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Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: ADiachronic PerspectiveSusannah VerneyPublished online: 15 Apr 2011.

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Euroscepticism in Southern Europe:A Diachronic PerspectiveSusannah Verney

After laying out the rationale and framework of the issue, this introductory article offers asurvey of party and popular euroscepticism in European Union member states, Italy,Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Malta and candidate Turkey, over several decades.

Leonard Ray’s criteria of ideological extremity, electoral unpopularity and opposition areused to assess whether South European euroscepticism has been a marginal phenomenon.

The article investigates whether Maastricht constituted a turning-point for the rise ofeuroscepticism and accession for its decline. Finally, it asks whether euroscepticism in

Southern Europe is moving towards a new ‘constraining dissensus’.

Keywords: European Integration; Party Attitudes; Public Opinion; Italy; Greece; Spain;

Portugal; Turkey; Cyprus; Malta

Euroscepticism really emerged as a significant issue on the EU agenda after the early

1990s. The event generally regarded as responsible for ‘uncorking the bottle’ (Franklin,

Marsh & McLaren 1994) was the agreement of December 1991 on European Union.

The Maastricht Treaty, as it is popularly known, was uniquely qualified to arouse

opposition, due to its multiple challenges to national sovereignty, its economic

prescriptions with their implications for national redistributive policies, and the fears of

the erosion of national identity aggravated by the project for European citizenship.

The crisis over the treaty’s ratification first shook the cosy belief in a ‘permissiveconsensus’ in public opinion, under which a broad majority offered passive support for

integration, allowing it to advance without significant opposition (Lindberg &

Scheingold 1970). Further referenda crises followed over three of the four subsequent

European Treaties. Within a seven-year period in the 2000s, voters in one or more

member-states successively rejected theTreaty ofNice in 2001, the EuropeanConstitution

in 2005 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. These repeated upsets both decelerated and

delegitimised the integration process. In addition to opposition at the mass level, a

reduction in consensus was also apparent among national governing elites, including incore EU states. A striking example was the stirrings of dissent in founder member, the

ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2010.570124

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Netherlands, long regarded as ‘one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Europeanintegration’ (Harmsen 2005, p. 99). Enlargement then added new eurosceptic elites from

Scandinavia and Central and Eastern Europe to the EU equation.The rising salience of euroscepticism is indicated by its central role in a new theory of

European integration. ‘Post-functionalist’ theory was developed by Hooghe andMarks (2006, 2009) in the aftermath of the Constitutional Treaty failure. While the

neofunctionalists traditionally emphasised the role of interest groups as potential driversof integration,Hooghe andMarks identify popular euroscepticism as the new brakeman.

They argue that public opinion, ignored by earlier theorists due to the development ofintegration as a series of elite bargains, now restricts elites’ room for manoeuvre.The result, as Hooghe puts it (2007a, p. 5), is ‘a limited zone of acquiescence for policy

choice’. Their analysis, that European integration has moved from the ‘permissiveconsensus’ to a new era of ‘constraining dissensus’, implies a pessimistic prognostication.

This is far removed from the neofunctionalists’ positive predictions concerning theforward march of integration, back in the latter’s early days.

But how much have things actually changed? Down and Wilson (2008, p. 46)examining data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys, suggested that

the overall level of popular support for integration in the early 2000s, while lower than inthe 1980s, was ‘little different’ from the 1970s—the era when Lindberg and Scheingoldfirst proposed the ‘permissive consensus’. This raises the question as to whether there is

really more euroscepticism now than in the past—or whether perhaps it is simplyperceived to have a greater presence because, for example, there has been much more

popular consultation on integration in the post-Maastricht era. The only way to answerthis question is through diachronic studies, focusing on how euroscepticism has changed

over time. As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b, p. 26) have noted, this currently constitutesa gap in the literature—one which this issue aims partially to fill through a study of

Southern Europe (SE), chosen for reasons that will be explained below. After outliningthe framework of the collective project, the article offers an overview of euroscepticism in

Southern Europe from a diachronic perspective.

Project Framework

Scope and Time Line

The goal of the present project is to contribute to our understanding of euroscepticism

by examining how it has played out in different national contexts. This is by no meansthe first comparative collection of country case studies of euroscepticism (see, for

example, Milner 2000; Harmsen and Spiering 2005; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a).However, this is the first collection systematically to examine both the pre- and post-

Maastricht periods in order to provide a fuller picture of eurosceptic change. It thuscovers the era of the European Community (EC) as well as the post-Maastricht EU

(with the term EC/EU used when referring to the whole time period). Rather thansetting a uniform starting date for the national case studies, each contributor was

encouraged to identify the point that seemed most meaningful in terms of their own

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country’s integration, including pre- and post-accession periods. In terms of achronological cut-off point, it was considered better not to cover beyond the onset of

the international economic crisis in 2008–09, which seemed likely to open a new era interms of attitudes to European integration in Southern Europe. To date, the study of

euroscepticism has developed along two often separate axes, party and populareuroscepticism, concerned with elite andmass attitudes respectively. While most of the

literature focuses on either one or the other,1 the contributors to this project wereasked to include both, again with the aim of providing a fuller picture.

Regional Focus: The Choice of Southern Europe

In terms of geographical scope, the collection edited by Milner focused on north-west

Europe, while the other two comparative volumes cited above include a range ofcountries from both Western and Eastern Europe, of different sizes and relative power

profiles, and with different ages of membership, ranging from founder members to2004 entrants. The present project also aims to emphasise diversity, but has chosen to

do so within one particular region. As a laboratory for the study of attitudes towardsEuropean integration, Southern Europe offers a particularly rich range of case studies.

In terms of membership age, it includes a European Community founder member(Italy), three ‘second generation’ members (Greece, Spain and Portugal), two recent

entrants (Cyprus and Malta), and one negotiating candidate with a long-termrelationship with European integration (Turkey).

Moreover, for the purposes of a diachronic perspective, Southern Europe is likely to be

particularly fruitful, as all seven states have been closely linked to the Europeanintegration project since the era of the European Community, with four members of

this group being the first states to sign Association Agreements with the EC in the 1960sand 1970s. (See Table 1 for a time line of South European relations with European

integration.) The choice of SE thusoffers a goodbasis to study euroscepticismover severaldecades. Meanwhile, euroscepticism in SE has to date been under-researched and

for some of our case studies, notably Cyprus and Malta, the articles in this issue arepioneers in examining the phenomenon in their respective countries.

Perhaps the most important reason to choose Southern Europe, however, is the

region’s reputation, in the words of Hooghe & Marks (2007a, p. 13) as ‘the EU’s most

Table 1 South European Countries: Association and Accession

Country Association (date of signature) Full Membership

Italy – 1957Greece 1961 1981Portugal – 1986Spain – 1986Cyprus 1972 2004Malta 1970 2004Turkey 1963 –

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pro-European’. According to Gomez-Reino, Llamazares & Ramiro (2008, p. 134), ‘theincorporation of Mediterranean countries into the European Union was preceded,

accompanied, and followed by a wide consensus on the positive effects of Europeanintegration’. Examining popular euroscepticism in Greece, Spain and Portugal,

Llamazares and Gramacho (2007, p. 212) note that respondents from these countries,together with the Italians, rank ‘among the most euro-enthusiast’ in Europe. In the

case of Italy, Conti (2003) remarks that this ‘is a country that has for a long time beenseen as one of the most Euro-enthusiastic among the member states’, while Quaglia

(2008, p. 58) claims that ‘in the past, any reference to “Italian euroscepticism” wouldhave been regarded as an oxymoron’, given the country’s unremittingly pro-Europeanimage.

This picture largely refers to the ‘old’ SE, i.e. the four former dictatorships whichjoined the EC pre-Maastricht, where integration acquired especially positive

connotations through its promotion as the route to democratisation. It applies lessto the ‘new’ Southern Europe of Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, which do not necessarily

share a strong pro-integrationist stance. Nevertheless, this europhile image suggestsSE might be a particularly useful weathervane when considering the future of a

‘post-functionalist’ European Union. If euroscepticism has developed into a force tobe reckoned with even in this region, or has at least grown there significantly incomparison with the past, this might confirm the ‘post-functionalist’ diagnosis of a

‘constraining dissensus’ likely to limit the further development of the EU.

Defining Euroscepticism

In establishing a framework for the issue, an important matter is how to define

euroscepticism, a topic on which there has been a certain amount of academic debate.For example, Oliver Daddow (2006, p. 64), writing from a historian’s perspective, has

suggested the possible meanings of the term could include ‘a broader-brush populistscepticism about anything to do with Europe at all’. However, in everyday language,

notably in the media, euroscepticism has acquired the rather specific meaning ofquestioning European integration and it is this usage that has also become established

in political science. It therefore does not seem useful to broaden our workingdefinition beyond this.Nevertheless, as Nick Sitter (2001) has commented, ‘euroscepticism is not a single

coherent stance on the EU as a polity’. Instead it covers a broad range of positions inwhich opposition can concern the whole concept of European integration or be confined

variously to its current form, to particular present aspects or policies, and/or to futuredeepening, either in general or with regard to specific competences. This has led some

authors to attempt to further narrow the definition. Notably Kopecky & Mudde (2002)suggested that the term ‘eurosceptic’ should apply only to one specific category of

integration opponents: that of ‘europhile europessimists’, i.e. those who are positiveabout European integration but negative about its present or pessimistic about its

future development. But this excludes the key group of hardcore eurodoubters—the

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‘europhobe europessimists’ whom these two authors classify in a separate category as‘euro-rejects’. It does not seem particularly helpful to our understanding of opposition to

integration to suggest the phenomenon should be studied without including its most

determined opponents.The problem that concerned Kopecky & Mudde, of capturing the category of those

who are positive towards integration in principle but opposed to its current practice, hasalso occupied other authors, such asWessels (2007), who proposed a three-point scheme

of ‘adamant eurosceptics’, ‘eurosceptics’ and ‘critical Europeans’. Moreover, euroscepticsand integration supporters are not permanent, mutually exclusive categories. Instead,

the borders between these two groupsmay be fluid, changing according to circumstancesand over time. Conti (2003) in particular has highlighted this problemwith his category

of ‘functional Europeans’, whose support for European integration is not based on

fundamental commitment and therefore may be changeable.Despite considerable sympathy with these classificatory attempts and the reasoning

behind them, it was felt the most useful approach for the issue would be to use adefinition which, while limiting euroscepticism to European integration, would

encourage the authors to opt for the broadest possible coverage of negative attitudestowards the EU. Hence, the project has adopted the definition of euroscepticism

proposed by Paul Taggart (1998, p. 365) as ‘contingent or qualified opposition, as wellas . . . outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’.

Also utilised is the classificatory distinction between hard and soft euroscepticism

subsequently developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Hard euroscepticism is defined as‘principled objection to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU’,

involving ‘outright rejection’ of both political and economic integration and‘opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU’ (Szczerbiak &

Taggart 2003, p. 12; Taggart & Szczerbiak 2008a, pp. 7–8). With soft euroscepticism,‘there is not a principled objection to the European integration project or transferring

powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU’s

current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencesthat the EU is planning to make’ (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2003, p. 12).

In the case of party euroscepticism, contributors were invited to examine only thoseparties that have been represented in the national or European Parliaments. The world

of extraparliamentary politics often includes a colourful range of opposition tointegration, but it was felt venturing into this domain risked entanglement in the

potentially picturesque but politically irrelevant. In identifying eurosceptic parties,contributors were asked to provide information on their stands in national

parliamentary ratification of EC/EU treaties. Richard Dunphy (2003, p. 3) has

cautioned against a simplistic identification of opposition to an EC/EU treaty withopposition to European integration. As he rightly remarks with regard to the

Maastricht Treaty, ‘it is perfectly possible to oppose [it] on the grounds that it was notsufficiently integrationist—that it did not go far enough’. Nevertheless, European Treaty

ratification is a ‘history-making moment’, when political forces stand up to be countedconcerning the direction that European integration is taking. The political statement

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made by abstaining or voting against a European Treaty would appear to express atleast some soft euroscepticism and therefore appears relevant to our account.

The next section opens our overview of euroscepticism in SE by laying out thespecific questions to be investigated. This will be followed by two sections examining

party and popular euroscepticism in SE. The article will conclude by attempting toanswer the question of whether a ‘constraining dissensus’ now seems to be emerging in

Southern Europe.

Overview of SE Euroscepticism: Research Questions

The basic subject under investigation in this issue is how the pattern of South European

euroscepticism has changed over time and, in particular, whether party and populareuroscepticism are stronger within national political systems than in the past. To examinethis, two working hypotheses have been formulated. The first is that the Maastricht

Treaty had a ‘system transforming’ effect on South European euroscepticism (Down &Wilson 2008, p. 38). This hypothesis thus seeks to determine the eurosceptic response to

the deepening of integration. The second hypothesis is concerned with euroscepticism ascharacteristic of a particular phase of the national trajectory in European integration.

Specifically, it proposes that there is an ‘accession effect’, with euroscepticism decliningfollowing full membership. The experience of recent and currently aspiring EU entrants

(the Central and Eastern European Countries [CEECs], Croatia and Turkey) suggeststhat in a candidate state, the demanding nature of accession negotiations is likely to result

in a popular reaction against EU entry. In contrast, the experience of membership andparticipation in the latter’s benefits—including decision-making influence, enhancedinternational status and possible budgetary inflows—might be assumed to have a

mitigating effect on euroscepticism.Party euroscepticism has been famously characterised by Paul Taggart (1998) as

‘a touchstone of dissent’, a characteristic of protest parties. Following Taggart’s originalobservation that ‘no major governmental party in an EUmember-state is unequivocally

anti-EU’ (Taggart 1998, p. 381), Sczcerbiak and Taggart (2000, pp. 5, 8) subsequentlyproposed a core–periphery distinction, with eurosceptic parties located on the periphery

of the party system, but likely to modify their stance when mutating into parties ofpower. Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2004) found euroscepticism to be concentrated inparticular party families, which happen to be principally those located towards the two

ends of the political spectrum. The picture of party euroscepticism which emerges fromthese authors is thus one of a marginal rather than a mainstream phenomenon.

Following this literature, Leonard Ray (2007, p. 154) has identified the basic features ofeuroscepticmarginality as ‘ideological extremity, unpopularity and opposition’, which he

suggests can be measured by ideological positioning, national parliamentary vote shareand government participation. Ray’s three criteria will be employed in this article to

assess the marginality (or otherwise) of party euroscepticism. Meanwhile, in the case ofpopular euroscepticism, the measure is straightforwardly numerical, based on

percentages of eurosceptic opinion poll responses or euro-referenda votes.

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Party Euroscepticism before Maastricht

The first finding on examining party euroscepticism in Southern Europe is that there hasbeen considerable national variation across the region. This can be illustrated by the

crucial decision to enter the EC/EU as a full member. As Table 2 shows, of the six SouthEuropean member states, accession was a consensual choice with unanimous

parliamentary support in two cases—Spain and the Republic of Cyprus. Behind thisconsensus was the belief that European integration would provide the essentialframework for, respectively, the stabilisation of Spanish democracy and the solution of

the Cyprus problem. In Portugal and Italy, EC entry was opposed by one and twoopposition parties respectively. But the last two cases, Greece and Malta, were polarised

around the issue of participating in European integration, with opposition coming fromparties of power. In Greece, just ten months after EC entry, almost 60 per cent of the vote

was gained by two hard eurosceptic parties (see Verney in this issue). In theMaltese partyduopoly, under which only two parties have been represented in parliament since 1968,

one of the two poles of the system promoted non-alignment and opposed accession forover three decades. In both cases, it is clear that accession would not have happened—at

least, not when it did—if the roll of the electoral dice had turned out differently.

Ideological Positioning

Examining party euroscepticism in the pre-Maastricht era, one of the reasons why SE hastraditionally been regarded as a region of low euroscepticism becomes immediately

apparent. In the 1970s and 1980s, in the two large member states, Italy and Spain, therewas a pro-integrationist consensus, which embraced all parliamentary parties. Indeed,

the Italian parliament during the 1980s manifested a rather striking pro-federalistactivism, calling for the ratification of the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty on

European Union, criticising the Single European Act for not going far enough in afederalist direction, and pressing for a referendum to give the EP a mandate to draw up anew Treaty on European Union (Preda 1991). Thus, as shown in Table 3, when the Single

Table 2 South European Parties against Accession Treaty Ratification

Country Parties voting against Parties abstaining

Italy (Treaty of Rome) PCI Communist PSI SocialistGreece None PASOK Socialist

KKE Communist*Portugal PCP Communist NoneSpain None NoneCyprus None NoneMalta MLP Socialist None

Note: *The Greek socialists and communists, having previously declared they would vote against theaccession treaty, both boycotted Parliament during the debate. In this case, the boycott was intended toindicate a stronger degree of opposition thanvoting against—in the words of theGreek socialists’ leader,it constituted a refusal to legitimise the procedure by the party’s participation (Papandreou 1979).

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European Act came up for ratification in the mid-1980s, the only parliamentary forces

opposing it in the then four member-states were the two orthodox communist parties

(CPs) in the two smaller countries. In both cases, these CPs were permanent opposition

parties and minor players in their respective national systems.

Table 3 South European Parties against European Treaty Ratification

Treaty Country Parties voting against Parties abstaining

Single European Act Italy None NoneGreece KKE Communist NonePortugal PCP Communist NoneSpain None None

Treaty of European Union Italy None NoneGreece KKE Communist NonePortugal PCP Communist CDS-PP ConservativeSpain EE Regionalist Left IU Radical Left

Treaty of Amsterdam Italy None LN Regionalist/rightGreece KKE Communist/DIKKI Left

populistSYN Radical left

Portugal PCP Communist/BE Radical Left NoneSpain IU Radical Left None

Treaty of Nice Italy RC Communist NoneGreece KKE Communist SYN Radical LeftPortugal PCP Communist/BE Radical Left NoneSpain None IU Radical Left

Treaty establishing a Euro-pean Constitution

Italy RC CommunistLN Regionalist/right

None

Greece KKE Communist/SYRIZA RadicalLeft

None

Portugal Not ratified Not ratifiedSpain IU Radical Left/BNG, ERC, CHA,

EA, Na-Bai Regionalist/leftNone

Cyprus AKEL Communist KOP GreenMalta None None

Treaty of Lisbon Italy None NoneGreece KKE Communist/SYRIZA

Radical left/LAOS Radical rightNone

Portugal PCP CommunistBE Radical left NoneSpain ERC, BNG Regionalist/left

IU/Radical LeftICV Regionaleco-socialist/Na-BaiRegionalist/left

Cyprus AKEL Communist KOP GreenMalta None None

Note: The author would like to thank Nicolo Conti, Antonio Egea de Robles, Ignacio Molina,Christophoros Christophorou, Marco Lisi, Sophia Michalaki and Kyriaki Kafyra for responding toqueries concerning the information in this table.Responsibility for any errors remains the author’s alone.

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However, the Italian andSpanishpro-integrationist consensuswas a newdevelopment:earlier, integration had encountered opposition in both countries, specifically from the

communist parties. As shown in Table 2, in the 1950s the Italian communists voted

against ratification of the Treaty of Rome. Meanwhile, in the early 1960s, their Spanishcounterparts, then operating underground during the Franco dictatorship, campaigned

against the regime’s aim of ultimate Association with the EC (Story 1979, p. 154).The change in communist policy was thus crucial. Eurocommunism was largely a South

European phenomenon, with the Spanish and Italian parties itsmajor proponents. Therewas also a small eurocommunist party inGreece, which, while represented in Parliament,

was electorally overshadowed by the orthodox CP. Adopting the strategy of a democratic

road to socialism, these parties sought a framework for the establishment of a stabledemocracy in which the left could come to power and promote socialist change in a

continent divided into Cold War blocs. In moving away from the Soviet embrace, theyreassessedEuropean integration as offeringmore favourable ground for the pursuit of this

aim than a national road to socialism. Eurocommunism thus constitutes a majorexplanatory factor for the limited level of South European euroscepticism at this time.

Another significant factor was the complete absence of right-wing euroscepticism inall but one case. The exception was Turkey, which, as noted by Yilmaz (in this issue),

displayed a quite different pattern, with euroscepticism located not only on the far left

but also on the nationalist right and in the Islamist movement. In fact, Turkey was arather special case because of the protracted and difficult nature of its relations with

the EC (and, subsequently, the EU). As Gunes-Ayata (2003, p. 205) notes, ‘since thecountry signed a treaty with the European CommonMarket in 1963, there has been no

political tendency (right, left, centre, Islamist, nationalist) that has not gone to somedegree through a stage of euroscepticism’. This applied particularly to the 1970s, when

economic crisis and disappointment over the functioning of the AssociationAgreement combined with growing alienation from the EC over the Cyprus question

and Greek accession to fuel euroscepticism. At this time, a soft euroscepticism was

expressed by the Kemalist and etatist CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—RepublicanPeople’s Party), which entered the Socialist International in 1975. CHP supported

Turkey’s westernisation but, particularly in the 1970s, had increasing difficulties withthe programme of market opening which lay at the heart of the Association.

In contrast, in the other SE states pre-Maastricht, euroscepticism took a hard form,focused around rejection of national participation in the European Community. Soft

euroscepticismwas generally expressed only by parties that were in the process ofmovingaway from an initial hard eurosceptic stance, such as the Greek socialists in the 1980s.2

During this period, especially the early years when integration was a relatively new

process, hard euroscepticism still appeared a meaningful position. Only one SE state wasa founder member, so for the rest the issue of membership remained open. In the six SE

states apart from Turkey, prior to the 1990s, opposition to integration could be foundexclusively among parties of the anti-capitalist left: the communist parties in Greece,

Portugal and Cyprus, as well as in Italy and Spain (in the 1950s and 1960s); a Greek leftfront party (pre-1967 when the CP was illegal); and the socialist parties in Italy, Greece

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and Malta. Among the socialists, for the Italians euroscepticism was a short-lived phase

in the 1950s (see Quaglia in this issue). The Greek and Maltese socialists were rather

different. Having little in common with West European social democracy, which they

strongly criticised, they preferred a non-aligned and third worldist orientation to EC

membership.

Marginal or Mainstream?

In these six countries, euroscepticism in the pre-Maastricht period thus fulfils one

of our three criteria of marginality, through its limitation to the far left of the

political spectrum. In contrast, in Turkey, Dosemici (2011 forthcoming) notes that,

after 1967, eurosceptic sentiments were expressed across the political spectrum, unlike

the early 1960s when, he claims, there was ‘near unanimous support’ for integration.

Subsequently, when political parties began functioning again after the 1980 military

coup, there was greater consensus around the EC orientation, including a new turn in

economic philosophy towards the market economy.

In terms of the second criterion, electoral popularity, in both Turkish elections

which took place in the 1970s the eurosceptic parties were among the most important

political forces. The Kemalist CHP was the first and the Islamists the third party, while

the nationalists were a smaller force with three parliamentary seats in 1973 and 16 in

1977.3 In our other six countries, the anti-capitalist and eurosceptic left constituted a

significant force in four. Under their respective two-party systems, the socialists were

one of the two potential parties of government in Malta throughout the period and in

Greece from 1977. The Greek socialists’ vote underwent a meteoric rise, from under

14 per cent immediately after the party’s foundation in 1974 to a highpoint of

48 per cent in 1981, while under the Maltese party duopoly the socialists’ vote share in

the 1970s and 1980s ranged from 48.9 to 51.5 per cent. The communists were the

second party in Italy throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with around one-quarter of

the vote. Also forming the second party were the Cypriot communists, apart from the

elections of 1981 when they were first and 1985, when they came third. Only in

Portugal and Greece were the communists the third or fourth party in every election,

consistently scoring less than 15 per cent of the vote.With regard to the third criterion of marginality—that of opposition—eurosceptic

parties participated in power in three South European countries before 1991. In Turkey

prior to the 1980 coup, a series of unstable coalition governments included both the

Islamists (1974–75 and 1975–77) and the nationalist right (1975–77), while the CHP

led a coalition government in 1978–79. Single-party governments were formed by the

eurosceptic socialists in Greece (1981–85)4 and Malta (1971–87). The sole

communist government participant—albeit very briefly—was the Greek CP, at a

time when its traditional hard-line opposition to integration had been muted to a soft

eurosceptic stance. In 1989–90, during a period of perestroika in the Soviet Union and

of national political crisis in Greece, the Greek communists, as part of a left alliance,

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took part in two short-lived coalition governments. In contrast, the Italian, Spanish,Portuguese and Cypriot communists were in permanent opposition.

Eurosceptics in Power

Government participation by eurosceptic forces had a considerable impact on national

relations with integration. Malta, despite an Association Agreement dating back to1970, for almost two decades did not pursue closer relations with the EC, due to the

16-year tenure of the eurosceptic socialists—the longest-lasting euroscepticgovernment in SE. It was only after the socialists lost power in 1987 that the

succeeding government actively pursued accession, submitting a formal application in1990. The timing of the Maltese membership request meant it became enmeshed withenlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, resulting in a further 14-year wait before

the country joined what was by then the European Union.In 1970s Turkey, in a climate of economic crisis and increasingly violent political

unrest, a succession of coalition governments including Islamists and nationalists donot seem to have raised obstacles to Turkey’s EC links on grounds of principle, but

pushed for greater flexibility from the EC in the implementation of the Association.5

In 1978 a CHP-led government announced a five-year unilateral moratorium on the

fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations under the Association. The Turkish action, followedby the military coup of 1980, was to result in what was essentially a lost decade forTurkey–EU relations. The latter were only formally reactivated in 1986, subsequently

leaving Turkey at the back of the now rapidly growing enlargement queue.For these states with Association agreements, the election of eurosceptic governments

thus led to the distancing of the countries concerned from the EC and probably delayedtheir accession processes by decades. For a member-state, the consequences were rather

different. The Greek socialists’ first administration (1981–85) was the sole example of asingle-party eurosceptic government in a South European member-state not only in the

pre-Maastricht era, but also up to the present. It may, therefore, be regarded as anexceptional case. It had a long-term impact on Greek–EC relations, shaping an image as

a difficult partner which the country has not fully overcome almost three decades later.In addition, it had consequences for the integration process. In an EC of only tenmembers, before the first amendment of the Treaty of Rome, the Greek government had

considerably more veto power than an average member-state today. It was thus able todilute foreign policy cohesion and, often by lining up with two other dissenters, the UK

andDenmark, to hinder the deepening of integration (see Verney in this issue).While thepresence of the Greek government was not the main factor, it clearly contributed to the

‘constraining dissensus’ which seemed to be paralysing integration in the early 1980s.

Post-accession Decline

Of the four states that entered the European Community during this period, thehypothesis that opposition to European integration diminished after accession and

before Maastricht is confirmed in two cases. These were Italy, due to eurocommunism,

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and Greece, where, after a few years of full membership, the socialists had becomereconciled to EC membership and the communists were also shifting ground

(see Verney in this issue). For the Greek socialists, the change occurred after a few yearsin power and for the two communist parties at a time when they aimed to become

coalitionable. The cases of these three parties therefore support the Szczerbiak andTaggart thesis that parties which are either participating in government or aiming to

do so will move away from euroscepticism. The hypothesis concerning post-accessionchange does not apply to the two Iberian countries. In the Spanish case, no eurosceptic

parties were represented in Parliament before accession, so there could not be areduction of party euroscepticism afterwards. In Portugal, where there seemed noprospect of communist government participation, the communist party—the

country’s sole eurosceptic force—did not change its stance in the five-year periodbetween EC entry in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty agreement in 1991.

Party Euroscepticism after Maastricht

The post-Maastricht era saw new patterns of euroscepticism take shape. European

integration was now well established and undergoing rapid deepening, most of thestates that hadpreviously remained outside—the neutralmembers of the European Free

Trade Area and the Central and East European countries—were queuing up to join, andfour of our South European countries were already member states. Under these

conditions, hard euroscepticism became a less sustainable position and, with a fewexceptions, virtually disappeared from Southern Europe. In its place, a broad range of

soft eurosceptic positions emerged, with considerably more ideological variation.

Ideological Positioning

On the right, in Turkey the 1990s found both the nationalists and the Islamists takingeurosceptic positions, including opposition to the customs union agreement signed in

1995. The nationalists retained a soft eurosceptic stance in the 2000s, declaring supportfor Turkey’s EUmembership so long as it did not conflictwithwhat theydefined as long-

term national interests including foreign policy issues, notably Cyprus, and thedomestic treatment ofminorities (Avci 2004). In one of themost striking reversals of thepost-Maastricht era, after 1999 the Islamists switched to support for EUmembership as

a central plank of their policy, a change attributable to the dynamics of domestic politicsand the realisation that Europeanisation, as a route to democratisation, could create a

framework allowing the formation of a stable Islamist government.Meanwhile, right-wing euroscepticism was no longer confined to Turkey but now

appeared in three more SE countries. Its emergence did not follow a common pattern,as the parties concerned had disparate ideological orientations. In Portugal, the

conservative party (CDS-PP) briefly adopted a eurosceptic stance in the yearsimmediately after Maastricht (see Costa Lobo and Magalhaes in this issue). In Greece,

a party of the radical right (LAOS), belonging to the new trend of populist and

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anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, was founded in 2000. In Italy, following thecollapse of the previous party system in 1993, euroscepticism appeared among the

parties of the new centre-right bloc (see Quaglia 2008 and in this issue). The European

stand of the two larger parties, Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale, which merged in2007 to form a single party of the centre-right, was differentiated from the bipartisan

euro-enthusiasm of Italian parties in the past, having a more pronounced nationalorientation and a more pro-Atlantic foreign policy.6 However, they will not be

included in this survey of party euroscepticism because, at the history-makingmoments when European Treaties were being ratified, they always voted in favour.7

This was not the case with their coalition partner, the Lega Nord, like LAOS a populist

and anti-immigrant party, which adopted a more clearly eurosceptic stance.The Lega’s European policy was closely linked to its primary identity as a regionalist

party demanding self-determination for northern Italy. The party’s initial europhilestance drew on references to a Europe of the Regions as the most appropriate

framework to realise this project, while the 1998 switch to euroscepticism seems tohave been at least partly influenced by the belief that Italy’s successful entry to

Economic and Monetary Union would weaken support for the country to split.The Lega’s eurosceptic stance has been anything but consistent, as indicated by

the party’s record with regard to European Treaty ratification: it abstained on the

ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, voted for the Treaty of Nice, against theEuropean Constitution and for the Treaty of Lisbon (see Table 3).

Regionalist euroscepticism constitutes a second strand of the new euroscepticism inSouthern Europe. It reflects the deepening impact of integration on centre–periphery

relations within the nation-state, an impact that varies from case to case, resulting in adifferentiated stance towards the EU (see De Winter & Gomez Reino 2002). Besides

Italy, it has also emerged in Spain—the only other SE member state large enough tohave regional autonomist movements. In the Spanish case, as the table shows, a series

of regionalist parties from the Basque country, Catalonia and Navarre have opposed

European Treaty ratification in the last decade. In contrast to the Italian Lega Nord,however, these have all been left-wing. Their stand has been partially influenced by the

unwillingness of the EU institutions to support autonomist demands that wouldundermine the territorial integrity of the member-states. In contrast, in candidate

country Turkey, the Kurdish political parties have not been eurosceptic, viewingEuropean integration as offering a more favourable framework for recognition of their

ethnic identity, and the EU institutions as potential allies in their struggle for minority

rights.A third new strand of SE euroscepticism has been Green. This was quite weak, first

because post-materialist values have been less appealing in a region with a lowereconomic development level and so Green parties have not been strongly represented in

South European parliaments. Second, the Green movement has been divided in itsstance on European integration. While in the past Green parties tended to be

eurosceptic, in recent years they have become more supportive of integration. Thus, forexample, the Greek Eco-Greens are pro-integrationist. However, Europe, a eurosceptic

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environmentalist party was represented in the Greek Parliament in 1990–93 while inthe 2000s, both the Cypriot and Catalan Greens abstained in the ratification of the Treaty

of Lisbon.Alongside these new entrants remained the traditional backbone of South European

euroscepticism—the left. Within the South European socialist family, the Maltese

socialists continued to oppose their country’s EU membership in the post-Maastrichtperiod. The Greek socialists, following the earlier change in their EC policy, in the

1990s became consolidated as a pro-integrationist party and the main architect of theircountry’s entry to Economic and Monetary Union. Meanwhile, a short-lived Greek

socialist splinter (DIKKI) accepted the country’s EU membership but rejected thedirection integration was taking post-Maastricht. In Turkey, the CHP, which had

adopted an enthusiastic pro-integration stance in the 1990s, moved to a soft

eurosceptic stance after 2002 when it became the official opposition to an Islamistgovernment elected on a pro-integrationist platform. While the CHP still proclaimed

its support for the EU membership project in principle, in practice its support, likethat of the nationalists, was conditional on accession not clashing with national

interests such as Cyprus and it strongly opposed many of the reforms required by theaccession process (see Gulmez 2008).

The neoliberal deepening of integration inaugurated by Maastricht andstrengthened by subsequent treaties also evoked new opposition from a group of

post-eurocommunist parties, which formed the basis for a new family of the radical

left. Maastricht of course coincided with the formal death of eurocommunism,marked by the dissolution of the Italian communist party in 1991 (preceded by the

Greek eurocommunist party in 1986). The new parties were the Spanish IU, anelectoral alliance formed in 1986 with the Spanish CP as its dominant component; the

Greek SYN, formed in 1992 by former eurocommunists and cadres from the renewalwing of the orthodox CP; and RC (Rifondazione Comunista), an Italian communist

successor party. While continuing to support European integration in principle and

rejecting an exclusively national road to socialism, these parties became increasinglycritical of the direction that integration was taking, moving to a soft eurosceptic stance

which became more pronounced with the passage of time.Among the orthodox communist parties, the Greek communists’ flirtation with soft

euroscepticism ended with their decision to vote against the Maastricht Treaty, afterwhich they returned to a more hard-line stance. The Portuguese CP softened its stance

after Maastricht, but it too returned to a harder eurosceptic line by the end of the1990s (see Costa Lobo & Magalhaes in this issue). Subsequently, the Greek and

Portuguese CPs can be regarded as the basic rearguard of hard euroscepticism in

Southern Europe. They are also the only two parties in Southern Europe which,throughout the decades in which their countries have participated in European

integration, have consistently opposed European Treaty ratification at everyopportunity on which they have been offered, from accession to Lisbon. In contrast,

the Cypriot communists moved to a soft eurosceptic stance. Formally dropping theiropposition to their country’s EU membership in 1995, they retained a ‘eurocritical’

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stance on the direction integration was taking, as reflected in their votes against theEuropean Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (see Agapiou-Josephides in this issue).

Finally, a new addition to the SE eurosceptic radical left was the Portuguese BE(Bloco Esquerda—Left Bloc), founded in 1999.

Marginal or Mainstream?

Turning to the three criteria of marginality, as a general rule all the South European

eurosceptic forces listed above were located in a marginal position towards one of thetwo ends of the political spectrum. The sole exception was the Turkish CHP, which is

usually regarded as centre-left. On the second criteria, electoral unpopularity,eurosceptic parties with strong electoral support were found in the two 2004 entrants.

In Malta, under the party duopoly, the socialists’ lowest post-Maastricht vote share was46.5 per cent, while in Cyprus, the communists generally gained 30–35 per cent of

the vote, making them the second party in the 1990s and the first party in the 2000s.The third ‘new’ SE country, Turkey, also registered a substantial eurosceptic vote, withthe Islamists emerging as first party with over 21 per cent of the vote in 1995, the

nationalists as second party with 18 per cent in 1999, and the CHP during its post-2002soft eurosceptic phase as second party with almost 21 per cent in 2007. In contrast, in the

four ‘old’ SE states, there was only one occasion onwhich an individual eurosceptic partygained more than a 10 per cent vote share (the Spanish IU with 10.5 per cent in 1996).

With regard to the third criterion, eurosceptic parties took part in government infour of our South European states during this period: in Italy and Cyprus for the first

time and also in Turkey and Malta. The Maltese socialists formed the only post-Maastricht single-party eurosceptic government in Southern Europe (1996–98).

Eurosceptic partners in coalition governments included, in Turkey, the Islamists(1996–97) and nationalists (1999–2002) and in Italy, the Lega Nord (2001–06 andpost-2008)8 and the ‘reconstructed communist’ RC (2006–08). The most striking

instance of communist government participation occurred in Cyprus, with cabinetparticipation in 2003–07 followed in 2008 by the election of the party’s leader as

President of the Republic, the country’s central political post. Thus, all three of the‘new’ SE states experienced eurosceptic parties in government post-Maastricht, as

opposed to only one of the four ‘old’ SE states. For the latter, Italy, this marked a rathermajor change, given this particular country’s pro-federalist past. In two ‘old’ SE states,

Spain and Portugal, eurosceptic parties have never participated in power.9

Eurosceptics in Power

In the two SE states that were non-EU members when eurosceptic parties took powerin the 1990s, the impact was once again on national relations with the EU. In Malta,

then a candidate for membership, the socialists suspended the accession application.As a result, Malta was initially excluded from the next round of membership

negotiations, until the socialists lost power and the application was reactivated two

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years later. In Turkey, then an accession applicant, the 1996–97 government, includingthe Islamists, whose favourite foreign policy project was the foundation of the D-8

group of Muslim nations, marked a new low point in Turkey–EU relations. Itcontributed to the Luxembourg decision, six months after the coalition’s fall, not to

recognise Turkey as an EU candidate. Within the government of 1999–2000, a periodwhen Turkey had been recognised as a candidate for EUmembership and was working

to meet the political criteria that would allow the opening of accession negotiations,the nationalists ‘frequently acted as a brake when it came to passing necessary reform

legislation’ (Avci 2004, p. 209), thus potentially slowing down the accession process.Eurosceptic government participation in two member states in the 2000s does not

seem to have had a constraining impact on the course of integration, in contrast to the

earlier experience with the Greek government of the 1980s. Of course, by this timethe potential for individual states to influence integration had been reduced by both

EU enlargement and European Treaty revisions. Meanwhile, in Italy, both LegaNord and Refondazione Comunista were contained within coalitions. While Lega Nord

representatives on occasion made incendiary eurosceptic statements, they did not pushgovernment policy in a eurosceptic direction. Cyprus’s size—it is the third smallest

member of the EU-27—reduces its potential for influence over the integration process. Ingovernment, the communists needed to retain support for the national priorities of theCyprus question and EU–Turkey relations. They hadnowish to risk this by alienating the

country’s EU partners over broader questions of integration.

Post-accession Decline

Of the two countries that entered the EU during this period, Malta constitutes a clear

case of party euroscepticism melting away after accession. The change in fact began alittle earlier, following the socialists’ defeats in the EU membership referendum and

national election the year before EU entry. After this, the socialist party, havingopposed accession for three decades, decided to accept the new situation (see Pace in

this issue). The extent to which the socialists reoriented their policy was indicated bytheir votes in favour of the European Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty and euro entry.

This turned Malta from a country that had always been polarised on the EC issue toone with an apparent consensus on the main choices related to integration. Indeed,Malta was the only South European country in which the last two amended European

Treaties have been ratified unanimously. In Cyprus, the decline in euroscepticism alsopre-dated accession—although, in this case, by almost a decade, dating back to the

communists’ 1995 decision to support accession, mentioned earlier. The change in EUpolicy was part of the Cypriot communists’ slow transformation from a party of

permanent opposition to potential government participant. It was also influenced bythe hope that EU membership would strengthen the Republic of Cyprus

internationally and provide a potential route to solution of the Cyprus problem.Meanwhile, by 2003, the Maltese socialists had been out of government for all but two

of the past 16 years and now needed an integration policy that would allow them to

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appear as a credible potential government in what was about to become an EUmember-state. Thus, in both cases, the policy change seems to have been linked to the

approach to power, as suggested by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000).

Popular Euroscepticism in Southern Europe

The main theme of this section will be the study of opinion polls, supplemented by a

discussion of referenda on integration. The examination of public opinion will bebased on the Eurobarometer (EB), conducted in the member states on a biannual basis

since 1973 and therefore providing a basis for diachronic and intra-countrycomparison. Usually, analyses drawing on EB data focus on the level of support for

European integration. In contrast, this presentation investigates the strength ofopposition. Two basic questions have been chosen as indices of euroscepticism.

In the first, asked since 1973, respondents are asked to rate their country’s EC/EU

membership as ‘a good thing’, ‘a bad thing’ or ‘neither good nor bad’. The three-pointscale, including the possibility of a non-committal answer, means that opting for the

answer ‘a bad thing’ can be interpreted as an unambiguous statement of opposition tomembership, thus expressing hard euroscepticism. The second question, asked since

1983, seeks an assessment of whether the country on balance has benefited frommembership (or will benefit in the case of candidate countries). Because this question

offers only two choices—‘benefited’ or ‘not benefited’—it requires respondents to takea clear-cut position either for or against (unless they opt for Don’t Know/Don’t

Answer, which consistently scores higher than for the first question). The answer‘not benefited’ thus captures a broader range of negative sentiment towards Europeanintegration, including individuals who might not go so far as taking an openly

negative stance against membership. It therefore embraces both hard and softeuroscepticism. The differences in the options offered produce an interesting

discrepancy between the answers to these two questions, with a significant proportionof respondents taking the apparently contradictory position of not describing

membership as ‘a bad thing’ even though they consider their country has notbenefited. From the first EB in 1973 to the 72nd survey in Autumn 2009, the number

of membership opponents in the member-states has ranged from seven to 17 per cent,while benefits sceptics have been considerably more, from 22 to 36 per cent.Nevertheless, both opposition to membership and scepticism regarding benefits have

always been minority positions within the ECnEU as a whole.Our examination of public opinion begins in the 1980s, the decade of EC enlargement

to Greece, Spain and Portugal, and is divided into three time periods. The first cut-offpoint is, of course, the agreement on theMaastricht Treaty inDecember 1991. The second

dividing line is the Fifth Enlargement in spring 2004, when the former four SouthEuropean member states became six. For these years, the Eurobarometer also includes

regular measurements for Turkey. During this third period, which coincides with thecrises over the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, the spectre of

euroscepticism loomed particularly large over European integration.

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Public Opinion pre-Maastricht

During the 1980s, in the EC as a whole, benefits sceptics ranged from one-quarter to

one-third of respondents while membership opponents, from a high point of 17 per

cent, were clearly on a downward trend, falling to single figures in the second half of

the decade. In Southern Europe in both categories, the average level of euroscepticism

was fairly consistently below the average for the EC as a whole in three of the four

states (as shown in Figures 1a and 1b). However, in both cases there was one SE outlier,

which not only diverged from the other SE countries, but was also generally above the

EC average—sometimes spectacularly so. What is intriguing is that this is not, as

might be expected, the same country for both questions.Greece, the SE member state with the highest electoral support for eurosceptic

parties during this period, also had the highest proportion of membership opponents

(see Figure 1a). Its results on this question followed the trend for the North European

countries of the first Enlargement, which had higher numbers of membership opponents

than the EC founder members. In particular, the Greek results were similar to those for

Ireland. In contrast, Spain and Portugal showed low levels of opposition to membership

similar to the original EC6. However, rather unexpectedly, it was Spain that had the

highest level of scepticism concerning benefits, where for several years the Spanish results

were as high as 25–30 percentage points above the EC average (see Figure 1b). It is rather

striking that, in a country where, as we have seen, the parliamentary elite had

unanimously favouredmembership, for the first three years after entry significantly more

than half the respondents had a negative evaluation of the benefits of membership. This

also meant that, in the Spanish case, there was an enormous divergence—sometimes as

high as 50 per cent of the Spanish sample—between benefits sceptics and membership

opponents.Investigating for the effects of membership on levels of euroscepticism is not possible

for Italy, which had already been a full ECmember for 15 years when the Eurobarometer

Figure 1a Membership Euroscepticism in Southern Europe, 1981-1991.

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polls were launched. In the 1980s, after over two decades of membership, Italy had

exceptionally low levels of both opposition to membership and scepticism regardingbenefits (although the latter could sometimes be up to four or five times as high as theformer). Of the three 1980s EC entrants, it is not really possible to discern an accession

impact in Spain and Portugal, because the overall level of opposition tomembership wasso low, remaining in single figures throughout the period. The only exception was a brief

‘pre-membership blip’ in Portugal in 1984–85, when opposition tomembership reacheda high point of 12 per cent (still just below the EC average at the time) before reverting to

single figures immediately after EC entry. In Greece, however, membership oppositionfell from 22 per cent immediately after EC entry to single figures from autumn 1988,

seven years later. Benefits scepticism registered a dramatic post-accession drop in allthree countries: in Greece, from one-third of respondents in 1983 to below 15% in spring1988; in Portugal, again from one-third of the sample in 1986 to single figures by 1991;

and in Spain—even more striking—from around two-thirds of respondents in 1986 toaround one-quarter six years later.

Public Opinion post-Maastricht

In the new EU launched at Maastricht, the levels of support for integration registered by

the Eurobarometer immediately began to drop. In 1996 a psychological barrier wasbreached, when those in the EU describing membership as ‘a good thing’ became a

minority for the first time since polling began in 1973. Throughout 1996–2003 thedeclared supporters of membership hovered around the crucial 50 per cent mark

(ranging from 46 to 53 per cent), while those who believed their country had benefitedfrommembership were a minority (below 50 per cent) in all but three surveys. However,

turning from support for integration to declared opposition, our two indices ofeuroscepticism showed only a limited rise. Moreover, comparing the pre- and post-

Maastricht figures suggests that actually it was the late 1980s, with their very low levels of

Figure 1b Benefits Euroscepticism in Southern Europe, 1983-1991.

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euroscepticism, that marked a deviation from the trend. To some extent, it might be

argued that the 1990s saw continuity with the period before the exceptional years at the

end of the previous decade, when integration had acquired a new momentum after the

1980s deepening and the Cold War appeared to be coming to an end.Essentially, the same picture applies to Southern Europe. As the figures show, levels

of euroscepticism in Southern Europe showed a moderate rise but generally to around

the levels of the early 1980s. Average levels of euroscepticism mostly remained below

the EU average. However, there were some significant variations among the SE

countries. Particularly for the earlier part of this period, there continued to be higher

levels of euroscepticism in Spain than in the other three countries. In contrast, Greece,

where opposition to membership had been high in the early 1980s, now had singularly

low levels of euroscepticism.In three of our four countries, in the 23 EB surveys conducted during this period,

opposition to membership remained in single figures in two-thirds of the surveys in

Portugal (where the highest level of euroscepticism was 12 per cent), all but three in

the case of Greece (with a maximum level of 14 per cent), and all but two in Italy (with

a high point of 13 per cent). However, in Spain, where opposition to membership had

previously been low, it jumped to double figures immediately after Maastricht and

stayed there for all but one of the next ten surveys, with a high point of 18 per cent. It is

thus the Spanish and. to some extent, the Portuguese cases that explain the brief point

in the early 1990s, shown in Figure 2a, when membership opposition in SE was higher

than the EU average.

Benefits scepticism remained considerably above the EU average in Spain until 1996

(see Figure 2b), when it dropped below the EU average to converge with the rest of

Southern Europe. At the same time, benefits euroscepticism was rising in Italy. While

Italian benefits sceptics had never exceeded 20 per cent of the sample in the 1980s, they

did so fairly consistently throughout 1992–2003. This still left Italy significantly below

the EU average, apart from at the very end of this period. (The Italian case explains the

sudden convergence of the EU and SE averages after 2002.) This rise in Italian benefits

scepticism did not translate into increased opposition to membership: throughout this

Figure 2a Membership Euroscepticism: Southern Europe and the EU 1992-2004.

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period, Italian membership opponents remained consistently around half the EUaverage. What it suggests, therefore, is a rise in soft euroscepticism whose emergence

parallels the first appearance of euroscepticism among Italian parliamentary elites.

Public Opinion post-Enlargement

In the enlarged EU of 25/27 following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, membership

supporters and those believing their country had benefited from membership wereconsistently a majority, although membership support did not approach the levels

of the late 1980s. Both euroscepticism indicators remained around the levels of theprevious period, with membership opponents in the EU never exceeding one-sixth

of the total and benefits sceptics around one-third. In Southern Europe, followingenlargement to Cyprus and Malta in 2004 and the opening of Turkey’s accessionnegotiations the following year, a differentiation appeared between the ‘old’ and ‘new’

countries.In the four existing member-states, the average number of membership opponents

was consistently below the EU average, although the gap tended to be closer than in thepast (see Figure 3a). Among the ‘old’ SE-4, however, the number of Italian membership

opponents, insignificant in the past, had more than doubled in comparison with thepreceding period, to reach the EU average. A similar picture applies to scepticism

concerning benefits: Greece, Portugal and Spain all remained consistently below the EUaverage (except for one survey in the case of Greece). In Italy, however, the level of

benefits scepticism was now slightly above the EU average. It would seem that public

Figure 2b Benefits Euroscepticism: Southern Europe and EU 1992-2004.

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opinion in the largest SE member state, once regarded as particularly resistant to

euroscepticism, was now more closely aligned with the EU average than with the other

‘old’ SE countries.In the ‘new’ Southern Europe, the average level of opposition to membership was

six to 10 percentage points higher than the average for the ‘old’ SE-4, and four to five

percentage points higher than the EU average (see Figure 3a). Cyprus had a strikingly

high proportion of benefits sceptics, who, for the first three years after accession,

numbered around 50 per cent. This differentiation may well be linked to the fact that

in Cyprus accession had been promoted as a route to the solution of the Cyprus

problem—which, however, failed to happen. In contrast, benefits scepticism in Malta

and Turkey was slightly below the EU average and slightly above the average for the

‘old’ SE-4 .

In Malta, membership opponents in the early post-accession years were less than 20

per cent—considerably less than half the proportion of the electorate who voted

against EU entry in the 2003 referendum. This was also several percentage points

below Greece, our other case of a country divided over accession, at a similar point in

its integration history. Malta also seems to have registered a mild downward trend in

Figure 3a Membership Euroscepticism : “Old” and “New” Southern Europe, 2004-2009.

Figure 3b Benefits Euroscepticism in ‘Old’ Southern Europe, 2004-2009

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popular euroscepticism post-accession, which, however, was reversed in 2008 and does

not seem to apply to Cyprus. In any case, the few years since EU entry may be too shorta period to decide whether there has been a ‘membership effect’ reducing opposition

to integration in these two countries. In Turkey, there was a significant increase ineuroscepticism in the spring 2006 survey, the first after the official opening of

membership negotiations. Although levels of euroscepticism subsequently showedsome fluctuations, they did not drop back to the levels of 2004–05, confirming theexpectation that the demanding accession process is likely to nourish euroscepticism

in candidate countries.

Referenda

In Southern Europe there has been minimal popular consultation on issues ofEuropean integration. In all, three referenda have been held, all resulting in clear

defeats for euroscepticism. Of the 14 EU member-states to have held membershipreferenda, the sole SE example was Malta. (Meanwhile, Cyprus was the only one of the

ten 2004 entrants not to consult its people.) The Maltese referendum of March 2003and its sequel—the following month’s general election, which to a considerable extent

functioned as a second vote on the EU—marked a national turning point (see Pace inthis issue). As was to be expected, given the Maltese party duopoly in which one party

was pro-integrationist and the other eurosceptic, the referendum campaign was highlypolarised. The result was a 46.4 per cent ‘yes’ vote on a 91 per cent turnout, the onlyone of the nine EU entry referenda that took place in 2003 in which less than

two-thirds of votes were cast in favour. Because the official opposition did not acceptthe outcome, a general election was called, with the socialists promising that in the

event of victory they would hold a new referendum to choose between EUmembership and ‘partnership’. Following the six per cent lead of the ‘yes’ side in the

referendum, the socialists’ election defeat by a four per cent margin—a landslide byMaltese standards (Fenech 2003)—definitively closed the decades-long debate on

whether the country should participate in the EC/EU. This was thus the only one ofthe three South European referenda that had a significant impact, determining the

contested question of Maltese participation in integration.

Figure 3c Benefits Euroscepticism: ‘New’ Southern Europe and EU 2004-2009.

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Of the 15 referenda held by member-states to decide on European Treatyratification, again only one took place in Southern Europe. The Spanish European

Constitutional Treaty referendum in 2005 produced a vote of 76 per cent in favour, 17per cent against and six per cent blank/invalid ballots. Although this sounds like an

overwhelming vote of confidence, participation was only 42.3 per cent—‘the lowestturnout figure of any of the 22 electoral consultations in recent democratic history’

(Torreblanca 2005, p. 2)—meaning that less than one-third of the electorate actuallyvoted in favour. While the openly eurosceptic vote, i.e. those voting against the Treaty,

thus amounted to only seven per cent of the total electorate, the real winner seems tohave been ’Euro-indifference‘, i.e. the non-voters, with 57.7 per cent. Following in thewake of the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes, this referendum had no consequences either

for the Constitutional Treaty, which was dropped and subsequently replaced by the lessambitious Lisbon Treaty, or for integration more generally.

In Portugal, a planned Constitutional Treaty referendum was cancelled after theFrench and Dutch voted against and the idea of a Lisbon Treaty vote was dropped

following pressure from other EUmembers (The Times 2008). As a result, four of ourSouth European countries—Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and Turkey—have never held a

referendum on European integration. This is not particularly surprising in the case ofnon-member Turkey, or of Greece, where there has been no tradition of referendasince 1974. Perhaps more surprising is that Italy, a country that has made systematic

use of referenda, holding 19 since 1974 on topics ranging from constitutional reformto artificial insemination or hunting, has only once consulted its people on European

integration. This was the consultative vote on conferring a treaty-drafting mandate onthe European Parliament, already mentioned. The referendum took place in 1979,

simultaneously with the first direct elections to the EP, and resulted in an 88 per centvote in favour (Preda 1991). This had no practical result as the Italian initiative found

no response in the rest of the European Community. However, that what appeared tomany non-Italians as a rather radical pro-federalist project was opposed by less than

12 per cent of those voting suggests that at this point euroscepticism had very littleappeal to Italian public opinion.

Conclusions: Towards a New ‘Constraining Dissensus’ in Southern Europe?

Our diachronic study reveals that euroscepticism in Southern Europe has been less

marginal than expected. In terms of electoral strength and government participation,in specific periods in several of our countries it has sometimes appeared mainstream.

This suggests that the view of Southern Europe as a region of traditional pro-integrationist consensus needs to be somewhat nuanced in light of the evidence. This

view refers largely to a period in the second half of the 1980s—a period when bothparty and popular euroscepticism reached their nadir but which constituted an

exception rather than the rule.In fact, the crucial choice of accession encountered substantive party euroscepti-

cism, not only in the ‘new’ SE but also in two of the four ‘old’ SE states. In terms of

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public opinion, hard euroscepticism measured by opposition to membership waslimited, reaching its highpoint with over one-fifth of Greeks in the early post-accession

years. However, the soft variety expressed by benefits scepticism has attracted support

from significant numbers of South Europeans at different times—most spectacularlyfrom around two-thirds of Spaniards in the mid-1980s, over one-third of Italians in

the 2000s, and 40–50 per cent of Cypriots post-accession. Meanwhile, of our sevencountries, there are only two—Spain and Portugal—where eurosceptic parties have

not participated in power. In considering whether Southern Europe is moving towardsa new ‘constraining dissensus’, it should thus be recognised that the idea of a South

European historical consensus around European integration may be closer to myth

than reality.Turning to our working hypotheses, the ‘system-transforming’ nature of Maastricht

is confirmed with regard to party euroscepticism. Pre-Maastricht party euroscepticismin Southern Europe, except in the rather exceptional case of Turkey, was of the hard

variety and limited to the left. By the eve of Maastricht, it had essentially shrunk to justthree parties: the Maltese socialists and Portuguese and Greek communists, with the

Greek party softening its stance. Post-Maastricht party euroscepticism became lessintense but also less marginal, largely mutating into a softer version but spreading

across the political spectrum. While now encompassing a broad range of ideological

positions, it generally remained confined to the flanks of the party system, outside thecentral core represented by the centre-left and centre-right. Contrary to what might be

expected, however, this new eurosceptic pluralism was not reflected in significantlyincreased electoral strength. In ‘new’ SE, eurosceptic parties continued to gain the

same kind of vote share as in the past, while in the ‘old’ SE there were no longerindividual eurosceptic parties of any significant size.

In the case of public opinion, the picture is somewhat complicated by nationaleurosceptic surges at different times. In the 1980s, hard euroscepticism was

pronounced in Greece and the soft variety in Spain. In the late 1990s, as soft

euroscepticism declined in Spain it began to rise in Italy. The latter emerged in the2000s as the country with the highest levels of soft euroscepticism and therefore one to

watch for the future. However, with regard to the overall picture in SE, Maastricht doesnot appear to have been ‘system-transforming’ in terms of changing the picture of

popular euroscepticism, suggesting that national variations may have more to do withnational conditions than with the deepening of integration per se. As elsewhere,

enlargement has led to the introduction of new eurosceptic publics, but in the case of SE

its impact is likely to be very limited. This is because the two newmembers, Cyprus andMalta, are bothmicro-states, representing a tiny proportion of the total EUpopulation.

Turning to our second hypothesis, there does indeed seem to be evidence for an‘accession effect’. Of our six EU member-states, party euroscepticism declined rapidly

and dramatically in Greece and Malta and over a longer period of a decade and a half inItaly. In Cyprus, the main eurosceptic party made a pre-emptive strike, softening its

euroscepticism before EU entry, while in Spain and Portugal, where party euroscepticismwas either non-existent or very limited, there was little scope for reduction. Popular

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euroscepticism fell after a few years of membership in Greece, Spain and Portugal, whileit is probably still too early to tell with regard to Cyprus and Malta. Italy remains an

unknown, due to the absence of pre-accession data. If the pattern in Southern Europe isrepeated elsewhere, then it would that suggest average levels of euroscepticismwithin the

EUmight increase after each enlargement, due to the presence of newmembers, but thenfall a few years later as they ‘acclimatise’ to EU membership. The likelihood of an

‘accession effect’ should therefore be borne in mind when assessing the ‘constrainingdissensus’ within the EU as a whole.

To date, euroscepticism remains, as it always has been, relatively marginal in SouthEuropean public opinion, with hard euroscepticism representing a small group, while

party euroscepticism is nowusually soft and expressed by opposition parties. Even if bothparty and popular euroscepticism were to become stronger than at present, they would

impact on European integration only if they succeeded in influencing government.In terms of eurosceptics in power, Southern Europe’s major contribution to a

‘constraining dissensus’ occurred with the Greek socialist administration of the early1980s. This sole example of a single-party hard eurosceptic government in an SEmember-

state seems unlikely to be repeated, while in the case of a coalition cabinet, a euroscepticparticipant is likely to be constrained by the other members. A new ‘constraining

dissensus’ in Southern Europe is therefore not currently visible and its emergence doesnot seem very likely on the basis of the trends discussed in this article. Nevertheless,

Southern Europe is now at the heart of the European economic crisis and, as mentionedabove, this has opened a new era in terms of the regions relationship with the EU. It

remains to be seen how this will impact on South European euroscepticism in the future.

Acknowledgements

This collective volume began life as a panel convened by the author at the conference of the ECPRStanding Group on European Union Politics at Istanbul Bilgi University in 2006. The author wouldlike to thank Gary Marks for kindly chairing the panel and Liesbet Hooghe and Anne Faber for theiruseful comments.

A substantial part of this paper was written during an all-too-brief stay as a Visiting Fellow at theHellenic Observatory, London School of Economics. The author would like to thank the HO andparticularly its Director, Kevin Featherstone, for offering her the necessary time and space tocomplete this project.

Notes

[1] Although, for example, the collection edited by Hooghe & Marks (2007b) investigates the linksbetween the two.

[2] Possible exceptions—such as the Italian socialists’ initial opposition to the European MonetarySystem in the 1970s, mentioned by Quaglia in this issue—seem to have been short-lived and didnot translate into constraining votes at crucial moments.

[3] The far left (TIP), which gained 14 parliamentary seats in 1965, reduced to two in 1969, wasdissolved by the regime in 1971. Although subsequently re-founded, it did not re-enterparliament.

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[4] The Greek socialists were returned to power in 1985, but by their second term had moved away

from euroscepticism.

[5] On the problems in the functioning of the Association, see Arikan, 2006, chapter 3, including p.

68 on the Turkish governments’ demands.

[6] The main ‘eurosceptic’ stand of the second Berlusconi government (2001–06) was the European

arrest warrant—but this seemed motivated more by concern with the Prime Minister’s own

judicial adventures than by euroscepticism.

[7] They are, however, included in the Italian case study by Quaglia in this issue.

[8] The Lega also participated in an earlier coalition government in 1994–95, but at this point was

not a eurosceptic party.

[9] In Portugal, although the CDS/PP has been a coalition government participant (in 1980–83 and

2002–05), its periods in power did not coincide with its short-lived soft eurosceptic shift in the

early 1990s.

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Susannah Verney is Assistant Professor in European Integration at the University of

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