Evaluation of the City's Electronic Monitoring Program Part 2: OPSO's Implementation and Supervision

Office of Inspector General

City of New Orleans

Evaluation of the Electronic Monitoring Program

Part 2: Implementation and Supervision

E. R. Quatrevaux Inspector General

Final Report December 3, 2014

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OfficeofInspectorGeneral EMPPart2:ImplementationandSupervisionCityofNewOrleans PageiFinalReport December3,2014

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS ED QUATREVAUX INSPECTOR GENERAL December3,2014Re: ElectronicMonitoringProgramPart2:ImplementationandSupervisionIcertify that the inspectorgeneralpersonnelassigned to thisprojectare freeofpersonalorotherexternalimpairmentstoindependence.

E.R.QuatrevauxInspectorGeneral

OfficeofInspectorGeneral EMPPart2:ImplementationandSupervisionCityofNewOrleans PageiiFinalReport December3,2014

Electronic Monitoring Program Part 2: Implementation and Supervision

STATEMENTOFINDEPENDENCE....................................................................................................iEXECUTIVESUMMARY...............................................................................................................v

I. OBJECTIVES,SCOPE,ANDMETHODS...........................................................................................1

II. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................3

III. IMPLEMENTATIONANDSUPERVISIONOFOPSOSELECTRONICMONITORINGPROGRAM.....................5

Finding1. EMP DEFENDANT RECORDS WERE INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE: FILESFREQUENTLYLACKEDONEORMOREDOCUMENTS,INCLUDINGCOURTORDERSANDVIOLATIONS REPORTS, AND 79 PERCENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORINGAGREEMENTS CONTAINED ERRORS OR OMISSIONS, INCLUDING INCORRECT OROMITTEDRESTRICTIONS........................................................................................6

Recommendation1. EMP SUPERVISORS SHOULD CAREFULLY REVIEW EMP RECORDSCOMPLETEDBYSTAFFASSIGNEDTOMONITORPARTICIPANTSANDHOLDMONITORING STAFF ACCOUNTABLE FORMAINTAINING ACCURATE ANDCOMPLETEAGREEMENTSANDFILES........................................................11

Finding2. MONITORING DEPUTIES ENTERED EXCLUSION ZONES IN THE OMNILINKMONITORING SYSTEM FOR ONLY TWO OF THE 37 DEFENDANTS WITH JUDICIALSTAYAWAYORDERS.......................................................................................12

Recommendation 2. EMP STAFF SHOULD ENTER PROHIBITED ADDRESSES PURSUANT TOJUDICIAL STAY AWAY ORDERS AS EXCLUSION ZONES IN THEELECTRONICMONITORINGSYSTEM..........................................................13

IV. ALERTSANDDOCUMENTINGDEPUTYACTIONS...........................................................................14Finding3. OPSO PROTOCOLS FOR RESPONDING TO ALERTS WERE NEITHER DETAILED NOR

COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE INSTRUCTION FORMONITORINGDEPUTIES......................................................................................14

Recommendation3. THECITYANDTHEEMPCONTRACTORSHOULD INCLUDE INTHECEAAND THE EMP STATEMENT OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SPECIFICINFORMATIONABOUT THEACTIONSMONITORING STAFF SHOULD TAKEIN RESPONSE TO ALERTS, INCLUDING TIME THRESHOLDS FORGRADUATED RESPONSES; THE EMP SUPERVISOR SHOULD PROVIDESUFFICIENTOVERSIGHTTOENSUREEMPPERSONNELCOMPLYWITHTHEPOLICY...............................................................................................15

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Finding4. MORE THAN HALF OF THE INCLUSION ZONE ALERTS REMAINED ACTIVE FORLONGERTHAN30MINUTES,ANDEVALUATORSCOULDNOTDETERMINEWHAT, IFANY,ACTIONMONITORINGDEPUTIESTOOKINRESPONSE...........................................17

Recommendation4. MONITORING STAFF SHOULD DETAIN DEFENDANTS WHO VIOLATECURFEWORHOUSEARRESTORDERSASSOONASVALIDINCLUSIONZONEALERTS ARE CONFIRMED; INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT SHOULD BECODIFIEDINTHEEMPSTATEMENTOFPOLICIESANDPROCEDURES.................20

Finding5. MONITORING DEPUTIES TAGGED ONLY 2 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ALERTSGENERATEDINAPRIL2012.................................................................................20

Recommendation5. MONITORINGSTAFFSHOULDTAGALLALERTSANDDOCUMENTACTIONSTAKENINRESPONSETOVERIFIEDALERTS..................................................24

V. EMPPERFORMANCEMEASURES.............................................................................................26

Finding6. THECITYDIDNOTESTABLISHPROGRAMOBJECTIVESORPERFORMANCEMEASURESTO ASSESS OPSOS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMP AND THE OVERALLEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM, AND DATAOPSO PROVIDED THE CITY HADLITTLEUSEFULINFORMATIONFORMEASURINGPROGRAMPERFORMANCE.....................28

Recommendation6. THEEMPCONTRACTORANDTHECITYSHOULDDEVELOPMEANINGFULPERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR JUDGES, CITY ADMINISTRATORS, ANDTHECITYCOUNCILTOEVALUATETHEEMP...............................................29

VI. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................32

VII. APPENDICES..........................................................................................................................34APPENDIXA:TYPESOFRESTRICTIONSORDEREDBYJUDGES....................................................34APPENDIXB:ALERTTYPESANDPROTOCOLSFORRESPONSE...................................................36APPENDIXC:GLOSSARYOFTERMS.....................................................................................37APPENDIXD:METHODS.............................................................................................39

VIII. OFFICIALCOMMENTSFROMOPSOANDTHECITYOFNEWORLEANS............................................42

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ListofFiguresFigure1. DEFENDANTPROFILE INFORMATIONWITHSTARTDATE,ANDMISSINGENDANDEOS (ENDOF

SERVICE)DATES...........................................................................................................8Figure2. EXAMPLEOFOMNILINKINCLUSIONZONE.......................................................................17Figure3. EMPALERTSLASTING30MINUTESORLONGER(APRIL2012SEPTEMBER2012)...............18Figure4. EXAMPLEOFOMNILINKMONITORINGSYSTEMDASHBOARDSHOWINGENROLLEDPARTICIPANTS,

BATTERYLIFE,ANDALERTS..........................................................................................21Figure5. EXAMPLEOFOMNILINKMONITORINGSYSTEMDEPICTIONOFALERTSWITHTAGS..................22Figure6. EMPALERTSANDTAGS(APRIL2012ANDAPRIL2013)..................................................24Figure7. JUVENILECOURT2012QUARTERLYREPORTSUMMARY....................................................26Figure8. CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT WEEKLY REPORT, SUMMARY OF ENROLLED ADULT DEFENDANTS

STATUS,JULY2012THROUGHOCTOBER2012...............................................................27NOTE:THEOIGHASADDEDINTERACTIVITYTOTHISPDF.CLICKONMAROONBOLDEDWORDSTOPULLUPADDITIONALINFORMATIONINAPPENDICESANDDEFINITIONSOFTERMSFROMTHEGLOSSARY.TORETURNTOTHEORIGINALPAGEINTHETEXT,CLICKRETURNTOTEXT.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TheOfficeofInspectorGeneraloftheCityofNewOrleans(OIG)conductedanevaluationoftheCitysElectronicMonitoringProgram(EMP)administeredbytheOrleansParishSheriffsOffice(OPSO).1 The objectives of the evaluation were to examine EMP operations, review theprogramsprotocols,assesshowthemonitoringdeputiesrespondedtoalerts,anddeterminewhether adequate performance measures were in place to gauge the effectiveness of theprogram.TheEMPallowsdefendantswhomightotherwisebedetainedavoiddetentionwhileawaitingtrial by agreeing to wear a monitoring device (i.e. ankle bracelet) that uses trackingtechnology to locate andmonitor theirmovements. Stakeholders interviewed by evaluators(e.g., judges,Cityofficials,OPSO)supported theuseofelectronicmonitoring inNewOrleansbecause itprevents thesignificant financialcostofdetentionwhileallowingselectedpretrialdefendantstocontinuetowork,attendschool,andotherwiseavoidnegativeconsequencesofbeing detained in a correctional facility. Despite this widespread support, evaluators foundsignificantweaknesses inprogramoperationsanda lackofclearlydefinedresponsibilitiesandexpectationsamongtheOPSO,theCity,andjudges.Evaluatorsreviewedatotalof359filesforall281juvenileandadultprogramparticipantsfromApril1,2012throughSeptember30,2012.2,3Thisreportincludesthefollowingmajorfindings:

x EMPrecordsmaintainedbyOPSOwereinaccurateandincomplete;x OPSOdidnotenterexclusion zone restrictions in themonitoring system for35of37

defendantswithcourtorderedstayawayzones;

1ApreviousOIGreportfoundthatneithertheCitynorOPSOimplementedeffectivefinancialcontrolsorensuredtheprograms fiscalaccountability.SeeCityofNewOrleansOfficeof InspectorGeneral,Evaluationof theCitysElectronicMonitoringProgramAdministeredbytheOrleansParishSheriffsOffice,PartI:BudgetandBilling(NewOrleans: Office of Inspector General, 2014), accessed November 26, 2014, http://www.nolaoig.org/uploads/File/I&E/Inspections/OIG%20EMP%20Pt%201%20Final%20Report%20140402.pdf.2Therewerea totalof281defendantsenrolled in theEMPduring thesampleperiod.However,someof theseindividualswereenrolledinEMPmultipletimesduringthesampleperiod.Thesedefendantshadmultiplefilesthatevaluatorsrecordedasseparateentriesduringdatacollection.Forthepurposesofthisreport,EMPparticipantsarereferredtoasdefendantsbecausetheywereundercourtsupervision.3Evaluatorsconducted interviewswithEMPpersonnel in2013andcomparedApril2012alertdatatoApril2013alertdatatodetermine ifchangeshadbeenmadeasaresultoftheNIJassessmentoftheEMPprogram in late2012.

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x EMP protocols for responding to alerts were not specific enough to provide clearinstructiontomonitoringdeputies;

x Morethanhalfofthe inclusionzonealertsremainedactive formorethan30minutesandmeasurestakentorespondtothesealertswereundocumented;

x MonitoringdeputiesonlytaggedtwopercentofthetotalalertsgeneratedinApril2012;and

x TheCitydidnotestablishprogramobjectives,minimumexpectations,orperformancemeasurestoassesstheprogramsoveralleffectivenessormonitorOPSOsperformance.

Based on these findings, the OIG makes the following recommendations related to EMPimplementationandsupervisionpractices:

x EMPsupervisorsshouldcarefullyreviewandmaintainallrecordstoensureaccuracy;x EMPstaffshouldenterallcourtorderedstayawayordersintothemonitoringsystem;x TheCityandtheEMPcontractorshouldincorporatespecificinformationrelatedtotime

thresholdsandgraduatedresponsesintothecooperativeendeavoragreementbetweenthetwoentities,andtheEMPmonitoringsupervisorshouldprovideoversighttoensuremonitoringstaffareincompliance;

x Monitoring staff should relocate toadefendants locationas soonas theydeterminethataviolationofcurfeworterritorialrestrictionhasoccurred;

x Monitoringstaffshoulddocumentallactionstakeninresponsetoalerts;andx TheEMPcontractorandtheCityshoulddevelopmeaningfulperformancemeasuresto

assesstheeffectivenessoftheprogram.

OPSOhasstatedthatitplanstodiscontinueitsadministrationoftheEMPbeginninginJanuary2015.TheCityhasexpressedan interest incontinuingtheuseofelectronicmonitoringasanalternative todetention forselectedpretrialdefendants.TheOIG recommends that theCityconsiderthe findingscontained in thisreportand incorporatetherecommendations intoanyfutureelectronicmonitoringinitiatives.

NOTE:THEOIGHASADDEDINTERACTIVITYTOTHISPDF.CLICKONMAROONBOLDEDWORDSTOPULLUPADDITIONALINFORMATIONINAPPENDICESANDDEFINITIONSOFTERMSFROMTHEGLOSSARY.TORETURNTOTHEORIGINALPAGEINTHETEXT,CLICKRETURNTOTEXT.

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I. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODS4TheOfficeofInspectorGeneraloftheCityofNewOrleans(OIG)conductedanevaluationoftheCitysElectronicMonitoringProgram(EMP)administeredbytheOrleansParishSheriffsOffice(OPSO).TheDeputyMayorforPublicSafetyoversawtheEMPonbehalfoftheCity.Hewasthepointofcontact for theCooperativeEndeavorAgreement (CEA)between theCityandOPSO,receivedOPSOinvoices,authorizedpayment,andmetadditionaladministrativeobligationsontheCitysbehalf.5Theobjectivesofthisevaluationwereto identifythegoalsoftheprogram,reviewtheEMPsannualbudgetallocationandexpenses,assessitsperformancemeasures,andexamineOPSOsadministration and implementation of the EMP. Part 1 of this report focused on the EMPbudgetandbillingpractices;6Part2examinesEMPoperations,OPSOssupervisionofprogramparticipants,andthemeasuresusedtoevaluatetheprogramseffectiveness.Evaluators reviewed a totalof359 files for all281 activeprogramparticipants fromApril1,2012throughSeptember30,2012andrecordedrelevantinformationinseparatespreadsheetsfor juveniles and adults.7 Evaluators interviewed OPSO personnel, City officials, andCouncilmembers and submittedquestions inwriting to judges from Juvenile,Municipal, andCriminalDistrictcourts.Evaluatorsalsoreviewedthefollowing:

x Relevantdocumentssuchas theCooperativeEndeavorAgreement (CEA)between theCity of New Orleans and OPSO, EMP intake forms, reports of violations, and otherdocumentsincludedindefendantfiles;

x Reports generated fromOmnilinks database, thewebbasedmonitoring service thatprovidedcasemanagementforOPSOselectronicmonitoringprogram;and

x OPSOsonlineDocketMaster system regardingadultdefendants inCriminalDistrictCourt.Evaluators reviewed courtminutes todeterminewhetherdefendants failed toappear for court hearings or were subsequently arrested on new charges while

4AmoredetailedexplanationofmethodsisavailableinAppendixD:Methods.5Evaluatorsuse EMP to refer to theNewOrleanselectronicmonitoringprogram administeredby theOrleansParishSheriffsOffice;EMreferstothepracticeofelectronicmonitoring.6 OIG, EMP, Part 1: Budget and Billing. http://www.nolaoig.org/uploads/File/I&E/Inspections/OIG%20EMP%20Pt%201%20Final%20Report%20140402.pdf7Evaluators revieweddocuments fromhardcopy filesEMPmonitoringdeputiesmaintained in theEMPoffice.Some individuals were enrolled in EMP multiple times, and each enrollment resulted in a separate file thatevaluatorsrecordedasaseparateprogramentry.Forpurposesofthisreport,EMPparticipantsarereferredtoasdefendantsbecausetheywereundercourtsupervision.


participating in the EMP. Evaluators also compared start and end dates for courtorderedmonitoringtoinvoicesanddatacollectedfromfiles.8

This evaluation was performed in accordance with Principles and Standards for Offices ofInspector General for Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews and includes findings andrecommendationsrelatingtotheefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheOPSOsmanagementandimplementation of the Electronic Monitoring Program paid for by the City of New Orleans(City).9OIGevaluatorswereassistedinthepreparationofthisreportwiththecooperationofCityandOPSOemployeesandofficials,aswellasCriminalDistrictCourtandJuvenileCourt judgesandstaff.

8LouisianaCodeofCriminalProcedureArticle334setsoutcriteriaforcourtstoconsiderwhendeterminingtheappropriateamountofbailtobesettoensurethereturnofadefendanttocourtandthesafetyofthedefendantand community. These factors are: (1) the seriousness of the charges, (2) theweight of the evidence, (3) thedefendantscriminalrecord,(4)thedefendantsabilitytopaybail,(5)thenatureandseriousnessofthepossibledanger posed by the defendants release, (6) voluntary participation in pretrial drug testing, (7) absence orpresenceofcontrolleddangeroussubstancesatthetimeofarrest,(8)whetherthedefendantiscurrentlybondedoutforafelonyarrest,(9)circumstancesthatmayaffectthedefendantsreturntocourt,and(10)thetypeorformofbail.ThisevaluationdidnotexaminewhetherjudgeswereusingthesefactorstodetermineappropriatenessoftheEMPasaformofbail.9 Quality Standards for Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews byOffices of InspectorGeneral, Principles andStandardsforOfficesofInspectorGeneral(AssociationofInspectorsGeneral,2004).


II. INTRODUCTION ElectronicMonitoring(EM)istheuseofelectronicmonitoringequipmenttotrackdefendantslocations and assess their compliance with courtordered geographic restrictions, includingcourtordered curfews. Many states have authorized electronic monitoring programs as anacceptedalternativetotraditionaldetentioninstateorlocalcorrectionalfacilities.10Electronicsupervision of defendantsmovements provides jurisdictionswith an alternative to the highcost of custodial care when administered efficiently and effectively.11 Electronic monitoringprogramsmayalsoallowdefendantstocontinuetowork,attendschool,andotherwiseavoidthenegativeeffectsofbeingdetainedinacorrectionalfacility.ElectronicmonitoringhasbeenanalternativetopretrialdetentioninNewOrleanssinceatleast2004. In2010OPSOentered intoaCooperativeEndeavorAgreement (CEA)with theCity toprovide EM services.12OPSO contractedwithOmnilink Systems, Inc. (Omnilink) toprovideleased equipment (monitoring devices) and webbased monitoring technology (electronicmonitoringsystem).MonitoringdevicesoranklebraceletsuseaGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS) as well as cellular tracking to locate and monitor the movements of defendants.Omnilinkscasemanagementsystemincludedmonitoringservicesandtechnicalsupport.The monitoring services included sending alerts twentyfour hours per day, seven days perweek.Generally, thedevices recordeddefendants locationsevery60 seconds,andevery15minutesthemonitoringservicereportedtheirlocationstomonitoringdeputiesviacomputerormobiledevice.13Thesystemalsohadtheabilitytoreportlocationdatainrealtime.Monitoringdeputies received anelectronicnotificationor alertwhen adefendant tamperedwith thedevice, failed toproperly charge thedevice, left the courtordered restricted area (inclusion

10Over40statesandWashington,D.C.haveadoptedlawstoregulatetheuseofelectronicmonitoring. 11InNewOrleans,pretrialdefendantsareunderthesupervisionofOPSOandarehousedinthejailunlessreleasedonbondorenrolledintheEMP.Theperdiem(chargeperinmateperday)forcustodialcareintheNewOrleansjail was $22.39, established by the Settlement Judgment, Hamilton v. Morial, March 26, 2003. The cost ofincarcerationalsoincludedothercosts,suchasmedicalcosts,thatmorethandoubledtheactualperinmateperdaycost.ForanexaminationoftheperpersondailyrateofincarcerationinNewOrleans,seeNewOrleansOfficeofInspectorGeneral,InspectionofTaxpayer/CityFundingtoOrleansParishSheriffsOfficein2011(NewOrleans:OfficeofInspectorGeneral,2013).http://www.nolaoig.org/uploads/File/All/OIG_Final_Report_Inspection_of_TaxpayerCity_Funding_to_OPSO_2011_130606.pdfTheEMP fee for juveniledefendantswas$14.75perdayand$13.25perdayforadultdefendants.12OPSOandtheCitysignedsubsequentCEAsin2011,2012,and2013.Thescopeofthisevaluationwaslimitedtothe2011and2012CEAs.13 Deputies could change the frequency with which the device reports its locations. Collectively, three OPSOdeputiesandoneNOPDofficerwillbereferredtoasmonitoringdeputies.AnNOPDofficerwasassignedtoEMPbutmaintainedanoffice intheJuvenileCourtbuildingandonlyreportedtotheEMPofficeasneededtoobtainequipment.


zone),orenteredanexclusionzone(anareathecourtorderedthedefendantnottoenterasacondition of his participation in the EMP).Monitoring deputies also received an alert if thedevicewasunabletocommunicatewiththemonitoringsystem.


III. IMPLEMENTATIONOFOPSOSELECTRONICMONITORINGPROGRAMJudgesdeterminedwhetheradefendantwasanappropriatecandidate for theEMP,and theOPSOsEMPPolicyandProceduregovernedtheprogramsintake,administrative,andremovalprocedures. Judges who assigned defendants to the EMP consistently cited the followingprogram objectives: promoting public safety, realizing cost savings, and ensuring thedefendants return to court.14 All judges who responded to evaluators questions saw theprogram as a positive alternative to detaining defendants awaiting disposition of pendingcharges. Evaluators revieweda totalof359 files fromApril1,2012 throughSeptember30,2012andfoundthatJuvenileandCriminalDistrictCourtsusedtheEMPmostfrequently.15ThepresidingjudgesassigneddefendantstotheEMPandissuedordersthatoutlinedrestrictionsontheEMPparticipantsmovements.16Thepresiding judgewas theonly individualauthorized tomodifythetermsofthoserequirements.OPSOs EMPPolicy andProcedureoutlinedmonitoringdeputies responsibilities,proceduresfor enrolling defendants in the program, andprotocols for how deputies should respond toalerts. Monitoring deputies were responsible for maintaining defendants file folders,monitoringdefendants compliancewith courtorders,and reportingviolations to judges.Onaverage, two deputies monitored between 25 and 30 defendants per day, a third deputyaveraged17defendantsdaily,andtheNOPDOfficerassignedtoJuvenileCourtmonitoredanaverageofeightdefendantsperday.AdultandsomejuveniledefendantswenttotheEMPofficelocatedinOPSOsIntakeProcessingCenter to enroll in the EMP pursuant to a judges order. Upon enrollment, the defendantreceived a monitor and instructions on participating in the program.17 EMP Policy andProcedurerequiredthemonitoringdeputyandthedefendanttosigntheElectronicMonitoringAgreement(Agreement),acontractualdocumentthatinformedthedefendantofanycourt

14JuvenileCourtjudgesrespondedtoevaluatorquestionsenbanc,threeCriminalDistrictCourtjudgesrespondedviaemail,telephone,orinperson;MunicipalCourtdidnotrespond.15MunicipalCourtassignedonlyninedefendants to theEMPduring the sixmonth reviewperiod;TrafficCourtassignednone.16Restrictionsincludedcurfews,stayawayorders,housearrestatalltimes,andanyothergeographicrestrictionsthatcouldbetrackedbytheelectronicmonitoringsystem.17JuveniledefendantsassignedtotheEMPreceivedtheirmonitorsandsignedtheAgreementatJuvenileCourtiftheNOPDofficerassignedtothatcourtwasavailable.


ordered restrictions, the EMP rules regarding compliance, and the penalties for notcomplying.18 According to the monitoring supervisor and OPSOs EMP Policy and Procedure, monitoringdeputies were expected to create a new file each time a judge ordered a defendant toelectronicmonitoring.Therefore,everydefendantshouldhaveanewfileforeacharrest,andadefendant could havemultiple files for same offense if theywere removed from and thenorderedbackonEM.

OPSOsEMPPolicyandProcedurealsostipulatedthateveryEMPfileforeachdefendantmustinclude hard copies of the court orders, the signed Electronic Monitoring Agreement(Agreement), thedefendantdatasheet,casedisposition,andany reportsofviolations.19Monitoring deputies were instructed to record all restrictions ordered by a judge, such ascurfews and stayaway orders, in both the defendant files and the electronic monitoringsystem.Finding1. EMP defendant records were incomplete and inaccurate: files frequently

lackedoneormoredocuments, includingcourtordersandviolationsreports,and 79 percent of Electronic Monitoring Agreements contained errors oromissions,includingincorrectoromittedrestrictions.

ThedocumentationrequiredbyOPSOsEMPPolicyandProcedureestablished the termsandconditions under which the defendant participated in the program and documented theprocess by which the defendant was informed of EMP requirements. Each of the requireddocuments was necessary to ensure that the judges orders to track and limit defendantsmovementsresultedintheappropriatelevelofsupervision.Only 21 percent of the Agreements reviewed by evaluators were complete and errorfree;almosthalfoftheAgreementsreviewedhadthreeormoreerrorsormissinginformation.20

18ThePolicyandProcedurestipulatedthatElectronicMonitoringAgreementsforjuvenilesmustalsobesignedbythedefendantsguardian.19Judgeshadtheabilitytocallinordersorissueordersinwritingaftercourthours.Theseordersshouldalsohavebeen included ineachdefendantsfilesincefaxedcopiesoforderswereacceptableandshouldbesubmittedtothe EMP office by the next business day.OPSOs EMP Policy and Procedure requiredmonitoring deputies tocompleteadatasheetoneachdefendant;theformincludedbasicidentificationandcontactinformation.20 Evaluators noted fileswithmissing defendant signatures/initials, device numbers, andmonitoring deputiesnames.Inaddition,evaluatorsnotedinstanceswhenadepositamountwasindicatedand/orinitialedeventhoughtheparticipantwasnotaselfpaydefendant.


Missingcourtorders:Evaluatorsdidnotfindcourtordersin47of359(13percent)participantfiles reviewed. Monitoring deputies and defendants could not be certain that they wereadheringtothetermsofthecourtsorderswithoutthesedocuments.Asimilarproblemcouldoccur if thecourtsorderswerenotproperlyrecorded in theAgreement,and tenof the359participantfilesdidnotincludeanyAgreement.Thelackofcompletedocumentationinbothofthese instances increased the likelihood that a monitoring deputy would not enforce thespecific terms and conditions imposed on the defendant by the judge. For example, adefendantwhoma judgeorderedtostricthousearrestmightnothave limitationsonhis/hermovements either established or enforced if the judges orders were not included in thedefendantsfile,theAgreement,andtheOmnilinkcomputermonitoringsystem.Missingviolationsreports:Violationsreportsweremissingfrom75percentofdefendantsfileswho were arrested, remanded, or whose program termination was recorded asunsuccessful.21 Monitoringdeputiescould requesta remand from the court ifadefendantviolated theEMP termsoutlinedby the judge.Adefendantwhowas remandedby thecourtcouldbe removed from theprogram and returned to jail. Tobegin theprocess,monitoringdeputiessubmittedaviolationsreportthatdescribedthedefendantshistorywiththeprogramandthecircumstancesthatpromptedthemonitoringdeputytofilethereport.Accordingtothemonitoring supervisor, monitoring deputies were required to place violation reports in theindividualdefendantfiles.Evaluators could not find a consistent method by which monitoring deputies recorded thereason a defendant was removed from the program. Monitoring deputies often wrote thedateswhenthedefendantbeganandendedtheEMPonthefrontcoveroffolders;sometimesthenote read unsuccessfulor new arrest, indicating thedefendanthadnot successfullycompletedthecourtorderedprogram.Evaluatorsidentified150fileswithanotationindicatingthe defendant had not successfully completed the program.22All of those files should havecontainedaviolations report,but112of the150 files (75percent)didnotcontainviolationsreportsorarrestreports.

21 Unsuccessfulmeant thedefendantwas takenoffmonitoring forviolatingEMPorders,which could includedevice tampering, curfew violations, or violations of any part of the Electronic Monitoring Agreement. NewarrestmeantthedefendantwasarrestedforanewchargeunrelatedtothechargethatcausedhimtobeplacedonEM.22 Indicationsofunsuccessfulprogram completion could include an arrest reportor violation report for anewarrest,anEMPviolation,anunsuccessfulnotation,ortheomissionofareasonfortheendofthedefendantsparticipationifthatdateprecededthecourtordereddate.Evaluatorsonlycountedthesefilesonceeveniftherewas some indication that participation in the EMP endedmore than one time. For example, files could haveunsuccessfulnotedandalsocontainanEMPviolationorarrestreport,butevaluatorscountedthatfileonce.


Missing defendant data sheets: OPSOs EMP Policy and Procedure required monitoringdeputiestocompletedatasheetsforeachdefendantandverifythedefendantsidentification,employer,references,currentcharges,andcontactinformation.However,monitoringdeputiesdidnot complywithPolicy andProcedure regarding thedata sheets; so few files containedcompletedformsthatevaluatorscouldnotusethemasreliabledocumentsources. Missing end dates and endofservice dates: TheOmnilink casemanagement system notedtwo end points at which a defendant exited the program: End Date and EOS (endofservice),whichincludedtheoptiontoenterareasonfortheendofservice.

Figure1.DefendantProfileInformationwithStartDate,andMissingEndandEOS(EndofService)Dates

(Note:Emptyboxeswithheavyblackbordersindicateinformationdeletedtoprotectprivacy.)


Enddates indicatedtheendofthe judgeorderedEMPterm;forexample, ifadefendantwasorderedto30daysofEM,thestartandenddatesmightbeJune1andJune30,respectively.However, judgescouldremanddefendantsbrieflyforEMPviolationsandthenordertheirreenrollmentintheprogram;ifso,theendofservice(EOS)dateforthatpendingcaseshouldberecordedinthecasemanagementsystemastheactualdatethedefendantwasremovedfromtheprogram.Forinstance,ifthedefendantwasremandedorarrestedonnewcharges,theenddate would reflect a date sooner than the judgeordered end date. End dates and endofservicedatesshouldmatchonly for thosedefendantswhoserved the fullEMP termwithoutrevocationorearlyrelease.Accuratelyrecordingenddatesandendofservicedateswasessentialfordeterminingboththelengthof time and thenumberof times adefendantwasenrolled in the EMP.An accuratecountofdaysenrolled in theprogramwasessential forauditpurposes,anddataentryofallfields would provide necessary information to compare dates of service to billing records.However,evaluatorswereunable to identifyhowmonitoringdeputiesdeterminedEMPenddates.According to themonitoring supervisor,deputieswere instructed towriteenddateson theoutside cover of defendant files, but monitoring deputies did not follow the practiceconsistentlynordidtheyreliablyenterthisinformationintothecasemanagementsystem.Missing monitoring deputy signatures on EMP Agreements: By signing the Agreement, amonitoring deputy accepted responsibility for making sure the defendant understood theEMPsrulesandthejudgesordersandthattheinformationintheAgreementwasaccurateandcomplete.Monitoringdeputiesdidnotsign158ofthe359Agreements(44percent),makingitdifficult for EMP managers to hold individual monitoring deputies responsible for errors oromissions.Also,evaluatorscouldnotdetermineifallmonitoringdeputieswereresponsiblefortheerrorsandomissions in thecontractsor ifpoor recordkeepingpracticeswere limited toindividualdeputies.MissingdefendantsignaturesonEMPAgreements:Uponenrollment intheEMP,defendantswere required to completeand sign theAgreementandacknowledgeprogram rules suchasapplicable curfew restrictions, battery charging requirements, and the cost of replacingdamagedequipmentbyinitialingeachindividualprovisionoftheAgreement.23TheAgreement

23Foranelectronicsupervisionprogramtoworkeffectively,offendersshouldbegivenexplicitinstructions,bothverballyand inwriting,aboutthetimestheymayandmaynot leavehomeorotherprogramexpectations(e.g.,automated reporting, takingalcohol tests, inclusion/exclusion zones)and consequences forviolations. AnnH.


also included instructions for defendants who were ordered to pay for their monitoring,includingadepositamountforthemonitoringdevice.Evaluatorsfoundthat39ofthe359files(11percent)didnothaveAgreementssignedbythedefendants.HoldingeitherthedefendantorthemonitoringdeputyaccountableforcompliancewiththejudgesorderswouldbedifficultintheabsenceofafilecompletewithboththecourtordersandtheAgreement.24TheAgreement concludedwith three statements, and defendants indicatedwhether or nottheychosetoparticipateintheprogramandunderstoodthetermsofparticipationbyinitialingoneofthestatements:

x Ihave read the above information andunderstand the conditionsofmy releaseand/orprobation.

x TheaboveinformationhasbeenreadtomeandIunderstandtheconditionsofmyreleaseand/orprobation.

x IREFUSEtotakepartintheOPSOElectronicMonitoringProgram.

Sixdefendantsrefuse[d]totakepart intheOPSOElectronicMonitoringProgram;however,they were still enrolled despite their refusal. Enrolling defendants who had signaled theirrefusaltoparticipatenegatedthepurposeoftheAgreementandiscauseforconcern.Takenatface value, the defendants had indicated their decision not to participate, which raisesquestionsaboutwhytheywerethenenrolled.Thediscrepancycouldalso indicatea languagebarrier,defendantsinabilitytoreadand/orunderstandwhattheyweresigning,ordefendantslackofcomprehensionregardingtheconditionsoftheirreleasefromdetentiontotheEMP.Missingor incorrect restrictions: Finally,92of359participantAgreements (26percent)hadcurfew restrictions eithermissing or different from the restrictions listed in the court orderassigning the individual to theEMP.Adefendant couldnotbeexpected to complywith theEMPs termsunless theAgreement clearlyoutlined the conditionsofadefendantsprogramparticipation.Forinstance,theabsenceofacourtorderedcurfewintheAgreementcouldlead

Crowe et al., Offender Supervision with Electronic Technology (Lexington, KY: American Probation and ParoleAssociation,2012),100101.24CriminalDistrictCourtjudgesauthorizedmonitoringdeputiestoarrestadultdefendantsforviolatingconditionsoftheirreleasethroughtheEMPasaformofConstructiveContemptunderCodeofCriminalProcedureArticle23. Judicial penalty is allowed for the willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, orprocess of court. Monitoring deputies described a more complicated supervision process for juveniles whoviolatedjudicialordersbecausedeputieshadtoobtainthejudgespermissiontoremandbeforetakingaction.


a defendant to conclude he/she did not have curfew restrictions evenwhen the judge hadexplictlyorderedacurfeworothergeographicrestrictions.Also,in31of37fileswithstayawayorders(84percent),monitoringdeputiesdidnotrecordtheorderasaterritorialrestrictionintheEMPAgreement.Defendantswouldbeunlikelytounderstand that they were violating the judges order or the consequences for doing so ifinformationessentialtotheircompliancesuchasstayawayordersorterritorialrestrictionswasnotincludedintheAgreement.Recommendation1. EMP supervisors should carefully review EMP records completed by

staff assigned to monitor participants and hold monitoring staffaccountable for maintaining accurate and complete Agreements andfiles.25

Thehighfrequencyoferrorsindicatedalackofcareful,systematicsupervisoryreviewoffiles,afailure to follow intake protocols, and a lack of compliance with OPSOs EMP Policy andProcedure.Themonitoringsupervisorstated thathe reviewed filesevery twoweeksorso,but mandatory documentation was consistently missing from the files and errors were notcorrected.Thenumberoferrorsandomissionssuggeststhatthelevelofoversightwasneitherfrequentnor thorough enough toholdmonitoringdeputies accountable for accurate recordkeeping.Moving forward, the next EMP contractor and the City should implement quality controlmeasurestoconfirmtheaccuracyandconsistencyof judgesorders,signedAgreements,andmonitoringsystemschedules.Forexample,theEMPcontractorcouldrequireaformtheEMPsupervisorwouldsignforeverynewadmissionintheprogrambywhichhe/sheatteststhatthefilesandmonitoringsystemprofilescontaincompleteandaccurate information, includingallcourtorders.Second,alldocumentsrequiredbyanEMPstatementofpoliciesandproceduresshouldbekeptin defendant files.Greater attention should be paid to procedural aspects of the admissionprocess; significant deficiencies in documentation indicated a general disregard of protocolsdesignedtoensurepublicsafetyandtheeffectiveimplementationoftheEMP.Third,theAgreementsbetweenprogramstaffandparticipantsshouldbeaccurate,complete,and signed by all parties. Inaccurate curfews and territorial restrictions could lead adefendanttofollowadifferentsetofrulesfromthoseorderedbythe judge.Theseproblems25AllrecommendationsarerelevantforanycontractortheCityengagestorunfutureEMPs.


indicateda lackofattentiontodetailandtheneedforbettersupervision,oversight,training,andclarificationofprotocols.Fourth, theEMPmonitoringsystemshouldhavestart,end,andendofservicedatesenteredforeachdefendant.EMPsupervisorsshouldusesupervisiontoolsavailablewiththeelectronicmonitoringsystemthatenablesupervisorstoevaluateindividualmonitoringstaffperformanceincludingthecompletenessofdefendantprofilesinthemonitoringsoftware.Finding2. Monitoring deputies entered exclusion zones in the Omnilink monitoring

systemforonlytwoofthe37defendantswithjudicialstayawayorders.Judges often relied on stay away orders to prevent a defendant from gaining access tovictims,placesofbusiness, and codefendants.Approximately12percent (37of312)of thecourtorders reviewedby evaluators specified a stay awayorder from alleged victims, codefendants,orpropertieswherecrimesallegedlyoccurred.26

Monitoringdeputies coulddesignate in themonitoring system specific geographic areas thedefendantwasprohibited fromentering.OPSOs EMPPolicy andProceduredescribed theseareas as exclusion zones for both domestic violence and nondomestic violence cases.Evaluatorsfoundthatonlytwoofthe37defendantswithstayawayordershadexclusionzonesrecordedintheelectronicmonitoringsystem.27Forthesetwodefendants,theelectronicmonitoringsystemcouldfunctionasintended:ifthesetwo defendants entered the area surrounding their prohibited addresses, the monitoringdeputywouldreceiveanalertand,accordingtotheprotocol,shouldtakeactiontodetermineifthe victimwasat risk.28However, judges stayawayorders couldnotbeenforcedusing theelectronicmonitoringsystem for theother35defendants: themonitoringdeputywouldnotreceiveanalertifthedefendantapproachedtheallegedvictimsaddress.Themonitoring systemalsoallowedmonitoringdeputies toaddabuffer zone surroundingtheexclusionzone,andthesystemwouldsendmonitoringdeputiesawarningifthedefendantentered the buffer zone around the prohibited area.OPSOmanagement stated that buffer

26Only312of the359 fileshad judgesorders in the folders.Evaluatorsdidnot reviewcourt files tosee if theremaining47filesshouldhaveincludedstayawayorders.27Generalordersforjuveniledefendantstostayawayfromotherjuvenilesorstayawayordersforwhichphysicaladdressescouldnotbedeterminedwerenotincludedaspartofthisanalysis.28A thirdadultdefendantsprofilehad theallegedvictimsaddress in thenoteswith the following instruction:observe stay away order. However, there was no corresponding exclusion zone for that address in themonitoringsystem.


zoneswere implemented in domestic violence cases; however, instructions regarding bufferzoneswerenotincludedinOPSOsEMPPolicyandProcedure.

Whenproperly implementedandmonitored,theexclusionzonecombinedwithabufferzonewarningcouldeffectivelypreventdefendantsfromaccessingallegedvictims,codefendants,orbusinesses.However,monitoringdeputiesdidnothavetheabilitytoenforcecourtordersfor95 percent of defendantswhom judges had ordered to stay away from alleged victims, codefendants, or businesses, because proper exclusion zones were not set up in the casemanagement system. Monitoring deputies and supervisors failure to use the electronicmonitoringsystemtoenforcejudgesstayawayorderscouldplacevictimsatrisk.Recommendation2. EMPstaffshouldenterprohibitedaddressespursuantto judicialstay

awayordersasexclusionzonesintheelectronicmonitoringsystem.MonitoringdeputiesfailedtoincludeexclusionzoneterritorialrestrictionsintheAgreementin84percentofthefileswithstayawayorders.ThisomissionincreasedthelikelihoodthattheinformationnecessaryforOPSOdeputiestoenforce judicialorderswouldnotbeentered intothemonitoringsystem,andmonitoringdeputiescouldonlybealertedtoadefendantenteringaprohibitedgeographicareaifthecourtorderedrestrictionswereaccuratelyenteredintothesystem.Future monitoring staff should enter prohibited addresses pursuant to judicial stay awayorders as exclusion zones and use buffer zones designed to warn monitoring staff whendefendantsapproachexclusionzones.ThestayawayordersandterritorialrestrictionsintheAgreementsshouldalwaysmatchtheordersandrestrictionsinthemonitoringsystem,andthemonitoringsupervisorshouldspecificallylookfortheseentriestoassurecourtordersarebeingproperly executed. Failure to improve this process could endanger victims relying on theelectronicmonitoringofdefendantwhereaboutstoprotectthemfromadditionalharm.


IV. ALERTSANDDOCUMENTINGDEPUTYACTIONSOPSOs EMP Policy and Procedure defined six different types of alerts (inclusion zones,exclusionzones,straptamper,devicetamper,lowbattery,andnolocation/nocommunication)anddescribed the responseprotocol foreachalert type. (SeeAppendixB fordescriptionsofalerttypesandresponseprotocols.)Monitoringdeputiesreceivedalertsviacomputer,laptop,or smartphone when a defendant violated a courtordered restriction entered into themonitoringsystem.Omnilinkalsonotifieddeputiesandsupervisorsbyphoneforcertaintypesofalerts(e.g.,strapanddevicetamperalerts).Analertautomaticallyclearedinthemonitoringdatabasewhentheviolationwascorrected.Forexample, if adefendant triggered an alertbyexiting an inclusion zoneduringhis courtorderedcurfew,thealertwouldclearassoonasthedefendantreenteredtheinclusionzone;lowbatteryalertsautomaticallyclearedwhenthebatterywaschargedaboveaspecific level;andnocommunicationornolocationalertsclearedwhenthesignaltransmissionresumed.29Finding3. OPSO protocols for responding to alerts were neither detailed nor

comprehensive enough to provide adequate instruction for monitoringdeputies.

OPSOsEMPPolicyandProcedureprovidedguidelinesforhowthemonitoringdeputiesshouldrespond toeach typeofalert.Thepolicy instructedmonitoringdeputies toattempt tomakecontact with the defendant by phone and, if necessary, go to the defendants last knownlocation.However,OPSOsEMPPolicyandProcedure instruction to locate thedefendant ifnecessarydidnot specify themaximum amountof time thedeputywaspermitted towaitbetweenfailingtomakecontactbyphoneandlocatingthedefendantinperson.Asaresult,theprotocol inappropriately vested themonitoringdeputywith theauthority to followarbitraryandinconsistentcriteriaforrespondingtoindividualalerts.Monitoringdeputies indicated in interviewsthattherewasnostandardfordeterminingwhento respond, and each had his or her own threshold for deciding when to respond to thedefendantslastknownlocation.EMPpersonnelalsotoldevaluatorsthatthetypeofalertandtimeofdayornightinfluencedhowmonitoringdeputiesmightrespond.Forinstance,deputiesreportedthatdefendantswhodidnotchargetheirdevicessufficientlycouldhave lowbatteryalertswhileatwork,school,or insomecases, ifattemptingtochargeatnightwhilesleeping. Accordingtomonitoringdeputies,noeffortwouldbemadetogotothedefendantslastknown

29Alertscouldalsobemanuallycleared.Accordingtothemonitoringsupervisor,monitoringdeputiesmanuallyclearedalertstotestforfalsealerts.


location in response to a low battery alert; instead, if the alert persisted or continued toreoccur,theywouldreporttheviolationtothepresidingjudge.Theprotocol for inclusionzonealertsstated thatmonitoringdeputiesmustattempt tomaketelephonecontacttodeterminewhetherschedulevariancesorlegitimatereasonsexistedforthealert,but itprovidednospecific instructions forhow toproceed ifefforts tocontact thedefendantbyphone failed. Asaresult,evaluatorsobservedalertstaggedwithnotationsthatindicatedmultipleattemptstocontactdefendantsbyphoneoveraperiodofseveralhoursbutno indicationthatthedeputywenttothedefendants lastknown location.30Thisobservationwas supportedby testimony from themonitoring supervisorwho stated that itwasOPSOspracticetoignoreinclusionzonealertsinthemiddleofthenighteventhoughdefendantswereviolatingjudicialorders.31Recommendation3. TheCityandtheEMPcontractorshouldincludeintheCEAandtheEMP

statement of policies and procedures specific information about theactions monitoring staff should take in response to alerts, includingtime thresholds for graduated responses; the EMP supervisor shouldprovidesufficientoversight toensureEMPpersonnelcomplywith thepolicy.

Offender Supervisionwith Electronic Technology: Community CorrectionsResource, producedwith funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), provides a clear and thoroughroadmapforimplementinganelectronicmonitoringprogram.32Theauthorsnotethatthelackof clear policies results in uncertainty on the part of staff and continuity from one staffmembertoanotherintheimplementationoftheprogramcanbeachievedonlythroughclearlywrittenpoliciesandprocedures.Vague protocols for responding to alerts vested deputies with an inappropriate amount ofdiscretionwhendecidinghow to respond.Monitoringdeputies reportedallowingdefendantsto violate judge orders and EMP rules several times before they reported violations to thejudge.However,thejudgeshouldhavesolediscretionoverdeterminingtheconsequencesfor

30Tagginganalertenabledmonitoringdeputiestorecordadditionalinformationaboutthealertinthemonitoringsystem.Taggedalertsappearedwithayellowboxaroundthealerticon;theinformationpoppedupinadialogboxwhenthecursorhoveredoverthealert.31 The specific example discussed by the monitoring supervisor was how deputies responded to defendantsviolatingcurfewintheEighthDistrict.TherewasnoexplanationprovidedforwhythatexamplewasusedoriftheEighthDistrictwastheexceptiontostandardprotocols.32 Matthew DeMichele and Brian Payne, Offender Supervision with Electronic Technology (Washington, D.C.:CommunityCorrectionsResource,SecondEdition,2009),85.


violating court orders, and monitoring deputies should have clear instructions for how andwhentorespondtoalertsandwhethertoreportviolationstojudges.Future EMP protocols should clearly establish minimum time requirements for makingtelephone contactandexplicitescalationprocedures, includinggoing to thedefendants lastknownlocationifdeputiesfailtomakecontactwithinaspecifiedperiodoftimeafterreceivingtheinitialalert.Protocolsshouldalsoestablishspecificrequirementsforanyvariationsinhowdeputiesshouldrespondtoalertsbasedonthetimeofday.To ensure public safety and consistent staff implementation, all regulations governingmonitoring staff responses toalerts shouldbecodified in theEMP statementofpoliciesandprocedures. In addition, policymakers should clearly outline their expectations for effectivemonitoringand responsiveness in futureCEAs toensure theappropriateandeffectiveuseofpublicsafetydollarsfundingtheEMP.

TheCEAshouldalsospecifythemethodbywhichtheEMPcontractorwilldocumentmonitoringstaff responses to alerts and ensure compliance with written policy, including anyconsequences it will impose on the contractor for noncompliance with agreeduponprocedures.


Finding4. Morethanhalfoftheinclusionzonealertsremainedactiveforlongerthan30minutes,andevaluatorscouldnotdeterminewhat, ifany,actionmonitoringdeputiestookinresponse.

Inclusion zone alerts occurred more frequently than any other type of alert. A defendantgenerated an inclusion zone alert when he left the geographic area in which a judge hadorderedhimtoremain.Aninclusionzoneusuallyconfinedadefendanttohisorherhomefor24 hours a day, in the case of courtordered house arrest, but it could also be limited todesignatedcurfewhours.Figure2showsanexampleofhowthe inclusionzoneappeared inthemonitoringsystem.

Figure2:ExampleofOmnilinkInclusionZone

Judges and EMP personnel stated that they considered the need towork late or attend anappointmentscheduledafterschoolorworkasanacceptablereasonforacurfewviolation.Asa result, theyalloweddefendantsa graceperiodof fifteen to twentyminutes to take intoaccountunexpectedoruncontrollabledelaysinreturninghome.EvaluatorsobtainedalertdatafromthemonitoringsystemforAprilthroughSeptember2012todeterminehowmuchtimeelapsedbeforealertswerecleared.Evaluatorsusedathresholdof30minutestoeliminatealertsgeneratedduringthegraceperiodaffordedtodefendantswhoranlateandalertscausedbyerrorsintechnology.33

33 Therewere a total of 15,290 inclusion zone alerts during the sixmonth review period, ofwhich 6,624 (43percent)wereclearedwithin30minutesand8,666(57percent)remainedactivefor30minutesorlonger.Therewerefewer lowbatteryalertsthanothertypesofalerts,atotalof2,436,ofwhichonly264(11percent)cleared


Approximately47percent(7,232)ofthe15,290 inclusionzonealertsthatoccurredduringthesixmonthperiodunderreviewremainedactivelongerthanthe30minutegraceperiodbutlessthan one day. Figure 3 shows the number of alerts (inclusion zone, low battery, nocommunication,andnolocation)thatremainedactivefor30minutesorlonger.

Figure3.EMPAlertslasting30minutesorlonger(April2012September2012)34

Thelargenumberofinclusionzonealertsthatremainedactivelongerthan30minuteswereinpart due to two informal policy decisions made by OPSO: monitoring deputies alloweddefendantstoviolatecurfewovernight,andtheydidnotenterdefendantsschedulechangesintothemonitoringsystem.ThesedecisionssignificantlyreducedthepublicsafetybenefitsoftheEMPandundermineddefendantsneedtotakecourtorderedrestrictionsseriously.

within 30minutes. Therewere 4,449 no communication alerts,ofwhich 1,368 (31 percent) clearedwithin 30minutes.Ofthe4,018nolocationalerts,only713(18percent)clearedwithin30minutes.34Sofewbackplateandstraptamperalertsoccurredduringthereviewperiodthattheywerenotvisibleonthechartandwerethereforenotincluded.

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Evaluation of the City's Electronic Monitoring Program Part 2: OPSO's Implementation and Supervision