Russia and South Ossetia: Conferring Statehood or Creeping Annexation?

By Tracey German

Abstract: Events in Ukraine have distracted international attention from the ongoing Russian involvement in the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus. This article explores the intensification of relations between South Ossetia and Moscow, focusing on the extent to which South Ossetia exists as a functioning state entity. Are the authorities in Tskhinvali able to provide vital services such as defence and control over ‘state’ borders and territory without Russian involvement? What has been happening in South Ossetia is important, despite being overshadowed by events in Ukraine, as it is indicative of what may well occur in eastern Ukraine: a simmering separatist conflict that is far more than a domestic territorial dispute, with both regional and international implications.

Keywords: Russia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, separatist territories, quasi-states

As the conflict in eastern Ukraine approaches its third year, international attention has been diverted from the ongoing Russian involvement in the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus. The West’s focus on Ukraine has enabled Moscow to consolidate its already-strong position in Georgia’s separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, signing alliance and integration treaties with both. In November 2014 Russia concluded a Treaty of Alliance and Strategic Partnership with Abkhazia, which came into effect on 5 March 2015, only weeks after a similar treaty with South Ossetia was concluded in February 2015. In a highly symbolic gesture, Putin formally signed the pact with the South Ossetian leader Leonid Tibilov in Moscow on 18th March 2015, the first anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea. Both separatist regions are accelerating their move into the Russian orbit, whilst simultaneously continuing to maintain that they are ‘independent’ states.

South Ossetia has been de facto independent since fighting a brief war with Georgia in the early 1990s and has enjoyed enduring support from Moscow, which has used the unresolved conflict to maintain political leverage over Tbilisi. Little progress has been made in resolving the political stalemate during the intervening years and, in September 2015, South Ossetia celebrated the 25th anniversary of its ‘independence’, marking the occasion with a four-day holiday, as well as a military parade (including Russian units and equipment), watched by representatives from Russia, North Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnistr, Luhansk Peoples’ Republic, Donetsk Peoples’ Republic and Nagorno-Karabakh. Addressing the parade in Tskhinvali, Tibilov thanked Russia for its support, describing it as the ‘sole guarantor’ of the republic’s security and its ‘most important ally and partner’. He went on to describe the Russian base as a ‘reliable guarantor of peace, security and the territorial integrity of our country’.

We remember our opponents saying that South Ossetia was unable to ensure its defence capability, build a state and survive economically. The road South Ossetia has travelled has contradicted these predictions. Freedom and international recognition, peace and security, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the beginning of economic revival are the realities of today’s South Ossetia, which did not veer from the path of constructing its own statehood and managed to defend its freedom. (Res news agency, 20 September 2015b)

This article explores the intensification of relations between South Ossetia and Moscow, focusing on the extent to which South Ossetia exists as a functioning state entity. Are the authorities in Tskhinvali able to provide vital services such as defence and control over ‘state’

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borders and territory without Russian involvement? In the same year that South Ossetia celebrated its 25th anniversary of ‘independence’ and Tibilov made grand statements about the region ‘constructing its own statehood’, it also signed an integration treaty with Moscow that appears to delegate responsibility for the provision of the basic attributes of statehood to Russia: South Ossetia today is further away from statehood than it was prior to its recognition as a ‘state’ by Russia in 2008. Whilst this article focuses on relations between Russia and South Ossetia, the evolution of their relationship is indicative of the Russian approach to sub-state actors across the post-Soviet space: Moscow confers statehood with one hand, using the language and discourse of statehood, but takes it away with the other, manipulating its relations with these actors in order to achieve broader foreign policy objectives, notably the retention of its influence across the post-Soviet space. The connection between supporting the ‘independence’ of Georgia’s separatist territories and Moscow’s wider strategic objectives was made clear in an article in Russian newspaper Izvestiya (11 March 2011), which identified this action as the most important achievement of President Medvedev’s presidency:

[B]y securing victory and consolidating it by recognising the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia resolutely returned to the table in the big geopolitical game, where it had not had a seat for two decades.

Russia appears to be seeking to use its strengthening ties to South Ossetia to deter Georgia’s efforts to develop effective relationships with external actors, particularly closer integration with the US and NATO. The Russian narrative remains dominated by talk of ‘competition’ and the need to be ‘competitive’ with the West, which is perceived to be encroaching into an area that had previously been Moscow’s exclusive zone of influence. This desire to limit the influence and presence of external actors, especially the US, and ensure its dominance across the post-Soviet space undermines the sovereignty of other regional states and their ability to pursue an autonomous foreign policy.

What has been happening in these territories is important, despite being overlooked and overshadowed by events in Ukraine. Moscow has been providing support for the two territories since the 1990s and has manipulated its position there to undermine Georgia’s autonomy. What has happened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian behaviour there, is indicative of what may well occur in eastern Ukraine: a simmering separatist conflict that is far more than a domestic territorial dispute, with both regional and international implications, preventing Ukraine’s closer integration with the West and retaining its influence over a post-Soviet neighbour. One of the major criticisms levelled at Putin in the wake of the March 2014 annexation of Crimea was the apparent ‘redrawing of international borders’ through the use of force and the disregard for international law. However, there was less of an international outcry when similar activity occurred in the South Caucasus and there has certainly been only a very muted response from the West to Russia’s increasing ‘absorption’ of South Ossetia.

Building statehood?

The Ossetian people in the South Caucasus were first separated between South and North Ossetia in 1918, when Georgia’s separation from Russia meant that the South Ossetians were divided from their fellow citizens in the north, causing tension and antagonism (Cornell 2001, 143). Under Soviet rule, South Ossetia was an autonomous region within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), while North Ossetia was an autonomous republic (ASSR) within the Russian SSR, on a higher administrative level than its southern counterpart. South Ossetia has traditionally been suspicious of the Georgian state, fearing what is perceived as Georgian ‘chauvinism’ that threatens a loss of ethnic identity. The idea of uniting the two Ossetias emerged during the national revival movement at the end of the 1980s when the renewed

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upsurge in Georgian nationalism during Mikhail Gorbachev’s era of perestroika increased inter-ethnic tensions within the Soviet republic, as manifold national groups were permitted free expression throughout the USSR and the manipulation of ethnic affiliation became a key dynamic in political life.

On 20 September 1990 the communist authorities of South Ossetia declared the formation of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic, a constituent part of the USSR, and the secession of this new entity from Georgia. However, ethnic Georgians living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to voice discontent with what they perceived to be anti-Georgian policies in these regions and in October 1990 Zviad Gamsakhurdia became leader of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, predominantly on the basis of his support for the rights of Georgians, promulgated under the slogan ‘Georgia for Georgians’. Gamsakhurdia stripped South Ossetia of its autonomy and introduced a state of emergency, escalating Ossetian demands for reunification with North Ossetia into full-scale violence.1 Armed skirmishes broke out, leading to full-scale war in the spring of 1991, provoking fears that a localised conflict may spread. This prospect, together with the election of Eduard Shevardnadze as Georgian president in March 1992, encouraged the two sides to seek a more conciliatory stance and on 24 June 1992 the Dagomys peace agreement was signed, prompting the deployment within the conflict zone of a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) that comprised three ‘national’ battalions from Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia and the establishment of a quadripartite negotiating body, the Joint Control Commission (JCC).

Despite a lasting ceasefire, a political settlement of the dispute remained elusive and South Ossetia existed as a de facto independent state for over a decade. The situation had looked relatively promising towards the end of the 1990s with signs that the two communities were seeking to normalise relations and refugees were beginning to return home.2 However, from the beginning of his presidency in 2004, Mikhel Saakashvili made the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity a priority, expressing his wish to consolidate the country by resolving the enduring conflicts with its secessionist regions.3 Efforts to restore central Georgian control over South Ossetia in August 2008 triggered a Russian military invasion. With the majority of the South Ossetian (and Abkhazian) population claiming Russian citizenship, Moscow was able to cite concerns for the security of its citizens as a motive for

1 Gamsakhurdia openly promoted the cleansing of Ossetians from the country with the aim of driving them back to North Ossetia and his election triggered a sharp deterioration of relations between the Georgian government and ethnic minorities, who began to view independence as the only way to retain their cultural rights and autonomy. Following attempts by Tbilisi in August 1989 to make Georgian the country’s sole official language, the authorities in South Ossetia (where reportedly only 14% of Ossetians spoke Georgian) ruled that Ossetian was to be the region’s sole language. On 19 January 1991 South Ossetia held a referendum in which reportedly over 90% of the population voted to become part of Russia, although the results were never recognised by Georgia. See Cornell, pp. 162-169. For an in-depth analysis of the conflict itself see Julian Birch, ‘Ossetia: a Caucasian Bosnia in microcosm’ Central Asian Survey (1995), 14 (1), pp. 43-74.

2 Writing in 2003 Dov Lynch surmised that ‘the separatist regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have survived isolation and blockades for a decade, and look set to survive another ten more years.’ Dov Lynch, ‘A regional insecurity dynamic’ in Dov Lynch (ed.), ‘The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU’, Chaillot Papers No 65, December 2003 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p. 20.

3 Infuriated by Western support for an independent Kosovo in 2008, the Kremlin warned that it would retaliate by formally recognising Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow was also angered by the declaration at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine were likely to become members of the military alliance at some unspecified point in the future and the Kremlin subsequently increased its cooperation with the two separatist territories.

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launching a military operation on Georgian territory.4 Having secured the two regions militarily, Moscow took its political support one step further, formally recognising the independence of Georgia’s separatist regions at the end of August 2008. Despite considerable international opposition, the Kremlin has continued to support Abkhazia and South Ossetia as ‘independent states’. Russia claims that it recognised their sovereignty ‘because in our judgement there was no other possibility to ensure not only the security, but also the very survival of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples in the face of the policies pursued by the Georgian leadership over the past 20 years, even if we leave aside the pre-Soviet period’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2010). However, subsequent events have done little to reinforce this ‘independence’. Rather, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become increasingly dependent upon Russian patronage, a situation reinforced by the recent treaties.

Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) have analysed the three ‘quasi-states’ of the South Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) to assess whether they exist as functioning state entities. They define state-building as ‘the establishment of the administrative, economic and military groundwork of functional states’, identifying ‘hard aspects’ of state construction, practical issues such as border control, defence and taxation, along with ‘softer’, intangible aspects, such as the construction of a shared identity and sense of unity. Although their article was written before Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, following the 2008 war, their analytical framework is still useful, particularly their central question: ‘to what extent are the authorities able to provide the populace with the services expected of contemporary states, such as internal and external security, basic infrastructure and welfare?’ (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008,484). This article focuses on the ‘hard’, practical features of South Ossetia’s state-building efforts, rather than nation-building. Despite the language of statehood used by both South Ossetia and Russia, it is clear that the former remains dependent on the latter to provide the basic functions of a state, such as control of its borders and territory, develop its economy and provide welfare for its people. Without Russian patronage, South Ossetia is not a viable state and would not survive, unable to function as a state entity. The leadership of South Ossetia is happy to increase its reliance on Russia, reflecting an understanding that the region would be unable to survive as a truly independent state. In a letter to President Medvedev in 2009 the then South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, assured the Russian leader that South Ossetia ‘will always remember to whom it owes its salvation’, emphasising that ‘the people of South Ossetia can now live in freedom and safety in the land of their ancestors in an alliance with great Russia.’ (Gazeta.ru 2009). The sentiment of Kokoity’s letter was echoed in a statement he made a year after the 2008 war, in which he claimed that South Ossetia was an ‘independent and recognised state’.

4 This was to be expected. In July 2004 the Russian authorities had warned that Moscow ‘will not remain indifferent towards the fate of its citizens, which comprise the absolute majority of South Ossetia’, a stance affirmed in 2005 by Andrei Kokoshin, head of the Duma committee on CIS affairs, who said that Russia ‘will not stay aloof’ if Georgia resorts to force, stating that: ‘Many residents of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia and Russia has the right to defend the life, freedom, property and health of its citizens using all means available to a state in modern circumstances.’ Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘V svyazi s obostreniem situatsii vokrug Yuzhnoi Osetii’ 9 July 2004, www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/3C8799FB6DC16167C3256ECC0045352E. Again, in September 2007, there was a similar warning that ‘in the case of aggravation of the situation around South Ossetia Russia will take all the necessary steps determined by its peacekeeping and mediation mission and by its responsibility for the security of Russian citizens.’ Statement by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs On the Situation in the Georgian-Ossetian Zone of Conflict, 14.9.07 - www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/fd30396df64db2c9c3257356005ad343?OpenDocument.

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We will build our own state, despite all economic difficulties,… but I want to stress once more, we will be in alliance with Russia and together with Russia. The time will come, and I am not excluding that, one day we will be part of Russia I do not [plan to] exclude the wish of the majority, the overwhelming majority. You understand that 98% of South Ossetian citizens are Russian Federation passport holders. And the West should respect this fact.(Rustavi 2 2009).

Kokoity emphasised that South Ossetia is an ‘independent and recognised’ state, which raises the question of what constitutes a ‘state’ in the legal sense. There is a paucity of formal documentation defining the concept of a ‘state’ in terms of international law. The 1933 Montevideo Convention ‘On Rights and Duties of States’ identifies a state as ‘a person of international law’ that possesses ‘a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states.’It also asserts that a state ‘has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organise itself as it sees fit’. However, interestingly the third article of the Convention declares that a state’s political existence is ‘independent of recognition by the other states’, undermining Kokoity’s statement regarding South Ossetia.

Since Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia as an independent state in August 20085, official communications between the two (and by Moscow regarding South Ossetia) have utilised the language of statehood, referring to the Republic of South Ossetia as a ‘state’, ‘interstate relations’ between the two, as well as ‘state borders’. Furthermore, relations are conducted through the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Ossetia. Tibilov has also been seeking closer ties with other ‘quasi-states’ in the post-Soviet space, including Abkhazia, Transdnistr, Luhansk and Donetsk.6 All of these regions are supported by Russia, and all are ‘satellites’ that have proved useful to Moscow as it seeks to achieve broader foreign policy objectives. During a meeting with official delegations from Abkhazia and Luhansk in September 2015 he maintained that they have all been through similar experiences in their recent histories, face ‘common challenges’ and share a ‘common destiny’:

When we saw the struggle of your people for their rights and freedoms we thought we have a common destiny. Our peoples walked along one and the same path. People have the right to self-determination. Their rights are enshrined in the charters of international organisations and international law. We were delighted by the decision Luhansk took. Our people immediately stood by your people and we recognised the independence of the Luhansk republic. (Res news agency, 20 September 2015b)

The 2015 Treaty on Alliance and Integration between Russia and South Ossetia talks of ‘making the transition to a new level of interstate relations’ and makes reference to the ‘national interests of both states’. However, the substance of the treaty suggests that South Ossetia is actually on the way to becoming a part of the Russian Federation. The agreement envisages the incorporation of South Ossetia’s armed forces, security agencies and customs authorities into those of the Russian Federation, and also includes a clause facilitating the

5 Only a few states other than Russia recognised it as an independent state: Nicaragua, Venezuela and Tuvalu, although it subsequently withdrew its recognition in 2014.

6 This approach caused some problems in September 2015, after an official delegation, which was returning from events in Tiraspol marking the 25th anniversary of Transdnistr’s ‘independence’, were detained at Chisinau airport and banned from entering Moldova for 10 years. ‘Zayavlenie ministerstva innostrannyikh del respubliki Yuzhnoi Ossetii’, Res news agency, 8 September 2015, http://cominf.org/node/1166506076 [accessed 22 September 2015]

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acquisition of Russian citizenship for citizens of South Ossetia, as well as permitting dual citizenship:

[T]he individual units of the Armed Forces and security agencies of the Republic of South Ossetia are part of the armed forces and security agencies of the Russian Federation by agreement of the contracting parties… The customs authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia will integrate with the customs authorities of the Russian Federation…

Article 2 of the treaty states that the two entities will form a ‘single space for defence and security’ and reiterates that Russia ‘ensures the defence and security of the Republic of South Ossetia, including the protection and security of the state border of South Ossetia.’ One of the most significant provisions to be found in both documents is a clause stating that any aggression or armed attack against one party will be considered an attack against both. This acts both as a warning to Tbilisi and formalises what has been clear since 2008: Moscow is determined to obstruct any Georgian attempts to restore its territorial integrity and will respond to any such efforts.

Notwithstanding the political rhetoric regarding South Ossetian statehood, the reality suggests that the authorities in Tskhinvali are unable to deliver the basic functions of a state, such as defence and control over borders and territory, and remain reliant on Russian provision of these services: Moscow is ensuring the defence and security of the region, including the protection of its ‘borders’. Moscow has spent vast sums of money strengthening the military infrastructure in the two regions. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared in 2009 that Moscow intended to spend 15-16 billion roubles during 2010 on the construction of military bases in Abkhazia, as well as the development of border infrastructure. A further R4bn has been spent on implementing infrastructure projects that will develop transport and border crossings, whilst a similar sum is being spent on military facilities in South Ossetia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2010). The most important aspect of Russian support has been the establishment of a permanent military base on the territory South Ossetia, complemented by increasing economic and diplomatic support. The Russian Defence Ministry established the 4th Base in South Ossetia (based near Djava and Tskhinvali), as part of Russia’s Southern Military District, following the 2008 conflict, and envisaged basing up to 4,000 troops there.7 The Kremlin emphasised that this permanent military base was set up at ‘the invitation and with the consent of the authorities of the receiving states [i.e. South Ossetia], as well as on the basis of the appropriate interstate agreements’ in order to ‘protect the local population and prevent terrorist acts’ (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 2010). A basing agreement was signed in February 2010, endorsing changes that had occurred since 2008. The lease for the base runs for a 49-year term, but can automatically be extended at 15-year intervals. Military cooperation agreements include provision for the training of the South Ossetian army and the development of military-technical equipment, i.e. arms deliveries (Vedomosti, 2009). However, as mentioned above, the 2015 integration treaty agreement signed with Moscow in March envisages the incorporation of South Ossetia’s armed forces, security agencies and customs authorities into those of the Russian Federation.

In addition to the extensive military support for South Ossetia, the Russian government’s recognition of South Ossetia as an independent state was supported by the arrival of Russian border guards. In April 2009 Moscow signed a bilateral agreement with South Ossetia on the joint protection of the ‘state’ border. Border guard directorates were set up by the Russian

7 The base has a military camp in Russia, which enables the number of personnel to be varied according to requirement. Itar-Tass news agency, Moscow, 1036GMT, 25.2.10, BBC Monitoring

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FSB Border Guard Service in both regions and units deployed (so-called ‘green berets’) at the request of the respective leaderships. The following year Russia’s Federation Council ratified the border agreement with South Ossetia which outlines how the ‘state borders’ of the region will be ‘defended’. Responsibility for defending the ‘borders’ has been delegated to Russia, although the agreements envisage responsibility for border defence being returned to the respective local authorities once they are able to protect them. In the case of South Ossetia, the Russian authorities will ‘[deploy] checkpoints and the FSB border guard directorate on the South Ossetian-Georgian border; [finance] the expenses of its servicemen and civilian personnel; [help] the state bodies of South Ossetia train specialists for the border guard agency.’(Interfax 2010). By 2011 there were 1,200 Russian border guards serving in South Ossetia and only two of 19 planned border posts had been constructed, with the remaining 17 expected to be built over the course of the year. South Ossetia is clearly unable to secure its own territory and remains entirely reliant upon Moscow to guarantee its security.

As well as being unable to ‘defend its integrity and independence, South Ossetia also appears unable to ‘provide for its conservation and prosperity’. In addition to the integration of their defence, security and customs agencies, the 2015 treaty underlined Russia’s involvement in supporting the republic’s economy. Article 7 notes that the wages of public sector workers in South Ossetia will ‘with the support of the Russian Federation’ be gradually increased ‘to a level comparable with the level of remuneration of similar workers in the North Caucasus Federal District’. Other notable features of the Treaty are the raising of the pension level for Russian citizens resident in South Ossetia (over 90% of the republic’s population hold Russian citizenship), as well as the implementation of Russia’s compulsory health insurance and the conformity of South Ossetia’s education laws with those of Russia. It is not just defence and security that Russia is providing: South Ossetia’s ‘prime minister’ Domenti Kulumbegov has announced plans to invite Russian specialists to the region to assist in developing its economy. According to Kulumbegov, South Ossetia is in particular need of specialists in property management, housing, public utilities and tariff policy (Res news agency, 26 September 2015). Russian deputy prime minister Aleksandr Khloponin (2015) has also announced plans to assist in the improvement of South Ossetia’s medical services, offering Russian specialists, medics and teachers work in the region if they are willing to relocate.

Following the 1992 ceasefire, South Ossetia became heavily reliant upon criminal sources of income and the lack of official borders between Russia and Georgia (i.e. between North and South Ossetia), facilitated a prolific smuggling operation predominantly of alcohol and fuel, with South Ossetia’s Ergneti market becoming a major trading centre for smuggled goods. The 2008 war altered the situation, with South Ossetia becoming more openly reliant upon economic support from Moscow. It received R8.5bn per year in 2009 and 2010, as well as additional budgetary support (Komsomolskaya Pravda 2010). Unlike Abkhazia, whose foreign economic links are very important (particularly tourism, which contributes a significant amount to the republic’s economy), South Ossetia exports practically nothing and imports almost all its non-food needs from Russia via the Transcaucasian Highway, through the Roki Tunnel (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 2011). The tunnel is sometimes closed in winter as a result of heavy snow and avalanches, cutting South Ossetia off and highlighting its dependence upon Russia. The Russian Ministry of Regional Development has established an interdepartmental commission for the restoration of South Ossetia, which is overseeing reconstruction in the region. According to the commission head Roman Panov, work being carried out includes the repair of hospitals, road construction and the development of a new high-voltage power transmission line between Tskhinvali and Russia which has ‘eliminated the need for the hook-up from Georgia’ (Kommersant, 2010). Furthermore, in August 2009 a

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new 163-km natural gas pipeline between South Ossetia and Russia came onstream, consolidating the region’s move away from Georgia, which had previously provided the region with natural gas. Significantly, the pipeline came into operation on the first anniversary of Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’s ‘independence’, highlighting the systematic eradication of the region’s physical links with Georgia and transference of dependence to Moscow.

‘Borderisation’

There is also an argument to be made that South Ossetia currently lacks a clearly defined territory, one of the characteristics of a state as identified by the Montevideo Convention. The boundaries of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region within the Georgian SSR were created in 1922 (Saparov 2010). The six-point agreement that ended the 2008 war did not identify the precise demarcation line between the sides. In fact, South Ossetia has presented Georgia with claims to its territory, stating that ‘this process may lead to expansion of the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast … In North Ossetia, they are also actively formulating the public opinion that South Ossetia is bigger than it in fact is.’(Vremya Novostei 2010).8 Since 2008, Russian and South Ossetian soldiers have been building a fence along parts of the administrative boundary line (ABL) that separates Georgia from South Ossetia. This process of ‘borderisation’ has been intensified and is now at least 45km long, according to the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), which monitors the Georgian side of the line (Ellena 2013). The fence has had a major impact on the rural communities in the area, often dividing villages and even families, preventing free movement of people, their animals and goods. Nevertheless, until recently the ABL was relatively static, clearly defining the territory of South Ossetia. However, during the summer of 2015 border guards within South Ossetia continued to install a barbed-wire fence and ‘border’ demarcation signs, shifting the ABL further south into Georgian territory, a move described by one politician as ‘creeping annexation’ (Civil Georgia 2015). The Russian Foreign Ministry (2015a) denied these allegations, maintaining that Georgian officials were seeking to create a ‘negative international atmosphere around the strengthening of the Republic of South Ossetia’s statehood’. South Ossetian officials reiterated this and accused Georgia of staging ‘provocations’ over the incident along the ‘state border’ (Res news agency, 20 July 2015). They deny that the line of its border has moved, asserting that they have merely been demarcating it more clearly. European Council President Donald Tusk echoed the language used by Tskhinvali and Moscow, describing their actions along the ABL as a ‘clear provocation’ and repeated the EU’s support for Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity within its ‘internationally recognised borders’. He also described the new fences and signs as the ‘infrastructure of separation’ (European Council 2015). The use of different terms is indicative of the opposing positions of the parties: officials from Russia and South Ossetia refer to the ‘state border’, using the language of statehood, whilst Georgian officials, as well as those from the EU and other international representatives talk about the ‘administrative boundary line’.

The expansion of South Ossetia’s territory means that it now includes a 1.6km section of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa oil export pipeline and is only 0.5km away from the main East-West Highway, the E60, and the Caucasian Corridor, Georgia’s principal transport and communications corridor. South Ossetian authorities declared that they are ready to guarantee the pipeline’s secure, continued operation, as long as BP pay, arguing that ‘[t]he pipeline did not appear on our territory just now [sic]… However, in such cases it is customary that

8 Kokoity has previously stated his belief that the Georgian resorts of Borjomi and Bakuriani are a part of South Ossetia.

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companies pay for the security and service of their sites’ (Sputnik Ossetia 2015). This gives the impression that the South Ossetian authorities are potentially seeking some form of transit tariff arrangement, which would certainly provide a much-needed boost to the region’s economy. According to a study published in 2005 (Starr and Cornell), revenue from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan(BTC) oil export pipeline were expected to add over US$62m per year to Georgia’s national budget.9

The ongoing process of ‘borderisation’ around South Ossetia has raised questions about the security of Georgia’s Caucasian Corridor and its ability to secure the oil and gas export pipelines that transit its territory, transporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian region to international markets. Georgia plays a key role in facilitating the transit of oil and gas from the producers in the Caspian region to international markets without the need to rely on Russia. Not only does Moscow lose out on transit tariffs, the BTC, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) and Baku-Supsa links also represent export supply routes to Europe that are not under Russian control. Georgia’s east-west ‘Caucasian Corridor’, the central valleys that run between the High Caucasus to the north and the Lesser Caucasus in the south, is narrow, squeezed between the two mountain ranges. It is through this corridor that the principal transport and communications links run, including pipeline infrastructure, highways and rail routes. The ease with which Russian troops were able to reach the Caucasian Corridor during the war in 2008 undoubtedly revealed the vulnerability of Georgia’s Caucasian energy corridor, a vulnerability highlighted again by the unilateral shifting of the ABL between South Ossetia and Georgia. Russian involvement in the ‘borderisation’ has clearly demonstrated the extent of its ability to exert its influence over not just Georgia, but over Azerbaijan and the West as well.

Moscow’s increasing pressure on Georgia by means of its presence in South Ossetia appears to be connected to Georgia’s growing ties with NATO: it is unlikely to be a coincidence that the intensification of the ‘borderisation’ process over the summer of 2015, as well as highly visible military drills across the region, took place as Georgia prepared to open the NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC) in August 2015.10 A statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2015 (b), following a session of the Geneva discussion on security and stability in the South Caucasus, outlined the growing concerns of the Abkhaz, Russian and South Ossetian delegations ‘regarding the deepening military cooperation between Georgia and NATO’. The statement drew attention to ‘the destabilising effect on security in the region of the early phase of the practical implementation of the substantial NATO-Georgia package, the opening of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in late August, and US plans to expand joint military exercises in Georgia, including elements of a rapid response force that includes the swift deployment of troops and military equipment from Europe.’ It argued that these developments were incompatible with Georgia’s obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, particularly vis-à-vis military restraint – a paradoxical statement, given Russia’s military posturing in the region and beyond.9 The study also estimated that the pipeline will lower the level of unemployment by over 30 per cent and contribute to a rise in GDP. Georgia has the right to take up to five per cent of the annual gas flow through the SCP in lieu of a tariff. If it does not take this it will be obligated to pay a fee. In monetary terms, this quantity is equivalent to around US$17m per year. It can also purchase a further 0.5 billion cubic metres of gas a year at a discounted price. 10 JTEC is designed to assist Georgia with the reform, modernisation and strengthening of its security and defence sector, as well as enhance the interoperability of Georgian forces and contribute to regional stability in the Black Sea and Caucasus region. Fact Sheet: NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), 27 August 2015, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20150827_150827-jtec-georgia.pdf [accessed 19 September 2015]

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South Ossetia’s relationship with Russia contrasts with that of Abkhazia, which is less keen to remain so dependent upon Moscow’s continuing patronage. Unlike South Ossetia, which, prior to 2008, had been seeking reunification with the Russian republic of North Ossetia, Abkhazia has always sought full independence, based on close political and economic integration with Russia. The different positions of the two territories towards their relations with Moscow is highlighted in the length of the respective treaties, both in terms of the number of clauses and terms of validity: the treaty between the Russian Federation and South Ossetia only contains 15 clauses and is valid for 25 years, automatically extended for successive ten-year periods. Abkhazia’s treaty is far more complex, running to 24 clauses and is valid for 10 years, automatically renewed for successive five-year periods. Since 2008 there has been growing unease in Abkhazia about its increasing reliance on Moscow and its desire to remain as independent as possible was reflected in the final version of the treaty: the first draft was a Treaty of ‘Alliance and Integration’11, whilst the version that was signed saw ‘integration’ replaced with ‘strategic partnership’, suggesting a mutually beneficial relationship between two equal partners. The first article of the treaty stresses the bilateral nature of the relationship between the two, which is to be based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The principal aims of the partnership are the development of a coordinated foreign policy (meaning, in reality, Moscow will oversee Abkhazia’s foreign policy) and the development of common security, defence, economic and social spaces. Nevertheless, Abkhazia will retain its own armed forces, which are to be modernised in order to ensure interoperability with their Russian counterparts. Furthermore, a Joint Group of Forces, comprising Abkhaz and Russian forces, will be established to repel any aggression against Abkhazia. In a clear manifestation of the balance of power within the relationship, the Commander of this Joint Group will be a Russian with an Abkhaz as the deputy.12

Concluding Remarks

Since recognising South Ossetia’s independence in August 2008, the Russian government has complemented its military support for the region with increasing economic and diplomatic support. The 2015 Treaty formalises Russian influence in South Ossetia, making reconciliation with Tbilisi ever more of a distant prospect. South Ossetia today is further away from statehood than it was prior to Russia’s 2008 recognition. The authorities in Tskhinvali are unable to provide vital services such as defence and control over ‘state’ borders and territory without Russian involvement: the 2015 integration treaty with Moscow delegates responsibility for the provision of the basic attributes of statehood to Russia: South Ossetia today is further away from statehood than it was prior to its recognition as a ‘state’ by Russia in 2008. The leadership of South Ossetia is content to increase its reliance on Russia, reflecting an understanding that the region would be unable to survive as a truly independent state, despite continuing support amongst some for South Ossetia to retain its ‘independence’. With so many key state institutions integrated with those of the Russian Federation, as well as

11 See http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252874 [accessed 2 October 2015]12 Following the ratification of the treaty, there have been indications that Moscow is seeking to strengthen its

control over Abkhazia, after a retired Russian general, Anatoly Khrulev, was appointed as the republic’s minister of defence. Although the appointment, announced last month (May 2015), was ostensibly made by Abkhazia’s de facto president Raul Khadjimba, the timing of the decision coincided with his return from a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting that the choice was not Khadjimba’s alone. The background of the appointee was also instructive: Khrulev commanded Russia’s 58th Army until his retirement in 2010 and was wounded in South Ossetia during the 2008 war.

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key services such as pensions provided by Russia, it is not clear how South Ossetia can function as an independent state.

The evolution of the relationship between South Ossetia and Moscow is indicative of the Russian approach to sub-state actors across the post-Soviet space: Moscow confers statehood with one hand, using the language and discourse of statehood, but takes it away with the other, manipulating its relations with these actors in order to achieve broader foreign policy objectives, notably the retention of its influence across the post-Soviet space. Russia’s decision to assist Georgia’s separatist regions and build up a strong military presence there, reflects the Kremlin’s wider efforts to retain its influence over the post-Soviet space, in this case by manipulating existing faultlines and using separatist conflicts as foreign policy instruments. Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili (2015) has described the treaties as annexation and criticised Russia’s ‘destructive’ response to negotiation efforts. Georgia is in a difficult situation, under pressure from Moscow, which continues to seek the disruption of relations between the West and states within the post-Soviet space. Strengthening its already strong relationship with the two territories presents the Russian leadership with further opportunity to thwart its southern neighbour’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Georgia’s aspirations of NATO membership remain a distant dream and other states in the region are wary of developing closer ties with the West, whose response to Russia’s increasing absorption of South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) has been muted. Europe’s eastern periphery is very volatile with the ongoing insurgency in eastern Ukraine, unresolved conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Transdniestr, and instability in the North Caucasus. The evolution of the relationship between Moscow and South Ossetia is also indicative of what may well occur in eastern Ukraine: a growing dependence and the maintenance of a simmering separatist conflict that is far more than a domestic territorial dispute, with both regional and international implications. By ensuring that Ukraine remains divided, Russia prevents its closer integration with the West, whilst simultaneously retaining its influence over a post-Soviet neighbour. European organisations such as the EU and NATO appear powerless to act, despite a desire to stabilise and contribute to the security of the wider post-Soviet space through indirect means, deterred by Russia’s sustained influence, as well as a lack of consensus or clear long-term vision of how to engage states within what Moscow considers to be its ‘zone of privileged interest’. Russian behaviour in the post-Soviet space has not been deterred, only encouraged, by Western procrastination since 2008, and its actions threaten the stability and security of both the Euro-Atlantic area and Europe.

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