuated Civi ta Vecch ia,and

Napoleon gave I taly a free hand to do as she pleasedi n Rome . The ch i ef E u ropean powers engaged not

to i nterfere , and Victo r Emmanuel wrote a conc i l iatory lette r to the Pope , offeri ng h im fu l l and honou rable protection i f he wou ld give up the Tempo ralPower. Pius IX repl ied that he would yi eld on ly toforce

,and afte r overcom i ng a bri ef res istance the

I tal ian army pou red i n to Rome.Rome was thus added to the Ki ngdom of I taly.

As the Pope pers isten tly refused to renou nce h isTemporal Power ” , a comprom ise was effected .

His palace of the Vatican,together with the Lateran

Church and Palace,was al lowed to form a l i ttl e

i s land of Papal terri to ry i n the m idst of Rome . Herethe Pope chose to remai n as a self—consti tuted prisoner.The State has guaranteed that he shal l have ab so

Iutely free commun ications wi th the other Eu ropeanS tates , and for th i s pu rpose he has h is own postaland telegraph ic system ; h i s personal safety is protected , and as far as possi ble he i s treated l i ke a sovereign pri nce . The State has absol utely no powerwith i n the rather extens ive pri son from which the



Emmanuel ; they wou ld far rather have con ti n ued thed isastrous war. At last a comprom ise was arranged .

Veneti a was granted i ts i ndependence by Napol eon ,and immediate ly voted by enormous majori t i es to bean nexed to the I tal ian ki ngdom .

Gari bald i , meanwh i le , had h is eyes sti l l tu rnedtowards Rome . I n 1867 he i nvaded the PapalStates

,but h i s foolhardy attempt was crushed by

French troops . He was defeated at Men tana,and

d id h i s cause far more harm than good . Eventual lythe Government sen t h im back to Caprera .

At last the long—awai ted oppo rtu n i ty came . I n1870 the Franco- Pruss ian war broke out (see p .

the French troops evacuated Civita Vecch ia , andNapoleon gave I taly a free hand to do as she pleasedi n Rome . The ch i ef E u ropean powers engaged not

to i n terfere , and Victo r Emmanuel wrote a conc i l iatory lette r to the Pope

,offeri ng h im fu l l and honou r

able protection i f he would give up the TemporalPower. Pius IX repl i ed that he would yield on ly toforce

,and afte r ove rcom i ng a bri ef res i stance the

I tal ian army poured i n to Rome .Rome was thus added to the Ki ngdom of I taly .

As the Pope pers istently refused to renou nce h isTemporal Power ” , a comprom ise was effected .

His palace of the Vatican , together wi th the LateranChu rch and Palace

,was al lowed to fo rm a l i ttl e

i sland of Papal te rri tory i n the m idst of Rome . Herethe Pope chose to remai n as a sel f- consti tuted prisoner.The State has guaranteed that he shal l have ab so

lutely free commun ications wi th the other Eu ropeanS tates , and for th i s pu rpose he has h is own postaland tel egraph ic system ; h is personal safety i s protected , and as far as poss i ble he i s treated l i ke a sovereign pri nce . The State has absol ute ly no powerwith i n the rather extensive pri son from which the

DEATH OF GAR I BALD I 85

Pope emerges on ly occasional ly to go to S t. Peter’s .A Law of Guarantees ” was passed wh ich securedcertai n rights and privi l eges to the Pope , leavi ng h imsupreme i n spi ri tual matters

,whi le the State received

some power of contro l i n secu lar matters over thebishops and priests th roughout I taly . The law was ,however

,not accepted by the Pope , and though the

State has kept i ts part of the bargai n , the Papalobsti nacy has led to many d ifficu lties and muchbi tterness .The ki ngdom of I taly , however, was now complete .I n 1872 Victor Emmanuel made a publ ic entry i ntoRome as h is cap ita l , and henceforth the I tal ian Parl iamen t met there .Gari bald i had , however, taken no part i n the fina lattack on Rome , for he had rai sed another vo l u n tee rcorps and was figh ting for France . He retu rned late ron to I ta ly , and spent the remai nder of h is l i fe qu ietlyas deputy for Rome . I n 1882 he d ied at h i s old homeon Caprera . The tenderness and s impl ic i ty of h ischaracter was man i fested even to the end by h is lastwo rds— bidd i ng h is se rvan t open the wi ndow to feedthe l i ttl e bi rds wh ich he had tamed .

Victor Emmanue l , the R e ga lan tuomo,the honou r

able ki ng,l i ved eight years after the captu re of Rome .

He was a man of very simpl e tastes , who shocked theRoman nobles by h i s hatred of ceremony , though hewas greatly beloved by most of h is subj ects . Whenhe d ied i n 1878 I taly lost her greatest statesman .

H is son , Humbert , who succeeded h im ,made l i ttl e

mark i n h isto ry . He was no statesman,but al l the

people learned to love thei r s imple sportsman Ki ng,who

, l i ke Victor Emmanuel , hated ceremony , whodrove the finest horses i n I taly

,and who went about

enti re ly wi thout guard or escort. When,i n 1900, he

was assassi nated at Monza , the national gri ef was

86 GAR I BALD I AN D THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

deep and gen u i ne . The presen t K i ng of I taly , Victo rEmmanuel I I I

,seems l i kely to be as popular as h i s

father and grandfather.I t is hard to write the h i story of the years 1870— 19 10,

for much of i t sti l l l i es h idden i n stacks of o ld newspapers . I t i s necessary , however , to give some i nd icat ion of the many questions i n wh ich I taly has beeni nvolved duri ng that period .

The Chu rch question , which has al ready been mentioned

,i s sti l l u nsett led

,and i s not l i kely to be settled

un less a Pope of very u nusual characte r should beelected . Leo X I I I and Pius X ,

who have succeededPi us IX

,have held fast to h is po l i cy , though Leo XI I I

showed h imsel f both d i plomatic and en l ightened .

Fi nance has been a nd st i l l i s a great d ifficu lty , buteconomy

,new rai lways

,a better system of taxation

,

i nc reased trade,and above al l the enormous i ndustrial

developmen t of Lombardy , have done much‘

to l essenthe financial strai n .

’ The army and navy both underwen t much- needed reforms . F r iend ly vis its were paidby the Ki ng to the Empero rs of Austri a and Germany .

Cons ide rable i rri tat ion was caused by the Frenchoccupation of Tun is

,wh ich would have been most

usefu l to I taly . At the Congress of Berl i n i n 1878

(see p . 220) I taly found herse l f en ti re ly i so l ated , andgai ned no advantage whateve r . A movemen t wastherefore made to promote a Triple Al l i ance betweenI taly , Germany , and Austria . B ismarck pressed i ton by al l the means avai lab le

,even go i ng so far as to

advocate the “ Tempora l Power ”,i n hopes of con

ci l iating the Pope and frighten i ng I taly . However ,after Ki ng H umbert had stoutly dec lared “ that hemust be master i n h i s own house the Triple Al l iancewas formed though the terms of the treatyremai ned secret . Soon after

,I ta ly came to a friend ly

u nderstand i ng with B ri ta i n,and the two coun tries


88 BI SMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER V

B ISMARC K AND THE MAK I NG OF THE GERMANEM P IRE

The on ly sound pr inc i p le of ac t ion for a grea t S ta te is po l i t ica lego ism , and not roma n t ic ism , a nd i t is unwor thy of a g rea t S ta te tofigh t for a ny ma t ter wh ich does not concern its own in te res ts .

Pr uss ians we a re and P russ ia ns we w i l l rema in .

”

B isma rck, 1850.

THE h istory of Germany i n the n i n eteen th centu ryseems at first s ight to be very l ike that of I taly ; i nboth cases a n umber of smal l and d ivided States havebecome a nation by means of war and of revo l ution .

But the real story i s very d i fferent , and because th i sd i fference i s largely due to O tto von Bismarck

,he has

been taken as the ch ief characte r of th is chapter.Before traci ng the cou rse of h is l i fe , however, i t i snecessary to real i ze what was meant by Ge rmany i n1815 . The great days of German h istory lay farbeh i nd

,i n the twelfth cen tu ry

,when Frederick Bar

barossa,Empero r of the Ho ly Roman Empi re and

Ki ng of Germany , had been the greatest monarchi n E u rope ; and agai n i n the s ixteenth cen tu ry , whenCharles V and Luther made the name of Germanyfamed , as i t has never been agai n un ti l the n i neteen thcentu ry . S i nce those days Germany had become moreand more d iv ided ; at one t ime there were over 300 independen t States , own i ng on ly a shadowy obed i enceto the Holy Roman Empi re

,then ch icfly powerfu l

i n Austria . One great struggle stands out i n theeighteenth centu ry— the hard and bi tter figh t to makePruss ia a nation , wh ich was so rel entl ess ly carried onby Frederick Wi l l i am I and F rederick the Great, Carlyle ’s hero , who fought i n al l iance wi th B ri tai n i nthe Seven Years War. Except for th is struggle ,Germany was s i ngularly qu iet and apathetic du ri ng

NAPOLEON ’S WORK I N GERMANY 89

the e ighteenth century . As Madame de Stael saidThe Germans un i te the greatest audaci ty of thought

to the most obed ien t character ” . Although i n manyways German th i nkers and wri ters were i n advanceof the rest of Europe , the majori ty of Germans wereconten t to take thei r ideas from France , and to admi tthat French l i terature

,manners

,and language were

infin itely superior to the i r own . Less i n g, however,rid icu led th is toadyi ng to France (e .g. i n M inna 71072

and Sch i l ler and Goethe made i t clear bythe end of the century that there was more power i nGerman l i teratu re at that momen t than elsewhere i nEu rope ; France , however , remai ned profound ly ignoran t of German thought and German ach ievement .Then came Napo l eon . He found Germany a mass

of i ncoherent governments , need i ng“to be gathered

i n to one by the vio l ence of a conqueror ”,some of

them good , some bad , al l except Pruss ia hopelesslyweak and o ldfash ioned . He l eft i n stead th ree mai ne lemen ts i n Germany : ( 1 ) the South - west States

(Bavaria , W ti rtemb erg,Baden , wh ich were

perm itted to reta i n thei r i ndependence because theywere favourable to France , and al lowed thei r fo reignpo l i cy to be d ictated by Napo l eon ; (2) the new F renchki ngdom of Westpha l ia , under Jerome Bonaparte ,where everyth i ng German was to be rooted out ; (3)the ki ngdom of Pruss ia , always hosti l e and i ndependent

,even after the defeats of Jena and Fried land .

I n Germany , however , as i n I taly , Napo l eon’s con

quests had some excel len t resu l ts ; antiquated customsand i nst i tut ions were swept away ; the chaos of ignorance , corruption , and abuses was no longer poss i ble ;the laws were s imp l ified and improved . Pruss ia , too,i n the day of her hum i l iation , tu rned to practical reforms . U nder her great m i n ister

,Stei n

,the who le

organ ization of the ki ngdom was reformed . Serfdom

90> BISMAR CK AN D THE GERMAN EMP I R E

was abo l i shed,mun ic i pal rights establ i shed

,an adm i t

able system of education was p rov ided , and sweepi ngm i l i tary reforms were carri ed out. Thus , i n 1813, whenthe War of Liberation broke out , Pruss ia was wel lprepared to take the field with Austria and Russia ,and afte r a few months ’ campaign Napol eon was utte rlydefeated at Leipz ig

,and the Al l i es were able to i nvade

F rance . I n the treaty wh ich fol lowed (Chaumont ,1814) i t was agreed that Germany shou ld become aConfederation of sovere ign States ; th i s was largelydue to Austrian influence , for Mette rn ich d id not wishto see Germany growi ng i n to a strong or conso l idatedpower wh ich m ight ignore h i s advice . The C onstitut ion of the Confederated States was very hasti ly d rawnup , and embod ied

"

in the “ Fi nal Act ” of the Congressof Vien na Thi rty- n i ne States were recogn ized ,each i ndependent i n matters wh ich concerned i tselfalone , pledged not to make war among themselves ,to mai ntai n a con federate army , to refe r al l exte rnalmatte rs and al l d i sputes to a Diet of represen tatives

,

meet i ng at Frankfo rt- on -Mai n,and pres ided over by

the Austrian m i n iste r. The wo rst fau l t of th i s D ietwas that i t would not take the respons i b i l i ty of acti ngas a sovereign body , i t consta ntly referred questionsback to the separate States ; i t was enti rely u nderAustrian influence, and thus l i ttle or no good wasach ieved by it . On e clause i n the Consti tution whichdeclared that there shou ld be “ assembl i es of estates

( i . e . some ki nd of Par l iament) i n a l l the confederatecountri es

,was not general ly carri ed i n to effect .

Thus i n 1815 the problem was ,“ Cou ld a U n i ted

Germany come i nto exi stence , and if so, how ?Germany was even less than a geograph ical expression ; i t had no very clear natu ral fronti er s ; no

one knew how far a U n i ted Germany m ight extend.The on ly test was language , and to bri ng together


92 BI SMAR CK AND THE GERMAN EMPIR E

secure democratic i nsti tut ions , and someth i ng of thel i berty , equal i ty , and fratern i ty so much ta lked of bythe revol ution ists . Some of the States— Weimar

,

Bavaria , Baden —tri ed the experiment of granti ngConsti tut ions .I n the U n ivers i t i es

,the gymnasti c associat ions and

the Bu rschenschaften (or students’ associat ions) talked

loudly and somewhat wi ld ly of patrioti sm and aU n i ted Germany . I n 1819, the murder of Kotzebue ,a supposed Russ ian spy , d rew down Mettern ich

’swrath . Although i t was clear that the murdererwas of unsound m i nd , Mettern ich and Hardenberg ,the Prussian represen tative

,drew up the famous

Carlsbad Decrees , which effectual ly muzzled boththe Press and the Un ivers it i es . A period of stagnation fo l lowed , broken on ly by some sympathywi th Greece (see p . 204) and much fru i tl ess exci tement over the French Revolution of 1830;

The years wh ich B ismarck spen t at the Un ivers i t i esof Gott i ngen and Berl i n ( 1832—35 ) belong to th i speriod of du l l ness , and he seems not to have takenany i nterest i n the Liberal movemen ts of the time ;the aristocrat ic students ’ corps to wh ich he belongedlooked with contempt upon the Burschenschaft. Asa student he led a wi ld and careless l i fe

,and some

years afte r he was sti l l known as “ the mad B ismarck ” I n 1840 B ismarck , who had completed h isyear of m i l i tary service

,had tri ed and had given up

the Civi l Service,wen t back to Schonhausen and

devoted h imself to the management of h is father ’sestates . He was devoted to the old ways i n almosteve ryth i ng, yet h is occas ional demand for reformsmade men cal l h im a Liberal . About th i s time hevi s i ted E ngland , and i t i s i n teresti ng to see howEngl ish influence affected h im . What he adm i redmost i n E ng land as a nation was i ts i ndependence ,

BISMAR CK ’S EARLY LI FE 93

and therefore he would neve r consent to im i tate her.He bel ieved that Pruss ia must refuse to learn anyth i ng from France or Eng land , and must wo rk out

her own success i n her own way . This explai n smuch of Bismarck ’s later pol i cy . I t d id not, however

,seem probable that B ismarck would ever be

the most powerfu l man i n Germany ; he seemed to

sett le down ent i re ly to a country l i fe ; he undertooka considerable amount of local busi ness i n the local“ Diets ” , and became gradual ly a much - respectedman i n h is d i strict. He tri ed to reform the manorialcourts , where j ustice was sti l l adm i n istered by thelandowners , as i n feudal E ngland ; he was profou nd lyinfluenced by a re l igious rev ival , and th i s influencewas strengthened by h is marriage . Bismarck ’s re l igion i s very notab le i n the h istory of hi s country

, b e

cause he says i t made h im bel i eve more firm ly i n themonarchy . I f I were not a Christ ian , I should bea Repub l i can

,he said ; and i t i s due largely to h im

that the Emperors of Germany seem to have revivedthe idea of Divi ne Right ” . He thought that theki ng held h i s th rone , not of the people , but by thegrace of God he cou ld imagi n e no finer death thanto d i e upon the scaffo l d for such a cause as Straffo rd ’s or Charles I ’s . One can see that, ho ldi ngsuch v iews as these

,he can have had but l i ttl e

sympathy with Li beral opi n ion .

But at th i s po i n t we must tu rn back to the K ings ofPrussia , and see to what exten t they were fu rtheri ngthe movemen t towards a U n i ted Germany . FrederickWi l l iam I I I , though a brave sold ier, and i n manyways a patriot ic ki ng , had one great fau l t : he couldnot fo l low a po l i cy of h is ow n without deferri ng to

Austria or Russia . His reign is ch iefly remarkablefor the success wi th which freedom of speech andfreedom of the press were put down , and for the

94 B I SMARCK AN D THE G ERMAN EMPIR E

establ i shmen t of the Customs U n ion (or Zo l lvere i n ) ,which was the first great step towards German un ity .

By th i s Zo l lve re i n i t was agreed that no duti es wereto be paid between the d i fferen t S tates of the C onfederation

,but on ly at the foreign fron tiers . Thus

,

goods passi ng from Russia to Prussia wou ld payheavy duties

,but on the i r be i ng sent on i n to Saxony

o r Bavaria,no fu rther duty would be paid . Austria

was excl uded from the U n ion . This was a veryimpo rtan t step ; not on ly d id the partial abo l i t ion of

duties make trade far more flourish ing ,but the fact

that Pruss ia had suggested the idea made al l theGerman States look to Prussia as a leader. ThisUn ion was not completed al l at once ; the first States

jo i ned P russ ia i n 1818, the last i n 1853.

Frederick Wi l l iam IV was a very d i fferen t manfrom his father ; mo re l i ke an arti st than a ki ng , hewas extraord i nari ly u n l i ke a Prussian k i ng. He wasvery l i ttl e a so ld ie r

,he had a shamb l i ng hu rri ed man

ner,and he hated the exactness and “ red - tape ism

”

of the Prussian officials .

“ Frederick the Greatwould have been the man for you ; I am no greatru ler , he said once

,and i t was very true . He had

great i ntel lectual abi l i ty,and d id al l he could to

encou rage gen i us ; he was a man of fasci nati ng manners

,and great versati l i ty of i n terests . I n pol i tics

he hated and feared Revolut ions ; he bel i eved i n thed ivi n e right of ki ngs and emperors , and yet hewould have l iked to grant h i s people what theywanted ; he was general ly weak and waveri ng , yeton some po i n ts i t was imposs i ble to convi nce h im .

Here,agai n

,was a ki ng from whom very l i ttl e cou ld

be hoped for Germany . A stronger man was needed ,and that man was B ismarck, whose gradual en tryi n to po l i t ical l i fe must now be traced .

Frederick Wi l l iam IV had come to the th rone at


96 BISMAR CK AND THE G ERMAN EMPIR E

afte r anothe r, fe l t i ts influence , and rose agai nst i tsru lers , with no very clear idea of what was wanted

,

but wi th a vague demand for Consti tution s and pol itica l l i berty , and wi th a mo re defin ite demand fora U n i ted Germany . I n March the Revolution brokeout i n Berl i n . The Ki ng fi rst o rdered the so ld ie rs tod isperse the mob , and then , bei ng almost a pri soneri n h is palace , he gave way , prom ised a Consti tu tion ,and put h imsel f at the head of the revo l ut ionarymovement . Not on ly d id he p rom ise manhood suffrage , trial by j u ry , and al l the rights usua l ly con

tained i n the Consti tut ion s , but he also acceptedthe nat ional movement , he wo re the German trico lou r (the black , red , and go ld of the students

’

assoc iation) , and'

declared that hencefo rth Prussiashou ld be swal lowed up i n Germany .

B ismarck was i n despai r. What cou ld be done ifthe Ki ng del i berately deserted h is own cause ? He

hasti ly wrote to the Ki ng, prom isi ng help and loya l tyi n any ci rcumstances ; then he came to Berl i n , to seei f he could be of any use . When the Estates-Generalmet for the last time to cons ider how to carry theConsti tut ion i nto effect

,the who l e House voted an

address of thanks to the Ki ng for the concessionshe had made . B ismarck and one fri end voted , i na m i nori ty of two , agai nst it. This was i ndeed acourageous act , for Berl i n was now as revo l ut ionaryas Paris . Anyone who opposed the n ew pri ncip leswent i n danger of h i s l i fe . The proposal s of the newNational Assembly were so extreme that B ismarckd id not even seek re- election , feel i ng that he cou ldhave no part i n i ts work. He spent h i s t ime try i ngto encourage the rem nant of the aristocratic party , andi n found i ng a newspaper , the K reuzzez

'

mng , whichwas to uphold the pri nciples of Conservati sm and

a Chri st ian monarchy .

THE REVOLUTION IN G ERMANY 97

Through the summer of 1848 matters remai nedthus

,but i n October came news that the Revo lution

Governmen t i n Vien na had been overth rown by thearmy (see p . Frederick Wi l l iam , always inconstant

,made up h is m i nd to try the same plan .

Coun t B randen bu rg was made ch ief M i n ister, theAssemb ly was forci b ly turned ou t (5 December) anddisso lved , the Ki ng issued a new Consti tution , givi ngh im far more power than the first, and summoneda new Assemb ly

,i n wh ich B ismarck sat as member

for Branden bu rg. Bismarck sti l l vehement ly opposed , not on ly revo l ut ion , but the whol e idea thatgovernmen t rested on the wi l l of the peop le . Sooneror later ”

,he said i n a speech made about th is t ime

,

“ the God who d i rects the battl e wi l l cast h i s i rond ice ” agai nst such pri ncipl es ; and when next day

(22 March , 1849) came the news of Charles Albert’s

defeat at Novara , he honestly be l i eved that the God

of Battles had spoken .

Whi le B ismarck and Frederick Wi l l iam were thussuppressi ng the Prussian Revo lution , a wider—reachi ng movemen t was on foot . The Liberal s o f SouthGermany had al ready organ ized a National C onvent ion , and when the Revo l ut ion carried a l l before i tthe old Diet ” at Frankfo rt agreed that the ideas ofthe Conven t ion shou ld be accepted , and that a GermanNational Parl iament shou ld meet , also at Frankfo rt .I t was fe rvently hoped that i n the genera l exc itementof the Revo l ut ion some form of government m ightbe dev ised to which a l l Germany shou ld be sub

ject. There were th ree great d ifficu lties i n the way

( 1) There was a strong Republ ican party , which ,al though a m i no ri ty , would accept no monarch ica lgovernmen t ; (2) i t was more than doubtfu l whetherAustria would agree to a new Germany i n wh ich shehad no part ; (3) i t was almost imposs i bl e to arrange

( 0 555 ) 3

IOO BISMARCK AN D THE G ERMAN EMPIRE

was determ i ned to hum i l iate Pruss ia— if possi ble todestroy her. When the I tal ian war was over hetu rned h is whole atten tion to Pruss ia . The Tsarsupported h im i n h i s th reats

,with the resul t that

Frederick Wi l l iam gave way at eve ry poi n t . TheCon ference of O lmutz (28 November, i n wh ichthe Ki ng and Schwarzenberg met

,marked the depth

of Prussia ’s hum i l iation,for the Ki ng

,besides h is

other concess ions , prom ised to d i sarm ,and made no

cond itions wi th Austria i n retu rn .

Prussia had been struggl i ng with yet another d iffi~

cu lty du ri ng the revo l ut ionary period— the Sch leswigHo lste i n question . The two duch i es of Schleswigand Holste i n lay between Denmark and Prussia .

The Ki ng o f Denmark was t ry i ng to an nex them ,

whi l e Hol ste i n cla imed to be German ; and i t wasalmost impossi bl e to say what ought to be done wi ththem . I n 1848 they broke i nto rebel l ion , and appealed to Prussia for help ; some troops were sen t ,at the o rders of the D iet . Later on ,

the d ifficu ltiesbecame too great ; Frederi ck Wi l l iam acted i ndependently of the National Parl iament at Frankfort

,

and made peace with Denmark (August , TheParl iament was angry at what they cal led Prussian

perfidy , and at first refused to recogn ize the peace .When at last i t was confirmed , the Frankfort mob

was fu rious with the Parl iamen t,and made a vio l en t

street attack upon it, wh ich was on ly put down byPruss ian troops . Although th is who l e ep i sode showedmore clear ly than ever that Pruss ia was the on lyeffective power i n Germany

,i t made Frederick Wi l

l iam ’s course st i l l more d ifiicu lt. The Sch leswig~

Hol ste i n quest ion wi l l come up agai n,for i t was by

no means settl ed yet .Hum i l iat i ng as the Conference of O lmutz was ,

B i smarck rej o iced i n i t. I t i s at fi rst d ifficu lt to see


102 BI SMARCK AND THE G ERMAN EMPIRE

I n 185 1 B ismarck was sen t as Pruss ian representative to the revived Diet at F rankfort. I t was newwork to h im ,

but he was perhaps the on ly man i nPrussia who cou ld keep fri end ly wi th Austri a andyet

,i n fam i l iar language ,

“ stand up to her. He

says i n h i s lette rs that he d is l i ked the atmosphere ofsusp ic ion and of petty fuss i ness , that he had becomean adept at wri ti ng long reports wh ich con ta i ned nomean i ng— even to h imself, that he found cautious d i shonesty was the characteri sti c of the Austrian envoys .Bismarck

,however, was bent on mai n tai n i ng an atti v

tude of equal i ty towards Austria . Prev iously on lyThun

,the Austrian m i n i ster and Pres ident of the

D iet,had smoked i n Committee meeti ngs ; B ismarck ,

to h i s great i nd ignation , asked h im for a l ight . On

another occas ion Thun sat down i n h i s sh i rt s leeves .I t i s very hot ” , remarked B i smarck , and took off h iscoat . This i s on ly typ ical of the way i n wh ich hetreated Austria on al l impo rtan t questions .Perhaps the greatest d i ffi cu l ty which B ismarck had

to so l ve du ri ng these years was the quest ion of theCrimean War. Pruss ia had no i n terest i n the question , but Austri a was d isposed to take s ides agai nstRuss ia , and publ ic opi n ion i n Germany

,l ed by the

Crown Pri nce and Pri ncess , fo l lowed the same l i n e .B ismarck

,however, contended that Pruss ia cou ld gai n

most cons ideration by th reaten i ng to jo i n the Tsaragainst Austri a and the other Western powers . Whathe rea l ly i ntended was that Prussia shou ld standupon her own feet , and get any advantage she cou ldout of the war . To th i s i n ten t he offered “ moralsupport to Russ ia . But with such a ki ng a l l B ismarck ’s d iplomacy was i n va i n . Frederick Wi l l iamfinal ly concl uded a treaty with Austria , promis i ng h issupport i f n ecessary . B ismarck was not consul tedabout th i s treaty

,and h is loyal ty was hard put to i t

RELATIONS WITH NAPOLEON 111 103

to endure the Ki ng ’s changeableness . However, hesaid noth i ng pub l i c ly , and i n the end peace was kepti n Pruss ia .Another problem was the establ i shment of fri end lyrelat ions wi th Napoleon I I I . The Ki ng wou ld havenoth i ng to say to a usu rper, who seemed to h im toembody the Revo lution . B ismarck

,who saw that

Austria was the first enemy to be d isposed of, wishedto be on fri end ly terms with Napoleon , sayi ng thatP russia had no concern wi th the i nternal affai rs of

other nations . But he was unable to bri ng the Ki nground to th i s po i n t of v iew

,and he grew dai ly more

u npopu lar at Court.I n 1858 a change came . Freder ick Wi l l iam

’s heal thhad been breaki ng down for some time , and h isbrother Wi l l iam was now permanently appo i n tedPri nce Regen t . A more Liberal m i n i stry came i n topower, and the first question i t had to consider wasthe war between I taly and Austria . Bismarck hadbeen i ncl i n ed to favour I ta ly , because she and Prussiahad a common enemy i n Austria , but German opi n iongeneral ly and the new m i n isters were opposed to

Napo l eon I I I and I taly ; and , as has been seen (see

p . Prussia now made an offe r, perhaps not verys i ncere , to ass ist Austria by attacki ng France on theRh i ne . However, Austri a i n her j ealousy wishedto appo i n t the general who shou ld lead the Germanarm ies ; the Pri nce Regen t cou ld not agree to th is ,and i n the end the Emperor of Austria made ahasty peace at Vi l lafranca

,preferri ng to su rrender

Lombardy rather than accept Prussian he lp on theRegent’s own terms . Vi l lafranca

,unsati sfacto ry

enough to everyone else concerned , was a tri umphfor Prussia.B ismarck, feel i ng more and more out of th is d iplomacy of wh ich he d id not app rove

,was transferred to

104 B I SMAR CK AN D THE G ERMAN EMPIRE

S t. Petersburg where there was no very im-n

portan t wo rk for h im . His years at Frankfo rt,how

ever,had been i nvaluable to h im, for he had gai ned

there a close acquai ntance wi th a l l the States of Germany , and th is was to be exceed i ngly usefu l to h imi n the years to come .I n 1861 the Pri nce on the death of FrederickWi l l iam

,became Ki ng . Wil l iam I was an abso l ute

contrast to h is brother . He was mai n ly a so ld ie r,with a bluff honesty and gen ial d ispos i t ion whicheventual ly endeared h im to h is subjects . I n manyways he was opposed to L i beral i sm ,

but i t was poss i ble to convi nce h im . He chose good m i n i sters

,and

l istened to advice , especial ly from Bismarck . Hisown atti tude i s best summed up i n h is own words“ I never could perm i t the progress ive developmentof the nation ’s i n ner po l i t ical l i fe to question orendanger the rights of the Crown , or the power ofPruss ia ” . On e m ight say that he put the Crownfirst, the Fatherland second , and the Consti tution last .He was a man of viv id personal i ty and strong re

l igious feel i ng , which B ismarck encou raged . Therei s someth i ng of Puri tan fe rvou r i n the way both cal lupon the Lo rd of Hosts to help i n battl e .The Ki ng ’s m i l i tary i nsti ncts , however, soonbrought h im i n to trouble . General von Roon wasappo i n ted to reform and i ncrease the army

,but he

cou ld get l i ttl e or no support for h is schemes fromParl iament . I n September

,1862 , the House en ti rely

refused to vote the necessary money . The Ki ng ,after th reaten i ng to abdicate , sen t for B ismarck, andasked h im i f he wou ld become ch ief m i n i ster, withouta majori ty i n th e House and withou t a Budget . Bismarck accepted , and the Ki ng tore up the proposedact of abdication . A few weeks previously B ismarckhad paid a flyi ng v is i t to London

,and exp la i ned to»


106 BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMP IRE

once more outraged publ ic op i n ion by passi ng ve rysevere Press Laws

,which gave the po l i ce the right

to suppress any newspaper wh ich they d id not l i ke .The Crown Pri nce dec lared h i s d isapproval of sucha pol i cy , and B ismarck came to the conclus ion thaton ly by an extremely v igorous foreign pol icy cou ldhe reconci le confl icting parti es at home . I t mustbe remembered that al l th rough these years he wassecretly aim i ng at a U n i ted Germany . I n August

,

1863, there had been a great meeti ng of Germanpri nces at Frankfort

,summoned by the Emperor of

Austria , to discuss the refo rm of the German C onfederation . Bismarck persuaded the Ki ng

,though

with much d ifficu lty , not to go ; he mean t to teach theother States how imposs i ble i t was to do anyth i ngwi thout Pruss ia .I n November , 1863, a yet better opportun i ty oc

cu rred— the Sch leswig-Hol ste i n trouble cropped upagai n . The Ki ng of Denmark had issued a newConsti tution for h is who l e ki ngdom

,i ncl ud i ng the

two duch i es,which were dete rm i ned not to accept it.

German feel i ng and the Prussian Court were ab so

lutely agai nst Denmark . Bismarck at first had no

sympathy with the duch ies,and d id not seriously

try to settl e the question ; but after a time he saw howuseful they wou ld be to Pruss ia by giv i ng her moresea coast . He was al ready ta lki ng of the great K ielcanal , and he made up h is m i nd to get ho ld of themsooner o r later by any means that he could devi se .The Ki ng wanted to make the duch ies i n to an i ndependent State u nder the Duke of Augustenbu rg

,but

B ismarck nevertheless meant to have h is own way .

I t i s imposs i bl e to go i n to the detai l s of the case, butB ismarck on the one hand pressed Denmark to withdraw the Consti tut ion , whi le he c i rcu lated reports,which he knew were en ti rely u ntrue

,that B ri tai n

CONVENTION OF GASTEIN 107

wou ld support Denmark i f she refused . Thus deceived , Denmark risked war. B ismarck then persuaded Austria to joi n wi th h im i n send i ng an armyi n to the duch ies . The combi ned forces were successfu l , and the d i sputed terri tory was given up to theA l l i es . Bismarck

, of course, wanted to an nex i t atonce , but he also wanted a cause for war with Austriai n the future. He therefo re came to a compromise i nthe Convention of Gaste i n , which he said was l i ke“ paperi ng over the cracks ” of h is d isagreements wi thAustria . Schleswig was to go to Prussia, Holstei nto Austria .

B ri ta i n and France were d isposed to protest v igorous ly agai nst th i s arrangement , for they had beentryi ng to negot i ate a mo re sati sfacto ry settl ement .B ismarck

,therefore , had to wi n them round , at least

to neutral i ty,before he cou ld en te r upon the war for

which Mo l tke , h i s best general , now to ld h im thatPrussia was fu l ly prepared . Late i n the year 1865 hewen t to Biarri tz

,and had many friend ly i n terviews

wi th Napo leon I I I . He assu red h im that the arrangement about the duch ies was on ly tempo rary , andexpla i ned to h im h is ideas for bu i ld i ng up a strongGerman State . Napo l eon was always sympathetictowards a national i st cause , and B ismarck led h im to

bel ieve that the price of h is n eutral i ty would be cons iderab le gai n s upon h is Rh i n e front i e r. I t wasto lerably certa i n that B ri ta i n would not i ntervene i nthe comi ng war, but B ismarck wanted an al ly , andhe therefo re proposed to make common cause wi thI taly agai nst Austria . The a l l iance was d iffi cu lt to

arrange , as nei ther s ide trusted the othe r ; but at lasti t was agreed that i f Pruss ia went to war with Austriawi th i n the n ext th ree months

,I taly would also make

war, and Pruss ia would support her u nti l Venetia hadbeen recovered .

108 BI SMAR CK AN D THE GERMAN EMPIRE

The real cause of the war was that B ismarck wantedi t, but he was carefu l to have good pretexts , and hehad to overcome the Ki ng ’s great rel uctance . A

quarrel had ari se n about the Austrian government ofHo l ste i n , wh ich B i smarck declared was sti rri ng uptrouble i n Sch leswig . A more respectable reason

,

however, was fou nd i n a scheme for reform i ng theConfederat ion . B ismarck , who had been so u l tra~

Conservative and aristocratic , now wished to replacethe D iet by a Federa l Parl iament , based on manhoodsu ffrage . B ismarck a lways treated opi n ions ratherl i ke fore ign al l i es , and changed s ides when he thoughtanyth i ng was to be ga i ned . J ust now he wanted to

gai n over the worki ng classes,who might be more

l i kely to support'

h is war pol icy . But he was verygeneral ly d istrusted , because wi th the example of

Napo leon I I I before the i r eyes , people thought hewas on ly prepari ng the way for despotism . Austriawas to be excl uded from th is new Confederation

,and

when , somewhat natu ral ly , Austria objected to thewho l e scheme , Bismarck made war. He contrivedto make i t appear that h i s hand had been forced byAustria

,but the actual declaration of war ( 18 Ju ne,

1866) came from Pruss ia .

The war was l i te ral ly on ly a matter of days . Bythe end of the month Hanover , Sch leswig-Holste i n ,Cassel— in fact al l the Northern States— were occupiedby the Pruss ians , and the th ree mai n arm ies , underthe Crown Pri nce , the

“ Red Pri nce ” (FrederickCharles) , and General von B ittenfeld , were advanc

i ng upon Austria . On 3 Ju ly the combi ned arm iesmet the Austrians at Sadowa (or Kon iggratz) , i nBohem ia , and there , on a h i l l overlooki ng the battlefield ,

B ismarck passed some of the most m iserablehou rs of h i s l i fe . S o far al l had been h is doi ng ; nowhe had to stand as ide and leave the issue to h is


I I O BI SMARCK AN D THE G ERMAN EMPIR E

than we can d igest he said . He knew that anotherstep was needed befo re the Southern States wou ldwi l l i ngly enter the German U n ion ; he was thereforecarefu l not to take any measu res wh ich m ight renderthem unfriend ly . (3) B ismarck had some trouble i npersuad i ng the Ki ng to accept th i s very moderatetreaty ; Wil l iam I was anxious to have some moresubstan tial advantages from his great victory .

Meantime Napo leon had been vaguely talki ngabout the compensat ion he was to rece ive . He

seemed very u ncertai n as to what he real ly wanted ,and foo l i sh ly wai ted ti l l B ismarck had made peacewith Austria befo re presen ti ng h i s cla ims . Then heasked for the Bavarian and Hessian possess ions onthe left bank of the Rh i ne

,o r fa i l i ng that , fo r part of

Belgium . Bismarck cou ld now refuse po i n t - blank ,and th reaten war i f Napo l eon persi sted . . He wascarefu l

,too , to keep a l l the Empero r ’s wri tten p ro

posals , and publ ished them late r on ,when he wanted

to i ncense the Southern S ta tes and the rest of Europeagai nst France .The next th ree years were comparat ive ly unevent

fu l . B ismarck was at last able to secu re a majo ri tyi n the Parl iamen t ; he a l l i ed h imsel f wi th the moderateLi berals

,and worked out the Consti tution for the

North German Con federat ion on the basi s of manhoodsuffrage . (Th is Consti tution wi l l be d iscussed furtheri n a later chapte r. ) He devoted a l l h i s efforts toarousi ng nat ional feel i ng i n Germany

,conci l iati ng

publ ic opi n ion i n the Southern States,and sti rr i ng up

i rri tat ion agai nst France° He revealed Napo l eon ’sdemands to the Southern States

,and so persuaded

them to make secret treaties with Pruss ia ; whenFrance protested agai nst Pruss ia ’s aggressive po l i cy,Bismarck ’s on ly answer was to publ i sh the secrettreaties .

CAUSES OF FRANCO-G ERMAN WAR I I I

The ci rcumstances wh ich led to the war of 1870

are very important , because they show how cleverlyB ismarck made i t appear as a French attack on Germany

,and not, as i t real ly was , a Prussian attempt

to secure un ion with the Southern States .I n 1869 Spai n i nv i ted Pri nce Leopo ld of Hohenzo l lern , a distan t re lat ive and devoted adheren t of

Wi l l iam I , to become the head of a consti tutiona lSpan ish monarchy . At fi rst he refused , but B ismarck pressed h im to accept

,and at last he agreed

,

provided that the Ki ng,as head of the fam i ly of

Hohenzo l l e rn , shou ld give h is consent . B ismarckpretended that i t was so l ely a question between theKi ng and the Pri nce . Napol eon I I I was fu riousboth because he had not been consu l ted

,and because

i t wou ld have been a very real danger to France tohave a German Pri nce ru l i ng i n Spai n , and devotedto Prussian i n terests . Bri tai n suppo rted France

,and

the oppos i t ion was so strong that i n a few daysLeopo ld withd rew ,

Bismarck ’s scheme was spo i led,

and al l seemed happ i ly sett led . But the Frenchm i n i sters were not content with th i s success ; theysent Benedett i , the French Ambassador , to KingWi l l iam at Ems , askingr h im to promise that Pri nceLeopo ld shou ld never renew h is cand idatu re . TheKi ng refused , though grac ious ly , but when Benedett iasked for another i n tervi ew

,he repl ied that the in

c iden t was now closed . Benedett i had been po l i te lysnubbed . Then the Ki ng sen t B ismarck a te legram— the famous “ Ems te legram — stati ng what hadtaken place . B ismarck was d i n i ng with Mo l tke andRoon when i t arrived . He read i t rapid ly

,asked

them if they were ready for war,took a blue penc i l

and struck ou t parts of the te legram,maki ng i t read

l i ke a del i berate i nsu l t to France,then he sent i t to

the newspapers and to a l l the German embassi es .

112 BI SMAR CK AN D THE G ERMAN EMPIR E

The tel egram had the des i red effect both i n Germanyand i n France . The Germans were i nd ignan t atexaggerated accou nts of B enedetti ’s presumption ; theFrench were stu ng to madness by the rebuff and theensu i ng rid icu l e . On 19 J u ly B i smarck received adeclarat ion of war from France , sen t, as the Frenchm i n i ster had open ly declared , with a l ight heart .Napoleon knew he was wrong, but he dared not facethe wrath of the Pari s mob , i f h e kept the peace .The h istory of the war has been told i n mo re detai li n the chapter on France . A short recap i tu lat ion wi l lbe enough here . Mo l tke ’s plan of campaign was tomass the German arm ies (for the who l e of Germany ,north and south

,had jo i n ed Prussia) on the upper

Rh i ne,and then to pursue and defeat the French

army wherever i t m igh t b e . The French,though

m iserably u nprepared , at fi rst expected to march i nt ri umph to Berl i n . The th ree German arm ies

,under

Stei nmetz,the Red Pri nce and the Crown Pri nce

,

won the battl es of Worth (6August) and Gravelotte

( 17 August) , shut up Baza i ne wi th men i nMetz

,and defeated MacMahon

’

s attempt to rel i eveh im at Sedan ( 1 September) . Th is terri bl e battl ebrought one phase of the war to an end . TheEmperor su rrendered i n person to King Wi l l i am ,

expla i n i ng,however, that i t was h is own swo rd

,and

not the swo rd of France,that he laid down . This

mean t that i f France cou ld o rgan ize another form of

governmen t immed iately , she m ight yet strugg le toret ri eve her honou r . B ismarck , who was with thearmy al l th rough the campaign , wou ld not yield as i ngl e po i n t to make the Emperor ’s hum i l i at ion less .He d id not be l i eve i n grat i tude

,as he d id not bel i eve

i n gen erosi ty , and therefore he said , Germany hadno th i ng to gai n by sparing France . But indeed ~ it

was imposs i b l e to make peace as yet . A Provisional


114 BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMPIR E

shou ld become Emperor of Germany . The lesserki ngs wou ld then be able to retai n cons iderable i nde

pendence , whi le i n al l importan t matters they wouldacknowledge the superio r authori ty of the Emperor.The Ki ng of Prussia , however, was not very wi l l i ngto give up h is anc ien t and honou rable ti t l e for a newcrown wh ich he professed to regard as a “ stage property — a show with no real i ty beh i nd it . B ismarck ,therefore , had to contrive that wh i l e there should bea popular demand for the revival of the Empi re , theactual offer shou ld come from the Pri nces and not fromthe Reichstag (National Parl iament) . H i s moderationi n maki ng terms wi th Bavaria , and the en thusiasm of

Bavaria for the war , gave h im much influence there .He persuaded the Ki ng of Bavaria to i nvi te h i s fel lowpri nces to jo i n h im i n request i ng Wi l l iam I to assumethe ti tl e of German Emperor. W i l l iam ’s oppos i t iongave way , and on 18 Jan uary

,187 1, i n the gl i tteri ng

Gal l ery of Mi rrors at Versai l l es , the s imple-man neredKi ng of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor.The un ion of Germany was completed on ly a fewmonths after the surrender of Rome had real izedVicto r Emmanuel ’s hopes of a u n i ted I taly . The afterh istory of the two coun tri es was to be strangely d i fferent. Ten days later Paris cap i tu lated , and B ismarckcou ld now tu rn h is who l e attention to the terms ofpeace . He demanded that France shou ld cede Alsaceand Lorrai ne to Germany , with the fo rtresses of Metz ,Strasburg

,and Belfort, and that Germany should

rece ive a war i ndem n i ty of 6,ooo,ooo ,ooo francsTh i ers , who was now at the head

of the French Government , fought desperately toobtai n some reduction of the penalti es for France .When he pleaded , with a curious m ixtu re of p rideand entreaty , that Belfort, “

an absolutely Frenchci ty shou ld be left to h im , B ismarck remai ned in

TR EATY OF FRANKFORT I 15

flex ib le . At last Th iers burst ou t Do it !Complete yourwork . We wi l l figh t to the last breath ;we shal l succumb at last , but we wi l l not be d ishonoured ”

. B ismarck was impressed at last by thebi tterness of h is gri ef and shame

,and after a time

consen ted to give up Belfort, i f Th iers wou ld agreeto a formal occupat ion of Pari s by the German troops ;the i ndemn i ty was also reduced to 5 ,000,ooo ,ooofrancs . On these terms peace was final ly madeat Frankfort , 10 May , 187 1. A fu rther clause p rov ided that German troops shou ld be gradual ly wi thdrawn from France as the war i ndemn i ty was paidoff. Havi ng thus subdued and cri pp led her enemy ,Germany was left the ch ief m i l i tary power i n Europe,and free to tu rn her m i nd to the peacefu l settlementof i n ternal diffi cu lties— a task wh ich has proved longerand more i n tricate than war . Germany , s i nce 1870,

forms as i t were a new chapte r i n h istory,in which

B ismarck appears i n a new character.

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY S INC E 187 1

We G ermans have ceased to b e the na t ion of th inkers , of poe tsand dreamers , we a im now on ly at the dom ina t ion and explo i ta t ionof Na ture .

”— D r . Rein .

“ I have b een fa i thfu l to th is : the un ification of Germany under theleadersh i p of Pruss ia . Al l e lse is accessory . — B z

’

sma rck.

AFTER the establ i shment of the new German Empi rei n 187 1, B ismarck remai ned , as before , the cen tralfigure i n German h istory . The brief sketch of theconsti tution of the Empi re (see p . 27 1) shows howenti re ly the Chancel lor mean t to hold a l l the stri ngsof government wi th i n h is own hands . I t i s true that

116 G ERMANY S INC E 187 1

he was often overru led by ci rcumstances , h is plan swere sometimes mod ified by the Empe ror, and occas iona l ly rej ected by the Reichstag, but on the who l ei t i s fai r to conside r B ismarck respons ible for German pol icy up to 1890 i n al l i ts good and al l i ts ev i laspects . His att i tude towards the party system makesi t clear that he was wi l l i ng enough to accept the re

sponsi bi l i ty . He might rely on the Conservative or

the National Li bera l party , he m ight alte rnately bu l lyor conc i l iate the Chu rch (or Central) party , he m ighteven stoop to wi n over the Social i sts , but what hewas always a im i ng at was the creation of a B ismarckparty— a party wh ich shou ld uphold h im bl i nd ly andwithout reserve , b ecause he (B ismarck) had made theGerman Empi re , and mean t to susta i n i t agai nst al lattacks from wi th i n or w i thout. This i s the key toB ismarck ’s changes of home pol icy du ri ng the years187 1

—90. The key to h is foreign pol icy is at first h is

s i ncere des i re for peace,now that he had obtai ned

what he wanted . Later on he real ized the necessi tyfor the expans ion of Germany as a colon ial and commercial power i f the Empi re was to conti n ue to carryweight i n the counci ls of Eu rope .The most press i ng need of the Emp i re i n 187 1 wasfor some further degree of un ion to bi nd the Statesmore firmly together ; hence B ismarck , with mucheffi cient ass istance , u ndertook the work of bu i ld i ngup Imperial i n st i tut ions .Fi rst

,perhaps , i n importance came the need for

l egal reform . I n 187 1 there were i n Germany at leastforty- s ix d ifferen t legal systems . The orig i nal l egalsystem had been the German common law, aki n tothe E ngl ish common law , but even in the fou rteen thand fifteenth centu ri es th is had been largely superseded by new codes based on Roman law. AsGermany spl i t up i n to hundreds of smal l states , the


118 G ERMANY S INCE 187 1

l egal system tended to spl i t a lso , and to develop veryd i fferently i n d i fferen t parts . The Napo l eon ic con

quests and influence i n troduced the Code Napo léon ,mi ngled wi th some su rvivals of o lde r custom ,

i n to theRh i ne provi nces . The resu l t was an appal l i ng confusion of law . Not on ly had the j udges to adm i n iste rforty- s ix d i fferent codes or systems of l aw wi th i n theEmpi re

,but i n each court a man m ight have a d i f

fe rent ki nd of trial . Here he m ight be al lowed anopen trial by j u ry

,the re a secret trial ca rried on by

means of writte n documents ; here j ustice m ight befai rly cheap and speedy , there i t m ight be cumbrous ,expens ive , and i n te rm i nab le i n i ts methods .I t was imposs i bl e to sweep away th is med ley of

j ustice and law , equal ly impossi ble to al low i t to con

tinue indefin itely . I t has therefore been gradual lysuperseded by new Imperia l codes deal i ng wi th spec ia lsubj ects , e .g. a code was publ i shed for the who l e sub

j ect of trade , commerce , and banki ng ; a late r codedealt wi th cond it ions of manufactu re , and the relations between maste rs and men ; the crim i nal lawwas also codified ; and i n 1900 a new Civ i l Code wasi ssued

,wh ich deal s wi th almost al l matters of law ,

but leaves the anci en t laws of land ten u re as theywere

,or subj ect on ly to al teration by i nd iv idual

States . At the same time the p rocedure (or methodof trial ) was made u n i form throughout the GermanEmpi re . This legal refo rm was not , to any greatexten t

,the work of B ismarck , though i t was i nsp i red

by h is des i re for the un ification of the Empi re .The commercial reorgan ization was h igh ly im

portan t for the futu re developmen t of Germany . A

new common coi nage was i nst i tuted ; an Imperia lBank and Imperial Post O ffi ce were establ i shed ; andB ismarck was extremely anxious to secu re an Im

perial ra i lway system . This , however, he cou ld not

DOMESTIC POLICY OF BISMARCK 1 19

accompl ish ; the oppos i tion was too great, and he hadto content h imself wi th taki ng steps wh ich seemed tol ead up to h is I mperial system . Al l the rai lways i nPrussia were taken over by the State ; many of theprivate rai lways th roughout Germany were boughtup by Prussia ; the rai lways i n Alsace- Lorrai ne areowned and worked by the Empi re ; moreover, theEmpi re has important rights wi th regard to the bu i ldi ng and worki ng of al l German rai lways , so far asthey may be needed for m i l i tary pu rposes . However,B ismarck was never able to complete h i s plan for thenational i zation of the rai lways

,because the separate

States hastened to acqu i re those with i n thei r ownterri tori es . Hence Germany is now a country of

State-owned rai lways , but , except i n Alsace- Lo rrai ne ,none of these rai lways are owned by the Empi re .Bismarck ’s ch ief financial measures were the re

o rgan ization of the Imperial revenue and the i ntroduction of Protection th rough a strict system of

Customs duties . There were several reasons for th is .I n 187 1 the Imperial revenue was provided by theCustoms duti es, and if these were insufficient, B is f

marck had to ask the separate States to make up thedeficiency i n proport ionate sums . Obviously , th i sm ight lead to endless d isputes between the States andthe central Government . B ismarck had also a greatd i sl i ke for d i rect taxes (i .e. taxes l i ke an i ncome tax ,paid d i rectly i n money), and i ndeed they seem tohave pressed very heavi ly on the poor i n Germany ;he thought that i nd i rect taxes on goods

,even on the

necessaries of l i fe , would be eas ie r to pay . Anothergreat reason for the change was the fact that manufactu res i n Germany were on ly j ust begi n n i ng to

flou rish ; Germany had vast wealth i n m i nera ls , especial ly coal and i ron , but as she was on ly just begi nn i ng to use them , she cou ld not produce goods as


cheaply as Great B ri tai n . Hence a system of heavyduties was bu i l t up , which was to exclude fore igngoods , and to encou rage the growth of manufactu resat home . I t was also found necessary to protectagricu ltu re i n the same way , i n orde r to secure theconsen t of the very large agricu l tu ral i nterests to theduti es on manufactu red goods .Statesmen and economists are st i l l d isput i ng as tothe wi sdom of th i s system of Protect ion . I t i s i nd is

putab le that German commerce has flourished andi ncreased under it ; but i t i s al so h igh ly probable thatGermany would have flourished equal ly u nder a FreeTrade system . I n any case

,the change

,which dates

from 1879, fu lfi l led one of i ts pu rposes by provid i ngB ismarck with a large Imperial reven ue

,and enabl i ng

h im , to a great exten t, to d i spense wi th d i rect taxation .

The th i rd great field for reorgan ization,

was theArmy . There i s actual ly no I mperial or Germanarmy . I nstead

,there are the Pruss ian army

,the

Saxon army,the Bavarian army , &c. ; but as al l

these State arm ies are under the u lt imate control ofthe Emperor

,they have al l con formed to the model

of the Prussian army,and thus there is no dangerous

d ivers i ty among them . On e of B ismarck ’s most notable defeats was on the subj ect of the Army . I n 1874he wanted to fix i ts n umbers permanently ; the Reichstag strongly obj ected that th i s would greatly weakenthei r powers . I f they cou ld not vote for an i ncreaseor decrease i n the army , much of the i r very sl ightcontrol over the Chancel lor and the Emperor wouldbe gone . Fi nal ly , a comprom ise was arranged , andthe numbers of the army were dec ided for sevenyears . The army has been stead i ly i ncreased eachtime that a vote i s taken , and si nce 1897 a s im i larperiodic vote i s taken on the i ncrease of the Navy.The Social ist party, however, have begun to i ssue



right to contro l the Chu rch i n any way,i n the

i n terests of publ ic order No bishop or priest m ightbe appo i n ted without a notification to the Government

,which reserved a right to veto the appoi ntmen t.

Agai n , no priest m ight be ordai n ed who had not beeneducated on l i n es laid down by the State ; even theschools for the tra i n i ng of pri ests were subjected toState contro l . Th is was persecution such as no P rotestan t State had yet attempted . The Catho l i cs protested vehemen tly and refused to obey the “ MayLaws The clergy and the bi shops were fined , impri soned , ban i shed , deprived of thei r parishes or the i rbishoprics . I n more than a thousand pari shes nore l igious services were carri ed on . Yet the priestshad the sympathy of the i r people , and often managedto el ude the Government watch by l iv i ng wi th eachof the i r pari sh ioners i n tu rn fo r a day or two . WhenB ismarck real ized that h is pol ice were havi ng a hopeless hu n t fo r the offend i ng p riests , he seems to havebecome aware that he was on the wrong track. TheCatho l i cs were regarded as martyrs ; a tremendousnewspaper agi tati on grew up the new priests approved by the Governmen t hard ly dared to show themselves i n thei r n ew parishes , and thei r chu rches stoodempty ; worst of al l

,B ismarck was al i enati ng al l

part i es i n Germany . I n 1877 the Centre (orCathol ic party) was larger than ever before ; the O ldConservat ives were d isgusted by the v iol ence andi n tolerance of B i smarck ’s an t i- cle rical campaign ; theSocial i st party grew stronger

,and the National

L iberal s , on whom the Chancel lor rel i ed , were b ecomi ng l ess importan t i n the Reichstag. Moreover,B ismarck had other schemes

,social and economic ,

which he wished to forward . Although he hademphatical ly declared that he “ would not go t o

Canossa ”

(i .e . would not hum i l iate h imse l f to the

CONC ILIATORY POL ICY OF BISMAR CK 123

Church) , he began gradual ly to abandon h is po l icyas a fai l ure .One by one the “ May Laws were relaxed andthen withdrawn ; the re l igious orders were al lowed toretu rn ; the attempt to contro l the education of priestswas given up . Leo XI I I , who succeeded Pius IX i n1878, was d iplomatical ly wi l l i ng to meet B ismarckha lfway . I n a few years ’ t ime B ismarck found h is“ jou rney to Canossa ” so sat isfactory that he eveni nv i ted the Pope to use h is influence i n the com i ngelections ! The Ku l turkampf faded away , but i t leftb i tter memori es , which resu l ted i n a permanen tstrengthen i ng of the Cen tre party .

The mai n reason for Bismarck ’s reconci l iat ion wi ththe Roman Catho l ic Chu rch was , as has been said ,h is des i re to press forward social and economic re

forms . The years after 1870 had been marked by agreat i ncrease of the Social Democrats , or Social istparty

,which i n B ismarck ’s op i n ion consti tuted a great

danger to the Empi re . The work i ng classes were ,to a large exten t , under the influence of the Catho l i cChurch

,and the Church was d isposed to jo i n hands

with the Socia l ists,and to declare that i t was the duty

of the State to prov ide the means of subs istence to al li ts ci ti zens . Th is probable u n ion of h is two worstenem ies thoroughly alarmed B ismarck . His pol icyfor the ten years 1878

— 88 was a vigorous attempt torid h imsel f of the danger. Thus he first effected areconci l iation with the Church ; he then tried to givethe poorer classes such great b enefits that they wou ldno longer need to be Social i sts ; final ly , he tried to

root out the Social i sts al together by methods of persecution s im i lar to those he had used agai nst theChurch .

Duri ng the years 1883— 9 B ismarck worked outsome extremely usefu l social legislation . His avowed


object was to make even the poorest classes real ize thatthe State was not on ly a necessary but a benevo l en tand b eneficen t power . He therefore perm i tted there- establ ishment of wo rkmen ’s u n ions or gu i lds ; h isreplacemen t of d i rect taxation by i ncreased i nd i recttaxes was i n tended to rel i eve the poo r, but h i s greatestwo rk was the establ ishmen t of a system of N ationa l

I nsurance agai nst s ickness,accident

,and old age .

This scheme roused much Oppos it ion i n the Reichstag , the Conservatives th i nki ng that i t wen t muchtoo far, the Social i sts averri ng that i t was merelypatch i ng up the great ev i l of poverty , and not real lycu ri ng it. However, for s ix years B ismarck stead i lypursued h is a ims

,and got h is i nsu rance scheme

th rough piecemeal . I n one notable po i n t i t wasamended by the Reichstag : B ismarck had meantthe State to pay the e nt i re contri bution

,in order that

the work i ng man m ight not feel any of the burden ,but the Reichstag obl iged h im to make h is schemecontributory , the cost be i ng d iv ided between theemployer, the workman , and the State . On thewho l e , the system has worked wel l , and has prevented much d istress

,but i t has certa i n ly been very

expens ive,i n propo rtion to the b enefits obtai ned .

But though B ismarck was wi l l i ng to give the nationwhat he thought good for it, he was not wi l l i ng tol i sten to the national vo i ce as expressed i n the Reichstag or th rough the elections . He hated Democracy ,and he hated the Social Democrats ; they must there ‘

fore be rooted out. Between 1878 and 1890 very severel egis lation was enforced agai nst the Social i sts . No

Social i st op i n ions m ight be expressed i n any newspaper

,no Social i st books m ight be read , no publ ic

meeti ngs m ight be held , no cl ubs or soc ieti es m ightbe formed for Social i stic pu rposes . Enormous powerswere given to the pol ice to exi l e any suspected persons,



n i nety days,but i t was eviden t that a changed Sp i ri t

wou ld have i nsp i red the Government had he l ived .

One of h is few acts was to d ism iss from ofli ce arelative of B ismarck ’s , who had been gu i l ty of corruption at the recent el ect ions . I n J une , 1888, he d ied ,and was succeeded by h i s son Wi l l iam

,the present

Emperor . At first i t seemed doubtfu l i f B ismarck ’spos i t ion would be affected . The new Emperor wasenergetic , young , impu ls ive , fu l l of ideas of h is own

great funct ions,imperious and exacti ng to h is sub

o rd i nates , unwi l l i ng to be gu ided or influenced . Yethe was an en thusiast ic adm i re r of h is grandfather

,the

great Emperor Wi l l iam ,and he was ev iden tly d i s

posed to agree wi th B ismarck i n m i l i ta ry matters,and

i n h i s more Conservative ideas . I n the end,however

,

Wil l iam I l’

s des i re to be a real ru ler,and not a mere

shadow, overcame the respect and grat i tude that were

due to the statesman who had served the Empero r andthe Empi re so fa ithfu l ly for so many years . B ismarckclaimed that the Empero r shou ld not commun icatewith subord i nate m i n iste rs except th rough h im

,and

quoted an order to th i s effect i ssued by the Ki ng ofPrussia i n 1852 . The Empero r i n s isted that the ordershould be repealed ; B ismarck refused to carry out h iswishes . B ismarck h imself says that he then askedi f the Emperor found h im i n the way , and that theEmperor cu rtly repl ied ,

“ Yes The detai ls of thequarrel are not accu rately known , but the Chancel lorwas obl iged to send i n h i s res ignat ion , and reti re i n toprivate l i fe . I t was wel l known that B ismarck andthe Emperor had d i ffered for some time past on

foreign po l i cy ; on the an ti-Soc ial ist laws , which werewithd rawn i n 1890 ; and on the Emperor ’s plans forsettl i ng labou r grievances . I t wou ld have been wiser,no doubt , i f B ismarck had reti red wi thout wa iting

'

to

be d ism issed,but he hard ly real ized that the Empi re

POLICY OF W I LLIAM 11 127

could survive wi thout h is gu idance . For the nextth ree or four years he kept up a constan t cri t ic ism of

the Government, and succeeded i n exci ti ng muchsympathy . I n 1894 , however, the Emperor wasformal ly reconci led wi th h is fal l en m i n ister . I n 1898

B ismarck d ied— u ndoubtedly one of the greatest , buta lso one of the least attractive , men of h is cen tu ry .

S i nce 1890 the ch ief i n terest of German h istory haslai n i n foreign po l i cy (which wi l l be treated separate ly) . I n i nternal affai rs Wi l l iam I I has general lyfo l lowed the l i n es laid down by B ismarck , thoughhe has aimed at conci l i at ion rather than persecu

t ion . The Soc ial i sts have been on the who le un

mo l ested , though at t imes la rge numbers of personshave been prosecuted for cri t ic i sms of the Empero r,such as would be al lowed i n any other country i nEu rope . The demand for an en larged franch i se i nPrussia has been stead i ly ignored or repressed ; thePo l es i n the south - east have been subj ected to a process of German izat ion wh ich has roused bi tter hosti l ity , and has been whol ly unsuccessfu l ; the hosti l i tyof Alsace - Lorrai n e has , on the who l e , been d im i nished by conci l iatory measu res . The Emperor hasa habit

,extremely d i sconcerti ng to h is m i n isters

, of

acti ng or speaki ng sudden ly on some importan t matter, without thei r knowledge or approval . I n 1908,after an u nusual ly strong outburst of cri t ic i sm on

some of the Emperor ’s statemen ts,h is m i n isters ex-w

tracted from him “ someth i ng l i ke a promise ” that hewould not i n futu re take any such publ ic steps wi thoutthe approval of the Chancel lor or h is deputy . I f th i su nderstand i ng with the Emperor i s mai n tai ned

,i t

wi l l mean a real step towards m i n isterial i nstead of

personal government i n Germany . Yet i t wou ld begiv i ng a wrong impression to i mp ly that the personalgovernment of the Emperor has not been popu lar. He

28 GERMANY S INCE 187 1

has been severely cr i t ic i zed at t imes,and by d i ffe ren t

parti es , but i n the mai n he i s cons idered to have donemuch to further German i n te rests .

Turn i ng back to the foreign po l i cy of the GermanEmpi re , i t must be noted that B ismarck

’s a im after187 1 was the preservation of the peace of Eu rope.B ismarck ’s desi re for peace was a very d ifferen t th i ngfrom Mette rn ich ’s . He d id no t fear war because i tm ight break up h is Empi re ; on the con trary , he hadj ust shown how a great war m ight consol idate theEmpi re . But, un l i ke Mettern ich agai n , he was fu l lof schemes for the refo rm and reo rgan ization andun ification of the Empi re— hence h i s love of peace .He first attempted to contro l E u ropean affai rsth rough the league of the th ree empero rs — Austria

,

Russ ia , and Germany . This was a general understand i ng wh ich aimed at keep i ng France weak

,and

preven t i ng her from renewi ng the war of 1870.

Gradual ly , however, the confl ict of Austrian andRuss ian i n terests i n the Balkan Pen i nsu la broke upthe agreemen t between the th ree emperors .I n 1878, when a Eu ropean Congress was cal l ed atBerl i n to settle the “ Eastern question ”

,B ismarck

fou nd h imsel f cal led upon to act as an arbi ter, andnot as the al ly of e i ther party . The Treaty of Berl i nmarked the he ight of B ismarck ’s power i n Eu rope ,and was perhaps the most d is i n te rested p iece of d ip lomacy to which he ever len t h is m i nd . But i t Was agreat blow to Russia to have the Treaty of SanStefano thus upset (see p . and the Russ ianm i n isters cons idered that i t marked the end of theleague of the th ree emperors .I n 1879, therefore, B ismarck formed a strict al l iancewith Austria

,by wh ich the two powers promised each

other support i n case one of them was attacked by ,



i n Morocco . I t is imposs i b le to show i n detai l howth is acqu is i t ion of colon ies has c reated causes of friction between Germany and both B ri tai n and France .Germany started late i n the race for colon ial wea l th

,

and she can not h nd a field where she can expandwi thout comi ng i nto co l l i s ion wi th other i n terests .Side by side wi th th is search for co lon ial possessions , and wi th the vast extens ion of German trade ,goes the des i re of the Empero r Wi l l iam for a strongnavy . From about 1894 the bu i ld i ng of battl esh ipshas gone on apace ; the open i ng of the Kiel Sh ipCanal i n 1896was a sign that, as the Empero r said ,Germany ’s futu re lay on the water Everyth i nghas been done to i nc rease the navy i n n umbers

, to

extend the i nte rest i n i t and the respect fe l t for i t bythe nation . The Navy League i s one of the strongestand most powerfu l soc ieti es i n Germany .

N ota — These la s t pa ra g raphs hold good up to Au gus t , 1914 . S incetha t da te the h i s tory o f G e rmany has b een the h is to ry o f the G rea tWa r . In Novemb er , 19 18, the s i gn in g of the Arm is t ice wa s accom

pan ied by Revolut ion in G ermany , the a b d ica t ion o f the Ka iser , andthe es tab l ishmen t of a Repub l ic in Germany.

AUSTR IA- HUNGARY 131

CHAPTER V I I

AU S T R IA - HU N GA RY

G ran t not the so i l on wh ich we dwe l l the sacred name of fa therland . The tr ue fa ther land , wh ich none can m isuse , of wh ich none

can rob us , we ca rry in our hea r ts . Dea r a re the woods , the s treams ,

the home inher i ted from our s i res . B ut the so le fa ther land w h ichendures , and defies a l l shame and insu l t , is tha t un i ty o f cus tom and

language and mood wh ich b lends sou l w i th sou l .— F rom a S lav P oem.

To understand the recen t h istory of Austria - Hungary

, one must begi n by looki ng very closely at themap

,and traci ng out with some care the ch ief pro

vi nces wh ich form the Dual Monarchy , as i t i s ca l led .

For Austria - Hungary is u n l i ke any of the otherStates of Europe ; i t i s real ly two States , un i ted underone person

,the Emperor and K ing Franc is Joseph

much as E ngland and Scotland were un i ted beforethe un ion of the two Parl iaments i n 1707 .

What is the importance of th is d i fference? Whatinfluence wi l l i t have on the futu re h i story of Europe ?How has the u n ion come about , and , hav i ng un itedthus far, why cannot the two States merge i nto one?

Which is the predomi nan t partner, and wh ich of thetwo wou ld one wish to see extend i ts influence overthe other? These are some of the questions wh ichmake the h istory of Austria - Hungary i nterest i ng.

The answers to them depend part ly on geography,

partly on past h istory,part ly on the extraord i nary

m ixture of races i n Austria-Hungary .

At the present day Austria is d iv ided from Hungaryby the l i ttl e ri ver Leitha

,near Pressbu rg. The pri n

cipal Austrian prov i nces are, from east to west,Gal ic ia , Moravia , Bohem ia, the o ld provi nces of

Austria proper , the Alp i ne val leys and slopes , notablythe Tyro l , Cari nth ia , Carn io l a , the Austrian coast


134 AUSTR IA- HUNGARY

the Turks . I n 15 26we find the Hungarians , who hadj ust been defeated by the Turks

,i nvi t i ng Ferd i nand of

Austri a to become elective Ki ng of Hungary . Fromthat time onwards Hungary and Austria have beenu n i ted under one rul er. I n 1556 Ferd i nand waselected Holy Roman Emperor , but he conti nued toru le Hungary as Ki ng, and not as Emperor

, for

Hungary had never been part of the Empi re .Duri ng the seven teen th cen tury the Tu rks were

fina l ly driven back , and Hungary recovered most ofwhat she had lost . Moreover

,Hungary reta i ned a

very strong sense of national i ndependence ; she hadhad a very i n te rest i ng consti tutional h i story , i n manyways l i ke that of Bri ta i n

,and i t i s largely due to

her i n sti tutions that she conti nued to res ist Austria ’sencroachmen ts .

One or two poi nts i n th is Consti tut ion must benoted . Hungary had a cen tral D iet or Parl iament

,

which al l the nobles had a right to attend . Thenobles were of th ree c lasses— the great nobles , thegentry , and the peasant nobles ; thus practical ly al lfree men m ight attend . There was also a large serfpopulation , wh ich had no pol i ti ca l rights .Besides th i s cen tral Parl iament

,Hungary had local

assembl i es,the County Congregation s

,wh ich were

rathe r l i ke the E ngl i sh sh i re cou rts . These Congre

gations were very importan t. I n them the gentry andpeasant nobles used to meet , and there was fosteredand kept al ive that sp i ri t of i ndependence wh ich wasto burst forth once more i n the n i neteenth cen tu ry .

At t imes Austri a t ried to un i te Hungary mo reclosely with hersel f, and to suppress some of the o ld

free i nsti tutions , but the fear of the Tu rks alwayskept he r from go i ng too far, as the Hungarians m ighteasi ly have been driven to u n i te with the Turksagai nst Austria .

THE PRAGMATIC SANCTION 135

One very important consti tutional change i n thee ighteen th cen tu ry must be noti ced , as i t has su rv ived al l the other changes i n Austria-Hungary. I n1723 Hungary accepted the famous PragmaticSanction wh ich was laid before i ts D iet byCharles V I . The best- known clause i n th is documen t i s that wh ich al lowed Maria Theresa to succeedher father i n al l h i s domi n ions . But i t had othervery weighty provi s ions . I t provided that the sameman or woman shou ld i n fa l l i b ly succeedto both the Austrian and Hungarian lands , and thatthose lands shou ld be u n i ted for al l t ime , and agai nstal l external powers . Hungary , however, i ns i stedthat i ts ancien t l i berties should be guaranteed

,and

that i t shou ld reta i n i ts own laws . I f th is cond it ionwere v io lated , Hungary would agai n become an i ndependent State . Mo reover, i f the hei rs mal e or femaleof C harles V I shou ld fai l at any time , Hungary m ightelect a new monarch of i ts own . Th is bargai n b etween Austria and Hungary must be rememberedwhen one comes to the epoch of revo l ut ion i n then i neteen th cen tu ry .

Duri ng the period of Napo l eon ’s power Austriap layed a very doubtfu l game , now oppos i ng h im ,

now al lyi ng with h im,but i n 1815 Austria perhaps

had been less changed by Napo leon ic influence thanany other country i n Europe . This bri ngs one tothe th i rd answer to the questions about AustriaHungary . Austria-Hungary never rose as a nationagai nst the tyran ny and aggress ion of Napol eon ,s imply because there was no Austro-Hungarian nation .

I n the preced i ng sl ight sketch has been shown howthe two States contai n both Germans and Magyars ;to these one must add various S lavon ic races (e .g . theCzechs i n Bohem ia, the Fo

g

les i n Gal ic ia,the Slovaks

i n Northern Hungary,and i n the south scattered


groups of S lovenes and Serbs , and the Croats of

Croatia) , a cons iderable I ta l i an el ement also i n thesouth , and a large and impo rtan t group of Ruman ians in the south - east

,who cla imed descent from

the Romans . Thus i n speaki ng of the national istand revol utionary movements of the n i neteenth centu ry i n Austria-Hungary one must speak i n tu rn of

the Germans,the Magyars

,the Czechs

,the Po l es , the

Croats— in fact , i t i s almost imposs i bl e to descri be al lthe movements for i ndependence wh ich have tom theDual Monarchy , and very much that i s i n te resti ngmust be omitted to make the rest i n tel l igi ble .

Such are the d ifli cu lties pecu l iar to Austria-Hungary .

To them must b e '

added the problem common to a l lthe States of Europe— how to obtai n self-government?Many of the provi nces had the i r own consti tut ionalarrangements , the i r own Diets ; but these D i ets hadl i tt le real power , except i n Hungary , and the tendencywas always for the Emperor to become mo re and moreabso l ute , more careless of the feel i ngs of h is subjects ,more en ti re ly under the influence of one m i n i ster.I n 1815 the Empero r Francis I (who had i n 1806renounced the ti tl e of Ho ly Roman Emperor , andwas now Emperor of Austria and Ki ng of Hungary)was not a man from whom much cou ld be expected .

He was slow,heavy

, opposed to i n novation , anx iousto suppress the p ri ncip les of the French Revo l u tion ,and to keep Europe at peace , but not at al l anx iousto take any dec is ive step .

“ Let us sleep upon it ”

was h is favouri te maxim ,but s leep brought no wiser

counse l wi th ir. His theo ry was that peace m ightbest be prese rved

,that men m ight be kept most in

active,by sett i ng I tal ians to ru l e i n Hungary , Ger

mans or Hungarians i n Itfi’

ly . Disconten t, he thought,would not break out i f o n ly he cou ld keep h is subjects



outweighed Stei n ’s,and the hope of a u n i ted Germany

was thwarted ; the Federal D iet establ ished at Frankfort was almost ent i rely o rnamen tal and useless

,and

Austrian po l i cy for the next th i rty years combi nedwith i n ternal causes to keep Germany d isun i ted andweak (see p .

Mettern ich is somet imes blamed as bei ng the authorof al l the harsh acts of Austria towards I taly

,of al l

the repress ion of German Liberal i sm , and of al l themaladm i n istration with i n Austria-Hungary . This ishard ly fa i r. Given a free hand

,he wou ld have been

open to Liberal ideas ; he was far mo re humane thanFranc is I

,and he would certa i n ly have reorgan ized

the system of government . But he conceived i t h i sduty to act as po l i ceman to Europe , and to mai n tai npeace and o rder at any cost . Hence he jo i n ed withthe Tsar i n the Ho ly Al l ia nce , though he thought thati t was mere empty wo rds as far as i ts re l igious intent ions went . He d id h i s best

,th rough the Carlsbad

Decrees,to crush .ou t al l thought, al l i n i tiat ive i n

South Germany ; he acqu i esced i n the repressive andun sympathet ic Austrian government i n I ta ly , and hemade no real attempt to secu re refo rms or progresswi th i n Austria - Hungary . His great a im was thegovernment of Europe by Congresses (see Chapter I) ;and perhaps h i s greatest con tri bution to the po l i t ica lthought of modern days i s the idea that peace can bekept i f al l the powers wi l l act i n concert . That, however

,i s a p ri nc ip l e wh ich ought n ever to be used ,

as Mette rn ich used it, to crush a nation struggl i ngfor national i ndependence or consti tutional l i berti es .Mettern ich h imse l f seems to have real i zed that h i stheory was not qu i te sound “ I have come i nto theworld ” , he said , ei ther too early or too late . Earl i er,I should have enjoyed the age ; later, I should havehelped to reconstruct it. To-day I have to give my

METTERNICH 39

l i fe to proppi ng up the mou lderi ng ed ifice . Andtherefore he fai l ed , as one of h is fel low diplomatssaid of h im ,

th rough acti ng t im id ly . The man whoma l l E u rope feared was afra id to take any step that m ightend i n change— a very poor standpo i n t for a statesman . I t i nvo lved the use of sp ies , the muzzl i ng of thePress

,repression of thought , repress ion of al l national

movements . No wonder that i n 1848 the great cry wasfor the abo l i t ion of the “ Mettern ich system ”

The one po i n t on which Mettern ich ’s fore ign po l i cywas bound to break down was the Eastern Question .

I f he was to po l ice Europe , he must have the co

operat ion of Russ ia, and Russia and Austri a had av i ta l cause of quarrel i n the Balkan Pen i n su la . Russiam ight suppo rt the Greeks , because they belonged to

the O rthodox fai th, and were sufferi ng at the handsof the Turks ; Austria m ight give her moral supportto the Sultan

,because Mettern ich always uphe ld legi

timate authori ty ; but i t was qu ite clear that the realquestion was whether Russia or Austria shou ld u lt imately reign supreme i n the Balkans . ThoughMettern ich succeeded

, on the who l e , i n mai n tai n i ngpeace , i t was obvious that h i s system could offer noso l ut ion of the Balkan prob lem (see Chapter IX ) .With th is explanation of the ki nd of governmen tcarried on by Franci s I

,Ferd i nand I

,and Mettern ich

,

one may pass over most of the even ts of the years1815

—

48, i n o rder to t race the various causes of thegreat Revo l ution of 1848

—9 . This means go i ng back

to take the provi nces to some exten t separately .

The central Government had somewhat shorts igh ted lyp erm itted the rev ival of national languagesand l i teratu res i n the various prov i nces , though anyi ndependent thought was repressed whenever detected .

I t was hoped , perhaps , that men’s m i nds m ight be

thus too preoccup ied to concern themselves wi th po l i

140 AUSTR IA-HUNGARY

tics . I f so, the p lan was an utter fa i l u re . J ust as theagricu ltu ral societies of Po land and I taly had workedfor reforms and i ndependence , so the ph i lologicalsociet ies

,the professors and students i n the un iver

s i t i es,together with the jou rnal ists , were the cen tre

of revolu tionary and national i st agi tation i n Austriaand Hungary . This was very natu ral , for amongsuch m ixed races the question of language was of theutmost importance i n educat ion , and the enforcemen tof one language or another plays a very large part i nAustro-Hungarian pol i t ics at th is time .I n trac i ng the cou rse of the Revolution of 1848—9,one finds that i t had at least fou r impo rtan t cen treswi th i n Austria-Hungary (Vien na, Budapest, Prague ,Agram ) , besides the two cen tres of rebel l ion i n I ta ly ,Ven ice and M i lan (see p . whose resistance anddefeat strongly influenced the i n ternal cou rse of even ts .There were th ree common claims made th roughout theHapsburg domai ns : (a ) the demand for better socialcond i t ions , for the emancipation of the peasan try , andthe abol i t ion of feudal dues and priv i leges ; (b) thedemand for a better pol i t ical system

,for real repre

sen tative government, and a Cabi net respons i ble toParl iamen t i nstead of to the Empero r ; (c) the demandfor equal i ty between races

,i nvolvi ng equal rights i n

Church matters,i n language , and i n education , and

equal rights to official pos i tions , which had general lybeen reserved for Germans, or men able to speakGerman .

I t wi l l be seen that these demands were to someexten t mutual ly hosti l e : whereas the demand for arepresentat ive assembly m ight have led to greate ru n i ty , the cla i m to equal i ty between races tendedtowards d isu n ion . These clai ms

,however

,were

general ly made th roughout the whole of the AustroH ungar ian domi n ions . The national movemen t was


142 AUSTR IA - HUNGARY

the schoolmaste rs wou ld be obl iged to use on ly afore ign tongue .The resentmen t of the I l ly rian party was cl ever lyused by the Imperial Governmen t of Austria ; theBan (or ru ler) of Croatia was an excel len t general

,

Jel lac ic, who seemed at fi rst to be th rowi ng h imselfi nto the nat ional movement . The Emperor wasnatu ral ly suspic ious of h im , but i t soon became apparen t that h i s ch ief motive was hosti l i ty to theHungarians , and he ben t al l h i s energies to preserv i ng the u n i ty of the Hapsbu rg domai ns

,with the

help of Croatian hatred of the Magyars . This i s veryimpo rtan t i n v iew of the m i l i tary operations agai nstHungary ; apart from that, the revol ution i n Agramhad l i tt le resu l t .The Czech movemen t of Bohem ia had its cen trei n Prague . Bohem ia had accepted the PragmaticSanction of 17 23without maki ng any cond i tions , andthough the Diet st i l l met , i t had no real power. Thenational i st movemen t , however , was mai n ly l i te rary ,concern i ng itself at fi rst with the rev ival of the Czechlanguage and l i te ratu re . I t was led by the jou rnal i stHavl ié

‘

ek , i n con nection with the scholars and professors of the u n ivers it i es ; a great impetus was givento i t by the patriot i c h isto ry of Bohem ia by P alacky .

This movement , l i ke the I l lyrian , had its d ream— P anslav ism . P ans lav1sm mean t the u n ion of al lthe peoples speaki ng Slavon ic tongues , e .g. Czechs ,Po l es , S lovaks ( in No rthern Hungary) , and the SerboCroats of the I l ly rian p rov i nces . They hoped tobe supported by the on ly i ndependent S lav power

- Russia. The most p ractical part of the movement,however

,was the bi tter oppos i t ion i t sti rred up to

Austria and the Germans i n Bohem ia .

I n Austria proper,and particu larly i n Vien na , the

nat ional question hard ly en tered i nto the Revol ution .

THE REVOLUTION IN AUSTR IA 143

I t was s imply an outbreak of Liberal ideas amongmen whose sympath ies were mai n ly German . I tmust be remembered that a Liberal and National Parl iament was s itt i ng i n 1848 at Frankfort (see p . 97 )try i ng to u n ite al l the German lands under a LiberalConsti tution

,presided over by a German Emperor.

The Austrian Liberals , therefore , were d rawn towardsGermany by two des i res— the desi re to establ i sh aconsti tutional governmen t i n Vien na , and the des i rethat the Austrian Empero r shou ld be the first em

peror of a un i ted Germany .

Looki ng thus to the North , the Austrian Liberalswere

,however, too ready to tu rn thei r backs on Hun

gary . The proposed German ic Empi re cou ld hard lyadm it a vast non -German ic terri tory such as Hungary

,

nor on the other hand cou ld Austria be expected to

renounce the un ion wi th Hungary . Hence the d ifficu lties that beset the Vien nese Liberal s were almosti n superable .This bri ngs one to the cent ral po i n t of the whol eRevo l ution— Hungary ’s att i tude . The HungarianRevol ution was essen tial ly national ist— a Magyarmovement. We have seen how proud the Magyarswere of the i r anc ien t Consti tut ion

, of the i r l egal system , of thei r i ndependent local government . Francis Ihad prom ised to preserve that consti tut ion unhurt

, to

love it, and to transm i t i t to h is hei rs . N everthe

l ess,for th i rteen years ( 1812— 25) no Hungarian Diet

was cal led . As the coun ties refused to contri butee i ther taxes or recru its for the army

,the Emperor was

obl iged to give way , and the Diet met agai n i n 1825 .

From that t ime onwards constan t s igns were givenof a great Magyar reviva l . This rev ival cen tresi n the work of th ree great Hungarian patriotsCount S zechenyi , Lou is Kossuth , and Franc is Deak .

Count S zech enyi was i n some ways a typ ical Hun


ga rian nobl e,but he had come under the influence of

modern ideas,and especial ly of Engl ish ideas . He

was zealous to restore Hungary to a great and command i ng pos i tion i n Eu rope

,but he d id not bel ieve

i n revo l utionary methods nor i n the use of repress ionagai nst othe r races . What he d id very thorough lyadvocate was the improvement of education and learn ti ng

,o f commerce and of material p rosperity . Thus

i n 1825 he offered h is whol e year’s revenue towardsthe found i ng of a Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; i twas largely owi ng to h is influence that the Magyarlanguage was adopted i n the Diet i n 1835—6, andh is name is con nected with such enterprises as themaki ng of roads

, .

the bu i ld i ng of the great bridgeat Budapest

,th e i ntroduction of steamboats on the

Danube , the improvement of the peasants’ pos i t ion

,

and the abol i t ion of the nobl es ’ exemption from taxat ion . He Opposed Kossuth as be i ng too revo l ut ionary , but was h imse l f d istrusted as too ari stocratic i nh i s methods .Lou is Kossuth was a man of very d i fferen t type .Essen ti al ly an en thus iast , of extreme vi ews

,l i ttl e

caution,and less statesmansh ip

,he was nevertheless

the l eader who not on ly sti rred h i s coun trymen to

act ion , but also by h is fiery words and viv id personal i ty roused sympathy th roughou t Eu rope and America . Yet he had also a practical s ide . Educated asa Protestan t

,he had tu rned to the study of law

,and

there h is en thusiasm for Hungary fou nd i ts origi n,

i n the legal i nst i tutions wh ich dated back so manycentu ri es . As lawyer and manager of a great lady ’sestate , he first l earn t to know the troubles of thepeasants . I n 1831 h i s sympathy was roused onbehal f of the Pol ish ex i l es . He did excel len t worki n mai n tai n i ng order th rough these troublous t im es ,and du ri ng a cho l era ep idem ic . I n 1832 he attended



reforms was expressed i n the words,

“ I ho ld h imfor no brave man

,no true Magyar

,to whom th is

poo r suffer i ng coun t ry i s not deare r than the mostbri l l ian t Emp i re i n Eu rope ” . A strange doctri n ei ndeed th i s would have sounded to Mettern ich !His wo rk i n the D iet was always on the s ide of

conci l iat ion . Agai n and agai n he sought to bri ngabout an u nderstand i ng between the Government andthe L i berals . I n 1843

—4 he refused to take h i s seat

,

because he knew there had been co rruption at h i selection . To the fiery eloquence and impassionedappeal s of Kossuth he opposed h is own convict ion

,

“ Generos i ty i s a fine th i ng , but there is someth i ngeven finer, and that is j ustice

”. His ideal for Hungary

is summed up i n the words : We cons ider i t i s contrary to law and just ice that the i n terests of Hungaryshou ld be made subo rd i nate to those of any coun trywhateve r. Ou r consti tut ional l i fe i s a treasu rewh ich we can not sacrifice .

”

Such were the men who made the revo l ution i nHungary . The Diet wh ich met i n 1847 hotly re

sented certai n Aust rian attempts to i nte rfere with theHungarian Coun ty Assembl i es ; Kossuth sought toinflame men ’s m i nds agai nst Austria ; S zecheny i

endeavou red to preserve o rde r and moderation ; Deakformulated the Hungarian demands

,and began to

refo rm and mod i fy the anc ien t Hungarian C onstitut ion . I n Feb ruary came the news of the Revo l ut ioni n Pari s ; Vien na was seeth i ng with d iscontent ; on

3 March Kossuth made h is famous speech agai nstthe Austrian Governmen t : “ From the charnel- houseof the Vien na Cabi net a pesti l en t ial ai r breathesupon us

,which du l l s our ne rves , and paralyses the

fl ight of ou r spi ri t ” . Hungary , with i ts own free”

i nsti tut ions , thus i nv i ted the revo l ut ion i n Austria ,bel iev i ng that the two States could most easi ly con

REVOLUTION I N V IENNA 147

tinue to l i ve under one rul er, i f Austria would adopta Liberal Consti tution .Thus on 3 March the Hu ngarian D i et voted anaddress to the Emperor

,aski ng for respons ible Parl ia

mentary government i n Hungary and a s im i lar C onstitution i n Austria ; no mention was made of anycommon affai rs

,wh ich wou ld need to be treated by

the two countries jo i n t ly . This address helped to

provoke the revo l u tion i n Vien na . On 12 Marchthere was a great demonstratio n of students

,jou r

na l ists , and ci ti zens , which ended i n street figh ting .

Mettern ich fled ignomi n ious ly to England , and Ferd inand prom ised a Consti tut ion . He was a lso obl igedto cons ider the Hungarian demands

,and al lowed a

m i n i stry composed of Batthyany , Kossuth , Deak ,S zecheny i , and E0tv0

’

s , and bound by no cond i tions,

to enter upon office i n Budapest .A s im i lar demand from Bohem ia was d isregarded ;the Bohem ian Diet thereupon assembled as an i ndependent Parl iamen t

,but a popu lar ri s i ng i n the streets

of Prague was put down by the t roops u nder CountWi nd ischgratz

,and the Bohem ian movemen t was

suppressed for the t ime . I n May a second revo l ut iontook place i n V ien na , and the Empero r, thorough lyalarmed and disheartened , fled to the Tyro l . I t mustbe remembered that duri ng al l these weeks of revolut ion i n Vien na , Charles A lbert was successfu l ly wagi ngwar agai nst Austria i n Lombardy

,and al l Austria ’s

resources were needed for the war (see p . Not

unti l the batt le of C ustozza , 25 J u ly , when thePiedmontese army was defeated

,cou ld Austria act

with a firm hand at home . I n J u ly,however, the

combi ned Austrian Diets met to d iscuss a new C onstitution ; most of the deputies were peasan ts , c lad i nsheepski ns ; the i r mai n i n terests were social and eco

nom ic rather than const i tut ional or national ; the ma


jority of them were Slavs . They recal led the Emperor,and then tu rned the i r atten t ion to manorial p rob lems

,

to the emanc i pation of the serfs , and the compensationof the land lords . I n September they refused to re

ceive a deputat ion from the Hungarian D iet, wh ichby th i s t ime was anxious to act i n concert wi th Austria .

The rejected deput ies joi ned forces wi th the GermanLiberals

,who wou ld have been qu i te wi l l i ng to al low

Hungary to separate from Austria ; another insurrect ion took place i n the streets of Vien na ; once morethe Emperor fled .

Meanwhi le,war had been declared between Austria

and Hungary. I t remai ns to be seen how th is warhad come abou t, . and what were i ts effects on theconst i tut ional and revo l utionary movements i n bothcou n tri es . The real cause of the war lay i n Croat ia .The moderate Hungarian leaders

,such as S zecheny i

and Deak,had been overshadowed by Kossuth

,and

Kossuth was u n fortu nate ly a typ ical Magyar i n h isharshness and i n tol erance towards a l l other races .The resu l t was that al l the Southern S lavs , togetherwi th the S lovaks and Ruman ians , resen ted the Magyar dom i nat ion ° I n Croat ia the nat ional asp i rat ionscreated by Lou is Gaj once more became important .Agram

,as wel l as Budapest , became a cen tre of

revo l u t ion . The Austrian Government, however, appo i n ted a very clever genera l and statesman

, Jel lacic ,to be Ban (or Governo r) of Croat ia. At first heencou raged the Croatians

,declared the ki ngdom en

tirely i ndependen t of Hungary , and convoked theCroatian D iet . But he was not genu i nely acti ng onbehal f of Croat ian i ndependence ; he had conceivedthe idea that i f Austria could manage to use the S lavsagai nst the Magyars

,and agai nst the German Liberals

i n Vien na,the Emperor m ight succeed i n re—establ ish

i ng h is authori ty agai n . The Croats were to be the



Hungarian D iet declared that the Emperor cou ld not

abdicate wi thout the i r knowledge and consent,and

that therefore Franc i s Joseph was not King of Hungary . Thus the Hungarians claimed that they werefigh ting i n defence of the Consti tution , and th i s claimwas strongly emphasi zed by G0rge i , the ch ief generali n Hungary

,who opposed any schemes that Kossuth

m ight have en terta i ned for maki ng Hungary a R e

publ ic . Deak and the moderate party,despa i ri ng

of conci l i ation , had reti red i n to private l i fe , and thus ,duri ng the wi nte r of 1848

—9 , Kossuth was practica l ly

Dictato r i n Hungary . Count W i nd ischgratz wassen t agai nst Hungary

, Je l lacic co- operated wi th h im ,

the Croats and Ruman ian s were wi l l i ng enough to

joi n i n the attack on the hated Magyars . Early i nJanuary

,1849 , Kossuth and the Diet left Budapest ,

and sought safety beyond the marshes of the Theiss ,at Debrecz i n . Defeat seemed to th reaten Hungaryon every side , but Wi nd ischgratz thought the v icto rywas al ready won , and wasted t ime i n use less delays.Gorge i , on the con trary , showed h i s m i l i tary capaci tyi n a marvel lous wi n te r campaign among the mountai ns ,t rai ned h is raw recru i ts i nto a capable and redoubtablearmy , and pressed fo rward to recover the ground thathad been lost . I n sp i te of much jealousy betweenh im and Kossuth , he advanced steadi ly duri ng themonth of March , won two considerable battles , (35 115 115and Nagy sa rlo , duri ng Apri l , together wi th severalsmal ler engagements

,and final ly , on 25 May , he

entered Budapest once more . Duri ng Apri l, how

ever , the Hungarian D iet had declared that there wasno longer any Ki ng of Hungary

,and had placed

Kossuth at the head of a temporary government , wi ththe ti tl e of Governor of the Hungarian Republ ic . (No

Republ ic was actual ly i nst i tuted . ) Th is action wasmai n ly i n spi red by Schwarzenberg ’s haste i n i ssu i ng

DEFEAT OF KOSSUTH AN D 00110111 15 1

a new Consti tution for Austria and Hungary jo i n t ly

(see p . Gorgei’

s mi l i ta ry success , however ,combi ned with the action of the D iet , tho rough lyalarmed Austria . The Governmen t sought help fromRussia

,and N icholas I was on ly too wi l l i ng to ass ist

i n putti ng down a revol ution ; a Russ ian army wassent

, on cond ition that i t shou ld be commanded enti relyby i ts own general

,and that i t should be larger than

any army put i nto the field by Austria . Even agai nstsuch odds Gorge i and Kossuth cou ld not combi ne .Gé rge i wanted to upho ld the Monarchy wh i le figh ti ng for Hungary ’s i ndependence ; Kossuth , perhaps ,wanted to assume a permanent D ictatorsh ip (or eventhe crown) h imself ; i n any case he was an imposs i bleco l l eague . Duri ng J une and J u ly

,the Austrians

u nder Haynau , the Russian s u nder P askievich , and

Je l lacic with h is Croatian s advanced once moreagai nst Hungary. Agai n the D iet fled eastwards toArad , the Hungarians were everywhere defeated , andat last, on 13 August, Gorgei surrendered to theRussian a rmy at Vi lagos . Kossuth had played anignoble part duri ng the last few weeks ; he had fi rstplaced an inefficient commander- in - ch ief over G0rge i ;on 10 August he had res igned h is D ictato rsh ip to

Gorgei and fled i n to Turkey ; when once he was safei n Tu rkey he declared that he had not l eft the D ictatorsh ip to Gdrge i i n order that he m ight su rrender it.

(Kossuth’

s ch ief importance i n Hungary ends here .He remai ned i n Turkey unti l 185 2 , then he came toEngland , and spent much of h is t ime i n E ngland andAmerica speaki ng and wri ti ng on behalf of Hungarianl ibert i es . He d ied , almost forgotten , i n 1895 , atTu ri n . ) G0rgei and h is army were handed over byth e Russian general to Haynau

,by whom the last

importan t battl e had been won . By the surrender ofVilagos the war was ended

,but Hungary had sti l l

15 2 AUSTR IA- HUNGARY

to su ffer e ight months of mart ial law , u nder the ru l eof General Haynau . Haynau , to put i t s imply , wasa brute . He had al ready , i n I taly, won for h imself anu nenv iable reputation by the who l esale massacre wh ichfo l lowed h is captu re of Brescia . He now wen t onto terrorize the Hungarians by a series of brutal execut ions

, confiscations , and othe r pun ishments imposedby m i l i tary law. At Arad th i rteen generals were shotor hanged ; Gé rge i on ly escaped th rough the intervent ion of the Tsar ; Coun t Batthyany , who had taken no

part i n the war, and had advocated more moderatecounsels

,was shot, together wi th other statesmen .

Fortu nately Haynau speed i ly quarre l led with theGovernmen t and resigned h is command ; the on lysat i sfactory ep isode i n h i s career i s the sound thrashi ng wh ich he rece ived from the men of a brewer ’syard wh ich he v i s i ted i n London i n 1850.

Thus Hungary was beaten,and the revo l ut ion both

i n Austria and Hungary was at an end . How wasthe const i tutional question to be sett led ? I t i s neces~

sary to go back a l i ttl e and see what had been happen i ng i n Austria du ri ng the war.Duri ng the wi n te r of 1848—9 the Austrian assembly ,which had fled from Vien na and then from Prague ,was s i tt i ng at Kremsier

,a smal l town i n Moravia ,

where i t hoped to be free from i nterruption . I t setstead i ly to work to frame a consti tut ion for the who l eof the Hapsbu rg domai ns . There were several al te rnat ives before it : e i ther Austria and Hungary m ightbe en ti re ly u n i ted

,under the same consti tut ion ; or

they m ight go on as they had done before , un i tedon ly by the person of the Emperor and Ki ng, eachcountry retai n i ng i ts own const i tut ion ; or they m ightseparate absol utely , as Kossuth wished duri ng thelater stages of the war ; or they m ight jo i n i n a Federalun ion

,i n wh ich a common consti tut ion shou ld contro l


I 54 AUSTR IA-HUNGARY

by the Hungarian Diet . Hence no consti tution offeredby Austria cou ld have been accep ted by Hungary

,but

for the time there was no fu rther tal k of consti tutions .From 1850 to 1859 Austria and Hungary sufferedu nde r an arbi trary provis ional governmen t

,which ex

ceeded even the “ Mettern ich system ” i n i ts sternrepression and i nqu is i torial pol ice methods . Theadm i n i stration was i n the hands of Bach

,the m i n ister

of the i n te rio r , and h is offi cial s , who gai ned the nameof Bach ’s Hussars ” , because they tried to treat thepeople as i f they were so ld iers to be dri l led .

Every national d i fference was to be ignored ; Germanwas the on ly offic ia l l anguage ; the local Diets , andal l the forms of local governmen t were to be abo l i shed :Croatia , Bohem ia , Hungary , were mere names,

“geo

graph ical express ions ” ; and the more national feel i ngcou ld be crushed and ignored , the more successfu lBach fel t h imsel f. I t i s on ly j ust, however , to statethat du ri ng these te n years of oppression much wasdone to improve agricu l tu re , trade , and commerce ,and Austria-Hungary i ncreased i n material p rosperity .

But the system was u n iversal ly hated— by al l theLiberals

,who had fought for a Consti tut ion ; by the

Czechs,who hated i ts German i sm ; by the non—Magyar

races,who had hoped to be rewarded for thei r help

to the Austrian Governmen t . Nevertheless , the system lasted ten years

,and the mai n i n terest of those

years l i es i n the fore ign pol i cy of Austria .The immediate question was whether Austriashou ld give up any attempt to influence the GermanStates and leave the leadersh ip to Prussia

,or whether

she shou ld try the fortu nes of war with Pruss ia.I n 1850, havi ng recovered from her i n ternal troubles ,Austria infl icted an apparen t hum i l iat ion on Prussiaby the Convention of O lm

'

utz (see p . but thehum i l iation was more apparen t than real . Pruss ia,

BACH’

s HUSSARS 15 5

and above al l B ismarck , needed time to prepare fo rthe i nevi table struggle

,which was postponed t i l l 1866.

Duri ng the Crimean War Austria and Pruss ia supported each other as neutrals ; but Austria was amazedto find that Russia regarded her as tho rough ly un

gratefu l for the help given i n 1849 , wh i le the Westernpowers resen ted her neutral i ty , and cons idered thatshe ought to have joi ned with them agai nst Russia .

Thus isolated , Austria cou ld not prevent Cavou r fromrais i ng the question of I ta ly i n the Congress of Pari s .I n 1859 came Napo leon I I I

’

s i n terven t ion on beha lfof I taly

,which Austria had ne i ther foreseen nor fo re

stal led by efficient preparation . The two defeats atMagenta and Sol feri no (see p . 7 7) opened the eyes ofthe Austrian Government- obviously someth i ng mustbe done . Bach ’s system cou ld not be cal led successfu l ; bes ides caus i ng infin ite discon tent , i t was ru i nously expens ive . The Hungarians had evolved amethod of pass ive resistance wh ich made governmen twel l n igh impossible . They would give absol utelyno obed ience to Bach ’s i n numerable offic ials . Theynei ther paid taxes , nor performed any publ ic se rv icewi thout compulsion ; i f the tax gatherer came andtook h is dues , he was not res isted , but the inhab itan ts refused to give h im any i n formation , or s implyret i red to the mountai n s or forests . Of cou rse i t wasposs i ble to col l ect money i n th i s way , but i t was , ashas been said

,ru i nously expensive . Someth i ng had

to be done . Hence the years 1860— 1 saw two mo reexperimental consti tutions

,the October D iploma and

the February Paten t . The fi rst of these was anattempt to conci l iate the provi nces by rev iv i ng thelocal D iets and un i t i ng them i n a Federal u n ion ;the second was an attempt to set up a cen tral izedConsti tution , on German l i n es , for the who l e of theHapsbu rg dom in ions . Both were al i ke opposed by


the Hungarians,l ed by Deak , on the ground that

the “ March Laws ” of 1848 were sti l l the HungarianConsti tut ion , and that they were unable to accept anyfu rther changes u nt i l these “March Laws ” had beene i ther l egal ly repealed or acknowledged .

Thi ngs,however, were slowly worki ng towards the

Compromise of 1867 . Hungary was no longer treatedas a nation of rebel s . I n the Reichsrath (or Counc i l ) ,which had d rawn up the October D iploma

,Hungarian

del egates had sat , and had had the oppo rtu n i ty of

express i ng the po i n t of v iew of Hungary . TheDiploma itse l f provided for the revival of local D ietsand for the presence of some Hungarian members i na cen tral Assembly . Deak h imsel f was wi l l i ng totreat the D iploma , not as legislat ion , but as ev idenceof the conc i l iatory i n ten tions of the Government .I n 1860 the Hungarian Coun ty Congregat ions wereal lowed to reassemble

,and they immediate ly showed

the i r sympath ies by elect i ng Kossuth (st i l l i n ex i l e) ,Napo l eon I I I , Cavour, and Gari bald i as members !The Diploma , however, pleased no one ; i t was tooessen tial ly a comprom ise . The m i n i stry wh ich hadi n troduced i t fel l

,and i n Feb ruary , 1860, the Feb ruary

Paten t was i ssued . Th is was an apparen tly LiberalConst i tut ion , sett i ng up a system of local D iets , whichshou ld elect members to a cen tral Parl iamen t . Thewho l e importance of the Consti tut ion was , however,v i t iated by a famous clause

,which al lowed the m i n

isters , whenever they pleased , to carry on the Governmen t without the consen t of the Parl iamen t . I n fact,the Feb ruary Paten t was an attempt to secu re the support of the German L i berals i n the war between Pruss iaand Austria that was i nevi tably com i ng ; i t was not agenu i ne attempt to secu re harmony and good governmen t at home . However , i t i s an importan t documenti n Austrian h istory

,as, with some mod ifications, i t



The Austrian Consti tut ion , as dete rm i ned by the February Paten t , was on ly sl ightly mod ified . But th i swas not the whole work of the Compromise . Whileadm itt i ng that both Austria and Hungary were i ndependen t and sovereign States , i t yet rese rved certai nquest ions for the i r joi n t control , and set up the mach i nery by wh ich these common afi

°airs were to be

regu lated . I n Chapte r XI I i s a fu l l er description of

the jo i n t m i n istry for war, finance , and fore ign affa i rs ,responsible to the two “ Delegat ion s ” of Austrianand Hungarian members, which supervi se the financeand adm i n i stration of the Dual Monarchy . On thewho l e , the Comprom ise was a reasonable sol ut ion of

the d ifficu lties between Austria and Hungary , and hasworked fai rly successfu l ly. D ifficu lties ari se when i ti s necessary (as i n m i l i tary matters) that the two cou ntri es should pass the same laws , but these d ifli cu ltieshave general ly not been i n su rmou n table ; the mostserious cause of fr ict ion has been the arrangementthat al l commercial and financ ial agreements betweenthe two States shou ld be renewed every ten years .

Si nce 1867 the h i story of Austria - Hungary hasbeen mai n ly i n terest i ng on accoun t of— (a) the developmen t of her fo re ign po l i cy i n the Balkan Pen i nsu la ;(6) the struggles between the d i fferen t national i t i eswi th i n both Austria and Hungary , with wh ich strugglei s closely co n nected the demand for el ectoral reform .

The developmen t of i n terest i n the Balkans was thed i rect resu l t of Austria ’s defeat by Pruss ia and herexpul sion from I taly. Geograph ical ly

,the Danube

i s the true cen tre of the Dual Monarchy ; i t was am istaken po l i cy that had led Austria to seek expan

s ion towards Germany or I ta ly . J ust as Russia wasled by sympathy with i ts fel low members of the

Greek Church,as wel l as by economic needs , to

THE EASTERN QUESTION 159

advance upon Constant i nople , so Austria-Hungarywas

compel led , by the vast numbers of her Slav popu lat ion , to sympath ize wi th the S lavs of Bosn ia, Herze

gov ina , Servia , &c .,who were sufferi ng under the

m isru le of the Turk ; i t was clear, too, that the eco

nom ic futu re of the Dual Monarchy lay on the Danubeand on the Eastern Adriat ic .The detai ls of the reopen i ng of the “ Easte rn Quest ion and the part played by Austria i n the Congressof Ber l i n , 1878, may be most cl early explai ned i n thechapter on the Ba lkan Pen i nsu la . Here i t may besufli oient to say that the Easte rn Question gradua l lydrove Austria-Hungary , somewhat u nwi l l i ng ly , i n tohost i l i ty to Russia and al l iance with Pruss ia . Themost tangib le resu l t of the negot iat ions to the DualMonarchy was the occupation of Bosn ia and Herze

gov ina i n 1878. These two provi nces,which had

suffered severely from Turkish i ncapaci ty and del i berate m isgovernment, were occup ied by AustriaHungary jo i n tly ; thei r adm i n i stration , which hasbeen very successfu l , therefore l ies i n the hands of

the jo i n t m i n i stry , supervi sed by the Delegations .These provi nces were formal ly an nexed i n 1908.

The i nternal h istory of both Austria and Hungary,

as has been said , i s one long strugg le to h nd somemeans of enabl i ng the various races to l ive togetheri n peace . The so l u t ions that come nearest to solv i ngthe question seem to be manhood suffrage

,and the

fact that economic questions are rapid ly becomi ngmore engross i ng than racial d isputes .The question of the suffrage d iffers i n Austria andi n Hungary .

By the Feb ruary Paten t Austria adopted a somewhat med ieval e lectoral system

,by which the e lectors

were d iv ided i n to cur iae, or classes (i .e . landowners

,

ci ti es , chambers of commerce,and ru ral d istricts) .

160 AUSTR IA—HUNGARY

By th i s system very few persons had votes , and thosefew were very u nequal ly represented . Not on ly werethe people u nequa l ly represen ted as to numbers andclass

,but they were u nequal ly treated as to race . The

whole period 1867— 1907 i s one long struggle on thepart of the Czechs to obta i n fai r p lay i n the Reichs~

rath ; the i r methods were often questionable , but thei rgrievance was u nden iable .A pretence was made i n 1896of remedyi ng th i sstate of affai rs . A fifth cu ria was added , cons ist i ngof al l c i t i zens over twen ty- fou r. Th is looked l ikemanhood suffrage , but i n real ity i t was rather amockery of it , for whi l e vote rs i n th is newclass elected 72 members , the remai n i ng 353memberswere elected by about Therefore the agitation wen t on u nabated , unt i l i n 1907 , largely th roughthe determ i nation of the Empero r, real manhoodsuffrage was granted , and the who l e system of thecurize was swept away . The resu l ts of the changehave bee n d isti nctly to l essen the an imos i ty betweenCzech and German

,Po l e or Ruthen ian . The elec

toral d ist ricts have been so arranged as to contai non ly one race , as nearly as was possible .I n Hungary , matters are perhaps less hopefu l . Thepo l i t ical gen ius of the Magyar i s to a large exten tnu l l ified by h i s i n capaci ty to sympath ize with anyother nat ional asp i rat ions . The Magyar po l i cy isframed defin ite ly to ensu re the “ Magyarizat ion of

the subject races as soon as poss i bl e.Travel lers i n Hungary are a lmost u nan imous i nthei r accoun ts of the harsh treatmen t of the S lavs andof al l non-Magyar races . The S lovaks of No rthernHungary seem to be particu larly i l l - treated ; thei rwo rst crime apparen tly i s that they are ferven t andpoetic Slav patriots . O ne serious grievance l i es i nthe educationa l system ; the Magyar language is a


162 RUSS IA

the army shou ld be one and und iv ided . Thereuponensued a serious deadlock, which has not yet beenfinal ly settl ed . The Empero r des i red that Hungaryshou ld adopt an equal system of manhood suffragebefore he pursued the d ispute fu rther. Variousschemes for an extens ion of the suffrage have beenp roposed

,but as yet n ei ther of them has been

adopted,and i t must be adm itted that the racial

e nm iti es i n Hungary seem to be as acute as ever. 1

CHAPTER V I I I

RU S S IA.

“ No th ing is more apt to ru in the pres t ige of a uthor i ty than a

frequen t and e x tens i ve emp loymen t of repress ion .

'

Measures of

repress ion a re dan ge rous , a nd when they ge t to b e con t inuous , theye i the r lead to a n exp los ion or e lse t u rn the peop le in to a casua l throng ,

in to h uman dus t .— Cou 7zt Wz

'

tte, f b rmer ly M z'

n is ler of F in an ce in Russ ia .

RUSS IA , the largest coun try i n Eu rope , i s perhapsl ess known and less u nderstood than any other. A l lth rough the M iddle Ages , Russia was a mystery to

the West— a l and almost as u nknown as Cen tral Asia .

I t i s d ifli cu lt to gai n access to Russia by sea . A mapwi l l show how eas i ly a fleet cou ld be p reven ted fromenteri ng or l eav i ng the B lack Sea or the Balt ic

,whi l e

the White Sea i s frozen du ri ng a great part of theyear. The cl imate i s co lder than that of most Eu ropean countries , and unt i l the rai lways were bu i l t ,travel l i ng was extremely d ifli cu lt and dangerous .The ch ief races of Russia— the Slavs

,who are the

Russ ians proper,the F i r ms

,and the Mongo l races

(Tartars , Turkomans, &c.,from Asia)— were al ien to

the Western nat ions , and thei r languages un in tel l i1 C f. notes on 0 120 and 0. 222.

EARLY HISTORY OF RUSS IA 163

gib le to them . Russia had been converted to Christian ity by m issionaries from Constant i nople i n thetenth cen tu ry ; her people , therefore , belonged to theGreek or O rthodox Church , the Church , that i s , wh ichacknowledged the Patriarch of Constan t i nople as i tshead i nstead of the Pope , and wh ich i n some of

i ts teach i ng and doctri nes d i ffered from the RomanCatho l i c Church .

Thus, owi ng partly to her geograph ical pos i t ion ,

partly to her past h istory , Russia was i n 1815 i nmany ways the most backward country i n Eu rope .I n order to real i ze i ts cond i t ion one must often compare i t rather wi th England or France i n the th i rteen thcentu ry than with any other Weste rn nat ion i n then i neteenth .

Towards the end of the seven teen th cen tu ry Russiaseemed to awake and press forward i n to the not iceof Western Europe . This i s not the place to tel l thestory of Peter the Great

,but ever s i nce the days when

he trave l l ed over Eu rope i n search of modern ideas,

Russia has been waveri ng between the East and theWest . At one moment she seems about to adoptmodern civi l i zation and Western i nst i tut ions ; atanother the i n tense patriot ism of her people seemsto th row her back on the o ld ideals, or the corruptionand tyran ny of her officials makes reforms imposs ible .The object , therefore , of th i s chapter i s to show very

b r iefly what Russia needed i n the n i neteen th centu ry ,why she has partly fai led to obtai n it, and what measu re of success she has attai ned . Russia had not

much to fear i n the earl ie r years of the century fromopen enem ies , she was not obl iged to make an hero i cstruggle for her very existence ; and thus, al thoughher fore ign pol icy was of the greatest importance toother nations

,i t i s the home po l icy of the Tsars

164 RUSS IA

which forms the real ly importan t aspect of Russ ianh istory .

The greatest problem that Russ ia had to deal wi thwas a social question — the existence of serfdom .

There were i n Russ ia i n 1815 on ly two mai n classesof society— the nobles or land lords

,and the serfs .

(The merchan ts , t raders , and townspeople general lyformed on ly a ve ry smal l proport ion of the population .

Even now the peasants fo rm 75 per cen t of the who l e . )The u nfortu nate peasan ts were i n much the samepos i t ion as the v i l le i n s on a medieval manor, butthey had even fewer rights and priv i leges . Theywere cons idered to be the property of the i r lord ,l i ke slaves ; they ,

worked for h im and paid taxes toh im ; he had the right to flog them ,

to pun ish themi n almost any way

, to arrange the i r marriages , to

send them to work i n one town or another, or to fetchthem back agai n . There was no law or j ustice forthem but the i r lord ’s wi l l . Of course they were not

al l i l l - treated,i n some vi l lages they were prosperous

and happy ; but they were practi cal ly slaves ,“ chris

tened property ” , as they were cal led , with no morepower over the i r own l ives than the tool s they used .

A large number of the serfs were the lord ’s househo ldservants , and these were the most completely at h ismercy . I t i s importan t to remember

,however, that

the Russ ian peasant had not always been i n th i sm iserabl e posi tion ; he had sunk th rough the d iflicu lties of payi ng heavy taxes

,and because the enti re

burden of m i l i tary service (as i n feudal days) had beenlaid upon the lord

,who oppressed the peasant i n

order to sati sfy the Tsar’s demands . Thus serfdomi n Russ ia was a comparatively new i nsti tution

,dati ng

from the s ixteen th centu ry,and was stead i ly gett i ng

worse— not , as i n France before the Revo lution , a

very ancien t i nsti tut ion wh ich was gradual ly d is


166 RUSS IA

t ions , to make the Tsar part w i th some of h is autocraticpower, and to obtai n the franch ise for as many Russianci t i zen s as poss i ble . Side by s ide wi th these two

great demands wen t the des i re for education , forthe i ncrease of prosperi ty , for the refo rm of judic ialmethods , and the expans ion of Russ ia i n CentralAsia and S iberia.After th is bri ef explanat ion of what one has to look

for in Russian h istory , we must tu rn back to dealwi th each re ign separate ly , for the character of theTsar was

,of cou rse , of enormous importance i n the

progress of Russia.

Alexande r I,whose re ign lasted from 180 1 to 1825 ,

was a ve ry remarkable man . I n early l i fe he hadbeen greatly i n terested i n the ideas o f the FrenchRevo l ut ion ; h is sympath ies were frankly Western ,and i t seemed probable that Russ ia wou ld see vastchanges u nder h i s ru le . For a t ime he was dazz ledby Napo leon ’s o ffe r of al l iance , and at the Treaty of

Ti ls i t the two monarchs pract ical ly agreed to d ivideEurope between them . However, Russi a

’s tu rn wasto come ; i n 1812 Napo l eon led the d isastrous expe

d it ion i n to Russia,which ended i n the bu rn i ng

of Moscow and a tremendous outbu rst of patriot ismamong the Russ ian people . Alexander’s part i n thecoa l i t ion agai nst Napo l eon , and i n the congresseswh ich fo l lowed , has been sketched i n an earl ie rchapter (pp . 12 I t i s i n terest i ng to not i ce how hewavered between the parts of a great m i l i ta ry leader,and a great i n terna l reformer. His was a cu riouslyu nbalanced character

,and he never seemed enti rely

su re of h is aim . He s i ncerely bel i eved that he hada mi ss ion to keep Europe at peace

,and to preven t the

spread of dangerous ideas ; he was convi nced , too ,that l i teral obedience to Chri st ian teach i ng would

ALEXANDER 1 167

bri ng about th is resu l t. Hence the formation of theHo ly A l l iance . At the same time he was s i ncerelyi n terested i n reforms , and sympatheti c towards thedemand for a Consti tution ; h is care for h is countrywas shown i n constan t v is i ts to d i fferen t parts , i nwo rk for the improvemen t of schoo ls , co l l eges, roads ,hosp i ta ls

,and prisons . His Liberal tendencies were

shown i n the Const i tut ion wh ich he granted to

Poland,accord i ng to promises made at the Congress

of Vien na,and i n the respect wh ich he showed for

the Consti tut ion of Fi n land— a provi nce wh ich hadon ly j ust been an nexed to Russ ia , and wh ich hasmai n ta i ned much of i ts i ndependence th roughout then i neteen th cen tu ry. But he d id not bel i eve thatRussia i tself was ready for a consti tution , and i t wash is settled po l icy that reforms ought to be given bythe Tsar to the people as a favou r, rather than that thepeople should be enabled to work ou t improvementsfor themselves . I n h is latter years he fel l almost entirely under the influence of Mettern ich , and h is fearswere roused by the growi ng number of secret societ ies

(s im i lar to the Carbonari i n I taly) i n a lmost everycountry i n Europe . Thus he abandoned h is bel i ef i nLiberal ism

,and was ready to use h i s influence , or h is

arm ies if necessary, to put down revo l u tionary movements i n Naples

,i n Germany , or i n Spai n . For a

t ime Mettern ich was able to wi thhold h im from jo i ni ng i n the Greek rebel l ion agai nst the Turks (see

p . but final ly h is desi re to act as champion of

h is fel low Chri stians of the O rthodox Church grewstronger even than Mettern ich ’s influence . At thetime of h is death he was general ly supposed to be onthe po i n t of taki ng act ive measu res agai n st the Turks .I n est imat i ng Alexander’s character

,i t i s apparen t

that h i s m i nd was often so u nstru ng as to be barelysane ; the melancholy and mystic form of rel igion

168 RUSS IA

which he adopted i n later l i fe seems to have bl i ndedh is eyes to the real trend of even ts i n Europe ; fearand susp ic ion completed the change . He d ied , as hesaid h imsel f

,wo rn out with the burden of a crown ”

.

Yet he had done m uch good work ; h is part i n thedefeat of Napo l eon and i n the reconstruct ion of

Europe was , on the who l e , i n harmony wi th h i s h ighideals ; h is reforms at home , especial ly h is at temptsto i mprove the cond i tion of the serfs , deserved realgrati tude . Had he been mo re strong-m i nded , mo reconsi stent

,l ess given to fo l low wanderi ng fires , he

m ight have ranked among the real ly great ru lers ofthe n i neteen th cen tu ry .

Alexander I d ied on 1 December, 1825 , and h isdeath was fo l lowed by a short period of anarchy andi nsu rrection . The next hei r was h is brothe r C onstantine , who was u nsu i table for the pos i t ion of Tsar,and mo reover

,did not des i re it. However, some

days passed befo re Constan ti n e could declare h is re

fusal , and before N icho las , the next brother , cou ldbe proclaimed Empero r. Duri ng these few days aserious i nsu rrect ion broke out i n S t. Petersburg ,ch iefly among the so ld i e rs and the numerous secretsociet ies . The i nsu rgents

,i nstead of accla im i ng

N icho las , shouted for Constanti ne and the C onstitution ; many of them ,

however,were so ignoran t that

they though t Consti tution was Constanti n e ’s wi fe !The rebel l ion was put down with the utmost severi ty ,and N icholas entered on h is reign with a conv ictionthat h i s brother’s fear of secret soc ieties was thorough ly

justified .

Nicho las I is said to have been a fine , handsome ,honest man— a blu n t so ld i er , i ncapable of sentimentalsympath ies . He was conv i nced that Western ideascould on ly bri ng harm to Russia , that Russ ia mustdevelop on her own l i nes

,with as l i ttle borrowi ng as


170 RUSS IA

No sooner was th i s d ifficu lty partly so lved thant rouble arose i n Po land . The year 1830 was a yearof revo l u t ion th roughout Europe , and Po land fe l t theimpulse wh ich origi nated i n France . The larger partof the ki ngdom had been jo i ned to Russia i n 1815u nder certai n cond i t ions ; these cond i t ions had beenpartial ly carri ed out , a Consti tut ion had been gran ted ,and Pol and was rap id ly becom i ng mo re prosperous .There were

,however, grave causes of disconten t ; the

Consti tut ion gave no real power to the Po l i sh assembl i es ; the army was i l l - d isposed and exasperatedbecause the Emperor had given i t no part i n theTurkish war ; secret soc iet i es were common ; thenobi l i ty was factious and d is loyal .I n 1830, when Nicho las summoned the Po l i sh D ietfor the first t ime i n h i s re ign , the d iscon ten t wasopen ly avowed , and when news came of the “ J u lyRevo l u tion ” i n Paris , i t was the s ignal for anotherrevo l ut ion i n Po land . I n November Warsaw wasfu l l of smal l armed bod ies of men , who attackedthe army and the palace of the V i ce roy Constan ti ne ,N icho las

’

s brothe r. Consta nti ne , u nfortu nate ly , losth is head , and made no attempt to ral ly h is men ; thePo l i sh army therefo re jo i n ed the movemen t . Theauthor i ty of the Empero r was cast off, a provis ionalGovernmen t was fo rmed

,and for a time i t seemed

to have a real chance of success .Nicho las wou ld hear of no comprom ise , and sen t anarmy to put down the ris i ng . None of the Eu ropeanpowers would help Po land , though they feebly re

m i nded N icho l as of the cond i t ions imposed by the Congress of Vien na . Pruss ia act ively sided with Russia.I n September

, 1831, Warsaw ,the Pol ish cap i tal , su r

rendered,and thus ended Po land ’s struggle for the

i ndependence wh ich had been hers for so manycentu ries . The Poles had fought wi th al l the i r old

END OF POL ISH R I S ING 17 1

bravery and dash,but they were not u n i ted , and they

were eviden tly i ncapab le of secu ri ng o rder amongthemselves . The Tsar put down the i n su rgents wi ththe utmost severi ty ; the prisons were soon fu l l ; thousands of ex i les were sen t to S iberia ; the Consti tut ionwas abo l i shed ; many of the speci al Po l i sh i n st i tut ionswere swept away ; the Tsar issued a ukase declari ngthat Po l and was no longer a nation ; everyth i ng wasdone to make the former ki ngdom an i n tegral part ofthe Russ ian Empi re .The various re l igious sects i n Po l and , such as theO ld Bel ievers ” or the U n i ted Greeks ” (who hadjo i ned the Roman Church wh i le p reservi ng many ofthei r old customs) , as wel l as the Lutherans i n theBa l t ic provi nces , were subj ected to a legal persecutionto make them jo i n the O rthodox Church . Th is pol icy ,though i t seemed successfu l at the t ime , l eft a legacyof hatred i n Po land wh ich , th i rty years later, was st i l lu nsoftened , and wh ich has effectual ly preven ted anyreal u n ion with Russia .

N icholas’

s bel i ef i n the value of the “ strong handdid not apply to Po land alone . I n Russia i tsel f theGovernment was more and more str ictly o rgan ized ,and the Tsar made a great effort to preven t corruptionamong h is offic ia ls ; but as he always i ns isted that thewho l e respons ib i l i ty lay with h im ,

and as he con

stan tly i n terfered i n every detai l , he was u nable tocreate a h igher standard among h is m i n isters andservants . A typical story i s to l d of the bu i ld i ng of

the rai lway between S t. Petersburg and MoscowThere was some discussion as to the best

route , and many of the smal le r towns were anxiousthat the l i n e shou ld pass through them . When them in ister tried to explai n the matter to the Tsar

,

Nicholas s imply took a ru ler,drew a l i ne on the

map , and said :“ You wi l l construct the l i ne thus ”.

172 RUS S IA

Ir. wou ld be hard to h nd a story which better explai nswhat is mean t by autocracy .

This tendency to autocracy was sti l l fu rther i ncreasedby news of the many revo l u t ions of the years 1848-

9.

The ris i ng i n Hungary u nder Kossuth (see p. 149)fi l led the Emperor wi th fear lest the trouble shouldspread

,and he wi l l i ngly came to the assistance of the

Austrian Emperor, Franci s Joseph , by send i ng h immen

,with whose help the revo l u t ion was

brought to an end . I t i s said that when the fi rstnews of th e revolu tion i n Paris arrived

,Nicho las

strode i nto the bal l room ,ho ld i ng out a piece of

paper,and cryi ng : Gentlemen , saddle your horses ,

France i s a Republ icWhen i n Maréh , 1849, the Ki ng of Prussia wasdoubti ng whether to accept the crown of Germany

,

ofie red to h im at Frankfo rt , the Tsar made i t veryclear that an Empero r of Germany wou ld i ncu r h isu ncomprom isi ng host i l i ty , and Frederick W i l l iamrefused the offe r.Thus far the influence of Russ ia i n fore ign affai rswas paramoun t ; i t was soon to suffe r a severe shock .

Most of the fore ign po l i cy of N icho las’

s re ign maybe summarized as i nd i rectly l ead i ng up to the CrimeanWar ; i t i s therefore necessary to d iscover what werethe essen t ial causes of that war .I t had long been eviden t that Russ ia had a very

firm ho ld over Tu rkey , and thus over the who l eBalkan Pen i nsu la ; i t was clear, too , that i f Tu rkeyclosed the Dardanel les to warsh ips of other nations ,i t wou ld be imposs ible, i n case a war broke out, to

attack Russia by sea. Moreover, the who l e fate of

the Balkan States was becomi ng a very press i ngquest ion (see Chapter IX ) . Nicholas was convi ncedthat Turkey was a s ick man and that the TurkishEmpi re must i nev i tably break up ere long . After


174 RUSS IA

The first importan t i nc iden t i n the war was thedestruction of a Tu rki sh fleet, which was lyi ng i nthe harbou r at S i nope ; war had real ly been declaredbefore th i s occu rred , but B ri ta i n and France got theimpress ion that i t was an unjustifiab le su rprise attack ,and i t was largely th i s impression wh ich caused theB ri t i sh nat ion to enter wi th so much zeal i n to the waragai nst Russ ia .At first the Tsar attacked Tu rkey on the Danube

,

by an i nvasion of Mo ldav ia and Wal lach ia,but

,

a l though h is fo rces were very strong , he was ob l igedto reti re from the siege of S i l istria, because Austri ath reatened host i l i t ies . Henceforward the war centredi n the Crimea ; Bri ta i n and France had dec ided thatSebastopo l , the harbou r of the Russ ian fleet

,must

be destroyed , and al l the i nc idents i n the war, fromSeptember

,1855 , to September

,1856, were l ead i ng

up to the captu re of th i s great fortress,which had

been so sk i l fu l ly strengthened that i t was almostimpregnabl e .The combi ned French and B ri t i sh arm ies landed

to the north of Sebastopol and marched southwards ;at the ri ver Alma they were met by a Russ ian forceunder Genera l Mensh ikoff, and i t was on ly the i rond isc ipl i n e of the B ri t i sh troops wh ich enabled them to

gai n the summ i t of a steep h i l l s ide i n the teeth of theRuss ian guns ; Mensh ikofi

'

was obl iged to d raw off,

and the Al l i es pressed on towards Sebastopo l .Passi ng to the south of the c i ty

,the French took

Kam iesh as thei r base , whi l e the B ri ti sh army ob

tained possession of Balaclava. Both these baseswere ports , and thus th roughout the long s iege theAl l i es were abl e to obtai n re i n forcements and pro

vis ions by sea , wh i l e the Russ ian forces and storeshad to be brought immense d istances by land , for theRussian fleet was almost ent i re ly d isabled .

176 RUSS IA

Soon after the sei zu re of Ba lac lava an u nsuccessfu lattempt was made to take Sebastopo l by assau l t

( 17 October, and the Russians retal iated byendeavouri ng to cut the l i n e of commun icat ions b etween the B ri ti sh army and Balaclava . I t was du ri ngthe figh ting that ensued that the famous charge of

the “ Light B rigade ” took place . I t wi l l n ever beknown exactly what happened , but i n some way awrong o rder was given . The commander of theLight B rigade bel ieved that he was o rdered to re

captu re some guns by chargi ng an overwhelm i nglystrong Russ ian pos i t ion . He knew i t was imposs i bl e

,

he knew that a m istake had been made,but he led

h i s wi l l i ng men on such a charge that “ al l the worldwondered ”

. For a moment i t almost looked as i fsuccess wou ld be the i r reward

,but a mu rderous

Russ ian fire swept th rough thei r ranks,and hard ly

one - th i rd of the Light B rigade came back al ive . TheFrench commander, u nable to see the reason for thecharge

,remarked to an officer : “ C ’est magn ifiq ue,

mais ce n ’est pas la guerre ” He was right ; no

general wou ld del i be rate ly send h is men to face suchodds , but the cou rage wh ich faced the odds wasi ndeed magn ificent.

A few days late r came the battl e of I nkerman , adesperate and co nfused struggle i n wh ich the Al l i eswere ab l e to ho l d thei r ground , whi le the Russ iansleft dead upon the field .

Then began the hardest part of the who l e s i egethe long wi n ter months of 1854— 5 , whi le l i ttl e couldbe done , and wh i l e the arm ies were su fferi ng theacutest m isery from co ld and lack of sto res and provis ions . The suffe ri ng was due to some exten t tom ismanagement and i nexperi ence of warfare (Bri tai nh ad been at peace s i nce partly to a viol ents to rm wh ich wr ecked n early th i rty vesse ls bri ngi ng


178 RUSS IA

they d id the arm ies of the Al l ies . The sense of defeatimpressed i tse l f on N icholas

’

s m i nd , i l l ness seizedupon him , and on 2 March , 1855 , he d ied , say i ng toh is son : “ I had hoped to leave you a wel l -orderedEmpi re

,but i t has pleased God to ordai n otherwise ;

I can on ly p ray for you and for Russ ia He honestlybel i eved he had done h i s best fo r h is cou ntry

,and h i s

m i nd seemed i ncapable of grasp i ng the idea of progress , of reform , of Weste rn c iv i l i zation .

Alexander I I , h i s son , was a man of very d ifferen tcal i bre . He has been cal l ed the “ Tsar Li berator ” ,

and certai n ly h i s abol i t ion of se rfdom , together wi ththe many reforms he ca rried th rough , give h im a j ustclaim to the t i tl e . But he was always anxious to hearboth s ides

,keen to choose the best poi n ts of both

parties ; h is d ifficulties were enormous , and he hasbeen reproached wi th a lack of stead i ness of pu rpose ,for weakness and waveri ng i n the face of danger.Men are sti l l d i sput i ng as to whether h i s des i re fo rl i be ral reforms was gen u i n e

,whether h i s weakness

was the cause of the d i sorder and lawlessness wi thwh ich he had to contend , or whethe r i t was the d i so rde r and v iolence of the progressive party wh ichmade h im fal ter on h i s path .

Be th i s as i t may , i t i s to Alexander 11 that Russiaowes the most val uable reforms of the n i neteen thcen tu ry , and al though he left much u ndone , he laidfirmly the foundations on wh ich al l futu re statesmenmust bu i ld .

His first task was very cl ear. Russia was exhaustedby the war, and peace must be made . AlthoughPalmerston , on behalf of Bri tai n , was opposed to

end i ng the war wi thout infl icting fu rther defeat onRuss ia

,Napo l eon I I I saw that he had noth i ng to gai n

by cont i n u i ng it. Negot iat ions were therefore begun ,and the Treaty of Pari s was s igned i n March , 1856.

TREATY OF PAR IS 179

By th i s treaty , each of the Powers bound i tself notto i n te rvene i n Tu rki sh affai rs wi thout the consen tof the othe r Powers ; Russia gave up her cla im toprotect the Christian subjects of the Sul tan ; and theSultan

,i n retu rn , prom ised rel igious tol eration to

al l . Greater i ndependence was granted to the provi nces of Mo ldavia and Wal lach ia, at the mouth ofthe Danube

,which later on became the ki ngdom of

Ruman ia (see p . The Danube i tsel f was declared free to al l E uropean nations , and i ts nav igat ionwas placed under the contro l of a European C ommiss ion . I t was agreed that the B lack Sea shou ldbe considered neutral , and that no warsh ips of anynation , not even of Russia or Turkey , shou ld beal lowed with i n it. Anothe r clause i n the treatyendeavoured to put an end to privateeri ng , by declari ng that neutral sh ips should not be attacked , evenwhen carry i ng suppl ies to the enemy ; and that , evenon an enemy ’s vessel , on ly such goods as were declared “ contraband of war ” should be l iable tocaptu re . This clause was very vaguely worded , andhas given rise to much d iscuss ion s i nce ; diplomatistsare constan tly try i ng to reach some agreement asto the exten t to which trade may be attacked duri ngwar.After the Treaty of Paris , Alexander entered uponfriendly relat ions with France

,and havi ng no external

dangers to fear, was able to set h imsel f to carry outsome of the refo rms he had so long med itated . EvenNicho las I had condemned serfdom

,and Alexander

had taken part i n several comm ittees appo i n ted to

consider i ts abo l i t ion . Almost al l the mo re h igh lyeducated classes , and especial ly the l i te ra ry men ,were i n favou r of abo l i t ion . Such nove l s as Gogol

’

s

D ead Souls and Tu rgen ieff’

s M emoirs of a H un tsman

had made people real ize the m isery and hopelessness

180 RUSS IA

of the peasant’s lot , and the degrad i ng effects ofslavery .

The difficu lties i n the way of abol i t ion were many .

The nobles would suffe r an immense loss , and thepeasants themselves would lose many righ ts to wh ichthey had long been accustomed . They had alwaysused the pastu re and the forest of the lord , and cou ldnot u nderstand why henceforth they should pay forthe i r grass or the i r wood ; they had fal l en i n to thehabi t of relyi ng on the lord in al l d iffi cu l ti es ; theywere often so ignoran t as to be barely fit for the independence of freemen . Moreover, many of themcontended that i n theory the land belonged to them

,

and that i t was u njust to make them buy it.Yet the change had to come i f ever the peasan tswere to take a step forward . The o rder fo r theemanc ipation of the Crown serfs came i n 1858, thegene ral order of emancipation i n 1861. Foremostamong the Tsar’s cou nc i l lo rs who helped on thecause was M i l iutin , a man prev iously u nknown , whosegenu i ne enthusiasm for the l i beration and prosperi tyof the peasants brought h im to publ i c not ice andthe Tsar’s favou r .Personal freedom was gran ted to every serf i nRuss ia ; the nob les were compensated to some exten tfor the i r losses ; the peasants who had previously heldland were al lowed to pu rchase smal l ho ld i ngs fromthe State , the pu rchase money be i ng paid i n i n stalmen ts duri ng the next forty- n i ne years . Nearly

of men were thus set free i n 1861. Nevertheless , some m istakes were made . I t was i n tendedthat each household should receive enough land tosupply i ts own needs , but i n many cases the estimatedho ld i ng (vary i ng , accord i ng to soi l , from 5 to 27 acres)was too smal l , whi l e i n others the lords were able tooffer the peasants a fou rth part of the ho ld i ng free , i h


182 RUSS IA

l i ttle authori ty save i n agricu l tu ral matters ; i t couldsettl e questions ari s i ng ou t of the cul t i vation of theland , and cou ld a l lot the share of taxation amongthe households , but i ts autho ri ty wen t no fu rther.Ten or more M frs , however, were grouped i n to abody cal led a Volost, which had the power of ad

m in isteri ng j ust ice for the peasants of the d i st rict . 1

The Z emstvo (one for each d ist rict , and a cen tralone for each prov i nce) was a represen ta t ive body of

men wi th certa i n powers of sel f- governmen t ; i t wasal lowed to manage such questions as education ,roads and bridges , poo r re l i ef, hosp i tal s and medica lrel i ef, i n su rance , &0. U nfo rtu nately the deci s ionsof the Zemstvo were to be carri ed out by the localpo l i ce , who , as a

'

ru le,had no sympathy with i ts

pol icy , and thus many of the prom ised improvemen tswere never real i zed .

S ide by side wi th these steps towards sel f-govern »

ment wen t a reo rgan ization of j ust ice . Fo rmerlytrial s i n Russia had been secret and very lengthy ;every step i n the proceed i ngs was comm itted to wri ti ng, and thus the s implest cases m ight i nvo l ve massesof documents , with the resu l t that j ustice was frequently “ sold

,den ied

,and delayed Al exander 11

made al l t rial s publ ic and oral ; he set up magistratess im i lar to the E ngl i sh J ustices of the Peace , some of

whom were to be chosen by the Zemstvo , and were toadm i n i ste r j ustice accord i ng to the ancie n t and customary law of the coun try , and not accord i ng to thei rown caprices . Trial by j u ry was to be employed i ncrim i nal cases . Appeals were al lowed from eachcou rt to a h igher on e . S i nce then Russian j usticehas had the supreme meri ts of cheapness and sim

p l icity ; i ts one great weakness i s that the j udges are

l These peasan t courts, wh ich do not appear to have been very effi cient ,were ab ol ished in 1910.

REFORMS OF ALEXANDER 11 183

not su ffi ciently i ndependent, and that very manyoffences are deal t with di rectly by the po l ice , acti ngu nder the orders of the Government, and not th roughthe ord i nary law courts .Such were some of the wisest of Alexander

’

s re

forms . He also i n troduced a better system of m i l i taryserv ice

, overhauled the finances of the country , en

couraged ra i lways , re laxed the Press Laws , and establ ished a wider and freer system of education . Someof h is reforms were shortl ived (e.g . the relaxation of

the Press Laws) , whi le some seemed on ly to i ncreasethe general d iscontent . The free peasants were oftenpoorer than the serfs had been , and i n some distr ictsserious ri s i ngs took place among them ,

whi le the

judicial reforms and local government bod ies wereoften rendered useless by the too great power lefti n the hands of the po l i ce and of the nob les . Thestudents i n the un ivers i t i es

,always the keenest and

most reckless upho lders of l i berty i n Russ ia,clam

ou t ed vio l en tly for far more fundamental changes ,pi n n i ng thei r fai th to revo l u tionary methods ratherthan to the s low process of reform . Al l th i s must becons idered before Alexander is reproached wi th havi nggone back upon h is earl i er po l i cy ; there was realdanger i n go i ng too fast

,and Alexander knew i t wel l .

Nevertheless , al l h is reforms had been i n the rightd i rection , and he deserves , as has been said , eternalcred i t for havi ng tried to understand the hal f- expressed wishes of h is peop le , for havi ng Open lyshown h is confidence i n them .

Two mai n causes contri buted to make Alexander I Iabandon h is Liberal ideas— the d issati sfaction andrebel l ion i n Poland

,and the growth of N ih i l i sm

th roughout Russia .

Poland had been d iscontented ever s i nce the unsuccessfu l revolution of 1831, and a party among the

184 RUSS IA

Po l i sh nobles sti l l looked for a chance of recoveri ngnational i ndependence . Alexander I I warned themagai nst i ndu lgi ng i n “ id le dreams ” ; but he pu rsueda conci l iato ry po l i cy towards Po land , hop i ng to showwhat benefits m ight fo l low the Russ ian ru le . From1855 to 1861 Po land wen t rapid ly forward

,and a

great Agricu l tu ral Society took up the question of

the serfs and of the improvements wh ich m ight bemade i n local adm i n i stration . Un fortu nately the Tsarwas offended when he d iscovered that a scheme wason foot for the settl emen t of the land question i nPo land

,qu i te i ndependently of h i s scheme for Russia .

He therefo re suppressed the Agricu l tu ral Soc iety i n1861. There ensued demonstrations and rio ti ng i n thestreets

,and these

‘

were put down wi th u n necessaryseveri ty by the troops . Fo r mon ths the Governmen twavered between weakness and severi ty , now suppress i ng a riot , now perm itti ng i t. I n 1862 the Tsardefin ite ly dec ided on conc i l iat ion

,and sen t as Viceroy

the Grand-Duke Constan ti n e , who was wel l known forh is Liberal v i ews . By th i s t ime , however, Po land wasready for anothe r revo l ut ion . The nobles demandeda Consti tut ion (in place of the one they had lost ‘

in

and the resto ration of al l the provi nces wh ichhad once belonged to Po land . Th is was more thancou ld poss i bly be granted by Russ ia , and the Government went back to the po l i cy of extreme severi ty .

For i n stance , on 15 January , 1863, almost eve ry househo ld i n Warsaw was searched i n the m iddle of then ight by Russ ian so ld i e rs , who carri ed off to pri sonal l such youths as they suspected of havi ng takenpart i n po l i t ical demonstrations . After th is the wholepopulat ion took up arms , and the Tsar had a seriousrebel l io n on h is hands . I t i s imposs i ble to fo l low thedeta i l s of th i s st ruggle ; the Poles had no regu lararmed troops , and they therefore reti red i n to the


186 RUSS IA

feel i ng that i t would fare even wo rse (as regards i tsi ndependence) i f i t fe l l u nder German ru le .Alexander ’s other great d ifficu lty , the growth of

Nih i l i sm,i s harder to expla i n . The word i tsel f (Lati n

711s noth i ng) means abo l i t ion , destruction , andN ih i l i sm was i n the begi n n i ng a bel ief that al l customs and i nst i tutions and forms of government al readyexisti ng are bad , so bad that they must be sweptaway

,i n o rder that a n ideal society may be bu i l t up on

a fresh basis . At first Nih i l i sm was on ly an op i n ion ,a theo ry ; late r on i t became i nvo lved i n questionsof Social i sm and po l i t i ca l economy . The N ih i l i stswished to destroy the exi sti ng systems of work andi ndustry ; al l land and weal th were to be held i n common by the people . The remarkable th i ng abou tN ih i l i sm was the ho ld i t obtai ned on al l c lasses of

society . Begi n n i ng as a theo ry among un ivers i tystudents

,i t sp read al l over Russia . I ts motto was :

“ Go among the People ” , and i ts upho lders carriedout the motto l i teral ly . Men and women , rich andpoo r, students and teachers , l eft the i r work and thei rhomes , don ned the peasan t d ress , and went i n to thehuts of the v i l lages o r the facto ri es of the towns to

preach the i r gloomy creed . Thei r devotion , however,gai ned them few conve rts among the peasants, whosestrongest en thusiasm was general ly for the Tsar andthe Chu rch . The best- known phase of Nih i l i sm beganafter 1878, when the N ih i l i sts ceased to be a pol i t i ca lparty

,and became a desperate band of consp i rators ,

seeki ng to carry out thei r po l i cy of destruction bymeans of dynam ite or the assass in ’s kn ife. Theyattacked Governmen t officials , heads of po l i ce , or

provi ncial governors , with abso l u te fearlessness , oftenan nou nci ng thei r deeds befo rehand . I n 1880 a m i n eexploded u nder the Wi nter Palace i n S t. Petersbu rg,and the Tsar owed h i s escape to an accidenta l delay .

THE NIH ILISTS 187

No sentences of ex i le or death made any d i fferenceto the N ih i l i sts ; when one man fai led , another wasappo i n ted to carry on the work of destruction , andthe who l e movemen t seemed to be less an o rgan izedprotest agai nst tyran ny than a fanatical madness , a l lthe more alarm i ng on accou n t of i ts coo l ness andsystem .

Alexander at first tri ed to meet the N ih i l i st outragesby i ncreased severi ty , by abo l i sh i ng or cu rta i l i ng mostof the reforms i n local governmen t

,i n j ustice

, or i neducation , which he had previously granted , and by increasi ng the power and the activ i ty o f the secret po l ice .Duri ng the years 1864 to 1879 Russia seemed to go

backwards ; her h isto ry consi sts to a la rge exten t ofa long l ist of Nih i l i st crimes , fo l lowed by the mostrelent less pun ishments . I n fo re ign affai rs

,however

,

Russia was taki ng importan t steps . The many d ifiicu lties i n the Ba lkan Pen i nsu la

,u l timately lead i ng to

war and to the Treaty of Berl i n,wi l l be d iscussed i n

a later chapter (see Chapter IX ) ; here i t may suffice

to say that the defeat of Russian i n ten tions agai nstConstanti nople he lped on the growth of Nih i l i sm

,

part ly through a feel i ng of despai r,part ly th rough

a deep disconten t wi th the Government .I n the East Russ ia was more successfu l . Through

out the centu ry the Empi re of the Tsars had beenextended gradua l ly i n the south - east

,and du ri ng the

years of react ion ( 1864— 79) the process of extens ionwent on more rapid ly .

The terri to ry around the Caucasus Mountai ns andthe Casp ian Sea was brought under Russian ru le ;repeated exped itions i nto the deserts of Central Asiaextended the Tsar’s authori ty as far as Merv

,and

roused the fears of Great B rita i n that an i nvasion of

I ndia might fo l low ; by treati es and negot iat ions withCh i na, Russia also made considerable add i tions to her

188 RUSS IA

S iberian dom i n ions , and obta i ned the port of Vlad ivostock, wh ich serves as a term i nus of the great TransS iberian Rai lway

,and as a base for the Russ ian fleet

i n the P acific . The importance of th i s extens ion of

Empi re was on ly gradual ly real i zed,and at the t ime

i t d id not serve to di spel the sense of fa i l u re wh ichthe Balkan settl emen t had left i n Russia .I n 1880,

i n consequence of the attempt at blowi ngup the W i n te r Palace

,the Tsar gave over al l the

execut ive powers of Governmen t to a Specia l C omm ission , at th e head of which he placed General Lori sMe l ikoff. A change i n po l icy fol lowed . M el ikoff wasan extremely abl e and ambi t ious man

,an Armen ian

by bi rth . He was keen - sighted enough to see thatrep ression and pun ishment wou ld not remove thecause of the d i scon tent

,and he was supremely

anxious that h i s own ru le shou ld be a success . He

therefore persuaded the Tsar to al low h im to try aconc i l i atory po l i cy , to resto re and i ncrease the L i beralreforms of the earl i er part of the re ign . Pri sonerswere released , the who lesal e a rrests and ban ishmentsceased ; the severe restrict ions on the press and onthe u n ivers i t ies were relaxed ; the oppress ive powersof the po l ice were restrai ned , and the whole po l i cyof the Governmen t took a d i fferen t d i rection .

The great demand,however

,of the Li beral party

i n Russia was not on ly for bette r and more to l e ran tgovernment

,but also for some ki nd of represen tat ive

i nst i tutions,some fo rm of Parl iament . Gradual ly

Lori s Me l ikofl'

succeeded i n persuad i ng the Tsar thatth is demand must be granted

,i n order that he m ight

regai n the popu lari ty of the early years of h is re ign .

The m i n ister therefore worked ou t an elaboratescheme by wh ich special comm iss ions were to i nvest igate every d istrict of the Empi re , d iscover th e needsof the peop le

,and d raw up suggestions of refo rms .


190 RUSS IA

movable wi l l,and a narrow outlook on l i fe, he had

many of the qual i ti es wh ich wi n personal popu lari ty ,and the ho rror fe l t at h i s father’s murder roused theloyalty and devotion of al l c lasses i n Russ ia . He hadfa l l en u nder the influence of h is o ld tutor

,P ob edo

nostzeff, the head of the“ Holy Synod ” of the O rtho

dox Church , and th i s influence had strengthened i nh im the determ i nation to wi n popu lar affect ion byact i ng as a thorough ly Russ ian , o ldfash ioned

,and

rel igious Tsar , a true L i ttl e Father to h is people .With al l h i s good qual i t i es , however, he combi nedcomparatively l i tt le i n te l lectual abi l i ty . B ismarck, whowas very scorn fu l of h i s powers , once declared that helooked at eve ry -quest ion from the standpoi nt of theRussian peasan t. This perhaps expla i n s why he wasable to wi n the ti tl e of the Peasants ’ Tsar but thehead of an immense Empi re needs a rathe r wider outlook . However, the great mass of the Russian peoplewas sti l l essen tial ly conservat ive ; the Tsar

’s pol i cysucceeded

,the prosperi ty of the country i ncreased ,

and gradual ly N i h i l i sm d ied out , ki l led by thepatriot ism and rel igious feel i ng to wh ich Alexanderappealed . True , i t i s on ly a false o r igno rant patrioti sm wh ich refuses to learn anyth i ng from other nations ,but for a t ime at l east success seemed to fo l low thereactionary pol icy .

Alexander I I I ’s re ign was marked by few externaleven ts . The Tsar on h is access ion had declared thathe would do a l l i n h i s power to mai n tai n Eu ropeanpeace , and on the who l e he held to h i s i n ten tions .H is relat ions with the Balkan States wi l l be descri bedi n another chapter (see p . i n spi te of the manyd ifficu lties there he managed to avo id actual hosti l i t i es .I n Asia , the Russian advances towards Afghan istanconti nued

,and a lmost brought about a war with

B ri tai n , but i n the end Russian and B ri ti sh i n terests

INTERNAL POLICY OF ALEXANDER I I I 191

were peaceably adjusted , and a boundary l i n e wasfixed . However, j ealousy and susp i c ion between thetwo Great Powers remai ned , and i n 189 1 an al l iancewas made between Russia and France, which seemedto promise mutual support to the two most iso l atednations i n E urope , and thus to make for the mai ntenance of peace . The French Republ ic welcomedthe a l l iance as a protect ion agai nst poss i ble dangerfrom Germany , whi le i t was most useful to Russ ia ,as i t enabled her to raise vast loans i n France . Capitalwas bad ly needed i n Russ ia , to bu i ld the rai lways

,

to develop the enormous m i neral weal th , and to he lpon the various manufactu res wh ich were com ing i ntoex istence. The French loans have therefore beenextremely valuable i n aid i ng the material developmen t of Russia .

Alexander,i ndeed , seemed to tu rn h i s whol e atten

tion to i ncreasi ng the material wealth and prosperi tyof h is country , wh i le he h i ndered and prevented intel lectual or po l i t ica l development. He resto red o rde r,and del ivered Russia , to some exten t, from the te rro rof the N ih i l i sts . He encou raged trade by every meansi n h i s power

,strengthened the navy

,reorgan ized the

army,and l i nked up a l l parts of h i s Empi re by care

ful ly plan ned rai lways . He gave specia l attention tothe cond i tion of the peasan ts

,and to the weak po i n ts

i n h is father’s emancipation scheme . He establ i shedLand Banks , to ass ist the peasan ts i n buyi ng thei rlands ; he advanced money and helped them to redeemthei r hold i ngs enti rely from the landlords

, or to obta i nlarger ones where such were necessary . He gave h ispersonal i n terest and assi stance to the d i stricts wh ichwere ravaged by fam i ne , by floods

,or by fire, and he

rearranged taxation , that i t m ight fal l l ess heav i ly onthe peasants . Moreover , he appo i n ted a commiss ionto enqu i re i n to one of the greatest cu rses of the coun try

192 RUSS IA

- drunken ness . The wi nter months i n Russia are soi ntensely co ld , the land i s so comp lete ly buried i nsnow

,that many ki nds of wo rk are imposs i bl e . The

on ly form of amusement avai lable was that wh ich wasafforded by the v i l lage sp i ri t shop , where enormousquanti t i es of “ vodka ” were consumed . Alexande rI I I i n troduced new laws contro l l i ng the sale of intoxicants , and these had the resu l t of decreasi ngdru nken ness to a cons iderable exten t . Another usefu l reform was the i n troduction of Factory Laws

,

model led on those of B ri tai n,to regu late the em

ploymen t of women and ch i ld ren i n the factori es .I n such ways as these , and i n the stricter contro lwh ich he kept over the po l ice

, and the countless othe rofficials with whom Russia i s bu rdened

,one sees

Alexander ’s genu i ne care for h is people ’s prosperi ty .

To see the other s ide of the p ictu re, one must look

at the changes wh ich he i n troduced in education,i n

local government, i n re l ig ion , and i n the treatmen tof the Press . Here one finds Alexander’s ru l i ngpri ncip l e— that i f good were done

,i t must be done

i n h i s way and in no one el se ’s . He bel i eved,to

some exten t rightly,that N ih i l i st opi n ions were due

to an education on ly half u nderstood ; he thereforet ri ed to h i nder the education of the poor. The number of studen ts i n the h igher schoo l s and un ivers i t i eswas l im i ted ; the sons of se rvants and worki ng menwere excl uded from them . The students were v igo rous ly i n spected and kept under strict d isc ipl i n e ; whenthey rose i n protest

,numbers of them were ban ished

to Si beria . An attempt was made to check the growi ng i n terest i n natu ral sc i ence

,and professors of whom

the Governmen t d isapproved were d ism issed from theu n ivers i t i es . The education of women , wh ich hadmade great p rogress i n Russia

,also rece ived a severe

set- back .


194 RUSS IA

and made stri ngen t regu lations to preven t the saleof land to any but Russ ians . These regu lat ionswere particu larly d i rected agai nst the imm igrat ion of

Germans i n to Po l and . Not on ly d id th is retard theprosperi ty of Po land , but i t i nc i ted B i smarck to abrutal pol icy agai nst the Russian Po l es i n Pruss ia

,

many thousands of whom were torn from thei r homesand sen t across the fronti e r i n the depths of thewi n ter of 1885

—6.

I n the Baltic Prov i nces i t was German and Protestan t influences that the Tsar wi shed to uproot. Thepeople of these provi nces were mai n ly of Slav races

,

whi le the nobles and upper classes were German .

No pai n s were spared to set the peasants agai n st theland lo rds , to transfer education i n to Russian hands ,to extend the O rthodox Church ; even the very namesof the towns were changed . As the German elementhad a lways been i n ferio r i n n umbers , the Russ ifica

t ion of the Bal tic Provi nces was accompl i shed com

parative ly eas i ly . Fi n land was a harder problem .

The Fi n n s are a race d ifferen t from any other (except the Magyars) i n Eu rope , with a total ly d i fferen tlanguage . Up to 1807 , however, they had been forcen tu ri es u nder the rul e of Sweden , and were partlySwedish

,partly i ndependen t i n the i r sympath ies and

customs . When they were given over to Russia bythe Treaty of Ti ls i t A lexander I promised to

l eave the i r Const i tu t ion u n touched , and to governthem , not as Empero r of Russia, but as Grand-Dukeof Fi n land . Thus th roughout the n i neteen th centu ry F i n land possessed a rep resen tat ive assemb ly ,the D iet, cons i st i ng of nobles, clergy , burghers , andpeasants

,whose consen t was n ecessary befo re any

legislat ion cou ld be passed .

I f the Tsar kept h i s prom ises,he was powerless

to al ter the Consti tut ion of Fi n land . Although

FINLAND 95

antiquated and rather i neffective, i t certai n ly seemedto work we l l . The F i n ns are a sma l l nation , dwel li ng i n a poor country , yet they are one of the mostprogress ive commun i t ies i n Europe . Rel igioustol e ration and c iv i l freedom had long been ach ievedamong them ,

and when A lexander I I I came to thethrone

,they were far i n advance of the rest of

Russia.There was

,however

,a certai n amoun t of j ealousy

among Russians,because F i n land was less heav i ly

taxed than any other part of the Empi re ; the Tsar,too

,thought that i n case of war

,a sem i - i ndependent

Fi n land m ight be a danger. I t was decided , therefore

,that Fi n land shou ld be “ R uss ified

”. Attempts

were made to i n troduce the Russian language ,Russian co i nage

,customs duties , and to bri ng Fi n

land i n to l i ne as a Russian provi nce,but there was

as yet no di rect attack on the Const i tut ion . (It i sconven ien t here to cont i nue the h istory of Fi n land ,i n stead of deferri ng i t t i l l the re ign of Nicho las I I . )I n 1899 , however, stronger measures were taken ;Nicholas I I i ssued a man i festo wh ich abo l ished thelegis lat ive power of the D iet , and practical ly gaveFi n land the same autocrat ic form of governmen tunder wh ich Russia suffered . The Fi n n ish armywas ama lgamated with the Russian ; Russian offi

c ia ls , po l ice , and sp ies , as wel l as the Russ ian language , were forced upon the F i n ns ; the who l eRussian system of ban ishments

,pol ice searches

,

Press censorsh ip,and i l legal arrests became dai ly

more thoroughly establ i shed . After long pati ence,

the F i n ns rose . I n 1904 the Russian governo r ,Bob rikoff

, was murdered . I n November, 1905 , anational strike ” began . With the exception ofthe necessary provis ion shops , no busi ness of anyki nd was carried on ; t rai n s , trams , schoo l s , offices ,

196 RUSS IA

shops , gas-works— al l stood empty and abandoned .

W i th i n s ix days the Russian Governmen t gave i nand the Consti tut ion was resto red . The F i n ns , however

,thought th i s a good Opportu n i ty to remodel

the i r governmen t ; they therefo re granted u n iversalsuffrage

,putti ng women on exactly the same foot i ng

as men , and i ncl uded i n the new Const i tut ion suchmodern safeguards as Freedom of Speech , Freedomof the Press

,and Freedom of Publ ic Meet i ng.

U nfortunately , i n 1908 the d ifficulties to some exten t began agai n

,because the cen tral Government

claimed the final decis ion i n al l questions wh ichm ight affect the Empi re as a whole . Although th issounds i n many ways a reasonable demand , theF i n n s have considered i t a covert attack on thei rConsti tut ion , and have b itte rly resen ted it. Thestruggle i s st i l l go i ng on , and i t i s impossi bl e tosay how i t w i l l fina l ly be settl ed .

This consideration of Alexander I I I ’s pol icy towards the prov i nces shows how unpopu lar he madeh imsel f among some classes. I n 1894 , when he d ied ,the news was greeted wi th almost equal sorrow andhope.Nicholas I I

,who succeeded h is fathe r in 1894 , and

is st i l l re ign i ng ( in i s a character very d iffi cu l tat presen t to descri be . He seems to belong to thegentle r, undecided type of ru ler, of wh ich AlexanderI and Alexander I I are examples

,though h is acts

are often as autocrat ic as those of N i cholas I orAlexander I I I . I t i s general ly said

,however, that

he i s a weak man who can not stand agai nst theinfluence of h i s m i n isters . U nt i l mo re of the secreth istory of Russia comes to l ight , i t is imposs ibleto speak with real certai n ty either of the Tsar or

h i s po l i cy .

N icholas I I began h is re ign , however, with two or


198 RUSS IA

Tsar offered to set up a Consu ltative Chamber,with

no real powers . Great d i ssati sfaction was expressed ;a general strike ensued i n S t. Petersburg and on

the rai lways ; vague prom ises were made , but thed isorders conti n ued , un ti l at last, i n October, 1905 ,the Tsar consen ted to grant a Const i tut ion and cal l al egi slat ive assembly , the Duma, with l im i ted powers .I n the fo l lowi ng spri ng the el ect ions took p lace (ona system of i nd i rect el ect ion ), and on 27 Apri l thefirst Duma met.1 The two mai n parti es i n i t were the “ Cadets or

extreme L i berals , and the Octobri sts , or Moderates,

who based thei r demands on the Tsar ’s promises of

the previous October. The Cadets had a large ma

jority , and they demanded such extreme and farreach i ng changes that the Governmen t d i sso l ved theDuma after two mon ths ’ sess ion . Another outbreakof muti n i es , ri s i ngs , and bomb outrages fo l lowed , butthe Duma d id not rece ive as much support as m ighthave been expected . I n 1907 the second Duma met .Although a l i tt l e more moderate than the first, i t sti l lwen t far beyond what the M i n i ster of the I n terior

,

Sto lyp i n , cou ld tol e rate ; some of i ts members wereaccused of a plot for corrupti ng the army , and i t a l sowas d isso lved after a few mon ths . Sto lyp i n saw thathe cou ld not wo rk with such an assembly , and therefore , by an Imperial Ukase , he changed the who l esystem of election i n such a way as to producemo re Co nservat ive representatives ; the th i rd Duma

( 1907— 19 12) worked i n to l e rable harmony wi th theM i n isters

,though i t may eas i ly be argued that i t

d id not represen t the people . However, some re

forms were carri ed out , e .g. i nd i vidual ownersh ip of

l and became poss i bl e to the peasant, and a ful le rmeasu re of rel igious toleration was granted , thoughin practice l i ttl e advance has been made .

THE BALKAN PEN INSULA 199

Further than th is i n the h istory of Russia i t i simposs i ble to go at present . I t i s hard to see i n whatd i rection progress i s be i ng made . Liberal s are d iscouraged that no more has been done ; i t i s freelysaid that sel f- governmen t is bei ng crushed out by thearmy of sel f- seeki ng officials and m i n isters , often i noppos i t ion to the real wishes of the Tsar.Yet i t may wel l be that Russ ia i s maki ng s i len tadvances

,i n education and i n material prosperi ty ,

which wi l l i n t ime enable her to assume the respon~

s ib i l ity of sel f-government. 1

CHAPTER IX

THE BALKAN PEN INS ULA

Very fa lse not ions a re en ter ta ined in En g land of the Turk ishna t ion . You know much b e t ter than I do the m i gh ty resou rces and

na t ive wea l th wh ich th is enormous empi re possesses . I am myse l f ada i ly w i tness of the persona l qua l i t ies of the inhab i tan ts , qua l i t ieswh ich , if proper ly d irec ted , a re capab le of sus ta in ing them a ga ins t awor ld of enem ies . But the Governmen t is rad ica l ly b ad , and its mem

b ers , who a re a l l a l ive to its defec ts , have ne i ther the w isdom nor the

coura ge to re form it. The few who have cou rage equa l to the ta skknow not how to reconc i le reforma t ion w i th the prejud ices of the

peop le . And w i thou t th is noth ing can b e effec ted .

— Lord S tra tford de Redcl ifi'

e.

CONSTANTINOPLE , from the fifth to the fifteenth centu ry , was the most c iv i l i zed cap i ta l i n Eu rope— thecentre of al l the great trade routes

,the home of art ,

of ph i losophy , and of cu l tu re,the El Dorado of the

Northern Sagas,the envy of al l poorer lands . A

Crusader i n the year 1204 descri bes how the Westernarmy gazed with awe and adm i ration upon the wonderfu l ci ty, toweri ng over Europe and Asia, crownedwith five hundred gi lded domes a nd sp i res , and

1C f. p . 322.

200 THE BALKAN PENINSULA

encompassed wi th magn ificen t wal l s , c rowded withso ld i ers . Thei r hearts were ch i l l ed , he says , by thereflection that never s i nce the begi n n i ng of the worldhad such an enterprise been undertaken as the s iegeof Constanti nople .To- day Constan ti nopl e i s the least c iv i l i zed

,the

most backward cap i ta l i n Eu rope— backward not on lyi n material express ions of c iv i l izat ion , such as a postalservice

,te lephones , or el ectr ic l ight , but backward

also i n its ideas , i ts modes of l i fe . How and why hasth i s change come about? The shortest answer andthe truest i s s imp ly

m the Turk . The Macedon ianshave two common proverbs wh ich express very wel lthe general effects of Turkish ru l e : “ The Tu rk neverchanges ” , and

“Where the foot of the Turk has trod ,the grass never grows ” . I n 1453 the Tu rks , whohad been gradual ly conqueri ng the Balkan Pen i nsu lafor the last hundred years

,completed thei r conquest

by sto rm i ng Constanti nople . The influence of theconquest of Constan t i nople i n hasten i ng the Renaissance i n I taly i s wel l known . The fate of the BalkanPen i nsu la u nder Tu rkish ru le i s l ess fam i l ia r.The Byzan ti n e (or East Roman) Empi re , wh ichhad fo rmerly i ncl uded the who le pen i nsula, was madeup of a medley of races at l east as various as thoseof Austria—Hungary . C onstan ti nople was the placewhere East and West seemed to meet , and the meeti ng brought with i t a great i nterm i ngl i ng of peoples .Turks

,Bulgars

,Serbs

,Greeks

,I ta l ians , Ruman ians

(or Vlachs) , Alban ian s , Armen ians , Jews , and Gypsies— these are some of the races who i nhabi tedfirst the Byzanti n e Emp i re , then the Turkish Empi re

,down to the year 1815 . The rel igious d iv i

s ions were almost equal ly n umerous : Mohammedans ,Greek O rthodox under a Patriarch , Bulgarian O rthodox under an Exarch , Roman Cathol ics u nder the



to convert or slaughter al l the Christians . Tributethen remai ned

,and hence the Chri stian subjects of

the Su l ta n were always treated i n theory as conquered people

,as l i ttl e bette r than cattl e . I n practice

,

however,the Turks must have had some good qual i t ies

as ru lers , or the Turk ish Emp i re cou ld never haveheld together at al l . The fact seems to be that theSul tan general ly left h is subjects alone as long asthey were subm issive , or u nt i l he was i n u nusual ly d i ren eed of money or troops . Then he would swoopdown upon them i n merci less and u nexpected exactions . Cond i t ions vari ed very much from provi nceto provi nce ; one group m ight be material ly pros

perous , and general ly u nmo l ested ; the next m ight beracked by d isp roportionate taxation

,and arbi t rary

adm i n istration of j ustice . I n fact, the wo rst featu reof the Turkish ru l e was the fact that i t on ly grantedpriv i leges

,and never acknowledged rights or customs .

As a ru le,the various races remai n ed at peace, b e

cause the i r social customs and thei r i nd iv idual i ty wereleft to them

,but they had absolutely no guarantee

that th i s wou ld be so . When and where the Su l tanpleased

,when and where the i nd iv idual Tu rki sh

governor pleased , he wou ld i n terfere wi th unspeakable barbari t i es— and there was no redress .When the i n tel lectual rev ival s of the eighteen thcentury

,the ideas of the French Revo l ut ion , and the

n i neteenth centu ry ideal of national i ty began to touchthe Balkan Pen i n su la

,they came i n confl ict with the

unchangi ng natu re of the Turk , wi th the uncompre

hend i ng O rien tal ch aracter, with the unquestionedteach i ng of the Mohammedan rel igion . Then beganthat long seri es of wars and i n term i tten t atroci t i es i nthe Near East, at wh ich publ ic op i n ion has almostceased to be moved , so fam i l iar have men grown wi ththe idea that there i s always “ trouble i n the Balkans ’

TURKISH EM PIRE1815

English M iles


The first step i n the d ismemberment of the TurkishEmpi re was taken by the Greeks . The idea of Greeki ndependence

,and the rev ival of the glori es that once

belonged to Greece , had been fostered by Russ ia evers i nce the time of Peter the Great — partly out of

sympathy with the Greek O rthodox Church , partlyfrom a general po l i cy of host i l i ty to the Sultan . Thei ncreasi ng prosperi ty of the Greeks

,together wi th a

great revival of i n terest i n Greek h istory and l i te ratu re and language , had brought the movement tothe fore

,j ust at the time when the French Revolu

tion came as a vast st imu lus to al l Eu rope . Thefirst practical outcome of Greek asp i rations was thefound i ng of a secret soc iety , the H etaz

'

r z'

a s'

lz'

ke (orsoc iety of fri ends) , wh i le i n Western Europe P h i lhell en io soc iet ies sp rang up duri ng the war.The objects of the H etaz

'

r ia P /zz'

l ike, which soonhad a membersh ip of of the most p rom i nen tGreeks

,were to expel the Tu rks from Europe , to

rev ive the o ld Byzan ti ne Empi re , and to secu re thesupport of Russ i a .The year 1820 seemed to i nvi te action . Al i Pasha ,the clever but sh i fty and cruel Governor of Jan i na ,had at last gone too far

,and war had broken out

between h im and h is nom i nal suzerai n,the Sul tan .

S imu ltaneously , the Greek Revolt broke out attwo centres— in Mo ldavia-Wallach ia (now Ruman ia)under Pri nce Alexander Ips i lan ti

,a general i n the

Russ ian army , and also i n the Morea . Ipsi lanti’

s

revo l t was thorough ly u nsuccessfu l ; i n sp ite of thegeneral Russian sympathy , the Tsar, Alexander I ,refused to cou ntenance a revolution ; I ps i lant i wasdefeated and obl iged to flee .I n the Morea the i nsu rrection was far mo re the

outcome of a national sp i ri t and less dependen t onRussia ; i t was therefore far more successfu l . The



poraries on the Cont i nen t , and h is death brought h imrenewed fame as the martyr in the cause of Greeceand l iberty.

I n 1823 Bri tai n , unde r Can n i ng’s influence , recog

n ized the Greeks as bel l igerents , i . e . acknowledgedthem as a nat ion at war with the Tu rks , and notas a mere group of rebe ls . Th is action led Russ iaand Austria to recons ide r the po l icy of igno ri ngthe war ; i t wou ld not be wise to al low B ri tai n to

i nte rvene alone , and therefo re Aust ri a and Russiaun i ted to d iscuss schemes by which Greece m ight beprotected by the European Powers . I n 1825 the Tsarseemed to be on the po i n t of declari ng war on theTu rks , but he d ied sudden ly on 1 December

,and

h i s successo r reversed h i s po l i cy for the t ime (see

p .

Meanwh i l e the Su l tan,Mahmud

,had sought help

from the most powerful of h is vassal s,Mehemet Al i

of Egypt , who sen t h i s son ,I b rah im Pasha

,with an

army and a splend id fleet to Greece. He rapid lyrecovered the ground that had been lost

,and a new

phase i n the strugg le began . I t was now real ly war ,and not merely al ternate massacres . Everywhere theTurks advanced u nti l they came to Misso longh i . Thisi l l-defended c i ty stood a s iege of twelve months ; atlast

,driven by hunger

,the i nhabitan ts abandoned

the town , and endeavou red to figh t the i r way th roughthe Turkish l i nes . They were cut down with horri bleslaughter by I brah im ’s troops ; but the gal lant ry anddoggedness of thei r defence revived men ’s bel ief i nGreece once more , and money and men poured i nfrom al l over Eu rope . We are figh ting said theTurks

, not with the Greeks , but wi th a l l Eu rope .”

The s iege of Athens fo l lowed on that of Misso longh i ,but i n sp i te of cons iderable help from some B ri ti shofficers , the Greeks were unable to sustai n the attacks ,

TR EATY OF ADR IANOPLE 207

and Athens fel l i n to the hands of the Tu rks on 5 J une,1827 .

Negotiations had been go i ng on al l th i s t ime . I n1826Can n i ng ’s part was made eas ie r by a requestfrom the Greeks tha t Great B ri tai n shou ld i ntervene .He was now ab le to show his sympathy mo re plai n ly ,and to put pressu re on Russia to combi ne with h im i ndemand i ng terms from Turkey .

Thus i n 1827 the Treaty of London was agreedon ; Britai n , France, and Russia were to u rge therecogn i tion of Greek autonomy , u nder the Su l tan

’snomi na l suzerai n ty ; i f the Su ltan wou ld not agree ,he was to be coerced by a “ peaceful blockade ” .

The combi ned fleets of Bri ta i n , France , and Russiaendeavou red to fo rce I brah im to observe the arm ist iceto which the Greeks had agreed , but by acciden t andpartial m isu ndersta nd i ng a battl e took p lace i n Navari no Bay i n wh ich the Tu rkish and Egyptianfleets were wiped out. The Su l ta n was en raged byth is defeat , and prepared for war with the th ree hosti lePowers . By th i s t ime , however, Can n i ng was dead ;Goderich ’s m i n i stry weakly adm itted that the batt lewas an “ untoward event (as i ndeed i t was) , andbacked out of al l further proceed i ngs . Russia enteredi n to the war , and France u ndertook to expel I brah imfrom the Morea . I n 1829 the Treaty o f Adrianopleob l iged Tu rkey (a) to acknowledge the autonomy of

Greece,under a pri nce to be chosen by the Great

Powers ; to acknowledge the i ndependence of

Mo ldavia-Wa l lach ia (see p . and (c) to concedea number of po i n ts to Russia i n con nection with thenavigation of the Bospho rus and B lack Sea .

I n 1832 the i ndependence of Greece was more fu l lyrecogn ized , and the country was made an i ndependen tki ngdom under a Bavarian pri nce

,O tto I .

The ki ngdom thus b rought i n to ex istence was sma l l


and poor ; i t had less than i nhabi tants (forThessaly

,which has a large Greek population

,was not

i nc luded) , and i t was barren and exhausted after thelong and i rregu lar war. At fi rst Otto governed as anabsol u te monarch , i n the m idst of much d isconten tand d isu n ion . I n 1844, however, the parties supported by B ri tai n and France succeeded i n maki ngthe Ki ng accept a Consti tution

,with a respons ible

m i n istry and two Houses of Parl iament . Otto I Iwas never popular , and i n 1862 the army and thepeople combi ned to effect a revo l ut ion and to deth roneh im . Next year

,through the influence of B ri ta i n ,

Pri nce Geo rge of Denmark was chosen Ki ng , andi s sti l l ru l i ng ; h is ki ngdom was strengthened bythe recovery of the Ion ian I slands

,which B ri ta i n

had held s i nce 1815 , and now ceded to Greece .The h i story of Greece s i nce 1863 i s a record of

spasmodic attempts to wi n back mo re terri tory fromTurkey

,e i ther i n Thessaly or i n Macedon ia . The

extension of the Greek fron tier i n Thessaly,which was

prom ised i n the Treaty of Berl i n,was on ly partial ly

accompl ished i n 1881 by the i n terven tion of thePowers . Crete i n 1866

,and agai n i n 19 10,

dec laredi ts own un ion with Greece , but Greece has not yetbeen abl e to an nex it. The ki ngdom has thus gai nedsl ightly i n terri to ry, and i s gai n i ng i n prosperi ty andi n population . But i t i s not yet satisfied . I t is saidthat i n Greek schoo l s the ch i ldren are taught , not theactual boundari es of the ki ngdom ,

but the boundarieswh ich the patriots hope to reach one day .

Side by s ide wi th the emancipat ion of Greece wentthe bu i ld i ng up of Serv ia . Servia had once been agreat power wi th an emp l re stretch i ng almost acrossthe Balkan Pen i n su la . But that was i n the seventhcen tu ry . I n 1815 the people were mai n ly peasants ,with l i ttl e wealth or commerce

,l i tt le knowledge of thei r


2 10 THE BALKAN PEN INSULA

After Greece and Servia and the Moldavian-Wallaob ian provi nces had thus cla imed and won thei ri ndependence or autonomy , Turkey saw no morenational upris i ngs for some years , and thus one

must tu rn back to the developmen t of Tu rkey i tse lfafter 1830.

Mahmud I I,the Su l tan , fu l ly u nderstood the weak

ness of h i s pos i tion at the end of the war of the GreekI ndependence . He saw also that h i s power outsideEu rope was seriously th reatened by h is far too

capable vassal , Mehemet Al i . Mahmud,however

,

was a man of cons iderable strength of character andsome open ness of m i nd . He tu rned h is atten t ion toreform i ng the Governmen t and thus strengthen i ngh i s hold on h i s subjects ; especial ly d id he strive toput members of al l rel igions on an equal i ty

,i n order

to remove the constan t excuse for i n terference on thepart of the Christ ian Powers . I n h i s desi re for reformthe Su ltan was backed up by a famous B ri t ish Ambassador, Stratford Can n i ng (Lord Stratford de Redcl i ffe) ,a man who had much sympathy wi th Turkey . He

refused to bel ieve that Turkey was real ly a s ickman ” , whose decease m ight be expected at any mo

ment ; he qu ite frankly denounced the Government asthorough ly bad

,but he also acknowledged that i t had

elements of strength,and he not on ly encouraged

Mahmud to make changes, but often obl iged h im,by

the force of strong personal i ty and great pers istence,

to carry out usefu l reforms ; above al l , he firmlyopposed Russ ia ’s claim to i n terfere i n Turkey withoutthe co- operat ion of the other Powers . Stratford Canmi ng ’s pos i t ion was that , bad though the ru le of Turkeym ight b e, yet the d issol ution of Turkey would be farworse , for i t wou ld be fo l lowed by a European war b etween Austria and Russia, and perhaps other Powers .W i th Constant i nople i n the hands of ei ther Austria or

MEHEMET ALI 2 11

Russia,the balance of power would be en t i rely upset,

and the whol e work of the Congress of Vien na wouldbe undone . Hence the trad itional pol icy of B ri ti shstatesmen to bolster up the s ick man ” , even i n sp i teof a keen demand that he shou ld be tu rned out of

Europe. I t has often made B ri tai n too carelessof the l ives and happi ness of subject races wi th i nthe Turkish Empi re , but there has at least beena sol id reason for the support given to the Turks

(see p . However, du ri ng the years 1831—4 1,

the Su l tan was more occup i ed wi th the questionof Mehemet A l i than wi th that of reform . Afterthe Egypt ian army had been ej ected from Greece

,

Mahmud I I seems to have sought an opportu n i ty tohum i l iate h is great vassal . Mehemet Al i therefo rereso lved to strike the first blow . I n 1831 he and h isson I brah im advanced agai nst Syria , go i ng on du ri ngthe next year to captu re Damascus

,and to march

th rough Asia M i nor t i l l he was almost wi th i n s ight ofConstant i nople . At the same time he claimed fromthe Sultan the governorsh ip of al l the provi nceshe had conquered . The Su l tan i n despai r i nv itedRussia to i n tervene

,but the other Powers , j ealous

of Russia , tri ed to make h im come to an agreementwith Meh emet Al i , by granti ng most of h i s demands .Mahmud ’s pride was hurt

,and he tried to rid h imsel f

of Mehemet Al i by maki ng a very subm iss ive agreement wi th Russia— the Treaty of U nkiar - S ke less i

( 1833) by which Tu rkey adm itted the paramoun t influence of Russia, and gave her the excl usive rightto leave or en ter the B lack Sea by

‘ the Dardanel les .Syria was left u nder Mehemet Al i ’s ru le , but re

mai ned discontented and unsettl ed,i ts peace broken

by constant i nsu rrections . I n 1839 Mahmud , hav i ngreo rgan ized h is army and h i s commerce , ventured to

attack Syria , but wi th i n a few months he d ied , and

2 12 THE BALKAN PENINSULA

was succeeded by Abdul Mej id , a boy of s ixteen .

Agai n the five Great Powers i n tervened . Russianow endeavoured to act i n harmony wi th B ritai n ;F rance , however, had conceived a romantic and i l lfounded adm i ration for Mehemet Al i , and was d isposed to make favou rable terms with h im without theassen t of the other Powers . Fi nal ly , B ri ta i n , Russia ,and Austria acted togethe r to enforce the Convemt ion of London , en ti rely igno ri ng France . TheFrench m i n isters tal ked of hosti l i t i es , the Frenchnation was genu i n ely en raged , but i n the end noth i ngcame of thei r anger. The whole ep isode was of greatd iplomatic importance

,i t al so helped to d iscred i t the

monarchy i n France (see p . but i ts practicalconsequences were not very great . Mehemet Al iwas ousted from Syria by a combi ned fleet , but hewas al lowed to remai n hered i tary Pasha ‘

of Egypt .Soon afterwards he d ied . Mehemet was sometimeshai led as a benefactor to h i s nation

,an en l ightened

despot,a d isc ip le of Bentham ; but the truth seems

rather that he was “ real ly an i l l i terate barbarian ,cou rageous , cruel , astute , fu l l of wi les , avaric ious ,and bound lessly ambi t ious Yet h is d ign i ty , charm ,

qu ick wit , and knowledge of human natu re enabledh im to keep the d iplomatists of Europe very i l l atease for many years .The i nternal h i story of Turkey between 1820 and

1860 d iv ides i nto two clearly marked periods— theperiod i n wh ich Mahmud 11 carried on a reform i ngpo l i cy of h is own , and the period i n wh ich Abdu lMej id carri ed out the reforms wh ich Stratford Cann i ng pract ical ly forced upon h im . Mahmud ’s methodswere characteri sti c ; i n 1826he wished to get rid ofa barbarous and muti nous army , the Jan issari es ; hetherefore blew up thei r barracks

,slaughtered and

exi led the su rvivors,and set to work to create a new



creeds have conti n ual ly existed,and sti l l ex ist . Never

theless , Can n i ng’s efforts showed the Western Powers

what practical po i n ts they must i ns ist on i n the i r deali ngs with the Turks

,and they have also shown the

people an ideal to be aimed at.

The fore ign relations of the Turkish Empi re weregeneral ly peacefu l du ri ng the years fo l lowi ng 184 1.

I n 1849 Kossuth’

s fl ight to Turkish terr i tory (see

p . 15 1) l ed to some d isagreemen t with Austria andRussia , but Stratford Can n i ng backed up Turkey

’srefusa l to hand over the refugees , and peace waspreserved .

I n 185 2 , however, a mo re momentous quarrel arose .The Emperor Napo l eon I I I wanted to assert them i l i tary pre- em i nence of h is nation ; i t was ev identthat he was seeki ng a war. The al leged cause of d isagreement was the right of access to the Holy Placesin Palesti n e (see p . but a far mo re importantquestion was the Tsar’s cla im to a protectorate overal l the Christian subjects of the Sul tan . The stepsl ead i ng up to the Crimean War have been traced i ndeal i ng with the h i story of Russia ; France , Bri tai n ,and I taly were figh ting on behal f of Turkey ’s i nde

pendence, and because they feared any extens ionof the power of Russia . The war began with thes i nki ng of the Turkish fleet i n the harbour of S i nope ,but i n the land campaign i n Wal lach ia the Turkswere successfu l in driv i ng back the Russian army .

With the second part of the war, the reduction of theCrimea , Turkey had l i ttl e to do , and she was a moreor l ess pass ive partner i n the Treaty of Pari s , 1856.

By th is treaty , however, the Powers bound themselvesnot to i ntervene i n Turkish affai rs

,after extract i ng

from the Su ltan a vague promise of reform ; theB lack Sea was to be kept open to merchan t sh ips ofal l nations b ut closed to a l l men -of-war.

N EW BALKAN STATES 2 15

With the end of the Crimean War a new phasebegan i n Turkey . Stratford Cann i ng left Constant in0ple i n 1858, and with h im d isappeared al l hope of

genu i ne and thorough reforms . The process of d ismembermen t of the Turkish Empire began agai n ;the feeble sparks of national sp i r i t were fan ned i ntofire by atrocious m isgovernment

,and the Western

Powers took up the idea of encou ragi ng the growthof buffer States to stand between Tu rkey and herenem ies , Russia and Austria .

Ruman ia was the first of these new “ buffer StatesI n 1856the two prov i nces of Mo ldavia and Wal lach iawere subj ect on ly to the vague suzerai n ty of theSu l tan

,and they obtai ned an i ncrease of terri to ry

from Russia ; i n 1858 they strengthened thei r pos i t ionby un ion , and i n 1866Pri nce Charles of Hohenzo l le rnbecame ruler of the two provi nces , taki ng the t i tle ofKi ng i n 1881. Thus a barrier was erected betweenRussia and Turkey , and when the next war broke out

(in 1877 ) Ruman ia had to be reckoned with .

I n 1861 the Su l tan Abdu l Mej id d ied , and h i s successo r, Abdu l Aziz , was ignorant , i ncapable, andun i n terested i n reforms . The begi n n i ng of h is reignwas marked by fresh nat ional ri s i ngs . The Serbsi n Servia

,Herzegovi na, Bosn ia, and Montenegro

were by 1862 engaged i n a general revol t agai nstthe Sul tan , and the d ream of a revived Serv ianEmpi re once more i nsp i red the ki ndred races . Mon

tenegro and Herzegovi na were bad ly beaten , but Servia i n 1867 secu red the withd rawal of Turki sh troopsfrom her terri tory , and pract ical ly acqu i red the com

p lete i ndependence that was formal ly granted i n1878.

I n 187 1 a new d iplomatic s i tuation was created i nEurope . Coun t Andrassy became M i n ister for Fo re ignAffai rs i n Austria-Hungary

,and he and B ismarck

2 16 THE BALKAN PENINSULA

arranged an i n fo rmal “ League of the Three Em

perors”

(Austria, Germany , and Russ ia) , whichaimed at settl i ng the Eastern Question by peacefu lmeans . For the time B ritai n seemed to be oustedfrom al l i n terest i n the matter

,but i t soon became

apparen t that the th ree al l i es could not long agree.By 1875 i t was eviden t that Tu rkey was agai n ina very d isqu ieti ng posi tion . The prom ises made inthe Treaty of Pari s had not been kept by AbdulMGJId ; Abdu l Az iz was even less l i kely to keep them .

I n 1875 the peoples of Herzegoy ina and Bosn ia ,burdened past endu rance by the extravagance of theSul tan

,rose agai n i n revo l t , and were vigorously

upheld by Servia and Montenegro . The Powersprotested , and the Sultan made promises ; Britai nseemed unwi l l i ng to take any firm stand or to attemptto coerce Turkey . Early i n 1876 the Powers presen ted the Sul tan with the “ Andrassy Note ” —a verydefin ite protest aga i nst h i s m isgovernment . TheSu l tan accepted the protest and made further elaborate promises . But as he cou ld see that the Powerswere dai ly more at variance wi th each other, he proceeded to do absol ute ly noth i ng ; the rebel l ions anddistu rbances went on as before

,and i n May , 1876,

the French and German Consu ls at Salon ika weremurdered .

Once more a protest was sen t —the Berl i n Memorandum— and th i s t ime i t was accompan ied by a cleari nt imation that the Powers wou ld take efficacious

measu res to secu re the i r demands . Meanwh i le even tswere movi ng fast i n Constan ti nople“ On 29 Maya momentary revol ut ion took place

,Abdul Az iz was

deposed , and h is place taken by Murad V . Therevolution was the work of a Li beral and patrioticparty , l ed by M idhat Pasha, and the first of the“ Young Turks ” . The new Turkish Governmen t



tinople du ri ng the wi nte r of 1876— 7 , proposed termsby which the Powers were to supervi se the most necessary reforms . The Sul tan refused the terms , and i tbecame eviden t that noth i ng but war wou ld make h iml i sten to fo re ign representations . Accord i ngly, Russ iadeclared war i n 1877 , al l the othe r Powers engagi ngto remai n neutral . The war was welcomed i n Russ ia

,

because i t was ostens i bly a war on behalf of Ch ri st iansagai nst Turks

,and also because i t o ffered a d ivers ion

from the outrages of the N ih i l i sts (see p .

Ruman ia agreed to co-operate wi th Russia , and atfirst i t seemed as i f the march on Constanti noplewould be almost u nopposed . However, the Turksstubbo rn ly defended the Shipka Pass i n J u ly

,1877 ,

and wen t on to entrench themselves i n P l evna , thekey to the ch ief h igh roads of Bulgaria . The Tu rkisharmy , though inefficien tly commanded , was largelycomposed of Alban ian s

,a fierce mountai n pe0p1e ,

who make some of the best sold iers i n E u rope . TheRussians were obl iged to u ndertake the siege of

Plevna , and i t he ld out for fou r months (SeptemberDecember, When Plevna was taken , however,the way south was clear

,and the Russian army ad

vanced as far as Adrianople . The Sul tan now suedfor peace

,and i n March

,1878, the Treaty of San

Stefano was drawn up . I ts ch ief pri ncip le was thecreation or recogn it ion of new national States i n theBalkan Pen i nsu la . The Sultan was obl iged to recogn ize the i ndependence of Ruman ia

,Servia

,and

Montenegro (see p . with en larged boundaries ,whi le an en ti re ly new State

,Bulgaria

,was to extend

from the B lack Sea to the E gean , and westwardalmost as far as the Adriatic

,thus cutti ng off an

immense sl ice of Turk i sh terri tory (see sketch map) .Russia was to gai n Bessarabia and the Dob rudja ,

in

exchange for other terri tori es gran ted to Ruman ia .

THE BALKAN PENINSULA

Th is treaty,however, was exceed i ngly u npopular

wi th the other Powers . Russ ia stood to gai n far toomuch ; i t was once more the o ld question of thebreak- up of Turkey i n the i n te rests of Russia . In

defence of the other Powers , i t m ust be u rged thatRuss ia had shown no signs of bei ng able to governher own te rri tori es i n a l i beral and to le ran t sp i ri t ;there was

,the refore , l i ttl e to be gai ned by replaci ng

Turki sh by Russ ian influence. The “ Great Bu lgaria ” created by the treaty was the real stumbl i ngblock ; the recen t war had shown how enti relyRuman ia was at Russ ia ’s d i sposal

,and i t was

thought that Bulgaria wou ld be equal ly subservient .There had been a great educational movement amongthe Bulgars i n the n i neteen th cen tury ; they had madecons ide rable progress ; the proposed Bu lgarian Stateco rresponded to a great exten t wi th the old Bulgarian Empi re of the ten th centu ry ; the Macedon ianprovi nces i ncl uded a very large group of the B ulgarian race . Nevertheless , i t seemed eviden t that aGreat Bulgaria merely meant an enormous extens ionof Russ ian influence, fo r i n 1878 no one cou ld havefo reto ld the immense and i ndependen t developmen tof Bu lgaria wh ich has taken place . Afte r forci blep rotests from B rita i n and Austria, Russia agreedthat the treaty should be revi sed . Accord i ngly , i n1878 represen tat ives of Russia , Germany , France ,Bri tai n

,Austria

,I taly

,and Turkey met at the C on

gress of Berl i n , under the presidency of B ismarck,who proceeded to play what he cal l ed the part of anhonest broke r ” i n bri ngi ng the others to an agreement . As he had prev iously declared that the wholeBalkan question was not wo rth the bones of a si nglePomeran ian grenad i er, he cou ld afford to be impartial .By the revi sed treaty Servia, Montenegro

,and

Ruman ia agai n secured thei r i ndependence,but Great



he so ld almost £4 ,ooo ,ooo worth of shares i n theSuez Canal to Britai n . But th i s cou ld not avert thebankruptcy wh ich was eviden tly hangi ng over h im .

Bri tai n and France,which had repeated ly granted

loans to Egypt , now undertook what was cal ledthe “ Dual Con tro l ” over her finances , and tri edto bri ng some order out of the chaos . I smai l , however

,objected ; the two Powers then appealed to

the Su l tan , and I smai l was amazed to find h imsel fdeposed , and h is son , Tewfik, appoi nted Khed ive i nh i s place The Dual Con tro l was agai n setup , but i n 1882 i t was d istu rbed by an i n su rrectionunder Arabi Pasha . Arabi appears to have ri sen atfirst i n protest agai n st bad governmen t , but he wen ton to show host i l i ty to a l l fore igners . When thei nsu rrection developed i n to a massacre , the B ri t i shfleet bombarded Alexandria as a warn i ng . Theri s i ng

,however

,cont i n ued ; the Sul tan refused to take

any steps ; France refused poi n t- blank to co- operatefurther with B ri ta i n ; I taly wou ld have noth i ng todo with the matter. Bri tai n , therefore , set to workalone to restore peace and order, and that i s whyEgypt to- day is u nder B ri ti sh occupation . Arabi ’srevo l t had been crushed at Tel - el - Kebi r by S i rGarnet Wolseley

,but if B ri tai n had then ret i red from

Egypt al l the work of pacification and reorgan ization would have had to begi n afresh . France wasextremely bitter about the action of B ri tai n i n th i smatter

,but there was no serious reason why she

shou ld not have joi ned i n the m i l i tary operation s , andso have mai n ta i ned the Dual Contro l . Thus thelast sh reds of the Sul tan ’s authori ty i n Egypt hadd isappeared by 1882 .

I n 1885 , by a peacefu l revo l ut ion , Eastern Rumel i awas u n i ted to Bulgaria

,and the Sul tan was obl iged

to accept the fact . I n 1894 t roub les began agai n i n

ARMENIAN MASSACRES 223

Armen ia,where the Christians were bei ng harsh ly

treated ; Bri tai n , France , and Russia i n tervened on

the i r behalf,and the Su l tan agreed to a scheme

of reform . But h is acceptance was immediate lyfo l lowed by a terri ble massacre , i n wh ichpersons are said to have peri shed . I t was to l e rablyclear that these massacres had ei ther been i nsp i red ,or at least con n ived at, by the Turkish Government. Noth i ng eff ective was done by way of pro

test ; the Powers could not agree as to what actionshould be taken . Germany by th is t ime had cometo the conclus ion that the Near East d id concernher

,and she had been very busy i n obtai n i ng rai l

way concessions from Turkey , and i n acti ng i n aconc i l iato ry fash ion towards the Sul tan . Noth i ngthen was done , and i n 1896 the Turks wen t on to

massacre Armen ians i n Constan ti nople i tself.I n 1897 war broke out between Turkey and Greece ;the Greeks were speed i ly and thoroughly defeated ,and had to sacrifice part of the i r te rri tory i n Thessaly .

The Powers, however, took the oppo rtun i ty to removeCrete from Turkish contro l and put i t u nder Pri nceGeorge of Greece as H igh Commiss ioner.The centre of trouble i n the Balkan Pen i nsu la was

now Macedon ia . Macedon ia touches on most of thei ndependent States of the Pen i nsu la, and contai ns am ixed population of Greeks

,Bulgars

,Serbs

,Alba

n ians , and Ruman ians . I t i s therefore a bone of

contention among the other States . I t had been givento Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano

,and thus

Bulgaria always fel t she had claim to it. Yet i t hada cons iderable proport ion of Ruman ians among i tspopulation ; i t was the on ly poss ible prov i nce wh ichGreece could add to her terri tori es , and there aremany Greeks i n Macedon ia ; moreover , i f Servi a wasto expand , the easiest way wou ld be th rough Mace


don ia. Meanwh i l e , the Turk ru led there as everywhere else — with arb i trary oppression

,with heavy

taxat ion,with rel igious persecut ion

,with corrupt

j ustice , with periodic massacres . Bes ides th is,the

ord i nary burden of Turkish ru le , Macedon ia has beendistracted by an imm igrat ion of Serbs

,Bulgars

,

Greeks , and Ruman ians , from the i ndependentStates , each keen on prov i ng that Macedon ia oughtto be an nexed to h is own State

,each sti rr i ng up

stri fe that made the usual confus ion infin itely worse .I n 1903 the Great Powers concen trated thei r attent ion on Macedon ia , and presen ted to the Su l tan ascheme of reform , which was to be defin itely carriedout u nder jo i n t supervi s ion . For a t ime mattersimproved , but i n 1908 a revo l u t ion i n Constan t i nopleput an end to these efforts on behalf of Macedon ia .

For some years the “ Young Turks ” had beengrowing stronger . As a party they aimed at reforms

,

and at the re- establ i shmen t of a L iberal Const i tut ion .

No one had qu i te bel ieved i n thei r real strength,for

they had l ived mostly i n exi le,and had not squan

dered thei r resou rces i n prematu re attempts . How

ever,they gradual ly made many converts i n the

army,and the year 1908 seemed a favourable oppor

tun ity for act ion . There was worse trouble thanusual 1n Alban ia

,where the Turkish Governmen t

was mak i ng a steady effort to i mpose taxation . TheAlban ian makes a sp lend id sol d ier

,but he compl i

cates the work of government by calm ly observ i ngNo

,we do not pay taxes . We are Alban ian , and

do not l i ke to ”. For years they had been a l lowed

to go untaxed , i n consideration of thei r services i nthe army ; now the attempt to enforce taxation provoked constan t ri s i ngs and i rregular warfare .The revolution was carried ou t very easi ly . TheCommittee of Un ion and Progress had estab



compl icated for Turkey by a ri s i ng i n Alban ia .Meanwhi le i n the Balkans a s i tuat ion of great gravi tywas aris i ng

,and Turkey , to free her hands

,made

peace with I taly on 18 October , 19 12 . The sameday saw the fi rst engagement of a more momentouswar

,the war of the Balkan League

,which opens a

n ew and u ncerta i n chapter i n th e h i story of EasternEurope .1

After th i s rap id sketch of the fortu nes of the Turki sh Empi re

,a word or two may be said of the

i ndependent States wh ich have broken loose fromTurkish rule .Li tt l e , perhaps , need be added to what has beensaid of Ruman ia and Serv i a . Ruman ia is advanci ngrapid ly i n material p rosperi ty , and i n loyal ty to i tsKi ng and Queen . Servia m ight advance if i t couldput an end to the quarrel s of i ts r ival dynasti es ; i tspeasan ts at least are i ncreas i ngly prosperous .I t i s Bu lgaria that has been the real su rpri se of thePen i n sula . The Bu lgarian rev ival may be d i rectlytraced to a h istory of Bulgarian Tsars and Sai n ts ,written i n 1782 , wh ich rev ived the national memori es .The nat ion seemed to awake from a long sleep , j usti n t ime to feel the impulse of the French Revo l ution .

Ever s i nce,the Bulgars have been en thusiasts for

educat ion ; a schoolmaster i s considered as essen tial lya patriot ; even i n the V i l lages that have been raidedby the Turks

,i t i s said that the first bu i ld i ng to be

rebu i l t i s the schoo l . I n 1870 the Bulgarian Chu rch ,which had always wavered between the Pope at Romeand the Patriarch at Constan ti nop le , became i nde

1 The war of the Balkan League against Turkey dur ing the win ter of 1912—3has profound ly mod ified the si tuat ion describ ed in 11115 chapter . Servia ,

M on

tenegro ,Bu lgar ia, and G reece have en larged their te rr1tor ies at the expense of

Turkey, b ut It 15 as yet too soon to descr1be the final sett lement

BULGAR IA 227

penden t of both under an Exarch of i ts own . I n 1878

Bulgaria became an almost i ndependen t pri nc ipal i ty,but nei ther Russia nor any of the other Powers real izedhow much th i s pri ncipal i ty would develop . Almosta l l wri ters agree i n cal l i ng the Bu lgars steady , l ab or ious , wel l- balanced , th ri fty , reserved , man ly , andtenacious . They are essen ti al ly an agricu l tu ral race ,not bri l l ian tly c lever

,but wi th a sane pract ica l j udg

ment wh ich made Lord Sal isbu ry say that Bulgaria“ seemed to have leaped i n to the world ready armedwith a l l the panoply of mature po l i t ical wisdom ”

.

The Bu lgars are pre- em i nen tly a people capable of

understand i ng and work i ng a consti tut ional government .Russia was thorough ly deceived i n Bulgaria.

When Pri nce Alexander of Battenberg was first

accepted as Pri nce of Bulgaria, he was ent i rely underRussian influence, but he gradual ly took up a morei ndependen t pos i t ion , and after a short and successfu lwar with Servia i n 1885 , he bade fai r to become apopular national hero . Russia was alarmed

,and

an exci ti ng episode fo l lowed . Some of Alexander ’sofficers were i nsp i red by Russ ia to se ize the Pri ncei n the m iddle of the n ight , force h im with th reatsof death to abdicate h i s th rone , and final ly carryh im off. The great Bulgarian M i n ister

, S tamb u loff,roused the Bulgars to bri ng h im back

,but he was

now too much i ncl i n ed to be subm issive to Russia,

and as he found th i s po l i cy wou ld be very unpopu lar,

he abdicated vo l untari ly .

Pri nce Ferd i nand of Saxe - Coburg - Gotha , whosucceeded h im , has been general ly popu lar , and hastaken up a more and more i ndependen t pos i t iontowards Russia, unti l , i n 1908, Bulgaria was able todec lare herse l f an ent i rely i ndependent ki ngdom .

The smal lest of the Ba lkan States,Mon tenegro

,


claims to have been i ndependen t th rough the centu ries

,never hav i ng been conquered by the Turks .

I t i s a t i ny p ri nc ipal i ty among the moun tai ns, in

habited by a race of hardy warriors,whose resources

are few , but whose wants are fewer. I n the constantstruggle wi th the Turks , wh ich lasted down to 1876,Montenegro developed an abso l u t i st m i l i tary governmen t. The Pri nce was u n l im i ted i n h i s power ; hewas the head of the army , and every man was awarrior ; he was al so the foun ta i n of j ustice , therewere no lawyers i n Mon tenegro

,and every case came

d i rectly before the Pri nce for settl ement . I n 1876Montenegro en tered upon her final war wi th Turkey ,and obta i ned cons iderab le success . By the Treatyof Berl i n her bou ndari es were cons iderably en larged ,and she gai ned access to the sea

,at Antivari , though

the port that she most covets,Cattaro

,st i l l remai n s

to Austria.S i nce then Montenegro has stead i ly progressed i n

i ts own way , and i n 1906the Pri nce so far modified

the form of governmen t as to cal l a Parl iamen t. I n19 10 he took the ti tl e of K i ng .

Though Gladston e ’s Opi n ion , that the trad i t ionsof Mon tenegro exceed i n glory those of Marathonand Thermopylae and al l the war trad i tion s of theworld may seem exaggerated , yet i t i s certai n thatMontenegro ’s dogged figh t agai nst such long oddshas gai ned her un iversal sympathy .

The concl us ion of the who l e Balkan question ,so far as i t is poss i ble to see , seems to be thatthe buffer States ” may wel l grow so strong as tobe an impassable barri e r to Russ ian or Austrianambi tions .‘

1Ob viously the course of the Great War has falsified some of the conclusionssuggested in th is chapter , though the facts recorded remain true


230 SPA IN AND PORTUGAL

and i ncl i ned to despise trade ; the most v igo rous e lements i n the nation , the J ews and the Saracens , hadbeen expel l ed for rel igious reasons ; the weal th of theI nd ies served on ly to i ncrease th i s lack of commerc ialen terprise . When the supply of precious metals waspartial ly exhausted

,and when B ri tai n was m istress of

the seas,Spai n sank to a very low level among the

nations of Europe .As regards governmen t , Spai n had possessed , i nthe th i rteen th century

,a Parl i amentary system very

l ike that of E ngland under Edward I . Each smal lki ngdom— Aragon

,Casti l e , Leon , and the rest— had

i ts Cortes , o r Parl iamen t,consi st i ng of fou r Estates

(the nobi l i ty , the kn ights , the cle rgy , and the repre

sen tatives of the towns) ; but these had gradual ly d iedou t , l i ke the States-General i n France . By the s ixteen th cen tu ry Charles V , or Ph i l ip I I , i ssued decreeswh ich became law just as i f they had been passed bythe Cortes

,and the people subm i tted without protest .

The War of the Span ish Succession ( 1700— 13) hadsti l l fu rther weakened Spai n , and i ts final resul t wasto put a French Bou rbon Pri nce (Ph i l i p V ) on theth rone of Spai n . The eighteenth cen tu ry i s one longreco rd of bad gove rnmen t , leav i ng the country i n analmost med ieval cond i tion . The King and h is favou ri tes monopo l i zed power, and those favou ri tes weregeneral ly eccles iast ics . Much of the weal th of thenat ion was i n the hands of the Church . The Cortesst i l l met occasional ly , but the i r bus i n ess was merelyformal .Such con fus ion , such i ncapaci ty attracted Napo l eon

’satten tion , and i n 1808 he took advan tage of a quarre lbetween Charl es IV and h i s son Ferd i nand to placeh is own brother Joseph on the th rone of Spai n . Thisi nsu l t roused the Span ish sp i r i t

,and the res istance

to Napoleon , though the most successful part i n - it

SPAIN IN 1810 231

was played by Wel l i ngton , marks a new begin n i ngi n Span i sh h i story.

While the war wen t on , the various provi nces appo i n ted smal l counci ls , or J un tas , to carry on localgovernment. Consti tut iona l ideas were s lowly spreadi ng ; a cen tral J un ta was establ ished , and to i t wasentrusted the task of rul i ng Spai n . Energetic mencame to the fore , now that the corrupt royal influencewas removed . Engl ish officers i n Spai n were amazedat the n umber of bri l l ian t men who sat i n the newcen tral Cortes wh ich the J unta had establ i shed . Abo ld step was taken when the Jun ta gave the co lon iesa right to send represen tat ives to both the Co rtes andJun ta at home— the very po i n t on which B ri ta i n hadgone to war wi th her American co lon ies .I n September

,1810, the Co rtes met , elected by

a compl icated system which d id not very sati sfactori lyrepresen t the peop le . The Liberals were the strongestparty , and they began at once to draw up a C onstitut ion for the government of Spai n when the Frenchshould have been ejected . I n March

,1812

,i t was

ready . Many of i ts provis ions were borrowed di rectlyfrom the French Consti tut ion of 179 1, and i t was evenmore u nworkable than that of the revo l ut ion ists . It

enti rely rejected the o ld i nsti tutions of Spai n , ignoredthe clergy and the nobles , and made the Sovere igna mere figu rehead . I t fo rbade re- elect ion of members

,who on ly sat for two years

, so that none of themwould ever gai n any experience . I t excluded theKi ng’s mi n isters from attend i ng the Parl iamen tarydebates , un less sent for, and thus they cou ld nei therexpla i n the i r p lans to the House no r l i sten to ori t ic isms upon them . I n one po i n t

,however

,the Span

iards , even the most advanced , cou ld not fo l lowFrance . They were essential ly a rel igious nation ,and therefore one clause of the Consti tution stated


that the rel igion of the Span ish nation i s andalways wi l l be the Aposto l i c Church of Rome

,the

on ly true Church ; the nation protects i t by j ust lawsand forbids the exerci se of any other re l igionTaken al together, th i s Consti tu tion would havebeen a very poor form of government and would havel ed to endless confus ion . But any refo rms seemedbette r than the old sta te of th i ngs

,any Parl iamen t

bette r than none , and so th i s Consti tution became toSpai n what Magna Charta was to England centuriesbefo re . I n any t ime of oppress ion or of d iscontent

,

there arose an outcry for the Const i tution of 1812

I t had not,however , a long trial .

I n December, 1813, Ferd i nand V I I was restored toh i s th rone , after Napoleon

’s arm ies had been drivenout of Spai n by We l l i ngton . The Cortes had madeone cond i t ion— that he should accept the Consti tut ionof 1812

,and Ferd i nand had given a rel uctan t consen t .

However , he was at first i mmense ly popu lar, and theConsti tution “ general ly od ious to the people ” . He

therefore lost no time i n abol i sh i ng both the C onstitut ion and the Cortes .Then fo l lowed a gloomy period of react ion , i n wh ichFerd inand ’

s character was plai n ly d isp layed ; he was asu rly i ncapable man

,wi th a low cun n i ng and a cyn ical

di strust even of h is u nworthy favouri tes . Not exactlycruel

,he yet took an i nhuman del ight i n ban ish i ng

h is enem ies or h is d i scarded m i n i sters , i n imprison i ngthem or reduci ng them to beggary . The I nqu is i t ionwas restored , al l the conven ts and monasteries re

ce ived thei r weal th agai n ; al l L iberal s , of whateverprofess ion , were persecuted ; on ly two newspaperswere al lowed to be publ i shed i n Madrid ; and foreignbooks were se ized , as far as poss i bl e , at the fron tier.Trade was almost destroyed , the seaports were deserted , brigands i n fested the roads and h id among the



and the troops mustered beh i nd the Pyrenees soonnumbered B ri tai n objected to any i n terference wi th Spai n

,and was special ly anxious that

the coun try shou ld not agai n be overrun by Frenchso ld ie rs . The ch ief mem bers of the Ho ly Al l i ance

,

however— Russia, Austria , and Pruss ia— supportedFrance , and in Apri l , 1823, Lou is XVI I I declaredwar , sayi ng : “ Let Ferd i nand V I I be free to giveto h is peoples i n st i tutions wh ich they can not hold butfrom him Spai n was i n too miserable a cond i t ionto offer any real res i stance , and by 23May the Frencharm ies , under the Duke of Angouleme , were at Madrid ;by September Ferd i nand su rrendered at Cad i z

,and

the war was over . The French general had behavedwi th great moderation and sound sense duri ng thewho le affai r

,and when he made terms wi th the Ki ng ,

he tried to persuade h im to gran t a Charte r and to

govern h i s peop le on some reasonable pri ncip les .But Ferd inand was essen t ial ly un reasonable ; al thoughAngouleme had apparen tly del ivered h im from revo lu

tion , he would take no advice , and as soon as he wasl i berated he began a new re ign of terror ”

,pun ish

i ng wi th great brutal i ty al l who had taken part i n thelate troubles

,and maki ng h is government as despotic

as ever.Can n i ng had not thought i t necessary to go to war

on th is quest ion— i ndeed , B rita i n cou ld have donenoth i ng agai nst the Ho ly Al l i ance— but he d id whathe could to mark h is d isapproval . “ I determ i n ed ” ,

he said i n a famous ph rase,

“ that i f France hadSpai n

,i t shou ld not be Spai n with the I nd ies . ” He

therefore declared that he wou ld not al low France tohelp Spai n i n recoveri ng her revo l ted colon ies i n SouthAmerica

,and he encouraged those co lon ies by givi ng

them defin ite recogn i t ion i n the name of B ri ta i nI n another grand i loquen t ph rase he declared :

POL ICY OF CANNING 235S

I cal led the New World i nto exi stence to redressthe balance of the O ld The subsequen t h istory ofthe South American States has hard ly j ustified Canh i ng’s claim , but at least he showed that statesmenmust henceforth look outs ide Europe i n cons ider ing

r

the balance of power .From 1823

—8 Spai n was partial ly occupied byFrench t100ps , but the occupation made l i ttl e or no

di fference to the Government. Ferd i nand and h ism i n iste r Calomarde conti nued to rule as they pleased ,and took great pai ns to deny “ the absu rd pri nc ip lethat the people has a right to change the establ i shedform of government ” . However , few of the Spaniards were wel l enough educated to demand anyth i ngbetter

,though a sma l l but enthus iastic m i nor i ty sti l l

wo rked on . The French Revo l ution of 1830 p ro

duced a new outbu rst of Liberal activ i ti es i n Spai n ,but i t was ruth less ly suppressed by the King , andthe persecution of suspected persons was redoubled .

Noth i ng further of any note occu rred u nti l thequestion of the succession to the th rone becamepress i ng .

I t had long been thought that the Ki ng ’s brothe r,Don Carlos , would certai n ly succeed h im ,

as Ferd inand had no ch i ld ren ; he was an honest , straightforward man , with very decided opi n ions i n favou r ofthe Church and of abso l ute Monarchy ; he wou ldprobably have been a far better and more popularki ng than h i s brother, but he would have abo l i shedeven al l semblance of Parl iamentary government .But i n 1829 Ferd i nand married agai n ; h is newwife , Maria Christi na , was a clever and determ i nedwoman , and when i n 1830 a daughter, I sabe l , wasborn to her, Christi na made up her m i nd that thatdaughter should i nherit the crown of Spai n .

There was one d iffi culty i n the way . Women had '


always been able to succeed to the th rone i n Spai nun ti l , i n 17 13, Ph i l i p V had i ssued a decree that theFrench Sal ic Law (wh ich fo rbade women to reign )shou ld henceforth have force i n Spai n . I n 1789 theo lder law was re- establ i shed , qu ite legal ly , and withal l the necessary forms , but the P ragmatic Sanction ,as i t was cal led , was never publ i shed . I n March

,

1830, before the bi rth of h is daughter,Ferdi nand

publ i shed the Pragmatic Sanction,and left the crown

by wi l l to h is e ldest ch i ld , whethe r son or daughter.Don Carlos opposed h im qu i te open ly and frankly

,

and declared that by “ Div i n e R ight ” he h imse lfought to be Ki ng on h is brother’s death . Hencefo rthSpai n was d ivided i n to two parti es— the Carl i sts andthe C h ristinos . The Carl i sts bel i eved i n abso l uteMonarchy and i n D ivi n e Right ; they argued that thePragmatic Sanction ” was i l l egal . The C h r istinosmai n ta i ned the legal i ty of the Pragmatic Sanction

,

and many of them a lso advocated a Consti tut ion .

The Ki ng cal l ed together a Cortes— chosen on theold system— to recogn i ze the rights of the l i ttl e P ri ncess I sabel ; Don Carlos ret i red to Portugal , as hecou ld not take the oath to the he i r apparent .I n 1833 Ferd i nand d ied , and h i s widow Ch ri sti nawas left as Regen t.The Carl i sts . immed iately p repared for war, and theQueen-Regen t tried to strengthen her pos i tion bymaki ng some concess ions to the Li berals . On theadvice of her m i n i ster

,Marti nez de la Rosa , she

publ ished a Royal Statute,which was a Consti tution

rather l i ke the Charte r of Lou is XVI I I . I t p rovidedthat a general Cortes shou ld meet , but shou ld not beresponsi b le for the government of m i n i sters ; the election of members was entrusted to holders of a h ighproperty qual ification , and even when elected themembers had very l i ttl e power. However, anyth i ng



the north and north - east of Spai n,and the war was

marked by great barbari ty . Both s ides shot a l l thei rp ri soners wi thout de lay, u nt i l at last the Duke of

We l l i ngton , who was fo l lowi ng the cou rse of the warwith great i n te rest , i n tervened , and the B ri ti sh envoy ,E l l iot , con trived , i n 1835 , to negot iate a treaty whichwas i n tended to pu t an end to these wholesal e murders . Such was th e war wh ich devastated Spai n forfive years .B ri ta i n , France , and Portugal al l i ed wi th Spai n tosupport Queen Chri st i na , though i t was on ly i nPortugal (see p . 247 ) and by sea that B ri ta i n tookany immed iate part i n the war. A Bri ti sh legionof volu nteers was raised , which d id good service i nrel i evi ng B i l bao , a seaport wh ich the Car l i sts hadfoo l i sh ly decided to attack , and where Zuma lacarregu i

was ki l l ed, or, as report said , po i soned .

I n the m idst of the war ( 1836) the Progressivesamong the so ld ie rs su rp rised the Queen i n her country home , La Granja , and made her promise to restorethe Consti tution of 1812 , and to appo i n t a Progress iveM i n i stry . I n the fol lowi ng year the Cortes met andrev i sed the Const i tut ion

,maki ng i t rather more work

able ; but henceforth the two part i es were even mo resharply d iv ided

,the Moderates demand i ng the Statute

of 1834 , and the Progress ives ho ld i ng to the Constitu tion of 1837 .

At l ast the war d rew to a close . The Basques weret i red of figh ting,

and they saw no chance of succeedi ng i n the s i ege po l i cy wh ich the Carl i sts wereadopti ng . Don Carlos would make no promises of

pardon to h i s enem ies ; he grew more bigoted andsuperst i t ious every day

,and offered publ ic prayers

for the exterm i nation of al l u nbe l i evers , as he ca l l edthe Li berals . Queen Ch rist i n a had at last found asuccessfu l general

,Espartero ,

a stern but magn ificen t

ABD ICATION OF QUEEN CHR I STINA 239

sold ie r ; a B ri ti sh squadron had co-operated with theC h ristinos at B i lbao .

Everyth i ng seemed to poi n t to peace, and whenEspartero

,to whom the negotiat ions had been em

trusted,promised to do h is best to preserve the

l i bert ies and local i nst i tut ions of the Basques , h iste rms were accepted . I n September , 1839, the Car l istslaid down thei r arms ; many of them passed immed iately i n to the royal army . I n the south of Spai nfigh ting went on ti l l 1840. Don Carlos renouncedh is rights i n favour of h is son , and fled , first to

France,then to Trieste , where he d ied i n 1855 .

On ly a year afte r the end of the Carl ist War

(October, 1840) Queen Chri sti na , who was struggl i ngwith many personal d ifficu lties and quarrels , made upher m i nd to abdi cate . She reti red to France , and thesuccessfu l general

,Esparte ro , became Regen t for the

next th ree years ; i n 1843 Prim and Narvaez , Espartero

’

s rivals,revo l ted , declared Queen I sabel to be of

age , and drove the Regent out of the count ry . Theyoung Queen was on ly th i rteen years of age

,and her

re ign i s one long scene of confus ion . I t i s use less tot ry and fol low the party jealousies of th i s t ime ; a fewo f the landmarks i n the re ign must , however, bei nd icated .

I n 1845 another Const i tut ion was set up , very l ikethe Royal Statute of 1834 ; i t was of l i tt le use , however, for none of i ts provi s ions was kept. TheQueen— or her m i n ister for the moment

,frequently

a general— governed as she pleased,without maki ng

any notable changes or st i rri ng up any very v io l entopposi t ion . The financial system was improved , and ,on the who l e , the country enjoyed more p rosperi ty .

I n 1846the Span ish Marriages question , wh ichhad been agitati ng E urope for some years , was fi na l lysett led . Queen Christ i na had bee n rece ived hosp it


ably i n France,and Lou is Ph i l i ppe had done al l he

could to secu re her tri umphant retu rn to Madrid i n1844 . She wished to show her grati tude by marry i ngher two daughters , I sabel and Lou i sa , to two of h issons . This arrangemen t was vigorously opposed byBri tai n , because i t seemed to th reaten once agai nthat Spai n and France wou ld be u n i ted . Eventual ly

,

i n spi te of oppos i t ion,I sabe l married her cous i n ,

the Duke of Cad iz , and Louisa married the Duke ofMontpensier, son of Lou is Ph i l i ppe . This , however,sti l l l eft a strong chance that the two th rones m ightone day be un i ted , and Lou isa

’s marriage was veryu npopular, both at home and abroad .

The year of revol utions,1848, passed comparat ively

qu ietly i n Spai n . General Narvaez was i n power, asch ief m i n ister and m i l i tary D ictator ; he declared thatSpai n al ready had a Li beral Government , and mostof the people were prepared to bel i eve h im . Riotsoccu rred i n several places

,but were promptly sup

pressed . By refusi ng the advice of a m isch i ef-maki ngB ri ti sh Ambassador and fina l ly by expel l i ng h imfrom Spai n , Narvaez gai ned a populari ty wh ichcarried h im and Spai n safely th rough the dangerousmonths . The Revo l ut ion , however, was on ly delayed . After 1848 the Government became mo reabsol uti st than ever.I n 185 1 a Concordat was made with the Pope ,without the consen t of the Cortes ; i ts effect was togive mo re power to the Church

,espec ial ly i n educa

t ion , which was to be en t i rely u nder ecclesiast icalcontro l ; the censorsh i p of the Press was madestricter.I n 185 2 the m i n i sters made an u n l ucky attempt toreform the Consti tut ion , by bri ngi ng i t i n to con form ity with practice ; e .g. the Consti tut ion declaredthat the Cortes shou ld pass al l taxes ; i n practice the



SPA I N AND PORTUGAL

he had many good and ki ngly qual i ti es , Amadeuswas from the fi rst u npopu lar i n Spai n , partly b e

cause he was a fore igner and partly because of thepart h i s father had taken agai nst the Pope . He

tri ed to govern as a Parl iamen tary ki ng,but he

cou ld hard ly secu re a majori ty , or keep a m i n i strytogether.Carl i st i n trigues and ri s i ngs d i stu rbed the cou ntry ;

I sabel had strengthened the party of the o ld royalfam i ly by abd icati ng i n favour of her young sonAlfonso . Amadeus could not endu re the unpopu

larity , the d iffi cu lties , and the i solat ion of h i s th rone .Early i n 1873 he abdicated and left Spai n . H isfai l u re was due - to no fau l t of h is own ; Spai n wasnot yet ready for reforms , and i n any case wouldhave been u nwi l l i ng to accept them from a stranger.For two years Spai n tri ed the experiment of aRepubl ic headed by a Pres iden t ; the Governmentwas no i mprovement on fo rmer experimen ts , and an

other Carl i st i n su rrectio n ravaged the north- east . On

31 December , 1874 ,the army once more took matters

i nto i ts ow n hands and proclaimed Alfonso XI IKi ng of Spai n .

With the reign of Alfonso XI I a new chapterbegan i n the h i story of Spai n . The Ki ng was abetter man than the count ry had known for generations— brave , s impl e , generous , with a real love forSpai n

,a real desi re to he lp h is people . He devoted

much care to the army , and was always ready fora post of danger . When earthquakes and floodsdevastated Southern Spai n

,the Ki ng h imself v i s i ted

the ru i ned towns , and d istri buted the rel i ef funds ;when h is m i n i sters wou ld not al low h im to run theri sk of vis i t i ng a d istr ict st ricken by cho lera ,

‘

he

secret ly left the palace wi th one attendant and tookthe next t ra i n to it . Yet wi th al l h is good po i nts ,

ALFONSO x11 243

Alfonso was unatt ractive and u npopular ; he was ins ign ificant i n appearance , and h is fore ign education ,though i t made h im a more capable Ki ng, al ienatedh is people ’s sympath ies . However, he made Spai nrespect the monarchy once agai n , though he couldnot make the people love thei r Ki ng ; h i s work waswise and useful

,and h is widow and l i ttle son profited

by it.The ch ief events of h is reign may be summedup b riefly . A Const i tut ion was agreed on , s im i larto that of 1869 , but on ly tax payers were to havevotes

,and the Ki ng chose h i s m i n i sters wi thout re

gard to party majori t i es . An agreement was final lymade with the Pope , who was greatly averse fromal lowi ng rel igious to le ration i n Spai n . Roman C athol icism was to be the national rel igion , supported bythe Government and the nation ; other rel igions wereto be to l e rated , but were not al lowed to ho ld anypub l ic ceremon ies .The second Carl ist war was brought to an end i n

1876, and after some d ifficu lty the sem i - i ndependentBasque p rovi nces were brought u nder the same lawsas the rest of Spai n ; they were treated tactful ly,however, and sti l l conti n ue to assess and co l l ect thei rown taxes— which they do far more economical ly thanthe othe r parts of Spai n .

A rebe l l ion i n Cuba gave much trouble , but waseventua l ly put down ; a movement began for thegradual abo l i t ion of slavery i n the Span ish colon i es .The ch ief m i n ister du ri ng th i s re ign was Canovas

,

a man of no fine qual it i es,sceptical

,cyn ical

,and

essen tial ly d ishonest ; i t was a fixed part of h is po l i cyto deceive the people i n to bel iev i ng that they had areal share i n the government

,whereas i n practice they

had none . He did good wo rk for Spai n , however ,by reconci l i ng the Church and the o ldfash ioned con


servat ive elements , and by help i ng the ki ng to establ ish h i s throne securely . But i n sp i te of reforms andimprovements the Queen , Maria Chri sti na , had ad iffi cult task before her when she became Regent .Alfonso XI I I , the present K i ng, was born i n 1886

,

shortly afte r the death of h i s father (November,Duri ng h is m inori ty h is mother ru l ed Spai n wi ththe utmost cou rage , tact , and abi l i ty .

The Queen began her Regency wi th the support ofal l part i es , and i ndeed the l i n e wh ich d ivides the o lderparti es has become very fai n t i n Spam . Manhoodsuffrage was agai n i n troduced i n 1890 ,

though theelect ions are st i l l corrupt and do not express the rea lfeel i ngs of the majori ty ; the old Republ ican partysu rvived i n smal l groups (particu larly i n Barcelona) ,wh ich al l i ed themselves wi th the Social i sts

,and have

several t imes wo rked up serious Labou r movements ;i n 1909 , at the t ime of the Portuguese Revo l ut ion ,there was much d isturbance i n Spai n , which oftentook the form of attacks on monasteri es . The twoch ief m i n i sters du ri ng the Regency were Sagastaand Canovas , who held office i n tu rn ; Canovaswas assass i nated i n 1897 . There were several s l ightri s i ngs

,and considerable d isconten t i n the army , but

on the who l e the Queen -Regent was able to keeppeace at home. Prosperi ty i ncreased

,the financial

system was improved,Span ish trade

,especial ly i n

wi nes,became far mo re flour ish ing.

I n the co lon i es , however , Spai n was u n fortunate .Cuba

,the largest of the West I nd ian I slands , had

been badly governed for years . Now i ts i n habitants—l argely half- castes and negroes - were clamou ri ngfor self-government ; the U n i ted States encouragedthem . I n the Ph i l ippi ne I s lands (Pacific Ocean )matters were even worse. The government hadfal len i n to the hands of the Chu rch , and the friars



age i n 1904 , and marri ed Pri ncess E na of Battenberg ,Queen Victoria ’s grandch i ld , i n but i t i s verydoubtfu l whether Spai n can ever grow rich enoughto be great under modern cond i tions , and whetherthe temperament of her people wi l l ever lead to anyvery great p rogress on modern l i n es .

The h istory of Po rtugal may be very b r ieflysketched s ide by side wi th that of Spai n .

I ts early stages i n the n i n eteen th cen tu ry are closelybound up with the Pen i n su lar War. I n 1807 Na

po leon’

s general,J unot, i nvaded Portuga l , and the

Ki ng , John VI , fled wi th h i s fam i ly to the most impo rtan t of the Portuguese co lon ies

,Braz i l . He

appeared to have abandoned h i s own country,and

from 1808 to 1820 the dec is ive vo i ce i n Po rtugueseaffa i rs was that o f We l l i ngton or Beresfo rd . After1815 Beresford retai ned h i s authori ty , am id cons iderabl e d iscontent ; the coun try was jea lous of Bri ti shru l e and wanted i ts own Ki ng back agai n . I n1820 there was a revo l ut ion i n Po rtugal (co i nc id i ngwith the revo l ut ions i n Spai n and the Two S ici l ies) ,and a Consti tut ion was d rawn up and adopted , on

the same l i n es as the Span i sh Con sti tut ion . j ohn VInow retu rned to Eu rope , l eavi ng h is son Pedro asru ler i n B raz i l ; i n 1822 Pedro made h imsel f Emperorof B raz i l and declared the new Empi re i ndependento f Po rtugal . Soon after Portugal gave up its C onstitution and wen t back to abso l u ti sm agai n . I n 1826John V I d ied

,l eav i ng two sons , Pedro I of B raz i l ,

the elder,and Dom Miguel

,the younger. Pedro took

up the posi tion of Ki ng , and granted anothe r Constitution ,

model led on Bri t i sh l i nes . But he d idnot wish to abandon B raz i l , and therefore resignedthe Portuguese th rone to h is daughter, Don na Maria,a ch i ld seven years of age ; he t ried to reconci l e h i s

DOM M IGUEL 247

brother, Dom M iguel , to th is , by promis i ng to marryDonna Maria to h im when she was o lde r.Miguel

,however, opposed Don na Maria

’s c laim ,

and managed to make himse lf Ki ng i n 1828. Duri ngthe desu ltory war between the two claimants , Bri ta i n ,under the influence of Cann i ng, took the s ide of Don naMaria ; partly because her party stood for consti tutiona l ism,

whi le her u ncle,Dom M iguel , was determ i ned

to be an abso l ut ist Ki ng , partly because B ri tai n wasbound by treaty obl igations to help Portugal .Miguel ’s reign lasted am idst many d isturbancesfrom 1828—34 . I t was marked by crue l ty and in

j ustice,arbi trary deal i ngs and corruption , d iso rder

and frequent hosti l i t i es . At last Ped ro came backfrom Braz i l to figh t h is daughter

’s cause , and M iguelwas fina l ly driven out of the country i n 1834 .

Maria ’s reign was tu rbulen t and unsettl ed ; the d iso rder i n Spai n affected Po rtugal , the Carl i st warsi ncreased the feel i ng of uncerta i n ty , and l i tt le o r

noth i ng was done to make the general cond i tion of

the country more p rosperous .I n 185 2 the C onsti tut ion was revised and mademore Li beral ; th i s seems to have given genera l sati sfaction

,fo r Maria ’s successor, Pedro V , had a qu ie t

and uneven tfu l re ign ( 1853 Po rtugal seems tohave fel t the general development of Europe veryl i ttl e ; her prosperi ty d id not i ncrease rap id ly

,her

finances were always i n a desperate cond it ion,her

Consti tution was of l i tt le use to her, for the adm in istration was always inefficient and corrupt . Duri ngthe re igns of Lou is I ( 1861— 89) and Carlos I ( 18891908) party feel i ng was growi ng stronger than everbefore ; the Social i st party greatly i ncreased thei rstrength , and the Republ icans became i ns isten t i nthe i r oppos i t ion to the royal fam i ly . Car los I i rritated publ ic op i n ion by arbi trari ly al te ri ng the C on

248 THE SMALLER COUNTR IES OF EUROPE

stitution , with no show of even consu l t i ng Parl iament . I n 1908 he had become so unpopular that hewas assass i nated i n the streets of Lisbon

,together

wi th the Crown Pri nce .H is second son , Manuel I I , succeeded h im ,

buthe was a mere boy, unable to take any decided l i neof h is own . Even tual ly i n 19 10 the long- expectedRevo l ution took place ; Ki ng Manuel and the royalfam i ly were obl iged to take refuge i n England

,and

Po rtugal became a Republ ic . One can not say thatmatters were thereby improved . Corruption had fi rmho ld upon al l the poss i ble m i n isters and offi cials ;

they seemed to cons ider Governmen t posts as expressly intended to provide them with salaries

,and

to ex i st for no other pu rpose . The Portuguese R e

publ i c i s i n a very u ncertai n pos i t ion ; bu rdened wi than immense national debt , torn by v io l e n t party feeli ng , harassed by Royal i st ri s i ngs , laden wi th u nequaltaxat ion , and provided with a most i nadequate educational system , i t i s doubtfu l whether the Republ ic canlast long . Royal i st fee l i ng does not seem very strongat presen t, but i t i s poss i bl e that i f the Republ icanm i n istries can not gai n the confidence of the people ,a second revo l ut ion may take place , which wi l l re

store Ki ng Manuel to h i s th rone.

CHAPTER X I

THE SMALLER C OUNTRIES OF EUROPE

AFTER deal i ng with the countries wh ich have mostd i rectly affected European po l i t i cs as a who l e , the reremai n some sma l ler States wh ich have had the goodluck to remai n neutral duri ng the n i neteenth cen tu ry

'

.


250 THE SMALLER COUNTR IES O F EUROPE

fina l ly to the loss of the two duch i es (see p .

Thus Denmark agai n suffered a great reduction i nte rri tory. Christian IX ( 1863— 1906) began h is reignwith another rev i sion of the Consti tut ion , which gavethe franch ise to al l men havi ng a low property q ua l ification

,but i n real i ty he ru led as a despot ic ki ng unt i l

about 1894 ; he preserved the forms of parl iamentarygovernment , but i n practice he always got h i s ownway , espec ial ly wi th regard to the army and thebudget . Duri ng h is re ign

,however , publ ic opi n ion

developed enormously i n the d i rection of Li bera l i smand Social i sm

,and the Ki ng was obl iged to give

way ; the franch i se has now been exte nded to al l menover th i rty years o f age

,and women are al lowed to

take part i n muni ci pal affai rs . Education has beencompulso ry s i nce 1814 , and i s extremely we1l o rganized ; o ld - age pens ions have been granted , and agricu l tu ral enterprise has been e ncouraged and developed

,

u n t i l i t i s i n an exceptional ly flourish ing cond i tion .

I ndeed,Denmark

,wh ich has so l i tt l e external h i story

duri ng the n i n eteenth centu ry,has developed ex

treme ly rap id ly i n a l l socia l matters , and is now one

of the most advanced States i n E urope , al though i ti s very sma l l

,and i n some ways ve ry s imple i n i ts

man ne r of l i fe . Frederick V I I I succeeded h is fatheri n 1906, and was h imsel f succeeded by h is son

C h ristian X i n 19 12 .

I n I celand the cen tu ry was marked by i ncreas i ngprosperi ty . Free trade was estab l i shed i n 1854 , andtwenty years later home ru le was granted , the Ki ngof Denmark , represen ted by a m i n i ster for I celand ,shari ng the legis lat ive power wi th the Alth i ng.

When Norway was ceded to Sweden i n 1814 , bythe Treaty of Kiel , the Norwegians made v igorousprotests and refused to be an n exed . They drew up aConsti tution for themselves at E idsvo ld , and chose

UNION OF NORWAY AND SWEDEN 25 1

a Dan ish pri nce,Christian

,as the i r k i ng. A sho rt

war fo l lowed between No rway and Sweden , i n whichNo rway was partia l ly successfu l , but Ki ng Christianres igned h is th rone , and the Norwegians were ob l igedto agree to a persona l un ion with Sweden . Theydeclared

,however , that the u n ion

“was not accom

pl ished by force of arms , but by free conviction”

; thatthey wou ld reta i n the Consti tution drawn up at E idsvo ld , and that the Ki ng of Sweden should be Ki ngo f Norway , not by the Treaty of Kiel , but by the freecho i ce of the No rwegian peop le . I t was to be a personal un ion such as that wh ich bound Austria andHungary together , and not i n any sense a un ion of

Parl iaments . There were,however, to be common

m i n i sters of war and fo re ign affai rs , which could not

we l l be managed separately.

Such was the No rwegian idea of the u n ion . U n

fortunately Sweden and the Swed ish ki ng could not

acquiesce i n i t. They i ns isted on treati ng No rway asa subj ect ki ngdom , and most of the d isputes betweenthe two countri es , which ended i n thei r separation i n1905 , may be traced to th is d i fference of op i n ion .

Mo reover , the two countries were essential ly un l i kei n many ways . Sweden was ari stocratic i n i ts ideasand i n i ts government

,No rway was democratic— or

rather, No rway claimed , rightly enough , that herrea l ly o ld and famous fam i l i es were now to be foundamong the peasan ts

,and that the few remai n i ng

nobles were qu ite modern fam i l i es,created by Dan ish

influence .

Charles XI I I of Sweden d ied i n 1818, and wassucceeded by an adopted hei r

,Bernadotte , a famous

French marshal , who took the name of Charles X IV .

He was genera l ly opposed to changes,and devoted

h i s energies to encou ragi ng the trade and prosperi tyof h i s two ki ngdoms ; thus , though the influence of

25 2 THE SMALLER COUNTR I ES OF EUROPE

the revo l u tion of 1830 was ve ry deeply fel t i n Norway ,i t brought no outward changes with it, save the adm ission of peasant deputi es to the Norwegian Parl i amen tor S tor t/zz

'

ng . I n 1838 No rway regai ned a pri vi legewh ich was very dear to her— the right to carry hernat ional flag on al l he r merchant sh ippi ng ; th i sapparen tly tr iv ial matter was typ ical of the Norwegian des i re for i ndependence ; i t crops up agai nand agai n i n al l the d isputes between the twocountri es .The reign of Oscar I ( 1844— 59) brought wi th i t noserious changes ; the Revolution of 1848 passed bywithout real ly affecti ng ei ther No rway or Sweden .

The Swed ish Diet was l i ke a medieval Parl iament ,composed of four estates , the nobles , the cl ergy , thec i ti es , and the peasantry . As these fou r classes al lsat separately

,and very seldom agreed , the Ki ng

was able to play off one agai nst another, and so

to gai n h i s own way . Charl es XV ( 1859— 7 2) was ,however, obl iged to consen t to a mo re modern Parl iamen t, cons ist i ng of on ly two Houses . This Constitution ,

d rawn up i n 1866, gave votes to on ly about8 per cen t of the popu lation , nevertheless i t remai nedi n force un ti l 1909 , whe n manhood suffrage wasi n troduced .

Duri ng the re ign of Oscar I I ( 1872— 1907) the friction between Norway and Sweden i ncreased . TheNo rwegian Parl iamen t cou ld pass b i l l s wi thout theKi ng ’s consent , i f they passed them th ree t imes , withi n tervals of th ree years between the votes . Thusthey could i n the long run get thei r own way

,but the

delay was very vexatious,and roused feel i ng agai nst

the Ki ng . The Ki ng , on h i s s ide , was i rri tated whenh is veto was thus set on one s ide . The most seriousgrievance

,however

,was the fact that the M i n isters

chosen by the Ki ng were i nvariably Swedes , and that


254 THE SMALLER COUNTR I ES OF EUROPE

I n l i teratu re,Swed ish and Norwegian names

,such as

that of Ibsen,have a wor ld-wide fame ; as seamen and

explorers the Scand i navian races have a renown atleast as great as that of the i r ancestors , the No rthmen

,though the fame of such men as Nansen and

Amundsen, o r Sven Hed i n , i s p leasanter and mo re

peacefu l than that of the o ri gi nal Danes . I t i s perhaps en ti rely safe to pred ict that many of the greatenterpri ses and very many of the new ideas of thefutu re wi l l be the wo rk of Scand i navia .

Another u n ion of two sma l l States,effected by

the Congress of Vien na , was that of Ho l land andBelgi um .

I t was effected,l i ke that of Norway and Sweden

,i n

defiance of racia l and soc ial d i fferences between thetwo peoples . I t has been explai ned before (p . 1 1)why the u n ion was not l i kely to prove permanen t o rpeacefu l . Wil l iam I of O range , who was made Ki ngof Ho l l and and Belgi um i n 1815 , was a foreigner tothe Be lgians ; he spoke Dutch , wh i le they spokeFlem ish or Wa l loon

,or very often French ; he was

a Protestant , a Calv i n i st , whi l e they were general lyzea lous Roman Cathol ics ; he l i ved i n Ho l land

,the

Governmen t was carri ed on en ti re ly on Dutch l i n es,

and almost al l the publ i c offi cia ls were Dutch . Belgium had the larger population

,but had on ly equal

representat ion wi th the Dutch ; the Belgians were fu l lof French ideas of government , and di s l i ked the exte nsive powers that were left to the Ki ng ; mo reover,advanced though they were i n some respects , theyhearti ly d isl i ked rel igious to l e rat ion , which the Dutchwere determ i ned to protect. As a matte r of fact , theu n ion would have i ncreased the prosperi ty of Belgium ;Be lgian manufactu res

,combi ned with Dutch fo reign

trade,would rapid ly have i ncreased the weal th of

R EVOLUTION IN BELG IUM 55

both cou ntries . But the un ion was dead agai nst boththe nationa l and the re l igious sentiment of Belgium ,

and therefore was doomed to fa i lu re . I n 1830, whenthe news of the second French Revo l ution reachedB russels

,a risi ng took place i n the city , which aimed

at creati ng a separate Belgian adm i n istration , whi leretai n i ng a personal un ion wi th Ho l land . Ho l land ,however

,deal t weak ly and rather fool i sh ly wi th the

cri s is,and so i rri tated the Be lgians that i n November ,

1830, a National Assembly decided i n favour of (a) thei ndependence of Belgi um ; (b) a consti tutional hered itary monarchy ; (c) the perpetual excl us ion of theHouse of O range .A Conference i n London proclaimed that the u n ion

of the two countri es was d isso lved , and i n 1831 Pri nceLeopold of Saxe-Cobu rg , Queen Victoria

’s u ncle , waselected Ki ng . The Dutch refused to agree to th is ,and i nvaded Belgium ; Leopo ld , however, was uphe ldby France

,and the combi ned French and B ri t i sh

fleets ob l iged Hol land to give up Antwerp,which

had been retai ned i n defiance of treaties . The i nde

pendence and neutral i ty of Belgium were first defin itelyguaranteed by the Great Powers i n the Treaty of

London , 1839. A sim i lar treaty was entered upon byBri tai n , France , and Germany i n 1870.

S ince the separa t ion the h istory of Be lg ium has b een uneven t

fu l , though its con st i tu t iona l deve lopmen t is in teres t ing . K ingLeopo ld was b o th w ise and tact fu l , and s tead i ly ma in ta ined h ispos i t ion as con s t i tu t iona l K ing . As the C on st i tu t ion had b eenm ode l led on Br i t i sh l ines , and b e fore the Reform Act of 1832 , the

franch ise was h igh , and compara t i ve ly few person s had votes.

Th i s gave dissa t i sfact ion to th e L ib era ls , bu t in 1848 a m easure

of e lec tora l reform was passed wh ich low ered the franch i se , andthus Be lg ium wea thered th e storm s of 1848 w i thou t fur ther d isturbances . In 1865 Leopo ld I d ied , and was succeeded by h is

son , Leopold 11, under whom the same peacefu l and order lycourse was pursued . The war of 1870 wa s a ma tter of some

256 THE SMALLER COUNTR IES OF EUROPE

a larm to Be lg ium , wh ich feared she m igh t b ecome agam th e

battlefield o f Eu rope . W i th the suppor t of B r i ta in ,however , she

ma in ta ined the n eu tra l i t y of h er terri tory .

S i nce 1870 i n te rnal affai rs have occup ied most ofthe attention of Belgi um . There has been a determ i n ed “ Flem ish movemen t ch iefly with the in tent ion of encou ragi ng the Flem ish language and customs

,and d iscouragi ng mere im i tation o f France .

The resu lt has been to create a mo re fri end ly feel i ngtowards France .There has been great t rouble over the question of

rel igious education i n schools . At p resen t the Statehas not taken any very defin ite stand i n the matter,but has left i t to sma l l d istricts to settl e , accord i ngto the i r own w ishes . There has also been a greatdeve lopmen t of Social i st Opi n ion , and much sociall egislation has been passed , deal i ng with such questions as o ld - age pens ions , the cond i tions of labou r,married women ’s p roperty , and educat ional problems .The franch ise has been lowered mo re than once , andmanhood suffrage i s now the ru le ; a curious systemgives an extra vote to men who by age

,suppo rt of

a fam i ly , weal th or education , show themselves to berathe r more respons i bl e persons than the average“ man i n the street ”

The best - known question i n relat ion to modernBelgium is the adm i n istration of the Congo FreeState

,i n Central and Western Africa. This was

an i ndependent State , adm i n iste red by a “ CongoAssociation of wh ich the K ing of the Belgianswas the head . The ki ng ’s pos i t ion was purely personal ; the Congo State was not a Belg ian terri to ryor co lony , and the Parl iament had no responsib i l i tywhatever for it

,but Leopold I I happened to be at

the head of the company or assoc iation wh ich ad

m i n istered it. The ch ief i ndustry of the Congo Free


258 THE SMALLER COUNTR I ES OF EUROPE

personal ru l e,and i n 1848 a new Consti tution lowered

the franch ise very cons iderab ly , and made the m i n e:

isters respons i bl e to the States-General,thus greatl y

d im i n ish i ng the K i ng ’s power.U nder Wi l l iam I I I ( 1849 -

90) publ ic op i n ion wasgreatly exci ted over the question of rel igious education i n schoo ls . Some of the Li beral party wantedto abo l i sh i t a l together ; the more conservative P ro~

testants wished to retai n i t i n thei r own hands,whi l e

the Roman Cathol ics (of whom the re was a group i nthe south ) i ns i sted on bei ng al lowed to teach rel igioni n thei r own school s . The d ifficu lty was settl ed on

the who l e peacefu l ly i n 1889 ; each denomi nation thathad bu i l t schoo l s and was recogn ized by the law wasa l lowed to mai n tai n i ts own teach i ng and to obtai nState gran ts ; the re were also free State schools wi thno rel igious teach i ng.

The loweri ng of the franch i se has been anotherburn i ng question ; i n 1887 , and agai n i n 1896, then umber of voters was very much extended

,but man

hood suffrage has not been granted yet .I n 1890 Wil l iam I I I d ied

,and h i s daughter

,

Wilhelm i na,who was on ly a ch i ld

,became Queen

of Ho l l and (or of the Netherlands) . She marriedPri nce Hen ry of Meckl en bu rg . Ho l land i s aweal thy

,prosperous coun try , owi ng much of i ts

weal th to fo re ign trade and i ts extensive co lon ialpossessions , ch iefly i n the East I nd ies . As a ru le , i tp lays no part i n the mutual jealousies and d iplomacyof the Great Powers

,but occas ional ly i t seems to fea r

an nexat ion by or i n terference from Germany .

I ts neutral pos i t ion has,however

,caused i t to be

chosen for the seat of the Cou rt of I n ternat iona lArbitrat ion , better known as the Hague Tribunal ,which endeavours to settl e i n ternational questionswi thout recourse to war. (See p .

SW ITZERLAND 59

The mai n features i n the h i story of Switzerlanddu ri ng the n i neteenth centu ry have been sketched i ndeal i ng with i ts Consti tution

,and need not be more

than b riefly i nd icated here .I t d ivides

,very roughly speaki ng , i n to about fou r

mai n period s , wh ich are general ly marked on ly bythei r consti tut ional i nterests .

From 1815—30 Swi tzerland was a very loose

Federation of Cantons , with l i ttl e or no cen tra l power ;the central Diet sat alternately at Berne , Zurich , andLucerne

,and almost a l l the cantons fel t the reaction

wh ich was so general th roughout Eu rope .

(17) From 1830—

47 Liberal ideas were gradual lymaki ng thei r way , and prepari ng for a new C on

stitution .

‘

(0) Duri ng the year 1847 the seven Roman Cathol i ccantons , which were al ike opposed to Liberal ism andto the strengthen i ng of the Feder al Government ,formed a league to protect the i r own i deas . The Dietordered th i s l eague (or Sonderbund) to d isband ; theSonderbund refused , and for a few weeks war waswaged between i t and the other cantons . The Protestan t and Libera l cantons were , however, successful ,the Sonderbund was disso l ved

,the Jesu i ts were ex~

pe l led from Switzerland , and the Consti tution of 1848was accepted .

(d ) The fourth period , 1848 to the presen t day , ismai n ly concerned wi th the worki ng of th i s C onstitut ion , and i s more fu l ly descri bed i n Chapter XI I .Duri ng th is period Swi tzerland has made steady p rogress i n educat ion , and i n general p rosperi ty . Therap id extension of rai lways

, often u nder the greatestd ifficu lties , has opened up al l parts of the country ,whi le the tu n nel l i ng of the S t. Gothard and theS implon Passes has made Switzerland a h ighwayfor the trade of Northern and Southern Eu rope .

260 THE CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE

The neutral i ty of Switzerland , which i s guaranteedby the Great Powers

,has made i t the secure home of

many movements ; i n n umerable i n ternat ional conferences take place on Swi ss soi l , and i t has alsoplayed a great part i n the development of the Peacemovement, wh ich has found i ts permanent home atthe Hague .I n conclus ion , i t may be noted how these smal le rcou ntries show j ust the same problems of national i tyas have tom the large r S tates . I n Norway andSweden , i n Hol land and Belgi um , the d iffi cu lty hasbeen settled by separation , i n Switzerland the sol ut ion has been Federal i sm , but i n each case thepri nciple i s the same — racia l fee l i ng must be re

spected i f stabl e government i s desi red .

CHAPTER X I I

THE C ON STITUTIONS OF EUROPE

For forms of governmen t let foo ls con tes t ,Wha te '

er is b es t adm in is tered , is b es t .

No Engl ishman could be expected to bel i eve the l i n esquoted above . For cen tu ri es E ngl i shmen have foughtand struggled

,not on ly for good government , but for

self-government . We bel i eve that experi ence , pol i t ical wisdom , and a feel i ng of respons i bi l i ty can beacqu i red i n some degree by al l men , and we bel i evethat i t i s better to atta i n these qual i t i es gradual ly thanto be governed even by an ideal ly wi se and cautioussovereign . Therefore

,i n cons ideri ng the various

Consti tut ions of Europe , an E ngl i shman i s apt _to

class them as good or bad accord i ng to the amoun tof sel f—governmen t wh ich they perm i t. I t wou ld ,


262 THE CONSTITUT IONS O F EUROPE

wished to resto re the Monarchy , or to set up anyother form of government , no l aws cou ld p reven t i tfrom do i ng so ; one generation can not have power tomake laws wh ich sha l l b i nd futu re generations fo rever . If

,however, such a change shou ld be made

i n France i t wou ld be a revol utionary,and not a

consti tut iona l change .But the idea of a rigid Consti tut ion has been veryuseful at times . I n B ri tai n th i ngs change slowly , ou rConsti tution i s the work of cen tu ri es

,and i nst i tutions

have been respected because they were old and wel ltried . After the French Revol ution , changes cameso th ick and fast that some countri es were i n dangerof forgett i ng thei r past h isto ry , and of changi ng thei rGovernments every few years . The idea of a rigidConsti tution , which can not be altered or upset

,has

helped to preven t too frequent changes , and has givena feel i ng of greater secu ri ty to peoples who have seenon ly too many revo l utions .This d i st i nction between flex ib le and rigid Consti

tu tions i s al so closely con nected with the man ner i nwh ich the Consti tution has been obta i ned . Duri ngthe n i n eteenth cen tu ry a Consti tut ion m ight begranted by a monarch (constitution octroy ée) , or i tm ight be constructed by a National and Consti tuentAssembly gathered together for that purpose . I f theConst i tution had been granted by the monarch (e .g .

i n Spai n and i n the Two S ici l ies i n 1820, or i nP iedmont i n the question arose , Could theConsti tut ion thus granted be revoked ? Was the p romise bi nd i ng on the monarch

,or cou ld he not change

h is m i nd , as an Assembly cou ld ? Ferd i nand of Spai nand Ferd i nand of the Two S ici l ies both he ld thatwhat they had given they could take away ; the Tsar,Nichol as I I , seems st i l l to hold th i s op i n ion . On

the other hand,Charl es Albert

,havi ng once gran ted

TYPES OF CONST ITUTIONS 263

a Consti tution— the “ S tatuto —to h is ki ngdom , bothhe and h i s son ,

Victor Emmanuel , en ti re ly refused tobe coerced by Austria i nto withdrawi ng it ; Frede r ickWil l iam IV of Prussia so strongly objected to bei ngbound by such a promise , which he thought wouldc lash with h i s D iv i ne Right , that he refused to al low“ a sheet of paper to come between h im and God

With such a practical d ifficu lty to so lve , i t i s easyto see why the National Assembl ies fostered the ideathat a Consti tut ion once given was both i rrevocableand unchangeable ; they had been cheated so often thatthey clung to any safeguard , even though i l logical .Such are the reasons for the greatest d i fferencebetween the B ri ti sh and many of the Eu ropean C onstitutions . As to the rights and pri vi leges thusgranted

,they di ffer i n almost every case , but i n

general , the Consti tutions gran ted or drawn up du ri ngthe n i n eteenth cen tu ry were copies e i ther of the Bri ti shConsti tution or of one of the French revo l utionaryConsti tut ions ; sometimes a combi nation of the two

would be arrived at,and there were always important

modifications to su i t the socia l cond itions and h istoricalpas t of each nation .

After th is general and prel im i nary sketch,we may

turn to exam i ne each State separately,and not ice

the most important feature of i ts Consti tution . Thetab le on p . 320 may be usefu l i n showi ng at a glancethe mai n d i fferences .

FRANC E

The French Const i tut ion,as i t stands at present ,

dates from the years immed iate ly fo l lowing the FrancoGerman War. I t i s very s l ight— a mere skeleton of

the absol utely essen tial laws . Un l i ke most earl i erFrench Consti tutions , i t has no place for theories or

264 THE CONSTI TUTIONS OF EUROPE

general pri nci ples ; noth i ng more is heard of theRights of Man Th is i s probably due to the factthat i t was regarded as a compromise wh ich wou ld notlast . The consti tutional laws— th ree i n n umber— werepassed duri ng the year 1875 (see p . they donot form a regu lar Const i tut ion , but are , as i t were ,the m i n imum amount of l egi slation wh ich seemed safeduri ng that very cri t ical year. The Government wasvested i n a President , a Senate , and a Chamber ofDeputi es , wh ich co rrespond rough ly to the B ri ti shKi ng , Lords , and Commons . The th ree parts arel i nked together, as i n B ri tai n , by a Cabi net, wh ichcontro l s the actions of the Pres iden t , and i n tu rn i scontro l led by the Lower House . The Senate , wh ichi s elected by a spec ia l body of electo rs i n each de

partmen t, can general ly on ly revi se and mod ify themeasu res sen t up from the Chamber of Deputi es

,

though i n theory i t has equal powers of l egis lation ;i t can not i n troduce financ ia l bi l l s , though i t maymodify them ; i n p ractice , too , i t has no contro l overthe m in isters , and therefo re can have l i ttl e rea l power.I ts consent i s necessary for the d isso l ut ion of theLower House , and i t may , on occas ion , act as aH igh Court of J ustice ; e .g . i t tri ed and condemnedGeneral Bou langer.The Chamber of Deputi es i s elected by manhoodsuffrage ; every man over twenty - one years of age ,who i s not d isqual ified by crime or i n some otherway

,has a right to vote . The Chamber consi sts of

576members , who are el ected for fou r years ; eachar rondz

'

ssemen t, or electoral d istrict, retu rns one member ; the F rench co lon ies also send a few members .I ts powers and work are very s im i lar to those of theHouse of Commons, but there are two notable d i fferences . The French Deputies appear unable to carryon an exci ti ng debate i n an orderly fash ion ; they


266 THE CONST ITUTIONS OF EUROPE

o r extreme Conservat ives ; i n the Cen tre , the moderateLi bera ls ; on the left

,the mo re extreme Libera ls

,

Rad icals , or Social i sts ; between these th ree theremay be lesser d ivi s ions , u nable defin itely to jo i nany of the groups .This arrangemen t i s found i n almost al l the Parl iaments of Europe , and i t expla i n s the d iffi cu lty of

wo rki ng Cabi net Government i n combi nation witha Group system ; i t i s almost imposs i ble to tel l fromday to day whether the Centre wi l l be more i n sympathy wi th the Left or the Right , whether the LeftCentre wi l l jo i n the Extreme Left or the Centre . I ti s because of th i s arrangemen t that Eu ropean parti esare often known mere ly as R ight or Left ; the one

advantage of the system i s that i t ought to give aman a chance of bei ng rather more honest than thetwo- party system ; i f he can not genu i n ely agree wi the i ther s ide , he can often h nd a moderate Group withwh ich to work . But i n practice the Group systemi s very unsat i sfactory .

The th i rd componen t part of the French Government

,the Pres ident

,has a somewhat d ifli cu lt pos i tion .

Like the K i ng i n B ri ta i n he i s at the head of theGovernment , but al l h i s acts depend on the adviceof h is m i n i sters . I t has been said that he ne itherre igns nor governs . I n many ways he appears to bea pure ly o rnamenta l personage , a substi tute for a ki ng .

Yet he often exerci ses an importan t influence ; he i se lected for seven years , and therefore does not changeso often as the Cabi nets , wh ich seldom si t as long astwo years ; h is tact and j udgmen t are often of theutmost value i n the fram i ng of a new Cabi n et , or i nrelat ions with fore ign powers .S uch are the more noteworthy features of the Centra lGovernmen t of France . Local government i s st i l l i ni ts i n fancy . Each department i s subdivided agai n i n to

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE 267

a r rondzlrsemen ts,cam b e r

,and communes ; of these the

communes , each pres ided over by a mayo r, are themost importan t. They possess fai r ly wide powersi n loca l bus i ness , and the communa l counci ls areelected by manhood suffrage ; the i r actions , however,are closely supervised by the Centra l Government ,and they have practica l ly no authori ty i n financia l

matters . I t i s largely owing to th i s weakness i n localgovernment that the French people as a who l e takeso l i ttl e active part i n po l i t ics ; the great majori ty of

them are wi l l i ng and anxious to be ruled by anyonew ho wi l l give them peace and order . However, th i ssp i ri t i s gradual ly strengthen i ng the Republ ic ; yearby year the fear of another revo l ut ion grows less ;year by year the Roya l i sts and the Bonaparti sts growfewer. When at last al l Frenchmen are Republ icans ,on ly d ivided on questions of po l i cy , the way wi l l beOpen for a regular two or th ree- party system ,

witha properly o rgan ized Opposi t ion ready to take oth eewhen the Governmen t is defeated . Then Parl iamen tary Government i n France may have a realchance of success .

ITALY

I n I taly a s im i lar system is i n work i ng , thoughI ta ly is a Ki ngdom i nstead of a Repub l ic . TheI ta l ian C onsti tution i s based on the “ Statuto of

1848, granted by Charles Albert, and loya l ly upheldby Victor Emmanuel th roughout h is many d iffi

cu lties . This Const i tution , o rigi nal ly gran ted for

Char les Albert ’s ki ngdom on ly,was extended with

out formal mod ification to the who l e of I ta ly . I t has ,however, been supplemented and overgrown by custom , with the resu lt that I taly i s now more “

constitu

tional” than her Consti tution ; e .g . the powers of the


King , as fixed by the Statuto , have been considerablylessened by custom .

The Governmen t cons ists of a Ki ng , Senate , andChamber of Deputi es ; the real responsibi li ty l i eswi th the Cabi net and the party groups

, of which,

as i n France,there are several .

The Ki ng is an hered i ta ry monarch,whose crown

can descend i n the male l i n e on ly ; he i s at the headof the Government , but genera l ly acts on ly on theadv ice of h i s m i n i sters . His influence i s said to bestrong i n fore ign affa i rs , and he has some real powersi n deal i ng with the Cabi net . Owi ng to the numberof smal l groups i n exi stence , i t i s genera l ly veryu ncerta i n who may be the n ext P rime M i n i ste r

, and

the Ki ng has a wide choice ; he may also perm it orrefuse to al low a d i sso l ut ion of Parl iament .The Senate i s a somewhat ari stocratic body , nomi

nated by the Ki ng ; i ts m embers are chosen fromd i fferen t impo rtan t classes of society , and represen tthe h igher offic ia ls , education , weal th , commerce , andothe r i n terests ; the Senate has the privi lege of accepti ng or rej ecti ng any new member . The powers of

the Senate are s l igh t ; i t can i n i t iate legi slation tobe subm i tted to the Lower House , but i t can hard lydelay or mod ify the l egis lat ion al ready approved bythe Deputies ; new members are often created i n largebatches to bri ng the Senate more i n to harmony wi ththe party feel i ng of the nation , and thus i ts importance is not great . I t may i n certa i n cases act asa H igh Cou rt of J ustice .The Chamber of Deputi es , which bears the realrespons i bi l i ty of Government

,cons ists of 508 mem

b ers , elected on a l i m i ted franch i se . Si nce 1882 the

qua l ification for a vote has been educational ; novoter can be registered who has not passed a simpleexam i nation i n read i ng and wri ti ng , and the ord i nary



on ly too often i s re i n forced by unscrupulous corruption .

Whi le the Chamber of Deputies , however , i s l argelyoccupied with loca l quarrel s , local government properi s very weak . When the various provi nces wereu n i ted to fo rm a new I taly , the predom i nan t fee l i ngwas the need fo r u n i ty ; the provi ncial d ivi s ions ,the refore , were broken up , and the work of ad

mi n istration was central ized as far as poss i bl e . I ndetai l s the system is very l i ke that of France

,and

suffers from the same weakness . This cen tral izationwas necessary at the time , but i t has serious defects ,i n that i t suppl i es l i ttl e or no education i n pol i t icaland adm i n i strative work to the rank and h le of thepeople . I n one po i n t on ly the old d iv i s ions havesurv ived —there

'

are five Supreme Cou rts of Appeal

(or Courts of Cassation ) , which si t i n Rome , Turi n ,Florence , Naples , and Palermo . The resu l t of th isi s that j ustice , as adm i n istered by the j udges , maydi ffer i n d i fferen t parts of I taly . I t i s u n fortunatethat the one case i n wh ich local priv i l eges have beenrespected shou ld be the h igh ly impo rtan t matte r ofjustice and law . The respect for the l aw would beenormously i ncreased if the Cou rt at Rome were tobecome a final Cou rt of Appeal for the whole nation .

The one great d ifii cu lty i n the reconstruction of

I taly has been the pos i t ion of the Papacy . C avou r’

s

idea was to have a free Church i n a free State ” ; thePope ’s cla im was that he must be actual ly sovereignwi th i n h i s own dom i n ions , i .e . Rome and the su rroundi ng provi nce . The question has been compromised by al lowi ng the Pope to l i ve almost l ike asovere ign pri nce wi th i n the Vatican , with al l thep rivi l eges necessary to make h im enti rely free i ndeal i ng with Chu rch questions both i n I taly andabroad . The Popes

,however

,have so far refused

PAPAL POL ICY 27 1

to accept the compromise , retu rned the yearly revenuegranted them by the State

,and professed to remai n

wi th i n the Vatican as pri soners . They have refusedto recogn ize the Ki ngs of I ta ly , and have forbiddenfai thfu l Roman Catho l i cs to take any part i n parl iamentary or po l i tica l busi ness . Although these o rdershave not been strictly fo l lowed , yet a large numberof I tal i an s have abstai ned from po l itica l

‘

action , andthus the Papal pol icy has had an u nfortunate influencei n modern I taly .

GERMANY

The Governmen t of Germany is a Federal Emp i rel

.

Federal i sm general ly means the u n ion,for certa i n

pu rposes , of a number of States wh ich are for otherpurposes cons idered as separate and i ndependent.Thus the U n ited States of America are treated byfore ign powers as one State , al though among themselves each State has certa i n very i ndependent powers

,

and the laws and i n sti tut ions of New Yo rk may di ffervery materia l ly from those of Vi rgi n ia or Cal i forn ia .

The object of a Federal Government i s genera l ly toobtai n strength and protection agai nst outs iders , whi leleavi ng the rights and i ndependence of smal le r Statesor nations u ntouched . I t wi l l read i ly be seen howthe idea of Federal i sm grew up i n America du ri ngthe American War of I ndependence .Germany had long been accustomed to some form

of Federal i sm . U nder the Ho ly Roman Empi remore than 300 separate States , large and smal l , hadbeen u n ited i n name by the Empi re

,though i n prac

t ice they were almost en ti re ly i ndependent . Napol eonhad suppressed many of the smal le r States and com

b ined them with others , but i n 1815 , at the Congressof Vien na

,Ste i n ’s des i re fo r a rea l Federa l U n ion

101. p . 322.


was put as ide,and Mettern ich ’s influence (see p . 90)

gave Germany a useless Federal D iet ; i n th i s al l theStates were rep resented

,though , as a matte r of fact,

they were alternate ly at the mercy of Pruss ia o r

Austria.The h istory of B ismarck (Chapter V ) shows howPrussia became the predominant force i n Germany

,

and thus one i s not su rpri sed to find that the German Consti tution , as d rawn up i n 187 1, real ly depends on Pruss ian superiori ty .

I n 1866— 7 , after the successfu l war agai nst Austria ,Pruss ia formed a u n ion with al l the States no rth of

the river Mai n,under the name of the North German

Confederation . A Consti tut ion was agreed upon , bywh ich the P russian Ki ng was to be the Pres iden t , withtwo legislative chambers— the B undesrath , o r Counci lcopied from the o ld Federal D iet

,contai n i ng repre

sentatives of each State,and the R eic/zs lag ,

or LowerHouse , elected from al l the States by manhoodsuffrage . Bavaria, W

'

urtemb erg , Baden , and Hessestood ou ts ide th i s arrangement unti l after the FrancoGerman War

,when

,i n 187 1, the

“ German Empi re ”

was declared at Versai l l es (see p . and a C onstitut ion was d rafted , on the model of the No rth GermanConfederation . The Ki ng of Pruss ia i s always tobe the German Empero r ; the affai rs of the Empi re

(wh ich i ncl ude al l the more importan t questions) areto be settl ed by the Bundes rath and the Reichstag ;the one respons ible m i n ister of the Empi re i s theChancel lor. Beneath th is I mperial Consti tut ion eachState was to keep or to change i ts own consti tution asi t pl eased ; some of these const i tu tions dated back tothe years 1815

— 20, some of them had been framedunder the influence of th e Revo l u tion of 1848. Herei t must suffi ce to sketch ve ry b riefly the wo rki ng of

the I mperia l Consti tution , and then to glance hasti ly



votes of the ten or twelve rep resen tatives of h is State .Pruss ia controls twen ty votes , and can eas i ly obta i na majo ri ty i n most cases . The powers of the Bundesrath are very extensive

,and , moreover, they are real

powers . I ts consen t i s necessa ry to al l l egislation ; i nfact , i t general ly prepares and d rafts n ew laws , andsends them down to the Reichstag for d iscussion ; i tcontro l s finance , makes regulations , declares war o rpeace , sends members to explai n i ts pol icy i n theReichstag, and may act as a Cou rt of J ustice

,to

i n terpret the Consti tution , or to settle d isputes betweentwo States . I ts debates are kept stri ctly p ri vate

,and

thus the outside world never knows , for example , howmuch oppos i t ion i s offe red to Prussia n po l i cy

,nor

what d i sputes go on between the States .The Bundesrath takes the place , to a large exten t ,

of the Cabi net i n other coun tries , but i ts executivework i s not so heavy

,as each S tate has i ts own de

pa rtments and its own m i n i sters , who are merelycontro l l ed and superv i sed by the Bu ndesrath .

The Empero r has a pecu l iar pos i t ion ; he i s bothEmpero r of Germany and Ki ng of Pruss ia ; as Empero rof Germany hi s mai n fu nction i s to act for the Bu ndesrath

, to be the head , the p resident of the ImperialGovernmen t. As Empero r he carri es great weighti n m i l i tary

,naval , and fo re ign affai rs ; as Ki ng of

Pruss ia he has even greater powers , and may usethem i n the Empi re by means of h is twenty delegatesi n the Bundes rath .

I t i s,however

,usel ess to cons ider the Empero r

apart from the Chancel lor, and the explanation of theChancel lor’s pos i tion i s s imply— Bismarck . I n d rawi ng up the Consti tut ion , B ismarck wou ld not hear ofhavi ng an Imperia l Cabi net ; he fel t equal to anyemergency , and thought i t mere waste of t ime to persuade othe r peop le that h is po l i cy was good ; h e

BISMARCK AS CHANCELLOR 275

knew it h imsel f,and that was al l that mattered .

Hence the Chancel lor i s the on ly responsi ble Imperia l M i n ister

,he has no co l leagues , though part

of h is work may be done by subord i nates, and he i sresponsible on ly to h is I mperial master, and not to

the Bundesrath or to the Reichstag. I t i s obv ious ,then

,that the governmen t of the German Empi re

rests mai n ly w ith two men , the Emperor and theChancel lor

,and the d iv i sion of power between them

depends mo re on the i r respective personal i t i es thanon the Consti tution .

Bismarck held al l the re i n s of power with i n h isown hands ; he was able as Chance l lor to domi natethe Emperor Wi l l iam ; as head of the PrussianCabi net

,he could contro l the po l icy of Prussia ; as

leader of the Prussian delegates i n the Bundesrathhe could overawe or influence that al l - importan tcounci l ; as Chancel lor he had a right to appear andto speak i n the Reichstag , and he seems to haveused th is right a l te rnate ly to bu l ly and to persuade .Such was B i smarck ’s actua l pos i t ion ; by the C onstitution h is powers d id not appear so enti rely overwhelm i ng , but by us i ng h is i ron wi l l and h is enormous prestige

,Bismarck was able to make for h imsel f

an othee of un l im i ted poss i b i l i t ies . The story of h i sfa l l has been told e lsewhere (see p . al thoughthe Chancel lo r was al l- powerfu l

,h is power depended

enti re ly on the Emperor ’s goodwi l l , and i n 1890 theyoung Empero r , Wil l iam I I , was able to dism i ss h isvete ran m i n i ster. S i nce that time the d i rection of

po l i cy has la i n wi th i n the hands of the Empero r ; thechancel lorsh ip lost much of i ts old importance , andfor the time the Chancel lor ceased to be at the headof the Prussian m i n istry . This change i n the balanceof power between Empero r and Chance l lor has hadsome important resu l ts . Wi l l iam 11

,the presen t


Empero r,i s a strong and determ i ned character

,with

a convict ion that he ru les by D ivi ne Right , and thathe must personal ly make h is power fel t th roughoutGermany . The French Revolution he once declaredto be an u nm i tigated crime agai nst God and manhence h i s antagon ism to both Liberals and Social i stsi s en ti re ly unvei l ed . Yet h i s pol i cy has roused suchhost i l i ty i n the Reichstag on more than one occas ionthat he has been obl iged to give way ; al l the un

populari ty of h i s acts fal ls on h im personal ly,rather

than on h i s m i n i sters . There has been , of late years ,a dete rm i ned attempt to make the Emperor act on lywith the consent or on the adv ice of h is Chancel lor,but the attempt has met wi th on ly i n term itten t success . O n the who l e , the Empero r has been able toenfo rce h is own pol icy , because the Reichstag i sbroken up i nto so many smal l groups ; sometimesthere are as many as twelve or fifteen parties or

subd ivis ions of parti es .I n 19 12 a general el ect ion ended i n a large i ncreaseof Soc ial ist members , and i t remai ns to be seen whatinfluence they may be able to exercise on the developmen t of the Imperia l Consti tution .

The secret of the Emperor ’s power i s that he standsfor u n ion and for strength i n m i l i ta ry and fo re ignaffai rs . The Social i st party i s opposed to war

,and

puts econom ic p roblems i n the first place ; the seriousquestion before i t i s whether, i f the control of theGovernment passes to the Reichstag , the Empi re wi l lbe e i ther better governed or more un i ted .

A sim i lar question i s that of the Consti tution of

Prussia . Prussia retai n s he r old const i tution , con

s isti ng of the Ki ng and an Upper and a Lower House .The Lower House i s elected by a pecul iar i nd i rectsu ffrage

, so d iv ided i n to classes as to give the leastpower to the greatest n umbers ; the vot i ng i s done


278 1111: CONSTITUTIONS or EUROPE

1861 and 1867 ; i t confides the government to theEmperor and two Houses of Parl iament, and canon ly be changed by a two- th i rds majori ty of bothHouses . The powers of the Empero r are very great ;the Cabi net i s respons ibl e on ly to h im , and not tothe Parl iamen t ; he has a veto on al l l egis lation , andhe uses it. Although the m i n i sters are thus com

paratively un importa nt, the var ious officials are al lpowerfu l ; perhaps i n no coun try except Russ ia arethe ord i nary c i tizens so much dom inated and supervi sed by the po l ice ; the Press i n theory i s free , butpractical ly the newspapers a re very much at themercy of the Government.The Parl iamen t consi sts of an Upper and a LowerHouse ; the Upper House mai n ly i ncludes hered i tarymembers

,but there are also l i fe-members , nom inated

by the Emperor. The Lower House i s elected by manhood suffrage

,which was granted i n 1907 afte r much

agi tation ; the consti tuenc ies were arranged as far asposs i ble acco rd i ng to race ; i .e . Austria was subd ivided , for election purposes , i n to groups of Po l es ,Germans , Czechs , Slovenes , I ta l ians , &c. The re

'

su l t has been to l essen racial j ealousy,and to day

parti es i n Austria tend to d iv ide on econom ic questions , such as Social i sm , rather than on race l i nes .The Lower House has very much the same powersas the House of Commons i n B ri tai n

,but wi th some

restrict ions — (a ) the questions of foreign relations ,the army , and finance are u l t imate ly reserved for

the Federal Government ; (12) certai n local questionsa re left to be settled by the local D iets

,which su rvive

i n al l the Austrian provi nces ; (c) as the Cabi net i snot respons ibl e to Parl iament

,and as the Lower

House i s d i vided i n to several groups , the Emperori s almost always able to enforce h is pol i cy , i n sp iteof hosti l i ty . The Austrian members of the Federal

HUNGARY 279

Assembly are nominated by the two Austrian Housesof Par l iamen t from among themse lves .The Hungarian Consti tution i s much o lder. I tmay perhaps be dated from the Go lden Bu l l of 1222

(the Hungarian Magna Charta) , by wh ich the K ingwas bound to observe the laws and rights of Hungary

,whi le h is subj ects were given a lega l right

to rebel i f the Ki ng d isregarded h is obl igation . I n1848 the ancient Consti tution was refo rmed and mod ified

,but on the whol e i t remai ns i n form much as

i t was th roughout the M iddle Ages . The Governmen t l i es i n the hands of the Ki ng (N .B .

— theEmpero r’s correct ti tle is Empero r of Austria and

King of Hungary , not Emperor of Austria-Hungary)and of two Houses of Par l iament , the Tab le of Magnates and the Tabl e of Deputi es . The Table of

Magnates cons ists of nobles,who have always played

a very lead i ng part i n Hungary,and of l i fe-members ;

the nobles,i f they prefe r it, may si t for el ection i n the

Lower House . The Deputi es , of whom there are 453,are el ected for five years , on a l im i ted franch ise , which ,however

,i ncl udes every man above twen ty- four who

can speak Magyar,and pays a sma l l tax an nua l ly .

Forty of these members s i t for Croat ia, wh ich hasbeen granted special priv i leges under a special m i nister , the Ban of Croatia , and reta i ns a local D iet ;

1

they are al lowed to speak the Croatian l anguage

(which , however, many of them do not know) , andthey on ly attend the House when Croatian mattersare under d iscussion . The Hungarian Parl iamentd i ffers from the Austria n i n that the Cabi net i s rea l lyrespons ib le to the Table of Deputi es and not to theKi ng ; moreover, the Hungarians are not d ividedi n to groups . This i s part ly due to the fact that , asthe elections are managed at presen t

, on ly Magyars1 The C roauan Const i tution was suspended in Apr i l , 1912.


can get i nto Parl iament,and they are too much afraid

of find ing the i r power underm i ned by Slavs , Croats ,Po l es

, or Ruman ians to risk spl i tti ng among themselves

,ei ther i nto two great parti es or i n to groups

,

although on some questions there are party d ivi s ions .The Hungarian Par l i ament i s also unchecked bylocal D iets , save i n Croatia . Local government i nHungary is bei ng modern ized , and is los i ng muchof i ts anci en t con nection with the represen tativesystem .

The Federal Consti tut ion , which i n some respects i ssuperior to those of both Austria and Hungary, maybe b r iefly exp lai ned . The Empero r and Ki ng re

tai ns the pos i t ion wh ich he gai ned by the PragmaticSanction , but has been given certa i n powers wi thregard to Austria-Hungary cons idered jo i n tly . He

must be crowned twice,at Vien na and at Budapest ;

he contro l s the jo i n t army , and must give h i s consentto any jo i n t legislat ion . Almost a l l execut ive work ,such as the co l lection of taxes

,or the rais i ng of

recru i ts for the army , i s l eft to Austria and Hungaryseparate ly ; there are Federal m i n isters for ForeignAffai rs

, for War, and for F i nance , but , with theexception of the M i n ister for Foreign Affa i rs , muchof thei r work i s merely supe rv is ion .

The Federal Assembly cons ists of 60 Austrianand 60 Hungarian del egates , who meet al ternate lyat Vien na and Budapest , and use both the German and the Magyar language i n al l the i r commu

n ications and records. The “ Delegations ” meetand debate separate ly

,and on ly occas ional ly vote

together i n case of a deadlock . I n th i s Assembly ,a l though the numbers are equal

,the Hungarians

general ly have the advantage,because

,as has been

seen,they act as one party

,and are not subdivided

i n to racia l groups . The powers of the Federa l


282 THE CONSTITUTIONS O F EUROPE

Switzerland,though the subsequent h isto ry has been

d i fferen t.Geograph ical ly, Switzerland i s the centre of Europe

— the land of the h ighest moun ta i ns and therefo re ofthe most importan t watersheds . Putti ng i t as s implyas poss i bl e

,Switzerland may be said to cons ist of

th ree great rive r val leys— the Rh i ne,the Rhone

,and

German

EGerman Ita l i an Ita l i a n

Can tons m Can ton

the Tici no ,with i n terven i ng mountai ns . Up those

va l leys penetrated French,German

,and I tal ian

fam i l i es ; up those val l eys spread the influence andru le of France , Germany or Austria , and Lombardy.

The val leys developed separate ly , and formed cantons

,o r t i ny i ndependen t States ; under long pressu re

from Austri a (cf. the legend of Wil l iam Tel l) thecantons formed l eagues among themse lves , and thusretai ned the i r i ndependence . The presen t C onstitut ion— a Federa l Republ i c— i s due to two causes : thestrong local feel i ng of the cantons , and the danger

SW ITZERLAND 283

trom without, which forced them i n to un ion . I n1815 the present boundari es of Swi tzerland werefixed , and the twenty- two cantons were u n i ted i n aloose federat ion . The existi ng Confederation is dueto the C onsti tution of 1848, which has , however , beenmuch modified .

The cantons , out of wh ich the Confederation wasbu i l t up , were severed from each other both byracial and re l igious feel i ng . French Switzerland ismai n ly Protestan t (Calvi n ist) , whi le German Swi tzerland i s to a large exten t Roman Catho l i c ; the I ta l iancantons are mai n ly Roman Catho l i c . Hence the cantons have i nsisted on reta i n i ng as much i ndependenceas poss i ble . Each has i ts own assembly , elected general ly by manhood suffrage ; i n these assembl i es ared iscussed al l questions wh ich are not special ly re

served to the Confederation ; the adm i n ist ration of

almost al l laws , federal o r can tonal , i s l eft to thecantons . The assembl i es d i ffe r i n the d i fferen t cantons ; the most i n terest i ng are the Landsgemez

’

nde,

o r general meeti ngs of al l the c i t izens for l egis lati vepurposes . These appear to be genui ne su rv ival s of

the Teuton ic custom descri bed by Tacitus i n theGermam

'

a , which has given way everywhere e lse 1n

Europe to a system of representation . The meeti ngof the Landsgemei nde i s a most p ictu resque s ight ;on a great meadow near the Lake of Lucerne meettogether al l the c i ti zens of the canton of U ri ; there ,shut i n by thei r protect i ng moun tai n s

,they stand and

l i sten to the p roposed legis lation (very carefu l ly prepared) for the fo l lowing year, and accept or rej ecti t as seems good to them . Most of the cantons haveaccepted some form of representation , and th i s massmeeti ng of the c i ti zens on ly takes place i n th ree or

fou r of them .

The central government , however, i s becomi ng


more powerfu l than the cantonal assembl ies . I t consi sts of a legislative Federa l Assembly , of an execu

t ive Federal Counci l,and of a j ud icial Federal

Tri bu nal .The Federa l Assemb ly l cons ists of two houses : (a)the National Counci l , elected by d i rect manhood suffrage from 5 2 e lectoral d istricts , retu rn i ng i n al l 147members ; (6) the Counci l of States , e lected by thecantons , each can ton send i ng two members . Thetwo houses are supposed to have equal and ident icalpowers ; as a matte r of fact the National Counc i l i sthe mo re impo rtan t

,and i t i s cons idered very l i ttle

honour to be elected to the Counci l of States . TheFederal Counci l takes the p lace of a Cabi net i n otherconsti tutions ; there i s no presiden t of the Swiss R e

publ ic , but a Presiden t or Chai rman pres ides overthe meeti ngs of the Federal Counci l . This Counci lconsi sts of seven members , chosen from among theFederal Assembly , without regard to party ; each of

the seven i s at the head of a departmen t (e .g . War ,o r Foreign Affa i rs) , and they are chosen for the i r

1FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

NATIONAL COUN C IL COUN C IL or STATES

( 147 members , from 52 electora l (44 members , 2 from each

d istricts) can ton)

FEDERAL COUN C IL7 memb ers from the Federal Assemb ly , actmg as Min isters

(a ) Foreign Affa irs.

(5 ) In terl or.

(c) Justlce and Pol ice.

(d ) War.

(6) F inance .

(f ) Industry and Agricul ture .

(g ) Post-ofi’

i ce and Ra11ways.



l aws , or amendments to the Consti tution , which mustbe d iscussed by the Assemb ly , and dec ided upon byReferendum to the who l e people . If

,for i n stance

,

ci ti zens wish for some amendmen t to the C onstitution ,

they may d raw up thei r amendmen t andhave i t referred to the people even though the Assemb ly may disapprove .Experi ence seems to show that the Referendum hasbeen valuable i n Switze rland as a means of secu ri ngthe rejection of unpopular l egis lation . I ts mai n weakness , however, i s that the people are too apt to rej ecta comp l icated measu re wh ich they do not understand

,

but wh ich m ight neverthel ess be b enefic ia l . TheI n i tiat ive

,on the other hand , seems to be nei ther ve ry

usefu l nor n ecessary i n Swi tzerland .

I t wi l l be seen how th ese two i n st i tutions tend to

l essen party feel i ng ; i f every importan t B i l l has to

go back to the peop le for confirmation, i t i s of no use

to talk about the i n iqu i ti es of the Governmen t ; nor

i s i t of much avai l to make att ractive prom ises atelection times , s i nce el ectors can always i n i tiateany legis lat ion they please . The general resu l t i sthat the el ecto rs tend to el ect men of the best busi nesscapaci ty and known worth , feel i ng confiden t that ifthey do not always agree wi th them , they wi l l haveanothe r chance of expressi ng the i r v iews . Thus the“ wi l l of the people ” ,

as far as men are concerned ,seems to be mo re tho rough ly consu l ted i n Swi tzerlandthan anywhere el se i n the world .

The other countri es of Europe may be more b r ieflyd ism i ssed

,as the i r C onsti tu tions ei ther con form to the

type of those a l ready descri bed , o r have not yet fu l lydeve loped .

EXTENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 287

S PAIN

Spai n is a Consti tut ional Monarchy , with the usua lCabi net and two- chamber system ; the m i n isters arerespons ible to the Cortes (or Parl iament) , which i se lected by manhood suffrage . Although the majori tyof Span iards hard ly rea l ize the i r pol i t ical power , partyfee l i ng runs very h igh

,as between the C lerical s ,

Li bera ls,and Soc ial i sts

,and there is much co rruption

i n publ ic l i fe .PORTUGAL

Portugal , wh ich was a consti tutional monarchy , i sat p resent under a very i nsecu re Republ ican Government ; Royal ist agitation , however , conti nues at intervals , and the Republ ic i s underm i ned by co rruption .

NORWAY

Norway,un i ted by a personal un ion with Sweden

i n 1814 , i n 1905 broke loose , and chose as Ki ng of

Norway Pri nce Char les of Denmark . The Ki ng retai nsconsiderable execut ive powers ; he can also veto a lawtwo or th ree times , but even tual ly has to give way .

He i s advised by a Counci l of M i n isters . The workof l egislation i s carri ed on by the S torming ,

cons isti ng of an Upper House , the Lag l /zz

'

ng ,and a Lower

House , the Odelst/zz'

ng . The Lower House i s elected

(s i nce 1907) by a l l c i t i zens , men ahd women , who havepaid taxes on a smal l i ncome (from £ 16to amarried woman is qual ified i f her husband is a taxpayer.

SWEDEN

Sweden has a Consti tut ional Ki ng,who retai ns very

extensive powers ; he can abso lute ly veto a law ,and

he ca n i n i t iate new l egi slat ion . He i s advised by a


Cabi net wh ich he appo i n ts , but wh ich i s respons i bl eto Parl i ament . The R iksdag (or Parl iament) consistsof two Houses , of which the Lower i s elected by manhood suffrage .

RU S S IA

Russia has a Governmen t wh ich has al ready beendescri bed i n Chapter VI I I . The Tsar i s an autocraticmonarch , bound on ly by one or two ancien t and“ fu ndamental ” laws of Russia ; he is advised by aCounci l , wh ich he appo i n ts and d ism isses ; l egislat ioni s d iscussed by the Duma , a national assembly el ectedby very i nd i rect and d isproport ionate methods . TheTsar has stated that he wi l l not legi s late wi thout theconsen t of the Duma , but i t must be not iced that th isl im i tat ion i s sel f- i mposed . The priv i leges wh ich theTsar has given he bel i eves that he may revoke at anytime .1

TURKEY

The Government of Turkey needs a word or two of

explanation . U p to 1909 the Su l tan of Turkey was atheocrat ic abso l u te monarch ; i . e. he was absol ute i na l l temporal affai rs , and i n sp i ri tual matters he wasregarded as the successor of the Prophet, Mohammed ,and therefo re as head of the Mohammedan rel igion .

I n 1909 , however, the absol ute power of the Su l tangave way to a Consti tut ion , establ i shed by the

“YoungTurks ” . Th is leaves h is sp i ri tual posi tion u ntouched .

The respons ibi l i ty for the government of Tu rkey now

rests wi th a M i n istry and a Rep resen tat ive Assemb ly

,but i t i s extremely difficu l t to d iscover what the

Assembly represen ts , and the M i n istri es appear to bethorough ly inefficient (see p .

1A Revolutlon in Russia began in March ,1917 , b ut as yet no sett lement has

b een reached


290 SOME TENDENCIES OF THE I 9TH CENTURY

between flexib le and rigid Consti tut ions , i t w i l l beseen that i n most States the Consti tution i s capabl eof al teration , by mo re or less compl icated methods ;that i n general i t i s not considered poss i bl e to revokea Const i tution

,though i t m ight conce ivably be done

by the Tsar,the Su ltan , or the Ki ng of Montenegro ;

that i n general i t i s easi e r to change the C onstitution of a U n ita ry than of a Federal State ; e .g . i twou ld be far mo re d ifii cu lt to change the Consti tut ionof the German Empi re , or of Austria-Hungary

,than

that of Spai n or I taly . There i s,mo reover

,always

the poss i bi l i ty that revo l ut ion may ent i re ly overtu rnex i st i ng Consti tutions , as i t has recent ly done i nTu rkey and i n Po rtugal .

CHAPTER X I I I

SOME TENDENC IES OF THE N INETEENTHC ENTURY

The man who does not know wha t has b een though t b y thosewho have gone b e fore h im is s u re to set an undue va l ue upon h is ow n

idea s .— M a rk P a ti z

'

son .

“ I make no cla im to have sa id a l l tha t m i gh t b e sa id ; b ut to havesa id so much a s w i l l lay th e founda t ion s , whe reon i f any man w i l lb u i ld up a s ta te l ie r ed ifice , h e sha l l not find me g r udge h im a u gh t ,b ut ra ther sha l l have my thanks. Grotz

'

us.

A KNOWLEDG E of h istory does not on ly i nvo lve l earni ng what men have done ; i t i s often more importan tand far mo re d ifi’i cu lt to know what men have thought .To understand al l i s to pardon al l , says the proverb .

and certa i n ly the best way of l earn i ng to agree o r tol ive peaceably with ou r opponents i s to try to understand what they real ly th i n k and mean .

Therefore we must make some attempt to tack lethe very d ifficu lt quest ion of what men thought and

I NFLUENCE OF FR ENCH R EVOLUTION 29 1

what they aimed at duri ng the n i neteen th centu ry ;what influences moved them , what men or booksi nspi red them

,what was the i r atti tude towards the

great systems and i nsti tutions wh ich they found i nex i stence o r helped to create .D ifficult though i t may b e , the various influenceswhich tended to make Modern Europe may yet bed isti ngu ished i n some degree from the general h i storica l causes wh ich had been worki ng for centu ries .Among the domi nan t influences at work from 1815onwards may be named the French Revo l ut ion , thecareer and ideas of Napo l eon , and the example , consc ious ly or unconsc iously fo l lowed , of Britai n .

Fi rst one must place the French Revo lut ion— withi ts larger v iew of the poss i bi l i t ies of human l i fe

,with

i ts i nsi stence on the righ ts of the i nd iv idual , with i tsshatteri ng of ancien t bonds

,i ts be l i ef i n manki nd , i ts

trad i t ion of vio l ence and b loodshed . To i t al l menlooked back- some , l i ke Wi l l iam I I of Germany , orthe Tsar Alexande r I , as to an “ unm it igated crime ” ,

whose repeti t ion must be prevented at a l l costs ; someas to the bi rth of l i berty and equal i ty ; some as to av io len t and terri bl e way of ach iev i ng a good end ;some , l ike Mazz i n i , as to a movemen t based on awrong conception , on an assert ion of the Rights of

Man apart from the Duties of Man . But i n anycase the Revol ut ion gave the impulse

,whence came

both th e react ionary po l i cy of the years 1815— 48, andthe great democratic movemen ts wh ich were fe l tth roughout Europe i n 1820, i n 1830, i n 1848, and tosome exten t i n 187 1. Nor

,i ndeed

,does the influence

of the Revo l u t ion cease here . I t d ies on ly when i tswo rk i s done , and i n Turkey , i n Russ ia , i n Pers ia ,i n I nd ia , or i n Ch i na i ts work i s sti l l go i ng on ,

happi ly wi th decreas i ng violence,but wi th no l ess

S tri ki ng resu l ts.

292 SOME TENDENCIES OF THE I 9TH CENTURY

S ide by side wi th the influence of the Revol utionwen t the lasti ng work of Napo l eon Bonaparte . I twas the an ti- nationa l po l i cy of Napoleon that laid thespark to the tra i n wh ich was to fire the national i stmovements i n Eu rope . The spark m ight burst to ablaze at once , as i n Spai n o r i n Russia , i t m ightsmoulder for years

,as i n I taly or i n P russia

,i t may

be smoulderi ng“

sti l l , but i n each case Napo l eon’s

hand l ighted a trai n that was to release forces of

wh ich he had no idea . His nephew ,Napoleon I I I

,

l ived to see and feel the power of that Spi ri t of national i ty , which he alternately encou raged and defied .

The who l e h istory of the n i neteenth centu ry i s mai n lyoccup ied i n traci ng i ts worki ng.

The th i rd great influence, that of B ri tai n , mayperhaps be con nected wi th the two prev ious ones .Bri tai n had been able to hold out agai n st Napo l eon ;she had money , and l i berty , and had had no Revo lu

t ion . S o one m ight sum up the B ri ti sh posi tion asi t appeared to Cont i nen ta l nations . What m ightEu rope not l earn from England ? Mo reover

,though

E ngl i sh l i berty was largely a matter of t rad i tion andconservati sm rather than of n ew ideas , yet E nglandprovided the man whose ideas were to give a realbas is , a pri nc ip le for reform .

While France tal ked about the Rights of Man , andNapo leon constructed a remarkably efii cient code ,j eremy Bentham was led on by h is desi re for reasonable and scien tific l egislation to the conclus ion thatl i es at the bottom of al l theories of self-government— that no laws can be good or durabl e u n less theyhave the consent and active goodwi l l of the who l ebody of c i t izens . Bentham ’s des i re to deal w i th thepractical p roblems of c rime and pove rty i n B ritai nbrought h im gradual ly to bel i eve that the on ly logical

qual ification for a vote was the capaci ty to feel the


294 SOME TENDENCIES OF THE 191 11 CENTURY

B ritai n was slow ,i ndeed

,but the very fact that any

progress was made was largely due to Bentham,and

thus one i s justified i n coun t i ng h im as one of thegreat influences which have gone to the remaki ng of

Europe .Very closely con nected with the work of the FrenchRevo l ution and of Ben tham is the influence of theRomantic Revival i n l i te ratu re . Romanti c i sm

, or

Natu ral i sm as i t i s sometimes cal led , often seems tocons ist of very contrad icto ry tendenci es , but i ts mai ni nsp i rat ion was the des i re to get back to Natu re

, to

the simple u nspoi led i nd iv idual , u ntouched by mo

dern civ i l i zation .

Through many years of the e ighteen th cen tu ryWesley had preached that re l igion was concerned

,

not so much wi th chu rches and i n sti tutions andtheo logy

,as with the worki ng fai th of the i nd iv idual ;

Napoleon had opened up caree rs to ta l en t, givi ng“ the tools to h im who can use breaki ngdown disti nctions of class and bi rth ; Wilberforce andHoward and Burn s had preached the doctri n e thata man ’s a man for a

’ that ” — whether he were aploughman , or a prisoner, or a slave . S o i n l i te ratu re Wordswo rth had shown how the real subj ects ofpoetry , the th i ngs real ly worth th i nk i ng about , werethe joys and gri efs , the hopes and troubles of i nd ividua l men and women , regard less of thei r pos i tionor importance i n l i fe .Wordsworth i s typical of a l i terary movement wh ichwas go i n g on al l over Eu rope i n the early n i neteenthcen tu ry — a movemen t which d rew its i n sp i rationvery largely from Rousseau , and wh ich d id much towi n men ’s sympathy for the struggle for i nd ividualrights and l i bert i es . Cruel ty , i nhuman i ty , negl igenceor i nj ustice were most successful ly combated by imaginative work , which made i t poss ible for ou ts iders

ROMANTICISM 295

to real ize what sufferi ng real ly meant to i nd iv idualsufferers . A good and fam i l iar example of the wayi n wh ich l i terature thus he lped on the cause of p rogress l ies i n the nove ls of Charles Dickens , wh ichmade men see for themselves the socia l ev i ls andcruelt ies goi ng on around them . Anothe r l ess- knownexample i s the work of Turgen ieff, the Russ ian novel ist

,who descri bed the m iserab le lot of the serfs .

Romantici sm had,however

,another and perhaps a

more prom i nent aspect . The same des i re wh ich ledWordsworth to look for the natu ral man i n the Cumber land dalesmen

,which made Rousseau glori fy the

noble savage run n i ng wi ld i n the woods , l ed others tolook back i n to h istory i n search of s impler , noblerheroes , and more prim i t ive emot ions . This looki ngbackward had two rather contrad ictory resu l ts .On the one hand , i t created a keen i nte rest i n med ieva l h istory and legend

,a firm conviction that no

period of the world ’s h istory cou ld be scorned , that nophase of human natu re was unworthy of study . I twi l l eas i ly be seen how th is developed i nto a reactionagai nst the destruct ive tendencies of the FrenchRevo l ut ion . The Monarchy , the Church , the M iddleAges could not be swept away by arden t refo rmersas i f they were mere heaps of debri s . They had i nthem elements of truth— above al l , touches of co lou rand picturesqueness ; hence many of the Romanticslooked backward rather than forward . Especia l ly , i nFrance , they tu rned away from both the Revo lutionand the Empi re , and were arden t champions of theold ideas of monarchy and d iv i ne right. Such menas Victor Hugo , Chateaubriand , Dumas , or M ichelet

(though to some extent the apostl es of freedom andi n novation) yet del i berate ly looked back to formerages and sought to revive elements of thought andl i fe wh ich had long been ignored or desp ised . Per


haps i t may be said that i n great wri te rs th i s react ionled to a wider and more complete v iew of l i fe , whi lei n the lesser men i t was apt to degenerate i n to amere fru i tl ess g lo rification of the past .On the other hand , Roman tic i sm also showed awonderfu l power of arous i ng national feel i ng

,even

among nations where that feel i ng seemed long si ncedead . Byron and Scott set the example of dwe l l i ngon the past glori es of obscure or pass ive peoples ;Byron , by h is i n tense fa ith i n the futu re of Greeceand of I ta ly , deserves to be counted among themakers of modern Eu rope ; Scott

’s unceas i ng i n teresti n legend and fo l k- song showed how the memories ofthe past m ight be rev ived

,how the cause of l i berty

and national i ndependence had had i ts heroes centu ries befo re .Genera l ly one may say that the l i te rary came b efore the po l i t i ca l rev ival , though occas ional ly bothseem to have gone fo rward s ide by s ide . Thus i nGermany the great national l i te ratu re came before theupris i ng of the German nation . Goethe , and Sch i l le r,and Lessi ng worked out the German ideal long beforeB ismarck . Hei ne and “ You ng Germany ” adoptedthe ideas of the Revolution long before Germanywas ready for a po l i t ical or soc ial revol ution . Thecreation of the German Empi re i n 187 1 had beenpreceded by an immense i ncrease of i n te rest i n theHo ly Roman Empi re of the M idd le Ages . Germanh istorians had worked s ide by side wi th B ismarckfor the u n ion of Germany . S o , too , i n the h istory ofAustria-Hungary i t has been shown how much of thenational i st fee l i ng was due to h i storians and jou rnal ists ; in Bohemia , i n I l lyria or Croat ia, i n Hungaryor i n Poland

,a l i terary revival was the herald , often

the cause of a pol i t ical renaissance .I n I taly , thought and l i te ratu re were a generation


298 SOME TEND ENCIES OF THE 191 11 CENTURY

Socia l i sm and I nternational i sm . By two means ,the pressu re of economic problems , and the growi ng des i re for permanen t peace , the i n ternat ionaltendency has been strengthened . As the demandfor national i ndependence grew stronger, so grew upthe need for some cu rb to i n ternational j ealousies .This has been created

,first, by an i ncreas i ng real i za

tion that the econom ic i n terests of nations are not

necessari ly antagon i sti c , and that economic p roblemsare much the same al l the wo rld over ; second ly ,by an immense growth of i n ternational relat ions

,of

i n ternational law,and an extens ion of the p ri nc iple

of Arbi tration , l ead i ng up to th e establ i shmen t of

the Hague Conference .To take the economic problems first. Some of thecauses of the growth of Social i sm have been deal tw ith i n an earl i e r chapte r

,but they may be sum

marized agai n here .The general resu l t of the French Revolution was

to place the i nd iv idual face to face wi th the world ,and leave h im to figh t h is way as best he could .

The motto of the early n i n eteenth cen tu ry was la issez

f az’

re— l et economic laws work themselves out freely ,and we wi l l abide by the consequences . The methodsu i ted a Napo l eon wel l enough ; i t su i ted , too , thecommercial gen i us . But i t worked d isastrously wi ththe o rd i nary man . When the old gu i ld system wasabol i shed

,or decayed , the i nd ividual workman cou ld

make no fai r bargai n wi th h i s employer,and h is

wages fel l to starvat ion poi n t . Chi ld ren of five or

si x worked for i ncred i bly long hou rs i n the factori es ;women were obl iged to accept work for which theywere physical ly unfit. Each generation that grewup under these cond i tion s was l i kely to be weak l i e rand less efficien t than the last. I t was facts suchas these wh ich led

,first, to the state regulation {

of

SOC IAL ISM 299

trade and i ndustry,th rough such legis lation as the

Facto ry Acts,and second ly , to the various Social ist

schemes, of which Lou is B lanc ’s “ O rgan ization of

Labour ” i s perhaps the best known . The ideaunderly i ng them al l i s that as i nd iv iduals can not betrusted to carry on i ndustri es without infl icting hardsh ips and i nj ustice on the i r workpeople , the who l eo rgan izat ion of labou r shou ld be carri ed on by theState . I t i s importan t to remember that th is i s thefundamental theo ry of Soc ia l i sm ; i nd ividual Social i stsd i ffer amazi ngly i n thei r ideas , and in the means theyare wi l l i ng to adopt i n order to carry out thei r ideas .But the one po i n t on which they al l agree i s thatthe State must undertake the managemen t of thoseeconomic i nstruments , such as land and i ndustria lcapi ta l , that can not be safe ly left i n the hands ofi nd ividuals ”.

1 The object of Soc ial i sm , too , almostal l Social i sts would agree to express i n the formu la ofBentham and John Stuart M i l l

,

“ the greatest goodof the greatest n umber ” . I t i s easy to see howSocial ism grew up out of the endeavou r to improvethe cond i t ions of the poor ; i t i s very much less easyto see whether i t would real ly so lve the d ifficu ltieswith which it would have to grapple . But i t i s imposs i b le to write the h i story of the n i neteenth centu rywithout some attempt to exp lai n what Social i sm standsfor .

Some accoun t has been given of the practical FrenchSocial i sm , worki ng general ly by experimen ts (see

p . The greatest theor i st of the cause was , however, Karl Marx , a German .

I n h is book , Cap i ta l , Marx brushed away al l thevagueness and u ncerta i nty of earl i e r Social i sts . He

made many m istakes, even i n the opi n ion of h is own

fol lowers, but he explai ned abso l utely clearly what he3Ramsay Macdonald .

300 SOME TENDENCIES O F THE 19TH CENTURY

meant , and h is book became a creed , accepted bySocial i st wo rki ng men al l over Eu rope . He taughtthat wage earners must combi ne agai nst the cap i tal ists

,

with whom they must have an undyi ng warfare ; heshowed how capi tal had grown , and how i t m ightbe taken over by the State ; he taught that h istoryought always to be i n te rpreted by econom ic mot ives .Although modern Social i sts have parted companywith Marx on many po i n ts , to h im belongs the re

spons i bi l i ty for the i mmense extension of the Social istmovemen t i n E u rope . As has been said , economicproblems are the same i n d i ff erent countries

,and i t i s

c la imed by Soc ial ists that they are teach i ng men to

forget national j ealousies ; even i n Austria-Hungary ,i t i s probable that the questions of the futu re wi l l beeconom ic rathe r . than rac ia l . Thus one may rankSocial i sm as one of the causes of the strong i n ternational tendency wh ich has al ready been mentioned .

I t must not, however, be supposed that Social i smalone has concerned i tsel f w i th the improvement ofsoc ial cond i tions . Social i sm has i ts own specialtheory of the means by wh ich changes should becarri ed out, but meantime the necessary work isbe i ng done by men of al l parti es . Napoleon I I I hada serious and practical i n te rest i n social and econom icquestions

,and made many real improvements . Bis

marck framed a State Soc ial i sm ”of h is own , which

i s said to have immensely improved the cond i tions ofl i fe i n Germany. I ndeed

, one of the most striki ngtendenc ies of modern Eu rope i s the way i n wh ichsocial experiments a re tri ed and passed on from onecountry to another.Legis lation to preven t the many abuses of thefactory system has sp read i n to almost every c ivi l izedState ; educat ion , heal th , and san i tation occupy anever - i ncreasi ng share of the l egi s lato rs ’ atten tion ;



maki ng Europe a group or fam i ly of nat ions,under

the pres idency or d i rection of France . The idea 01

the med ieval Empi re seemed to have attracted h im .

But the day of a dom inan t Empi re was over. I nternational relat ion s have been systematized by othermeans . The Ho ly Al l i ance was an attempt to providea substi tute for war and i nsu rrections ; for the timethe C ongresses contro l l ed Eu ropean affai rs . Napo leonI I I tri ed to assume the pos i t ion o f European arbi ter

,

but he fai led lamentably . The Congress of Berl i n i n1878, and later Congresses , though they have serveda usefu l pu rpose , and have averted wars , have not

been conspicuously successfu l i n solv i ng some of theproblems presen ted to them . Mo reover

,a Congress

was on ly an occas iona l and vo l u ntary gatheri ng o f

the Powers , and cou ld not be appealed to when d ifficu lties first arose . Someth i ng more systemati c wasneeded .

There had long been a feel i ng that Arbi tration couldsettl e many of the quarrel s wh ich had h itherto beenfought out. But i n o rder that Arbi tration shou ldbecome general

, two or th ree prel im i nari es wereessential . There must be an I nte rnational Code of

Law, to which al l c iv i l i zed nat ions wou ld agree ; there

must be a fixed and imparti al method of choos i ng thearbi te rs or j udges ; and there must be a general u ndertaki ng to abide by the award of the arb i ters .The fi rst cond ition was perhaps the eas i est to fu lfil .Sai lo rs and merchants have always fel t the need fori n te rnational law

,and i n some form or othe r i t has

almost always existed . Duri ng the seventeenth century much was wri tten on the subject , and the idea of

i n ternational law developed rapid ly . Sometimes general ly accepted ru les were i ncorporated i n treati es , suchas the rul es concern i ng neutra l sh i ps and neutralgoods wh ich were embodied i n the Treaty of Pari s

THE HAGUE CONFER ENCE 303

(see p . sometimes a reasonable ru l e was s implytaci tly accepted

,and upheld by the lawyers . Doub tu

fu l cases were settled by arbit ration , one of themost famous bei ng the quarrel of Britai n and theU n ited States over the cru i ser A labama . Questions ,too , of boundaries or fish ing rights were refe rred toarbi trat ion , and peaceably solved . Treati es weremade between various States bi nd i ng them to acceptarbi tration i n a l l cases save those affecti ng nationa lhonou r or existence . Chi l e and Argenti na have now

gone a step further, and have uncond it iona l ly undertaken to subm i t any d ispute aris i ng between them to

arbitrat ion . I t has been suggested that B ri tai n andthe U n i ted States should make a s im i lar u ndertaki ng ; i f such a treaty could be co ncl uded i t wouldbe a great step towards secu ri ng the peace of theworld .

I n spite of the more frequent recourse to arbitrat ion ,the expend i tu re of European States on the i r arm iesand nav ies i ncreased rap id ly , and became an immensepermanen t bu rden on the i r finances .

In 1898, Nicholas I I su rprised Europe by aski ngfor a conference to d iscuss the possi b i l i ty of a generall i m i tat ion of armamen ts . I n 1899 the first HagueConference ” met for th i s pu rpose . The Russianrepresentatives cal led upon al l nations to un ite i nsecu ri ng so great a b enefit ; the French representativeexpressed h i s conv iction that the object of civi l i zationwas more and more to abo l i sh the struggle for l i febetween men , and to put i n i ts stead an acco rd b etween them for the strugg le agai nst the un re len ti ngfo rces of matte r But the German spokesman declared that expend itu re on the army and navy wasa patrioti c duty and sati sfaction , and not a crush i ngbu rden ; no one knew exact ly what steps cou ld betaken then and there

,and the Con ference broke up ,

304 SOME TENDENCIES OF THE 19TH CENTURY

apparen tly a fai l u re . Two good resu l ts,however

,

fol lowed . The Conference agreed to appoi n t a permanent Cou rt of Arbi tration , the Hague Tri bunal ,to s i t at the Hague . Appeal s to th i s Court areoptional , but its help i s always avai lable . One ofthe most notable cases wh ich have been refe rred to

i t was the m istaken attack , duri ng the Russo

j apanese war, made by part of the Russian fleetupon some B ri t ish fish ing boats . The attack wasproved to be a m istake , and peace was mai ntai ned .

The second valuable resu l t was that the Conferenceagreed to meet agai n , and the second meeti ng , i n1907 , found it far better prepared with p ractical ideas .The Conference now i n cl udes most of the o rgan izedsovere ign States i n the wo rld , and u ndoubted ly i t hasa great work before it. I f it can i n the futu re secu repeace, or even . a considerable lessen i ng of war andthe horrors of war

, i t wi l l deserve to be ranked as thegreatest developmen t of the age.1

Another force wh ich ought to work for peace i s thei ncreased knowledge of economic cond itions th roughout the world . I t was partly the love of peace thati nsp i red the Free Trade po l i cy of Bright and Cobden ,whi le mo re modern wri ters have tri ed

,somewhat un

convi nci ng ly , to show that war among civ i l i zed nationsi s imposs i bl e owi ng to thei r close econom ic interde

pendence . But that t im e i s not yet . I t has been saidthat the characteristi c work of the n i neteen th centu rywas “ the revelat ion of the poten t force of national i ty I s it, perhaps , u nduly ideal ist ic to hope thatthe twentieth cen tury may be marked by its recogn ition of a world-wide commun ity of i n terests wh ichshal l make for peace?

1The League of Nations estab l ished b y the Peace Treaty of 1919 , wi l l , i tis hoped , prove a much stronger safe-

guard of peace than the Hague Conferencecou ld b e.


306 CONCLUS ION

Such h istory as th i s i s barely forgotten ; a word toan old man

,a l i ttl e pati ence i n l i sten i ng to remin is

cences , a question here and there , wi l l b ri ng i t al lback to us as l iv i ng facts , as th i ngs wh ich actual lyhappened to real men a nd women .

The changes,too , are sti l l go i ng on . A new

mi n i ster i n Russia , the next Duma that meets , m i ghtmake h isto ry almost as fast as the assembl i es of theFrench Revolution . Norway , Denmark , Swi tzerlandmay make experiments i n democratic governmen twh ich wi l l l eave the “ Mother of Parl iamen ts ” farbeh i nd . And al l these changes are u tte rly un intel l i

gi b le unti l on e has l earned someth i ng of the h istory of

yeste rday wh ich merges i n to the pol i tics of to-day .

I have tri ed to suggest the questions that we may askof the past , the expectations wi th wh ich we may lookto the futu re .

‘

In a word , I have tri ed to make thenewspaper i n tel l igi bl e .

N ote.—Perhaps th i s Conclus ion may b e left as i t s tood in 1913, s ince

the t ime has not yet come in wh ich to wr i te a b r ief s tory of the

G rea tWa r. But every reader w i l l b e on l y too keen ly awa re tha t w i thin the five yea rs 1914

- 19 he has h imse l f l i ved th rou gh a lmos t more

“ h is tory tha n is con ta ined in the who le o f th is b ook , and w i l l needthe less urg ing to look backwa rd a s wel l as forward .

S eptember , 1919.

A P P E N D I C E S

GENEALOG ICAL TABLES .

EURO P EAN RULERS DUR ING THE N INETEENTHC ENTURY.

GLOSSARY OF SOME Pou n cm. AND OTHERTERMS US ED m n us Boox .

B IBL IOG RAPHY.

S UMMARY OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT m

EUROPE.


APPEND IX210

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659

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311APPEND IX

Ev

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m

312 APPEND IX B

HOUSE OF SAVOY

Victor Amadeus I I I ,King of Sard in ia ,

mis ts

APPEND IX B

Cha r les Emmanuel(cous in of Cha rlesEmmanuel IV).

ICha rles Albert,

x831-

49

VictorEmmanuel I I ,

1 4 8

(King of ?la ly

Humbert I ,

Victor Emmanuel I II.1900

EUROPEAN RULERS DUR ING THE N INETEENTHC ENTURY

FRANC E

1814- 1824. Lou is XVI I I.

1824—1830. C ha r les X .

1830- 1848. Lou is Ph i l i ppe.

S econd F ren ch Republ i c, 1848- 1852.

Pres iden t : Pr ince Lou is Napoleon .

S econd F ren ch Emp i re, 1852—1870.

Emperor of the French : Pr ince Lou is Napo leon , as

Napo leon I I I.

Thzrd F ren ch Republ ic, 1870— to presen t day.

Pres iden ts187 1

-

1873.

1873—1879.

1879- 1887 .

1887—1894 .

1894— 1895 .

1895— 1899.

1899—1906.

1906—19 13.

1913“

Th iers .

MacMahon .

G revy .C a rno t .C as im ir-P é r ierFa ure .

Loub et .Fa l l iereso

Po inca ré


314 AP P E N D IX B

DENMARK

1808- 1839. Freder ick VI (King 1848— 1863. Frede r ick V I I .

a lso of Norway t i l l 1863— 1906. C h r is t ian IX .

1906—19 12. Freder ick V I I I .1839—1848. C h r is t ian V I I I . 1912 C h r is t ian X .

S PA IN P O RTUGAL ‘

Ferd ina nd V I I . John.

Isab e l la I I . Pedro IV (abd ica ted).Prov is iona l Govern Ma r ia I I .men t . Dom M ig ue l .

Amadeo I . Ma r ia I I (res tored ).Repub l ic . Pedro V .

Al fonso X I I . Lu is I .Queen Ma r ia . Dom C a r los .

Alfonso X I I I . Manue l I I .Repub l ic es tab l ished .

Russu TURKEY

1801—1825 . Alexander I .1825

- 1855 . N icho la s I .1855

- 1881. Alexander I I .1881—1894 . Ale xander I I I .1894

—19 171. N icho las I I .

1Revolution in Russ ia

Mahmud I I .Ab du l Mej id .

Abdu l Az i z.Mu rad V.

Abdu l Hamid I I .Mohammed V .

Mohammed VI .

APPEND IX c 315

APPEND IX C

GLOS SARY OF SOME POLITICAL AND OTHER

TERMS US ED IN TH IS BOOK 1

Budget. A sta temen t of the probab le revenue and expend i t ure forthe com ing year , presen ted by a C hancel lor of the E xchequeror finance min is ter to a Lower House of Pa r l iamen t .

Bundesrath . The G erman Federa l C ounc i l , cons is t ing of de lega tesfrom each of the sepa ra te S ta tes of the German Empire .

Cl eri cal . In pol i t ics , a pa r t isan of the ru le , supremacy, or s tron ginfluence o f the c lergy.

Commune. (a ) The Governmen t on communa l is t ic pr inc i p les es tabl ished in Par is by in su rrec t ion for a shor t t ime in 187 1.

(b) A loca l d i v is ion in Fra nce and e lsewhere for admin is tra t i vepurposes.

Concordat. An ag reemen t . Genera l ly an agreemen t be tween C hurchand S ta te , and espec ia l ly be tween the S ee of Rome and a secu la rgovernmen t re la t i ve to ma t ters tha t concern both .

Consti tuent Assemb ly . An a ssemb ly wh ich has power to frame a

C ons t i t u t ion .

Consti tut ion . The sys tem or body of fundamen ta l pr inc i p les accord ingto wh ich a na t ion or s ta te is cons t i t u ted and governed .

Duma. The Russ ian Representa t i ve Assemb ly or Pa r l iamen t. Alsoused for loca l assemb l ies , genera l ly mun ic i pa l.

Encycl ical . A let ter or c ircu la r issued by the Pope.

Execut ive. Tha t pa rt of the Governmen t wh ich is espec ia l ly concern edw i th carry ing out law s , decrees , and j ud ic ia l sen tences .

Federation. The forma t ion of a pol i t ica l un i ty out of a n umber of

sepa ra te s ta tes , prov inces , or co lon ies , in such a way tha t eachre ta ins the managemen t of its own affa i rs .

Franch ise. The r i gh t or pr i v i lege of vot ing a t pub l ic elect ions , especia lly for memb ers of the leg is la t ure.

Indemni ty . A sum pa id by way of compensa t ion for loss or damage.

Ini tiative. The r i gh t of a c i t i zen or cer ta in numb er of c i t i zens to

or ig ina te leg is la t ion , e.g. in Sw i tzer land a nd in some of the Un i tedS ta tes of Amer ica .

Inquisit ion . An eccles ias t ica l tr ib una l former ly used by the Roman

C a tho l ic C h urch for the suppress ion of heresy and pun ishmen tof here t ics.

1The defin itions are general ly taken from the N ew Engi z'

sh D ictiona ry .

310 APPEND IX C

Legislature. The body of persons inves ted w i th the power of mak ingthe laws of a coun try or S ta te ; genera l ly the two Houses of

Pa r l iamen t.Mir . The R uss ian v i l lage commun i ty.Pl eb iscite. A d i rec t vo te of the who le of the e lectors of a S ta te to

dec ide a ques t ion o f pub l ic impor tance (see Referendum). The

word P leb isc i te seems to b e used for a vo te taken in ex traord inary c ircums tances , w h i le a Referendum is pa r t of the

ord ina ry mach inery of governmen t . The words a re , however.often used as in terchangeab le.

Porte. Genera l ly the “ S ub l ime Porte The Turk ish Governmen tor m in is try.

Proportional Representation. An a t tempt to secu re , by a d ifferen ta rrangemen t of vo tes , tha t minor i t ies w i th in g i ven d is tr icts sha llob ta in some represen ta t i ves .

Referendum. A vote of the whole body of electors , genera l ly on

leg is la t ion subm i t ted to them for a pprova l .Reich stag

‘

. The Represen ta t i ve body of the Leg is la t ure of the G erman

Empire , e lec ted by manhood sufi'

rage for the whole Empire .

Sal ic Law. An anc ien t law preva len t in France and some othercoun tr ies wh ich forb ade women to succeed to the th rone.

Sel f-g‘

ovemment . A governmen t in wh ich laws a re made by or w i ththe consen t of the maj or i ty of the peop le .

States-General . A name for a Represen ta t i ve Assemb ly ; used in

France b efore the Revo lu t ion ; s t i l l surv ives in Hol land as the

name for the Du tch Pa r l iamen t .Suffrage. Or ig ina l ly a vote or vo ice. G enera l ly used for the pos

sess ion of a vo te ; e.g . un i versa l suffrage the possess ion of

a vote by every c i t i zen .

Temporal Power (gem ). The power of the Pope to r u le persons and

terr i tor ies a s sovere ign , a s we l l as in h is ca pac i ty of eccles ia s t ica lsuper ior . One can a lso d is t ingu ish the tempora l and spir i t ua lpower of the S u l tan .

Ukase. An order issued by the Tsa r of Russ ia wh ich had the force

of law .

Veto. The r igh t possessed by some mona rchs in E urope of preven t ingthe pa ss ing of a law . The ve to may b e (a ) fina l ; (6) las t ing on lyfor one or two sess ions of Pa r l iamen t.

Volost . A R uss ian d i v is ion composed of ten or more M irs , g roupedtoge ther for j ud ic ia l purposes .

Zemstvo. A represen ta t i ve loca l body in R uss ia .


318 APPEND IX D

Fa l loux. M e'

moz'

res d’

un Roy a l i‘

ste.

Pr ince Lou is Napoleon . Les [ de’

es N apole'

om'

en n es.

Rosebery. N apoleon o The Last P hase.

Ba rrot.

G ERMANY

Head lam.

ITALY

Bol ton K ing. H istory of I ta l ian Un i ty (2Treve lyan , G M Ga rz

'

ba ldz”

s Def en ce of the Roman Republ ic:Gar iba ld i a nd the Thousan d.

A Ga r i ba ld i and the M aki ng of I taly .

Ma r t inengo-C esa resco The Li bera tion of I taly .

(C oun tess).I ta l ian Cha racters.

The Un ion of l ta ly .

L ife of M azz im’

(Everyman ed i t ion) .Au tobiography .

Marr io t t , L A. R. M akers of M odern I ta ly .

Thayer. Cavour (2

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Leger . H is tory of Aus trz'

aJi ungary o

C oxe . M emoi rs of H ouse of Austr ia

E isenmann. [ e Compromz'

s Austro-hongrow.

D ra g e .

Se ton -Wa tson . Racia l P roblems i n H u nga ry ”

B isma rck and the Found ing of the German

Empi re (Heroes of the Na t ions) .Found ing qf the German Emp i re.

La Fonda tz’

on de I'

Empz'

re a l lemand .

Germany and the Germans.

The E volution of M odern Ger many .

Young Germany (for l i tera t ure).M akers of M odern H z

’

stmy (Essay on

B isma rck).Wi l l iam the Grea t.

Refl ections a nd Remim'

seences.

The F ra n co-German Wa r .

Germany i n the N i n eteen th Cen tmy (lectu res pub l ished by Manches ter Un i vers i tyPress).

APPEND IX D

The Fu tu re of Austr z'

a -H ungary .

L if e of Dedk.

M emoi rs .

Austr ia in 1848, 1849.

Revolu tion a ry M ovemen ts of 1848 in

Austr ia , an d Hunga ry .

RUS S IA

Leroy-B eau l ieu , A.

Morfil l , W. R .

Ramba ud , A. N .

Skr ine , F . H .

Drage , G .

Pa res , B .

Wa l lace , D . M .

Vinog radolT, P .

Bar ing , M .

Kingla li e, A. W.

F in lay.Mi l ler , W.

Vi l lar i (ed i ted by) .B ra i lsford , H.

Durham, M . E .

Ph i l l i ps , W. Al ison .

Pea rs , E .

Lane Poole , S .

Durham , M . E .

Ramsay , S ir W. M .

Fra ser , J. F .

Lane Poo le , S .

King lake , A. W.

Ranke .

M i lner . E ngland i n Egypt.S ee a lso L i ves of G lads tone , B eacon sfield , and Lord G ranville o

S PAIN AND PORTUGALB ut ler C larkeo Spa in , 1815

—1898.

Borrow , G . The B i ble i n Spa in .

Hume , Ma rt in a M odem Spa in .

Whyte . A Cen tu ry of Spa in an d P ortuga l ,

19

L’

Empz'

re des Tsa rs (3Russ ia (Story of the Na t ions).H is toz

'

re de la Russz’

e.

Expans ion of Russ ia ( 1815Russ ian Af a i rs .

Russ ia and Ref orm .

Russ ia (2In Lectu res on H istory of N in eteen th Cen

tu ry (ed . Kirkpa tr ick).The R uss ian P eople.

I n vas ion of the C r imea .

BALKAN PEN INS ULA

H{story of Greece.

The B a lkan s (S tory of the Na t ions).The B a lkan Question .

Th rough the Land of the Serb .

The Greek Wa r of I ndependence.

Ta rkey and i ts P eople.

Ta rkey (S tory of the Na t ions).[ n s g

'h A lban ia.

The R evolution in Constan tin ople.

The Land of the B lack M oun ta in .

L if e of Lord S tra tf b rd de Redclzjfi’

e.

APPEND IX E .

Form ofGovernmen t.

ConstitutionalMona rchy.

FRANC E . Repub l ic.

GERMAN EmP IRE.

‘

ITALY.

AUSTR IA HUNGARn

l

Russm.1

SWITZER LAND.

C onstitutionalMonarchy.

Nonwmr.

Constitutiona lMonarchy.

SWEDEN .

DENMARK .

S PAIN .

RUMAN IA.

S ERV IA.

MONTENEGRO.

GREEC E .

BELG IUM ,

HOLLAND.

MONACO.

SAN MARINO.

Head of Governmen t.

Pres iden t of the FrenchRepub l ic.Emperor.

SUMMARY OF

E xecutive.

Cab inet.

Cab inet.

Chancel lor .

Cab inet.

Em eror ofAustria , and Cab inet in Austria .

ing of Hunga ry.

Tsar of all the Russ ias.

N0 Pres iden t.

King of the Hellenes.

King (01Queen).

Cab inet in Hunga ry.Join t min istry forAustria-Hungary.

Council.

Federa l Counci l(Seven Min isters) .

Council .

Cab inet.

Cab inet.

Cab inet.

Council of Min isters .

Cab inet.

C ab inet.

Council.

Cab inet :

Cab inet.

Cab inet.


N ote.-The en tr ies under G ermany , Aus tr ia-Hungary , and Russ ia

have b een left as in 1914 in orde r to correspond w i th the accoun t o f theC ons t i t u t ions g i ven in C ha pte r X I I . Act ua l ly ( 19 19) G ermany is now

a Repub l ic ; G erman -Aus tr ia is a Repub l ic ; a new Repub l ic , C zecho

S lova k ia , has b een formed fromBohem ia ,Morav ia , S i les ia , and S lovak ia ;Po land has b een recogn i zed as an independen t S ta te ; R uss ia has as

ye t no se t t led Governmen t .The other en t r ies have b een rev ised where necessary.

INDEX

Abdu l Aziz , Su l tan of Turkey,

Hamid I I , S u l tan of Turkey,

Mej id , S u l tan of Turkey, 212,

214 , 215 , 216.

Abyssin ia, 87 .

Academy of Sciences, Hungar ian ,

144 .

Adrianople, 169, 218.

Treaty of 207 .Adriat ic Sea, 141, 159, 218.

[ Egean Sea, 2 18.

Afghan istan , 190.

Afr ica, 62, 129, 256.

Agram, 140, 142, 148.

Agricu l tural Society in Poland , 184 .

A ix - la-C hapel le , C ongress of, 14 .

Alabama d i spute, 303.

Alban ia, Alban ians, 200, 218, 223-6.

Alb ert I , King of the Belgians, 257 .

Alexander I , Pr ince of Bulgar ia,227 .

Emperor of Russia, 7 , 12—4 ,17 , 138, 166—8, 189, 194. 196,

I I , Emperor of Russia, 105,178

—89, 193, 196.

I I I , Emperor of Russia, 189—96.

I , King of Servia, 209.

Alexandria, 222.

Al fonso XI I , King of Spa in,242

-

4 .

XI I I , King of Spain , 244—6.

Alger ia, 19, 62.

Algiers, the Dey of, 19.

Al i , Pasha of Jan ina, 201, 204.

Alma, 174.

Alps, 9, 701 7 71 133°

Alsace-Lorraine, 9, 11, 47, 60, 114 ,119, 127.

Amadeus I , King of Spain , 241—2.

Amer ica, 5 , 25 , 144 , 15 1, 229, 245 ,257 , 27 1.

south ; 57 , 67 1 701 731 233—5 '

Amundsen , Capta in , 254.

Andrassy, C oun t, 157 , 215 , 2 16.

Angouléme, Duke of,18, 234 .

Annam, 38.

Ant ivari , 228.

An twerp, 255 .

Apenn ines, 73.

Arab ia, 201.

Arab i Pasha , 222.

Arad, 15 1, 152.

Aragon , 230.

Arb i trat ion , C ourt of Internat ional .S ee Hague C onference.

Arc de Tr iomphe, 25 , 47 .

Arenenburg C astle, 23.

Argen t ina, 303.

Armen ia, 200, 201, 223, 225 .

Asia, 133, 162, 166, 187 , 190, 197 ,199.

Asia Minor, 201, 211, 225 .

Aspromon te, 83.

Associat ions forWorsh i p 60.

Assoc iat ions Law ”, 58, 59.

Athens, 206, 207 .

At lan t ic Ocean, 55, 70.

Augsb urg, 23.

Augustenberg, the Duke oi , 106.

Austria, 3, 8. 9, u , 13, 14 , 24. 34.37 , 39—4 1.61.64.66.69, 70, 72,74—7 1 831 86- 81 90, 931 941 97100, 102, 103, 105

—10, 128, 129,132—62, 174, 177 , 206, 2 10, 212,

2 14—6, 220, 228, 233, 234 , 25 1,

263, 272 , 277- 82 , 301.

~Hungary, 132—62, 200, 209,215 , 22 1, 225 , 277—81, 290, 296,300.

324 I NDEX

Austro-Hungar ianWar 149

52 ,

Babeuf, 28.

Bach , 154 , 155.

Bach’s Hussars 154.

Baden , 89, 92, 109, 272, 277 .

Balaclava, 174 , 176.

Balkan League , War of the, 306.

Pen insu la, 128, 139, 158-

9, 169,172 , 187 , 199—228.

S tates, 172, 190,218, 223, 224,

226- 8.

Bal t ic provinces, 17 1, 193, 194, 197 .

Sea, 162.

Banks, Land , 191.

Barbarossa, the Emperor Frederick ,88.

Barcelona, 244.

Basques, the, 237—9, 243.

Battenberg, Prince Alexander of.

See Alexander I , Pr ince of Bul

gar ia.

Pr incess Ena of, 246.Batthyany, Count , 147 , 152 , 153.

Bavaria, 7 1 891 921 941 1091 1131114 , 272, 277 .

Bazaine, General , 44, 46, 112.

Belfort , 46, 47 , 114 , 115 .

Belgium, 10, 11, 12 , 55 , 110, 254—7 ,

260, 289.

Belgrade, 141.

Benedett i , 40, 111, 112.

Ben tham, Jeremy, 2 12, 292—4, 299.

Beresford, Viscoun t , 246.Berl in , 42, 92 , 96, 99, 112, 125, 128.

the Congress of, 86, 128, 159,220, 302.

Memorandum, 2 16.the Treaty of, 128, 187, 208, 221,228.

Bernadotte, Marshal , 25 1.

Berne, 259.

Berry, the Duke of, 18.

Bessarab ia, 10, 218, 221.

B iarr i tz , 107.B ible in Spa in , 293, note.

B i lbao, 238, 239.

B i l l of R igh ts, 5 .

B ismarck , Otto von, 39—41, 45, 47,60, 61, 83, 86, (quoted ) 88, 91—7 ,

155. 185. 190, 194. 2 15 ,220, 272, 274

-

5, 296, 297 , 300.

B i ttenfeld, General von , 108.

Blacl

g

Sea , 162, 179, 207 , 211, 214,21

B lane, Louis, 26—9, 31, 299.

Bob rikoff, General , 195 .

Bohemia, 108, 132, 135 , 142, 147 ,I S3. 154. 296.

Bologna, 78.

Bomba ”, 64 , 7 1.

Bonaparte, Jerome, King of Westphal ia, 9, 89.

Joseph , King of Spa in, 230, 233.

LOUIS , King of Hol land, 22.

Bonapartes, the, 22, 25 , 5 1, 76.

Bonapart ists, 17 , 18, 22, 25 , 267.Bordeaux , 45 , 46, 48.

Borrow, George, 293.

Bosn ia, 159, 2 15 , 216, 221, 225 .

Bosphorus, 207 .

Bou langer, General , 54 , 264.

Bou logne, 25 .

Bourbaki , General , 47 .

Bourbons of France , 15 , 21, 50, 5 1,54, 230.

of Naples, 10, 7 1.

Brandenb urg, 91, 97 .

C oun t of, 97 .

Braz i l , 246, 247 .

Brescia., 152.

Brigh t , John , 304.

Bri tain, 1-

5 , 8, 10, 13, 14, 20, 23,26. 29. 35. 37 . 38. 62.75. 76. 86. 88. 92. 93. 101. 106.107 , 111, 120, 125 , 129, 130, 132,134. 145. 147. 15 1. 163. 169.I 73- 8, 185 1 187 ) 190, I 9912 11- 4 , 2 16, 217 , 220, 222 , 223,

256—7 , 262, 266, 278, 289, 291—4 ,303.

Brogl ie, the Duke de , 53.

Brown ing, E l izabeth Barrett ,(quoted ) 7. 65.

Brussels, 255 .

Budapest, 140, 144, 147 , 148, 150,280.

Bulgaria, 209, 2 18, 220, 221, 223,

Bu lgarian Atrocmes 217 .

Bu lgars, 200, 220, 223, 224 , 226- 7 .

Bundesrath , 272, 273—4 , 275 .

Burma, 61.Burns

,Rob ert

,294.


326 INDEX

C iv i ta Vecch ia, 73, 84.

C larke, But ler, (quoted) 229.

C ler ical party, C ler ica l ism , 37 , 38,40. 52. 531 57 1 58, 751 77 1 116.122 , 123, 241, 269, 287 .

C lot i lde of Savoy (daugh ter of

Victor Emmanuel I I ), 76.C ob den, R ichard, 304.

C och in-C h ina, 38, 61.

C ode Napoléon , 118.

C ombes, fimile, 59.

C ommons, House of, 264 , 265 , 278.

C ommonweal th in England, 157 .

C ommune, 49—50.

C ommun ists, 49.

C omo, Lake , 77 .

C ompromise” of 1867 , 156, 157—8,277 .

C oncordat of Napoleon I , 52.

185 1, the S n ish , 240.

C oncorde, Place (iha

la, 47 .

C ongo, 62, 256—7 .

Congresses, the Age of 13.

European, 131 I 41 37 1 381 751 761128, 138, 166, 302.

C onsa lvi , C ard inal , 8.

C onservat ism, Conservat ives, 95, 96,108

,116

,124 , 126, 198, 258, 266,

292.

C onstance, Lake, 23.

Constan t ine, Viceroy of Poland , 184 .

b rother of Alexander I of Russ ia,168

, 170.

C onstant inople, 1, 159, 163, 169,187 , 199, 200, 205 , 210, 2 11,

215—8, 223-6.

C onst i tut ional Government , 5 , 6,13. 15. 289

—90

in Austria, 147 , 153—60,277

Belgi um,255 , 289.

Bri ta in , 5 , 16, 261- 3, 289.

C roatia, 161, 279.

Denmark , 106, 249- 50.

F in land, 167 , 194-6.

France , 16—7 , 21- 2 , 33, 36,541 263—7

Germany, 90—2, 95—9, 110,1151 I 431Hungary1 I34-

51 I431 I461147 . 150. 156. 157. 27 7 . 279- 80

I taly, 68, 69, 267 - 7 1.Norway, 250—1, 287 .

C onst i tut ional Governmen t in P0land , 167 , 170—1, 184.

Portugal , 246—8, 287 .

Russia, 168, 197—9, 288.

Spa in , 111, 230—6, 238—41,

Sweden , 252—3, 287- 8.

Sw i tzerland , 259, 281—6.

— Turkey, 2 17 , 221, 224—6,

288

C onst i tut ions, flexib le and r igid, 5,54, 261, 262 , 289, 290.

C onvent ion , the French Nat ional,

3.

Cortes, the S an ish , 230—3, 236—8,7 .

C ossacks, 189.

C ounci l , the Swiss Nat ional , 284.

of S tates, the Sw iss, 284 .

C oun ty C ongregat ions of Hungary,

C rete, 173, 208, 223.

C r imea, 174 , 2 14 .

C rimeanWar, 37 , 75 , 102 , 155 , 172,

C ri spi , 87 .

C roat ia, C roats, 133, 136, 14 1, 142 ,148—5 1. 153. I S4. 161. 279. 280.296.

C rusaders, 199—200.

C uba. 243. 244. 245C umberland, 295.C ustoms Un ion . S ee Zol lvere in .

C ustozza , the first ba tt le of, 70, 7 1,I 47 , I 49the second ba ttle of, 83.

C ZeCh Su I3S1 I361 I 421 I S31 I S41157 , 160, 278.

Dalmatia, 9, 11, 133, 137 , 14 1.

Damascus, 2 11.

Dan te, 66.

Danube, the r iver, 133, 144 , 158,I S9. 169. 174. 179

Dardanel les, 172, 211.

Dead S ouls, 179.

Deék, Francis, 143, 145- 8, 150, 153,

Deb recz in , 150.

Decemb er 2, C oup d ’état of, 36.

Delegat ions”of Austr ia-Hungary,

158, 159, 280- 1.

Demerara, 10.

INDEX

Denmark , 7 , 11, 4 1, 100, 106, 107 ,2081 249

—501 297 1 306'

Pr ince C harles of. See HaakonVI I

,King of Norway.

Pr ince George of. See George I ,King of Greece.

Deput ies, French C hamb er of, 20,

58, 264—6.

I tal ian Chamber of, 268—9, 270.

Tab le of, 279.

Devi l ’s Island , 57.D ickens, C harles, 295.

D iet , at Frankfort, 97 , 99, 100, 102 ,108, 138, 272.

the Hungarian , 134-6, 143—8,

150, 15 1, 154 .

the Swed ish , 252.

the Swiss C en tral , 259.

D i ploma, the October, 155—6.

D irectory, The, 3.

D israe l i , Benjam in , 61, 105, 217 .Dob rudja, 218—21.

Draga, Queen of Servia, 209.

Drake, Francis, 229.

Drave, the r iver, 149.

Dreyfus, Capta in , 56- 8.

Dual C on trol ” , the, 222.

Monarchy, 132, 136, 158, 159.

Duma, the Russian , 198, 288, 306.

Dumas, Alexandre, 295 .

East, the Near, 129, 202, 223.

EasternQuest ion”

, 128, 139, 159,173, 2 16.

East Mark , 133.

Edward I , King of England , 230.

Egypt , 61, 173, 201, 206, 212,

221—2.

E idsvold , 250, 25 1.

E lba , 8, 12, 15 , 16.

El l iot, 238.

Em 101 of Austria, 278, 279, 280,1.

Ems, 111.

England . S ee Bri tain.

En ten te C ord iale 61.Eotvos, 147 .

Espartero, General , 238—9, 241.

Estates-General of Prussia , 95, 96.

Eugenie, the Empress, 37 , 40, 45,7S

Exarch of the Bulgarian Church ,200, 227 .

Factory Laws, 192, 299 , 300.

Fal loux, Loi , 35 .

Fashoda inc iden t, 61Faure, Presiden t , 56.

Favre, I“165. 391 45 , 47Federal Assemb ly of Austria-Hun

gary, 278, 280- 1.

Swi tzerland, 284 , 285 , 286.

C ounci l of Sw i tzerland, 284 , 285 .

Parl iamen t , 108.

Federal ism, 260, 27 1—2, 280—1, 2826, 290.

Ferd inand of Austria, Holy RomanEmperor and King of Hungary,134 .

I , Emperor of Austr ia, 137 , 139,I 421 I 47 1 I 4S1 I 491 153‘

I , King of Bulgaria, 225 , 227 .

I,King of the Two S icilies, 10,

I I , King of the Two S icilies, 64 ,68. 70. 7 1. 74. 78VI I , King of Spa in , 10, 14 , 18,232-6, 262.

of Spa in (son of C harles IV) , 230.

Ferry, Ju les, 53, 54 , 61.

Fin land, F inns, 10, 12, 162 , 167 ,

193—6.

Flem ish Movemen t 256.

Florence, 65 , 83, 270.

Four ier , 28.

France, 3, 4 , 8, 9, 11—63, 66, 72,75

—8. 80. 85. 89—91. 93. 95. 103.

I 7O1 I 72"

4 1 I 791 I SS1 I 911 2071208, 2 12 , 2 14 , 220,

222 , 223, 230,231. 233. 234. 238

—4 1. 255. 256.

261—71 2691 2701 2821 2931 295 1

302.

Anatole , 57 .

Francis I , Emperor of Austria, 7 ,12. 136- 9. 143Duke of Modena , 66. [80.

I I , King of the Two S icil ies, 79,Joseph , Emperor of Austr ia

, 7 7 ,

160, 161, 162 , 172 , 305 .

Franco-Prussian War, 11, 40- 8, 60,

84 , 111—5 , 129, 24 1, 263, 272.

Frankfort , 48, 90, 100, 104 , 106,

109, 115 , 172.

Nat ional Parl iament at, 97- 9,100, 143.

328 I NDEX

Freder ick VI , King of Denmark,

249.

VI I , King of Denmark, 249

—50.

VI I I , K ing of Denmark , 250.

the Great, King of Prussia, 88,91. 94. 99I I I , German Emperor, 42 , 60,106, 108, 109, 112 , 125

—6.

C harles of Pruss ia, 42, 46, 108,112.

Will iam I , King of Prussia , 88.

I I I , King of Pruss ia, 12, 91,

IV , King of Prussia , 94— 100,

102-

4 , 172 ,263.

Free Trade, 38, 120, 304 .

Fr ied land , the Batt le of, 89.

Gaeta , 72 , 80, 81.

Gaj , Louis, 14 1, 148.

Ga l ic ia, 9, 11, 132 , 135 .

Gamb etta, Léon , 45 , 46, 48, 50, 52 ,

Gar iba ld i , An i ta, 73, 74 .

_ Joseph 1 351 4 11 63r 641 67 1 691701 83-

51 871 1561269. 305 .

Gaste in , the C onven t i on of, 107 .

Gaul , 1.

Geneva , 10.

Genoa , 10.

George V , King of England , 305.

I , Kin of Greece, 208.

German gonfederation , 90, 94, 98,106, 108, 109, 113.

Empe ror, 272—6.

Empire, 34 , 47 , 114-6, 118, 119,I 23. 126. 128. 143. 27 1—3. 275.276, 290, 296.

Germam'

a , 283.

Germany, 1- 3, 9, 11, 14, 17 , 23,

34. 39. 40. 42. 57 . 60- 3. 83. 86.88— 130. 133. 137 . 138. 143. 158.

27 1—7 , 281, 282, 296, 300.

South , 95 , 97 , 109—11, 113, 121,133. 138

G iobert i , 297.G ladstone , Wi l l iam Ewal t, 7 1, 74 ,78, 2 17 , 228, 289.

Goder ich m in istry , 207 .

Godol lo, the Batt le of, 150.

Goethe, 89, 296.

Gogo l , 179.

Golden Bu l l of 1222, 279.

Gorge i , General , 150—1, 152, 305.

Gott ingen , 92.

Gravelotte , Batt le of, 44 , 112.

Great Germany party, 98.

Greece, G reeks, 92, 169, 200, 2048, 2 10, 22 1, 223, 224 , 296.

Pr ince George of, 223.

Greek C hurch . S ee OrthodoxC hurch .

Independence, 24 , 67 , 167, 2047 , 209, 2 10.

révy, Ju les, 53.

rot ins (quoted) , 290.

Group System 265—6, 268.

Guaran tees, Law of, 85 .

Gu izot , 29, 30, (quoted ) 48.

Gustavus V , K ing of Sweden , 253.

Gypsies, 200.

Haakon VI I , King of Notway, 253,287 .

Hague C onference or Tr ibuna l , 197 ,258. 260. 298. 303—4

Ham, the Cast le of, 26.Hanover , 108, 109.

Hapsb urgs, the , 137 , 140, 142, 152,1531 155°

ardenberg, 92.

Hav l icek , 142.

Haynau , General , 15 1—2 .

He ine,Heinr ich , 296.

Hel igoland, 10.

Herzegovina, 159, 215 , 216, 221,

225 .

Hesse , 109 , 272 .

Darmstadt , 109.

Hetairia Phi like 204.

H istory qf Teh Years, 26.

Hohenzol lern, Pr ince C harles of.

S ee Charles I , King of Ruman ia .

Pr ince Leopold of, 111, 241.

Hoh enzol lerns, the, 111.

Hol land , 3, 10—2, 22, 137 , 254 ,

255. 257 . 258. 260. 289.

Holste in , 100, 107 , 108, 109 , 250.

Holy All iance, the , 13, 138, 167 ,233, 234 , 302Ho ly P laces ” , 173, 2 14 .

Roman Emperor, 63, I34 , 136.

Empire1 21 91 881 I341 27 11296, 302.


330 INDEX

L ibera l ism, Liberals, 14 , 29, 30, 34 ,581 91

-

5 1 971 991 1031 IO41 1101

146—9, 154 , 156, 167 , 183, 184 ,

188, 189, 197- 9, 2 16, 2 17 , 224 ,

266, 276, 287 .

Lib erat ion , the War of, 90, 91.

Ligh t Br igade, 176, 305 .

Lisbon , 248.

L issa , 83.

L i t t le Germany party, 98.

Loi re, the river, 46.

Lombardy. 9. 7 7.86, 103, 137 , 147 , 282, 301.

London1 251 331 35 1 831 1041 I SZ1255,C onvent1on or Treaty of207 , 2 12.

Lords, House of, 261, 264 .

Loubet , Pres ident , 56.

Louis XIV , Kin of France, 2, 3.

XVI , King ogFrance, 16.XVI I (the Dauph in ) , 16.XVI I I , King of France , 9, 13,16—9. 234. 236.

I , King of Portugal , 247 .

Napoleon , Prince . SeeNapoleonI I I .Ph i l i ppe , Ki ng of the French , 2 1,22. 24. 25. 29. 30. 48. 240

Louisa of S pa in , sister of Isabe l I I ,240.

Lucca, 65 .

Lucerne , 259, 283.

Lunevi l le, 44.

Luther, Mart in , 88.

Lutherans, 17 1.Luxemb urg Palace, 31.Lyons, 27. 45. S6.

Macdonald, Ramsay (quoted ), 299.

Macedon ia, Macedon ians, 200, 208,209, 220, 22 1, 223 4 , 225 .

MacMahon , Marshal , 44 , 50, 5 1,53, 112.

Madame Royale (Duchess of

Angouléme) , 16.

Madrid, 232, 234 , 237 , 240.

Magenta, the Batt le of, 7 7 , 155 .

Maggiore , Lake, 77 .Magnates, Tab le of, 279.

Magyars. I33. 135 . 136. I 42. 143.

I 94. 279- 80

Mahmud I I , S u l tan of Turkey, 206,207 , 2 10—3.

Ma in , the r iver, 272 .

Malakoff, 17 7 .

Mal ta, 10.

Manchur ia, 197 .

Man i la Bay, 245 .

Man in , Dan iel , 69, 72.

Manuel I I , King of Portugal , 248.

Manzon i , 297 .

Marathon, 228.

Marchand, C apta in , 61.

Marches, the, 80.

March Laws, 153, 156, 157 .

Mar ia I I , Queen of Portugal , 246- 7 .

C hr ist ina, Queen Regen t of

S pain ( 1833 235 40C hr ist ina, Queen Regent of

S pa in ( 1885 244»

Theresa , Empress, 135 .

Mar ie An toinette, 16.Lou ise of Austr ia (w ife of Na

poleon I ), 23, 65.

Marsa la, 79.

Marse i l les, 17 .

Mart inez de la Rosa , 236.

Marx , Karl , 39, 299—300.

Max im i l ian of Austria (Emperor of

Mex ico), 38.

May Laws 121—3.

Mal l ingJoseph , 35 1 671 721 731 79187. 291. 297. 305Meck lenb urg, Pr ince Henry of, 258.

Mehemet Al i , of Egypt , 201, 206,2 10, 2 11, 212 , 221.

M el ikoff, General Loris, 188— 9.

M emoirs of a Hun tsman , 179.

Menshikott, General , 174.

Men tana , 84 .

Mered i th , George (quoted), 63.

Merv , 187 .

Messina , 7 1.

Mettern ich , 8, 13, 14, 29, 69, 87 ,901 911 921 I 25 1 1281

-

91 I 461147 , 154, 167 , 205, 233, 272 .

Metz. 42. 44 . 46. 49. 112. 114.

Mex ico, the Lat in Empire ih , 38.

Michelet , 295.

M idd le Ages, 2, 63, 162, 279, 281,295. 296.

INDEX

M idhat Pasha, 2 16, 2 17 .

Miguel of Portugal, 246—7 .

Mi lan , 37 , 66, 69, 70, 140.

M iliutin , 180.

Mi l l , John S tuart , 299.

M inna van B arnhelm, 89.

M ir”, the, 181- 2.

Mirrors, Gal lery of, 114.

Missolongh i , 205 , 206.

Modena, 65 , 77 , 78.

Moderate party, 237 , 238.

Mohammed, 201, 288.

V , Sul tan of Turkey, 225.

Mohammedan ism, Mohammedans,200—2 , 2 13, 223, 288.

Moldavia, 169, 174, 179, 204 , 207 ,2 10, 215 .

Molé, 30.

Mol tke, Marshal , 4 1, 42, 45 , 107 ,

Monarch ists in France, 35, 48, 50,55Monarchy, 17—9 , 21, 22, 25 , 29, 31,33. 48. 87. 93. 95. 96. 101. 15 1.

Mongol races, 162.

Mon tenegro, 14 1, 209, 215 , 2 16,218, 220, 227

—8, 289, 290.

Mon tesqu ieu , 15 .

Monte Video, 67 , 72.

Mon tpensier, the Duke of, 240.

Mon t Valérien , Batt le of, 47 .

Monza,85 .

M oral d ud C ivi l P r z’

rzzacy qf the

I tal ians, 297 .

Moravia, 132, 149, 152.

Morea, 204 , 205, 207 .

Morocco, 130, 201.

Moscow, 166, 17 1.

Murad V , S ul tan of Turkey, 216,2 17 .

Murat , Joach im,King of Naples, 9.

Nagysarlo, the Bat tle of, 150.

Nansen , Dr. , 254. [270.

Naples, 14 , 64 , 7 1, 72, 80, 81, 167 ,Napo leon I , Emperor of the French ,

1, 3, 4 , 6—10, 12, 15—8, 2 1—5 , 32 ,

46. 52. 54. 65. 89. 90. 135. 141.166, 168, 229, 230, 232, 246, 249,27 1. 291. 292. 294. 297. 298.301.

302.

Ob renovich , M l lOSh , 209.

Octob rists 198.

Odelsth ing, 287 .

O’

Donnel l, 233, 241.

Old Bel ievers ” , 17 1.

Old Cathol ics ”, 121.

331

Napoleon I I I ,Emperorof the French ,12, (quoted ) 15 , 22, 23, 25 , 26, 32451 481 541 75

- 801 831 841 1011

I O31 IO7- I31 155 1 I S61 I 731 I 7S12 14 , 292. 300. 302, 305 °

the Pr ince Imper ial , 48, 5 1.

Louis (brother of Napoleon I I I ) ,22.

Napoleon ic Empire, 12 , 15, 33, 37 ,391 40. 4 11 45. 295°

Narvaez, General , 239, 240.

Nassau , 109.

Nationa l Assemb ly of Prussia, 96,97C onvent ion of South Germany,97Guard, 19, 20, 30, 49.

Nat ional i ty, Nat ional Spm t, 3, 6,24. 67. 69. 74. 87. 95—6. 107.110. 113. 134 -6. 138-

45. 148-

9.1531 I S41 I 58“ 6I 1 I 84 ‘

5 12 15, 218, 226, 252 - 3, 292, 296- 8,304.

Navar ino, the Batt le of, 19, 169,207 .

Navy League, 130.

Netherlands, 9, 13, 137 , 258.

N eufchfitel , 10.

N ew York , 76, 27 1.

N ice.63, 7c. 76, 78. 79, 81.

N icholas I , Emperor of Russia, 100,1021 I 5 11 I SZ 1 I6S1 I68“ 74 1 I 7 7—91189, 196, 2 14 .

I I , Emperor of Russia, 195—9,

262, 303.

N ightingale, Florence , 177 .

N ih i lism, N ih i l ists, 183, 186, 187 ,189

—92, 218.

N i le, the r iver, 61.

North German C onfederat ion , 109,110, 272 .

I tal ian Kingdom. S ee Piedmont.Norway, 10, 11, 249, 250

-

4 , 260,287 , 306.

Notre Dame, 49.

Novara, the Batt le of, 70, 97 .

332

Ol l iv ier, Emi le , 39.

011111112, C onference of, 100, 101,

154 .

Opposi t ion , Parl iamen tary, 265 , 267 .

Orange , House of, 254 , 255 .

Pr ince of, 10.

Ord inances o f 1830, 29, 20.

Organ i zation of Labour , 27 , 28, 299 .

Orleans, the Duchess of, 30.

Orthodox C hurch , the Bu lgar ian ,200 226.

Greek , 139, 158, 161, 163,

200,204.

Oscar I , King of Sweden and N 01

way , 252.

I I , King of Sweden and Norway,252

—3.

Otto I , Ho ly Roman Emperor, 133.

King of Greece, 207 , 208.

Oudinot, General , 35 , 73.

Pacific Ocean , 55 , 129, 188, 244 .

Palacky , 142.

Pala is Bourbon , 265 .

Royale , 30.

Palermo, 7 1, 79 , 270.

Palest ine, 173, 2 14 .

Palmerston , Lord, 29, 78,293.

Panama C anal , 26, 55 .

Panslavism, 142.

Papacy, 53, 59, 63, 65 , 72, 80, 825. 87 . 270- 1

Papa l S tates, the, 29, 69, 76, 84 .

Par i5 1 41 I61 I 7 1 I 91 201 25 1 27 1 30"

3. 37 . 38. 40. 42. 44—50. 56. 5 7.59.60. 95. 96. 112-

5 , 170, 172 .

the Archb ishop of, 49.

the C ongress of, 75 , 155.

the C oun t of, 30, 48, 50.

the Second Peace of, 17 .

S iege of, 45—8, 113

—5 , 305 .

the Treaty of 178-

9, 213,2 14, 216, 302.

Parl iament, the Austr ian , 278—9 .

the Hungar ian , 279—80.

Parma , 65 , 7 7 .

Pask ievich , 15 1.

Patent , the Feb ruary, 155- 9.

Patriarch of the Orthodox Church ,163, 200, 205 , 226.Patt ison, Mark (quoted), 290.

178,

I NDEX

011830, 236.

Prague , 140, 142, 147 , 149, 152.

the Treaty of, 109.

Prater, 7 .

President of the French Repub l ic,264, 266.

Press, freedom of the, 16, 20, 35 ,

92. 106. 124. 139. 183. 193. 1956, 240, 278.

Pedro IV, Kingof Portugal (Ped ro I ,Emperor of Braz i l ) , 246— 7 .

V, King of Portugal , 247 .

Pel l ico, S i lvio,297 .

Pen insu lar War, 229, 231, 246.

Persia , 291.

P esth Gazette, 145 .

Peter the Great , 163, 204.

Pet i t ion of R igh t , 5 .

Ph i l i p I I , King of Spa in , 230.

V, King of S pa in , 230, 236.

Ph i l i ppine Islands, 244—5 .

P iedmon t , 10, 12 , 66, 68, 70, 7 1,741 75

- 81 801 S I 1 262I’ i lo, Rosa l ino, 79.

P i t t, Wi l l iam ( the younger) , 4 .

Pius IX , P io Nono ,29, 35 , 37 , 67

701 7 52- 5 1 801 841 861 123'

X 1 591 601 86°P levna, 2 18.

P lomb ieres, the Treaty of, 37, 75 .

Pobedonostzeff, 190.

Poland, 9, 10, 12, 13, 29, 38, 105 ,I 4O1 I67 1 I 7O1 17 11 183—61 193-

4 1I 97. 296.

Poles in Austria-Hungary , 135—6

,

142, 160, 278, 280.

Po l ignac, Pr ince , 19.

Pomeran ia, Swed ish , 9.

P0 the , 8, 37 , 50, 52, 65 , 67 , 82,8: 85 , 86, 12 1, 163, 201, 226,240, 242, 243, 270—1.

Pope , Alexander (quoted), 260.

Portuga l , 10, 236, 238, 246—8, 287 ,290.

Posen , 9.

Powers, the European , 4 , 12, 14 ,

260.

and the Eastern Quest ion , 201,

205—8, 2 10—2 , 2 14

—8,220, 222

—4 ,

227 .

Pragmat ic Sanct ion 135 , 142,280.


334 I NDEX

220, 221, 223, 227 , 234, 278,

288, 291, 292, 297, 306.

Russo-Japanese War, 62 , 197 , 304 .

Ruthen ians,160.

Saarb rucken , Batt le of, 44 .

Sadowa, the Batt le of. S ee Kon iggratz.

Sagasta , 244 .

Sahara Desert , 62.

Sal ic Law, 16, 236.

Sal isb ury, Lord , 227 .

Salon ika, 2 16, 225 .

San S tefano, the Treaty of, 128,

2 18, 220, 223.

Sant iago de C uba, 245 .

Saracens, 230.

Sard in ia, 12 , 66.

Savoy, 17 , 66, 76, 78.

Saxe -C oburg, Pr ince Ferd inand of.

S ee Ferdmand I , King of Bul

gar ia.

Prince Leopold of. S ec Leopo ldI King of the Be lgians.

Saxony, 9. 94 .

Crown Pr ince o f, 44 .

S cand inavia, 249—54.

S ch i l ler, 89, 296.

Sch lesw ig, 107 , 108, 250.

Sch lesw ig - Holste in Quest ion , 38,100, 106-

9, 250.

Schbnhausen , 91, 92, 95.

Schwarzenberg, 99, 100, 149, 150,153.

Scotland, 132.

Scott , S ir Wal ter, 296.

Scutar i , 177 .

Sebastopol , 174—7 .

Sedan ,Battle of

, 45 , 49, 112.

S e ine, the, 20.

S enate, the French , 264.

I tal ian , 268.

Separat ion , Act of, 59.

S eptennate Law, 51.

Serb s, 136, 141, 142, 200, 209, 215,223, 224 .

Serfdom,164—5 , 178- 81.

Serrano, General , 24 1.

Servia, 159, 169, 208- 10, 215—8,

220, 223, 226, 227.Seven Years’ War, 88.

Sh i pka Pass, 2 18.

S iam, 61.

S iber ia , 166, 17 1, 188, 192.

S ici l ies, the Kingdom of the Two,

.

64 , 65 , 74 , 79, 137 . 246. 262.

S l c

gly. 10, 14 , 64, 68, 7 1. 78. 79.3.

S il istria, 174 .

S implon Pass, 259.

S inope , 174 , 2 14.

S lav Races, 135—6, 14 1, 142 , 148,

149. x59. 160. 162. 194. 280S lavon ia, 14 1.

S lovaks, 135 , 142, 148, 153, 160.

S lovenes, 136, 278.

Soc ial Democrats. S ee Social ism.

Social ism, Social ists, 27 , 28, 31, 32,

247 , 250, 256, 266, 276—8, 287 ,298

—300.

Sol fer ino , the Battle of, 77 .

Sonderb und , 259.

South S eas, 129.

S pa in ,1. 3. 10. n ,

13. 18, 35. 40.111, 167 , 229

—46, 247 , 262 , 287 ,

290, 292 , 293Span ish Marr iages the , 29,239—40

S uccess ion , War of the , 230.

Spicheren ,Bat tle of, 44 .

S t. C loud ,20.

Gothard Pass, 259.

Helena, 4 , 10, 16, 25 , 301.

Peter’s, 85.

Petersb urg, 104 , 168, 17 1, 186,198.

S imon , 28.

S tae' l , Madame de, 89.

S tambulofi, 227 .

S tates-General of France, 230.

Hol land , 257—8.

S tatuto ”, the Piedmon tese, 263,

267 , 268.

S te in, Baron von, 89, 138, 27 1.

S te inmetz , 42, 112.

S tolypin , 198.

orthing, 252 , 287 .

S trafiord , Earl of, 93.

S trasb urg, 25 , 42, 46, 114 .

S tratford de Redcl ifl’

e, Lord. S ee

C ann ing, S tratford .

S trossmayer , Bishop , 141.

S tund ists, 193.

S uez C anal , 55 , 221, 222.

Su l tan , the, 129, 139, 173, 179, 201,

I NDEX 335

202 , 204, 207 , 215 , 222 , Turkomans, 162.

288,290. Tuscany, 65, 76—8, 82 .

Sven Hed in , 254. Tyrol , the Austr ian , 9, 132, 147 .

Sweden , 10, 11, 194 , 249, 250-

4 ,260, 287 , 288.

Swiss Confederat ion , 10, 12 , 29,

Swi tzerland , 10,23, 25 , 70, 259

60,281—6, 306.

Syr ia ,201

,2 11, 2 12.

Szechenyi , C ount , 143—4 , 146—8.

Taci tus, 283.

Tal leyrand , 8, 13.

Tangier , 76.

Tartars, 162 .

Tel -el -Keb ir, 222.

Te l l , Wi l l iam , 282.

Temple , the , 16.

Temporal power, 53, 65 , 82, 84 , 86.

Ten Po ints.

”S ee March Laws.

Tewfik Pasha, Khed ive of Egypt,

222.

Theiss, the r iver, 150.

Thermopylae, 228.

Thessaly, 208, 22 1, 223.

Th iers, 38, 39, (quoted ) 48, 50,114

—5 .

Thousand Gar ibald i ’s, 79—81.

Three Emperors, League of, 215—6.

Than, 102.

Ticino, the r iver, 282.

T i lsi t, Treaty of, 166, 194.

Tobacco R iots, 69.

Tocquevi l le, De (quoted) , 1.

Tours, 46.

Trans-S iberian Rai lway, 188, 197 .

Tr ieste, 239.

Tr i ple All iance, 86, 129.

Tr ipol i , 87 (note), 226.

Tr iumvi rs, 72 .

Trochu , General , 45 .

Troppau , the C ongress of, 14.

Tsar of Russia, 288, 290.

Tui leries, the, 25 , 30, 49.

Tun is, 61, 62 , 86, 129.

Turgen iefi'

, 179, 295 .

Tur in, 66, 76, 81, 83, 15 1, 270.

Turkey, 10, 37 , 87 (note), 15 1, 169,172.

—4 , 179, 185 , 201, 207 - 21,

223- 6, 290,

291.

Turkish Empire, 200- 2, 204 , 2 11,

2 13—5, 226.

Umb r ia, 76, 80.

Un ion and Progress Commi tteeof, 224 , 225 .

Un i ted Greeks 17 1.

Un i ted I taly ”, Society of, 7 1.

Un i ted Kingdom , the, 5 .

Un i ted S tates of Amer ica, 55 , 244 ,245. 303.

nkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, 2 11.

Uri,283.

Valais, 10.

Vat ican ,the, 59, 84 , 270, 27 1.

Vendéme C o lumn , 25 .

Venet ia, 91 661 771 811 831 841 I071109, 157. 269.

Ven ice, 69, 7 1—3, 137 , 140.

Verona, the C ongress of, 14 .

Versai l les, 45 , 47 , 49, 113, 114 , 272.

Victor Emmanuel I I , King of Italy,37 1 7 11 74 1 87 1 I I4 1 2411

I I I , King of Italy, 59, 86.

Victor ia, Queen, 24 , 60, 78, 246,255.

Vienna, 7 , 10, 12,66, 69, 97 , 109,

140. 142. 143, 1469. 152. 280th e C ongress of, 4 , 6- 10, 12 , 34 ,90. 137 . 167. 170. 2 11, 249. 254.27 1.

Vi légos, 15 1.

Vi l lafranca, Armist ice of, 7 7. 103.

Virgin ia, 27 1.

Vz'

ttorz'

a , 63.

Vlachs, 200.

Volost ”, 182Vosges Mountams, 44 .

Wac/zi am Rfiez’

n , 95 .

Waldeck -Rousseau , 50.

Wal lach ia, 169, 174 , 179, 204, 207 ,210, 214 , 2 15 .

Warsaw, 170, 184 .

Water loo, the Batt le of, 1, 4 , 8, 12.

We imar, 92.

We issenb urg, Batt le of, 44 .

Wel l ington , the Duke of, 4 , 8, 17 ,32, 231—3, 238, 246.

Wesley, John , 294.

336 I NDEX

Westphal ia, Kingdom of, 9, 11, 89. W i t te, Coun t (quoted ) , 162.

Wh i te Sea, 162. Wolseley, S ir Garnet , 222.

Wh i te Terror, the, 17 . Wordsworth , Wi l l iam, 294 , 295 .

Wi lberforce, Wi l l iam, 10, 294 . Workshops,Nat ional , 31, 32.

Wi lhelmina, Queen of Hol land , 258. Wé rth , Battle of, 44 , 112.

\Vil l iam I , King of Hol land and Wtirtemberg, 7 , 89, 109, 272 , 277 .

Belgi um , 254 , 257 .

I I , King of Hol land , 257 .

I I I , King o f Ho l land , 258.

I , King of Prussia and German

Emperor1 401 451 47 1 601 103—61108, 110—4 , 125 , 126, 275 .

I I , King of Prussia and GermanEmperor, 126—8, 130, 2756,

291.

the S i lent , 11.

Wind ischgr’

atz, C ount , 147 , 149, 150.

Winter Palace, 186, 188.

“ Young German 296, 297 .

Young Turks ’

, 216, 217 , 224

225, 288.

Zemstvo 182, 189.

Zola, 57 .

Zol lvere in , 94 .

Zu luland , 5 1.

Zumalacarregui, 237 , 238.

Zur ich , 259.


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Europe Since Napoleon c ontents cuam intro ductory i. the reconstruct ion of europ e ii. fr ance an d bonapart ism 1815—71 iii. france as a repu bl ic iv. gar i bal di an d the li