Dialogue Regarding Platonic Forms, etc.

> PETER:> There may be all sorts of consonances between Shaykhi ideas> and Babi and Baha'i ideas, so I for one would be very> interested to know what Shaykh Ahmad wrote about Platonic> forms.

KEVENHere is a provisional translation of mine of an important passage fromShaykh Ahmad's Sharh al-Masha'ir that mentions the Platonic Forms. As thisis only part of three pages from a 300 page book devoted to this subject, wecan imagine how much we have yet to learn from Shaykh Ahmad! It should benoted that 'Abdu'l-Baha refers to Shaykh Ahmad and Siyyid Kazim as "the twomost great names who were calling aloud in the wilderness of the Spirit, thevale of rapture, announcing the glad-tidings of the Manifestation of God"and he refers to them as the "seals of commentary and exposition"(Ma'idiy-i-Asmani 9:52).

Passage from Shaykh Ahmad:          “The truth is that when the creative action is related toexistence, it is the Will; when it is related to the archetype ('ayn), inother words, the species form, it is Purpose; and when it is related to thelimitations of the created, that is to say, their topography (handasa)-whichincludes length and breadth, continuance and mortality, term of duration,and the like-it is predestination. Through the accomplishment of the act ofcreation and the thing itself, it is fate; and through its manifestation,the revealing of causes, and the disclosure of means, it is execution.            “In regard to the Pen, it is that which draws from the Inkwelland produces the Tablet. The Pen is the Universal Mind, and the Tablet isthe Universal Soul. The transcendent Platonic Models exist through thejoining of the Mím and the Thá, and they are the forms of things. Some havecharged that Plato established the forms of things, which are their causesand their realities, in the Essence of the Emanating Source, by which ismeant their establishment in the Essence of God, exalted and glorified beHe. The statements of the people correspond with this meaning. Theyestablished all things in His Essence in a mode nobler than they are inthemselves. Mullá Muhsin Fayd said in his epistle that all things have anexistence in the Essence essentially posterior to the stage of His knowledgeof Himself. So the stage without the concomitance of multiplicity in HisEssence, by reason of their multiplicity, is applicable to the order whichjoins multiplicity to oneness. This is what he has stated in the Kalimátal-Maknúnah (Hidden Words) describing the existence of the world:

’Existence was a latent state in Him free of any archetype, but the archetypeis disposed for that existence by the Command. When God commanded, thePurpose of the Creator became attached to it, and His Command was unitedwith the notion of the archetype. Through it the existence latent in Himpassed from potentiality into actuality. Therefore, the locus ofmanifestation for its being is the Real, and the existent itself is thereceiver of that existence. Were it not for its receptivity and dispositionto receive existence, it could not exist. Moreover, God would not havegenerated it unless it had a fixed archetype in the divine Knowledgecorresponding to its essential, uncreated disposition, its receptivity forexistence, its worthiness to hearken to the word "Be!" and its fitness toreceive the same. He would not have called it into being unless it was inHim. Or we say, the essence of the inner name is the same as the essence ofthe outer name. The recipient is the same as the agent, and the uncreatedarchetype is the same as God, so His action and receptivity are His twohands. He is the agent by one of the hands and the recipient by the other.The Essence is one, and the multiple are impressions [in Him]. Thus it istrue that He has created nothing except Himself, and what He has created areHis manifestations.’…

            “But those who know the intent of Plato recognize that he meansby that which contains the Platonic Forms (al-muthul) the originalfoundation (al-'unsur al-aslí) from which all things were created, for hefollows the meaning of his predecessors, who derived most of philosophy fromthe Prophets. Sometimes they speak of "the Essence of God," but they intendthe essence of the universal Vicegerent of God, in the sense that it is anessence from God that He has related to Himself as a position of honor. AsHe says: ‘I breathed into him a measure of My spirit’ (Qur'án 15:29). 'Alí has alsodescribed the honored position of their souls: ‘Its root is the Intellect.From it, it began; through it, it is heedful; to it, it points andsignifies; and unto it, it returns when it is perfect and resembles it. Fromit, all existents began, and unto it they return in perfection. It is theEssence of God, the Most High, the Blessed Tree, the Sadratu'l-Muntahá, andthe Paradise of the Water. Whosoever recognizes it shall never be wretched,and whosoever fails to recognize it shall fall into error and go astray.’

“The traditions differ outwardly on the meaning of this root. The learnedalso differ in regard to it. Thus, it is said to be the water ‘from which Hemade every living thing’ (Qur'án 21:30), or it is said to be existence, or theIntellect, or the Throne, or the Tablet. It is possible, however, toharmonize these various statements. If it is said to be existence, what ismeant is matter, as we have established. If it is said to be water, theexponents of the outer meaning and the exponents of the inner meaning agreethat it is existence, which the latter interpret as matter on account of itsreceptivity to a never ending succession of forms. Those who say it is theIntellect intend by what it contains the ideas of things free of temporalextension, elemental matter, and melancholic, psychic, and imaginal form.

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Those who say it is the Throne mean that upon it is a likeness of eachthing, as they recount from Sádiq about the wonders of creation: ‘Eachbeliever has a likeness upon the Throne, such that when he performs anobligatory prayer his likeness does the same, whereupon the angels bless himand ask for his forgiveness. And when a servant is disobedient, God causes acurtain of night to descend around his likeness, of which the angels areaware.’ This is the explanation of his words: ‘O Thou Who displayest what isbeautiful and concealest what is ugly.’ In the Khu?batu'l-Bayán, he says:’The possessor of the Throne has exalted stations, and upon that Throne arelikenesses of whatever God has created on land and sea.’ This is the meaningof His utterance: ‘Nothing exists whose treasury is not with Us’(Qur'án 15:21).Those who say it is the Tablet intend the Universal Soul, which is the locus ofthe second creation and the first congelation….

“He [Sadrá] intends by his words ‘what is beyond the Intellect’the supreme Object of worship, exalted and glorified be He…But it isevident from the teachings of the people of the House, as their traditionsmake clear without any contradiction and the Book of God affirms (and themind is illumined by their lights), that beyond the Intellect is the deadearth, or the barren earth, which is the earth of potentialities, or the oil’which is nearly luminous though no fire toucheth it’ (Qur'án 24:35). Beyond this is the water from which God ‘made every living thing’ (Qur'án 21:30), and it is the existence that flows forth through the action of God without an intermediary. From one perspective, this is the foundation which Plato intended contains the models of all things. But from another perspective, the foundation which contains the models is the barren earth. The origin, therefore, of these models is either (1) the shares of primary matter, or active matter, which is the water and existence, or (2) the shares of forms and differentia, which is the oil and the barren earth.

“In short, what is meant by the foundation ('unsur) is theInkwell, which is both the receiver and what is received. The Pen, whichmore properly speaking is the Intellect, draws from the Inkwell and producesthe Tablet by means of spiritual elements which then act as seeds for thecomposition of the body of man. So prior to it [the Pen] is the Will of God,which is His action; eternity (sarmad), which is His time; and the possible,which is His place and the most great chasm. These three things are what tipthe scales in favor of existence. It is allowable to say that the water andthe barren earth derive from these three, and that they belong to delimitedexistence.[1] So the things beyond the Intellect are five, and God is theencompasser beyond them. All of them are created by God through His action.

“The meaning of the author [Sadrá] is that the Intellect isuncompounded, and that which is beyond it is uncompounded, namely, God, andsince all is an uncompounded reality (basít al-haqíqa), then He is all theexistents. But this view is false, for the Intellect is not uncompounded,except in relation to what is below it in the temporal world. They have onlyconceived it to be uncompounded based upon the words of the ancientphilosophers, who obtained wisdom from the Prophets. It may be that aphilosopher deduced it from their sayings, so the error is in the deduction.

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They wrote their books in Syriac, and when they were translated into Arabicsome errors in interpreting and understanding the words of the masters mayhave occurred. For instance, when they said this Intellect is pure(mujarrad), they meant that it is free of elemental matter, temporalextension, and melancholic, psychic, and imaginal form. He [Sadrá] hasasserted that the Intellect is utterly uncompounded, as is applicable to theCreator, exalted be He. But whatever is created, without a doubt, iscomposed of two aspects, and aspect from its Lord, which is existence, ormatter; and an aspect from itself, which is the quiddity, or form. This isbecause every contingent thing is a composite pair, and nothing other thanGod has an uncompounded nature. How then can it be said to be uncompounded?”

(translated from Sharh al-Mashá'ir, pp. 15-18)

[1] In his writings, Shaykh Ahmad divides existence (wujúd) into threecategories: (1) real existence (al-wujud al-haqq), which belongs only toGod, (2) absolute existence (al-wujúd al-mutlaq), which belongs to the worldof Command-this is the existentiational action [ibdá' ] which includes thestages of Will and Purpose-and (3) delimited existence (al-wujúdal-muqayyid), which belongs to the world of created things (khalq). ShaykhAhmad explains that this third type of existence is "the things generated,whose beginning is the Universal Mind" (Rasá'il, p. 44),  "all the outcomesof the acting" (Fawá'id, p. 98), and "existence as delimited byindividuations, which is the existence of beings composed of substances andaccidents in the hidden and manifest worlds" (Mashá'ir, p. 136). Heclarifies that "absolute existence may be applied to  the water and thebarren earth, for it is before the state of delimitation" (Ibid., p. 138),but sometimes he associates these two with delimited existence, as above.

> PETER:> Socrates and Hippocrates and Aristotle and Hermes and yet> others have been praised in the Baha'i source literature as> divine philosophers.  We are not asserting that the Baha'i> Writings embody Socratic dialogue or Hippocratian medicine> or Aristotelian astronomy or Hermetic gnosticism, so why> would we assume that Plato's Forms would come along with> praise of his garden work?

KEVEN:The Forms are the core concept of Plato's philosophy and everything else inhis philosophy revolves around acceptance of the Forms. Without the FormsPlato's philosophy is meaningless. In Islam, it was Suhrawardi whoapprehended and restored Plato's Forms to close to their original meaning,exposed the erroneous conceptions of the Peripatetics concerning the Forms,and established their importance. All major Islamic philosophers afterSuhrawardi down to Shaykh Ahmad accept a Platonic version of the PlatonicForms, which is easy to understand, since Plato's theory harmonizes well

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with the doctrine of creation. It is not without reason that 'Abdu'l-Baha inhis talk at the Open Forum in San Francisco gives the view of "thephilosophers of the East," who he explains to be "Plato, Aristotle, and thephilosophers of Iran" as concordant with his explanation of evolution. Fromstatements of Baha'u'llah and 'Abdu'l-Baha, however, I would rankPlato/Socrates above Aristotle in terms of spiritual perception. Baha'u'llahcalls Aristotle "the well-known man of knowledge" but refers to Plato as"divine" and to Socrates as one who "drank one draught when the Most GreatOcean overflowed with gleaming and life-giving waters" (Tablets 146-147).Further 'Abdu'l-Baha says of Aristotle in a letter to an individual: "He wasa philosopher of the world of bodies, but thou art a physician of the worldof souls. Although that celebrated man was peerless and his fame worldencompassing, he was unaware of the luminous world and did not receive afull share and portion of God's eternal outpouring" (International Baha'iArchives AC001/001/01552).

> PETER:> I would be very much obliged if you could cite some> examples.

KEVEN:Here is a passage from 'Abdu'l-Baha which I believe uses explicitly Platoniclanguage in describing the nature of the temporal world and its relation toan unchanging world:

"That which thou beholdest in this temporal world arethe fleeting shadows of the world of the Kingdom and the external images ofthe celestial realm. This is why thou observest that these shadows and formsare continuously being renewed. They are not permanent, but the successionof similar forms and like states is such as to give the appearance ofpermanence. In the end, however, it will become clear that it was a mirage,not real water; illusions, not the realities of the signs" (provisionaltranslation from Muntakhabat 3:23).

This passage is harmonious with Plato's exposition in the Timaeus where hedescribes a threefold division of reality:(1) an intelligible and unchangingmodel (2) a visible and changing copy of it, and (3) the receptacle, thenurse of becoming and change. He says:

"Whenever we see anything in process of change, for example fire, we should speak of it not as being a thing butas having a quality; water, again we should speak of not as a thing but ashaving a quality. And in general we should never speak as if any of thethings we suppose we can indicate by pointing and using expressions 'thisthing' or 'that thing' have any permanent reality: for they have nostability and elude the designation 'this' or 'that' or any other that

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expresses permanence. We should not use these expressions of them, but ineach and every case speak of a continually recurrent similar quality. Thuswe should give the name fire to one uniformly occurring quality, and so onfor everything else in process of change....The same argument applies to thenatural receptacle of all bodies [equiv. to 'Abdu'l-Baha's ether]. It canalways be called the same because it never alters its characteristics. Forit continues to receive all things, and never itself takes a permanentimpress from any of the things that enter it; it is a kind of neutralplastic material on which changing impressions are stamped by the thingswhich enter it, making it appear different at different times. And thethings which pass in and out of it are copies of the eternal realities,whose form they take in a wonderful way that is hard to describe" (Timaeus49-51).

To make further comparison, "realities" in 'Abdu'l-Baha's statementcorresponds, I believe, to "eternal realities" in Plato's statement, and"fleeting shadows" and "signs" in 'Abdu'l-Baha corresponds to "changingcopies" and "qualities" in Plato. Here we also have the unknowable-in-itselfessence of things and the temporal knowable attributes which correspond tothose realities.

Here is a passage from the Bab, Whose philosophical writings from what I cangrasp appear to correspond with the views of Shaykh Ahmad, which containsstrongly Platonic terminology:

"Those who say the fixed archetypes reside inthe Essence of God in order to establish His knowledge, as all believe savethose whom God hath pleased to preserve, have completely forsaken thereligion of the Family of God, for any reference to otherness in their beingtestifieth to their separation and indicateth their complete rupture fromGod. God is the eternal Being, Who from time immemorial hath not changed,and it is not possible for divine unity to belong to anyone save Himself.Rather all things are the images of substances (jawhariyyát) whose existence hathno trace in God" (provisional translation from Amr va Khalq 1:101).

> PETER:> I don?t think any of you have yet> responded to my suggestion that there may be three kinds of> essence: 1) the essence in the sense of the individual> identity, selfhood, personhood; 2) the essence in the sense> of the class membership, being a mineral or vegetable or> animal or human; 3) the essence in the sense of what is> important about something.  If there are three distinct> kinds of essence, then does 1) apply to things other than> human beings?  Does 2) apply to things in a general sense,> regardless of whether individual things exist or not?  Does

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> 3) have any function other than as an individual and social> statement of value?

KEVEN:I think you have made a good division of the kinds of essence, but I wouldadd a fourth category. My list would include (1) essence in the sense ofindividual identity. This kind of essence corresponds to actual individualbeings. Of this kind, only human souls survive death. Aristotle would callthis the substance. (2) real essence in the sense of class membership:Platonic sense. I would redefine this to include all the kinds of thingsthat are possible to exist. These are the realities of things in the PrimalWill. (3) nominal essence (logical universal) in the sense of classmembership: Aristotelian sense. This kind of essence is usually termedquiddity, and it has only a mental existence in human minds. Aristotletermed these secondary substances. (4) essence in a literary sense: What ismost important about something. To answer your question about an atom. It,as well as all other created things, has all these senses of essence. Withrespect to an atom, sense (1) does not survive decomposition; sense (2)always exists at all times for all things; sense (3) exists as long as theirare human minds to abstract universals from particulars; and sense (4)applies in the same sense as (3).

> PETER:> There are essences pertaining to existences in this> physical world and in the spiritual worlds.  Are the> essences physical or spiritual?  The class essences are> called spirits [ruh.], so I very much doubt that they are> physical.  Keven?

KEVEN:I think that essences are not physical, except in the case of definition(1), where essence is equivalent to individual identity. But the individualidentity in the case of humans continues after death, so it is both physicaland non-physical. The physical part of the identity is lost upondecomposition. Spirits (ruh) are not really class essences in sense (2)above. I would translate ruh here as power, so we have the power of growth,which is the plant spirit, the power of sense perception, which is theanimal spirit, and so on. These powers, including the human power ofintellect, emerge during the course of evolution as a result of thecombination of the elements in certain configurations.

> PETER:> Based on these references, as well as the ones you cited,> are you certain that the Central Figures and the Guardian> regarded Aristotle as inferior to Plato?  My understanding> so far has been that BH and AB harmonize the Aristotelian

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> and Platonic points of view in a "God's eye perspective".>  Wouldn't you agree that many of the Islamic philosophers> attempted to do the very same, whether Ibn Sina,> al-Suhrawardi or Mulla Sadra?

KEVEN:What I stated earlier was that I believe Aristotle's station which respectto spiritual reality is inferior to that of Plato and Socrates. I base thisparticularly upon a letter of 'Abdu'l-Baha, which I quoted earlier, where'Abdu'l-Baha clearly states that Aristotle "was a philosopher of the worldof bodies" and "he was unaware of the luminous world and did not receive afull share and portion of God's eternal outpouring" (provisional translationfrom a letter in the International Baha'i Archives, AC001/001/01552). It isPlato and Socrates who were the proponents of the luminous spiritual worldof Forms, whereas Aristotle argued against their existence over and overagain. This in no way diminishes the wonderful contributions to philosophymade by Aristotle, and as Ian has pointed out so well that many of ourBaha'i principles can be traced to Aristotle. Personally, I see no evidencethat the Central Figures attempted to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. What Isee is that the valid doctrines from the teachings of these two greatphilosophers are accepted, while the rest is ignored or in some instancesrefuted. For example, in the same letter quoted above, 'Abdu'l-Baha goes onto say: "Despite Aristotle's position of honor and renown in the respectedbranches of knowledge, new discoveries undermined all his fundamental maximsin the physical sciences in the opinion of the scientific community. TheAlmajest became outdated and its mathematical rules and astronomicalobservations regarded as the idle conjectures of a former age." Although theAlmajest was written by Ptolemy, his atronomical system was based upon thegeocentric system of Aristotle.

> PETER:> Socrates is considered, by Islamic philosophers, as well as> by BH and AB as the "father of philosophy", after> Idris/Hermes that is.  It seems that his ranking as a> philosopher/wise man is only secondary to the Prophets who> are the true originators of philosophy according to Islamic> writers and Baha'i source texts.  Plato, as the "student"> of Socrates, is also very highly ranked in both Islamic and> Baha'i literature.  Hippocrates and Aristotle are also> frequently mentioned.  1) I do not see the Central Figures> or the Guardian ranking the philosophers in order of their> importance, and hence I see no grounds for establishing a> Baha'i doctrine to that effect.  2) I see no purpose in> ranking Plato versus Aristotle, because both contributed> significantly to philosophy.  3) Ranking Plato versus> Aristotle would continue the very longstanding

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> bifurbication of intellectuals into Platonic and> Aristotelian camps.> As far as "many of our Baha'i principles can be traced to> Aristotle", if you mean by this that there are Baha'i> teachings which seem to be in agreement with some of> Aristotle's positions, I think you and Ian may be right> about that.  If what you mean is that BH and AB actually> conveyed principles that are not theirs but which are> rather actually from Aristotle, I very much doubt that this> is the case, since BH is very emphatic in His statement> that His knowledge is innate and divine in origin rather> than acquired and human in source.

KEVEN:On this, I feel the same way that Kevin Hill expressed so well. I think weall use the Writings as our standard, but when we see ideas or statements inthe Writings that appear to be in consonance with the ideas or statements ofa certain philosopher, then I, for one, am eager to go there and learn more,because the Writings often do not provide a lot of details, especially onphilosophical questions. They guide us in the right direction. It was theWritings that led me to Plato, and also to Aristotle, and Hermes, and inthe writings of these great thinkers I have found ideas and statements thathave helped me to better understand concepts expressed in the Baha'iWritings, such as the subject of creation. As Kevin stated, to use thesesources and benefit from them does not in the least belittle the station ofBH or AB or question Their innate knowledge, rather it honors Them, becauseThey have pointed us toward these philosophers. It will take some time forall the Baha'i Writings to be translated and studied before we can say whichaspects of the Baha'i Teachings have correspondences in Plato and Aristotleand which correspond to other philosophers.

> PETER:> In your judgment then, this one passage written by AB> espouses the existence of the Platonic Forms.  And given> that Shaykh Ahmad writes copiously about Platonic concepts,> and, you attest, espouses also the existence of the> Platonic Forms, you have come to the conclusion that> 1) Baha'i metaphysics includes the Platonic Forms.  As you> know, other Baha'i students of the subject have come to> other conclusions, and have affirmed that 2) Baha'i> metaphysics is Aristotelian; 3) Neo-platonist> (Ishraqi/Sadra'i); 4) Relativist.  If we aren't careful, we> are going to end up in doctrinal camps, just as the> followers of other religions have crystallized their> positions and refused to budge!!

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KEVEN:My judgment that the Baha'i Writings support the Platonic Forms is notsupported by only this one statement of 'Abdu'l-Baha. There are many otherstatements. Before I mention just a few, however, I want to ask why thisshould be threatening to anyone? If we find a correspondence between BH andAB's statements and certain ideas in Plato, does this imply that acorrespondence between Them and Aristotle or other philosophers with respectto other ideas is ruled out? Of course not. Baha'u'llah and 'Abdu'l-Baha, inTheir Writings, have given us a true picture of reality. It just so happensthat parts of that picture correspond to important conceptions found in thephilosophy of Plato, and parts of that picture correspond to conceptions ofreality found elsewhere. I personally am aware of aspects from all of thephilosophical views you mention above found in the Baha'i Writings. But myown research of the Writings has led me to give a lot of respect toSocrates/Plato with regard to certain key ideas in the God-Worldrelationship. This does not denigrate or lessen the importance of otherideas found in other philosophies that correspond to the Baha'i Teachings onthis subject. Such a situation, I think, should be a cause of delight forany truth-seeking mind, because it shows us how rich and multi-faceted theBaha'i Writings are.

Earlier I had stated that so far I have found no explicit references toPlatonic Forms in the Baha'i Writings. By explicit I meant the use of theterm "muthul aflatuni," which is an exact Arabic counterpart for "PlatonicForms." There are however implicit references, that is, the use of Arabicterms which are known synonyms in Arabic philosophical texts for thePlatonic Forms. Thus we have "rabb al-naw' " (lord of the species), which isone of the terms Suhrawardi frequently uses for Platonic Forms (see ThePhilosophy of Illumination, trans. John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai. BrighamYoung University Press 1999). In answer to a question about the meaning ofthe "active force" in the Tablet of Wisdom, Baha'u'llah responds: "Theintention of the active force is the lord of the species, and it hath othermeanings" (provisional translation from Athar-i-Qalam A'la, vol. 7, p. 113).Therefore, we have here a clear instance of Baha'u'llah stating that theactive force, as used in the Tablet of Wisdom, refers to the Platonic Forms,although it has other meanings as well. This is unequivocal, and thereshould be no doubt on the basis of this one statement, not to mentionothers, that Baha'u'llah supports the Platonic Forms. There is another termthat is a known philosophical equivalent to Platonic Forms among IslamicPhilosophers, and that is a'yán thábita, "the fixed archetypes." This termoccurs in the Writings of the Bab, Baha'u'llah, and 'Abdu'l-Baha. They donot deny the reality of a'yan thábita, but disagree with Mulla Sadra andcertain Sufis over their location. For instance, the fuller text of apassage I quoted earlier from the Bab reads: "Those who say the fixedarchetypes reside in the Essence of God in order to establish His knowledge,as all believe save those whom God hath pleased to preserve, have completely

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forsaken the religion of the Family of God, for any reference to othernessin their being testifieth to their separation and indicateth their completerupture from God. God is the eternal Being, Who from time immemorial hathnot changed, and it is not possible for divine unity to belong to anyonesave Himself. Rather all things are the images of substances whose existence hathno trace in God" (provisional translation from Sahífiy-i-Tafsír-i-Há, Amr vaKhalq, vol. 1, p. 101). Here the Bab denies the existence of the fixedarchetypes, i.e. Platonic Forms, in God's Essence, and states that they arecompletely separate from God. He goes on to emphasize that all things areimages (asbáh) of substances (jawhariyyát here as synonymous with PlatonicForms or fixed archetypes), whose existence has no trace in God. This is thesame thing that Shaykh Ahmad argues in the long passage I quoted from theMashá'ir. He tries to show that they are located in the Original Foundation,which is both primary form and matter, or the stages of Will and Purpose inthe Seven Stages of coming into being.

PETER:> I had proposed that there were three kinds of essence, and> you suggested that a fourth kind of essence be added.  But> we haven't heard yet from Ian and Theo about these four> kinds of essence, and as I have indicated here, I have> reservations about your fourth essence--simply because I do> not find it positively indicated in the Baha'i source texts.

KEVEN:You are free to understand the Writings as you wish. But I wonder how youwould explain how God creates the things He has created with only referenceto the three essences you have mentioned, that is if you only recognize theAristotelian class essence and not the Platonic one as well?

> PETER:> Do you regard Shaykh Ahmad and Siyyid Kazim as sources of> Baha?I metaphysical doctrine?  Considering the high praise> accorded Plato, do you regard Plato as a source for Baha?I> metaphysical doctrine?

KEVEN:Not sources, but I find that the Baha'i Writings confirm much of what isfound in Plato, Shaykh Ahmad, and Siyyid Kazim. Baha'u'llah's source is theinvisible wellspring of divine guidance.

PETER:> As soon as we call the Baha?I teachings> Platonist or neo-Platonist, or, for that matter,> Aristotelian, existentialist, by any label whatsoever, we> narrow their scope, delimit their range of appeal and

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> reduce their meaning to preconceived and entrenched> positions.  I don?t see how this serves Baha?u?llah?s purpose?

KEVEN:I agree with you completely. Baha'u'llah Revelation transcends all suchlabels. But we can find what I would call Platonic correspondences andAristotelian correspondences in the Writings of Baha'u'llah.

> IAN:> I agree that the Writings do not mention Platonic Forms as> such, but I do think that they re-appear in the 'Names' and attributes> of God from which all things must be derived, at least logically.

KEVEN:As I understand the names and attributes of God, these stand at the verypinnacle of the hierarchy of causation in the world of creation, and in factare part of the World of Command. Regarding the role of God's (created)names and attributes, 'Abdu'l-Baha states: "Praise be to God, Who has evercaused the effects of His names and attributes to penetrate the degrees ofexistence....He has ordained these names and attributes to be the firstprinciple of giving existence in the world of creation and the source of thedifferent grades of realities in the degrees of existence" (Makátíb 1:13quoted in note 1 of my article " 'Abdu'l-Baha's Response to the Doctrine ofthe Unity of Existence, JBS 11:3/4 p. 2). These are the opening word's of'Abdu'l-Baha's significant Tablet known as Lawh Aflakiyyih (Tablet of theUniverse). I would have to disagree that Platonic Forms reappear in thesenames and attributes. It is the other way around, these names and attributesreappear in the Platonic Forms, the next stage down in the divine creativeact. In another famous Tablet of 'Abdu'l-Baha, in which he explains themeaning of the Basmallah, which opens most surahs of the Qur'an, afterexplaining how these names and attributes do not exist in any form in thestation of God (ahadiyya), he continues: "Rather, it is in the station ofunity-multiplicity (wáhidiyya) that the names become manifested,distinguished, realized, established, and given existence--an existencewhich emanateth from the merciful Reality and giveth rise to spiritualrealities and heavenly essences at the level of the fixed archetypes"(provisional translation from Makátíb, vol 1, pp. 49-50). The names andattributes of God, as I understand this passage, act as spiritual elementswhich give rise to "spiritual realities" and "heavenly essences" at thelevel of the fixed archetypes/Platonic Forms. These in turn give rise to thesouls (arwáh) of individual beings in time.

THEO:>  I feel that the major problem with P or NP is the static nature of these Eternal> Forms.  Static just doesn't jive with what we know of creation.  If there> is a dynamicity to these Forms, i find it acceptable, reasonable, supported

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> by science, and intuition.  Does any tradition present a dynamic nature to> the Forms??

KEVEN:YES!! In Shaykh Ahmad, the Platonic Forms take on, for the first time, adynamic nature. Mulla Sadra had proposed that existence itself must be inmotion, hence his idea of haraka jawhariyya (substantive motion). But ShaykhAhmad extended this idea to include the Platonic essences of things as well.Existence-Essence is an unbreakable dynamic polarity, and it is in motion byvirtue of itself. Idris Hamid devoted his dissertation to Shaykh Ahmad andhis main finding is that Shaykh Ahmad's metaphysics and cosmology is pureprocess metaphysics. Shaykh Ahmad breaks with the substance basedmetaphysics that had been the staple of Islamic philosophy in an even moreradical manner than Mulla Sadra had done. In my article on 'Abdu'l-Baha'sResponse to Darwinism I go into this, but evidently not enough. I alsomentioned that a'yan thábita need not be translated as "fixed" archetypes.Thábita also means "posited." But even "fixed" does not implystatic-in-itself. Something can be fixed in the sense of "established" or"determined," which are also meanings of thábit. This term has many shadesof meaning, only one of which means "static."

> PETER:> In this Tablet Baha'u'llah says that the 'active force' is the> 'lord of the species'...in it He also says that the 'active> force' and 'that which is its recipient' are different and> the same.  What does He mean by this?

KEVEN:What I understand Baha'u'llah to mean is that based on the principle thatGod is the only uncompounded reality, and all other things are composites ofessence and existence (= form and matter), including the Primal Will, thesetwo principles, at the level of the Primal Will, are the same yet different.Shaykh Ahmad explains this in great detail in his metaphysics (see IdrisHamid, "Metaphysics and Cosmology of Process According to Shaykh AhmadAhsa'i"). He says they are an unbreakable polarity, like Yin and Yang, asimultaneous process of acting and becoming-in-yielding-to-acting. Theycannot conceivably exist without each other. This means that the Names ofGod, which are the first principle of giving existence and the highest levelof Platonic Forms, and the lower level Platonic Forms such as speciesessences, are all composites of essence-existence, or form-matter, which isthe same yet different. It is matter being molded by the divine creativeact. Hence, Shaykh Ahmad states that matter is active and form is receptive.But it really doesn't matter, because matter is itself receptive to God'sact, and form is active in relation to whatever its effect is. So it makesperfect sense that Baha'u'llah states that the active force is the lord ofthe species (i.e. Platonic Form), and it also makes perfect sense when

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'Abdu'l-Baha states the active force is ethereal matter. And, Theo, as youcan see, these are dynamic Forms, not static.

> PETER:> You lost me there.  First you are speaking of a'yán> thábita, and then you state that "all things are> images (asbáh) of substances (jawhariyyát here as> synonymous with Platonic Forms or fixed archetypes".  It> would not surprise me at all if the Bab were to be using> this terminology.  This passage clearly indicates that He> strongly refutes the notion that the a'yán thábita reside> in the Essence of God...but He does not say that the a'yán> thábita are emanations of God or creations of God or even> manifestations of God.  He changes terminology!  Why do you> conclude as a translator that [jawhariyyat] here means> "Platonic Forms or fixed archetypes" rather than "essences"?

KEVEN:Essences are the "fixed archetypes". There is no difference. Unless you arereferring to a nominal Aristotelian essence, which is the product of humanthought, but how could this be the cause of anything in real existence? Andif you are referring to the individual as essence (which is not really atechnical meaning of essence), how can something cause itself? ProfessorJa'far Sajjadi gives the following definition of fixed archetypes (a'yanthabita) in his Farhang-i-Istilahat-i 'Irfani: "According to the wayfarers,these are intelligible forms (suwar 'ilmiyya) in the world of God; and inthe terminology of the philosophers, they are the essences (máhiyyát) ofthings. The archetypes are the forms of the divine names, and souls are themanifestations of the archetypes" (p. 115).

> PETER:> my understanding thus far is that God creates all things by> means of the First Creation, variously called the Primal> Will, First Mind, Word, Holy Spirit, etc.

KEVEN:I agree.

PETER:> The First Creation has an unknowable essence and essential> and contingent attributes.  The former class of attributes> are synonymous with the unknowable essence and hence are> unknowable. The contingent attributes, that is, the> attributes as they can be understood by contingent> realities like ourselves are knowable.  Since Baha'u'llah> states that the Manifestations of God are one even as God

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> is one, it seems to me that while we understand the divine> attributes to be multiple, in reality they are one.

KEVEN:Here I disagree. Only God is truly one and uncompounded. The Manifestationsof God are one in essence, in the sense that they all share in being theManifestations of the same Primal Will. They are not truly "manifestationsof God" in a literal sense. The Primal Will itself is a composite reality.'Abdu'l-Baha states: "The World of Command is the station of the PrimalWill, which is a universal reality that is resolved into infinite forms('álam-i amr maqam mashiyyat avvaliyya ki án haqíqat kulliya ast ki muhallbi-suwar ná-mutanáhí ast). It is the Ocean of the Will which is the World ofCommand (án bahr-i mashiyyat ast ki 'álam-i amr ast). (Makátíb 2:141).

PETER:> In this case it would appear that there are in reality no> Forms but rather that such Forms are human constructs which> we have imagined in our attempts to understand the divine> names and attributes.

KEVEN:As you can see from 'Abdu'l-Baha, the Primal Will is resolved (munhall) intoinfinite Forms by the divine creative act, and these Forms, as explained bySajjadi above, are the same as the term essences (máhiyyát) used by thephilosophers.

PETER:> If one follows this line of thinking, it is not the Forms which are the realities of> things, that is, all things are not the images of the > Forms, but rather the Forms > represent human images of the essences of things.

KEVEN:As stated above the Forms and the essences of things are synonymous terms.To take the Forms as human images, though, puts them into the category ofAristotelian nominal essence or logical universal. Such types of essencesalso exist in us as abstractions made by our minds, but they lack any powerof causation, being unreal.

PETER:> But since we cannot know essences, all> such Forms are imaginary.

KEVEN:Because we cannot know essences (with which I agree), it does not followthat Forms (which are essences) are imaginary.

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PETER:>  In this case, God creates all things, the> world of creation ['Alam-i-khalq] through the medium of His> First Creation, sometimes designated 'Alam-i-Amr, and the> reality of the Platonic Forms corresponds to this First> Creation; but the human conceptions of the Platonic Forms> are products of our imagination.

KEVEN:I agree here. The distinction is between real essence (= real Platonic Formin the World of Command) and nominal essence (= our human conceptions ofwhat the Forms are).

THEO:> Theo asks:> Inasmuch as earlier i said i do not hold to this notion, but have given it> reconsideration and think it may be plausible.  However, saying that and in> line with my last post, to affirm Fixed archetypes-of physical forms-is what> i think is too static.  It does not allow for the uniqueness of each sphere> that may generate life, and the unique conditions of evolutionary pressures> that form the structure of each species.

KEVEN:I hope that some of my recent posts have answered this by showing that withShaykh Ahmad they become dynamic realities. From my reading of the Bab andBaha'u'llah, it is Shaykh Ahmad's metaphysics that are accepted by theBaha'i Faith. Just the fact that Baha'u'llah identifies the active force(fá'il) with the "lord of the species" (rabb al-naw') shows that He acceptsShaykh Ahmad's dynamic concept of them. (And of course, to say that theFaith accepts Shaykh Ahmad's metaphysics means that much of P/A/NPphilosophy is there as well.)

THEO:> If i consider these Forms as pertaining to the Names and Attributes of the> Manifestation, then it becomes palatable because these are not <fixed> in> the same way.  I don't just mean personally palatable, but historically,> philosophically, scientifically, etc.  If what we apprehend in this world> reflects what is in the spiritual realm, then we must conceive of the> spiritual realms as intensely dynamic.  The names and attributes that we> affirm are indeed fixed in that we can discern power, education, wisdom,> etc. in any cultural milieu, in many social orders or possible worlds. They> are dynamic in that the plurality of expressions, multivocal manners of> demonstrating and embodying these is limited by the immense diversity of> human psychology, not just humans here, but as a species in any possible> world.

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KEVEN:The Forms, as explained both by Plato and Proclus, are a hierarchy. Thus wehave "Oneness," "Otherness," "Beauty itself," "Justice itself," etc. Theseare the same as the names and attributes of God at the level of the PrimalWill. At a lower level there are Platonic Forms for the species of physicalthings, such as "dog," "horse," etc. Now in one sense, these are fixed, asthe laws of nature are fixed, or "determined" might be a better word, but inanother sense they should be dynamic, as you explained. I don't think of"dog" and "cat," as we conceive of these things, as being fixed, but I dothink that there are fixed categories of existence as determined by the setof what is possible. It is interesting that in the Bab's Tablet to thegovernor of Shustar, He calls the third stage of the Seven Stages ofcreation, which is predestination (qadar, also = predetermination) "the wombof the possible and most great chasm" (INBA 40:140-141), both terms used byShaykh Ahmad as well. It makes sense to say that what is possible to existis fixed, but within the categories of possibility there must be a dynamicof infinite variety. In this vein, the Bab explains: "Through this [second]station [Purpose, which is enformed matter] the mode of relationships knownas predestination appeareth, which is the beginning of multiplicity andinfinitude. Whatever is going to exist in the contingent world cometh intoexistence through the existence of Purpose [i.e. enformed matter]" (Ibid.).

I anticipate that you will ask why I call Purpose "enformed matter." Thereason is that both Shaykh Ahmad and the Bab identify the first stage of thecreative act, Will, with matter, and the second stage, Purpose, with form.Will and Purpose are also indentified with the two letters "B" and "E" ofthe imperative BE! (Kun). The Bab states: "The "E" (Nún) in the stage ofutterance is the same as the "B" (Káf). It is the totality of the possible(imkán), and the possible itself in the world of contingency is fullycontained in the word "BE" (kun). The "B" is the stage of the Will and the"E" is the stage of Purpose. The Will is the father of all things, andPurpose is their mother. As He hath stated: ' 'Alí and I are the parents ofthis people.' Through the "B" God created the matter (mádda) of allthings...and through the "E" God created the form (súra) of all things"(provisional translation from the Bab's Tafsir-i-Basmallah, INBA 60:48-49,also INBA 64:74). When we see the Bab saying that the Kaf is the same as theNun, yet they are two different things, I am reminded of Baha'u'llah'sstatement again that the active force and its recipient are the same yetdifferent. Baha'u'llah and the Bab are describing the same thing, the twocomplementary principles by which all created things come into existence.

THEO:> Natural physical forms on this planet have been so formed by principles> intrinsic to our realm, photic, chemic, etc., not conditioned by any eternal> pattern that is extrinsic, unless we think it necessary to affirm that any> world that the human species exists must have animals or vegetation that

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> looks like this world here.  Other worlds with other chemical and natural> principles would differ in the human and non-human life forms.  This is the> Aristotelian complaint: how can material forms come from anything that has> no matter as part of its reality?  Names and Attributes do not require this> inasmuch as they are spiritual attributes, non-material, and will, if they> be part of the structure of Reality, hold for any possible world where> intelligent life forms, humans, exist.

KEVEN:It is a misconception to say that what is spiritual has no matter. Allcreated things, whether spiritual or material, are composites of form andmatter, or essence and existence. 'Abdu'l-Baha explains that their are twotypes of this composite existence: (1) where essence and existence aredistinct but inseparable (2) where essence and existence are distinct andseparable. The first category applies to the Primal Will and the whole realmof spiritual reality with all its worlds; the second applies to thisphysical temporal domain. Regarding this, 'Abdu'l-Baha states:

"It [the staion of the Godhead] hath no existence additional to and apartfrom the Essence. For existence is either identical to essence, or differentfrom it. And if it is different from it, we must ask whether it is arequisite of it and its concomitant without cancellation or separation, oris it possible for it to be canceled and separated. The first is applicableto the reality of the Essence in the station of absolute oneness. Hisexistence is the same as His essence, and His essence is the same as Hisexistence. The second is applicable to the station of necessity [i.e., thePrimal Will], where existence is distinct from essence, though the former isa concomitant of the latter in such a way that separation and disassociationare inconceivable and unimaginable, since existence is an essentialattribute of essence. The third is applicable to the station of contingency,where something's existence is acquired from another and obtained from thatwhich is beyond itself. In this case, its existence is other than itsessence, its essence is other than its existence, and the separation anddisassociation of these two are possible" (provisional translation fromMakátíb, vol. 1, pp. 49-50).

'Abdu'l-Baha does not define material reality by matter but by whether ornot something can be composed and decomposed. He explains this concept, forinstance, in a talk given in the home of Mr. Dreyfus on 10 November 1911:

"The human soul, however, is not a composition of diverse elements. Rather,it is devoid of elements and sanctified from physical properties. As it isnot composed of elements, this is why it is ever-living, immortal, andeternal. Even in the natural sciences it is established that it isimpossible to destroy a simple element due to its uncompounded nature. Nay,

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the soul is devoid of elements and sanctified from physical properties, andas it is not composed of elements, it is not subject to decomposition. Thosebeings which are composed of elements, however, will eventuallydisintegrate. It is said, for example, that gold cannot be destroyed becauseit is a simple, uncompounded, solitary element, and that as it is notcomposed, it cannot be annihilated or cease to exist. But the people oftruth hold that all material existents, even those which the scientists oftoday consider simple, if investigated carefully and examined closely, willalso be found to be composed. In brief, inasmuch as the soul of man is notmade up of elements and does not belong to the world of composed things, itwill not become destroyed or cease to exist" (provisional translation fromKhitabat 1:145-146).

I agree with you here that the natural physical forms found on our planetare determined in large measure by the environment, but the doctrine ofcreation implies that there are other factors involved as well. Otherwise,we would be in the same camp as the materialists. These "other factors" arethe "essential nature" (máhiyya) or "specific nature" (naw'iyya) of createdthings, which 'Abdu'l-Baha states are permanent (báqí) and established (barqarár). These are realities which are independent of the evolutionaryprocess and which determine the paths evolution can work within. In arguingagainst arbitrary physical transmutation (taghyír) as being the source of"man," 'Abdu'l-Baha states: "How puerile and unfounded is this idea and thisthought! For the originality of the human species, and the independence ofthe essence (máhiyya) of man, is clear and evident" (SAQ p. 184). The otherpassage I mentioned above reads: "The species (naw'iyya = specific nature)and the essences (máhiyya = essential nature) of all things are permanent(báqí) and established (bar qarár). Only within the limits of each speciesdo progress and decline occur" (Má'idiy-i-Asmání 9:27, quoted in my articleon evolution p. 45). These permanent and established realities (which areone category of the Platonic Forms as I mentioned above) are, according toboth Baha'u'llah and Shaykh Ahmad, also dynamic (fá'il). I quoted to Peterthe explanation of Baha'u'llah where He says: "The meaning of the activeforce is the 'lord of the species' (maqsúd fá'il rabb al-naw' ast)" (AtharQalam A'la 7:113; also quoted by Vahid Ra'fati in his article on thissubject "Lawh-i-Hikmat: fá'ilayn va munfa'ilayn," Anadalíb, vol. 5, no. 19,p. 29). This term rabb al-naw' is a technical term in the illuminationistphilosophy of Suhrawardi for Platonic Forms, which all the majorphilosophers of Iran after him accepted, down to and including Shaykh Ahmad,and as we can see is also accepted by Baha'u'llah. This whole idea of thingshaving a "specific" or "essential" nature, which is not determined bychance, finds logical continuation in the explanation of 'Abdu'l-Baha in SAQwhere He says:

"There is no doubt that this perfection which is in all beings was realized

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by the creation of God from the composition of the elements, by theirappropriate mingling and proportionate quantities, by the manner of theircomposition, and the influence of other beings....In brief, the perfectionof each individual being--that is to say, the perfection which you now seein man and apart from him, with regard to parts, organs, or faculties--isdue to the composition of the elements, to their measure, to their balance,to the manner of their combination, and to the interaction and influence ofother beings. When all of these factors are gathered together, then manexists. As the perfection of man is entirely due to the composition of theelements, to their measure, to the manner of their combination, and to theinteraction and influence of different beings--then, since man was producedten or a hundred thousand years ago from these earthly elements with thesame measure and balance, the same manner of combination and mixture, andthe same influence of other beings, exactly the same man existed then asnow. This is evident and not worth debating" (SAQ, pp. 178-179, revisedtranslation).

The point here, as I understand this passage and given that all things havea "specific nature" or "essential nature" created by God, is that not justany combination of elements or any manner of mingling or influence of otherbeings will produce "man" in the physical world, or other creatures for thatmatter. The manifestation of "man" or other Platonic Forms/essences requiresparticular kinds of composition and proportions of the elements andinfluence of other beings. In other words, it seems, according to'Abdu'l-Baha, that it may not be possible for "man" to be manifested in theform of a slug, for example. It may be that the general form of man havingarms, hands, legs, and a head at the top of the torso for vision, hearing,etc., and a certain cranial capacity for intelligence, are necessary for themanifestation of the human essence.

KEVEN: (Revisiting the Platonic View)I want to apologize if I have offended anyone with anything I have said.Sometimes I am not very tactful, but it is something I am working onimproving. I agree with Peter (and 'Abdu'l-Baha) that reality is reality andit is one, but I also understand Theo's point that there must be room formany different viewpoints towards that reality. I am fond of Plato's dictumthat whatever people think in this world is and always will be opinion,while truth is ever a little beyond our reach, though some may be closer toit than others. Plato's method of inductive reasoning from particulars touniversals was a means to approach the truth, the reality, the Forms ofthings. He never intended that what we conceive of as the Forms are theForms themselves. Our conceptions of what the Forms are is only an opinion,an imperfect reflection of what they are. He explained, for example, thatthere is such a thing as "Justice itself" and that this is a real objectivereality in the spiritual world. He said that what we term "justice" in thisworld is only an imperfect reflection, an approximation, of Justice itself.

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He applied the same principle to other things, such as the kinds and speciesof beings that exist in the world. He said that there is also a realobjective reality for all these things that exists in the spiritual world,of which the physical things in this world are imperfect reflections.

Does this view not correspond to the Baha'i Teachings? Consider that'Abdu'l-Baha divides realities (what is real) into two kinds (see SAQ,chapter 16). There is what is perceptible to our senses (this is all thethings in the physical temporal world we live in), and there are thingsperceptible to our intellect or soul, but which have no outward form orplace, yet they are real (these are spiritual realities in the spiritualworld). It is interesting that 'Abdu'l-Baha includes ethereal matter in thesecond category. He says:

"The other kind of human knowledge is of things perceptible to theintellect, that is to say, intelligible realities, which have no outwardform and no place and are not perceptible to the senses. For example, thefaculty of intellect is not sensible; none of the inner qualities of man isa sensible thing; on the contrary, they are intelligible realities. So loveis an intelligible reality and not sensible....Even ethereal matter, theforces of which are said in physics to be heat, light, electricity andmagnetism, is an intelligible reality, and is not sensible. In the same way,nature, also, in its essence is an intelligible reality and is not sensible;the soul of man is an intelligible, not sensible reality" (SAQ pp. 83-84;provisional revised translation).

What this second category of real things have in common is that (1) theycannot be perceived by any physical means but can only be perceived by thesoul or mind, as Plato perceived the Forms through inductive reasoning, and(2) they are immaterial and eternal, not capable of decomposition. We cannotsay that these are subjective realities, unless we want to believe that theyare only mental abstractions of our minds. But as Baha'is we believe thehuman soul is real and objective, albeit not physical. The same applies tothe divine attributes reflected in man. 'Abdu'l-Baha himself statesregarding spiritual matter: "If we wish to deny everything that is notsensible, then we must deny realities which unquestionably exist. Forexample, ethereal matter is not sensible, though it has an undoubtedexistence. The power of gravity is not sensible, though it certainly exists.>From what do we affirm these existences? From their signs. Thus this lightis the vibration of ethereal matter, and from this vibration we infer itsexistence" (SAQ, p. 190; provisional revised translation).

Just as Plato inferred from material particulars the existence of immaterialobjective universal realities, 'Abdu'l-Baha does the same. He says we canknow through our minds (but not our senses) that these things exist byinferring them from their physical signs. So from light, we can infer the

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existence of non-material matter, from human actions we can infer theexistence of objective attributes that are the stardard of all moralactions. From physical nature around us we can infer the existence of animmaterial nature (which 'Abdu'l-Baha states in a Tablet is the Primal Will)that is the foundation of the former. This is exactly how Plato inferred hisnon-material realities. We cannot say this is Aristotle's philosophy,because he denied the existence of such immaterial things. He refutedPlato's Forms, and found in physical things alone a sufficient cause for theexistence of those things (like today's materialists). This is why'Abdu'l-Baha states that Aristotle was unaware of the luminous world and wasa philosopher of the world of bodies, as I quoted in one of my earlierposts.

Dear friends, I am not trying to be pushy or to hold rigidly to my ownopinion. Far from it. But the evidence in the Writings overwhelminglysupports a Platonic doctrine that immaterial, eternal realities exist whichhave a causal relation to material things. This is not to say that Platounderstood it all, but he was inspired in this regard. Shaykh Ahmad addsmore insight by saying such realities are not static, as is Theo's concern.

My point is that we should proceed in these discussions on the basis of theWritings and use them as our standard. If the Baha'i Writings confirm aPlatonic view of reality, albeit modified, why deny it. Rather we should tryto understand it.

THEO:> Remember Peter's post recently where he wrote that it is against list> policies to become offended by what another says??  This is very true here.> I think many of us are used to lists where we cannot be frank and honest,> and have to sidestep issues.  Not here.  I believe that we all respect each> other enough, and though we don't know each other well, our respect for each> other is clear.  You are not nor have you been in any manner pushy; you hold> firm convictions on issues based upon your understanding of the Writings and> searching to modify those views if need be.this is what we all do

KEVEN:Thank you, Theo. Also thanks to IAN for your support. I just wanted to besure I hadn't overstepped any bounds.

THEO:> Re: Platonic Forms.  Due to our discussion, i do agree that there is a> <Platonic> notion of these in the Writings, though more Ahmadian as in the> Names and Attributes of the Manifestation.

KEVEN:I don't know what you mean by "more Ahmadian" if you could elaborate? Thus,

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what would be the difference between such Platonic Forms as "Beauty itself"and "Justice itself," which are two Forms Plato writes often about, and"beauty" and "justice" as created attributes of God in the Baha'i Writings?Personally, I can see no difference, because both Plato and 'Abdu'l-Bahaplace these into the category of immaterial objective realities (see lastpost).

THEO:> If you could provide some> passages from the Writings that bear on other levels of existence, the> notion of species essence for non-human species, it would help.

KEVEN:I have been doing this since I joined this list, so I would have to complainas you did with Peter, that what I have been writing and quoting from theWritings is not getting read carefully or not read at all. If you re-read myearlier posts you will find that besides the level of "names and attributes"numerous quotations from the Baha'i Writings refer to "archetypes" (a'yán),essences (máhiyyát--lit. "what-is-its"), "realities" (haqíqát), "forms"(suwar), and "species" (naw'iyyát) of things. All of these terms in mostcontexts, though not all, refer to the same identical thing: "that by whichsomething is what it is." I have already discussed a lot about what theseessences and archetypes "of things" are, but you ask for quotations from theWritings. Here are some which I have already posted as well as a few more:

"Creation hath existed from the beginning that hath no beginning and willlast until the end that hath no end. The species (naw'iyya) and the essences(máhiyya) of all things are permanent (báqí) and established (bar qarár).Only within the limits of each species do progress and decline occur"('Abdu'l-Baha, Má'idiy-i-Asmání 9:27, quoted in my article on evolution p.45).

"Know that this material world is the mirror of the Kingdom, and each ofthese worlds is in complete correspondence with the other...for the truth ofall things is laid away in the treasuries of the Kingdom. When that truth ifmanifested in the material world, the archetypes (a'yán) and realities(haqá'iq) of beings attain realization" ('Abdu'l-Baha, Makátíb, vol. 3, p.172, quoted in my article on evolution p. 88).

"This general [external] existence is one of the accidents inhering in therealities (haqíqát) of beings, while the essences (máhiyyát) of beings arethe substance (jawhar)....Certainly, that which is the substance is superiorto that which is the accident, for the substance is the origin, and theaccident is the consequence; the substance is dependent on itself, while theaccident is dependent on something else; that is to say, it needs asubstance in which it subsists" ('Abdu'l-Baha, SAQ, p. 292, provisional

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revised translation)

"Those who say the fixed archetypes (a'yán) reside in the Essence of God inorder to establish His knowledge, as all believe save those whom God hathpleased to preserve, have completely forsaken the religion of the Family ofGod, for any reference to otherness in their being testifieth to theirseparation and indicateth their complete rupture from God. God is theeternal Being, Who from time immemorial hath not changed, and it is notpossible for divine unity to belong to anyone save Himself. Rather, all things are the images of substances (jawhariyyát) whose existence hath no trace in God" (The Báb, from Sahífiy-i-Tafsír-i-Há, Amr va Khalq, vol. 1, p. 101).

"Rather, it is in the station of unity-multiplicity (wáhidiyya) that thenames become manifested, distinguished, realized, established, and givenexistence--an existence which emanateth from the merciful Reality and giveth rise to spiritual realities and heavenly essences at the level of the fixed archetypes"[1]('Abdu'l-Baha, Makátíb, vol 1, pp. 49-50).

[1]"According to the wayfarers, these [archetypes] are intelligible forms(suwar 'ilmiyya) in the world of God; and in the terminology of thephilosophers, they are the essences (máhiyyát) of things. The archetypes(a'yán) are the forms of the divine names, and souls are the manifestationsof the archetypes" (Ja'far Sajjadi, Farhang-i-Istilahat-i 'Irfani, p. 115).

"He is the Single, the One, the Self-Subsisting, Who hath ever existedwithout requiring the existence of anything in the world of contingency andWho always will exist as He hath been without any aspect of Himself in thearchetypes (a'yán) of things" (The Bab, from the Lawh-i-Vali-i-Shustar,INBA, vol. 40, p. 137 ff.).

"The World of Command is the station of the Primal Will, which is auniversal reality that is resolved into infinite forms (suwar). It is theOcean of the Will which is the World of Command" ('Abdu'l-Baha, Makátíb2:141).

"The Primal Will, which is the realm of Command, is the inner reality of allthings, and all beings are therefore the manifestations of the Divine Will,not the manifestations of the Divine Essence and Reality itself....HisHoliness the Bab hath stated that the meaning of this verse "The sea hathever been the sea, and all contingent things its waves and forms" isfulfilled in the Primal Will, not in the Divine Essence" ('Abdu'l-Baha, MinMakátíb, vol. 1, pp. 275-276).

"The first emanation from God is the outpouring of the Kingdom [= PrimalWill, cf. SAQ 203] which appears in infinite forms in the realities of allthings and becomes specified and individualized according to the disposition

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and capacity of the essences of things" ('Abdu'l-Baha, SAQ, p. 295,provisional revised translation).

KEVIN HILL:> What would happen if we identified "Primal Will" with> "natural (and supernatural) law"?

KEVEN:Wonderful!!! I have often felt this to be a reasonable equation. I equatePlato's Forms (as the realities of all things into which the Primal Will isresolved) with natural law as well. Here is a footnote on this that I addedto Chapter One of SAQ, when I was working on revising its translation forthe UHJ some years ago:

Bahá'u'lláh states: "Nature is God's Will and its expression in and throughthe contingent world" (Tablets of Bahá'u'lláh  142).  Abdu'l-Bahá, ininterpreting this passage, explains that "all of the realities andconditions which the philosophers attribute to nature are the same as havebeen attributed to the Primal Will in the Holy Scriptures" (Má'idiy-i Ásmání2: 70). In contemporary terms, the contents of the Will may correspond tothe laws of nature posited by modern science. Thus, God by the operation ofhis Will (nature's stable inner reality) allows complex structures, whichare inherently unstable, to emerge and evolve in the universe. Nature isalso defined in  'Abdu'l-Bahá's Tablet to Auguste Forel as "those inherentproperties and necessary relations derived from the realities of things. Andthese realities of things, though in the utmost diversity, are yetintimately connected one with the other" (Bahá'í World Faith  340).

There is an important book on this subject, which you may know about as alaw student, and if not, I highly recommend it. Here are the details:

John Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law. TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1953.

Wild shows how the theory of natural law developed out of Plato's theory offorms.

> PETER:> BH clearly depicts a hierarchy of perception of truth in SV> and other Writings.  I don't think you need say that "some> may be closer to it than others"--rather I think we can be> certain that some psychological perspectives are much> closer to ontological reality than others.  Is truth beyond> our reach?  Not if we turn to the Manifestations rather> than to human beings as our guides in the wilderness of> reality.  This brings us to Baha'i epistemology.

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KEVEN:Why would not the same principle of not being able to ever fully apprehendthe truth apply to our understanding of the Baha'i Writings? Myunderstanding is that we will always continue to grow and deepen inunderstanding of the verities they contain. This is the same as Plato's viewtowards the Forms/realities of things.

> PETER:> Affirming that there are spiritual> realities that correspond to physical realities does not> imply that every physical reality has a spiritual "Form" in> the Platonic sense.  Nor does it indicate that this> spiritual counterpart is "ideal" or "abstract" or> "intellectual".  It simply isn't physical, and we don't> know anything about it beyond that.  We don't know because> we can't find out about these spiritual counterparts in> this world, and the Manifestations don't tell us about them> because it is beyond our capacity to deal with them on this> plane of existence.  This is how I understand BH's refusal> to divulge the nature of the spiritual worlds.

KEVEN:If the whole corresponds, then do not the parts also have to correspond?'Abdu'l-Baha is clear that the inner realities of "all things" areequivalent to the Primal Will. He does not say "the inner realities of somethings." I agree with you, however, in the sense that the particular guisethings take on in this world through the accidents of nature do not exist inthe spiritual world, but the law or principle that determines the essentialnature of each thing must exist in the spiritual world. By the way, Plato islikewise emphatic that we can never know the realities of the spiritualworld in their essence. We can only apprehend imperfect likeness of thoserealities in this world.

> PETER:> It does not follow that because we can know things> intellectually as well as sensorially, that we therefore> can know essences intellectually as we know attributes> sensorially!  BH even says that the Manifestations cannot> know essences, so how can our intellects know essences?  I> have no problem with grasping (intellectually that is :)> that there are some spiritual (or even physical) realities> that cannot be apprehended by the senses but can be> perceived by the intellect.  But those spiritual realities> are known by their spiritual attributes, not by their> essences or as essences.

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KEVEN:As I stated above, this is also Plato's view. He never says we can know thetrue Forms of things in their essence. We can only perceive them imperfectlythrough the intellect insofar as we apprehend their external attributes andlikenesses in this world.

> PETER:> Of course Baha'is can say that the Forms are subjective> realities!  They represent perceptions of Plato, and they> could very well be imaginations of his mind and therefore> subjective.

KEVEN:You are mixing up ontology with psychology here. The point is that'Abdu'l-Baha affirms that such realities are not subjective. Would you say,as a Baha'i, that the realities of things in the Primal Will (its infiniteforms) affirmed by 'Abdu'l-Baha as real are subjective realities? Not if youaccept the authority of 'Abdu'l-Baha. Since Platonic Forms fit the samedefinition as the realities in the Primal Will (which they do), they cannotbe subjective realities. Plato affirms over and over again that the Formsare objective real immaterial realities independent of human minds; they arenot subjective. Yes, our conceptions of those Forms in this world aresubjective, but that is obvious. It is Aristotle's essences which aresubjective because they depend on human minds. Plato's Forms, just like'Abdu'l-Baha's realities of things, do not depend on humans thinking them.

> PETER:> I would have to disagree with this statement.  "Plato> inferred from material particulars the existence of> immaterial objective universal realities"...AB may employ a> line of reasoning that is familiar, that bears similarities> to Plato's line of reasoning, but He did not arrive at a> positive knowledge of "immaterial objective universal> realities" through inference.

KEVEN:Why disagree? Cannot Plato arrive at his knowledge through inference,reasoning and inspiration, while 'Abdu'l-Baha attained the same knowledgethrough direct divine guidance.

> PETER:> Plenty of other philosophers, Greek and otherwise have> discerned, whether through Prophetic influence or through> intuitive and rational channels, the existence of spiritual> phenomena.  If we call Plato inspired, we must also call

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> Pythagoras and Empedocles and Apollonius of Tyana and many> many other philosophers inspired.

KEVEN:I agree. I have no problem with calling many of the philosophers inspired.Baha'u'llah also seems to have no problem with this in the Tablet of Wisdom.

> PETER:> Mulla Sadra didn't see spiritual realities as static> either.  I haven't the time to go into this in detail right> now, but Islamic philosophy as a whole needs to be> considered in any reference to Baha'i philosophy.

KEVEN:I disagree. Mulla Sadra's main contribution to philosophy was to take motionout of the category of accidents and make it substantive. But he only didthis for existence, not essence. Shaykh Ahmad does this for both existenceand essence, and he is the first to recognize that neither one has primacyover the other in actuality, since they are an unbreakable polarity. Inother words, they can only be separated in the mind, not in actuality. SeeFazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 96, where he explains thatMulla Sadra retained the concept of static essences.

THEO:> You mention that you also feel that perhaps your contributions are not> being read thoroughly and thus my persistent questioning over matters that> you have answered.  I have again reviewed your posts on the topics,> excerpted some of your own words, and still make the same claim: you make no> case for there being Platonic Forms (or to you essences) of animals and> plants, except by your own interpretation.  This latter is fine, but it is> not supported by the Writings to one (or many) who do not hold to such> platonic notions.  This is why, i think, Peter said if you can convince him> you can convince anyone.>> 1) I shall begin with the most problematic, your reinterpretation of SAQ.> Now, i do not hereby express anything judgmental against you, please never> take it this way.  I mean that your giving a retranslation of SAQ is very> problematic because you do so to fit your Platonic notions.  This, of> itself, is no problem.  I see a problem arise exactly when your translation> clashes with explications proffered by the UHJ.  Since they cannot> interpret, they can only expound what has been given in the Texts we all> cherish.  However, if we hold that this Body is divinely guided, then> somehow we must think (unless we take Juan's tack) that their expounding has> some element of this, though we could affirm that it is a non-sequitur since> the domain of the UHJ is law.  However, you give a retranslation of SAQ:>

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> "The other kind of human knowledge is of things perceptible to the> intellect, that is to say, intelligible realities, which have no outward> form and no place and are not perceptible to the senses. For example, the> faculty of intellect is not sensible; none of the inner qualities of man is> a sensible thing; on the contrary, they are intelligible realities. So love> is an intelligible reality and not sensible....Even ethereal matter, the> forces of which are said in physics to be heat, light, electricity and> magnetism, is an intelligible reality, and is not sensible. In the same way,> nature, also, in its essence is an intelligible reality and is not sensible;> the soul of man is an intelligible, not sensible reality" (SAQ pp. 83-84;> provisional revised translation).>> You know, of course, that the current work gives a different translation:>> "The other kind of human knowledge is intellectual -that is to say, it is a> reality of the intellect; it has no outward form and no place and is not> perceptible to the senses.  For example, the power of intellect is not> sensible; none of the inner qualities of man is a sensible thing; on the> contrary, they are intellectual realities.  So love is a mental reality and> not sensible; for this reality the ear does not hear, the eye does not see,> the smell does not perceive, the taste does not discern, the touch does not> feel.  Even ethereal matter, the forces of which are said in physics to be> heat, light, electricity and magnetism, is an intellectual reality, and is> not sensible.  In the same way, nature, also, in its essence is an> intellectual reality and is not sensible; the human spirit is an> intellectual, not sensible reality.">> The difference between intellectual and intelligible is really significant,> and of such a purport that it fundamentally alters the interpretation given.>  This shows me clearly that translation is as much interpretation as> anything, especially with religious or philosophical texts.> Now, the problem: In a letter on behalf of UHJ to Brent Porier about ether,> this Body responds:>> The argument presented in this approach is that the latter definition of the> term "ether" is in conformity with the usage adopted by 'Abdu'l-Bahá where> He states that "ethereal matter, the forces of which are said in physics to> be heat, light, electricity and magnetism, is an intellectual reality, and> is not sensible", and defines such an intellectual reality as one which "has> no outward form and no place and is not perceptible to the senses".> (Letters of The Universal House of Justice, 1994 Feb 22, The Concept of> Ether)>> Notice clearly the use of intellectual reality, not intelligible.  One> could argue that since the research dept. merely used the current> translation this means little in the way of an understanding.  On the other

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> hand, one could justifiably argue that since this work was translated not by> the Guardian, but otherwise, the House surely could proffer a different use> of intellectual (ma'qulat) and render it as <intelligible> and then give a> different meaning to this term.  They opt to not do this.  Thus there is> some justification for keeping ether as an intellectual and NOT an> intelligible reality as these mean radically different things.> A third option of course: since the letter is from the research dept. it has> not the authority as does a letter from the UHJ; this is what has been> argued many times about letters written on behalf of the Guardian and it> very problematic-these institutions would allow letters to be send on their> behalf without their endorsing the views expressed.  I think this is> unjustified.> So, your re-translating SAQ to fit your interpretive scheme, while not> incorrect in light of the history of the terms being used in the original,> may be incorrect in light of the entire corpus of the Masters thought and> his attempt to push us beyond the historical renderings of such terms and> the philosophical concepts they evoke.> Your use of intelligible, faculty of intellect (which is no where in the> entire philosophical history of the west ever explained, just assumed.and> set against some faculty of senses which are never explained either!!), etc.> are, i think, very problematic.

KEVEN:I am glad that you noticed this difference in the way ma'qúlát can betranslated, and indeed there is a vast difference in meaning between"intelligible realities" and "intellectual realities." That is why Imodified the translation of this term. The former refers to somethingimmaterial that actually exists independent of a human thinking of them,such as Platonic Forms or the Intellects posited in classical philosophy.The latter refer to intellectual concepts which depend for their existenceupon human minds thinking them, such as the terms and theories that thinkerscome up with to explain reality, which may or may not correspond to anythingreal. We only need to use Ian's criterion of logic to see why the besttranslation for ma'qúlát in Chaper 16 of SAQ is "intelligible realities,"and not "intellectual realities." The criterion for judging this is todetermine whether the realities 'Abdu'l-Baha is referring to are bothimmaterial and real, or not. If not, then "intellectual realities" is thecorrect translation. But if they are, then "intelligible realities" is thecorrect translation. First of all, regarding the ether, 'Abdu'l-Baha isclear that it is real and not a subjective creation of the mind. He states,as I quoted earlier: "If we wish to deny everything that is not sensible,then we must deny realities which unquestionably exist. For example,ethereal matter is not sensible, though it has an undoubtedexistence....Thus this light is the vibration of ethereal matter, and fromthis vibration we infer its existence" (SAQ, p. 190; provisional revisedtranslation). I am sure that we would not say that, according to

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'Abdu'l-Baha, the human soul is an intellectual reality, i.e. only asubjective mental concept. We know from the Writings that the soul is animmaterial objective reality independent of whether humans think about it ornot. Hence, we must refer to it as an intelligible reality. The same appliesto the attributes, which 'Abdu'l-Baha mentions in this chapter. If, as'Abdu'l-Baha states in the first words of the Lawh-i-Aflakiyyih, they arethe first principle of giving existence then they cannot be subjective,mind-dependent intellectual realities. If they are independent of ourthinking about them, if they are real, and if they are immaterial, then wemust term them intelligible, and not intellectual, realities. We can howeverlegitimately term our own subjective conceptions of such immaterial andactual realities intellectual.

I believe that when the House of Justice replied to Brent Porier on thequestion of ether, it was relying upon the old translation. Just as theGuardian could only make decisions based upon the knowledge he was provided,which was not always accurate, in the same way, the House of Justice canonly provide elucidation as good as the translations of the Holy Textsavailable to it.

THEO:> 2) you write:   Earlier I had stated that so far I have found no explicit> references to Platonic Forms in the Baha'i Writings. By explicit I meant the> use of the term "muthul aflatuni," which is an exact Arabic counterpart for> "Platonic Forms." There are however implicit references, that is, the use of> Arabic terms which are known synonyms in Arabic philosophical texts for the> Platonic Forms. Thus we have "rabb al-naw' " (lord of the species), which is> one of the terms Suhrawardi frequently uses for Platonic Forms (see The> Philosophy of Illumination, trans. John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai. Brigham> Young University Press 1999).>> I respond: Walbridge's work, The Science of Mystic Lights clearly asserts> that the species lord derives from the ten intellects, assumed by all> Ishraqi philosophers to be valid since it fit their adherence of the> Ptolemaic system.  It is not valid, thus we need to trash it.  DO you find> support for such a series of intellects in the Writings?> By your declaring that all the Ishraqis accepted Suhrawardi's distinctions,> and that the Master does as well as BH does not wash, it is not valid.> Though we assuredly find similar terminology, this does not mean sameusage.

KEVEN:All Platonic thinkers from the time of Plato afterwards have debated aboutwhere to locate the Platonic Forms, since Plato was not explicit on thisquestion. Thus, Philo and the early Church Fathers were content to locatethe Platonic Forms in the Logos, or the Word of God. Suhrawardi made them

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independent of God and derived them from the vertical order of Intellects,as you mention. Mulla Sadra, in contrast, located them in God's mind. Manythinkers have equated them with God's thinking of things. Shaykh Ahmad isclear that they are not in the Essence of God, but are created by God'saction. You are correct that we need to trash the scheme of verticalIntellects, which was concocted in order to make sense of the Ptolemaiccosmos, but it does not follow from this that we need to trash the Platonicforms as well. The Baha'i Writings and the works of Shaykh Ahmad stillretain one Intellect, now termed the Primal Will, where the Platonic Formscan dwell. You say that similar terminology does not imply same usage. Iagree. But we do find that 'Abdu'l-Baha clarifies for us that the PrimalWill is the same the First Intellect of the philosophers of the past (SAQ203). We also know that Shaykh Ahmad, who is closest to the time of the Baband Baha'u'llah and greatly respected by them, located the Platonic Forms inthis First Intellect. In fact, identifying the First Intellect with thePrimal Will was already done by Shaykh Ahmad.

THEO:> You write:   In answer to a question about the meaning of the "active force"> in the Tablet of Wisdom, Baha'u'llah responds: "The intention of the active> force is the lord of the species, and it hath other meanings" (provisional> translation from Athar-i-Qalam A'la, vol. 7, p. 113). Therefore, we have> here a clear instance of Baha'u'llah stating that the active force, as used> in the Tablet of Wisdom, refers to the Platonic Forms, although it has other> meanings as well. This is unequivocal, and there should be no doubt on the> basis of this one statement, not to mention others, that Baha'u'llah> supports the Platonic Forms.>> I respond: the other meanings as well could be radically different and mean> that the meaning He gives here is because it is what the recipient of the> Tablet accepted as valid.> The other meanings is what the recipient could not have accepted, and what> we might find by pushing beyond the old manner of conceiving.  Your argument> is weak, i assert, because it only affirms that He uses this term, but does> so in a new way. it has other meanings.

KEVEN:Baha'u'llah is clear. The meaning of the active force in the Tablet ofWisdom is the lord of the species. The individual has asked Baha'u'llah:what is the meaning of the active force in the Tablet of Wisdom. We alreadyknow one of its other meanings, because 'Abdu'l-Baha has stated it isethereal matter, the other side of the coin of ethereal form. In othercontexts, outside the creation scheme in the Tablet of Wisdom, the activeforce and the recipient have many other applications, some of which areexplained by Vahid Ra'fati in his article on the Tablet of Wisdom. I thinkthat your argument is weak, because it is assuming that Baha'u'llah is only

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telling the questioner what the questioner accepts to be valid. Why would Hedo this? Is not the purpose of the Manifestation to reveal the truth and todemolish conceptions at variance with reality? I agree that what Baha'u'llahmeans by "lord of the species" is open to question and requires thoroughinvestigation, but I do not agree that He was using this term merely toappease His questioner. I also don't think Baha'u'llah would use this termand intend a meaning widely different than anything His audience wouldunderstand. The common and accepted meaning of rabb al-naw' then and now isan immaterial objective reality or being which has some kind of causativerelation to the species in the physical world.

THEO:> 3) The fixed archetypes: You write:> This term occurs in the Writings of the Bab, Baha'u'llah, and 'Abdu'l-Baha.> They do not deny the reality of a'yan thábita, but disagree with Mulla Sadra> and certain Sufis over their location.>> I respond: Surely we find this term with new thoughts.  Their location> cannot be ascertained by any human.in the Commentary on the Hidden Treasure,> and Commentary on Overthrow of the Byzantine's we learn these are reflected> in the <book of self>; their location anywhere beyond this is speculation on> our behalf.  What we find is that the Central Figures deny these archetypes> reside in the Reality of God.  Where do They assert they <are> located??

KEVEN:I agree that it is clear that the fixed archetypes do not reside in God. ButI don't think it is unclear where they reside. They are located at the levelof the Primal Will, in the station of unity-multiplicity (wáhidiyya). Thisis stated by 'Abdu'l-Baha: "Rather, it is in the station ofunity-multiplicity (wáhidiyya) that the names become manifested,distinguished, realized, established, and given existence--an existencewhich emanateth from the merciful Reality and giveth rise to spiritualrealities and heavenly essences at the level of the fixed archetypes"(provisional translation from Makátíb, vol 1, pp. 49-50).

THEO:> 4) You write more of the archetypes:> "Rather, it is in the station of unity-multiplicity (wáhidiyya) that the> names become manifested, distinguished, realized, established, and given> existence--an existence which emanateth from the merciful Reality and giveth> rise to spiritual realities and heavenly essences at the level of the fixed> archetypes" (provisional translation from Makátíb, vol 1, pp. 49-50). The> names and attributes of God, as I understand this passage, act as spiritual> elements which give rise to "spiritual realities" and "heavenly essences" at> the level of the fixed archetypes/Platonic Forms. These in turn give rise to> the souls (arwáh) of individual beings in time.

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>> I respond:> While your interpretation is one way of seeing things, i want to offer> another.>> “And as for the station of creation, know thou that created things are of> several kinds: some are the creation of the womb and are created in the> womb; some are spontaneous creation without an apparent cause, like the> creatures that are found in fruits; and some come into being in an egg.> These are the corporeal divisions of created things.  But the inner> spiritual creation and the hidden divine emanation is a different creation> and another emanation.  That creation is of sanctified spirits in the bodies> of the believers in the Divine Unity and in the innermost being of mystic> knowers.  It is the creation of forms and realities in the kingdoms of> heaven and earth.” (Hidden Treasure)

KEVEN:I have looked at the original text of this passage, which occurs in Makátíb,vol. 2, p. 24. This translation is misleading, because it leaves out thecrucial conjunction va, which makes the meaning clear. First 'Abdu'l-Bahadescribes kinds of corporeal generation. Then he goes on to explain whatdivine inner creation is. It has two senses. One is the sense in which thesouls of believers become sanctified through their recognition of theManifestation of God and observance of His teachings. This is commonlytermed "new creation." The second sense of divine inner creation is that ofthe creation of archetypes and realities for the kingdoms of earth andheaven, that is the creation of the ontologically real inner spiritualdomain (the names of God and the realities in the Primal Will) which is thecause by which the things in this world exist. If I were to translate theabove passage, I would translate the relevant part like this:

"But the divine inner creation and the heavenly concealed emanation isanother creation and another emanation. It is (1) the creation of sanctifiedspirits in the temples of those who believe in the divine unity and in thehearts of them that understand. And it is (2) the creation archetypes(a'yán) and realities (haqá'iq) in the kingdoms of earth and heaven."

The discussion that follows in 'Abdu'l-Baha's Commentary on the HiddenTreasure is not about definition 1 but about definition 2 above.'Abdu'l-Baha spends a considerable amount of time presenting the argumentsof both philosophical camps for whether or not the archetypes and realitiesof things mentioned above are created and separate from God, or uncreatedand not separate. From the manner in which he praises those who favorcreated separate archetypes and his lack of praise for the other position,you can tell that he favors created separate archetypes. I explain this indetail in my article " 'Abdu'l-Baha's Response to the Doctrine of the Unity

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of Existence" in JBS, vol. 11, number 3/4, pp. 1-29.

THEO:> So, these spiritual realities are embodied realities, in the believers!  I> have an article on the <return of the spirit> where, it seems clear to me,> that this refers to our realm as well as anything else.  Furthermore, the an> existence which emanateth from the merciful Reality and giveth rise to> spiritual realities and heavenly essences at the level of the fixed> archetypes" cited above has strong resonance with:>> The splendors of the perfections, bounties and attributes of God shine forth> and radiate from the reality of the Perfect Man - that is to say, the Unique> One, the supreme Manifestation of God.  Other beings receive only one ray,> but the supreme Manifestation is the mirror for this Sun, which appears and> becomes manifest in it, with all its perfections, attributes, signs and> wonders. (`Abdu'l-Baha:  Some Answered Questions, page 222)

KEVEN:I agree with you that certain spiritual realities in the spiritual worldsbecome embodied (in the sense of manifested) in believers, but there arerealities which become manifested in other creatures as well. This is clearby 'Abdu'l-Baha's frequent usage of the expression "the realities of allthings."

THEO:> These become apparent in this world.  Your assertions are speculative, i> submit, because your ideas hold to Platonic thoughts, whereas even the Bab> indicates clearly that such speculation may not be valid:> Whatever is heard concerning all the worlds is realised within this world.> Thus, for example, the Prince of Believers ('Ali), on whom be peace, became> the first to believe in Mohammed within this world. This is an evidence that> he was a believer in all the worlds. All these latter are made real beneath> the shadow of this world and to manifest here before them that are possessed> of intelligence. Blessed be he who beholds all things in their reality and> does not imagine a fanciful matter that has no reality in the Eyes of God or> of them that possess intelligence.(Bayan; tr. MacEoin)

KEVEN:Can you please provide the Bayan chapter and section number for this. Idon't see any indication here that the Bab may consider Platonic thinking asinvalid speculation.

THEO:> 5) You equate:  Essences are the "fixed archetypes". There is no difference.>> Professor Ja'far Sajjadi gives the following definition of fixed archetypes

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> (a'yan thabita) in his Farhang-i-Istilahat-i 'Irfani: "According to the> wayfarers, these are intelligible forms (suwar 'ilmiyya) in the world of> God; and in the terminology of the philosophers, they are the essences> (máhiyyát) of things. The archetypes are the forms of the divine names, and> souls are the manifestations of the archetypes" (p. 115).>> I respond: Souls are the manifestations of the archetypes; this accords with> many Scriptures we have, in that the soul reflects these Names and> Attributes by embodying them, but that these essences/archetypes/forms refer> to archetypes of animals, plants, etc is not.  It is this that you have not> provided any evidence to support.> YOU provide:> "The species (naw'iyya) and the essences (máhiyya) of all things are> permanent (báqí) and established (bar qarár). Only within the limits of each> species do progress and decline occur">> I respond: this clearly makes a distinction and states TWO realities, even> accepting a Platonic notion: species AND essences.  Where do we find any> support in the Writings that any species besides the human species is a> metaphysical species?  The animal and vegetable realities, the essences or> spirits, dissipate upon dissolution of the form, this is clear in many of> the Masters writings.  Human science, from Aristotle, makes this distinction> for species that we apprehend, based upon difference, and genus.  Where do> you find support for any notion that animal species are eternal?  Thus> species AND essences here are not a <species essence> in any sense.

KEVEN:The Writings do not say that any other species besides man has a soul thatsurvives physical death. I have never asserted that. Only man has animmortal soul. But soul (rúh) is not the same thing as "essences" or"species" or "realities" of things. These latter, which 'Abdu'l-Bahaexplains above are permanent and established, which might also be translatedas "eternal and changeless" are so because God's creation with all of itsmembers has always existed. I don't think you can find any place in theWritings where 'Abdu'l-Baha says animal and vegetable realities or essencesdissipate upon dissolution of the physical form, because such realities oressences are the very things by which all animal and vegetable formscontinue to come into existence. What 'Abdu'l-Baha does say is that theanimal or vegetable spirit (rúh), by which is meant the power of sensationor the power of growth, ceases to operate in those physical forms andbecomes dissipated.

I think I have provided ample evidence that there are realities andarchetypes for more than just man. In the passages I quoted in my last post,you can see that there are realities and archetypes for all things and allbeings.

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I disagree with you that 'Abdu'l-Baha is using the terms "essence" and"species" to refer to two different things in the passage above. It iscommon practice for 'Abdu'l-Baha, when explaining something, to use severalterms which are synonymous or nearly synonymous with each other in order tomake clear what is being described. The philosophical definition of bothessence and species is that which you answer when someone asks: "What isit?"

THEO:> 6) Your use of all things:> 'Abdu'l-Baha is clear that the inner realities of "all things" are> equivalent to the Primal Will. He does not say "the inner realities of some> things.">> I respond: then the inner reality of opium is equal to the Primal Will.  I> think you and others take this <all things> too literally.  In SAQ we find> the use of the word <all> in such ways that it cannot be taken literally,> unless we stretch our imagination to extremes.  This is not dissimilar to> <all things>. The inner reality of my defecation is the Primal Will.right?> I say this not out of any disrespect, but out of making a point.

KEVEN:I would say that the inner reality of opium is part of the Primal Willbecause opium exists. The Primal Will is where the potentialities andpossibilities of all things ultimately reside. The same with defecation.What's wrong with this idea? Defecation is natural. Whatever derives fromnature also derives from the Primal Will, since the Primal Will is the innerreality of nature. I think it helps to equate the Primal Will with the lawsof nature by which nature operates, and by which man operates insofar as weare part of nature.

THEO:> 7) YOU cite:  The World of Command is the station of the Primal Will, which> is a universal reality that is resolved into infinite forms.  It is the> Ocean of the Will which is the World of Command.>> I respond: then you have opened the case for a mysticism that cannot exclaim> union with God, but with the Primal Will and this Primal Will, being> resolved, as this could be taken, means that all things are the Primal Will,> and then where is the distinction?  <The integrity of every rank and station> must needs be preserved. GL p. 188>  IS the inner reality of the <book of> self> the same as the Primal Will?  Where is the distinction?

KEVEN:Yes, the inner realities of all things (not the physical forms and

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particular identities of things, which are accidents) are, according to'Abdu'l-Baha, identical to the Primal Will. This does not mean our souls areidentical to the Primal Will. Our souls come into being through the minglingof the elements. Souls are phenomenal and have a beginning, whereas therealities of things don't. If the Primal Will has no beginning in time, as'Abdu'l-Baha explains in SAQ p. 203, then the realities of things also haveno beginning in time. There is a vast difference in rank and station betweenus and the Primal Will. The Primal Will is where all things in all theworlds, both physical and spiritual, have their origin.

THEO:> Now, Keven is presenting some cogent arguments from some Texts that are> being reworked to suit a Platonic reading, and asserting ideas that i find> at least plausible.

KEVEN:The last thing I would want to do would be to "rework" any of our sacredText to suit a particular philosophical reading. Such a thing would bedishonest and misleading. My goal is to attain accuracy in translation tothe best of my ability based on the literal meaning of the terms and theirmeaning in particular contexts. For example, ma'qúlát can literally berendered either "intellectual realities" or "intelligible realities" (or"objects of intellection" and other possibilities), but the context, thatis, 'Abdu'l-Baha referring to them as realities which have "an undoubtedexistence," as he indicates for ether, shows that "intelligible" is a moreaccurate translation than "intellectual," if by "intellectual" we understandsomething that has no real existence in itself. I understand that I am onlyone translator and that my translation is not final. It is up to atranslation committee composed of many trained scholars to make a finaldetermination as to the best translation for the term in question.

THEO:> I cannot read the original texts of our Writings, and when i read Keven> asserting that Moojan's translation is misleading, or that the passages we> have of SAQ are not accurate, and that somehow we should agree that his> interpretation/translation is the correct one, to be frank i cannot endure> it.  It is my weakness, my intolerance of such extreme ambiguity.

KEVEN:Please do not have me saying things which I have never asserted. I havenever asserted that the present translation of SAQ is inaccurate. I wouldonly go so far as to assert that in a few instances there are sentences orterms that are inaccurately translated, but not whole passages. Many of theother changes made in my provisional revision have more to do with stylisticimprovement, clarity, and refinement. For example, Shoghi Effendi almostinvariably translates ruh as "soul" in his translations, when this term

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refers to the immortal self-identity of man, whereas Mrs. Barney oftentranslates ruh as "spirit" in the same context, so in my revision, I havechanged such instances to be in accord with the Guardian for consistency. Iwould call this an issue of clarity and not accuracy, since spirit and soulare equivalent terms when referring to the immortal self-identity of man.

I hope that I have never said anything to indicate that the other members onthis list should agree that my translations/interpretations are the bestones. I realize that other members on this list cannot read the Writings intheir original Arabic and Persian, and I understand that this is adisadvantage. I wish it could be remedied. Personally, because of this factthat many of the Writings that treat metaphysical and cosmological issuesare not yet officially translated (but only exist as provisionaltranslations) or have not been translated at all, and since little study andcomparison of these primary texts to the writings of Shaykh Ahmad and SiyyidKazim has yet been undertaken, I believe it is really too early for any ofus to make strong claims that the Faith favors one philosophical positionover another. It is true that I  presently feel strongly that the Baha'iFaith, with regard to metaphysics and cosmology, corresponds with a modifiedPlatonic worldview, and my training in Arabic, Persian, and IslamicPhilosophy at UCLA along with my study of the original texts of ourWritings, leads me in that direction, but I never want to assert that thisis final and hold rigidly to it. I am always interested in opening andextending my vision, and in seeing new possibilities. Our discussion on thislist has helped me a lot in this regard, but so far I have seen no evidencepresented from the Baha'i Writings, or based on logic, that undermines amodified Platonic viewpoint as a basis for Baha'i metaphysics.

THEO:> Jean-Marc holds a fundamentally divergent view from Keven, for example; Ian> asserts clearly that an Aristotelian notion of essence is not nominalism;> Keven asserts it is.  Keven holds to essences as beings or immaterial> realities, Ian holds that souls are immaterial realities for the human, but> affirms A notions for the rest, that is, not eternal.

KEVEN:I will not speak for the others, but I will speak for myself. I don'tbelieve I have ever said that essences are beings. Suhrawardi held thisconcept in regard to Platonic Forms. He regarded them as beings, as angelsthat were the lords of species. But I don't know of any other Platonic philosophers who held this view. It is not my view. I regard a real essence, in the Platonicsense, as an immaterial eternal reality (like the realities into which the Primal Will isresolved). I also accept that there are nominal essences of things, which donot have real being, which are universals abstracted from concreteindividuals by our minds. As for individuals beings, I do not regard them asessences in a technical sense. Individual beings participate in real

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essences and are expressions of real essences, but they are not the same asthose real essences. For example, the plan of a building in the mind of anarchitect is the essence of that building, but a particular building basedon that plan is not the same as the plan itself. It is only participates inthe plan, as other individual buildings of the same type participate in it.And all individual building of the same type are expressions of the sameplan, but they are not the plan, or essence, itself.

Theo, thanks for being honest. Wishing you lots of energy and inspiration asyou complete your book. I will answer some of the points in your attacheddocument separately.

Points from attached document:KEVEN writes:Yes, the inner realities of all things (not the physical forms andparticular identities of things, which are accidents) are, according to'Abdu'l-Baha, identical to the Primal Will. This does not mean our souls areidentical to the Primal Will. Our souls come into being through the minglingof the elements. Souls are phenomenal and have a beginning, whereas therealities of things don't. If the Primal Will has no beginning in time, as'Abdu'l-Baha explains in SAQ p. 203, then the realities of things also haveno beginning in time. There is a vast difference in rank and station betweenus and the Primal Will. The Primal Will is where all things in all theworlds, both physical and spiritual, have their origin.

Keven also writes: I would say that the inner reality of opium is part ofthe Primal Will because opium exists. Whatever derives from nature alsoderives from the Primal Will, since the Primal Will is the inner reality ofnature.

THEO replies:Am i the only one who finds this inconsistent and that i fail to follow it??Is my logic that faulty?

Deriving from and part of are these the same to others?

KEVEN:These are not the same. But if you read the above more carefully, you willsee that I am saying the inner reality of a thing is "part of" the PrimalWill. After that I do not say that that same inner reality then "derivesfrom" the Primal Will. That would be contradictory. I am saying that whatderives from nature also derives from the Primal Will, because 'Abdu'l-Bahaexplains that nature in its essence, or inner reality, is the Primal Will.This is the same as saying that outer, temporal beings derive in some mannerfrom inner, atemporal realities.

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THEO:Regarding the term "inner realities" Keven asserts that: 'Abdu'l-Baha isclear that the inner realities of "all things" are equivalent to the PrimalWill. He does not say "the inner realities of some things."

So opium and defecation in their inner reality, which are part of nature,are identical to [or part of our choice i guess] the Primal Will.  The humansoul comes into being from the mingling of elements of nature [unless thereare other elements not part of nature].but this is not equated a statussimilar to either of the other two as being part of [or identical to] thePW.

KEVEN:Yes, that is generally how I understand it. The soul is not a reality oressence, but a being or entity. Beings or entities, which are individuals,are not part of the Primal Will, though they derive from the realities ofwhich the Primal Will consists.

THEO:DEFINITION: identical: Exactly alike; incapable of being perceived asdifferent; being the exact same one; not any other.

PW- Primal WillIR- Inner Reality/-iesIRAT- IR of All thingsATAW-all things in all worldsPF-physical formsPI- particular identity/-ies

1) IRAT is identical to PW    Our soul is not identical to PW    Our soul does not have an IR<OR> Our soul is not an IR<OR> Our soul is not a thing

2) IRAT identical to PW--givenPW has no beginning--givenIRAT have no beginning--given

KEVEN:(1) is logical and valid if you stick with the conclusion, "Our soul is notan IR." The other two proposed conclusions, "Our soul does not have an IR"or "Our soul is not a thing" do not follow from the first premise. (2) islogical and valid.

THEO:

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3) IRAT identical to PWPI of things are accidentsPI have no inner realityPI not identical to PWPI are part of "All things"IRAT not identical to PW

4) IRAT identical to PWPW is origin of ATAWATAW are origin of itself<OR>  IRAT are origin of PW:If PW identical to IRATthe ordering makes no difference

KEVEN:(3) would be logical and valid if you added "PW is not an accident" afterthe second premise, and concluded "PI not identical to PW." (4) would belogical and valid if you concluded "IRAT are origin of ATAW." The otherproposed conclusions do not follow.

THEO:5) PI are accidentsEvery Manifestation is PIEvery Manifestation is accident

5.1) PF are accidents Every Manifestation had PF Every PF of Manifestation was accident

KEVEN:(5) is flawed because not all PI are accidents. The soul of man is not anaccident, although it is called into existence by accidental causes. (5.1)sounds fine.

THEO:6) IRAT have no beginningAll human souls have beginningAll human souls are not IR

7) IR of opium is part of PW because opium exists IR of nature derives from PWSoul derives from elements from natureSoul is part of PW because soul exists

KEVEN:(6) is logical and makes sense, though it should be noted that there may be

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cases where the term "reality" is used in a non-technical sense in referenceto the soul. (7) is illogical and invalid as stated. The second premiseshould read "Nature derives from PW" followed by "Soul depends upon elementsof nature" and "Soul depends upon PW" (The soul does not derive from thephysical elements; it only depends upon them for its origin.)

THEO:8) PI are individual realitiesPI have no IRIndividual realities have no IR

9) Physical forms have no IRHuman bodies have physical formHuman bodies have no IR

KEVEN:(8) and (9) are invalid since both PI and physical forms have IR. All thingshave IR.

THEO:10) PI are accidentsEvery member of a species is an individual identityEvery member of species is accidentWithout members, there is no speciesPI are essential for there to be speciesPI as accidents are essential

11) PF are accidentsMatter and spirit are coeternalPF are materialPF are accidentmatter is accidentCoeternal aspect of spirit is accident

KEVEN:Re. (10): As stated above, the human soul is a PI which is not an accident.I would also change the fifth premise to "Without members, there is noactualization of species" "PI are essential for there to be actualization ofspecies" "PI as accidents are essential for actualization of species"(Without accidents real essences can have no temporal realization.) Theproblem with (11) is that matter is not an accident.

THEO:Keven provided: The species (naw'iyya) and the essences (máhiyya) of allthings are permanent (báqí) and established (bar qarár). Only within thelimits of each species do progress and decline occur."

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Theo: When i mentioned that this refers to two different things, Kevenreplied:

I disagree with you that 'Abdu'l-Baha is using the terms "essence" and"species" to refer to two different things in the passage above. It iscommon practice for 'Abdu'l-Baha, when explaining something, to use severalterms which are synonymous or nearly synonymous with each other in order tomake clear what is being described.

Theo asks: why does the <and> in this passage NOT refer to two differentrealities, but in the one cited from Moojan [given below] that you think ismisleading, you think that the <and> does so refer?  Is the fullstop-punctuation-given in the original as you have rendered it here?

Keven also provided:But the divine inner creation and the heavenly concealed emanation isanother creation and another emanation. It is (1) the creation of sanctifiedspirits in the temples of those who believe in the divine unity and in thehearts of them that understand. And it is (2) the creation of archetypes(a'yán) and realities (haqá'iq) in the kingdoms of earth and heaven."

KEVEN:In the first passage, "species" and "essence" occur next to each other inthe same sentence, and the va (and) in this case signals the presence ofequivalent terms. In the second passage from the Commentary on the HiddenTreasure, the va (and) is signaling the beginning of a new sentence andthere is no necessary implication that the spiritual creation of man isstill being described. But it is really context more than anything and logicthat indicate that 'Abdu'l-Baha has moved on to describe another category ofdivine inner creation, just as he had previously described severalcategories of corporeal generation. In the case of the first passage,similarly, it is not a rule that va (and) within a sentence always linksequivalent terms, though it is very common. It is really the context, andthe readers knowledge of the subject matter, that determines whether two ormore terms or sentences are equivalent or not. So technically you can readthe Hidden Treasure passage as you did, but logically it doesn't make sensein light of the discourse that follows, which has to do with thephilosophical debate over whether or not archetypes are created and separatefrom God or uncreated and not separate from God. What does that have to dowith the spiritual creation of man? But it does have something to do withthe creation of the outer temporal world by means of ontologically realrealities in the inner divine world.

THEO:> I agree we are all striving to learn and understand, but i also know that it

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> is an archetypal fact that about 150 years after every revelation, thinkers> engaged in exactly what we are engaging in: and the paths went astray> because of accepting Greek thought over scripture, or interpreting scripture> through the lens of Greek thought.  I am, i know, hypersensitive to this not> happening for our Faith.  The dual truth issue that was dominant in Islam> appeared here: one religious, the other philosophical.  What a mess!

KEVEN:In our case, we are lucky because our scriptures actually point us to thosedoctrines in Greek philosophy which are correct. We don't have to guess ordecide by the criterion of reason alone. We also have the criterion ofscripture. Ian has done a lot of ground-breaking work here with respect toAristotle, and I have done some for Plato. I don't think Ian and I willharmonize Plato and Aristotle, but we should be able to harmonize ourviewpoints on which aspects of Plato and Aristotle the Writings accept.

THEO:> Keven,> I think that one great challenge in our discussion is your limiting the> usage of these terms: species, essence, reality, etc. to <technical Islamic> terms>.  I think it is far too restrictive and very difficult if we ever can> pull ourselves, as Bahais in a new Revelation, from such technical> philosophical straight-jackets.

KEVEN:I don't believe I have ever stated that all usages of the terms "reality"and "essence" in the Baha'i Writings refer to a technical philosophicalmeaning. I believe I indicated early on during our discussion that their aremany contexts where "essence" and "reality" refer to something else. But inthe passages I have quoted from the Writings in support of the existence ofPlatonic Forms, I am convinced that these are all examples of instanceswhere the technical philosophical meaning is meant. If context and reason donot guide us as to which meaning of a term is meant in a particular passage,then we are doomed to hopeless ambiguity.

THEO:> How about the passage from the BH where, as Khazeh's passage i citedearlier> indicates:>> If it be said that all in this Wondrous Theophany hath never existed in the> past, this saying is a correct saying, too. For if God, glorified be His> Glory, uttereth a word that all people have uttered in the past,> nevertheless that word is a wonderful new creation.>> Surely the words BH and AB presented would fit in this "that word is a> wonderful new creation."  Species did not originate in Islamic philosophical

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> thought, but from Greek.  The term Eidos was translated into Latin as> species, and this caused much difficulty; Islamic philosophers used it for> their speculative philosophy, and because of the confusion of A and P> philosophy, through the Theology of Aristotle-as you know actually part of> the Enneads of Plotinus. It was used in a very A sense to refer to the> animals we see, but in a NP sense very confusedly.

KEVEN:I agree that with Baha'u'llah's Revelation, everything He has uttered takeson a new meaning and a new life. But I see it more like a new springtimecoming, where everything is renewed and made fresh and the old and outworntossed out. It doesn't mean "new" in an absolute sense, like never seenbefore in any form. When a new springtime comes it is the same speciesagain, just renewed. So Baha'u'llah's Revelation is renewing whatever goodthings have been said in the past and adding new things appropriate to ourday and age. So I can't really see Baha'u'llah's statement above as a validargument for determining that "species" has an entirely new meaning in HisRevelation. In my book, I go into extensive detail to show that'Abdu'l-Baha's usage of the term "species" is much closer to the classicalphilosophical meaning used by the Islamic philosophers than the modernnominal meaning used by population biologists.

THEO:> Perhaps in time you may> convince me that there are such animal <species> that are spiritual species> that must exist in order for their to be some spiritual reality that gives> from to the accident-the animal body we apprehend.  I think the only> spiritual species, qua species, is human. But i am open to learning. Since> i do not have your book on this matter, i must admit my handicap!

KEVEN:I am glad you have an interest in reading my book (actually mine andEberhard's). I think it will help you to see where I am coming from a lotmore as you read the wealth of evidence I have gathered. I will try to seeif I can get an electronic copy from Kalimat.

THEO:> To support my assertion that you limit <inner reality> too much, i append> these.  If, however, you think that i am incorrect, and the original terms> differ so that <inner reality> is not appropriate, please let me/us know> what it might read better as.>> RE: soul-> For the inner reality of man is a demarcation line between the shadow and> the light, a place where the two seas meet; it is the lowest point on the> arc of descent, and therefore is it capable of gaining all the grades above.

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> With education it can achieve all excellence; devoid of education it will> stay on, at the lowest point of imperfection. (Compilations, The Compilation> of Compilations vol. I, p. 270)  [individualized IR, referring to that soul> which originates from the elements of our world]

KEVEN:I agree with you that this is a context where "reality" refers to the humansoul. I looked this passage up. The term translated as "the inner reality ofman" is haqíqat insániyyih" (Muntakhabát 1:127), which literally means "thehuman reality." There is no corresponding word in the original Persian ofthis sentence for "inner." So there is no sense here that "man" or "reality"in this case means anything other than actual man. The inner reality, in thesense of archetypal essence, is not being referred to.

THEO:> The All-Merciful hath created humankind for the adornment of this contingent> world, so that men may array the earth with the manifold blessings of> Heaven; that the inner reality of the human being may, like unto a lamp of> the spirit, cause the community of man to become as a mirror for the> assemblage on high. (Compilations, The Compilation of Compilations vol. I,> p. 278)> [here inner reality is individual-the IR of the human being-not plural or> general]

KEVEN:I agree that the reference here is also to individual human souls. Can'tfind the original of this, since no source is given.

THEO:> Thus every created thing beareth witness that it is debarred from the> sanctuary of Thy presence by reason of the limitations imposed upon its> inner reality. (The Bab, Selections from the Writings of the Bab, p. 175)>   [again individualized IR]

KEVEN:I agree that individual reality may be meant here, though this passage wouldmake sense either way.

THEO:> Often a man makes up his mind positively about a matter; for instance he> determines to undertake a journey. Then he thinks it over, that is, he> consults his inner reality and finally concludes that he will give up his> journey. What has happened? Why did he abandon his original purpose? It is> evident that he has consulted his inner reality which expresses to him the> disadvantages of such a journey, therefore he defers to that reality and> changes his original intention.

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> This other and inner reality is called the heavenly body, the ethereal form> which corresponds to this body. This is the conscious reality which> discovers the inner meaning of things, for the outer body of man does not> discover anything. The inner ethereal reality grasps the mysteries of> existence... (Abdu'l-Baha, Foundations of World Unity, p. 109-this is also> found in PUP p. 464, and unless things have changed, the original tablet had> not been located when in inquired about this in 1987, so it may be> spurious.)

KEVEN:There is no question but that the individual soul of man is meant here.Context makes that clear. By the way, the original Persian for this doesexist in Khitabát, vol. 2, pp. 336-339. I'm surprised the ResearchDepartment missed it.

THEO quotes:> Thus it is that He has said:> "Read your own book, your self is sufficient to give an account against you> today [49]." For example, consider a circle: however much a compass moves,> it can only move around the point which is the centre of the circle. This> illumined verse, in the reality of angelic souls, has the same role as that> point, for all of the senses and understanding of man revolve around that> Divine verse.>> Theo: This is what i stake my position on.  You see these Names as> pertaining to and referring to archetypes of [all created things]-plants,> animals, human, etc.  I see these Names as pertaining to the one unique> spiritual species: humanity.  These Names, as clearly indicated in the text> by the Master, refer to the Names we attribute to God, though they clearly> refer to the Names pertaining to the realm of the Manifestation, as> reflected in our soul.

KEVEN:I think we do not disagree on the intent of the above passage, that nomatter how far we soar in the realm of knowledge we will always be limitedby and circling round the book of our own self. But this has nothing to dowith two different positions being equally correct in terms of ontologicalreality. Again it only affirms that our personal understanding of reality isrelative, but not reality itself. In the commentary on the hidden treasure,'Abdu'l-Baha implicitly favored the position of created separate archetypesby his praise of those who espoused that view. He did not give any suchpraise to the other viewpoint. Thus, it is clear that he did not regard bothviewpoints as equally correct or "fine," and this is borne out by explicitstatements of 'Abdu'l-Baha against the doctrine of the unity of existence inother texts. Now you are saying that the divine inner creation only pertainsto the spiritual creation of believers, and I am saying it pertains to both:

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(1) to the spiritual creation of believers, and (2) to the atemporalcreation of the Names and Attributes of God and to the realities of thingsin the spiritual realm. Both of these positions cannot be equally correct or"fine" in terms of reality.

By the way, I am sure you are aware of the many passages in the Writingswhich state that the names and attributes of God are reflected in allcreated things but that man has the unique status of being able topotentially reflect all of the names and attributes of God, whereas othercreatures only reflect a portion of the divine names. These "other portions"are what I understand as archetypes for other things besides man. Sajjadi inhis lexicon explained, archetypes are manifestations of the names.

THEO:> Though clearly one may read these terms, archetypes, Names, fana,> baqa, poverty, etc., in the light of Sufistic or Ishraqi understandings, I> submit, that when this is read in the light of the Book of Certitude, and> when our eyes are cleansed, we see these Names in the book of self, and> affirm that whatever is asserted about them in the realms beyond is not our> concern nor task, though they are surely our interest.

KEVEN:I submit that the Book of Certitude gives us the key to understanding andunlocking the mysteries of the scriptures of the past and many other things,but it presents little on how God actually created the universe. Forthat we need to turn to other Tablets, such as the Tablet of Wisdom, andmany other Tablets in the Writings that specifically deal with thesequestions. I agree that we cannot know the Names and the Archetypes inthemselves as they exist in the spiritual world, but that is not my concern.My interest is just to understand clearly as much as I can what is assertedin the Writings on this subject. And in most cases, I have found, thatclearer understanding comes with understanding the historical environmentand the philosophical context in which those Writings were revealed, becauseit is usually the case that the primary meaning of terms and ideas is whatthe people of that time, who were addressed by the Bab, and Baha'u'llah, and'Abdu'l-Baha, understood them to mean. We can make up new meanings, but Idon't think that is reality. For example, I think it would be a grossdistortion (unless we discover a text of Baha'u'llah to the contrary) tointerpret rabb al-naw' (lord of the species) as anything but a reference toPlatonic Forms, because this term was in use by Baha'u'llah'scontemporaries, such as Sabzavari and the inheritors of the School ofIsfahan, with that precise meaning and not any other meaning. It is for thesame reason that Baha'is are highly encouraged to study Islam and its lawsand history, so that we can better understand our own Faith. Islam and itsdevelopment is the historical and intellectual context needed to properlyunderstand our own religion, and I submit that understanding Sufism and

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Islamic philosophy, especially the later Islamic philosophy of the School ofIsfahan and of Shaykh Ahmad, fits in there in order to properly understandthe use of Sufi and philosophical terminology in the Baha'i Writings. It isonly through understanding these terms in their original context that we canapply them now in a way that can illuminate contemporary questions.

THEO:>  Let me try to be> clearer: based upon what we learn in the Bahai corpus, we do understand that> these Names (archetypes) exist in the realm of the Manifestation, the Primal> Will, not in the realm of God.  I agree here.  What i mean here is that> though we know this much, this much is all we know.  How they exist we do> not know.

KEVEN:I agree. My point was simply that the Writings illuminate many details ofthe nature of the spiritual world and its realities, and not simply thatthey exist.

THEO:> Remember the post i sent to Peter where i stated my view might more> correctly be called a perspectivism, because i am talking about OUR human> perspectives.  I can discuss ontology when we come to the physical realm,> but beyond that i often don't venture...the book of self intervenes here i> think.  Even though, when we return to the discussion of essence, i am sure> that there will be different stances struck, my approach will be> perspectival rather than ontological.  As we have seen in our brief> discussion of essence so far, even using the Writings gives us different> views because of this book.

KEVEN:I agree again, though I believe, in principle, if we follow the fourcriteria of knowledge given by 'Abdu'l-Baha, we should be able to agree onwhat the Writings say. I think unity of thought is attainable, but it takeshard work and time. Maybe more time and effort than any of us have rightnow.

THEO:> You write: For example, I think it would be a gross distortion (unless we> discover a text of Baha'u'llah to the contrary) to interpret rabb al-naw'> (lord of the species) as anything but a reference to Platonic Forms, because> this term was in use by Baha'u'llah's contemporaries, such as Sabzavari and> the inheritors of the School of Isfahan, with that precise meaning and not> any other meaning.>> I respond: SO, though there are <seventy meanings> to each passage of

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> Scripture, in this situation there simply is not. I nteresting.  Ta'wil has> ceased, i guess?  And we know all that there is to know about such a term as> above?  How does our understanding develop and mature if there is only this> interpretation?

KEVEN:I agree that with mystical and religious terms there are numerous meanings.That is clear. But rabb al-naw' is a philosophical term, and philosophicalterms almost invariably have one precise meaning; otherwise it makes thelogical operation of philosophy impossible. It is true that the meaning ofphilosophical terms may change in the hands of a new philosopher. Forinstance, the meaning of a'yán thábita in Ibn 'Arabi meant "fixed entities"but by the time of Mulla Sadra, it meant "fixed archetypes" and Shaykh Ahmadalso clarifies in his Sharh al-Mashá'ir that this term (a'yán) refers to thespecies form. In regard to rabb al-naw', the question then would be todetermine (1) if this term has taken on a new meaning by the time ofBaha'u'llah, or (2) if there is any evidence that Baha'u'llah is using it ina different sense. In regard to the first point, I have not read any worksby Islamic philosophers so far in that time period that use rabb al-naw'differently. Seyyed Hossein Nasr writes concerning this term as used in thistime period by the School of Isfahan:

"The names and attributes, which are the same as the archetypes [ascombinations of the former], Platonic ideas, or the lords of the species(rabb al-nau') as the Ishráqís call them, in turn generate the world ofchange [this is what Baha'u'llah states as the role of the active force].They are the immutable intelligences of this world, and each species in thisworld is a theurgy (tilism) for its archetype. The relation between theimmutable archetypes and the world of change is like the reflection of themoon in a stream of water in which the image of the moon remains unchangedwhile the substance in which it is reflected, i.e., water, flows oncontinually" ("The School of Isfahan," A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed.M. Sharif, vol. 2, p. 916).

As for the second point, I see no evidence that Baha'u'llah is using rabbal-naw' in a new or different sense. First of all, using it in a new sensewithout informing the questioner, who asked Him for the meaning of theactive force, would be contradictory to His purpose of explaining itsmeaning. When a term, such as rabb al-naw', is used to define another term,such as al-fá'il (the active force), the former must have a precise andcommonly accepted meaning to the questioner, otherwise why would Baha'u'llahuse it to define the meaning of the term which is unclear, namely al-fá'il.Also the context of the Tablet of Wisdom, where al-fá'il is used, isharmonious with the understanding of the Islamic philosophers thatrabb-al-naw' have a role in generating the world of change. Rabb al-naw' asan interacting, inseparable complex of intelligible form and matter in the

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spiritual world is both act and the recipient of act. Through thisinteraction, Baha'u'llah explains, the temporal world comes into being, andby the continual interaction of these two active and receptive principlesthe world continues to subsist and change in form.

PETER:> Since Keven is citing Hussein Nasr, certainly one of my> favorite writers on Islamic philosophy and mysticism> (althoughly clearly a perennialist and a Twelver Shi'i> himself and therefore probably predisposed to seeing and> describing Islamic tradition from this point of view), I> found another passage relating to [rabb al-naw']:>> "In the case of man, a "lordly light" exists at the center> of each soul and governs each man's activities. As for the> human species in its totality, it is Gabriel who is> considered as its angel, the archetype of humanity (rabb> al-naw al-insãni) whom Suhrawardi identifies with the Holy> Spirit and the Spirit of the Prophet Muhammad - upon whom> be peace - and therefore also with the function of> revelation, Gabriel being the supreme revealer of all> knowledge.> "Besides having this guardian angel for the whole of his> species, man has also his own guardian angel residing in> the angelic world. Suhrawardi considers each soul to have> had a previous existence in the angelic domain before> descending to the realm of the body. Upon entering the> body, the soul, or its inner center which is its immortal,> angelic core, divided into two parts, one remaining in> heaven and the other descending into the prison or "fort"> of the body."  (S.H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 1964)>> My purpose is citing this passage is to point out the> differences between the way Suhrawardi describes the soul> and related spiritual entities and the way Baha'u'llah> describes them.  The way that Suhrawardi has characterized> [rabb al-naw' al-insani], as the "guardian" of the entire> human race, and the revealer of all knowledge, associated> with the angel Gabriel and the Spirit of Muhammad, suggests> to me that Baha'u'llah would use this term in reference to> the Manifestation of God.  The Manifestation is a different> entity from the human species essence, from the individual> human essence, from the Platonic Forms.  Hence, it appears> that Nasr identifies one meaning for [rabb al-naw'> al-insani] in one treatise, and another meaning for the> same term in another treatise.  I think he may do so

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> because for him, and perhaps also for Suhrawardi and other> Islamic writers who "followed" him, the "archetype" of> humanity as a whole, what Ibn al-'Arabi called [Insan> al-kamil] or Perfect Man, is potentially every man.  The> Prophet and the human being are not, for them, two> different ontological orders of being.  The Prophet is the> Perfect Man, and every other man may become perfect if he> actualizes his potentialities.  Suhrawardi seems to> identify [rabb al-naw' al-insani] not only with what> Baha'u'llah was the call the Manifestation, but also with> the individual guardian angel which is half of the soul.>> Baha'u'llah denies that every human being has a guardian> angel residing in the angelic world.  The soul did not have> a previous existence in the angelic domain before becoming> manifest in the human existence on the physical plane.  The> soul did not divide into two parts, with one remaining in> the angelic world and the other descending into the body.>  His depiction of the soul is radically different--(1)every> human being has infinite numbers of guardian angels> residing in Malakut, the angelic world, the world of the> kingdom--we are not limited to one guardian but can pray> for guidance and protection and inspiration to whichever> soul we wish; (2)the soul comes into existence with the> conception of the body, and exists eternally thereafter;> (3)the soul does not divide at any time, but remains always> one entity, and it always remains in the angelic realm,> never descending into the body.  Given the differences> between Suhrawardi and Baha'u'llah on these points, why> should we expect that every detail of Suhrawardi's use of> [rabb al-naw'] would agree with Baha'u'llah's use of that> term?

KEVEN:Thanks, Peter, for sharing that. I agree with you that Baha'u'llah is notusing rabb al-naw' in exactly the same sense as Suhrawardi, though both areusing it in a Platonic sense. I will explain below. In the Tablet whereBaha'u'llah defines the meaning of the active force, He does not say it israbb al-naw' al-insání (the lord of the human species), i.e. Gabriel toSuhrawardi. He states simply that the active force is the rabb al-naw' (thelord of the species). This is a clear reference to the Platonic Forms ingeneral, not to one Platonic Form. We must remember the context of theTablet of Wisdom, where the interaction of the active force and therecipient brings the world of being into existence. A single archetype wouldbe incapable of doing this, since all the archetypes of all things arenecessary to bring the whole world with all of its many kinds into

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existence. I don't believe, however, that Baha'u'llah conceived of rabbal-naw' like Suhrawardi as beings or angels. As far as I know, this wasunique to Suhrawardi's conception of the Platonic Forms. The philosophersafter him, such as Mir Damad, Mulla Sadra, and Shaykh Ahmad, understand themto be realities or essences like Plato, not beings. I see no evidence thatBaha'u'llah considered rabb al-naw' as anything other than the universalrealities of things, the same realities of things into which 'Abdu'l-Bahastates the Primal Will is resolved (munhall). So yes, I agree, the PrimalWill is the active force, but it is the Primal Will as resolved into therealities of things, which then act as active causes to the temporal speciesover which they rein.

To revisit a point Theo was concerned about. This does not imply a staticuniverse. Shaykh Ahmad and 'Abdu'l-Baha are both clear that the cause offormation is voluntary, not necessary. This meshes well with the theory ofevolution, because it is only the archetypes of things (which are not actualbeings) at the level of predestination that are fixed or predetermined. Howthe manifestations of these types express themselves in the temporal domain,while limited by the essence as to essential characteristics, is totally andinfinitely varied because all things voluntarily choose their form withinthe limits of possibility.

> > PETER:> > So, for Aristotle "essences" are "universal, necessary> > (non-contingent), immutable, the forms of things abstracted> > from particular instances"?>> IAN:>> Yes, but you must understand what A means by that. For an object to be a> dog, it must have certain characteristics of form. Thus, these> characteristics are logically necessary. Because they are necessary, they> are immutable and non-contingent i.e. whether an entity exists now or a> million years from now, it will still have to have a certain set of> characteristics to be a 'dog'.>> These characteristics are not time-sensitive and they are instantiated in> every particular dog. The intellect is what recognises these attributes as> necessary to each and every dog regardless of what other individual> attributes it might have. It abstracts these characteristics from particular> instances.>> A particular dog dies, i.e. its particular instantiation of doggy attributes> passes away. But the essence per se doesn't die or change. It is exemplified> in another dog.>

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> In fact, with A one could go even further and say that the cosmic/material> potential to  realise 'dogness' in particular examples is eternal and> immutable. That would be a semi-Platonic reading of A (and one which I> favour).

KEVEN:This is very interesting. I wonder if you have read E. Gilson's Being andSome Philosophers (1952). He comes to the conclusion, with which I agree,that if we take Aristotle at his word, then Plato can make essentially thesame argument against Aristotle on Form that Aristotle made against him.Rather than explaining, I will quote what he says (with some comments of myown in brackets):

"The distinctive character of a truly Aristotelian metaphysics of being--andone might feel tempted to call it its specific form--lies in the fact thatit knows of no act superior to the form, not even existence [Gilson meansexistence as we know and see it here]. There is nothing above being [this isParmenides "being," which cannot not be]; in being, there is nothing abovethe form, and this means that the form of a given being is an act of whichthere is no act....This fundamental fact entails many puzzling consequences,the first of which is that, when all is said, we are coming back to Plato.It has often been remarked, and rightly, that the forms of Aristotle are butthe Ideas of Plato brought down from heaven to earth. We know a form throughthe being to which it gives rise, and we know that being through itsdefinition. As knowable and known, the form is called 'essence'. Now, it isa fact that forms or essences remain identically the same in all theseindividuals that belong to a same species. If the main objection directed byAristotle against Plato holds good, namely, that 'man' in himself does notexist and that, if he exists, we are not interested in him, because what weneed to know is not 'man', but men, the same reproach seems to apply toAristotle. Like that of Plato, his own doctrine has neither use nor room forindividuals. The only difference is that Plato made open profession not tobe interested in individuals, whereas Aristotle makes open profession to beinterested in nothing else, and then goes on to prove that, since the formis the same throughout the whole species, the true being of the individualin no way differs from the true being of the species.

"All this is very strange, yet it was unavoidable. On the one hand,Aristotle knows that 'this' man alone, not 'man', is real; on the otherhand, he decides that what is real in this man is 'what' any man is; howcould his 'this' and his 'what' ever be reconciled? True enough, Aristotlehas an explanation for individuality. Individuals, he says, are such invirtue of their matter. Yes, but the matter of a being is not 'what' thatbeing is, it is what is lowest in it; so much so that, of itself, it has nobeing. However we look at it, there is something wrong in a doctrine inwhich the supremely real is such through that which exhibits an almost

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complete lack of reality....

"During the Middle Ages, thinkers and philosophical schools were dividedbetween themselves on the famous problem of universals: how can the speciesbe present in individuals, or how can the multiplicity of individuals sharein the unity of the species? At first sight, this centuries-long controversyhas the appearance of a purely dialectical game, but what really lies at thebottom of the whole business is the very notion of being. What 'is'? Is it,as Ockham says, only individuals? Then the form of the species is absolutelynothing but the common name we give to individuals similar among themselves.This is nominalism. [This is why I have called Aristotle's essences nominal,because I have been reading him to say that individuals are the primaryrealities. If he is not saying this, then Aristotle is still a Platonist,who doesn't realize it.] If, on the contrary, you say that the form of thespecies must needs be, since it is owing to it that individuals are, thenyou are a realist, in this sense, at least, that you ascribe to specificforms a reality of their own. But what kind of reality? Has the form a sortof self-subsisting reality? Then it is a Platonic Idea. Has it no otherexistence than that of a concept in our mind? Then in what sense can westill say that it is the very core of actual being?

"The primary mistake of Aristotle, as well as of his followers, was to usethe verb 'to be' in a single meaning, whereas it actually has two. If itmeans that a thing is, then individuals alone are, and form are not; if itmeans 'what' a thing is, then forms alone are and individuals are not....

"Had Plato lived long enough to read, in the First Book of Aristotle'sMetaphysics, the criticism of his own doctrine of ideas, he might havewritten one more dialogue, the Aristoteles, in which it would have beenchild's play for Socrates to get Aristotle entangled in hopelessdifficulties:

'I should like to know, Aristotle, whether you really mean that there arecertain forms of which individual beings partake, and from which they derivetheir names: that men, for instance, are men because they partake of theform and essence of man.'

'Yes, Socrates, that is what I mean.'

'Then each individual partakes of the whole of the essence or else of partof the essence. Can there be any other mode of participation?'

'There cannot be.'

'Then do you think that the whole essence is one, and yet, being one, is ineach one of the things?'

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'Why not, Socrates?'

'Because, one and the same thing will then at one and the same time exist asa whole in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state ofseparation from itself!'

'Nay, Socrates, it is not so. Essences are not Ideas; they do not subsist inthemselves but only in particular things, and this is why, although weconceive them as one, they can be predicated of many.'

'I like your way, Aristotle, of locating "one" in many places at once; butdid you not say that essence is that whereby individual beings are?'

'Yes, Socrates, I did.'

'Then, my lad, I wish you could tell me how it may be that beings arethrough sharing is an essence, which itself is not!'" (Being and SomePhilosophers, pp. 47-50)

As I point out in my article on 'Abdu'l-Baha's response to Darwinsim,Aristotle has a problem with Plato's Forms because he does not see a needfor God as the creator of the existence of the world (in Aristotle God isthe indirect cause of the motion of the world, but not its existence). WithGod as creator, the Forms can be understood as the models or plans (that'swhat I mean by a real essence) by which God creates the world. Hence theyare separate from the individual concrete beings for which they are themodel, and the connection between the two realms of being is God's creativeaction.

IAN:> Finally, please remember that in A "essence" can also mean "substance", i.e.> that which stands independently of everything else, that which is not an> attribute of anything else, i.e. identity.  There are two kinds of> substances, primary substance of which there is only God, the only> absolutely independent entity there is,  and secondary substance of which> you and I and rocks are examples because we depend on God for our existence.

KEVEN:I am curious about your understanding of primary substances in Aristotle andwonder if you can provide some quotations from Aristotle where he indicatesthat individuals of all species are secondary substances? I ask because, Ifind Aristotle saying the opposite, that individuals of all species areprimary substances and that secondary substances are the universalsabstracted from them. For example, Aristotle says:

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"A 'substance'--that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily,and most of all--is that which is neither said of a subject nor in asubject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species inwhich the things primarily called substances are, are called 'secondarysubstances', as also are the genera of these species. For example, theindividual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of thespecies; so these--both man and animal--are called secondary substances....

"All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjectsor in them as subjects....So if the primary substances did not exist itwould be impossible for any of the other things to exist. Of the secondarysubstances the species is more a substance than the genus, since it isnearer to the primary substance. For if one is to say of the primarysubstance what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give thespecies than the genus. For example, it would be more informative to say ofthe individual man that he is man than that he is an animal." (Categories2a.11- 2b.13)

"As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each ofthem signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individually andnumerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, although itappears from the form of the name (when one speaks of man or animal) that asecondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not reallytrue; rather, it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not,as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of manythings." (Categories 3b.10 - 3b.19)

This is why I take Aristotle as a nominalist, because he is placing primaryreality on individuals: this man, this horse, etc., the primary subjects ofwhich all other things are predicated. (If he is also trying to say thatthe species form is primary, then what he is saying here contradicts that.)God, as I read Aristotle, is also a primary substance, but merely thehighest primary substance among other primary substances, and the cause ofthe motion of the other primary substances as the ultimate Object of desire.But he does not create their existence. This is the basis of theAristotelian argument for the co-eternity of the world and God, becauseanything whose existence is through itself must be co-eternal with thatwhose existence is through itself.

> IAN quotes:>> (1) "-The change in conditions, alterations and transformations are> necessities of the essence of beings, and essential necessities cannot be> separated from the reality of things."(SAQ, 93)>> AB is saying that alteration and transformation are necessary, i.e.

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> immutable and non-contingent attributes that are instantiated by "beings."> This information is abstracted by looking at many different beings are> noticing that mutability (growth, decline, etc) are something they all share> in common.

KEVEN:The statement quoted from SAQ is not quite accurately translated, though Ithink your conclusion still holds. The original Persian reads: "Change ofstates, alteration, and transformation are essential concomitants ofcontingent beings (az lawázim dhátiyyih-i-mumkinát ast), and an essentialconcomitant cannot be separated from the reality of things."

> PETER:>> >As we have found, some of these> > "essences" are individual rather than universal, contingent> > rather than necessary (except for the essence of God),> > mutable rather than immutable, particulars rather than the> > abstracted forms of things.> >>> IAN:>> When did we find that essences are contingent? We found that *particular> embodiments*, instantiations or exemplifications are contingent but not> essences per se. Each particular cat is contingent but 'cathood' or> 'catness' is not,  even though we can only know it through particular> individual cats. Do not confuse human epistemological conditions - knowing> about the essence through particulars - with the eternal necessity for all> particular cats to  possess certain attributes.

KEVEN:I disagree, though I recognize two types of contingency. (I assume we aredefining contingency as dependency here?) I think that the Writings areclear that everything but God is contingent for its existence (however itexists, whether as real essence or as actualized individual) upon God. ThePrimal Will itself, which contains the real essences (realities) of allthings, is utterly dependent upon God, and there is nothing higher than thePrimal Will but God. 'Abdu'l-Baha states of the Primal Will: "Though theFirst Intellect is without beginning, it does not become a sharer in thepreexistence of God, for the existence of the universal reality in relationto the existence of God is nothingness and it has not the power to become anassociate of God and like unto Him in preexistence" (SAQ 203).

The Báb is clear in the following statement:

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"With the exception of God, nothing can subsist through itself. All thingsare composite. Once the decree of duality is established, the decree ofconnection (rabt) is also established, for a thing cannot be a thing exceptthrough its existence, which is the aspect of manifestation (tajalli) in it,through its essence, which is the aspect of receiving (qubúl), and throughconnection (rabt), which is realized after the union [of the firsttwo]....The names of these three at the beginning of the creative act areWill, Purpose, and predestination (qadar)....It is not possible for anythingto exist without the elements described, even were God's command offered toa willing soul, for the contingent world cannot come into existence savethrough two complementary principles. Once the remembrance of duality isestablished, the remembrance of states (shu'ún) continueth without end, forthese states have no end." (provisional translation from INBA 14:268 ff,compared with versions of the same Tablet in INBA 67:38 ff. and 86:137 ff.)

If nothing but God can subsist through itself, does this not make essencescontingent, in the sense of dependent? So the Primal Will and the realessences of things are dependent upon God, but they are independent andself-subsistent in relation to individual particular things, which makes theformer not contingent in relation to particularized things, but contingentin relation to God.

> IAN:> Plato does not think that essences, Ideas, are unknowable; his point is that> they are knowable through intuition, i.e. that the true philosopher can have> true, i.e. immediate knowledge of the Ideas if he is inwardly ready for such> knowledge.

KEVEN:My understanding, from reading Plato, is that Plato only knew that the Ideasexist through intuition but not what they are in themselves. I don't believeI have ever read a statement from Plato which indicates that he believed ahuman being could know the Ideas as they are in themselves (i.e. directknowledge). When Plato speaks of knowledge of the Ideas, this is a relativeknowledge, not an absolute knowledge. His whole approach to knowing them wasthrough induction (the observation of particulars to arrive at theuniversals) and through the dialectic of questioning and answeringpropositions, until one could arrive at an answer most coherent withobserved facts and all principles accepted as true. But this was neverunderstood to be the whole answer or the final truth. He was very scientificand humble in his approach, and it has been noted by more than one authorthat the Socratic method is the origin, in principle, of the scientificmethod. For example, in the following, A. E. Taylor, is speaking ofSocrates, but it applies equally to Plato:

"Socrates is accused by his unfavourable critics in Plato of this

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affectation [of acting as if he knows nothing] because he habituallyrepresents himself as the humble inquirer who wants to sit at the feet ofthose who know more than himself, while it is manifest that he is reallytheir intellectual superior....Plato's own conviction, of course, is thatSocrates' professions are perfectly serious. He declares himself ignorantfor the same reason that he thinks very little of the wisdom upon which someof his contemporaries plume themselves: he has a sound and exacting standardof what real knowledge should be, and therefore knows how far short he andall the rest of them come of reaching that standard. Hence he alone seesboth himself and the rest of mankind in their true proportions, and thecontrast between men's pretensions [to knowledge] and their performanceappeals to his sense of humour" (Socrates, pp. 47-48).

"If we cannot discover the truth about things [i.e. the Ideas, Forms, oressences of things] by direct inspection of the things themselves, we mayattempt to reach it by examining the statements, or theories (logoi), whichwe make about them....The procedure he is describing is precisely thatwhich, as we see from Xenophon, as well as from Plato, he called'dialectic', a name which properly means the method of 'conversation'. Thethought which explains the use of the name is that truth [always relativetruth is meant] has to be reached by dint of dialogue, or debate, which maybe carried on between two inquirers, or also within the heart of a singleinquirer, as his 'soul' questions itself and answers its own questions. Thetruth, which is not to be discovered by any direct inspection of 'facts',may be beaten out in the crucial confrontation of rival interpretations ofthem [this seems very similar to what 'Abdu'l-Baha says about truth arisingfrom the clash of different opinions during consultation]....

"The Phaedo gives us a fairly full account of the nature of the procedure.The method is that Socrates starts from some proposition which, on anygrounds, commends itself to him as presumably true. This he calls hisinitial hypothesis, and he proceeds to ask himself 'what must follow if thisis admitted', that is, to deduce its consequences. The truth of the initialhypothesis being at present unquestioned, whatever follows from it is alsoset down as true, and whatever conflicts with it is false. Thus theassumption of the method is simply that truth is a coherent system, and thatnothing which conflicts with a true principle can be true....Socrates takesit [the assumed principle] as the starting-point of an argument because hepresumes it to be true, or because it is common ground to himself and theother party to the discussion. On the other hand, there is no question ofasserting it as self-evident and final truth. It may be called intoquestion, and in that case requires to be defended by being deduced as aconsequence from some more ultimate and less disputable hypothesis. Theimportant rule of method is that the question what consequences follow fromthe hypothesis, and the question whether the hypothesis itself is true, mustbe kept distinct....

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"So far, the method ascribed to Socrates in the Phaedo [and also used byPlato] is clearly in principle that which has proved itself the one path totruth in scientific theory down to our own time....The one notabledifference is that Socrates makes no special reference to the verificationof theory by the confrontation of theorectical consequences withobservational fact" (Socrates, pp. 155-159).

> IAN:> I tend to agree with Gilson that A's forms are Plato's Ideas "brought down> from heaven to earth" insofar as to my way of thinking, the forms or Ideas> are eternally existing potentials inherent in matter, not unlike Whitehead's> Eternal Objects always available for  actualisation or "ingression."  This> certainly brings A & P closer together and thus, in my view, more into line> with the philosophical nature of the Writings.

KEVEN:I agree here that the Forms are, in a certain sense, eternally existingpotentials inherent in ethereal matter. Shaykh Ahmad explains form and matter to be two sides of the same coin, eternally inseparable and mutually interdependent, neither having any real existence without the other. This is looking at it from our perspective, after the act of creation, which is all we know. But since it is God who provides the Form by His creative act, and since the Form is what we define as having being, is not matter by itself the same asnon-existence, not absolute nothingness, but real non-existence? So Godcreates things from this real non-existence, which is matter without form,through His creative act. But it seems that the source of the "thing" asthing is the act and not the matter, so that the real source of being is theagent of the act, and not the medium upon which the agent acts. A blankcanvas will remain eternally blank until the painter paints upon it. Is thepotential of the picture is in the canvas, or is it in the mind of thepainter, and then realized by the action of the painter?

IAN:> However, I respectfully disagree with Gilson that A's philosophy "knows of> no act superior to the form, not even existence" because of the fact that no> potential can actualise itself. A potential/form/Idea must be actualized by> an actuality, i.e. something that already exists and this, I would argue,> gives the act of existence priority over essence or form/Idea/potential. God> is pure existence, "I am Who am"; God is that being whose essence is to> exist. I think Gilson reads A as he does because he wants to reserve the> discovery of the primacy of existence for Aquinas and so overlooks the fact> that it's already implicit in Aristotle.

KEVEN:If you would reread Gilson, chapter one, you will see that he is really

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saying the same thing you are. He distinguishes between "existence" and"being." He is following Parmenides definition of "being" as that which isone, simple, and cannot not be. This would be God. Whereas his use of"existence" here refers to "the definite mode of being which belongs to theworld of change such as it is given in sensible experience" (p. 9). I agreewith you, of course, that the potential/ form/Idea must be actualized by anactuality, that is, by an act coming from the actual existence of God, butthis is a different mode of existence than that which belongs to thetemporal world. Form, from a Platonic perspective, is an act superior to theexistence of the temporal world.

IAN:> IMO the crucial difference between P and A concerns the way in which we may> know Ideas, forms, essences, potentials. Plato ultimately thinks that they> can be intuited immediately by those who have undergone the necessary> preparation,(see the parable of the cave) and Aristotle thinks they must be> known through their instantiations. Hence Plato emphasized mathematics and> geometry, and Aristotle empirical studies such as physics and biology. IOW,> the conflict between the two is more epistmeological than metaphysical. Not> surprisingly, when Plato gets into physics (Timeaus) he expresses his> intuitions in a myth, not in an empirical work because myths are a means of> indicating truths that must ultimately be intuited directly.>KEVEN:I discussed this some in my other posts. I don't feel that Plato's methodcontradicts what we have in the Baha'i Writings in any manner. The parableof the cave is after all a parable, and should not be taken too literally. Ihave never gotten the sense from Plato that he means it is possible for usto know the Forms directly as they are in themselves. Maybe some mysticshave said this, but that is not Plato. When he says we can know them orintuit them, I take this in the same sense that 'Abdu'l-Baha states we canperceive or intuit intelligible realities with our minds and hearts, butwhen it comes to trying to explain them and to understand them, we areforced to use the objects of this physical world (SAQ chapter 16). Plato inthe dialogues does no differently. He has perceived and intuited theseintelligible realities called Forms or Ideas, which are independent of timeand space, but both he and his listeners are always forced to explain themand understand them by recourse to physical individual things, which is allthat it is possible for us to know directly. This confirms and supports theposition of 'Abdu'l-Baha that in this world all we can know directly are theattributes but not the essences of things.

IAN:> When Gilson writes, "If the main objection directed by> > Aristotle against Plato holds good, namely, that 'man' in himself does not> > exist and that, if he exists, we are not interested in him, because what we

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> > need to know is not 'man', but men, the same reproach seems to apply to> > Aristotle" he is, I think, overlooking that the prime difference between A> & P is epistemological, i.e. we must know "men" because the form can only be> known through a study of instantiations, not through direct immediate> intuition. Thus A's critique of P cannot be held against A himself. This> also means that Gilson's view that A has "no room for individuals" is> mistaken. In A individuals are necessary for knowledge, but in P they are> not since essences can be intuited directly.

KEVEN:This is the same question as before? Does Plato really say and hold that wedo not need to study the instantiations of things to understand the Forms? Idon't think so, and a quick perusal of the dialogues belies this. TheSocratic method, which Plato uses in the dialogues to attempt to understandthe Forms, relies completely upon references to the particulars andinstantiations of things in the physical world. What Gilson is saying isthat Plato is honest in professing his main interest to be the Forms (whichrepresent truth to him), but he is completely reliant upon the particulars,the images of the Forms, to get closer to the truth in which he isinterested. Aristotle, on the other hand, professed to be mainly interestedin individuals, but his philosophy, Gilson is saying, is leading him to thesame separate species Forms which he is opposed to in Plato.

IAN:> Gilson goes on to say:>> > "All this is very strange, yet it was unavoidable. On the one hand,> > Aristotle knows that 'this' man alone, not 'man', is real; on the other> > hand, he decides that what is real in this man is 'what' any man is; how> > could his 'this' and his 'what' ever be reconciled? True enough, Aristotle> > has an explanation for individuality. Individuals, he says, are such in> > virtue of their matter. Yes, but the matter of a being is not 'what' that> > being is, it is what is lowest in it; so much so that, of itself, it has no> > being. However we look at it, there is something wrong in a doctrine in> > which the supremely real is such through that which exhibits an almost> > complete lack of reality....> >> IMO, Gilson trips over the distinction between the 'actual' and the 'real'> that is implicit though not explicit in A's thinking.(It's implicit in his> doctrine of change as the actualization of potentials.)  Gilson should have> said that for A, " 'this' man alone, not 'man' " is *actual*, i.e. is a> potential that has been actualized by a previously existing actuality. The> form/potential/idea of man is real but not actual. What distinguishes the> potential/form/idea from a particular instantiation is the act of existence.> There is no inherent contradiction between the two as suggested by Gilson.

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KEVEN:I don't believe Gilson is mixing up the distinction between 'actual' and'real'. He is merely explaining what Aristotle himself says, and there is adifference between what Aristotle says, and what is implicit in Aristotle.That is the point of Gilson's analysis, namely, that what is implicit inAristotle's philosophy is a lot closer to Plato's philosophy than Aristotlehimself would admit. For example, Aristotle argues against Plato's separateForms, but when Aristotle's own concept of form is carefully analyzed, itcomes down to the same thing as Plato's. It is Aristotle who thinks " 'this'man alone, not 'man' is real," and it is Plato who thinks " 'this' manalone, not 'man' is actual," though both 'this' man and 'man' are real.Gilson is saying that Plato's view is implicit in Aristotle, but Aristotledidn't realize it. Otherwise, he would not have argued against Plato'sForms.

> IAN:>> In my reading of forms/ideas as potentials, Ockham is in error because, as I> said before, the forms/Ideas/potentials are real but not actual or> actualized. They are real because the potentialities inherent in matter> (sensible or non-sensible) are always there, i.e. available for actualization> by an existing actuality. What Ockham should have said was that only> individuals are *actualized*. He should also have said that potential is> *known* through the individual, i.e. made an epistemological statement as A> did, instead of a metaphysical one.>> This is why I don't think A is a nominalist. He recognizes that the forms> are real (a metaphysical stance) but asserts we can only know them through> individuals (an epistemological stance).

KEVEN:As I said before, there is a difference between what Aristotle says and whatcan be implied from his philosophy. I don't think Aristotle himselfrecognized real forms apart from individuals, which would make him anominalist. There are so many passages in his writings where is affirms theprimary reality of individuals and immanent form and argues against Plato'sseparate transcendent forms. The intent of 'Abdu'l-Baha's statement thatAristotle was a philosopher of the world of bodies and unaware of thespiritual world is strong support, I think, for this view that Aristotlehimself did not believe in anything real outside of the actual individualsubstances of the universe.

> IAN:>> I think A has problems with the ideas implicit in Plato's particular 'myth'

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> of creation. I'm going to quote from my A paper which refers to your passage> specifically.>> "However, I think that Brown  ignores the fact that the nature of God as> Unmoved Mover, is *logically* prior to its consequence, the existence of> matter (that which is moved) , so that in a logical sense, God is, indeed,> the cause, the necessary prior condition, of matter.>> As already noted, the Unmoved Mover requires something to move. Furthermore,> if by "self-existent"12 Brown means 'self-created', then he is mistaken> about Aristotle's doctrine. According to Aristotle, matter did not create> itself; instead, matter has always existed though dependent upon the eternal> Unmoved Mover; that is, Aristotle's matter is co-eternal which is exactly> what the Writings teach.

KEVEN:I don't disagree with this. I agree that matter, as relative or realnon-existence, is self-existent insofar as it can be said to exist. But Istill hold, as I stated in my article, that God in Aristotle's system doesnot play an active role in the creation of the universe. Unlike the God ofreligion, Who creates the world voluntarily through His action, the God ofAristotle eternally contemplates His own Being as the only object worthy ofHis thought. Having no thought of the world, how then can He will to createit voluntarily through His action? If one does not create by voluntary will,then in what sense can one be called creator? Not in the religious sense.

IAN:> If by there being "no transcendent cause for the existence of things"13> Brown means that matter is independent of God, he is in error from yet> another perspective because according to Aristotle, matter also depends on> God for order and form.

KEVEN:I agree. I think I have amply stated that matter is not independent from Godin the sense of needing God's act to have form, by which act it also attainsreal existence.

IAN:Aristotle's God, as we recall, is the universal "the> object of desire"14, that is the final cause for which all things strive.> However, by being the final cause of all motion, the Divine is also the> efficient cause of all motion, that which actually sets things into> movement; moreover, by being the final cause, the Divine is also the formal> cause.15 Nor can matter form itself according to Aristotle since it is a> fundamental principle of his system that actuality precedes potentiality16, > which is to say that all potentials must be  actualized by an actuality or,

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> in this case, God, who is pure actuality. We must, therefore, reject Brown's> effort to erect the co-eternity of matter or creation as a barrier between> Aristotle and the Writings.

KEVEN:It is not the co-eternity of matter or creation which is a barrier (both ofwhich I agree are accepted in a particular sense in the Baha'i Writings),but it is Aristotle's understanding of the role and nature of God. As I read him, God issimply not conscious of the world at all in Aristotle and plays no voluntaryrole in its creation. As such, the title Unmoved Mover fits (as theunintentional cause of the motion of the universe), but the title Creator(as the conscious, willing creator of its Forms as determined by His wisdom)does not fit.

IAN:> Indeed, a correct understanding of Aristotle's doctrine not only allows a> resolution to the apparent self-contradiction between a creation that is> co-eternal with God and the doctrine of a specific moment of creation, but> also allows a reconciliation or synthesis with Brown's views about "God's> actional Will"17and the "first creation"18 in the world of possibilities.> The co-eternity of creation refers to the co-eternity of matter, that is,> the capacity or potential to manifest form whereas the specific moment of> creation refers to the actualization and manifestation of particular forms.> Thus, insofar as the potentials are co-eternal with God, creation is also> timeless, whereas the actualization of form is something that occurs at some> particular point in time. As we can see, this beginning or actualization of> form, has, from the perspective of potentials, no beginning itself: the> potentials have always existed.  That is why Bahá'u'lláh is able to refer to> the "beginning that hath no beginning."19 Using Aristotle's definition of> matter as the potential to receive and manifest form, it becomes obvious> that matter in this sense may be identified with "God's actional Will as> part of His 'First Creation' " of the universe in potentia." 20 With this in> mind, an Aristotelian reading of the Writings can fully agree with Brown> when he says "This Will, which corresponds to the possible, manifests the> realities of things as a sea manifests itself in the forms of the waves."> 21Moreover, this actualization is voluntary insofar as the Divine must> select which potentials to actualize and which to leave in their potential> state at least for the present.

KEVEN:I have no problem with this.

> IAN:> A does not mention 'secondary substances' as I used in the term in my> response but the idea is implicit in his work insofar as only the Prime> Mover is truly independent of everything else, i.e. the ultimate primary

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> substance, which, as the universal "object of desire" differs in kind from> other primary substances. The Medievals brought in the further distinction> I refer to and I think it's a good one, i.e. useful for understanding the Writings.

KEVEN:Thanks for this explanation.

> IAN:> I think we will have to define 'create' more carefully because the> co-eternity of matter as taught by the Writings also suggests that God is> not a creator - if by creation we mean something being brought into> existence from absolute nothingness. That is what the Christians mean and> why they stand so four-square behind creatio ex nihilo. However, as I> indicated earlier, creator may also be understood as the logically prior and> necessary condition/ground of being, the sine qua non. IOW, neither A nor> the Writings have a 'creator' God in the creatio ex nihilo sense, but they> do have a logically prior ground of being.

KEVEN:I agree with you that the Baha'i Writings do not believe in a God Who, asChristians hold, creates things out of absolute nothingness. But the matterout of which God creates things from cannot be said to really fully existeither. It requires form to be really existent, just as form requires matterto be really existent. That is why I identify matter with relative or realnon-existence (a definition also given by some Islamic philosophers). So Goddoes create matter in the sense that He is giving it real existence by meansof forms created by His action, just as he is simultaneously giving formsreal existence through matter.

IAN:> I think your view of Aristotle "placing primary reality on individuals"> needs to be refined. IMO, A places "primary reality on individuals" in the> order or knowledge, i.e. epistemologically. Human knowledge comes through> knowledge of individuals. But this epistemological fact does not warrant the> metaphysical conclusion that only individuals are real and that universals> are simply convenient terms that do not correspond to anything real. I would> say that the potentials which inhere in matter as available possibilities> for actualisation are self-evidently real and objective.>> No less an authority than WD Ross agrees with me; he writes: "The world which> is given to us in experience is a world of concrete individual things acting> and reacting on each other. In contemplating these, we become aware of> characters common to many individuals, These are for Aristotle as real and> objective as the individuals. They are not in any sense the work of the> mind, any more than are the Forms to Plato." (Aristotle: 155).

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KEVEN:I still think that what you and Ross are saying is implicit in Aristotle'sconcept of Form is not clearly stated or grasped by Aristotle himself.Gilson is also drawing out what is implicit to show that Aristotle's conceptof Form is not so different from Plato's, but Aristotle himself has notdrawn this conclusion. Otherwise, he would not have argued against Plato'sforms as he did. This is why Gilson contrived the dialogue between Socratesand Aristotle, in order to show Aristotle (and future readers of Aristotle)what was implied by his premises.

IAN:> Nominalism is not merely empahsis on the primacy of the individual; it is an> assertion that the actual indvidual alone is real; and that universal terms> are 'mind-made' and correspond to no real thing.  In short, they are> fictions. There is nothing in Aristotle to suggest that he would have> assented to either of those propositions.

KEVEN:I would be interested if you could share some passages from Aristotle wherehe states that universals are real and not mind-made?

> IAN:> I did not say or even suggest that essences can self-subsist like God. They> *depend* on God for their being and (ultimately) actualisation. They are> contingent in the sense of dependent.>> However, they are not contingent in the sense of being able to be other than> they are in this universe - which is the sense I was referring to.>> IOW, in this  particular universe, a square has 4 sides, and if God wants to> make a square here, it will have to have 4 sides. In being bound by this,> God is bound by no more than His original will to make this particular> universe the kind of universe it is. It represents His demonstrated> commitment to order instead of chaos. To change this, He would have to make> this universe other than it fundamentally is, which is, in effect, to make> it another, different universe.

KEVEN:Thanks for that explanation, Ian. Yes, that makes sense.

IAN:> I read Plato differently, i.e. in light of the parable of the cave.>> What you describe as the dialectic, are, in effect, only the efforts of the> prisoners in the cave to free themselves from the (intellectual) bonds that> hold them in the cave and force them to keep observing only second-hand

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> realities, which is all they have with which to carry out their inductive> processes. What eventually leads them to freedom is not the knowledge gained> by induction because these second-hand realities, i.e. shadows, can only> bring opinion and not knowledge; rather what opens the way to knowledge is> the recognition that all dialectic about shadows leads to confusions.

KEVEN:I disagree. It is through dialectic about the shadows (continual questionand answer as in consultation) that leads us towards the truth. God placedthe evanescent things of this world here as signs pointing to Him and as ameans to grasp what is real. In the process of dialectic, we can draw uponthe criteria of knowledge to help us: sense perception, reason, scripture,and inspiration. Dialectic/consultation leads us closer to an accurateapproximation of the truth, which as relative truth is still always opinion.

IAN:> IOW, just as in the parable of the cave, the philosopher leaves the cave and> steps into the fresh air, he directly and immediately beholds real objects,> real sunlight and a real sun (like Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas.")> But this apprehension is direct and immediate. Dialectic does not give this> knowledge but only prepares the seeker to receive it.

KEVEN:The parable of the cave is just that, a parable. In reality, we cannot leavethe cave until we die, and while we are here all of us (including Socratesand Plato) are forced to contemplate the realities of things through theirshadows and images in the world of sense. I agree that dialectic does notgive direct and immediate apprehension of the realities of things, but Idon't believe Plato intended that we could ever have this direct andimmediate apprehension in this world (which is the cave), except in thesense of perceiving the 'existence' of such intelligible realities throughthe faculties of our minds and hearts. But to attain an imperfect andrelative understanding of 'what' those realities are, we are obliged torefer to their shadows and images (this is what 'Abdu'l-Baha confirms inSAQ). This is why Socrates and Plato were so eager to engage in dialectic,because they wanted to come closer to the truth. They spent their wholelives devoted to the search for truth. They never claimed to have actuallyattained it in any absolute sense. Socrates recognized the first conditionfor attaining truth, and that was to recognize his own ignorance as well asthe ignorance of all other men. He was impatient with their pretensions toknowledge, because only through humility and recognizing our ignorance canwe progress to higher levels. I find the idea that Plato claimed thepossibility of direct knowledge of the realities of things while we remainin the cave to be utterly against the spirit of all that Plato and Socratesstood for.

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IAN:> Since dialectic by definition only works with shadows, it is inherently> incapable of providing real knowledge for which reason I cannot accept your> presentation of a quasi-modern 'scientific' inductive Plato patiently> seeking real knowledge through dialectical inquiries among the shadows. In> Plato's philosophy, no amount of such debate can ever yield more than> opinion. No agreement about the shadows could ever provide certain truth -> and that makes induction unreliable.

KEVEN:I believe that certain truth, absolute truth, is completely unattainable inthis world to all human beings. While in the cave, we are all limited toopinion. But the opinion of some individuals, through adhering to the fourcriteria of knowledge, can be closer to the truth than that of others. Andthrough the clash of differing opinions in the course ofdialectic/consultation, as 'Abdu'l-Baha and Socrates both explain, the sparkof truth (relative truth) can be attained. If you look carefully at thedialogues, is there any other method besides the dialectic by which Socratesand Plato seek to acquire knowledge and inspire it in others? SometimeSocrates heard a divine voice, which guided him toward certain principles,but he always tested his assumed principles, whether gained through thesenses, reason, or inspiration, through the process of dialectic.

IAN:> What the debate about shadows can do is prepare the seeker to see for> himself, to intuit the truth directly.

KEVEN:The debate about the shadows does prepare us to see for ourselves, but as Ihave said, I don't think there is any process available to us while weremain in the cave that can enable us to intuit the truth directly. All thetools we have available to us--the senses, reason, scripture, andintuition--help us to perceive the truth indirectly and relatively, but notdirectly and absolutely. I believe the only ones who can know the truthdirectly are the Manifestations of God through the agency of the HolySpirit, which is the Universal Divine Mind. What they provide to us asscripture, however, must still be interpreted by us through reason andinspiration, both of which are faulty.

IAN:That is why Plato was seen as> 'mystical', i.e. one who holds that true knowledge comes only through direct> intuition just as the philosopher directly sees the sun when he leaves the cave.

KEVEN:But we do not leave the cave until we die. Having an intuition or

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inspiration is not leaving the cave. Whatever we see or feel, whether indreams or awake, is still represented to us in terms of the pictures andimages of this world. At most our intuition or inspiration can tell us thatthere is something real beyond the cave, but what that thing is in itself isstill unknowable. We can only know it through the manifestation of itsattributes in this world; hence the importance of dialect upon the shadows.If the philosopher cannot leave the cave, how can he directly know the Sun?

> IAN:> Plato would agree that "dialectic about the shadows (continual question and> answer as in consultation) that leads us towards the truth" but the question> is *how* such dialectic approaches this task.>> Plato, as I read him, sees dialectic as helping us approach the truth by> preparing us to see by means of a dialectic which removes the intellectual> obstacles to insight.

KEVEN:I agree with this that Plato/Socrates used dialectic to remove intellectualveils and enable the questioner to obtain true insight into the realities ofthings. I see the same as being the goal in the consultative process.

IAN:> Socrates, of course, already has the insight, the> direct vision of the truth, and guides others to it by leading them to see> the untenability of their views. IOW, I take Socrates' professions of> ignorance to be an  pedagogical ploy needed in order to help the other> attain the required insight. Bluntly put, Socrates' claim that he was> ignorant cannot, I think, be taken at face value. Having used that method> for 26 years in the classroom, I recognise the sure-footed self-confidence> questioning that betrays the *rhetorical* questioner who already knows the> answer.

KEVEN:Yes, I too think Socrates was not really ignorant. He was brilliant andinspired, as far as I am concerned. But I still believe that Socratesrecognized the principle of recognizing that ignorance and knowledge arerelative terms. One may be wise compared to those in a lesser station ofknowledge, but ignorant compared to those in a station above you. I thinkthis is what Socrates meant. He recognized this principle and believed init, even though in practice he was probably the wisest person around duringhis lifetime. I don't see how one can become wise without first recognizingone's ignorance and then doing something about it.

IAN:> As I read them, the Writings are not Platonic in this way but rather

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> Aristotelian since it is Aristotle who thinks that by studying the> changeable world of shadows we can obtain real knowledge about an entity> rather than mere "opinion" as Plato held.  IOW, Baha'i epistemology is> Aristotelian, not Platonic, though both adhere to a correspondence theory of> truth.

KEVEN:I differ here. First of all, the Writings themselves are neitherAristotelian nor Platonic, since they are divine revelation. (I realize thatis not what you meant.) The question is which method of acquiring knowledge(i.e. true understanding) do the Writings support. We already know that'Abdu'l-Baha accepts the four criterion for acquiring knowledge (senseperception, reason, scripture, and inspiration) as all valid means toacquire knowledge, but each is limited by itself. In one of his talks inAmerican, he stresses that all four together are the surest means toattaining true knowledge. As to method, Baha'u'llah explains that the meansto understanding is through the method of consultation. "The maturity of thegift of understanding is made manifest through consultation." Now what isthe Platonic method by which understanding (true knowledge) is obtained orelicited? Is it not the dialectic, and is not the dialectic very similar to,if not the same as, consultation? My dictionary defines "dialectic" as"discussion and reasoning by dialogue as a method of intellectualinvestigation; specifically the Socratic techniques of exposing false beliefs andeliciting truth." I would have to conclude that the Baha'i Faith supportsthe Socratic method of obtaining knowledge of what is true anddistinguishing it from the false. This is Platonic, not Aristotelian.

I also think it can be shown that Socrates and Plato relied upon all fourcriteria for acquiring knowledge in varying degrees, though I am not sure inthe case of Aristotle. He seems to rely mostly upon reason and senseperception.

Regarding your assertion that in Plato by studying the changeable world ofshadows we can only obtain opinion and not real knowledge, this is not true.This would be true if we remained focused upon the shadows themselves. Butthe changeable world of shadows itself induces us to perceive that there areuniversal principles beyond the world of shadows, which principles are theobject of true knowledge. For example, by studying a number of particularacts in this shadow world which people call just, we can be led tounderstand that there is a principle of justice not limited by space or timewhich exists in itself, which is the standard by which all particular justacts can be considered just. As long as we only perceive particular acts ofjustice in the shadow world isolated from their common guiding principle,this is opinion, but as soon as we attain by insight gained from dialecticupon the particulars the principle of justice itself (independent of spaceand time), this is true knowledge. This true knowledge of the realities of

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things, to which Plato aspired, is facilitated mainly by dialectic upon theindividuals of the world of shadows, though once the world ofself-subsistent Ideas is recognized, then dialectic can continue at a higherlevel upon the relationship and interaction between the Ideas themselves andtheir connection to yet higher principles.

> IAN:> IMO,  you are discounting the parable of the cave too much. It is not 'just'> a parable tossed in as a decorative embellishment. Rather it is paradigmatic> of Plato's metaphysics and epistemology.>> Moreover, I see nothing in Plato to indicate either directly or indirectly> that we only leave the cave when we die. The cave is a symbol of an> epistemological condition, not a symbol for existence of earth. Indeed, were> such the case, there would be no point in conducting any dialectic while we > live since direct insight would be denied to us on earth. Thus, at the very> least Plato and Socrates held out the possibility of attanining real and> direct knowledge of the truth.

KEVEN:I agree with you that the Parable of the Cave does symbolize for us realepistemological conditions. The people left in the cave symbolize those whoare focused upon the shadows themselves (individuals and individual actions)without perceiving the common, time-independent principles that unite them.The person who has left the cave symbolizes those who perceive thetime-independent, non-arbitrary principles governing all things. I agreewith you that insight, and what we call true knowledge or understanding, ofthose principles can be obtained during our life on earth. Otherwise, whatwould be the object of seeking and the independent investigation of truth?But what I meant is that ontologically speaking the philosopher has not leftthe cave. We will not ontologically perceive the realities of things untilafter we relinquish our mortal garment. (What I mean by perceivingontologically is the way our eyes see the physical objects around us.)'Abdu'l-Baha describes this ontological or actual perception of therealities of things taking place after we die. In one Tablet, he states: "Asfor the unveiling of the beauty of the Holy Manifestations at the time ofascending to the limitless worlds, this pertaineth to the fact that thematerial world and the perceptions of the body are a metaphor while theworld of the spirit is reality itself. When the morning of reality dawneth,the realities of all created things will become apparent, the heedless willbecome conscious, and the slumberers will awaken" (Amr va Khalq, vol. 1, p.293).

> IAN:> We disagree here insofar as I do not see Socrates or Plato as seeking> knowledge among the shadows, i.e. things in becoming. In fact, it is

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> self-contradictory for them to do so. Plato's thought requires us to leave> the realm of shadows behind if we seek certain or absolute, non-relative> knowledge.

KEVEN:The search for knowledge only starts among the shadows. It can leave theshadows epistemologically speaking (not ontologically) as soon as theexistence of the principles behind the shadows is realized.

IAN:> In regards to "certain truth, absolute truth" I think we must be careful of> how we define our terms. That brings us to questions about what we mean by> 'relative'  and 'absolute' truth. This is something that I think needs> further exploration.  For example, is it only relatively true in this world> water is necessarily H2O, or that a triangle on a plane has 3 sides whose> interior angles add up to 360? What does it mean to say this truth is> 'relative?

KEVEN:I agree. What we mean by "truth" and "knowledge" etc. can be easilymisunderstood. What I mean by truth being relative, is that it is relativeto the station (or understanding) of the entity perceiving it. Thus theknowledge of the Manifestation of God, though complete and perfect comparedto our knowledge, is incomplete and imperfect in relation to the knowledgeof God. But it is not relatively true that water is H2O or that a trianglehas three sides, because these are facts, not truth. Truth is how weperceive or understand the significance of water being H20 and a trianglehaving three sides.

IAN:> While we both agree that the clash of opinions may lead to the spark of> truth, we disagree on what this means. In Plato/Socrates this means a moment> of direct insight into the truth. The Writings, however, promise no such> moment of privileged insight and. in that sense, are more Aristotelian than> Platonic.

KEVEN:I differ on this. I think our Writings do promise us that we can attainmoments of direct insight, perception, and discernment into the nature ortruth of things. How often does Baha'u'llah speak of those endued withinsight or who have discernment, or who have perceived the truth. How isthis different from Plato discerning or having insight into the realities ofthings?

>  KEVEN:> > The debate about the shadows does prepare us to see for ourselves, but as I

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> > have said, I don't think there is any process available to us while we> > remain in the cave that can enable us to intuit the truth directly. All the> > tools we have available to us--the senses, reason, scripture, and> > intuition--help us to perceive the truth indirectly and relatively, but not> > directly and absolutely.>> IAN:> Now I agree with this and so do Aristotle and the Writings.  But, in my> reading at least, Plato does not. Just as Socrates has stepped out of the> cave in his life-time, Plato expects that certain others  who have passed> through the stage of dialectical training will be able to achieve the same> and leave the world of shadows behind.  The philosopher kings of the> Republic are such individuals. The possibility of stepping out of the cave> in this life-time is the only reason he bothers with dialect. I see no> evidence in the dialogues that Plato and Socrates think we cannot surmount> the world of shadows in this life-time.

KEVEN:I see where I have been unclear and imprecise. (This dialogue is helping toclarify what I mean to myself!) What I meant above when I said "I don'tthink there is any process available to us while we remain in the cave thatcan enable us to intuit the truth directly," is that there is no means whilewe remain in the cave by which we can ontologically perceive the realitiesof things. But we can epistemologically perceive the realities of things andsuch things as the soul and ether (in accord with SAQ chapter 16) while inthe cave. I think this is something that Aristotle and Plato share incommon, though Aristotle did not recognize, as Plato did, that suchrealities transcend material bodies.

> IAN:> I would amend your statement to read that only the Manifestations know the> *whole* truth

KEVEN:What about God? Does not God know more than His created Manifestations? Ifso, then the knowledge of the Manifestations is relative compared to God'sknowledge.

>  IAN:> I see no indication that Plato believed we only leave the cave when we die.>> Now, as a Baha'i, I believe that I cannot see the sun directly in this life,> i.e. my knowledge is always conditioned by my senses, capacity to reason,> revelation, (though we must define in what areas revelation is relevant),> and intuition. With the exception of revelation, I think A would agree with> this view, which is why I think the Writings are, epistemologically

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> speaking, Aristotelian.>> I also agree - as would A - that we only know things through their> attributes - though whether this constitutes 'relative' knowledge as> distinct from incomplete knowledge has yet to be considered.

KEVEN:I agree with you, as our discussion is making clear, that Plato did believehe could leave the cave epistemologically. But the Writings and Aristotleagree with this also. We can all look beyond the shadow individuals andperceive intellectually the real universal principles beyond them whichunite them. This, to my mind, is leaving the cave epistemologically. Platonever claimed to be ontologically leaving the cave. Therefore, there is noconflict between Plato, Aristotle, and the Writings in this regard. Thequestion is where such real principles of things are located? My position isthat Plato and the Writings hold that such realities transcend the physicalbodies in which they are manifested. I believe that Aristotle holds suchrealities to be immanent in material bodies.

Plato would agree that in this physical world we only know things,ontologically speaking, through their attributes. I think this is what'Abdu'l-Baha means as well; otherwise it would make the search for knowledgemeaningless.

> IAN:> I'm not quite sure here, what you mean here by "ethereal matter." It> certainly can't be matter without form, because matter (sensible or> non-sensible) always has form, even from God's POV, since the notion of> prime matter, i.e. unformed matter, is purely intellectual. Form and matter> though intellectually distinct are not actually separable - as you seem to> suggest they are when you write that "God> > creates things from this real non-existence, which is matter without form,> through His creative act."

KEVEN:I think we agree on the principle that form and matter cannot exist withouteach other in actuality, though specific form can beseparated in actuality from specific matter. Thus the specific form of chaircan be separated from the specific matter of wood.So I guess what I am describing is my attempt to mentally picture thelogical or essential priority of God to His creation. The fact that form andmatter cannot be separated in actuality does not imply that form and matterhave no reality in themselves apart from each other. It is God's actionwhich eternally joins them together. As soon as God acts, this dualityexists, and since God has always acted, the duality of form and matter havealways existed as well. But we know that God has the power not to act if He

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chooses. This would not mean that form and matter are no longer real, but nolonger actual. So when we attempt to picture the essential priority of Godto His creation, I think we can correctly view form and matter as separateand real, but just not actualized. But when we look at the finished act ofcreation, it is impossible to see form and matter in any other way buttogether.

Describing this matter from which God creates as "real non-existence" is anexpression used by Avicenna and again in Mir Damad, whom I am studying rightnow. Both these philosophers distinguish between "absolute non-existence,"which the logical non-existence of something by virtue of itself, "temporalnon-existence," which is another kind of logical non-existence with respectto time (things logically cannot exist in both the time of their existenceand non-existence in time), and "real non-existence," which is the actualnon-existence of temporal things in meta-time or perpetuity (dahr).

IAN:> Thus, there was no time at which totally formless matter, prime matter, ever> existed, though of course, there have been times when matter with this or> that particular form did not exist. If there has never been formless matter,> then there was never a moment in which God created ex nihilo. The act of> creation is co-eternal with God, and so is (formed) matter, as noted by> Abdu'l-Baha when he says that a creator without a creation is inconceivable.

KEVEN:I agree with this when we say there was "no time" at which totally formlessmatter ever existed. But if we go outside of time and consider the act ofcreation itself, does this not change how we view form and matter? We stillmust explain how from what is absolutely one and simple (God) multiplicitycame into existence, and this explanation should reflect what is real andnot merely a helpful mental construct.

My own intuition leads me to favor Plato's Dyad in answer to this question,as it seems to correspond with statements made by the Bab regarding theprimal duality at the commencement of the creative act (as I quoted in anearlier post). But here is how G. Reale describes Plato's Dyad:

"The 'Dyad' or 'indeterminate Duality' is therefore obviously not the numbertwo, just as the One in the sense of the Principle is not the number one.Both of these Principles have a metaphysical status, and hence aremeta-mathematicals. In particular we must note that the Dyad is thePrinciple and root of the multiplicity of beings. It is conceived as theDyad of the great-and-small in the sense that it is infinite quantity andinfinite smallness, insofar as it tends to be infinitely great andinfinitely small. It is precisely by reason of this two-fold directiontoward (infinitely great and infinitely small) that it is called the

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infinite Dyad or indefinite Dyad....The Dyad is a kind of 'intelligiblematter'....It is an in-determinate and in-definite multiplicity thatfunctions as substrate for the action of the One, producing the multiplicityof things in all their forms; and hence, besides being Principle ofhorizontal plurality, it is Principle also of the hierarchical gradation ofthe real. The problem from which we began is solved in this way: plurality,difference, and gradation of entities arise from the action of the One thatdetermines the opposite Principle of the Dyad, which is an indeterminatemultiplicity. The two Principles are therefore equally present at theorigin. The One cannot effectively be productive without the Dyad, even ifit is hierarchically superior to the Dyad" (Plato and Aristotle, pp. 67-68).

IAN:> Now, God may have created particular worlds at particular moments, but He> never worked with unformed matter. The fact that matter is, as Abdu'l-Baha> says, relatively non-existent as compared to God (i.e. its existence is> dependent) does not open the way to a creatio ex nihilo doctrine as> Christians understand that doctrine. In their understanding, there was a> moment before which God had no created - and then, a moment after which He> had created, IOW, a moment time when God was not a creator - and a> subsequent time when He was. To the Writings, this concept is logically, and> theologically absurd.

KEVEN:I agree that God has always been a Creator because He has always willed tobe a Creator. I also agree that in the realm of time and in the spiritualworlds where souls exist, God has most likely always worked with formedmatter (not directly, but indirectly--my understanding is that allindividual entities take on their form voluntarily in accordance with theirown disposition as influenced by the environment). But if we are consideringGod's act of timeless creation of the realities of things, then I think wecan speak of God working with unformed matter at least with respect to thefirst reality or Form essentially prior to all others (the firstdetermination of the Dyad). I mean "first" here in the sense of essentialpriority, not temporal priority. God creating by His action on the Dyad isnot creation out of absolute nothingness, but it is also not creation out offormed matter.

> IAN:> First, I rather doubt Plato would consider a Form as an 'act', since that> would involved the Forms in becoming, which, for Plato, means a lesser> reality. Only a neo-Platonism in which the Forms are the creation of the> First Mind or First Will, could countenance the notion of Forms as 'acts'.

KEVEN:We must allow this possibility in Plato, because in one passage he states

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that the Forms are created by God (Republic x, 597b-e). But we mustdistinguish between the reality of Forms as act (i.e. God's creation outsideof time) and the acts of becoming in the realm of time.

IAN:> Second, whereas for Plato, the Forms are superior to the temporal world,> this is not the case in the Writings. For example, the human soul is real as> a potential but it still requires actualisation and experience (Keats called> the world, "the vale of soul-making") in the temporal world of becoming to> be fully itself. This view moves the Writings away from a Platonic direction> into an Aristotelian direction since Aristotle is more 'time-friendly' than> Plato.

KEVEN:I believe it would be more accurate to say that in Plato the Forms transcendthe temporal world, and I believe, contrary to what you assert, that theWritings support this transcendence. I understand these Forms to beidentical to the realities of things into which the Primal Will is resolved(as explained by 'Abdu'l-Baha), and I think we would both agree that thePrimal Will transcends the temporal world. Of course, without the temporalworld the Forms can never be actualized or manifested. So this makes theForms dependent for their actualization or manifestation upon the accidentsof the realm of time. But the accidents of the realm of time also dependupon the Forms for their realization and the Forms have an essentialpriority to the accidents of time. If we mean by "superior" that the Formsor realities of things have an essential priority to the temporal accidentsthat manifest them, then the Writings and Plato are in accord.

The question of the soul becoming more perfect through experience in thephysical world is also in accord with Plato. Though Plato believed, unlikethe Writings, that the soul existed formerly in the spiritual world and hasgone through a series of incarnations, he believed that by coming into thisworld it could be perfected to a state where it would no longer have toenter the cycle of rebirth and death. The soul, by the way, is not a Formbut an individual entity which itself mirrors the Forms.

> IAN:> Could you please provide a reference for Aristotle as a philosopher unaware> of the spiritual world? I can't find it in either Oceans or Immerse. In any> case, here are 3 quotations that contradict that view:>> (1) "Today the philosophy and logic of Aristotle are known throughout the> world. Because they were interested in both natural and *divine* philosophy,> furthering the development of the physical world of mankind as well as the> intellectual, they rendered praiseworthy service to humanity." (PUP, 327)>

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> (2) "The philosophers of Greece -- such as Aristotle, Socrates, Plato and> others -- were devoted to the investigation of both natural and *spiritual*> phenomena."(PUP, 326)>> (3) "As to *deistic* philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,> they are indeed worthy of esteem and of the highest praise, for they have> rendered distinguished services to mankind" (Abdu'l-Baha, Tablet to August> Forel, p. 7)

KEVEN:I have quoted the words of 'Abdu'l-Bahá regarding Aristotle being "aphilosopher of the world of bodies" and "unaware of the luminous world"several times on this list. Here is the quotation again, this time in moredetail:

"He is God!O dear and spiritual friend! When I think of thee, a picture of the famousAristotle appeareth in my mind [the recipient of this Tablet was named MirzaAristotle Khan]. He was a philosopher of the world of bodies, but thou art aphysician of the world of souls. Although that celebrated man was peerlessand his fame world encompassing, he was unaware of the luminous world anddid not receive a full share and portion of God's eternal outpouring.Despite Aristotle's position of honor and renown in the respected branchesof knowledge, new discoveries undermined all his fundamental maxims in thephysical sciences in the opinion of the scientific community...."(provisional translation from International Baha'i Archives ms. AC001/001/01552)

I believe 'Abdu'l-Baha refers to him in the Tablet to Forel as a "deisticphilosopher" because Aristotle did believe in God and engaged inmetaphysics. He was not a materialist philosopher. But I believe that'Abdu'l-Baha states Aristotle was a "philosopher of the world of bodies"because of Aristotle's emphasis upon individual primary substances (i.e.this man, this horse, etc.), and I believe that 'Abdu'l-Baha states he was"unaware of the luminous world" because Aristotle denied Plato'stranscendent Forms and that whole luminous realm where they exist betweenthis temporal world and God. It is interesting that the revival of purePlatonic Philosophy in Islam is known as the Philosophy of Illumination, andthe realm where the Platonic Forms exist is the world of lights.

> IAN> To me it seems clear that Aristotle  holds that the species essence which is> common to all members of a species is more than a mere human construct or> fiction. It is known by abstraction from individuals, but this does not mean> that *what* is known is merely a construct. His correspondence theory of> truth suggests a similar conclusion; knowledge corresponds to something> real, which in the case of a species essence is repeated in all members.

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> This, too, suggests, it is not a construct. IOW, the tenor of his philosophy> militates against seeing him as what we would call a nominalist.>> Aristotle's quarrel with Plato was not really about whether or not Forms> were real but rather, where the Forms were to be found - in a realm of their> own or exemplified in individuals.

KEVEN:I agree with you that this is the real issue between Plato and Aristotle:Where the Forms are located. But I don't see how "in a realm of their own"or "exemplified in individuals" is different or conflicting. To the Platothe Forms are in a realm of their own, but they are exemplified inindividuals. They are the patterns or models existing in the "luminousworld" by which the individuals in the "shadow world" are able to be whatthey are. The individuals of a species in the shadow world are all similarbut different examples of one model or archetype in the luminous world. IfAristotle has no Form apart somewhere else from the individuals, then theForm is immanent in the individuals, so how can it be independent of theindividuals and common to all members of the species? Plato avoided thiscontradiction by making the common species form separate from theindividuals which exemplify it. This is just how an architect can have onebasic plan for a certain type of building, but all the individual actualinstances of that building are separate and varying. The connection betweenthe plan in the mind of the archictect (or in a file) and the individualbuildings is made only when the architect carries out the plan and puts itinto effect in the actual world.

> KEVEN:> I would be interested if you could share some passages from Aristotle where> he states that universals are real and not mind-made?

> IAN:> Aristotle did not discuss the issue in those terms. However, he does touch> on it in Metaphysics IV, chp. 4, 1007a - 1008a where he discusses views that> we recognise as being related to the problem.>> In discussing accidental and essential attributes of things, he argues> against those who hold that "all attributes are accidental"> (Metaphysics,IV,4, 1007a).>> "Therefore, our opponents must say that there cannot be such a [essential]> definition of anything but that all attributes are accidental; for this is> the distinction between substance and accident - 'white' is accidental to> man, because though he is white, whiteness is not his essence. But if all> statements are accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they> are made, if the accidental always implies predication about a subject. The

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> predication then goes on ad infinitum. But this is impossible . . . ">>  He goes on, the gist of his argument being that if all attributes are> accidental then "all contradictory statements are true of the same things at> the same time. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, and a man..."> which he regards as self-evidently absurd.>> Nominalists are precisely those who deny that there is any essential> definition of a thing and assert that all attributes are accidental. In> contemporary terms, they assert that all concepts of essence are> constructions or fictions.>> Now, we may not agree with Aristotle's argument every step of the way here,> but the conclusion - that essences are real in a way accidents are not - is> unmistakable. .

KEVEN:Thanks for that explanation.

> IAN:> I would rather put the issue like this: the *idea* of matter and the *idea*> of form are real, distinct - but not disjunct because they are correlates,> i.e. imply each other - in the divine Mind, i.e. in the order of reason. Is> this the same as saying that form and matter have "reality in themselves and> apart from each other"? If so, we are in agreement. If not . . . .

KEVEN:In my view, "idea" is the same as "form" with God, so this is like saying"idea of idea" and I am not sure if this is necessary with respect to Godand the Primal Will where such ideas would exist. I think that we humans dohave an "idea" of matter and an "idea" of form. I also do not think thatthere is an idea of matter with God in the Primal Will, because matter is,by definition, what is not an idea/form. I have a problem with "in thedivine mind," unless we are speaking metaphorically, since the mind of theDivine Essence cannot literally contain the Platonic Forms and theirintelligible matter. If they are "in" something, they are in the PrimalWill. As the Bab explains in one of His Tablets:

"Those who believe that the Essence is the cause of creation have madethemselves partners with Him, as He cannot be known. He, verily, abideth ina state accessible only to Himself. Nothing is connected to Him, and in Himnot a trace of the existence belonging to created things can befound....Those who say the fixed archetypes reside in the Essence of God inorder to establish His knowledge...have completely forsaken the religion ofthe Family of God, for any reference to otherness in their being testifiethto their separation and indicateth their complete rupture from God. God is

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the eternal Being, Who from time immemorial hath not changed, and it is notpossible for divine unity to belong to anyone save Himself. Rather, allthings are the images of substances whose existence hath no trace inGod....Verily, God is the eternal Being, Who begetteth not and was notbegotten....There is no statement in the estimation of God more absurd thanthis saying of theirs, for they mean by it that creation is the branch ofthe one Being. Verily, the Essence hath ever been void of His creation andHe was apart from it when it came into being. No aspect of it is in Him. Thephilosophers were compelled to propose the doctrine of the fixed archetypes[in God's Essence] and the uncompounded reality [being all things] by theirdesire to establish the former in the knowledge of God. But gracious God! Toestablish God's knowledge of His creatures can only lead to falsehood, sincefrom time immemorial God's knowledge hath been the same as Himself withoutanother object of knowledge within Him. No one can understand the state ofHis Being except Himself. And whosoever aspireth to encompass the knowledgeof his Lord at the same moment disbelieveth in Him, for how is anyone ableto encompass the knowledge of his Lord whose very reality existeth throughHis act of creation and was brought into being from nothing? He hath everbeen the All-Knowing, even though nothing was with Him; and He is now theAll-Knowing, despite the fact that nothing is with Him in His exaltedstation. The attributes of power and knowledge, and all the other names andattributes, are signs belonging to His creation and the musings of theimaginations of His servants that they may not doubt their Creator inanything." (Sahifiy-i-Tafsir-i-Ha, Amr va Khalq, vol. 1, pp. 100-102)

IAN:> I have difficulty with the notion that God> "joins them together", insofar as, like the 2 sides of a coin, they were> never disjunct in the first place.>> Nor do I think we can view them as "separate and real but not actualized" if> by "separate" you mean 'disjunct'. They can only be actualised> correlatively.

KEVEN:I don't think that God "joins" matter and form together in the way we mightliterally imagine. But He does join them together in some sense. Otherwise,how are we to explain such statements of Baha'u'llah, where He says: "He Whohath been manifested is the Hidden Mystery, the Treasured Symbol, throughWhom the letters B and E (Be) have been joined and knit together" (Prayersand Meditations 321)? We also know from the Bab that the letters "B" and "E"of the creative fiat "BE!" represent the realities of matter and formrespectively. As He states in His Tafsir-i-Basmallah: "The 'B' is the stageof the Will and the 'E' is the stage of Purpose. The Will is the father ofall things, and Purpose is their mother....Through the 'B' God created thematter (mádda) of all things...and through the 'E' God created the form

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(súra) of all things" (INBA 60:48-49 and INBA 64:74). We can also glean theequivalence of the "B" and "E" to matter and form respectively from thesewords of the Bab: "The first stage of anything for which the 'thingness' ofexistence [i.e. form or essence] is not a condition is the Will. The momentthingness is attached to it, it becometh Purpose, and this moment isaccompanied by predestination" (Sahifiy-i-Usul va Furu', Amr va Khalq, vol.1, p. 99). This same logical sequence is followed by 'Abdu'l-Baha in Hisstatement: "The world of Command is the station of the Primal Will, which is auniversal reality that is resolved into infinite forms" (Makatib vol. 2, p.141).

 As I see it, matter as the Primal Will (stage 1) already semi-exists and isequivalent to the term "nothing" (laa min shay) in the above passage fromthe Bab, which literally implies before "thingness" or "essence" isconnected to something. As soon as "thingness" (essence or form) becomesattached to it, it is Purpose (stage 2), and this is the same as'Abdu'l-Baha saying that the Primal Will is resolved into infinite forms. This doesn't seem any different to me than the action of the One upon theDyad, as explained by Plato. So form literally comes about timelesslythrough God's action upon matter, just as a painting comes about by theaction of a painter upon a canvas.

In sum, I am not comfortable with the idea that matter and form cannot beseparate from each other from the perspective of God, though I amcomfortable with this idea from the perspective of creation. I also thinkthat what the Bab, Baha'u'llah, and 'Abdu'l-Baha are describing correspondsto ontological reality and not simply to an order of reason in our minds.Thus, the Painter can separate the canvas from the forms He paints upon it,but we within the painting cannot make any such distinction.

IAN:> The problem  facing all discussions about creation per se in the Writings is> that creation is co-eternal with God in the order of actuality. This means> there cannot be a specific moment when God combines the intellectual> realities of matter and form in order to create 'the actual universe.' The> act of creation, as you describe it here, could - if it occurs at all - only> occur in the order of reason. This is not an objection to what you write,> but only an observation about its inherent logic.

KEVEN:I agree with you from our perspective, but I don't think the same logicapplies to this question from the perspective of God. What is actual to usis a fleeting shadow in relation to God.

IAN:> Does God have the power to choose not to create? If He is to be God the

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> Creator, no, because a Creator without a creation is inconceivable as noted> by Abdu'l-Baha. He can> choose not to create this or that particular world, but He cannot choose not> to create per se without  violating His nature as a Creator. Since God is> not subject to potentiality, this possibility does not exist for Him. He is> free, but freedom does not mean caprice; rather it means facing no external> obstacle to being what He really is.

KEVEN:I agree. Thanks for making this clear.

IAN:> I admit that I am dissatisfied with the notion of creation in the order of> reason. Rather, I think of God's act of creation as the act or 'push' that> actualizes potentials in the sensible and non-sensible matter He has> created,  not as the fusion of form and matter by a logically prior act of> God. This actualisation, IMO, is an on-going process.

KEVEN:I understand how you feel! I often feel that my attempts to understand God'screative act are vain and futile, like a gnat trying to reach the sun. As Isee it, matter has absolutely no potential to realize itself. It is purelyformless and characterless. But the act or "push" of God gives it form orenables it to take on form, and so I tend to see the potential of formcoming more from the act of God than from the matter. This is just a matterof which side of the coin one is looking at, I guess. Shaykh Ahmad sees thismatter as active and form as passive, but he must mean matter as moved byGod's action, or simply as God's acting (which logically can't be uponabsolute nothingness).

> IAN:> I would say matter and form can exist separately outside of time only as> ideas in the Mind of God. As ideas, they logically imply each other, i.e.> they are already .  When God actualizes them, i.e.empowers them 'to be',> these implications are also actualized.>> For my part, I> would argue that multiplicity comes because of the nature of God: God is the> only 'One' and the only entity whose essence is to be one. Whatever is other> than God must inherently be dual. Since God> is the Creator, this realm of duality, creation, has always existed and will> always> exist. IOW, the very existence of the 'One' requires 'the Many'.

KEVEN:As I stated before, I don't believe that matter is an idea in the mind of

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God. I see it as a non-thing (lá shay) unactualized in itself butontologically real and co-eternal with God. How otherwise could God createanything? He would have to create things out of His own substance, and thiswe know from the Writings is not an option the Baha'i Faith considers. Ialso am wary of saying "the 'One" requires 'the Many'," because this impliesneed in God, and we know from the Writings that God is beyond needinganything besides Himself. I discuss the implications of this view in myarticle on creation as follows:

The relation between the Creator and the created is one of voluntaryemanation (sudúr). Creatures emanate from God, as speech proceeds from aspeaker, action from an actor, and writing from a writer (Some AnsweredQuestions, pp. 202-206). The speech, the action, and the writing all dependcompletely upon that from which they proceed, but they are notconsubstantial with it or comparable to it. 'Abdu'l-Bahá contrasts this viewwith that of those Sufis who say that creatures are the manifestation (zuhúror tajallí) of the Creator:

"The Sufis say: "The realities of things are the manifestations of the RealUnity." But the Prophets say: "They emanate from the Real Unity," and greatis the difference between manifestation and emanation. Appearance bymanifestation means that a single thing appears in infinite forms. Forexample, the seed, which is a single thing possessing the vegetativeperfections, which it manifests in infinite forms, becomes resolved intobranches, leaves, flowers, and fruits. This is called appearance bymanifestation. Whereas in appearance by emanation the Real Unity remains andcontinues in the exaltation of Its sanctity..The Real Unity can be comparedto the sun. The rays of the sun emanate from it and shine upon all createdthings, but the sun remains in the heights of its loftiness; it does notdescend or resolve itself into the forms of the rays, nor does it appear inthe identity of things through specification and individualization."(revised translation, Some Answered Questions, pp. 294-295)

Though both parties agree that "by God all things are realized, and by Himall beings have attained to existence" (Some Answered Questions, p. 203),the Sufi doctrine of manifestation would make the act of creation necessary,not voluntary. The seed, for example, of necessity must manifest thepotentialities latent within it. It cannot yield what it does not alreadypossess. This view corresponds with that of many Muslim philosophers,including Avicenna, who believed that the procession of creatures from Godis "necessary," hence ruling out creation as a voluntary act on the part ofGod (cf. Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, pp. 56-57). The reasonthe philosophers have said that God's creation is necessary is because oftheir identification of God with the first direct cause of creation, andcause and effect, in this sense, necessarily entail each other (in the sameway that fire necessarily entails heat). On this basis, they also argued

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that the creation is eternal, because that which is caused as a necessaryeffect always exists together with its cause. The Bahá'í view, as quotedabove, is that God is the Originator of the first natural cause of createdthings, but not Himself such a cause. For were "necessity" to accuratelydescribe the relation between God and creation, the true meaning of"creation" would be negated, which implies the power to freely createsomething new and novel from what is outside oneself. As summed up byEtienne Gilson, "the philosophers who examined these problems with the helpof reason alone were never able to rise to the Christian notion of a freeGod" (History of Christian Philosophy, p. 466).

> IAN:> I agree that the Forms/potentials transcend the temporal world. I also agree> that "superiority" is a poorly chosen term. I should rather have said that> the Forms are incomplete without temporal actualization.> Finally, I concur that forms/potentials are real (but not actual) prior to> their temporal actualization.

KEVEN:I am delighted that our dialogue is moving us in the direction of agreementon the nature of the Forms.

> IAN:> It seems to me this reference by Abdu'l-Baha is aimed primarily at> Aristotle's sciences (e.g. astronomy, his biology, parts of his physics)> rather than his metaphysics. The quotes I provide show that according to> Abdu'l-Baha, Aristotle was interested in and investigated both divine and> natural phenomena. Given this context and these other statements, I would> beware of over-interpreting the statement that A is a philosopher of the> body.>> Now, as my A paper shows, I agree that Aristotle by himself  is *not* a> sufficient ground for a complete understanding of the philosophical nature> of the Writings. Plato and neo-Platonism are definitely necessary in order> to deal adequately with Forms, Manifestations and the various levels of> being.

KEVEN:I agree. Aristotle was not a materialist. And I think we both agree thatneither Aristotle nor Plato had a complete grasp of the reality of thenatural order of things, though what they did discover and reason is amazingand summons our utmost admiration. I do think, however, that the letter of'Abdu'l-Baha to Mirza Aristotle Khan regarding Aristotle, more than justindicating his weakness in the physical sciences, also shows that Aristotlefailed to understand the foundation of Plato's philosophy, which is theluminous world of the Forms.

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> IAN:> I agree that on the issue of forms, Aristotle is deficient and that> logically, Plato has the upper hand. There is ultimately no contradiction> between forms in a realm of their own and forms instantiated in> individuals - and neo-Platonism saw this quite clearly. The Writings, I> think, re-affirm this insight.

KEVEN:We are in complete agreement here, and I am thankful for your openness andreadiness to accept differing points of view. I hope that I may be blessedwith this same openness, flexibility, and sincere spirit of investigation.

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