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EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? Ingo Bunzeck, Martine Uyterlinde ECN Policy Studies www.ecn.nl Alter-Motive mid-term conference, Vienna, April 20, 2010

EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

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Page 1: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? Ingo Bunzeck, Martine Uyterlinde

ECN Policy Studies

www.ecn.nlAlter-Motive mid-term conference, Vienna, April 20, 2010

Page 2: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

“I just don’t understand what people have i t l t i hi l blagainst electric vehicles – my power cable

reaches from home to work.

2

Page 3: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Main messages

• The CO2 emission reduction from electric vehicles can be substantial…- depending on the method of electricity

generation• Electric vehicles need innovation policy, to be

coordinated with power sector to realize full potentialpotential

• RES-E has advantages over nuclear due to its flexibility in terms of location and size

• (Political) Action is required now to bring about the desired changes

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Page 4: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

The challenge

100%

120%

00%

) 3 °CEU-27 All sectors

100%

120%

00%

) 3 °CEU-27 All sectors

80%

s (1

990

= 10

2 5 °C

80%

s (1

990

= 10

2 5 °C

40%

60%

em

issi

ons

reduction60 - 80%

2.5 °C

40%

60%

em

issi

ons

reduction60 - 80%

2.5 °C

20%

40%

EU-2

7 C

O2

80 - 90%2 °C

Annual growth rate: 1.4% p.a.avg. 2000 - 2005

20%

40%

EU-2

7 C

O2

80 - 90%2 °C

Annual growth rate: 1.4% p.a.avg. 2000 - 2005

0%1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

E 80 90%EU-27 Transport

0%1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

E 80 90%EU-27 Transport

4

(graph adapted from [EEA 2009])

Page 5: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Policy options - road transport

1. Reduce transport demand2 I d i i b h i2. Improve driving behaviour3. Improve vehicle efficiency 4 U l b f l4. Use low carbon fuels

… extra innovation?Bi f lBiofuelsHydrogen in fuel cell carsElectric cars and plug-insI t lli t T tIntelligent Transport Systems

5

Page 6: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Our future car: PHEV, EV or H2FC?(Green) (bio)

ICE(Green)

electricity( )fuel

HEV PHEV

E-motor EV

H2FC

FCICE: internal combustion engine; FC: fuel cell; HEV: hybrid electric vehicle; PHEV:

HydrogenReduction of CO and local emissions

6

ICE: internal combustion engine; FC: fuel cell; HEV: hybrid-electric vehicle; PHEV: plug-in hybrid-electric vehicle; EV: electric vehicle; H2FC: hydrogen fuel cell vehicle

Reduction of CO2 and local emissions

Page 7: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Every option has individual advantages in the market segmentg

7Source: Lars-Peter Thiesen, GM Europe

Page 8: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

New market actors

8

Page 9: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

CO2 emissions depend on electricity generating mix

[Mton]g g

• Strongly depend on renewable or

40

45[Mton]

Other Coalrenewable or sustainable RES-E

• Moment of charging! 30

35 innovations

EV andPHEVRES• Incremental options

do not offer sufficient savings potential 20

25PHEVRES-

E

• AND: It saves primary energy because it is more

10

15Historische dataReferentiescenarioScenario 1Scenario 2

Historical data

Reference scenario

because it is more energy efficient

0

5

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

Scenario 3Scenario 3 met 100 g/kWhScenario 3 met 600 g/kWhScenario 3 with 100 g/kWhScenario 3 with 600 g/kWh

9

Page 10: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Grid impact of increased RES-E

The often variable nature of RES-E (wind, solar) can cause a mismatch between supply and demand when a high share of pp y grenewable energy is to be implemented

Example: wind energy providing 50% of all electricity

production > demand

demand > production Storage / backup needed

Source: EcoGrid 2007

1010

demand > production g p

Page 11: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Stages for grid related services of EVs Two main options to use EVs as enablers for increased RES-E

Charging regulation

Grid related services(V2G) EU

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Page 12: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Developing world: window of opportunity for EVsbecause of lower consumer demands?

1212

Page 13: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

P li i i l EVPolicy options to stimulate EVs• To stimulate large scale introduction of EV’s and co-evolution with

Prepare for EV’s Increase RES-E production

Ensure balanced grid development

RES-E, a two-phased, long term policy approach is needed:

Phase 1• Infrastructure and

standardization• Pilot fleets in niche

k l i

production

• Feed-in tariffs or premiums

• RPS or obligations

grid development

• Priority access for renewables

• Coordinate h i l d

Phase 1Market Preparation

I

Increase

markets - learning effects and cost reductions

• Provide long term perspecti e to

• Cap and trade technical and institutional efforts

• Smart grids and active load management

Increase

deplo

system

integr

perspective to industry

managementoyment

of

EV

t

ation

to

enabl

Phase 2Deployment

to

reach

mass

le

higher

use

1313

markets

of

EV

and

RES

Page 14: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Current RES-E policies are strengthened with increased penetration of EVs

• Direct incentive because absolute RES-E target increases with growth of electricity consumption from EV

RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EVy

• Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of e g wind power -Feed-in tariffs or improves the profitability of e.g. wind power -more RES-E supported with same subsidy budget premiums

• Enabling role in providing transparency to EV owner Certificate systems

• Indirect incentive through increased CO2 price to RES-E or other low-carbon electricity

Cap and trade systems

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Page 15: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

In Europe, EVs shift part of transport sector’s energy consumption under ETSp

EVs substituting conventional cars:

• More CO2 in ETSETS

• Incentive for RES-E or CCS• Post 2012 ceiling to be negotiated• Refineries included in ETS

Directtransportemissions

Non-ETS

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Page 16: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

N li i id di li k ?New policies to provide a direct linkage?

DSO• Invest energy tax

for traction current in additional RES-E

OEM• Allow to count EV’s

as ZEV if financial contribution per

Utilities• System stabilizing

bonus if consumers connect their car to

Government• Hard coupling:

increase RES-E share in the system

deployment via energy fund

• Requires smart metering

psold EV goes to energy fund (depending on vehicle type MJ/km)

the grid• Set up independent

energy fund that invests in RES-E deployment

ywith growing EV market penetration

• Tax exemption on traction current if from RES EMJ/km)

• Helps lower overallfleet emissions

deployment, financed from DSO and OEM

from RES-E

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Page 17: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Conclusions • Renewables are not dependent on EVs for their full deployment

- BUT EVs may help to increase the uptake of renewable energy

• EVs do need renewables to realise their full benefit:- Reducing greenhouse gas emissions- Reduce dependence on fossil fuels

• A co-evolution between the introduction of electric vehicles and increased renewable electricity production may provide a range of synergies:y g- Buffering peaks in renewable electricity production- Vehicle-to-grid functions: grid stabilisation- Improve the business case for electric vehicles and for renewable p

electricity

• Coordinated policy approaches needed for a balanced development in transport and power sector

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in transport and power sector

Page 18: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Thank you!

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Page 19: EVs and RES-E – are they mutual beneficiaries? · RES-E target as % of electricity demand from EV • Indirect incentive when preferential charging improves the profitability of

Acknowledgements

Parts of this presentation are based on results from the ‘RETRANS’ j t fi d b th IEA‘RETRANS’ project, financed by the IEA.

http://www.iea-retd.org

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