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EXPERIENCE WITH AVALANCHE RESCUE TRANSCEIVERS

J.G. Lawton

Introduction

The practicality of avalanche rescue transceivershas been established beyond any doubt by the successfulrescues which have been carried out by means of this equip­ment. Several accidents in which rescue transceivers wereused to locate victims who were completely buried by avalancheswill be reviewed (the fact that Skadis were used in theserescues is a reflection of the data available to the author,who, to date, is not aware of any successful rescues by theuse of transceivers of any other manufacture). Errors whichhave occurred in the use of rescue transceivers, some ofwhich have resulted in fatalities, will be discussed (againthe fact that none of these cases involved Skadis reflectsthe data available to the author). No fatalities due tomisuse or failure of Skadi have been reported. However, inat least one case, a skier equipped with a Skadi was killedby an avalanche in spite of being promptly located and theimmediate availability of medical help. This accidentunderscores our warning that a rescue transceiver cannotprotect one from the dangers of avalanches -- all it can dois to speed up locating a victim. Finally, we will reporton an accident which appears to have set a record for theleast elapsed time to locate a victim who was completelyburied by an avalanche.

Transceiver Operation

Because it is impossible to predict the conditionsand personnel who may become involved in avalanche accidentsand rescue operations, it is essential that rescue transceiversbe simple to operate, foolproof as possible and extremelyreliable. It is emphasized that the simplicity of operationdoes not imply that better performance, i.e., a reduction intime required to locate and recover a victim, cannot beattained by training and additional equipment. In fact, ithas been repeatedly demonstrated that even a few hours oftraining and practice greatly improves both performance andConfidence. It is also strongly recommended that smallavalanche shovels be carried in addition to the rescue trans­ceivers. There is at least one accident on record in whichOVer an hour was spent digging with hands and skis in anunsuccessful attempt to recover a victim whose position had.be7n approximately located with the aid of a rescue transc7~ver(P~eps). Upon the arrival of the ski patrol, who were equ~pped

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with shovels and Skadis, the body of the victim was promptlyrecovered. This particular accident occurred in 1975 inColorado.

The principle on which avalanche rescue transceiversof the Skadi/Pieps variety operate is that all persons whomay become exposed to avalanche hazards will carry a transceiverwhich must be switched to transmit at all times. The trans­missions result in a beeping signal in any other unit which isswitched on to receive and located within range of theequipment. (Approximately 30 m for Skadis.) The strength ofthis signal increases rapidly as the rescuer approaches thevictim. Since the transceivers are carried in the transmitmode, the potential victims need do nothing if an avalancheshould occur. If someone should become buried, his comradesswitch their transceivers to receive and can quickly locatethe buried victim provided that the transceiver is stilllocated-on his body. There was an accident in Austria in1974 where an avalanche, which killed three people, alsoknocked a Pieps out of the pocket of_ a fourth person, who,as luck would have it, escaped and eventually recovered histransceiver. The lesson here is obvious -- carry thetransceiver in-such a way that it cannot become separatedfrom your body. (Personally, I carry my Skadi in a shirtpocket with a securely closed flap and with the lanyardaround my neck.) Obviously, one cannot make contact with atransceiver which is either switched off or switched toreceive. In a somewhat unusual accident in Austria in 1973,a man had used his Pieps in an unsuccessful search for somepeople buried in an avalanche. When the search was discontinued,he forgot to switch his Pieps back to transmit and was thenhimself buried by another avalanche. His body was eventuallyrecovered.

The only sensible policy is to switch the transceiveron upon departure (in the morning) and to leave it on all thetime until you return. Skadi uses rechargeable nickel cadmiumbatteries, so there is no incentive whatsoever to switch thetransceiver off in order to save the batteries. (The Nicadbatteries will actually perform better if they are dischargedall day than if they are used only for part of a day.) Apossible solution to the problem of having the transceiverswitched to receive would be to equip these units with aspring-loaded switch which would automatically switch fromreceive to transmit unless the switch is deliberately heldin the receive position(s). A foreseeable problem with thisapproach is that one cannot guarantee that everyone in a searchparty will be able to hold his transceiver in the receiveposition until the search is completed. One might have torelease one's grip for anyone of a number of reasons, e.g.,to use another piece of equipment (such as a radio) to dig out

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the first victim to be located, etc. If the unit automaticallyswitches to transmit, when the grip is released its trans­missions will be received by the other searchers and the searchwill be disrupted. l One can certainly devise a remedy for thisproblem, but the complexity of the cure may be worse than thedisease. Furthermore, it will be of no use if the equipmentis left in the off position.

Simplicity of operation, reliability and compatibil­ity with other rescue transceivers in use in the area, arethe key properties to consider when selecting an avalancherescue transceiver. There was an accident in Canada in 1974in which rescue transceivers of three different manufacturerswere used at the same time. Only two of these, Skadi andPieps, were mutually compatible. Skadi and Pieps both operateat a frequency of 2275 Hz and, as far as I know, are the onlyones which operate on this frequency and are compatible.

The need for extreme simplicity is illustrated bythe following observation. Early model Skadis, the so-calledHot Dog models, used a three position switch (Transmit - Off ­Receive) and a separate volume control, all clearly marked.Next to the volume control there was a large arrow labelled"Louder" and the first item of the instructions stated:Search: All Skadis on Receive, Volume Loudest. Nevertheless,every once in a while someone would set out on a practicesearch with the volume turned all the way down and thus wouldnot be able to complete the practice. (Also, sometimes theswitch was not in the receive position.) In the latest modelSkadis, the Flat Pack, there is only one knob which controlsall functions. The unit is arranged so that when it is ontransmit it gives off a beep which is loud enough so that itcan be heard with the cover closed. But again, Murphy's lawapplies, just because the unit is beeping does not guaranteethat it is transmitting. It will also beep if it is switchedto receive and another unit is transmitting nearby. Severalpeople, both here in Alberta, and in the U.S. have been rathersurprised when this was pointed out to them. It is, however,very easy to assure oneself that the unit is switched totransmit; the transmit position is the extreme clockwiseposition of the knob. ~Vhen the knob is turned to that position,a safety lock snaps into position and prevents the knob from

IOn February 28th, 1977 an accident occurred where one personin a search party forgot to switch his Skadi from transmitto receive. The signals from his transmitting Skadi led thesearch party astray. Fortunately the victim was found intime by a second search party and did not suffer any illeffects.

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being accidentally backed out of the transmit position. Itrequires a deliberate effort with two hands to release thesafety lock, but it can be done easily, even in darkness, andwith mittens on.

Before reviewing some actual rescues, I want to againstress that although operation of avalanche rescue transceiversis simple, practice is definitely necessary. For example, wehave found that almost always the amount of time required tolocate and to dig out a transceiver which is buried about 1.25 mdeep can be cut in half with two practice sessions. The problemis not in picking up the signal but in reducing the time spentin searching for the exact location and in digging. Pinpointingthe location is very important - it takes a lot less time torefine the position from an uncertainty of 2 m to 0.5 m than todig a pit which is 2 m across. One more point - there is nothingwrong with taking the transceiver into the pit to refine theestimate. I have seen a pit dug 2/3 m deeper than the Skadi wasburied when the pit wall just missed the Skadi. Rescue trans­ceivers, practice, and a good shovel, are the key ingredients ofefficient avalanche rescue. Incidentally, a good way to getmore out of training sessions is to tie a red string (avalanchecord) to the buried transceivers. The transceivers should beburied over a meter deep with the string coming straight up towithin a ! m of the surface. The problem is considered completedwhen the searcher uncovers either the transceiver or any partof the string. Thus, if the location of the transceiver isprecisely determined, one needs to dig only ! m to reach thestring. But if the location is not accurately determined, amuch wider and deeper pit must be dug. Since digging a large pitrepresents a fair amount of work, the trainees have additionalincentive to be as accurate as possible.

Case Histories of Transceiver RescUes

Skadis have been in use since 1970. Prior to thewinter of 1971/72, there had been several close calls whereSkadis had been at the scene of an avalanche accident but somepart of the victim, or his equipment, was visible above thesurface. To the best of my knowledge, the first person who wa~

completely buried by an avalanche and rescued by means of Skadiwas Mr. Roy Fisher of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. The accident .occurred on January 10, 1972 in the Bugaboos range of the canad1anRockies. I have received letters both from Mr. Fisher andHans Grooser of Canadian Mountain Holidays which describe thi~.accident and the successful resuce. There is no doubt that 16would have been a fatal accident if Skadi had not been available.Excerpts from both Mr. Fisher's and Hans Gmoser's letters arereproduced below.

Excerpts from Mr. Fisher's letter of 21 January,1972 :

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••• "You are no doubt aware that Hans Gmoseris utilizing your Skadi radios for avalancherescue for his guests in the Bugaboos. Iwish to report to you that your Skadi wasresponsible for saving my life while I wasskiing there ori January lOth.

My friend Bob Kimoff and myself had startedour descent when a fracture took place about100 feet above us. According to the guides,the avalanche was a good sized one; itultimately travelled about 400 yards. Bob,who was near the side, ended up near thebottom with his head and arm exposed. Hesuffered four fractured ribs and a puncturedlung as a result of colliding with a tree onthe way down. My ride was somewhat gentler,except for a rocky ledge which caused onebroken tooth and many sutures in my lower lip.I came to rest at the bottom, completely buried,with my head closest to the surface at a depthof about three feet, the guide and my companionshurriedly rescued Bob and switched his Skadioff of transmit. Approximately ten minutesfrom the time the avalanche stopped, two of myfriends had located my position with theirSkadis and in another five minutes my head wasexposed and everything was on the mend.

The extensive area of the slide, coupledwith limited manpower would have made it virtuallyimpossible to locate me with the probing technique.There is no doubt in any of our minds that withoutSkadis I would not have been found in time ...• "

Excerpt of Mr. Fisher's letter of 4 February, 1972:

" ••• I am sure that I lost consciousness veryrapidly; probably within one minute after theslide had stopped. I can recall only threethoughts:

~the one to try to move (which movement wascompletely impossible);

-the second was that I was breathing rapidlyand should try to slow the breathing rate;and

-the third was that I had the Skadi and thatI would be found.

I don't recall swallowing any snow or havingdifficulty breathing while the avalanche was

1972:

1972:

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moving. However, my rescuers said that one ofthem used a finger to remove snow from my mouthbefore I regained consciousness.

My rescuers did mention that the snow waspacked fairly well and it was hard digging touncover me. • •• II

Excerpts from Hans Gmoser's letter of 18 January,

" .•. Last week the Skadi saved one of our skier'slife. The man was buried three feet under thesnow. He was found in ten minutes on a slidethat dropped 600 vertical feet. He had justturned unconscious and was revived withinminutes. II

Excerpts from Hans Gmoser's letter of 7 February,

II The first avalanche happened on January 10,1972 at 11:00 a.m. The weather was overcastwith light snow, a southwest wind of ten knots,temperature about 15 above. The slope had a dueEast exposure. Four days prior we dug a profileabout 300 yds. from where the avalanche occurred,right at the fracture line of an old avalancheand determined that the snowpack itself was quitestable. However, since then the slope had beenloaded by shifting snow. The prevailing wind upthere is Southeast blowing almost across theslope. Between the slope where we had dug theprofile and the one where the avalanche occurredis a very slight ridge with small trees actingas a windbreak and of course allowing the snowto deposit on the next slope over. Averageincline of the slope would be about 35 degrees,in two rather pronounced depths with a flatteningout in the middle.

The guide skied and tested the slope first,was about half way down and had skied off it tothe North and stood along a ridge of trees there.Three of his guests had already corne down, oneat a time. \"1hen the next two vlent out on theslope it broke and carried them a distance ofabout 1500 feet and 600 vertical feet down. Inthe process they went through a stand of wideopen small trees and may even have been slightlyairborne as they passed a lip in the middle of

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the slope. The guide immediately got his grouptogether, they all turned their Skadis to "receive",proceeded down the slope and spotted one victimwhose head and shoulders were out. The guideattended immediately to him while the party con­tinued on down the slope trying to pick up thesignal of the second person, who was not in sight.Within about three minutes the signal was pickedup and two to three minutes later the rescuerswere right on top of the victim. The personwhose head was out had suffered four broken ribsand one rib had punctured the lung. He wasimmediately flown down to the lodge and later onto Banff for hospital treatment.·

The person that was completely buried had somelacerations around the mouth and some slight damageto the front teeth. One of the members in ourgroup that week was an oral surgeon who took careof the damages right at the lodge and the personremained and skied with us for the rest of theweek.

If we hadn't had the Skadis it would have beenat least 20 to 30 minutes before we could haveorganized a proper probing and may have been atleast another 10 minutes before the victim wouldhave been found. He was buried under three feetof snow, right at the end of the deposition, onlywithin 10 feet from the end of the avalanche itself.I am almost positive that during that time lapsethis man would have completely suffocated.... "

It might be noted that this victim was found by hiscompanions, lodge guests and recreational skiers who obviouslyhad been adequately instructed in the use of their Skadis.The accident, as described above, "was right out of the book."As described in the Skadi instruction manual, the searchproceeded in a downward direction and.the victim was found inthe deposition zone, a common location. The downward searchpresumably also would have located the other victim first ifhe had been completely buried since he came to rest higher onthe slope. A second accident is also described in Hans Gmoser'sletter of 7 February, 1972:

" ••• On January 23rd, one man in a party of 10skied out of the suggested route which resultedin his breaking off a cornice, dropping 300 verticalfeet down in a rocky shute. The cornice alsotriggered a small loose snow avalanche whichcompletely buried him. The guide immediately came

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around the steep face, switched his Skadi toreceive and immediately began picking up thesignal. Since there were some big chunkssticking out of the avalanche which were partof the cornice, he headed straight for them.The signal kept increasing and when he arrivedat the biggest of these chunks he was convincedthat the victim was buried underneath it. Twodigs with the shovel uncovered the head and withinseconds the face was freed. The person was alreadyunconscious. Two members of L~e party had,immediately after the accident happened, been sentto the lodge. Three of the guides got their rescuetoboggan and flew with the helicopter to the sceneof the accident. By that time the person had beencompletely dug out, was transferred to the stretcherand into the helicopter. By the time we returnedto the lodge he regained consciousness and after atwo hour sleep felt completely fit and stayed toski the rest of the week.

In this case, without the Skadis this persontoo could have died before he was found. "

Finally, I will review an accident in which no onewas injured and which, due to presence of mind, may have seta record for the least time used to locate a completelyburied skier. This accident occurred in January, 1976 in theBugaboos. In this case, the last skier in a group of tentriggered the avalanche when he came to an abrupt stop. Threeskiers were carried about 60 mi one of them was completelyburied, one chest deep and one to the neck. Mrs. Sandy Hansen,who was buried chest deep, is responsible for the speed of thisrescue. Before digging herself out, she asked the other skier,who was buried to his neck, to switch his Skadi to receiveand to start searching for any other buried skiers. InMrs. Hansen's words:

" .••yelled for everyone to 'head for the trees'.I didn't look up, but traversed rather quicklytowards the trees. Just as I approached the treesI felt myself lifted by the snow and carried down­hill. By some natural response I lifted both armsand felt as if I were body surfing. Only brieflydid any snow brush over my head, and I was gentlydropped about 200 feet downhill, landing in astanding position with skies and poles still on,and buried chest deep. The fall took only a matterof seconds and I was uninjured.

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About ten feet uphill from me was anotherfellow buried to his neck. In response to a verythorough training session by our guides before ourskiing began that week, we quickly put our Skaditraining to practice, and both located the signalof the woman buried beside me. Within a minute ortwo our guide and another skier reached us andbegan digging. In a matter of minutes, though itappeared an eternity, the victim was recovered,and no first aid was needed as she became consciousimmediately. I'm sure the sight of her being dugout will remain with me forever. ..

There was another skier buried further up hillwho was located by two other members of our group,plus still another skier partially buried thoughable to dig himself out. In my opinion everyoneremained calm and the situation was handledadmirably. • .• II

The completely buried skier, Ruta Lucas, was dugout right near the feet of Mrs. Hansen.

Aside from the fact that the rescue was very promptlycarried out in all these accidents another common featureemerges. In all cases the victims lost consciousness veryrapidly.

Finally, I would like to urge all of you to reportany avalanche accidents or unusual experiences. It is fromfirsthand experience that we can best learn how to avoidaccidents, and how to improve our equipment and rescuetechniques. I will be more than happy to disseminate anysuch reports which you may send me.