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Explorations in PublicOpinion-Presidential PowerLinkages: CongressionalAction on Unpopular ForeignAgreementsMELISSA R. MICHELSONPublished online: 06 Aug 2010.

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P o l i ti cal C o m m un i c atio n , 15 :63–82, 1998Copyright ã 1998 Taylor & Francis

1058-4609 /98 $12.00 + .00

Explorations in Public Opinion—PresidentialPower Linkages: Congressional Action

on Unpopular Foreign Agreements

M ELISSA R. M ICHELSON

Un iversity of Il l inois at Chicago

Th i s arti c l e e xp lo re s th e effec t o f pu b l i c o p i n io n o n c o n g ress io n al ac ti o n o nfo re ig n agre em en ts, fo c u s in g o n th e P an am a C an al tre ati e s o f 1977 an d th eN o rth A m eri c an F re e Trad e A g re em en t o f 1993 . Th e tw o agre em en ts are h ig h l ysu i te d to c o m pari so n , an d p ro v i de an exc e l l en t te st o f h o w sh i fts in pu b l i co p in i o n i n fl u en c e sh i fts i n c o n gre ss io n al su ppo rt. Tw o ty pe s o f o p i n io n are i n -c l ud ed : (1) th e g en e ra l ra ti n g o f th e P res id en t’ s j o b pe rfo rm an c e , an d (2) o p i n -i o n o n th e fo re i gn ag re em en t b e i n g d eb ate d i n C o ng ress . U sin g q u an ti ta ti v em e th o d s, I te st th e re spec ti v e i n flu en c e o f eac h o f th e se ty pes o f o p i n io n o nc o ng re ss io nal ac ti o n . B o th ty pes o f pu b l i c o p i n i o n are reg re ssed o n head co u n tsan d v o te s taken o n th e tw o ag reem en ts , w i th th e expec tati o n th at th e m o respec i fi c o p i n i o n d ata w i l l b e m o re in flu en ti a l .

Keywords North Am erican Free Trade Agreement, Panam a Cana l treaties, publicopin ion and congressiona l action , public op inion and foreign policy , presidentia lpopu larity effects

Postw ar survey researchers concluded that pub lic op in ion has li ttle if any im pacton foreign policy (Almond, 1950 , 1956; Lippm ann, 1955). M ore recent work haschal lenged that consen sus. Severa l ag g regate studies have found that pub lic op in-ion and pub lic policy tend to be h igh ly correlated over tim e, a l though the authorsare carefu l to reject any causa l conclusions (M i ller & Stokes, 1963; M onroe, 1979;Page & Shap iro, 1983; Weissberg , 1976). Poli tica l sc ien ti st Alan M onroe notes: “Itshou ld a lso be m ade clear that th is research is in tended to avoid argu ing tha t anysim i lari ty between public op in ion and publ ic policy is necessarily indicative ofa c au sal relationsh ip betw een the form er and th e la tter” (1979 , p . 8 , i ta l ics inorig ina l ). Long -term agg regate sh ifts in op in ions on relations w ith China , th e V iet-nam War, the Nicaraguan Contras, and the Reagan arm s bu i ldup , am ong others,seem to have in fluenced publ ic policy over tim e (Page & Shap iro, 1992). Othershave found publ ic op in ion to be correlated w ith m il itary spending (Russett, 1989),presidentia l arm s control policy (Graham , 1989), presidentia l foreign pol icy m aking(Hinckley, 1992; Nincic, 1992a), Reagan’s decision to pull the M arines out of Lebanon(Powl ick, 1991 ), and congressional defense sp ending in 1981 (Bartels, 1993).

Although the postw ar consensu s has been v igorou sly cha l lenged, a new con-sensus has yet to em erge (Holsti , 1992). Th is study helps do that b y exam in ing thein fluence of strong and well -docum ented public op in ion on decisions in Congressusing two com parab le case studies—the Panam a Canal treaties of 1977 and theNorth American Free Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) of 1993. Although the publ ic m ayhave li ttle to say on m ore obscu re foreign pol icy issues, both of these ag ree-m ents were the sub ject of considerab le pub lic interest. In addition , for both issues,

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opponents and supporters a like considered pub lic support as crucia l to their suc-cess, and spent con siderab le resources pu rsu ing that su pport.

The two cases are a lso notab le in that they both include a “turnabout” inpubl ic op in ion , where there w as a m arked sh i ft from disapproval to app roval . Th isprov ides an opportun ity to stu dy th e in fluence of pub l ic op in ion on policy m akingwhen there is a m arked sh ift in pub l ic op in ion , by examin ing how Congress re-acted to those turnabouts. The hypothesi s investi g ated is tha t pub l ic op in ion “turn-abouts” caused increased levels of support among m embers of Congress—that leg is-la tors were in fluenced by pub l ic op in ion .

H 1: When publ ic op inion on a p iece of leg islation sh ifts from oppositionto support, congressional support w i ll a lso sh ift from opposition tosupport.

A second hypothesi s investig ated in th is study stem s from the li teratu re on theim pact of the President’s pub lic app roval rating s on h is ab i li ty to get h is leg islativerequests approved by Congress. Since 1945, the Gal lup Pol l has regu larly askedAm ericans, “Do you approve or disapprove of th e w ay [President’ s nam e] is han-dl ing h is job as President?” Em pirica l work using the President’ s Gal lup Pol l ratingas an independent variab le has found l ittl e or no effect of presidentia l app roval onpresidentia l pow er in Congress (e.g ., Bond & Fleisher, 1984, 1990; Edw ards, 1985,1989 ; M ichelson , 1994; Ostrom & Sim on, 1985; Su ll ivan , 1991).

However, whi le politica l sc ien ti sts cla im that there is no such l ink, poli ti c iansdo not seem convinced. Su l livan (1991, p . 696) quotes a Carter sta ffer as notin g :

When the President is low in pub lic op in ion polls, th e M em bers ofCongress see little hazard in bucking him. . . . After all, very few Congressmenexamine an issue solely on i ts m erits; they are pol itic ian s and they th inkpol itica l ly . . . . They read the pol ls and from them th ey feel sure intu rn ing their backs on the President.

In a recent N ew Yo rk T im es artic le, an experienced leg isl ative stra teg ist on the sta ffof a leadin g Democratic Senator comm ented , “It’s an absolute ru le up here: popu-lar Presidents get w hat they w ant; unpopular ones don ’t” (Rosenbaum , 1993a).

Severa l theories support a link betw een publ ic approval rating s and presidentia lsupport in Congress. M em bers of Congress may support a popular President inorder to try to tap into som e of that popularity . Conversely , they m ay try to dis-ta nce them selves from an unpopu lar Presiden t, possib ly by rejecting h is leg islativerequests, in order to avoid sim ilar disapproval by the publ ic . Another th eory is thatm em bers of Congress use pub l ic approval rating s of the President as a sort of surro-gate m easure of what th e public th inks about the Presiden t’s agenda. When thePresident is h igh in the polls, they w ill consider that an endorsement of the President’sagenda; w hen the President is low in the polls, they w il l be m ore likely to rejectth e President’ s proposa ls, and be em boldened to pursu e their own policy p refer-ences. As S incla ir notes, th is approach predicts that “on ly when m em bers read thepresident’ s popularity as resting , at least in part, upon their constituents’ support forh is pol icy p roposa ls is th is popularity l ikely to sign ificantly increase congressionalsupport” (1993, p . 222).

The tw o issues stud ied here were both strong ly assoc iated w ith each President.

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President Carter clearly wanted the Panama Canal treaties approved; President Clintonwas openly push in g for approval of NAFTA. It follows th at presidentia l app rovalrating s m ay have in fluenced congressional decision m aking on those tw o item s.The com parison is fu rth er a ided by the fact that both w ere relatively unpopularDem ocratic Presidents at the tim e when the treaties w ere under discussion , andboth lobb ied Congress extensively to w in support for their respective foreign pol icyitem . Alth ough NAFTA w as in itiated b y George Bush , and endorsed by severa lother former Presidents, the issue cam e before Congress during Clinton ’s adm in is-tration . In iti a l House support w as stronger am ong Republ icans than Dem ocrats, butRepub lican s qu ickly backed away from the pact when it becam e closely assoc iatedw ith the Dem ocratic President. It then becam e Clinton ’s task to bu ild up new ,Dem ocratic support for the ag reem ent, and therefore h is approval ra tin gs are m orerelevant for th is issue than are Bush ’s.

H 2 : When the President is popular, Congress is m ore likely to supporth is p riority leg islation than when the President is unpopula r.

Given th at both types of pub lic op in ion data w ere ava i lab le, m em bers of Congressm ay h ave elected to ignore the President’ s pub l ic approval rating s in favor of them ore relevant issue-specific pub l ic op in ion data . If th e fi rst hypothesi s is fou nd tobe true, then th e second hypoth esis is less likely to be tru e.

Prev ious studies of the Panam a Canal treaties have been qual ita tive rath er th anquan tita tive. Those studies (Hogan , 1985 ; M offett, 1985) concluded that the turn-about in pub lic op in ion (which turned out to be il lusory ) in fluenced many Senatorsto vote for the treaties. M y study u ses reg ressions to estim ate the exact nature ofth e effect of pub l ic op in ion on congressional decision m aking . The m ore recentNAFTA issue is a lso included in order to streng th en the resu lts. The study of in-stances of turnabou ts in pub l ic op in ion shou ld help clari fy th e condition s underwh ich public op in ion a ffects congressional decision m akin g .

The remainder of th is artic le is d iv ided into three sections: (1) deta i ls of thepresent study , (2 ) em pirica l resu lts, and (3) conclusions.

The Current Study

The Model

In order to assess the im pact of pub lic op in ion on votes on the Panam a Canaltreaties and NAFTA, I formu lated a m odel that in cludes the fol low ing independentvariab les: (1) pub lic su pport for the ag reem ent, (2) pub l ic opposition to the ag ree-m ent, and (3) the President’s approval rating . Variab les 1 and 2 stem from H 1, thattu rnabouts in pub lic support for a leg isl ative i tem w i ll cau se turnabouts in congres-sional support for the leg isl ative i tem . As pub lic support increases and public oppo-si tion decreases, congressional support is expected to increase. Opposi tion is in-cluded a long w ith support because the two are not necessari ly related. Particu larlyin the early stages of debate on a m easure, the pub lic is l ikely to be very poorlyin form ed. High percentages of survey respondents are likely to respond “don’t know”or “no opin ion .” In cluding both variab les a llows the m odel to distingu ish betweenpubl ic op in ion and the lack of pub l ic op in ion (e.g ., 30 percent approve and 70percent no op in ion versus 30 percent approve and 70 percent disapprove). For the

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Panam a Canal treaties, both “good” and “bad” polls w ere included. “Good” pollsare those that properly m easured publ ic op in ion ; “bad” pol ls are those that resu ltedin b iased reading s of pub lic op in ion due to poor question wording , such as refer-ences to proposed amendments. (Question wording can be found in Sm ith & Hogan,1985.) While the “bad” polls found a turnabout in pub l ic op in ion , the “good” pollsremained relatively constant throughou t th e debate. Categoriz ation of polls a s“good” or “bad” is taken from Sm ith and Hogan (1987). G iven that th e pro-treatyportra it of pub lic op in ion prevai led in the Senate during the debates (Hogan, 1985),I expected that “good” polls, show ing constan t pub lic op in ion , w ould be poorpredictors of congressional op inion, while “bad” polls, showing the turnabout, wouldbe good predictors. A th ird independent variab le, presidentia l approval , is includedto investig ate H 2, that pub l ic approval of th e President w i ll in fluence congressionalsupport for a leg isl ative i tem i f th e President is strong ly assoc iated w ith the pro-posa l . As presidentia l approval increases, congressional support is expected to in-crease. For a l l of the pub lic op in ion variab les, I a ssum e that m em bers of Congressare aware of the pol l resu lts as soon a s they are reported in the m edia . The depen-dent variab le includes head counts taken during the debates and the fina l votes.

Tw o sets of reg ressions w ere run for each item . The first used support for theleg islative item as the dependent variab le. The second, a imed at capturing the down-side of the role of pub l ic op in ion , used opposi tion as the dependent variab le. Th isfollows from the theory that mem bers of Congress are m ore likely to oppose aleg islative i tem if pub l ic op in ion is ag a inst i t, or i f the item is strong ly assoc iatedw ith an unpopu lar President. It should be noted that the two possib le posi tions foreach m em ber of Congress, support and oppose, do not necessarily capture a ll mem-bers, particu larly for the head counts. M any m em bers of Congress chose not tota ke a pub l ic position unti l the latter stages of the debates.

Becau se these are tim e-series data , in i ti a l OLS reg ressions w ere checked forserial correlation. Serial correlation was found for all of the models; iterative Cochrane-Orcutt reg ressions were used to estim ate the fina l equations.

The Data

Trends in pub l ic op in ion and head coun ts are recorded in Figures 1–5 . The publicop in ion data for the Panam a Canal treaties are taken from Smith and Hogan (1985),who collected a l l of th e pol l resu lts for that issue from various new s and pol lingorgan iz ations. Data for NAFTA were col lected by the author from a ll documentedsources, including NBC News/Wal l St. Jo u rn al , CNN/U SA To day /Gallup , the Lo sA n geles Tim es and the N ew Yo rk T im es. Although the question w ording is notidentical for m ost of the surveys, they are grouped together in these figures becauseI assum e that m embers of Congress considered the questions to be com parab le.The im portant variab le is not tru e pub lic opinion , but perc e i v ed pub l ic op in ion .Data on head counts (interim counts of supporters and opponents of the pactsta ken b y various actors) w ere col lected by the author from various pub l icationssuch as the Wash i n g to n P o st and O i l D ai l y , and netw ork new s program s such asCBS’s F ac e th e N ati o n and CNN’s In s id e P o l i ti c s.

Figures 1 and 2 show how publ ic op in ion on th e Panam a Canal treaties sh iftedfrom late 1977 until Apri l 1978. Figure 1 shows op in ion trends in good pol ls,where question wording did not b ias responses. Throughout th e debate, pub licop in ion w as consistently ag a inst the treaties, at about 50 percent, w hile supporters

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rem ained a m inority of about 30 percent. Figure 2 show s the b iased public op in ionrecorded by poorly w orded or m isleadin g survey questions as categoriz ed by com-m unication scholars Ted Sm ith and J. M ichael Hogan (1987 ). One such question ,from January 10–11, 1978 , asked:

Wou ld you favor or oppose approval of the Panam a Canal treaty if anam endment w ere added speci fica l ly g iv ing the U nited States the right toin tervene i f the cana l is th reatened by attack? (Sm ith & Hogan , 1985, p .14)

Sixty-five percent of respondents to th is question sa id they would favor approval,wh ile on ly 25 percent sa id they w ould not. In critiqu ing th is question , Sm ith and

Figure 1. Panam a Canal treaties: public opin ion in good (unbiased) polls, 1977–1978 . So u rc e :Sm ith & Hog an (1985). Good (unb iased) pol ls are those that asked abou t the treaty w ithou tnoting any am endm ents or other inform ation .

Figure 2. Panam a Cana l treaties: pub lic opin ion in bad (b iased) pol ls, 1977–1978 . So u rc e :Sm ith & Hog an (1985). Bad (b iased) pol ls m isread publ ic op in ion due to poor or m islead ingquestion w ording .

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Figure 3. Panam a Cana l treaties: head counts and votes in the Senate, 1977–1978 .

Hogan cla im the w ording is “am biguous” (1985, p . 29). Another “b ad” question ,used just a few days before the fina l vote, asked:

Two amendments have been added to the treaties. One a llows the UnitedStates to defend the Canal beyond the year 2000. The other am endm entperm its U.S. ships to go through the Canal first during a national emergency.With these amendments, do you approve or disapprove of the treaties?(Sm ith & H ogan , 1985, p . 17)

Fifty -one percent of th ose asked th is question approved of the treaties, w hile 35percent d isapproved. In th is case, Sm ith and H ogan cla im the question w ord ing isb iased in favor of the pro-treaty posi tion (1985, p . 29 ). Figure 2 show s a consi stentm ajority of abou t 50 percen t in fa vor of the treaties, whi le opponents were a m i-nority of 30–40 percent.

Figure 3 show s Senate head counts and votes on th e Panama Canal treaties forth e same tim e period. Alth ough supporters outnumbered opponents at a ll times,th e fi ght was not merely for a ma jority but for 67 votes, as trea ties m ust be rati fi edby tw o-th irds of the Senate. The first head count in early Novem ber 1977 fou ndonly 51 Senators w i ll ing to support ratification . Support fell a few weeks later toonly 39 Senators in favor, but recovered by the next head count in early February1978 and then rose steadi ly unti l the M arch 16 vote on th e Neutra li ty Treaty . Ju stbefore th e fina l vote on the Neutra l ity Treaty , the fi rst of th e two treaties to beconsidered, the Senate app roved two am endm ents clarify ing U .S. rights to defendth e Panam a Canal and to have priority passage in times of em ergency . The “Lead-ersh ip Amendm ents” increased su pport, and the treaty passed 68–32. H ead countsfor the second treaty w ere im m ediately low er, w ith on ly 57 Senators in favor, butsupport ag a in rose to pass the Panam a Canal Treaty by an identica l 68–32 vote.

Figure 4 records pub lic op in ion on NAFTA for the period between August andNovem ber 1993. Supporters are consistently outnum bered by opponents, a lth oughby on ly a few percentage points, w ith one notab le exception . In early Novem ber,support sp iked up considerab ly . Th is coincides w ith th e NAFTA debate, a ired onCNN’s Larry K in g Li v e , betw een Vice President Al Gore and former presidentia l

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Figure 4. NAFTA: pub lic op in ion pol ls, Ju ly–Nov em ber 1993 .

Figure 5. NAFTA: head counts and votes in the House, 1993 .

candidate and NAFTA opponen t Ross Perot. During the debate, Gore suggestedthat Perot opposed NAFTA for selfish poli tica l and financia l reasons. The N ew Yo rkTim es reported that the debate “b roke no new g round on th e m erits and dem eritsof the trade pact, devolv ing instead into b ickering and recrim inations” (Rosenbaum,1993b). M ore important, Perot perform ed badly ; polls taken before and a fter thedebate show ed Perot’s unfavorab le ratin g up from 39 to 51 percen t. A postd ebatepol l of those who reported hav ing watched the debate fou nd a sign ificant increasein support for th e pact, from 34 percent in favor to 57 percent. Alth ough that pollwas l im ited to debate viewers, other Am ericans w ere a lso probab ly in fluenced byth e sub sequent m edia attention to the V ice President’s v ictory . Unfortu nately , nogeneral-popula tion national surveys were done at that time. A week later, supportdropped off and opponents ag a in dom inated in national pub lic op in ion pol ls.

Figure 5 records the concurrent trend in House head counts and votes onNAFTA. The first head count, in early August 1993 , found about 160 votes in favor(of 218 needed). H owever, many of these in itia l su pporters w ere Republ ican s w ho

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decided du ring the Augu st recess to w ithhold their support to force th e Clintonadm in istra tion to find Democra tic support for the unpopular ag reem ent. The Presi-dent g radually bu i lt up support over th e next few m onths, to about 170 in m id-October and about 180 by early Novem ber. The Gore–Perot debate coincides w ithan increase in support—the next morning , NAFTA supporters claimed to have reachedth e 200 m ark. Given that th e tw o even ts coincide, it is likely that the debate andth e resu ltant surge in pub l ic support for the pact in fluenced th e head counts.

The m ere ob servation of congruence betw een opin ion and policy tellsus li ttl e, of course, about which causes which . . . .

The use of tem poral asym metries, however, permits us to draw someinferences about causal priority. In particular, when public opinion changesbefore pol icy does, it is genera lly reasonab le to in fer that pol icy has notaffected op in ion . (Page & Shap iro, 1983, p . 185)

Such a tem poral asym m etry is found in th is case. Representative Robert M atsu i (D,CA) commented to the Wal l St. Jo u rnal the next day that the debate had not changedany votes in the H ouse, but that interna l poll in g show ed a sh ift in favor of theag reem ent. “When m em bers go b ack hom e th is weekend ,” he sa id , “. . . m aybepeople w ill say , ‘H ey , su pport NAFTA’” (Calm es & Frisby , 1993). A w eek later, thepact passed w ith a 234–200 vote.

Media Framing

Both the Panam a Canal treaties and NAFTA were the sub ject of substantia l am ountsof m edia coverage, particu larly as the crucia l votes in Congress approached. M ediafram ing is exam ined here in order to look for focuses in coverage that m ight havein fluenced public op in ion , particu larly during the op in ion “turnabouts.” I exam inednational telev ision news broadcasts for 1977, 1978, and 1993 using the V and erb i l tTe le v i si o n N ew s In d ex and A b strac ts and national new spaper coverage in the N ewYo rk T im es.

P anam a. When the Panama Canal treaties were fi rst com pleted in August 1977,television new s stories noted that ratification would be diffi cu lt becau se of pub licand Senate opposition . Coverage focused on presiden tia l efforts to w in the supportof Republican leaders, and adm in istration argum ents that the cana l was not as va lu-ab le now as in the past and that rejection m igh t brin g further v iolence in Panam a.Critic isms by Reagan and other leading opponents w as a lso reported . The treatiesissue heated up in early October w hen Senator Bob Dole (R, KS) leaked a classi fiedState Departm ent cab le, w hich suggested that different versions of the treaties werebein g sold to the Am erican and Panam anian people. Dole charged that the adm in-istra tion was m isrepresenting the treaties to the publ ic , and the President was forcedto acknow ledge th at the treaties w ere in trouble. General Om ar Torrijos cam e toWash ing ton to m eet w ith Carter, and the d ifferences in interpretation—over U .S.rights to defend the cana l and priority passage in em ergencies—w ere c leared up .The publ ic w as very supportive of these issues; th e first “bad” pol l, taken a fewweeks later, found that 63 percent of Am ericans w ould su pport rati fi cation if thetreaties were am ended to include those rights.

In m id-M arch , th e networks noted passage of the “Leadersh ip Am endm ents,”

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which put into the treaties the ag reements made earl ier between Torrijos and Carteron canal defen se and priority p assage. From then unti l the fina l vote on April 18 ,telev ision coverage was dom inated by controversy over the DeConcin i am endm entto the Neutra l ity Treaty , which addressed U .S. rights to keep the cana l open. M ean-while, the Times in M arch noted the increasin g pressure being put on undecidedSenators, and deals that th e President was m aking in order to get their votes as thevote on the Neutra li ty Treaty approached (M arch 16), in cluding one story whichnoted th at the Presiden t h ad ag reed to a reservation by Senator DeConcin i (D, AZ)to get h is vote. The DeConcin i reservation a lmost com pletely dominated coveragein April , a s Panam a threatened to reject the treaties and supporters w orked to getDeConcin i to agree to soften the reservation . A last-m inute agreement on a reserva-tion resta ting that the U nited States would not intervene in the interna l a ffa irs ofPanam a won over a ll sides, and a llowed fina l passage of the Panam a Canal Treatyon Apri l 18 .

Figure 6 g raphs telev ision coverage of the treaties between August 1977 andth e fina l Senate vote. For clari ty , on ly friendly and un friendly stories are disp la yed,a l though stories w ith m ixed coverage w ere a lso exam ined. The g raph show s that,at first, un friend ly coverage dominated. After the Panam anian p leb isc i te in October1977 , coverage dropped off un ti l the Senate began debating the treaties in January1978 . Coverage w as friendlier in 1978, w ith th e notab le exception s of Februarystories on the drug tra ffi cking charges ag a inst Torri jos and h is fam i ly , and April

Figure 6. Telev ision coverage of the Panam a Cana l treaties. Th is fig ure show s the num berof news stories broadcast on the three m ajor networks from the tim e the Panam a Cana ltreaties w ere sig ned (August 1977) unti l the n ig h t before the fina l Senate vote (April 17 ,1978). At first, un friend ly coverage dom ina ted . After the Panam an ian p leb iscite in October1977 , coverage dropped off until the Senate began debating the treaties in Janua ry 1978 .Coverage wa s m ore friendly in 1978 , w ith the notab le exceptions of February stories on thedrug trafficking charges ag ainst Torrijos and his fam ily , and April stories about the DeConcin ireservation and attendant con troversy. For c larity , on ly friend ly and un friend ly stories a red isp layed here and in Fig ure 7 ; m ixed and neutra l stories were a l so ana ly z ed .

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stories about the DeConcin i reservation and attendant controversy . How ever, a l-th ough the April stories w ere m ore negative, they kept the focus on U .S. rights,wh ich p robab ly helped the adm in istra tion .

Overal l, m edia coverage of the Panama Canal treaties focu sed on the b attle forpubl ic op in ion and the battle for Senate votes. After the leaked cab le in October1977, and particularly after the Leadersh ip Am endm ents were added in M arch 1978,m ore attention w as g iven to the a ctua l term s of the treaty and the rights of theUn ited States to continue to defen d and use the cana l . As these issues were h igh-lighted in the news, pub lic op in ion pol ls found that guarantees of such rights werevery popu lar. Coverage of the issues of canal defense and priority passage probab lycontributed to the publ ic “turnabout,” in that they tu rned attention away from theem otional issue of “g iv ing away” the cana l to specific treaty issues on which theUn ited States was getting what i t w anted, and on rights w hich the U nited Stateswould reta in a fter th e year 2000. When survey questions asked about th e treatiesin general , they found that the public w as sti l l opposed, but w hen survey questionsin cluded references to th e specific issues of the Leadersh ip Amendm ents, the pub-lic was m ore su pportive.

N A FTA . The NAFTA ag reem ent passed through Congress m uch m ore qu ickly thandid the Panama Canal treaties, m aking less coverage possib le. At fi rst, a m ajority oftelevision stories focused on the jobs issue—whether NAFTA would mean that Americanjobs would be sent to M exico—and on opposition from labor, Democrats, and thepubl ic . Of n ine network reports in August, fi ve discussed the jobs issue. Of 15stories in Sep tem ber, 12 discussed the jobs issue or opposition to th e p act. Thevote w as seen as a test of Cl inton ’s ab il ity to get what he w anted, and l ittl e men-tion was made of the fact th at the pact w as in itiated by form er President GeorgeBush , a lthough it w as noted th at form er Presiden ts favored the agreem ent. Storiesin early Novem ber announced the p lanned Gore–Perot debate and featured newconcessions w on by th e White H ouse from M exico on certa in im ports, sweeten ingthe pact for Congress and a l low ing the adm in istra tion to h igh light the pact’s protec-tion ist p rovisions. The m edia a lso covered the President’s efforts to sh ift th e deba tefrom one about jobs to one about foreign pol icy , whi le critic iz in g the labor un ionsfor their pressure on Congress to kil l the pact.

The Gore–Perot debate w as g iven sign ificant am ounts of network attention , aswas Perot’s very pub l ic opposition cam paign and h is a l leged personal stake in thefree-trade issue. Stories reported that Perot had taken the opposition role aw ay fromth e Repub lican Party , and noted h is cla im that the pact w ould cost Am erican jobs.V iewers who m ight have m issed the actua l debate were ab le to see excerpts on theevening news, and heard repeatedly how Gore had bested Perot. ABC and NBCnoted that Perot had a personal interest in seeing NAFTA fa i l. Tim es coverage ofthe Gore–Perot m eeting reported that Gore had accused Perot of using the issue forpersonal politica l and financia l advantage and tha t Gore w as genera lly con sideredth e w inner. One story cla im ed th at the debate had been viewed in 11 .2 m il lionhom es, the largest audience for any regu larly scheduled program in the h istory ofcab le telev ision , not in cluding th ose who saw the debate on sta tions other th anCNN. Newspaper coverage a lso continued to include the President’s broaden ing ofth e issue, h is dea l-m aking w ith m em bers of Congress, and labor’s opposi tion to thepact. As the fina l vote approached , network stories on the jobs issue g ave way toitem s about how the undecideds w ere going to vote, and what deals the President

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was m aking w ith indiv idua l mem bers of Congress. The Tim es noting that oppo-nents w ere featuring the jobs issue w hile supporters w ere fram in g the issue asforeign policy, reported on deals made by the President, and pred icted v ic tory forth e adm in istra tion desp ite sp li t pub l ic op in ion .

Figure 7 g raphs the num ber of news stories broadcast on the three m ajor networksduring the four m onths before th e H ouse vote (November 18 , 1993). As in Figure 6 ,for clari ty on ly friend ly and unfriendly stories a re disp layed, a lthough stories w ithm ixed coverage were a lso examined. At first, un friendly coverage dom inated, focus-in g on the opposi tion and the jobs issue. As th e vote approached, coverage becam efriendlier, including an ti-Perot stories and the Clinton cam paign for support. Cover-age in Novem ber is d iv ided into predebate and postdebate to il lu stra te that tele-v ision stories fol low ing the Gore–Perot m atchup were particu larly favorab le.

Overal l, the m ed ia ’s focus ch anged from how the p act would a ffect Am ericanworkers and jobs to a personal battle between th e Presiden t and h is opponents(esp ecia lly Perot), w ith the attendant horserace and vote-counting coverage. M em-bers of the House who m ight have been a fra id to support NAFTA because thepopu lar Perot w as a ga inst i t were probab ly encouraged by pol ls show ing that thepubl ic w as increasing ly critica l of the form er independent candidate for President.As w ith the Panam a Canal treaties, coverage sh i fted from the em otional issue—inth is case Am erican jobs—to m ore specific stories about Cl inton ’s dea l-making andhead counts. Aga in , th is sh ift in m edia coverage probab ly helped the adm in istra tionw in publ ic su pport, as ev idenced by the leap in pub l ic support for NAFTA fol low-in g the Gore–Perot debate.

Figure 7. Telev ision coverage of NAFTA. Th is fig ure show s the num ber of news storiesbroadcast on the three m ajor networks during the four m onths before the H ouse vote (No-vem ber 18 , 1993). At first, un friend ly coverage dom inated , focusing on the opposition andthe jobs issue. As the vote approached, coverage becam e m ore friend ly, includ ing an ti-Perotstories and the Clin ton cam paign for support. Coverage in November is d iv ided into predebateand postdebate to il lu strate that telev ision stories follow ing the G ore–Perot m a tchup w ereparticu larly favorab le.

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Empirical Results

Four m odels were estim ated: su pport for the Panama Canal treaties, opposi tion toth e Panam a Canal treaties, support for NAFTA, and opposi tion to NAFTA. Theequations were estim ated w ith an iterative Cochrane-Orcutt procedure a fter in itia lOLS resu lts revea led seria l correlation . The resu lts g ive som e support for the firsthypothesis, that pub lic op in ion in fluenced congressiona l op in ion , but on ly verylim ited support for the second hypothesis, tha t pub lic approval of the Presidentin fluenced congressional op in ion .

Tab le 1 shows the effect of pub l ic op in ion on Senate support for the Panam aCanal treaties. Pub lic opposi tion from “good” pol ls and “bad” polls had an effecton congressional op in ion , w hile pub lic support from “good” polls d id not. Thecoeffi cient estimates suggest that for each percentage point increase in pub l ic oppo-si tion recorded in a “good” pol l, eigh t m ore Senators decided to oppose the trea-ties, w hile each percentage point in crease in pub lic opposi tion in a “bad” pollcaused fi ve m ore Senators to oppose the treaties. Each percentage point increase inpublic support in “bad” polls caused a lmost one (0 .69) Senator to decide to supportth e treaties. In addition , pub lic approval of Carter is found to be sta tistica lly si gn ifi-cant, a l th ough th e coeffic ien t estim ate is negative. Th is im plies th at the Senate w asm ore supportive of the treaties as Carter’s approval rating s dropped . It is un likelyth at there is a causa l relationsh ip between these two variab les; rather, the increasesin su pport were p robab ly driven b y other factors (su ch as the pub lic op in ion andm edia effects exam ined in th is artic le), whi le presidentia l approval just happened todecrease durin g the sam e period.

Tab le 2 shows resu lts for the equation estimating th e effect of pub l ic op in ionon Senate opposi tion to the treaties. In th is case, none of the independent variab lesare sta tistica lly si gn ificant.

Tab le 3 show s the resu lts for the equation l inking pub lic op in ion data to con-

Table 1Support for Panam a Canal treatiesa

Coeffic ient Std . error P > t(coeffi cient (standard t (level ofestim ate) error) (t va lue) sign ificance)

Oppose–good –7.871 1.591 –4.947 0.039Support–bad 0.693 0.152 4.563 0.045Oppose–bad –4.942 1.238 –3.991 0.057Carter –8 .035 1.542 –5.212 0.035(constant) 938 .895 189.087 4.965 0.038

rho –1.047 0.098 –10.699 0.000

Support–good Not included in th e equation because it fa i ls to m eetm in im um tolerance tests of si gn ificance.

aBecause OLS Durbin -Watson tests revea led seria l correlation , the equations were esti -m a ted using i terated Cochrane-Orcutt. “Rho” estim ates, m easures of seria l correlation , a resig n ifican t for a ll four m odels.

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g ressiona l su pport for NAFTA. In th is m odel, none of the independent variab leshave a coeffic ient estim ate that is sta tisti ca lly si gn ificant, a lthough th e estim ate for“Cl inton” com es close. S im ilarly , Tab le 4 shows that for the equation linking pub licop in ion to congressiona l opposi tion to NAFTA, none of the coeffic ien t estimatespass the standard sta tistica l sign i fi cance test.

Conclusions

Overal l, there is m ixed ev idence of an effect of pub l ic op in ion on congressionalop in ion . The Panam a Canal treaties exam ple suggests that dram atic turnabouts inpubl ic op in ion do in fluence congressional op in ion (H 1). The NAFTA exam ple, onth e oth er hand, finds no ev idence to support either hypoth esis. The one m odel thatfinds sta ti sti ca lly si gn ificant coeffi c ient estim ates for th e effect of pub lic op in ion onSenate support for the Panam a Canal treaties finds support m ostl y for n egati v e pub-lic op in ion . The va riab le for pub l ic support from “good” pol ls fa il s to pass m in i-m um tolerance tests of sign ificance, and th e coeffic ien t for pub lic support in “bad”pol ls finds a sta ti sti ca lly sign i fi cant but sm al l effect: a 10 percent increase in pub licsupport wou ld have caused seven Senators to decide to support th e treaties. Pub lico ppo s i ti o n , on the other hand, in both “good” and “bad” pol ls, had a large andsign ifi cant effect on Senate head counts and votes.

Table 2Opposi tion to Panam a Canal treaties

Coeffic ient Std . error t P > t

Oppose–good 0.927 1.726 0.537 0.645Support–bad 0.085 0.160 0.528 0.650Oppose–bad 0.954 1.337 0.713 0.550Carter 0 .668 1.657 0.403 0.726(constant) –83 .374 203.973 –0.409 0.722

rho –0.644 0.108 –5.957 0.001

Support–good Not included in th e equation because it fa i ls to m eetm in im um tolerance tests of si gn ificance.

Table 3Support for NAFTA

Coeffic ient Std . error t P > t

Support 0 .604 0.951 0.635 0.539Oppose 0.777 1.584 –0.491 0.633Cl inton 3.490 2.280 1.531 0.154(constant) 30 .132 103.870 0.290 0.777

rho 0.593 0.232 2.554 0.023

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Table 4Opposi tion for NAFTA

Coeffic ient Std . error t P > t

Support 0 .489 0.486 1.007 0.335Oppose –1.104 0.773 –1.427 0.181Cl inton –1.470 1.147 –1.282 0.226(constant) 300 .154 57.777 5.195 0.000

rho 0.835 0.094 8.872 0.000

The dram atic turnabou ts in pub lic op in ion seem to have caused a turnabout inSenate op in ion on the Panam a Canal treaties, but not on NAFTA. Wh y is th is thecase? Why did th e NAFTA turnabout have no effect on m embers of Congress?Som e h in ts to the answer m ay be found in Gallup Pol l questions su rrounding theNAFTA debate, taken in early and m id-November of 1993 (Tab le 5 ). When askedwhether they would change their vote in the 1994 election based on how theirrepresentative voted on NAFTA, few respondents sa id th at they w ould “remem berin Novem ber.” In other words, th e pub lic told Congress that voting for NAFTAwould not endanger their chances for reelection . Th is a llowed m em bers of Con-g ress to put aside electora l considerations and instead take their cue from otherincentives to app rove th e ag reem ent, including p residentia l pressu re and sidedeals, or perhaps the belief that the ag reem ent w as good publ ic pol icy . One last-m inu te p ro-NAFTA convert, Joh n Bryan t (D, TX), com m ented that i f NAFTA hadbeen rejected, “we would be m issin g a h istoric opportun ity . M ore th an anyth ingelse, that intu itive feeling cau sed me to vote in favor of i t” (Cloud, 1993b, p .3179).

Slightly a ltering the question asked from “does” pub lic opin ion matter to “when”does pub lic op in ion m atter helps clari fy w hat seem s to have happened in thesetw o cases. General pub lic op in ion rem ained strong ly opposed to the Panama Canaltreaties and NAFTA throughout congressional del iberation on th e pacts. But w henm edia attention and survey questions sh ifted from th e general to the speci fic , w henth ey mentioned the Leadersh ip Am endm ents or focused on the Gore–Perot debate,responses becam e m ore supportive. If pub lic op in ion had rem ained strong ly andunwavering ly in opposition , it is not clear that Carter and Clinton would have beensuccessfu l . After a l l, the Senate rejected President Woodrow Wilson ’s League ofNations proposa l in the face of continued publ ic opposi tion . But m em bers of Con-g ress cou ld see from th e varying poll resu lts that there w as m ore going on in thepubl ic m ind than b lind opposition . When polls began show ing support for theLeadersh ip Am endm ents in th e “bad” pol ls, Senators probab ly rea lized that thepubl ic would ag ree to the Panam a Canal treaties i f su ch issues were cleared up . Inother words, th ey w ould not be as opposed to turn in g over control of the Canal toPanam a if th e United States were prom ised certa in cana l defense and priority pas-sage rights, even th ough they sti ll c la im ed to oppose the treaties when asked adirect question in a “good” pol l.

Another possib i li ty is that the ev idence that pub lic op in ion on the treaties w asnot com pletely stab le—that it cou ld be a ltered by sh i fti ng the question from general

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Table 5

If your m em ber of Congress votes in favor of the NAFTAagreem ent, w i ll that make you m ore l ikely or less likelyto vote for h is or her reelection next year, or w i ll it haveno effect on your vote?

Novem ber 2–4, 1993

Pro-NAFTA Anti-NAFTA Tota l

M ore likely 21% 3% 9%Less l ikely 3 40 20No effect 74 56 67No opin ion 2 1 4

100% 100% 100%

Based on telephone interv iew s w ith a random ly selectednational sam ple of 1 ,003 adu lts, 18 years or older. M arg inof error ± 3 percentage points. (M oore, 1993, p . 11)

Novem ber 15–16, 1993

Tota l

M ore likely 13%Less l ikely 21No effect 60No opin ion 6

100%

Based on telephone interv iew s w ith a random ly selectednational sam ple of 1 ,017 adu lts, 18 years or older. M arg inof error ± 3 percentage points. (M oore & Saad, 1993 , p . 17)

support of the treaties to support of the treaties w ith certa in U .S. rights guaran-teed—encouraged the Senators to vote in favor by ra isin g the possib i li ty of usingsuch w ording to exp la in their vote to con sti tuents, i f necessary . After a ll , m uch ofwhat mem bers of Congress do is designed to protect them selves from the fu turewrath of voters (Fenno, 1978). Poli ti ca l sc ientist Richard Fenno quotes one anony-m ous m em ber of Congress, w ho exp la ins:

I don ’t th ink any one vote w ould defeat any congressm an anyw here. Ihear some of m y col leagues say that, but I don ’t believe it. If you gettoo far away from your d istri ct, you ’l l lose i t. But on any one vote, theim portant th ing is that you be ab le to exp la in why you d id i t. (Fenno,1978, p . 144)

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Ra ther th an ignoring pub l ic op in ion when m aking their vote decisions on thePanam a Canal treaties and NAFTA, i t m ay be that mem bers of Congress were ex-trem ely aw are of pub l ic op in ion . But the nature of that pub l ic op in ion data toldthem that publ ic op in ion was m ore complicated than a sing le survey question couldcapture. The publ ic rem ained opposed to “g iv in g away our cana l ,” bu t was reas-sured by promises of continued U.S. rights; they worried about losing jobs to M exico,but becam e disenchanted w ith Perot and h is opposi tion to the pact a fter the Gore–Perot debate. M em bers of Congress m ay have concluded from these deta ils that itwas sa fe to vote as they liked.

Another im portant findin g from th is study is that m edia fram ing p layed a largerole. By sh i fting the focus on the Panama Canal treaties from “g iv in g aw ay ourcanal” to protecting U .S. rights to defend and use the cana l in the fu ture, the m ediacontributed to changes in pub l ic op in ion that m ade i t easier for Senators to vote forrati fi cation . By sh i fti ng coverage of NAFTA from the jobs issue to foreign policyand the President’ s personal battle ag a inst foes such as Perot, the m ed ia helpedpave the way for the House to approve the p act. Although on ly l im ited evidencewas found l inking pub l ic op in ion to congressional head counts and votes, there isconsiderab le ev idence that m edia fram ing in fluenced publ ic op in ion .

Desp ite th e m ixed resu lts from th is study , the idea th at m em bers of Congresspay heed to public op in ion polls on speci fi c foreign pol icy m easures is sti l l va l id .The large am ount of tim e and effort expended by policy makers in the hopes ofbu ild ing pub lic support for their proposed actions suggests that they believe there issom e va lue to publ ic op in ion . M ore research is needed before strong conclusionscan be drawn about the exact nature of the relationsh ip between publ ic op in ionand congressional decision m akin g .

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Pow l ick, Ph il ip J. (1991). The attitud ina l bases for resonsiveness to pub lic op in ion am ongAm erican foreign policy offic ia ls. Jo u rn al o f C o n fl i c t R e so l u ti o n , 35, 611–641 .

Rosenbaum , Dav id E. (1993a , Apri l 29). Clin ton ’s p lan for econom y m ay h inge on h ispopu larity . N ew Yo rk Tim es, p. A1 .

Rosenbaum , David E. (1993b , Novem ber 11). Gore and Perot duel on TV over the tradepact. N ew Yo rk T im es, p . A1 .

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Appendix: Data

2. Panama Canal treaties head counts and votes. Compiled by the author.

Date For Against Source

11/9 /77 51 33 C h ri sti an Sc ien c e M o n i to r11/13 55 20 CBS’s F ace th e N ati o n (Dole)11/21 39 29 UPI2/7 /78 58–60 23–28 Wash i n gto n Star3/6 63–64 28–30 Wash i n gto n P o st3/16 68 32 Vote on Neutra l ity Treaty3/17 57 27 Wash i n gto n P o st (ABC News)4/18 68 32 Vote on Panam a Canal Treaty

1. Panama Canal treaties public opinion. Compiled by Smith & Hogan (1985).

Good polls Pro Con Bad polls Pro Con

9/77 29% 50% 11/1 /77 63% 24%10/77 30 55 12/77 49 3011/1 /77 29 49 1/13/78 65 2511/6 /77 33 47 2/2 /78 43 3712/77 26 53 Feb. 47 371/17/78 29 51 3/1 /78 54 402/78 31 40 4/3 /78 44 394/3 /78 29 60 4/13/78 51 354/13/78 30 534/27/78 30 53

3. Carter public approval. Source: Edwards & Gallup (1990 ).

Date Approval

8 /8 /77 60%8/22 669/11 5410/3 5910/17 5510/24 5410/31 5111/7 5511/21 5612/12 571/9 /78 551/23 522/14 472/27 503/5 493/13 504/3 484/17 40

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P re si d en ti al P o w er Li n kages 81

4. NAFTA public opinion. Compiled by the author.

Date Pro Con Source

7/27 31% 29% NBC News/Wal l St. Jo u rn al8/18 41 44 CNN/U SA To d ay /Gallup9/14 35 41 CNN/U SA To d ay /Gallup10/2 26 31 Lo s A n ge l es T im es11/9 38 46 Gallup11/10 34 38 CNN/U SA To d ay /Gallup11/11 57 36 CNN/U SA To d ay /Gallup11/14 38 41 CNN11/16 37 41 NYT11/17 38 41 CNN/U SA To d ay /Gallup

5. NAFTA head counts and votes. Compiled by the author.

Date For Against Source

8/8 160 160 Wash i n gto n P o stSept. 120 Wash i n gto n P o st9/15 120R, < 100D N ew Yo rk T im es9/22 90R, 50D Wash in g to n T im es9/23 79R, 65D Wash in g to n T im esEnd Sept. 203 139 Wash i n gto n P o st10/11 170 190 Wash i n gto n P o st10/12 170 225 C h ri sti an Sc ien c e M o n i to r10/19 110R, 60–65D Lo s A n ge l es T im es10/21 130 190 C o ng re ssD ai l y

201 O i l D ai l y (White H ouse)212 O i l D ai l y (opposi tion)

93–133R O i l D ai l y (Richardson)10/22 70D O i l D ai l y

129 187 C o ng re ssD ai l y10/26 178 C o ng re ssD ai l y

208–240 Gannett10/30 140 200 O ttaw a C i ti zen11/2 170 Wal l Stre et Jo u rn al (White House)

208 Wal l Stree t Jo u rn al (Bonoir)11/3 190 C o ng re ssD ai l y

73D Bureau of National Affa irs11/4 210 UPI11/5 184 213 D al las M o rn i n g N ew s

168 213 Wash in g to n T im es180 213 F in an c i al P o st

11/8 81D, 103R Richardson< 80D, 100R Wash in g to n T im es

11/9 140 205 C o ng re ssD ai l y185 Richardson

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Date For Against Source

190 218 CNN’s M o ney l i n e183 Wash i n g to n P o st (White House)

11/10 84D, 104R 174 Wo m en ’ s Wear D ai l y190 218–243 Larry K in g Li v e

220 Wash i n gto n P o st (Republicans)11/11 196–200 221 Wash i n gto n P o st and San

F ran c i sc o C h ro n i c le11/12 221 Gannett News Serv ice11/13 198 Wash i n gto n P o st11/14 176 204 NBC’s M eet th e P re ss (AP pol l)11/16 205 223 UPI11/17 217 197 U SA To day

102D, 122R Wash i n gto n P o st (White House)214 185 CNN In s id e P o l i ti c s

(3 :02 p .m . ET)213 190 C N N N ew s100D, 120R 185 C N N In si d e P o l i ti c s

(4 :01 p .m . ET)217 CNN’s C ro ssfi re (7 :30 p .m . ET)230 CNN’s Larry K i n g L i v e234 200 Fina l vote, C N N N ew s

(10 :38 p .m . ET)

6. Clinton public approval. Source: Gallup Poll Monthly (January 1994).

Date Approval

7 /21 41%8/10 448/25 449/9 449/22 469/30 5610/10 5010/18 4710/30 4811/4 4811/16 5011/21 48

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