45
1 Exactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP Program Manager GO Cyber Security TVA v 1.0

Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    6

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

1

Exactly the Same, but Different

Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

Program ManagerGO Cyber SecurityTVA

v 1.0

Page 2: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

2

Agenda

� Define Mobile Device Security

o Similarities

o Differences

� Things you Should be Doing

Page 3: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

3

Mobile Device Security

“There is no question that mobile security will eventually equal – if not surpass – PC security as a threat to IT departments.”Denise Culver, Heavy Reading Mobile Networks Insider

Page 4: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

4

Mobile Device vs. Computers:SIMILARITIES

Page 5: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

5

Definitions: Level Setting

Com·put·er [kuhm-pyoo-ter] : An electronic device designed to accept data, perform prescribed mathematical and logical operations at high speed, and display the results of these operations.

Mo·bile De·vice [moh-buhl dih-vahys] :A portable, wireless computing device that is small enough to be used while held in the hand; a hand-held.

Source: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/computer

Page 6: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

6

Page 7: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

7

NEWS FLASH:

MobileDevices

AREComputers!!!

Sources: http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/prog_030402_all.pdf http://www.anandtech.com/show/4215/apple-ipad-2-benchmarked-dualcore-cortex-a9-powervr-sgx-543mp2/2http://www.slashgear.com/ipad-2-benchmarks-blast-competition-show-less-than-1ghz-processor-speed-13139678/

…and we can do something about that, can’t we?

Page 8: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

8

Same Kind of Different…

Same kind of security controls you *should* use anyway:� Encryption� NAC� DLP� AV / Malware� Inventory Management� Controlled Admin Privileges� Port & Service Management

Page 9: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

9

Similarity: Order of Magnitude

Risk from an OSI perspective:

� Most risk shifting to applications

� Lower-level layers becoming relativelymore ‘tame’

Source: http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/trends.php

Page 10: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

10

Define: Metadata

Metadata : Data that defines or describes another piece of data.

Metadata may reveal more about you, your organization, or your devices than you realize. Many devices, such as your computer, camera, or smart phone, automatically embed metadata in any digital files they create.

Source: http://www.securingthehuman.org/newsletters/ouch/issues/OUCH-201204_en.pdf

Page 11: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

11

Metadata

Some examples of metadata include:� File creation date and time� The address or geographic location where the file was created� Your name, organization’s name, and computer’s name or IP address� The names of any contributors to the document or their comments� Type of camera you are using and its settings when the photo was

taken� Type of audio or video recording device you are using and its settings

when a recording was taken� Make, model, and service provider of your smart phone

Source: http://www.securingthehuman.org/newsletters/ouch/issues/OUCH-201204_en.pdf

Page 12: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

12

Metadata Solutions

Metadata Tools:

� Document Inspector : http://preview.tinyurl.com/3996c2a

� EXIF Metadata Explanation: http://preview.tinyurl.com/775mbxc

� Free Metadata Extraction Tool: http://meta-extractor.sourceforge.netor http://preview.tinyurl.com/aueb4

� Disabling Geo-location for Smartphone Camerashttp://preview.tinyurl.com/3v4xznm

Source: http://www.securingthehuman.org/newsletters/ouch/issues/OUCH-201204_en.pdf

Page 13: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

* ( + )=

13

Unsecured WAP – Sidejack Math

� Sidejacking - A well-known Wi-Fi hotspot attack that takes advantage of websites that don’t use SSL/TLS encryption correctly by pirating the legitimate user’s cookies and using those in the attacker’s session (session hijacking)

� Firesheep – A Mozilla Firefox plug-in that automates session hijacking attacks over unsecured Wi-Fi networks. The packet sniffer analyzes traffic between a Wi-Fi router and a person’s laptop or smartphone and captures the session cookie ("point-and-click" sidejacking)

Source: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/2240112288/Top-5-mobile-phone-security-threats-in-2012http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/answer/Be-aware-of-Wi-Fi-security-to-deal-with-Firesheep-at-public-hotspots

Page 14: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

14

Mobile Device vs. Computers:DIFFERENCES

Page 15: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

15

Risk Remediation

Mobile Device risks are the same as many of the risks we already face everyday. For example…

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4_qg22Onak&feature=related

Page 16: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

16

Difference 1: BYOD

Source: http://www.sans.org; SANS Mobility / BYOD Security Survey March 2012 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2012/041712-byod-258264.html?page=3

How do you handle user-owned devices?� Applications� Data Ownership� Encryption

NetworkWorld BYOD Survey:65.3% necessary tools not in place46.2% increased end user productivity5.7% said it lead to breech, while 66.7% said no 47.2% increased end users' ability to work from home

SANS Survey:

Page 17: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

17

Difference 2: SMS

SMS: Short Messaging Service, or text messages

Common Vulnerabilities:

1) SMS of Death2) Midnight Raid Business Card Attack3) SMS Tokens4) Smishing Attacks

Source: http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/12656-The-SMS-of-Death-Mobile-Phone-Attack-Explained.htmlhttp://www.csoonline.com/article/491200/3-simple-steps-to-hack-a-smartphone-includes-video-

Page 18: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

18

SANS Survey: Platform Support

Source: http://www.sans.org; SANS Mobility / BYOD Security Survey March 2012

Page 19: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

19

SANS Survey: Platform Support

Source: http://www.sans.org; SANS Mobility / BYOD Security Survey March 2012

Page 20: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

20

Each platform – even within the same OS – have unique characteristics, default settings, and/or vulnerabilities:

� PIN settings– Service Carrier– Like default passwords on

routers or admin accounts� iPhone / iPad batteries

Scope: Android Fragmentation� 281+ different products� 850,000 daily activations� 300,000,000+ total devices

Sources: http://www.securingthehuman.org/newsletters/ouch/issues/OUCH-201204_en.pdfhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Android_devices

Difference 3: Hardware / Carrier

Page 21: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

21

Hardware / Carrier: PIN Codes

Ten numbers represent 15% of all cell phone pass codes

Sources: Rooney, Ben (15 June 2011). "Once Again, 1234 Is Not A Good Password". The Wall Street Journal. http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2011/06/15/once-again-1234-is-not-a-good-password/.Retrieved 8 July 2011.

http://www.phonearena.com/news/Do-you-use-one-of-the-most-common-lock-PINs_id19533

Page 22: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

22

Hardware / Carrier: PIN Codes

Ten numbers represent 15% of all cell phone pass codes:

1) 12342) 00003) 25804) 11115) 5555

Sources: Rooney, Ben (15 June 2011). "Once Again, 1234 Is Not A Good Password". The Wall Street Journal. http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2011/06/15/once-again-1234-is-not-a-good-password/. Retrieved 8 July 2011.

http://www.phonearena.com/news/Do-you-use-one-of-the-most-common-lock-PINs_id19533

6) 5683 (spells 'LOVE')7) 08528) 22229) 121210) 1998

Other popular choices include Year of birth & Year of graduation (social triangulation!).

Page 23: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

23

PIN Code >>> Data Loss

CASE STUDY: VERIZON WIRELESS

Corporate Support Web Page

How do I access my Voice Mail to retrieve messages?� To access your Voice Mail, press "*VM" (*86), then "SEND." Follow

the prompts to enter your password and retrieve your messages. If you press "*VM" (*86) and hear your own or a system greeting, press the # key to interrupt the greeting and follow the prompts to enter your password and retrieve your messages.

Source: http://support.verizonwireless.com/clc/faqs/Features and Optional Services/faq_voice_mail.html

Page 24: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

24

Difference 4: Caller ID / ANI

ANI : Automatic Number Identification (NAC for cell phones)

Masquerading as the target cell number, threat actors may be able to steal unsecured data. Possible vectors include:

� VXML� Social Engineering� Orange Box Spoofing

Sources: http://wiki.docdroppers.org/index.php?title=ANI_and_Caller_ID_Spoofing#So.2C_just_what_is_ANI.3Fhttp://www.ncvc.org/src/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=44055

Page 25: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

25

Social Engineering: Telco

Social Hack Scenario:You pick up the phone, at the dial tone call 10102880

AT&T Automated Operator: "AT&T,�to�place�a�call…"�Enter 800-646-0000

AT&T Automated Operator: "Thank�you�for�using�AT&T"�<RING>�

Telus: This�is�the�Telus�operator,�Lisa�speaking.�(or,�This�is�the�Telus�operator,�what�number�are�you�calling�from?)�

You: Hi�Lisa,�This�is�the�Telus�technician,�you�should�see�an�ANI�failure�on�your�screen,�I'm�calling�from�[number to spoof] I�need�you�to�place�a�test�call�to�[number to call]

Telus: Thank�you�from�Telus�

Source: http://wiki.docdroppers.org/index.php?title=ANI_and_Caller_ID_Spoofing#So.2C_just_what_is_ANI.3F

Page 26: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

26

Threat Actors

The APT in action…

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ETMkub3NwK0

Page 27: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

27

Application Vulnerabilities

� Native to many mobile OS (smart phone & tablet)Mobile Device Management (MDM)

� Default Permissions may be invasivee.g., Apple log file stores all visited geo-locations

� Open Web Application Security Consortium (OWASP)https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_device_management

“Application security is the next big trend in penetration testing… which means it’s already the big trend for hackers.”Joe McCray, Strategic Security LLC

Page 28: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

28

Lessons Learned

Top 5 from the 2012 SANS Mobile Device Security Summit

1) Jailbreaking & Rooting is BAD for mobile device security

2) The OWASP Mobile Top 10 is going to be just as important

3) Mobile Threats are an evolving, moving target; security teams have to be quick to adapt to new mobile technology

4) Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions are a requirement for any deployment

5) Apple iOS devices are preferred over Android in the enterprise

Source: http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/20752-Top-5-Things-Learned-at-the-SANS-Mobile-Device-Security-Conference

Page 29: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

Mike Jones, Symantec

29

Things You Should Be Doing

“For many professionals, the mobile phone has become a mobile office.”

Mike Jones, Symantec

Page 30: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

30

Control Starts at the Policy

Source: http://www.sans.org; SANS Mobility / BYOD Security Survey March 2012

Page 31: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

31

Mobile Policy Best Practices

� Think from a threat controls perspective:

o Consider capabilities of mobile devices and apps in your environment

o Identify threat vectors & mitigate

o Identify non-technically enforceable controls and address with administrative policies & awareness

� Assess how mobile devices are already managed

� Use existing policies as a guideline

� Consider how to test successful control implementation

Source: http://www.sans.org; SANS Mobility / BYOD Security Survey March 2012

Page 32: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

32

2012 Top 5 Mobile Security Threats

1) Geolocation exploits2) Excessive Permissions3) Mobile Application Vulnerabilities4) Unsecure Wi-Fi5) Lost and Stolen Devices

Source: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/2240112288/Top-5-mobile-phone-security-threats-in-2012

Page 33: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

33

Mobile Risk Management Tools

Source: http://www.sans.org; SANS Mobility / BYOD Security Survey March 2012

Page 34: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

34

Protecting the Mobile Executive

Considerations for your Mobile Policy / Best Practices:

� USER EDUCATION

� Physical Security

� Leave it at Home– Clean Loaner Devices– Prepaid Cellular devices– Blank SIM cards– * + Google Voice

Source: http://threatpost.com/en_us/slideshow/How%20to%20Avoid%20Getting%20Hacked%20While%20Traveling?page=0

� Fear Public Wireless– Use Conference WAPs– Corporate VPNs

� 2G = No E!

� Don’t Blab

Page 35: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

35

Its About the Basics

Verizon Business 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)

Analysis of 2011 attacks determined that:

� 83% were targets of opportunity

� 92% were not highly difficult

� 95% were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls

Source: http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf

Page 36: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

SANS Top 20 Controls (v 3.1)

1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, & Servers

4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment & Remediation

5: Malware Defenses

6: Application Software Security

7: Wireless Device Control

8: Data Recovery Capability

9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps36

10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches

11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services

12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges

13: Boundary Defense

14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Security Audit Logs

15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know

16: Account Monitoring and Control

17: Data Loss Prevention

18: Incident Response Capability

19: Secure Network Engineering

20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises

Page 37: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

37

Summary

� Mobile Devices vs. Computerso Similarities (yes Forrest, they are computers)

o Differences� SMS� Native Metadata� Hardware / Carrier Issues (PINs, etc)� Sidejacking� Application Vulnerabilities

� Things you Should be Doingo Policieso User Educationo Protect the Execso SANS Top 20 <-> Top 5 Mobile

Page 38: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

38

Questions

Page 39: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

39

New Mobile Security Tools

“Bleeding Edge” Mobile Security Solutions

Page 40: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

40

New Mobile Security Tools

Can you hear me NOW, punk?!?

Page 41: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

41

New Mobile Security Tools

AndroidSecurity

If you need to ask, you don’t need to know.

Really.

Source:http://www.techrepublic.com/photos/obscure-costumes-at-emerald-city-comic-con-2012/6357085?seq=24&tag=thumbnail-view-selector;get-photo-roto

Page 42: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

42

New Mobile Security Tools

Sometimes Simple Security = Great Solutions…

Page 43: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

43

New Mobile Security Tools

Hot from the UK: Less Mobile = Harder to Steal

Page 44: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

44

New Mobile Security Tools

Old School Tech

Page 45: Exactly the Same, but Different - ISSA Chattanoogachattanooga.issa.org/.../01/Mobile_Device_Security_sm.pdfExactly the Same, but Different Shayne Champion, CISSP, CISA, GSEC, ABCP

45

New Mobile Security Tools

Keeping ahead of the Technology Curve…

Source:http://www.techrepublic.com/photos/obscure-costumes-at-emerald-city-comic-con-2012/6357085?seq=24&tag=thumbnail-view-selector;get-photo-roto