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Event Tree Analysis Best Practices in Dam and Levee Safety Risk Analysis Part A – Risk Analysis Basics Chapter A-5 July 2019

Event Tree AnalysisEvent Tree Analysis • A model for estimating risk • Depicted by an event tree • Used to decompose and discretize a complex sequence of events • Improves

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  • Event Tree AnalysisBest Practices in Dam and Levee Safety Risk AnalysisPart A – Risk Analysis BasicsChapter A-5July 2019

  • Objectives

    •Define event tree terminology and rules•Demonstrate common applications

    2

  • Outline of Topics

    •Structure•Terminology•Calculations•Construction

    3

  • Key Concepts• Event Tree Analysis is an inductive modeling technique that uses

    Boolean logic to evaluate a sequence of events• Frequently used concepts and techniques include

    • Conditional – Probability depends on an event that has occurred• Intersection – Used to multiply probabilities• Mutually Exclusive – Used to sum probabilities• Partitioning – Used to discretize continuous functions• Consistent Percentile – Used to combine uncertainties

    4

  • Event Tree Analysis• A model for estimating risk• Depicted by an event tree• Used to decompose and

    discretize a complex sequence of events

    • Improves understanding of potential failure modes

    • Alternative models• Fault tree analysis• Stochastic simulation

    5

    Initiating EventForward Looking (Inductive) Logic

    • Chronological• Causal Chain

    Consequences

  • Example• Verbal PFM description

    • In a given year, an earthquake occurs with a peak horizontal acceleration between 0.6g and 0.8g. The ground motion triggers foundation liquefaction which causes instability of the upstream embankment slope. The resulting slope failure lowers the crest of the dam to a level below the reservoir pool. Overtopping of the lowered crest ensues causing erosion and breach of the dam.

    • Key events• Earthquake occurs with PHA between 0.6g and 0.8g• Foundation liquefaction is triggered• Upstream slope instability lowers the crest• Overtopping erodes the lowered crest• Breach occurs

    6

  • Possible Event Tree

    7

    Earthquake PHA0.6g – 0.8g

    Liquefaction

    No Liquefaction

    Slope Instability

    No Slope Instability

    Overtopping

    No Overtopping

    Breach

    No Breach

  • Terminology

    Flood

    Stage< 1520

    Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Monolith Slides

    Monolith Slides

    Spillway Erodes

    Spillway Erodes

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    0.99

    0.009

    0.001

    1.00

    0.02

    0.05

    0.93

    0.04

    0.1

    0.86

    100

    40

    5

    170

    50

    15

    Initiating Event

    Node

    Probability

    Pathway

    Consequences

  • Rules and Math• Branches must be mutually exclusive

    • Only one outcome can occur• Probabilities across branches can be summed

    • Probabilities must be conditional• Probability of an event depends on all events

    along pathways to the left• Probabilities along pathways can be multiplied

    • Branches must be collectively exhaustive• The sum of probabilities across all branches

    must equal one

    9

    Stage1520-1550

    Non Breach

    Monolith Slides

    Spillway Erodes0.009

    0.02

    0.05

    0.93

    Monolith Slides

    Spillway Erodes

    Non Breach

  • Single Tree Format

    Flood

    Stage< 1520

    Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Monolith Slides

    Monolith Slides

    Spillway Erodes

    Spillway Erodes

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    0.99

    0.009

    0.001

    1.00

    0.02

    0.05

    0.93

    0.04

    0.1

    0.86

    100

    40

    5

    170

    50

    15

    0.009 * 0.02 = 0.00018

    0.009 * 0.05 = 0.00045

    0.009 * 0.93 = 0.00837

    0.001 * 0.04 = 0.00004

    0.001 * 0.1 = 0.0001

    0.001 * 0.86 = 0.00086

    0.99 * 1.0 = 0.99

  • Separate Potential Failure Mode Trees

    Flood

    Stage< 1520

    Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Monolith Slides Life Loss

    Monolith Slides Life Loss

    Monolith Slides Life Loss

    Flood

    Stage< 1520

    Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Spillway Erodes Life Loss

    Spillway Erodes Life Loss

    Spillway Erodes Life Loss

    Non breach event tree not shown

  • Calculating APF

    Flood Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Monolith Slides

    Monolith Slides

    Spillway Erodes

    Spillway Erodes

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    0.009

    0.001

    0.02

    0.05

    0.93

    0.04

    0.1

    0.86

    100

    40

    5

    170

    50

    15

    0.00018

    0.00045

    0.00837

    0.00004

    0.0001

    0.00086

    APF(Monolith Sliding) = 0.00018 + 0.00004 = 0.00022

    P(Event A) = Sum of end branch p values for all pathways that contain Event A

  • Calculating ALL

    Flood Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Monolith Slides

    Monolith Slides

    Spillway Erodes

    Spillway Erodes

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    0.009

    0.001

    0.02

    0.05

    0.93

    0.04

    0.1

    0.86

    100

    40

    5

    170

    50

    15

    0.00018

    0.00045

    0.00837

    0.00004

    0.0001

    0.00086

    ALL(Monolith Sliding) = 0.00018 (100) + 0.00004 (170) = 0.0248

    E(C | Event A) = Sum of end branch p*c values for all pathways that contain Event A

  • Partitioning

    14

    • Tree branches are discrete• Input functions are continuous• Analogous to Simpson’s rule for integration• Numerical precision

    • Number of partitions (more is better)• Location of partitions (capture shape changes)

    • Can generate intervals manually or automatically• Intervals can be regular or irregular spacing

  • Example

    15

    Flood

    Stage= 1500

    Stage= 1507

    Stage= 1537

    Stage= 1580

    Stage= 16001480

    1500

    1520

    1540

    1560

    1580

    1600

    1620

    0.00010.0010.010.11

    Peak

    Res

    ervo

    ir St

    age

    Annual Chance Exceedance

    Continuous

    Discrete Approximation

    1 - 0.5 = 0.5

    Exceedance interval

    Non-ExceedanceInterval Partition Probability

    Partition Stage0.5 – 0.1 = 0.4

    0.1 – 0.01 = 0.09

    0.01 – 0.001 = 0.009

    0.001 – 0 = 0.001

    ∑ (area under the curve)= 1

    These partitions are mutually exclusive

    1 2 3 4 5

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

  • Avoid Double Counting

    16

    Flood

    Stage> 1500

    Stage> 1507

    Stage> 1537

    Stage> 1580

    Stage> 1600

    1480

    1500

    1520

    1540

    1560

    1580

    1600

    1620

    0.00010.0010.010.11

    Peak

    Res

    ervo

    ir St

    age

    Annual Chance Exceedance

    Continuous

    Discrete Approximation

    1

    0.5

    0.1

    0.01

    0.001

    ∑ > 1, not goodDo Not Use Exceedance ProbabilitiesThese partitions are not mutually exclusive

    1

    12

    3

    4

    5 2

    3

    4

    5

  • System Response Curves

    17

    Flood

    Stage= 1500

    Stage= 1507

    Stage= 1537

    Stage= 1580

    Stage= 1600

    0.5

    0.4

    0.09

    0.009

    0.001

    Breach

    Breach

    Breach

    Breach

    Breach

    3E-5

    8E-5

    0.003

    0.00001

    0.0001

    0.001

    0.01

    0.1

    1

    1500 1520 1540 1560 1580 1600

    Prob

    abili

    ty o

    f Bre

    ach

    Peak Stage

    0.09

    0.25

  • Variable Transformation• Peak stage is typically used as the independent variable to

    combine the hazard, system response, and consequence functions• Peak stage defined as a function of AEP• SRP and consequences defined as a function of peak stage

    • Other variables might be• More convenient – Probability of failure as a function of overtopping depth• Better indicator – Consequences as a function of peak outflow

    • Event tree calculations can be set up to perform and apply these transformations

    • Overtopping depth defined as stage minus top of levee• Peak outflow defined as function of flood AEP

    18

  • Monte Carlo Analysis• Branch probability estimates and consequences can be modeled

    with uncertainty• Monte Carlo analysis can be used to combine these uncertainties

    to obtain the uncertainty distribution for APF and ALL

    19

  • Distribution of Sums and Products• Because event tree math is additive and multiplicative

    • The mean AFP and mean ALL can be estimated by using the means of the input distributions

    • Can become problematic in other models with operations that are not strictly additive or multiplicative

    • Use the mean of the output distribution from a Monte Carlo simulation

    • The distribution of AFP and ALL will typically trend toward a normal or log normal distribution because of the central limit theorem

    20

  • 0

    0.002

    0.004

    0.006

    1 2 3 4

    Syst

    em R

    espo

    nse

    Prob

    aibl

    ityFlood Loading Interval

    Median (50th Percentile)

    15th and 85th Percentile

    Curve Sampling

    21

    • Independent sampling of each load partition can generate physically impossible samples

    30%Flood interval 1

    Flood interval 2

    Flood interval 3

    Flood interval 4 0.3

    0.9

    0.2

    0.4

    90% 20%

    40%Sampled SRP curve cannot decrease with increasing load

  • 0

    0.002

    0.004

    0.006

    1 2 3 4

    Syst

    em R

    espo

    nse

    Prob

    aibl

    ityFlood Loading Interval

    Median (50th Percentile)

    15th and 85th Percentile

    Sampled System Response (70th Percentile)

    Consistent Percentile Sampling

    22

    • Sample a single percentile and apply to all loading partitions

    70%Flood interval 1

    Flood interval 2

    Flood interval 3

    Flood interval 4

    0.7

    70%

    70%

    70%

  • “Risk taking is inherently failure prone. Otherwise, it would be called sure thing taking.”

    -Jim McMahon

  • Exercise

    Flood Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Slope instability

    Slope Instability

    Internal Erosion

    Internal Erosion

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    0.009

    0.001

    0.02

    0.07

    0.91

    0.08

    0.14

    0.78

    30

    60

    5

    80

    140

    15Calculate APF for slope instabilityCalculate ALL for slope instability

    Stage< 1520

    0.99

  • Solution

    Flood Stage1520-1550

    Stage> 1550

    Non Breach

    Non Breach

    Slope instability

    Slope Instability

    Internal Erosion

    Internal Erosion

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    Life Loss

    0.009

    0.001

    0.02

    0.07

    0.91

    0.08

    0.14

    0.78

    30

    60

    5

    80

    140

    15

    Calculate APF for slope instability = 0.00018 + 0.00008 = 0.00026Calculate ALL for slope instability = (0.00018 * 30) + (0.00008 * 80) = 0.0118

    Stage< 1520

    0.99 0.009 * 0.02 = 0.00018

    0.001 * 0.08 = 0.00008

    �Event Tree AnalysisObjectivesOutline of TopicsKey ConceptsEvent Tree AnalysisExamplePossible Event TreeTerminologyRules and MathSingle Tree FormatSeparate Potential Failure Mode TreesCalculating APFCalculating ALLPartitioningExampleAvoid Double CountingSystem Response CurvesVariable TransformationMonte Carlo AnalysisDistribution of Sums and ProductsCurve SamplingConsistent Percentile SamplingSlide Number 23ExerciseSolution