Exit Report_Project Moon Raker

7/30/2019 Exit Report_Project Moon Raker

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Messaging, Organizing

Go Hand in Hand:An Exit Summary

For Project Moon RakerA Discussion Framework

Evaluating the Successful Re-election of Mayor Michael L. RamaMarch 2012 to May 15, 2013

Part 1

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Preliminary Assessment

The project began with a competition analysis based on raw sampling data from the pro-administration Liberal Party andthe opposition United Nationalist Alliance outlined as follows:

Part 22


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Middle-game Adjustments


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Part 3End-game Refinements

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Part 4How Things Play Down:

Strategic and Tactical Review6


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Tommys Losses: Sore Campaigns Do Not Pay

WHEN the smoke of political battle cleared, re-election-bound Michael Ramahas had 6,376 votes more than Rep. Tomas Osmena, in a surprising upsetpainted on odds most people thought were largely on the challengers favor,analysts say.

The final count showed 217,448 for Rama and 211,072 for Osmena, as thoughhistory repeated itself before Cebu: little David killed Goliath again! What wentwrong for Tommy? What turned out right for Rama?

The campaign has had three stages build-up, consolidation, and momentum

and obviously Tomas Osmena and his BOPK party should have found

themselves deficient and wanting in these aspects, say analysts from private-ran Tools & Strategy, a local politico-economic think-tank.

The Rama campaign plan was simple: it was meant to draw sharp comparisonand/or distinction between two protagonists, in various political hues, socio-economic colours, and impact to individuals and organizations, Mayor Ramasays. The BOPK, on the other hand, from start to finish, was bent on demolitionjobs to discredit Rama, painting him as indecisive, unfocused, lacking in vision,

and at a certain point, gay. It was powered by one mans anger and hatred.

Tommy had lost more than half of the formidable coalition of 726 organizations he had built when he first ran for mayor inJanuary 1988, analysts say. Against Mayor Ramas bottom-to-top structure, which was backstopped by strong allies informer Rep. Antonio Cuenco, former mayor Alvin Garcia, 46 barrio captains, 414 barrio councilmen, and a host of formercity councilmen, he has little strength to count on when he began campaigning in May 2012. Suspicions of infiltration andloyalty questions within the ranks repeatedly stalled his organizing pace. The BOPK has been decimated by defections,intrigue, bickering, disunity, and brain drain in the last 24 years.

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While Rama was able to organize and empower 64 parallel organizations built around friendships he has forged with citygovernment department heads and CEOs of home-grown companies during the consolidation stage around January2013, Tommy increasingly relied on 34 allies among barrio captains, 51 newly formed voter fronts and/or alliances with

urban-poor sector groups, and money to move volunteers led by untrained, inefficient leaders, says lawyer Jan Ponce,one of Ramas consultants.

Team Rama had thousands of volunteers who served without pay or allowance. Tommy and his party also hadthousands, all hired hands, ready for work because he had money to pay, Ponce adds.

By the time Rama acquired momentum during most days of April 2013, the BOPK caught itself on the defensive on many

fronts, drawing heavy fire on seven decisive issues integrity, experience, competence, charisma, health, performance,

and platform all directed on Tommy for which altogether the party eventually failed to respond well, say analysts from the

Campaigns & Image Group. Leaks on the BOPK-commissioned political tracking poll and voter preference surveyconducted by students of the University of San Carlos and some of its professors, in which Osmena and the BOPK werelackluster and faring less than expected, have had created the strong public perception that Rama has finally gained theupper hand.

Twelve days into May 13, during which concluding campaigns by Team Rama zeroed in on Tommys character, attitudetoward people (peers and subordinates), performance as legislator and past mayor, and platform, the BOPK insteadviciously counterattacked with negative campaigning, raising the specter of Ramas alleged ties with drug lords, Ramasfailed marriage, and Ramas psychiatry record, that boomeranged altogether and hurt Tommy even more, analysts say.

Despite massive election spending for some last-ditch attempt to wrest the initiative, the endgame turned tables in Ramasfavour. Tommy lost 447 votes in Guadalupe, where up to 31,756 of its 32, 411voters turned up to cast their ballots andwhere he is a registered voter. Worse, in his own precinct, he lost to Rama 27 against one. Rama lost only in 29 of the 80barrios and 547,681 electors that made up the citys political landscape.

Summary of Successful Actions

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March to October 2012Phase I: The Moon Rake project was able to touch base with 64 organizations within Team Rama, succeeded in layingdown the Seven-Item Issue Framework, completed indoctrination and trainings for speakers, and empowered them intocommunity engagement through the use of 16 white papers;

Phase II: Succeeded in touching base with senior citizen organizations across the wide demographic of 62,000 ageingmen and women who are still qualified to vote, and influenced the organizing pace for Senior Citizens of Team Rama orScooter for short.

November to December 2012Phase III: Touched base with media (radio, TV, newspapers) on social networks, especially Face Book, and planted theissue framework based on 16 white papers;

Phase IV: Launched six propaganda initiatives for the grass-root level, riding on the crest of negative public perceptionand sentiment on key issues, especially the South Road Properties, corruption, and growing public debts incurred;

Deployed eight comic strips emphasizing the major issue points;

January to February 2013Phase V: Revitalized speaker groups toward using refined white papers;

March to May 10, 2013Touched base with city council candidates for upgrades in messaging; Laid the ground work for special vote conversionoperations and deployment of tactical facilities, including city-owned business, for election day.

Part 5From the Planning Vantage Point:

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Strategic and Tactical Review

RATIONALETo lay the ground work for 2013 mayoralty campaign

SITUATION ANALYSISGetting MLR re-elected needs a STRONG LIFT from a set of valid issues close to the hearts and minds ofthe populaceaspirations and dreams to which voters can directly identify themselves to.

Through COMMUNITY ORGANIZING and CONSULTATIVE APPROACH on an indirect, sublime, yet high-impact ISSUE INTERCEPTION, we can create and develop a new Social, Politico-Economic, and EcologyDevelopment (SPEED) framework with the direct participation of communities. SPEED will serve as the

master plan of city development, endorsed and supported by men and women in the urban poor, youth,industrial, services, agriculture, and faith-based sections of the local economy.

The grass-root voters dreams and aspirations become Ramas own. They will find in Rama a clear reasonto cast their vote for. They become stakeholders, instead of being kibitzers and fence-sitters. Their questfor solutions to their social and politico-economic needs form part of the Rama political agenda.

SPEED will serve as the sounding board or an instrumentality for re-echoing our key messages. This holdsthe key to a high-impact, less costly campaign. The how-tos are shown here under.

Reasons for ActionVoter perception tracking data from the US Embassy shows that MLR holds an edge against TRO in termsof incumbency (17.20 percentage points), charisma (6.45 p.p.), and character (3.87 p.p.).

These combined advantage of 0.2752, when weighed against an average voter turnout of 85 percent andelector base of 522,476, shows a glimpse of the MLR potential in 143,785 votes. This project is meant tocapitalize on the factors fueling these existing perceptions, as illustrated below.

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As illustrated below, voter preference tracking data from the UK Embassy shows TROs strength inpopularity (18.44 percentage points), financial preparations (12.46 p.p.) and experience (6.91p.p).

If weighed against a voter turnout of 85 percent and 522,476 electors, this combination of factors pinpointwhere Tommys building blocks for support at 197,548 heads will be and where we should be usingresources to undermine certain initiatives.

Homestretch may run from 1.5% to as high as 4%, weighed against actual voter turnout on the day ofballoting. This translates to a winning range of 5,750 votes (baseline) to 15,335.

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Section I Objectives1.0 Build a Broad Multi-sector Base of Support2.0 Establish common ground with congressional and city councilor-candidates3.0 Empower Small Teams for Targeted Vote Conversions

FRAMEWORK Cost-effective, low-profile, high-impact, barangay level organizing

Target sectors: Urban, youth, stakeholders in industrial, services and farm cross-section, and faith-based groups

Duration: 14 months

Target: 526,476 individual voters in 192,760 households

Section II Strategies12


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Community Relations, Communications, Coalition Building, Voter Conversion, Vote Delivery, VoteProtection

Section III TacticsMethodology TrainingCommunity Organizing

Targeted Communications (Primary Messaging)Advocacy (Secondary Messaging)Agitation Propaganda (Tertiary Messaging)Radio Block timersPR/Media Relations/Reputation ManagementBarangay-Level Consultative Planning WorkshopCitywide Conference on New Social, Politico-Economic, and Ecology Development (SPEED)

MLR Adoption of SPEED FrameworkCouncilor-candidates using SPEED frameworkCongressional candidates adopting SPEED issue frameworkHiring Staff: 4 writers, 1 driver, 1 utility

Section IV Key MessagesTogether We Can Make Things Happen (Person-to-Person)A Vote for Rama, a Vote for Your Sector (Person-to-Group)A Vote for Rama, a Vote for Your Dreams (Person-to-Person)

PART V ToolsMessaging Kit #1: 8 PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEEDframeworkMessaging Kit #2: 32 graphic slides for Face Book deploymentMessaging Kit #3: 48 issue interception modules for radio block timersMessaging Kit #4: 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations

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Messaging Kit #5: 36 special speeches

Section VI Implementation Summary

Description

TimeLine

Update

Schedule

Targeted Message Delivery Channels

StoryPitch

PR

PressCon

M2G

P2GSPEED

RadioBlock

FB+

MK #1 July12 toMay13

Dec15,2012

MK #2 Oct 12toMay13

Feb 1,2013

MK #3 Oct 12toMay13

Jan 2,2013

MK #4 Jun 12toMay

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Dec 1,2012

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

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Seven-Step Implementation Flow

5

4

3

2

1

IMPLEMENTATION FLOW15

Strategy

Tactic

Launch

Adjust

Regroup

Convert Protec Deliver


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PART VII Action PlanThis project will be implemented by Chief Strategist Leonardo Chiu and ABC.

The following models (as shown below) govern both functional organizational coordination at the policy,strategy and tactical levels of the campaign.

Entire plan takes into account the formulation of initiatives in community organizing, PR/media relations,

community relations, coalition building, and radio-based propaganda programs.On the ground level, PROJECT MOON RAKER is operationally under the control and supervision of the ChiefStrategist, who reports directly to Mike Rama. The coordination flow between Media Relations, under theCampaign Manager, should be clear at this point (as was shown in the diagram).

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Stimu

M2G

P2O

P2G

P2S

Fine-

Refin

Refin

Refin

Review

Protection

Conversion

DeliverySystem

Regrou

Rama

Review

Regrou


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Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

Propaganda Management Model

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Grass-root Platform Diversification:The SPEARS Model

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Mind

Emotion

s

Thinking

Heart Feelings

DecisionThought

s

Vote

StimulusImagery

Words

ChoicesPerceptionsPreferences

Signature Propaganda


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Vote Development, Protection and DeliveryModelType A: Family-based

19 Father/Moth

Issue

Issue

Platform

Developm

Platform

Developm

Platform

Propagati

Platform

Propagati

Signature

Propaganda


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Figure 1

Type B: Friendship-centered

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Mother/Fat Son

SonDaugh

You

Frien

Frien


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Figure 2

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Friend Friend D


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Figure 4

Organizing Structure across Six Target Fields

Details to Action Plan

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March 2012Recruit, train, organize, empower six (6) team leaders (first level)These team leaders, who will be recruited from among Ramas staff, will assist implementation of Project MoonRaker in the following sectors:

Industrial ServicesAgriculture/fisheryYouthUrban poorFaith-based (Roman Catholic and other Christian/Bible-based denominations)

LVC provides the operations center of the team, coordinates with MLR over staff assignments, procures equipmentand supplies, and facilitates funding.MLR keynotes the first team meeting. ABC will conduct the one-day briefing and training for the team. Theoperations and responsibility structures will be presented.

StoryPitch

es

MediaReleas

es

Household

Reached

New

Allies

TVCovera

ge

RamaSpeech

es

Press

Cons

MediaRelations

2 2 5,000 25 - 1

PublicRelations

2 2 5,000 25 - 1

CommunityRelations

2 - - 1 1 -

CoalitionBuilding

2 - - - 1 -

Radio 2 - - - - -

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Descriptio

n

Monthly Key Result Indicators


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PropagandaTOTAL 10 4 10,000 1 2 2


2nd Quarter 2012APRIL/MAY:Recruit, train, and empower six (6) coordinators in each district or 12 altogether (2nd level) inaccordance with the multi-sector targets stated beforehand;All six team leaders and 12 coordinators hold one-day team-building briefings, group dynamics, andtraining. Operating structure will be discussed.District-level coordinators will recruit six (6) men/women from six sectors from each barrio under theirAOR.South District will have 204 representatives; North District, 276.The goal is to identify the key community development needs in each barrio, pinpoint a program-benefitratio, and create a central document to be called Socio-Political, Economic, and Environment Development(SPEED) plan. This will be the rallying poinht for all community organizing actions and emergence of 80duly registered peoples organizations.

JUNE:Deploy MK# 4 and Speeches #1/2/3/4 of MK#5

Organize and sponsor barrio-level SPEED workshops 480 in 80 villages (3rd

level). We will provide thehome venue, snacks, training supplies, and token cash allowance for each representative.Production of eight (8) PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEEDframeworkProduction of 32 graphic, issue-illustrative slides for Face Book deploymentProduction of 48 issue interception modules for radio block timersProduction of 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations

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StoryPitch

es

MediaReleas

es

Household

Reached

Individuals

Allies

TVCovera

ge

RamaSpeech

es

Press

Cons

MediaRelations

6 12 15,000 250 - 6

PublicRelations

6 - 15,000 250 - 6

CommunityRelations

6 12 - - 3 3 -

CoalitionBuilding

6 6 480 480 - 3 -

RadioPropaganda

6 6 5,000 5,000 - - -

TOTAL 30 36 35,480 5,980 3 6 12The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

3rd Quarter 2012JULY:Consolidate all 80 SPEED proposals through a citywide conference of 480 representatives, 12coordinators, and six team leaders (Total heads: 498 heads). MLR will be keynote speaker. Snacks, lunch,

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Descriptio

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and token allowance will be provided. The adoption of the Cebu City SPEED plan will be the maindeliverable, on top of collective decision to organize 80 peoples organizations (PO).

Deploy MK#1 and Speeches #5/6/7/8 of MK#5

AUGUST:We will assist in the registration of 80 PO.MLR adopts SPEED as part of the campaign platform.Deployment of eight (8) PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue inSPEED framework We will initiate house-to-house propagation of the SPEED message and recruitment ofmembers who subscribe to our development platform;Deploy 48 issue interception modules for use by radio block timersDreams and aspirations of each barrio, in accordance with SPEED plan, will be propagated and/or

articulated in newspapers, radio, and TV issues in media, and in our own radio propaganda section.Deploy 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations

Ramas congressional and city council allies adopt SPEED. The SPEED issue framework integrated in tomessaging by councilor-aspirants.

SEPTEMBER:Increase the pace of SPEED team deployment through group presentations, for house-to-houseenumeration, sector-to-sector coordination, P2O educational initiative; consolidate community organizingusing the power of two.Maintain pace in deployment of MK2/MK3/MK4.

StoryPitch

MediaReleas

Household

Individuals

TVCovera

RamaSpeech

Press

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es es Reached Reached ge es Cons

MediaRelations

6 12 15,000 250 - 6

PublicRelations

6 12 15,000 250 - 6

CommunityRelations

6 12 250 500 3 3 -

CoalitionBuilding

6 6 7,680 69,120 - 3 -

RadioPropaganda

6 6 5,000 5,000 - - -

TOTAL 30 48 42,930 75,210 3 6 12The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

4th Quarter 2012Continue/maintain house-to-house issue and SPEED propagation, education, recruitment, and enumerationinitiative

OCTOBER:Deploy MK #3 and Speeches #9/10/11/12 of MK#5Barrio allies seek SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY funding for SPEED programs; this issue-baiting initiative is

meant to pick a fight with local leaders loyal to TRO and who dont subscribe to the SPEED framework. Allresistance and objections will be articulated in media and mass-based agitation in our propagandasections.

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NOVEMBER:One at a time our barrio SPEED allies formally write the CITY COUNCIL asking consideration and financialassistance for the implementation of programs. Exploit SP resistance in agitation propaganda, PR/mediaadvantage

DECEMBER:MLR discusses SPEED before targeted organizations and ask certain corporations to assist SPEED-identified NGOs in getting financial assistance through corporate social responsibility programs. Anyattempts by TRO to disparage the initiative will be articulated in our PR/media relations, communityrelations, coalition building, and propaganda initiatives.

Update MK #1 and Speeches #7 and #8 in MK#5 for the homestretch campaign

StoryPitch

es

MediaReleas

es

Household

Reached

Individuals

Reached

TVCovera

ge

RamaSpeech

es

Press

Cons

MediaRelations

6 12 15,000 250 - 6

PublicRelations

6 12 15,000 250 - 6

CommunityRelations

6 12 250 500 3 3 -

Coalition 6 6 30,720 122,88 - 3 -

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Building 0RadioPropaganda

6 6 25,000 75,000 - - -

TOTAL 30 48 85,970 198,880

3 6 12


1st Quarter 2013JANUARY:Update MK #3 for the homestretch campaignDelivery of Speeches #13/14/15/16 of MK#5MLR continues to seek corporate funding sponsors for SPEED projects via social responsibility.Barrio-level SPEED formally write letters to TRO and CDM asking for endorsement and financial help for theirprojects.Resistance, objections, bad comments against SPEED and its framework will be subject of our media releases,commentaries, letters to the editors, and discussions in our radio-based propaganda programs.

FEBRUARY:Update MK #1 for the homestretch campaign Delivery of Speeches #17/18/19/20/21 in MK#5Bring over senators and congressional candidates to address SPEED meetings; deploy additional radio block-timers (2nd round)

MARCH:Start house-to-house enumeration tactic (red and white chalk markings; refer to propaganda manual for details;continue block-timer initiatives

Delivery of Speeches #22/23/24/24/25 in MK#5

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First Quarter 2013

StoryPitch

es

MediaReleas

es

Household

Reached

Individuals

Reached

TVCovera

ge

RamaSpeech

es

Press

Cons

MediaRelations

6 24 5,000 250 - 6

PublicRelations

6 24 5,000 250 - 6

CommunityRelations

6 24 250 500 6 3 4

CoalitionBuilding

6 24 92,160 184,360

3 3 4

RadioPropaganda

6 24 5,000 50,000 - - -

TOTAL 30 120 107,410

235,360

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April 2013Consolidate amplification of SPEED agenda in media, party causes, P2O presentations; use SPEEDinitiatives as propagandaCarry out Final Leg Enumeration Strategy using blue chalk.Prepare precinct-level vote conversion strategies and tactics Delivery of Speeches #26/27/28/29/30 in MK#5

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April 2013 KRI

StoryPitch

es

MediaReleas

es

Household

Reached

Individuals

Reached

TVCovera

ge

RamaSpeech

es

Press

Cons

MediaRelations

2 24 5,000 250 - 6

PublicRelations

2 24 5,000 250 - 6

CommunityRelations 2 24 250 500 6 3 4

CoalitionBuilding

2 24 112,760

368,640

3 3 4

RadioPropaganda

2 24 5,000 25,000 - - -

TOTAL 10 120 * 394,640

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May 2013String up SPEED groups for vote conversion Delivery of Speeches #31/32/33/34/36/36 in MK#5

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Description



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May 2013 KRI

StoryPitch

es

MediaReleas

es

Household

Reached

PotentialAllies

TVCovera

ge

RamaSpeech

es

Press

Cons

MediaRelations

2 4 9,000 900 - 3

PublicRelations

2 4 4,500 450 - 3

CommunityRelations

2 4 250 500 4 3 2

CoalitionBuilding

2 2 115,000

221,000

2 3 2

RadioPropaganda

2 2 5,000 2,500 - - -

TOTAL 10 18 * 225,350 6 6 10The Campaigns & Image Group

VIII Estimated CostsItemDescription

%wt

Estimated Cost TotalMar-Dec2012

Jan-May2013

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Radio block timers 25 218,125 112,687.50 330,812.50

PR/media relations 16 139,600 72,120.00

211,720.00

Volunteer StaffAllowances

20 174,500 90,150.00

264,650.00

Communication (e-Load)

10 87,250 45,075.00

132,325.00

Food 14 122,150 63,105.00

185,255.00

Gasoline 12 104,700 54,090.00

158,790.00

Office supplies 3 26,175 13,522.50

39,697.50

Total10

0 872,500 450,750.00 1,323,250.00The Campaigns & Image Group

Cost-efficiency AssumptionsSince built-in city government resources and strategic assets are already in place, there will be asignificant reduction in out-of-pocket expenses.Campaign goal: 225, 350 men and women

Spending from March 2012 to May 15, 2013: P5.87 per voter

IX Areas of ConsiderationAverage voter turnout in last three elections has been 78%For May 2013, AVT of 407,531 is a close call.Not the best-case scenario yetUncommitted votes: 86,316 or 21.18%

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A swing vote as large as thisa wide gapis crucial to both sides

The best-defensive-case scenarios for TRO:Line P500 for each of targeted 40,000 voters among urban poor and young voters, and spend P20 millionon Election DayGiving money to keep 40,000 of Ramas supporters at home for P25 millionHe did that once; he will do it again

Ramas best-offensive-case scenario:Raise voter turnout at the 88% threshold (459,778)Line up 52,247 more votes at no expense in Mikes favorDiminish TRO initiatives in the Services, Youth, and Agriculture sectorsForce TRO into costly defensive propaganda actions, stretching his financial rope to maximum limitsWork out special conversions in traditionally gray areas of the political economy (W4, U1, and YMW5)Disrupt vote-buying

X Expected Results Advantage #1: MLR is guided by an issue-based framework, which runs parallel to mainstream

campaign messaging

Advantage #2: By winning hearts and minds, Mike will be able to get win even if TRO spends P50

million on Election Day.

Advantage #3: Rama creates and sustains the impression that he values other peoples ideas andinputs more than his own, thereby raising his acceptability and viability as a candidate.

Contested SectorsAcross AgeBrackets

Est.VoteMass

Theaters C/F HomestretchNORTH

SOUTH

MLR TRO

Services 41-60 163,012 30/31 48,903 50,533

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87,860 75,152Industrial 22-40 151,510

81,66969,841

32/28 48,483 42,422

Youth 19-21 53,12928,631

24,498

29/31 24,378 28,751

Agriculture 41-55 73,14639,430

33,716

31/28 27,158 31,152

Others*UP/FBNRC/SC

81,67944,024

37,655

49/29 52,470 29,625

Total 522,476

281,614

240,862

38/34 201,392

182,483

Interpolated data from US/UK political sections (2012): Country Sheet for www.cia.gov, CIA World Fact Book (2012): AverageVoter Turnout at 78%;

Inner-core, Election-day Scenarios Voter turnout between 71% and 80% Losses from cross-candidate diffusion among councilor-candidates may hit 5% and may favor

OSMENA ticket (11/5)

OSMENA may attack central positioning anchored on LABELLA and four other candidates in the RAMAticket via large-scale cash infusion, thereby ensuring that MARGOT VARGAS OSMENA (MVO) gets thetop slot in the South District;

TRO/MVO spending in South District may take some 4.53% to 5% off Ramas support lineup,affecting BATUHAN

TRO spending in North District may affect MLR a little, if the elder Del Mar runs. If not, diffusion by

3% stands likely. Homestretch may run from 1.5% to as high as 4%, weighed against actual voter turnout on the day

of balloting. This translates to a winning range of 5,750 votes (baseline) to 15,335.

Adding 15,335 to the 201,392 homestretch potential of Rama may establish the winning point at216,727 in both South and North districts.

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http://www.cia.gov/http://www.cia.gov/


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Prepared By: Recommending Approval:ABBEY B. CANTURIAS

LEONARDO V. CHIU

Approved: MICHAEL L. RAMA

Conceive. Believe. Achieve

[email protected]: canturias8811; Mobile: +63 918 619 0440

Landline: +6332 417 7559

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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

Documents

Exit Report_Project Moon Raker