Evolution of War the Fourth Generation

8/13/2019 Evolution of War the Fourth Generation

1/15

EVOLUTION OF WAR: THE FOURTH GENERATION

BY: T. X. HAMMES

CATEGORY: WAR & TERRORISM SMALL WARS & STRATEGIC THINKING


2/15

The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation

LtCol Thomas X. Hammes

Marine Corps Gazette

September 1994

The move toward fourth generation warfare is occurring in parallel with the move into the

information agei.e., with the political, economic, and socialchanges affecting society as a whole-

and the essential characteristics of thisnew form of warfare have been clearly illustrated in recent

conflicts.

If we loo at the development of warfare in the modern era! we see three distinct generations "

Third generation warfare wasconceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918

" s it not abouttime for the fourth generation to appear! #Marine Corps Gazette! "ctober 1989

In 19$9! the authors of this articlechallenged their readers to consider whether the passage of %&

'ears meant it was time for a generational shift in war( )uring the * 'ears since the article was

published! the world has undergone incredible changes in its political! economic! and social

structure( There is a growing consensus that the world is on the cusp of a fundamental shift from an

industrial societ' to an information#based societ'( +istor' shows that societal shifts of this

magnitude cannot occur without a fundamental change in the wa' we conduct war( It is clearl' time

for a fourth generation of modern war(

In this article! I intend to show that the fourth generation of war has! in fact! evolved in con,unction

with the political! economic! and societal changes that are modif'ing our world( -urther! lie its

predecessors! the fourth generation of war did not arrive on the scene as a full' developed

instrument but evolved .and is continuing to evolve/ at widel' scattered locations( -inall'! lie its

predecessors! fourth generation tactics will not be used in isolation but mi0ed with those of earlier

generations(

The First Three Generations of War

rior to challenging us to consider the implications of the fourth generation of modern war! Mr( 2ind

and his co#authors presented a brief setch of the three previous generations of war( The' theorized

that the first three generations of modern war focused! in turn! on massed manpower! then massed

firepower! and finall' on maneuver( 3hat these generations had in common is the fact each sought

to defeat the enem' militaril'(

Why Generational Change?
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm#bio#biohttp://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/gaz.htmlhttp://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htmhttp://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm#bio#biohttp://www.mca-marines.org/Gazette/gaz.htmlhttp://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm


3/15

3hile 2ind and his fellow authors outlined the tactical changes between the generations of modern

war! it is essential we understand what actuall' caused these generational shifts in warfare(

The most commonl' cited reason is the evolution of technolog'( 3hile technological changes clearl'

have a ma,or impact! attributing the generational changes in warfare primaril' to technolog'

oversimplifies the problem(

The true drivers of generational change are political! social! and economic factors( ach of these

factors was pivotal in the evolution of the first three generations of war( 3hile brevit' prevents a

detailed discussion! the single e0ample of 3orld 3ar I will illustrate the point(

3hile the evolution of rifled artiller'! machineguns! and barbed wire brought about trench warfare

on the 3estern -ront! these technological developments alone were not sufficient to bring about the

firepower#intensive second generational war that evolved from 1914#191%(

The second generation re5uired not ,ust improved weaponr'! but the evolution of an entire political!

economic! and social structure to support it( Second generation war grew from the societ' of the

times( It re5uired the international political structure that focused on the balance of power! formed

the alliances! and stuc to them through four incredibl' e0pensive! e0hausting 'ears of war(

-urther! it re5uired the output of an industrial societ' to design! produce! and transport the

e5uipment and huge 5uantities of ammunition it consumed( -inall'! it re5uired the development of a

social s'stem that brought catastrophic losses( Technolog'! while important! was clearl'

subordinate to political! economic! and social structures in setting the conditions for 3orld 3ar I(

+aving completed this ver' brief introduction of the previous generations of modern war and wh'

the' evolved! it is time to tae up the challenge of the authors 5uoted at the beginning of the

article( 3e must tr' to determine the form and impact of the fourth generation of war( 6ased on the

observed correlation between each generation of war and the societ' it grew from! it is logical to

assume the fourth generation of war will also tae its shape from societ'(

High Tech War as The Fourth Generation?

In eeping with this observation! man' authors writing on the future of war have predicted it will be

based on the impact of the information revolution on tactics and weapons( 7umerous articles have

traced the development of information#based warfare from the incredible success of the Israeli 8ir

-orce in the 6ea alle' in 19$: to the culmination of information war;


4/15

To understand the potential shape of the fourth generation of war! we must loo at the political!

economic! and social changes in societ' as well as the changes in technolog' since the advent of the

third generation of war(

oliticall' the world has undergone vast changes( The third generation of war developed when

international relations were defined in terms of the uropean nation states that dominated them( Incontrast! the fourth generation of war is coming of age during a period of e0ponential increase in

the number and t'pe of pla'ers on the international scene(

3hile the outward trappings of the international s'stem are still in place! there have been massive

changes in how it reall' operates( 6esides the huge increase in the number of nation states! there

has been a fundamental change in the t'pe of pla'er involved in international affairs( 7ation states

still remain the primar' actors! but increasingl' international actors in the form of the >nited

7ations! 7orth 8tlantic Treat'


5/15


6/15

Thus both the article and the boo see fourth generation war as comple0 engagements fought

across the spectrum of human activit'( 8ntagonists will fight in the political! economic! social! and

militar' arenas and communicate their messages through a combination of networs and mass

media(

3hile these authors agree on a coherent theor' for the fourth generation! theories! even b' highl'respected authors such as van Creveld! are insufficient ,ustification for polic' changes( 7ational

securit' decision maers must demand a higher standard of proof before committing a nations

resources to face a threat that ma' or ma' not be valid(

Therefore! the e' 5uestion is whether we can validate these theories through observation of past

and current conflicts( I contend we can(

Evolution of the Fourth Generation of War

ach element of fourth generation war proposed b' van Creveld and 8t5uilla and onfeldt can be

seen in the evolution of insurgenc'( 3hile a wide#ranging stud' of insurgenc' will provide numerous

e0amples of this new t'pe of war emerging! the length of this article re5uires that I focus m' stud'

on the e0periences of ietnam! China! 7icaragua! and the alestinians(

China

8s the first practitioner to write e0tensivel' about insurgenc'! Mao! lie Clausewitz! understood war

is fundamentall' a political undertaing( +owever! he went much further than Clausewitz in his

definition statingH


7/15

%hase &&&' The Strategic )ffensive:


8/15

In summar'! Mao envisioned man' of the elements 8r5uilla and onfeldt identif' as fourth

generation( +e built networs! shaped opinions in target groups! and conducted intense propaganda

and ps'chological operations campaigns( +e used those networs to ma0imize his political!

economic! and social power while minimizing the militar' aspects until the final offensive(

Maos ideas obviousl' belong more to the fourth than the third generation of war( Mao still believedfinal victor' could onl' be won b' a third generation militar' campaign( It was to +o Chi Minh! MaoJs

principal successful imitator! to tae the evolution of war a step further(

*iet !am

(S(

ground forces were introduced into the conflict( 3ith the entrance of these units! the communists

were forced bac to hase II operations until such time as the correlation of forces once again

changed in their favor( 8ware of his militar' and economic inferiorit'! +o sought to use international

political maneuvering in con,unction with guerrilla war to bring about this change( +e new a e'

factor in the outcome of the war was the international political situation(

The length of each stage depends on " the changes between the enem' forces and ours! and also

on the changes in the international situation whether the general offensive will come earl' or late(

To accomplish those changes in the international situation! +o went be'ond Maos concept of

national networs and introduced 'et another aspect of fourth generation war( +e built or tapped

into a variet' of international networs( +o activel' encouraged and supported international peace

movements .ietnam eterans 8gainst the 3ar/! international charities .Kuaers/! and even

individuals Eane -onda and +arrison Salisbur'/( 3hile he could not control these networs! he could

influence them and use their assistance in getting 8merican societ' to change its view of the war(

In 19F$! +o and his principal strategist! Giap! provided another ma,or step forward in the evolution

of war( The' used the media and international networs to turn the tactical disaster of the 19F$ Tet

(S(

support for the war were showing( Their massive commitment of irreplaceable resources to the Tet

offensive shows the' hoped for a ma,or impact on the outcome of the war( 6ut despite all their

planning! the' could not foresee the e0tent of the political impact in the >nited States(

Bet unlie the >(S( leadership! the communists were 5uic to recognize the impact Tet had on >(S(

public opinion and to capitalize on it( 3orldwide the' hammered at +os themeH

The truth is that resident Eohnson wants neither peace nor peace negotiations( 8s a matter of fact!

at the ver' moment when he tals a lot about peace discussion! the >(S( imperialists are further

e0panding the war of aggression in South ietnam! massivel' sending there tens of thousands of

>(S( troops and e0tending escalation in 7orth ietnam(! The peoples of the world have clearl'


9/15

seen this( That is precisel' the reason wh' the progressive 8merican people are activel' opposing(

the >(S( war of aggression in ietnam(

Given insurgenc's political nature! +o understood the >(S( center of gravit' was our political will(

+e used both the mass media and his carefull' cultivated international networs to magnif' the

impact of Tet( 6ased on the media coverage of Tet and his own information campaign! he portra'edthe iet Cong as a militaril' insoluble problem for the >nited States( +e set out to directl' attac

the >(S( center of gravit' and succeeded( 3ithin months of Tet! resident Eohnson had withdrawn

from the 19F$ presidential race and >(S( public opinion turned against the war(

This is +os uni5ue contribution to the evolution of war( +e shifted the emphasis from the defeat of

the enem's militar' forces to the defeat of his political will( -urther! the enem's will was not to be

broen through direct attacs on the battlefield but rather through indirect attacs on his will to

continue(

+o! using the tools of fourth generation tactics! had defeated the much more powerful >nited States

because the >nited States never understood the ind of war it was fighting( 8fter the withdrawal of

>(S( support! it was onl' a matter of time before the communists! using basic third generation

tactics! con5uered the south(

!icaragua

8nother step toward the fourth generation of war was taen b' the Sandinista 7ational 2iberation

-ront .-S27/( The -S27 went a step be'ond +o b' developing a strateg' based on the assumption

that they could not win a militaryvictory.

8ccording to 8lfonso =obelo! one of the earl' opponents of the Somoza =egime! the -S27 never

e0pected a total victor'( This was something that the' made clear( The' never e0pected it "

Instead of militar' victor' against Somoza! the -S27 planned to win the war through internal and

e0ternal political pressure against the Somoza regime( Itwored(

8ccording to Col Eohn 3aghelstein! an insurgenc' anal'st with the Strategic Studies Institute! the

-S27 achieved their victor' b' emplo'ing the following strategic approachH

6ringing the mass appeal of broad front political organizations into the movement to ensure

not onl' better and wider internal support but outside support that did not have Cuban!

astern 6loc! or Soviet taint(

>sing the Church! through 2iberation Theolog'! to give the guerrillas the moral high

ground(

7ot losing sight of >(S( attention level( Controlling or influencing >(S( and world opinion through the media( Guerrilla chiefs

actuall' wrote editorials for The &ew 'or( Times.

Targeting the >(S( Congress through public opinion and orchestrating the propaganda

campaign to minimize the >(S( response(

stablishing front groups outside the countr' to function as public affairsLinformation offices

to generate support for the movement and to pressure the >nited States into a less

responsive mode(


10/15

(S( academic! civic and church groups(

These groups! in turn! will write letters to >(S( congressmen who hold e' committee

positions overseeing securit' assistance operations(

6ased on this foundation! the Sandinistas established a two#tiered approach that attaced the

Somoza government across the spectrum of political! economic! and social issues while maintaininga low#level guerrilla campaign( nited States! the Sandinistas were able

to portra' themselves as a democratic movement in sharp contrast to the despotic and oppressive

Somoza regime( These networs in turn made sure that message was passed clearl' to the >(S(

Congress(


11/15

)espite some glaring mistaes in dealing with the >(S( Congress! the Sandinistas definitel'

advanced the art of war( The' twice won a victor' using a fourth generation information approach of

focusing on political and social activit' rather than militar' action( The Sandinistas proved fourth

generation war focused on the political level could defeat a wea! inefficient! and unpopular

government( The 5uestion remainedH Can it do the same to a strong! efficient! popularl' elected!

highl' legitimate governmentD

The %alestinians

The answer is 'es! as proven b' the intifada uprising in the nified 7ational Command of the >prising .>7C>/!

and finall' e' alestinian academics! ,ournalists! and political representatives(

8ll three leadership groups e0isted before the intifada broe out( Bet! b' bringing together the

street protesters and the three leadership groups! the intifada created a uni5ue organization ideall'

suited to e0ploit the advantages of fourth generation war( The local neighborhood networs dealt

with grassroots issues;food! water! and medical care( The' maintained the morale and

effectiveness of the uprising during various attempts b' Israeli forces to stamp it out( The >7C>!

consisting of representatives of the four main alestinian nationalist factions! but e0cluding the

fundamentalists! provided overall direction and coordination to the neighborhood committees( The

academics! ,ournalists! and political leaders used their ties to >(S( and Israeli political and media

leaders to e0plain the alestinian side of the issue( 6' appearing reasonable! educated! and

concerned about peace and ,ustice in the Middle ast! the' drasticall' increased the impact of the

action the local committees were orchestrating in the streets( Their ver' status as media stars

neutralized attempts b' Israeli securit' forces to detain and silence them(

3oring together! the three levels of leadership developed a well thought out strategic approach to

the struggle using all the tools of fourth generation warH political! economic! social! and mass

media( .-igure F(/ The' opted for a strateg' of limited violence .no use of firearms or e0plosives/!

ma0imum media e0posure for their side of the issue! division of the battlefield into a contested

zone .the occupied territories/ and! a safe zone .Israel proper/( In short! the' sought political

victor' rather than a militar' one(


12/15


13/15

defeated repeatedl' for 4& 'ears( The intifadabecame a matter of pride not ,ust for alestinians but

for all 8rabs(

The alestinians used the international! Israeli! and 8rabic media as a specific tool( The international

media! b' repeatedl' broadcasting scenes of the Israeli 8rm' firing on roc#throwing alestinian

teenagers! changed the image of Israel from a besieged nation in the midst of power enemies tothat of oppressive occupier( The constant repetition of this image even neutralized the powerful

Eewish lobb' in the >nited States( The alestinians used the 8rabic media to show their own people

and their 8rab brothers how the' were challenging Israel on a dail' basis( These broadcasts built

the pride and solidarit' of the movement( Most important! the alestinians used the Israeli media to

hammer home to Israelis the idea that the cost of maintaining Israeli presence in the occupied

territories far e0ceeded its dubious securit' benefits( 8ccording to former rime Minister Shamir

the most important 5uestion of the .199:/ election was retention of Greater Israel(

alestinian action in the


14/15

6eginning with Maos initial concept that political power was more decisive than militar' power and

progressing to the intifada+s total reliance on the mass media and international networs to

neutralize Israeli militar' power! warfare has undergone a fundamental change( The fourth

generation has arrived(

Strategicall'! it attempts to directl' change the minds of enem' polic'maers( This change is not tobe achieved through the traditional method of superiorit' on the battlefield( =ather it is to be

accomplished through the superior use of all the networs available in the information age( These

networs are emplo'ed to carr' specific messages to enem' polic'maers( 8 sophisticated

opponent can even tailor the message to a specific audience and a specific strategic situation(

Tacticall'! fourth generation war willH

6e fought in a comple0 arena of low#intensit' conflict(

Include tacticsLtechni5ues from earlier generations(

6e fought across the spectrum of political! social! economic! and militar' networs(

6e fought worldwide through these networs(

Involve a mi0 of national! international! transnational! and subnational actors(

The strategic approach and tactical techni5ues of fourth generation warfare will re5uire ma,or

changes in the wa' we educate! emplo'! structure! and train forces( rofessional education! from

initial#entr' training to war#college level! will have to be broadened to deal with the wide spectrum

of issues commanders will confront in a fourth generation conflict( 8s 8r5uilla and onfeldt stated!

leaders must be prepared to group together from a new perspective a number of measures that

have been used before but were viewed separatel'( Training .as distinct from education/ must

e0pand to deal with tactical situations uni5ue to fourth generation warfare! such as staged

confrontations between securit' forces and unarmed women and children( -urther! this broadened

education must not be limited to militar' officers but must include decision maers from all agencies

of the government involved with international securit' issues(

3e must go be'ond ,oint operations to interagenc' operations( If the enem' is going to strie

across the spectrum of human activit'! our national response must be coordinated across the

multiple national agencies that deal with international issues( Eust as ,oint undertaing had to

evolve graduall' into full#fledged ,oint operations! so will interagenc' operations have to mature

from simple meetings to discuss cooperation into full' integrated national operations( -orce

structure must be reconsidered in light of fourth generation issues(

-ourth generation war will re5uire much more intelligence gathering and anal'tical and

dissemination capabilit' to serve a highl' fle0ible! interagenc' command s'stem( 8t the same time!

the fact that fourth generation war will include elements of earlier generations of war means ourforces must be prepared to deal with these aspects too(

-inall'! ,ust as man' current conflicts do not emplo' third generation tactics! not all future conflicts

will be fought primaril' using fourth generation tactics( Therefore! it will be essential for national

leaders to mae an accurate anal'sis of the war the' are about to enter( The comple0 mi0 of

generations of war with their overlapping political! economic! social! militar'! and mass media

arenas maes determining the t'pe of war we are entering more critical than ever( 3hile much of


15/15

Clausewitz "n %ar has been rendered obsolete b' the enormous changes in the world! his

admonition to national leaders remains more important than ever( Clausewitz wroteH

The first! the supreme! the most far reaching act of ,udgment that the statesman and commander

have to mae is to establish b' that test the ind of war on which the' are embaringA neither

mistaing it for! nor tr'ing to turn it into! something that is alien to its nature(

Colonel T( N( +ammes is now .:&&4/ a senior militar' fellow at the 7ational )efense >niversit' in

3ashington! )C(

Documents

Evolution of War the Fourth Generation