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Journal of World Business

Volume 46, Issue 3, July 2011, Pages 320327

Languages Special Issue Section
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Exploring national culture's consequences oninternational business lobbying

Andrew Barron ,

ESC Rennes School of Business, 2, rue Robert dArbrissel CS 76522, 35065 Rennes

Cedex France

Available online 14 August 2010.

AbstractThis conceptual paper explores the cultural dimensions of corporate political activity (CPA).Concerned that prior research into firms political actions has been insensitive to culture and itsimpact on corporate strategising, national culture is introduced as an explanatory factor behindmanagers political objectives and the strategies they prefer to use in pursuit of those objectives.The paper adds to existing research by unpacking and examining corporate political action at a

deeper, more complex, human level. Understanding that corporate political strategies are affectedby culture enables politically-active managers to anticipate, respond to and act on strategiespursued by competitor firms from other countries.

Keywords Corporate political activity;

Strategic management;

Managerial preferences;

National culture

1. IntroductionRecent economic and political developments, including for example the 2009 G20 Summit inLondon, the Financial Stability Plan unveiled by the Obama Administration in February 2009,and the common agenda agreed by European Union (EU) leaders in December 2009 to regulateand supervise financial markets, suggest that, in the perennial debate regarding the role of thestate in economic affairs, the pendulum is currently swinging towards the need for more ratherthan less government. Quite aside from these policy measures aimed at alleviating the credit
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crunch and softening the impact of the resulting economic downturn, the fact remains that, eachyear, the world's advanced industrialised economies formulate literally hundreds of politicaldecisions that affect businesses.

For many business practitioners, regulation is considered to be a threat. However, forty yearsago,Epstein (1969) argued that firms should use governments as competitive tools for creating

business environments that favour their activities. In the intervening period, corporate politicalactivity (CPA), defined by Getz (1997: 32)as any deliberate action taken by firms to influencegovernmental policy or process, has become central to many firms overall business strategies(Oberholzer-Gee, Cantrill & Wu, 2007). Historically, companies tended to focus their politicalactions on their domestic political settings. The growing importance of international business andthe rise of the multinational enterprise (MNE) have led to an internationalisation of corporatepolitical strategies. Firms are increasingly becoming politically active away from their homemarkets (e.g. Hillman & Keim, 1995).

As argued by Blumentritt (2003), scholars interested in CPA have not fully kept pace with theinternationalisation of business-government relations. Although studies into the increasinglyinternational dimensions of firms political strategies abound (e.g. Boddewyn, 2007), most

research published in the field examines the growing international character of firms politicalactivities using theories developed by American scholars to explain largely Americanphenomena. By drawing their inspiration from these theoretical traditions, scholars haveneglected to consider the extent to which insights gleaned from other academic disciplines canpotentially shed new explanatory light on the political objectives and practices of firms.

One such discipline is cross-cultural management. Culture, broadly understood here as thesocially transmitted behaviour patterns, norms, beliefs and values of a given community(Salacuse, 1998), is shared by members of a given society. Culture lies at the core of behaviour,differs between nations, but is stable within them ( [Hofstede, 1991]and[Schein, 1985]).Scholars have demonstrated that national culture impacts many different individual-leveloutcomes, including perceptions, beliefs and behaviours (e.g. Leung, Rabi, Buchan, Erez, &

Gibson, 2005). More specifically, research has shown that national culture affects managersstrategic thoughts and actions. Indeed, Hofstede (1980)claimed that culture leads to cross-country differences in patterns of managerial thinking, feeling and acting whilst other scholars(e.g. [House et al., 2004] and [Schneider, 1989]) argued that managers socialised in differentcountries respond to strategic choices in different ways, and that these choices reflect underlyingnational cultural pReferences

Despite the increasingly international nature of CPA, and despite the growing importance ofcross-cultural management as a segment of business and management research, little scholarlyattention has been invested in combining insights from these two corpuses of literature toinvestigate whether and to what extent culture impacts on corporate political strategising. Thispaper seeks to fill this gap by unlocking managers mindsets and identifying the impact of theirnational cultures on the political strategies that they formulate. It begins by taking a criticalreading of the mainstream CPA literature. In response to concerns identified in the existingcorpus of research, it sets forth a theoretical framework emphasising culturally-groundedmanagement techniques and preferences as factors capable of determining firms corporatebehaviours. This framework is subsequently used to develop sets of testable, culturally-sensitivepropositions. The contribution rounds off by discussing the implications of the theoreticalframework for researchers and practitioners and proposing avenues for future research.

2. Prior research


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Emerging from a largely United States context, research into CPA has drawn on numeroustheories (including interest group theory, resource dependency theory, institutional theory,agency theory, the behavioural theory of the firm, collective action theory, transaction costtheory, and public choice theory) to understand why firms become politically active and howthey seek to influence policy decisions (for meta reviews of the mainstream CPA literature, see[Getz, 1997], [Getz, 2001]and [Hillman et al., 2004]). Using these theoretical traditions to guidetheir enquiries, studies have found that the political objectives and practices of firms aredetermined by firm-specific characteristics (e.g. company size, financial resources, pastexperience), industry-specific characteristics (e.g. number of firms in the sector, dependency ongovernments) and institutional conditions (e.g. characteristics of political systems). Since theyhave highlighted determinants of firms political actions that are relatively easy to observe andmeasure, studies into CPA in the United States context have served as the basis for replicationstudies focusing on single countries (e.g.[Chaudhri and Sampson, 2000],[Grant,2000] and[Sinha, 2005]) and cross-national comparative studies (e.g. [Bouwen, 2004],[Camposand Gonzalez, 1999] and [Pharr and Putnam, 2000]).

Those scholars investigating CPA outside the USA have like other scholars of internationalbusiness and management as discussed by Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) not considered theextent to which their underlying theories were developed to explain the political behaviour offirms in the U.S. context. Similarly they have not assessed whether it is appropriate to apply suchtheories to other distinctive, national contexts. Scholars examining CPA from an interest-grouptheory perspective, for example, assume that organised interests play a fundamental role inpolicymaking processes (e.g. Dahl, 1961). Although this assumption may be valid in the contextof the United States (e.g. Masters & Keim, 1985), it does necessarily hold true in a country likeFrance, where interest group activity is much less developed (e.g.Safran, 2003). So, as arguedby Coen (2007), before the wholesale replication of American studies of political action becomesthe norm, scholars should consider the applicability of their underlying theories to the publicpolicy processes and institutions of other regions.

The use of theories developed in the United States to investigate CPA in other countries raises

another concern. Scholars have tended to focus on finding similarities that confirm theuniversality of corporate behaviou observed in the United States. Again, this is an issue commonto much research into international business (e.g. Boddewyn, 2008). There are reasons, ofcourse, for expecting greater similarity in firms political strategies. The pressures ofglobalisation, for example, are said to be leading to a convergence of managerial thinking andpractices around the world (e.g. Lammers, 1990). As firms become increasingly politically activeoutside their domestic political settings (e.g. Boddewyn, 2007), they might be expected to adoptmore uniform strategic behaviours when seeking to influence policy outcomes on the globalstage. With specific reference to the European Union context, for example, scholars have debatedwhether the processes of European integration have led to a convergence or Europeanisation(e.g. Heritier et al., 2001: 3) of practices and preferences amongst economic, social, and political

actors in the EU member states.These arguments notwithstanding, the existing CPA literature can by and large be considered tobe located within what Child (2000) referred to as a low-context research perspective. Thisperspective is insensitive towards nations and cultures as analytically significant contexts. Thiscan also be said of those scholars who have examined CPA from an institutionalist perspective,the trajectory of existing literature that focuses most sharply on cross-country differences infirms political behaviours. For example,Hillman (2003) and Hillman and Keim (1995) arguethat, in countries where government-business relations are described as corporatist (e.g.


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Germany, Sweden), firms enter into long-standing relationships with policymakers whilst inmore pluralist systems (e.g. USA, UK) firms engage on a more ad hoc, issue-by-issue basis withpolitical decision makers. What these accounts of CPA overlook, however, is the cultural originsof countries institutional arrangements and the extent to which societies dominant attitudes andbeliefs (i.e. cultures) result in elaborate systems of institutions (e.g. [North, 2005]and[Redding,2008]).

3. Culture's consequences on corporate political activityIn response to the clear absence of CPA research that adopts a high-context, culturally-sensitive(Child, 2000) perspective, the following section presents a theoretical framework that helpsunderstand the effects of national culture on firms political objectives and strategies. Inaccordance with existing research into CPA, the framework assumes that managers enter thepolitical arena in pursuit of specific objectives. When seeking to achieve those politicalobjectives, it assumes in accordance with the decision-tree-based taxonomy of political actiondeveloped by Hillman and Hitt (1999) that managers face three specific strategic choices: theymust choose their general approach to political action, their level of participation in thepolicymaking process, and the specific tactics to use when seeking to influence policymakers.

According to the model, the objectives and strategies pursued by managers in the policymakingarena are directly driven by perceptions, preferences and expectations concerning rules andregulations, strategic planning horizons, negotiation, decision-making processes, and financialinducements. Drawing inspiration from the significant corpus of research that identifies andexplains cross-national variations in management styles and practices using classificationsystems of national culture based on empirical research into national values (e.g. [Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1994],[Hofstede, 1980],[Hofstede, 1991], [Hofstede,2001] and[Laurent, 1983]), the framework assumes that Hofstede's cultural dimensions have anindirect, moderating effect on the managerial preferences and expectations that underpincorporate political strategising. Fig. 1 provides a graphical representation of the key linkagesbetween Hofstede's cultural dimensions and the different aspects of corporate political action:


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Fig. 1. A cross-cultural framework of corporate political action. Masculinity v.Femininity - Gender role orientation (Hofstede new work relabelled this dimension.

SeeHofstede, 2001).

View thumbnail images

The different components of the framework are unpacked to elaborate propositions that moreclearly elucidate how the objectives and different aspects of corporate political activity areaffected by Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The framework departs from the assumption thatmanagers enter the political arena to achieve specific objectives. As argued by Shaffer (1995),these objectives can include seeking to pass new legislation that gives their firms a competitive
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090951610000477http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090951610000477#gr1


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advantage, or seeking to block the passage of proposed legislation in an attempt to combatagainst unwanted regulatory intrusion. In the same way, Van Schendelen (2005)distinguishedbetween managers who engage in positive lobbying (to pass regulations that support theirbusiness activities) and those that conduct negative lobbying (to block regulations that impactadversely on their activities). For his part,[Bonardi, 1999]and[Bonardi, 2004]argued thatmanagers can become politically active to enhance or promote deregulation. Broadly speaking,therefore, the framework suggests that managers political objectives are influenced by thesignificance that they attach to rules and regulations: managers who consider regulation to behelpful will engage in positive lobbying and seek to pass new legislation; those who consider itto be harmful will engage in negative lobbying and seek to block regulation or promotederegulation.

Scholars in the field of cross-cultural and internationalmanagement have identified and explainedcross-national differences in attitudes towards rules and regulations in terms of uncertaintyavoidance, the dimension developed by Hofstede to measure the tolerance of countries citizenstowards uncertainty and ambiguity. Crucially, studies (including [Calori et al., 1997],[Harrisonand McKinnon, 1999],[Jeanquart-Barone and Peluchette, 1999],[Meuleman, 2010], [Moussetiset al., 2005]and [Perry, 2002]) have shown that citizens of uncertainty-avoiding cultures (e.g.,Japan, China) are more likely than their counterparts from uncertainty-accepting cultures tointroduce regulations (at the organisational level) and laws (at the societal level) as mechanismsfor overcoming unpredictable situations.

Assuming that managers overall political objectives (i.e. to block or pass legislation, to promotederegulation) are influenced by their perceptions of rules and regulations, and assuming thatthese perceptions are themselves affected by culturally-grounded attitudes towards uncertaintyand ambiguity, the framework proposes that:

Proposition 1. Managers socialised in uncertainty-avoiding cultures will engage in CPA tocreate new regulations whilst managers socialised in uncertainty-accepting cultures will engagein CPA to block the passage of regulations or promote deregulation.

Based on this proposition, managers from France (a country identified by Hofstede asuncertainty-avoiding) will be more likely than their counterparts from Britain and the USA(comparatively more uncertainty-accepting countries) to engage in political action to create newrules and regulations. Anecdotal evidence would appear to support this claim. For example,following the credit crunch of 2008/2009, the political representatives of French banksdemanded new regulations to restrict the activities of the City of London (Barbier & Benoit,2009) whilst their UK counterparts opposed plans to create an EU body responsible forregulating hedge funds and private equity firms. Fearful of losing market share and underminingthe quality of wines available on the European market, French winegrowers have lobbiedaggressively against the demands of American wine exporters for the EU to lift regulationsregarding coupage, the blending of red and white wines to create ros (Samuel, 2009).

When seeking to achieve their political objectives, the framework assumes, in accordance withthe decision-tree-based taxonomy of political action developed by Hillman and Hitt (1999), thatmanagers must first choose their general approach to political action. This involves decidingwhether to engage transactionally or relationally with policymakers. The transaction approachinvolves waiting for specific public policy issues to develop before devising a strategy inresponse to that issue; the relational approach involves fostering enduring relationships withpolicymakers across numerous policy issues. Over time these relationships will have in place thenecessary contacts and resources whenever policy issues arise. In this way, CPA can be


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considered to involve strategic planning preferences: managers choosing a transactionalapproach to CPA can be seen to prefer short-term strategising whilst those opting for therelational approach can be considered to prefer long-term strategising.

Cross-country differences in preferred strategic planning horizons have been explained using thelong-term versus short-term dimension developed by Hofstede and Bond (1988) to measure

citizens willingness to forgo present for future benefits and the importance they attach toattaining results immediately or over the long run. For example, in their analysis of strategicinvestment decisions, Carr and Harris (2004) found that managers socialised in the long-termorientated cultures of Germany and Japan focused on long-term strategic success over a period of15 years whilst their counterparts socialised in short-term orientated cultures of the UK and theUSA framed their strategic objectives in 2- or 3-year terms.

Assuming that managers choices of general approach to CPA (transactional versus relational)are driven by their strategic planning preferences, which are in turn influenced by culturally-conditioned attitudes towards time, the framework also proposes that:

Proposition 2. Managers socialised in short-term orientated national cultures will prefer to usea transactional approach to political action whilst managers in long-term orientated national

cultures will prefer to use a relational approach to political action.

This proposition supposes that managers from Japan (a country whose citizens have a long-termtime orientation) will prefer to foster enduring relationships with policymakers. By contrast,managers from Germany (a country whose citizens have a comparatively shorter-term timeorientation) will favour a more ad hoc approach to political action. Evidence from theinternational automotive industry would appear to support this prediction. For example, whenengaging in political action in Brussels, Japanese car manufacturers, such as Nissan and Toyota,have sought to cultivate and maintain long-standing, personalised networks with policymakersacross the EU's institutions (Hamada, 2006). By contrast, German manufacturers, such asVolkswagen and BMW, have favoured a more ad hoc approach to interest representation,especially in the field of environmental policy, where they have tended to enter the political

arena only in reaction to threats posed by specific policy issues (Coen, 2004).The framework assumes that, having decided upon their general approach to CPA, managerschoose what Hillman and Hitt (1999) refer to as they level of participation in the policymakingprocess. Specifically, managers can choose to pursue political action individually or collectively.Whether managers choose individual or collective political action is contingent on theirnegotiation preferences. Such preferences are important for CPA insofar as managers ultimatelyoperate in a negotiated environment. That is, their relations with external stakeholders, includingpolicymakers, are open to negotiation and the exchange of concessions (Pfeffer & Salancik,1978). Rather than blindly adhering to and complying with proposed legislation, managersbargain for special consideration from policymakers if they find conformity with legislation to beunpalatable or unworkable (e.g. [Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994] and [Oliver, 1991]). The

framework in Fig. 1 specifically suggests that managers can choose to negotiate suchconcessions with policymakers independently, or they can choose to negotiate collaboratively byjoining forces with managers from other firms.

Scholars have identified and explained cross-country variations in negotiation behaviour usingHofstede's dimension of individualism versus collectivism, which measures cultural preferencesfor acting autonomously or within a group, and the extent to which the attainment of individualobjectives or collective achievements takes precedence. Specifically, studies (e.g. [Cai et al.,2006] and[Drake, 2001]) have shown that managers socialised in individualistic countries tend


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to view negotiation in competitive terms, and negotiate alone for individual benefit. This is whatFisher and Ury (1981) have described as distributive bargaining techniques. By contrast,managers socialised in more collectivist cultures generally view negotiation in collaborativeterms, and negotiate collaboratively for common benefits using integrative bargainingtechniques.

Assuming that managers choices of participation level in the policymaking process (individualaction versus collective action) are informed by their preferred negotiation behaviours, andassuming that such behaviours are shaped by culturally-informed preferences for achievingindividual or collective objectives, the framework proposes that:

Proposition 3. Managers socialised in individualistic cultures will prefer individual politicalaction whilst those rooted in collectivist cultures will prefer collective political action.

The framework predicts that managers from Great Britain (a highly individualistic country) willtend to consider the policy negotiation process as a competitive exercise and have a culturaldisposition for individual political action. By contrast, managers from Germany (a morecollectivist country) will view policy negotiations as a collaborative exercise and have a culturalpreference for collective political action. Such cross-cultural differences in preferred levels of

participation in the political process are visible in the pharmaceutical industry. In theircomparative study of large firms as political actors,Grant, Martinelli, & Paterson (1989) foundthat British managers preferred to lobby the EU institutions using their government-relationsstaff EU whilst German managers favoured co-ordinated, collective action through industryassociations. Today, BASF and Bayer play leading roles in theBundesverband derPharmazeutischen Industrie, which represents the political interests of over 260 Germanpharmaceuticals companies of all sizes on the European stage. By contrast, GlaxoSmithKline andAstraZeneca prefer to petition the EU institutions alone rather than within the Association of theBritish Pharmaceuticals Industry (Greer, 2006).

Finally, the framework is built on the assumption that corporate political strategising involveschoosing tactics to influence decisions taken by executive and legislative bodies and agencies

(e.g., Lord, 2000). In this respect, Hillman and Hitt (1999)stated that managers can choosebetween information strategies and constituency-building strategies. Information strategiesinvolve issuing position papers and technical briefs or making contributions to publicconsultations in order to communicate their policy preferences and concerns directly to specificpolicymakers. Constituency-building strategies involve designing wider-reaching public relationscampaigns that generate grassroots support for their concerns amongst voters, who in turnexpress their policy concerns and preferences to political decision-makers.

In her review of existing CPA literature,Getz (1997)stated that managers, when choosing theirpolitical strategies, will choose tactics that are aimed at those people whom they believe can helpresolve the specific issues they face. Accordingly, the framework supposes that directinformation strategies targeted specifically at policymakers will be preferred by managers who

consider that the power to make political decisions resides solely with policymakers. By contrast,the more indirect constituency-building strategies aimed at wider publics will be favoured bymanagers who consider decision-making power to be more widely spread across society.

The literature on cross-cultural and internationalmanagement teaches us that there exist cross-country differences regarding who is involved in decision-making and who ultimately hasdecision-making power. These variations have been explained using power distance, the culturaldimension developed by Hofstede to describe the extent to which citizens of a given countryaccept power hierarchy and inequality to be legitimate (e.g. [Erez, 1994],[Harris et al., 2006],


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[Sagie and Koslowsky, 2000] and[Triandis, 1994]). These studies have found that decision-making responsibility is widely spread in low power distance countries and concentrated in thehands of a limited number of individuals in high power distance countries. Other studies (e.g.[Eising, 2003], [Kohler-Koch, 1997] and [Schmidt, 1999]) suggest that high power distancescores are associated with statist countries (e.g. France, Greece). In such countries, politicaldecisions tend to be made by ruling elites of likeminded politicians, civil servants andbusinessmen who attended the same prestigious education establishments, whilst lower powerdistance scores are associated with more corporatist (e.g. Austria, Germany) or pluralistcountries (e.g. UK, USA) where, compared to statist countries, political decisions tend to bemade by policymakers in consultation with other social and economic actors, including firms,trade unions and representatives of civil society.

Assuming that managers choices of information or constituency-building strategies depend ontheir expectations regarding who has the authority to influence political decisions, and assumingthat these expectations are themselves affected by culturally-conditioned attitudes towards powerand hierarchy, the framework proposes that:

Proposition 4. Managers socialised in power-distance accepting national cultures will prefer to

pursue information strategies whilst those socialised in power-distance rejecting nationalcultures will prefer to pursue constituency-building strategies.

The framework predicts that managers from France (a country that scores high on Hofstede'spower distance dimension) will prefer to pursue information strategies and communicate theirpolicy concerns to policymakers directly. By contrast, managers from Britain (a lower powerdistance country) will also use constituency-building strategies and shore up support for theirpolitical causes using wider-targeted public-relations programmes. Evidence of such cross-cultural preferences for information or constituency-building strategies is provided by BrunoDupont, the managing director of the Brussels-based EURALIA lobbying consultancy. Heclaims that French business lobbyists are more likely than their peers from other countries torequest direct meetings with EU policymakers (Lory, 2002). Similarly, research conducted by

the Paris Chamber of Commerce shows that British firms pursue a more bottom-up approach tolobbying, choosing to channel their concerns and preferences to policymakers through the mediaand other public relations mechanisms ( [0045] and [0080]).

In their decision-based model of CPA, Hillman and Hitt (1999) identified a third type of politicaltactic. Essentially, alongside information and constituency-building strategies, managers can alsochoose to use make financial contributions to policymakers or political parties, or fund electioncampaignsa tactic defined by the authors as the financial incentive strategy. Such strategies,they argue, are used by managers who regard financial inducements as morally acceptable, andavoided by managers who them to be ethically suspect.

Scholars of cross-cultural management have empirically demonstrated that managerial attitudestowards the legitimacy of financial inducements differ across countries. Such cross-national

variations have been explained by Hofstede's gender role orientation dimension, which measuresthe assertiveness and competitiveness of a country's citizens and their attachment to materialpossessions and money. Although financial inducements are used in many countries to influencepolitical behaviour (e.g. OECD, 2008), studies have demonstrated that they are eschewed bymanagers socialised in feminine cultures but considered acceptable by managers socialised inmore masculine cultures (e.g.[Husted, 1999] and [Vitell et al., 1993]).

Assuming that managers decisions to use financial incentive strategies are influenced by theirperceptions regarding the legitimacy of financial inducements, and assuming that such


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perceptions are linked to culturally-grounded attitudes towards money, the framework proposesthat:

Proposition 5. Managers socialised in masculine cultures will be more likely than thosesocialised in feminine cultures to pursue financial incentive strategies.

This proposition suggests that managers for example from Venezuela and Colombia (countries

identified by Hofstede as highly masculine) will seek to invest more financial resources inrepresenting their companies interests than their homologues from for example the Netherlandsand Norway (countries that Hofstede identified as being highly feminine). It is notoriouslydifficult to obtain reliable information on the financial contributions made by managers topoliticians. As legislators, particularly in the European Union, are seeking to impose strictercontrols on lobbying practices (e.g. Obradovic, 2009), managers may be unwilling to admitopenly to using financial resources to buy influence. These methodological difficultiesnotwithstanding, research conducted by Transparency International found that 28% ofVenezuelan managers and 8% of Colombian managers surveyed admitted to paying kickbacks topublic officials, compared to only 2% of Norwegian and 1% of Dutch managers surveyed(Zinnbauer, Dobson, & Despota, 2009).

In summary, the framework first suggests that managers political objectives (i.e., to pass or toblock legislation, to promote deregulation) are driven by their perceptions regarding rules andregulations, which in turn reflect culturally-grounded attitudes towards uncertainty andambiguity (P1). Second, it suggests that managers preferred choices of general approach to CPA(i.e., relational versus transactional approaches) are affected by their strategic-planningpreferences, which themselves are influenced by culturally-bound time orientations (P2). Third,the framework states that managers preferred level of participation in the policymaking process(individual versus collective action) is influenced by negotiation behaviours, which aredetermined by culturally-conditioned attitudes towards achieving individual or collectiveobjectives (P3). Fourth, it suggests that managers choices of tactics (specifically, informationversus constituency-building strategies) are informed by their expectations regarding who has the

authority of influence political decisions, which in turn are influenced culturally-conditionedattitudes towards power hierarchy and inequality (P4). Finally, the framework states that the useby managers of financial incentive strategies to influence policy decisions is affected byperceptions regarding the legitimacy of financial inducements, which are informed by culturally-informed attitudes towards money (P5).

4. Theoretical implicationsThe theoretical framework and propositions developed have implications for scholars andpractitioners of CPA alike. From a research perspective, this contribution adds generally to theliterature demonstrating that managers approach strategic choices in different ways, reflectingpreferences and expectations informed by the national cultures where they were socialised (e.g.[Harris and Dibben, 1999], [Harris and Ghauri, 2000],[House et al., 2004]and [Schneider,1989]:). Although much is already known about how national cultures affects how managersformulate communication strategies (e.g. [Clausen, 2007] and [Zhu, 2006]), design humanresources practices (e.g. [Carr and Pudelko, 2006]and[Lloyd and Hartel, 2004]), conduct qualitymanagement activities (e.g. [Vecchi and Brennan, 2009] and [Yavas and Rezayat, 2003]) andimplement strategic marketing strategies (e.g. Lee & Trim, 2008), this contribution breaks newground by discussing how culturally-grounded management styles and preferences are applied tocorporate political behaviour, an endeavour hitherto overlooked by scholars interested in theeffects of national culture on corporate strategising. The framework developed here suggests that


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managers do not stop being American, British, Chinese, etc. in their mentalities or behaviourswhen engaging in political rather than other management activities.

This contribution also has significant implications for scholars interested in corporate politicalactivity. Whilst existing CPA research tends to focus attention on the firm-level, industry-leveland institutional-level antecedents of corporate political action, the emphasis of this contribution

is placed on individual managers. Focusing on individual-level antecedents allows the strategicbehaviour of firms to be unpacked and examined at a deeper, more complex, human level. Thismakes sense to the extent that firms political strategies are ultimately formulated by managers,including government affairs staff, public affairs staff, and politically active Chief ExecutiveOfficers.

Placing the emphasis on how managerial preferences and behaviours are influenced by nationalculture suggests that existing explanations of CPA may provide only a partial picture of whyfirms become politically active and why they choose certain political strategies over others. Forexample, mainstream CPA research suggests that firms choices of general approach to CPA arecontingent on their dependency on government contrasts (e.g. Hillman & Hitt, 1999), whetherthey operate in a corporatist or pluralist system (e.g. [Hillman, 2003]and[Hillman and Keim,

1995]), or whether they offer a highly diversified range of products and services (Hillman,2003). The theoretical framework developed here builds on these existing explanations bysuggesting that whether firms pursue a transactional or relational approach may depend on theirmanagers cultural-grounded preferences for short- or long-term orientated strategic planning.Crucially, those socialised in comparatively long-term orientated national cultures will prefer toengage relationally and those from more short-term national cultures will prefer to engagetransactionally with policymakers.

Firms choices of participation level in the policymaking process have been explained by theirdependency on governments (e.g.Ozer & Lee, 2009), the number of firms in their industry (e.g.Masters & Keim, 1985), their financial resources (e.g.[Coen, 1997], [Coen, 1999],[Cook andFox, 2000] and [Hillman and Hitt, 1999]), and the specificity of the threats that they face (e.g.

[Blau and Harris, 1992], [Kaufman et al., 1993] and [Shaffer, 1992]). The propositionsdeveloped here suggest whether firms choose to engage alone or collaboratively in CPAdepends on their managers culturally-influenced perceptions as to whether negotiations areeither collaborative or competitive exercises.

The suggestion that firms choice of tactics (information, constituency-building or financialinducement strategies) is dependent on managers culturally-conditioned preferences also buildson existing CPA research. For example, prior research states that managers pursue informationstrategies because they share common positions with voters on salient policy issues (e.g.Keim &Zeithaml, 1986), because they wish to convey factual information to key decision makers whenthe latter do not understand policy issues (e.g. Getz, 1993), or because government officialsdepend on lobbyists for information and expertise (e.g.Mahoney, 2007). The frameworkdeveloped in this contribution adds to these explanations by suggesting that managers choosesuch strategies because they have culturally-grounded expectations that political decisions aretaken by an elite of policymakers.

Prior research argues that managers engage in constituency building because they wish to createcredibility with individual policymakers (e.g. [Coen, 1997] and [Coen, 1999]), because their firmand voters disagree on salient policy issues (e.g. Keim & Zeithaml, 1986), because policymakersand firms disagree over issues (e.g. Getz, 1993), and because policymakers consider an issue tobe of low priority. The framework developed here enriches this existing research by suggesting


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that managers choose constituency-building strategies because they expect the power toinfluence political decisions to be equally distributed across society.

The proposition that managers choose to use financial inducement strategies because they havean cultural attachment to material possessions and money adds to existing CPA research, whichsuggests that the propensity of managers to use financial inducement strategies depends on the

salience of policy issues (e.g.Keim & Zeithaml, 1986) or the dependency of their firms ongovernments as customers (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

5. Managerial relevanceFrom a practitioner's perspective, the paper sensitises managers to cultural factors that caninfluence the strategic political preferences of their international competitors on the politicalstage. Based on the arguments developed here, knowing that firms political strategies can beinfluenced by managerial cultural preferences can contribute to managers efforts to anticipate,respond to, and act on the strategies pursued by rival firms. For example, having background,cultural knowledge about rival firms political representatives can potentially improve firmspolitical monitoring and issue management activities. Knowing that their rivals socialised in

uncertainty-avoiding cultures are likely to propose new legislation as a solution for economicproblems enables firms political representatives socialised in uncertainty-accepting cultures toidentify in a timely manner potential threats to their own political objectives. Information aboutthe cultural background of firms political representatives also facilitates the search for potentialpartners in the political arena. Indeed, knowing that managers socialised in collectivist cultureswill be more open than managers from individualistic cultures to influencing policy decisionscollaboratively will enable firms political representatives to more efficiently select appropriatecollaborators for political action.

The propositions developed in this contribution also have potential implications forpolicymakers, especially at a time when the financial crisis has prompted large governmentinterventions not only in national but also increasingly in supranational policymaking arenas to restore confidence in financial systems and contain the fall-out of the crisis on the realeconomy (e.g. Claessens, DellAriccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2010). For example, if policymakersseeking to introduce legislation to ease the effects of the crisis know that politically-activemanagers socialised in uncertainty-avoiding cultures are likely to engage in political action toblock new regulation, they will be better placed to anticipate and plan for possible sources ofresistance to their planned measures. Their ability to foresee and respond to opposition to theirplanned legislation may also be improved if they are aware that managers socialised in power-distance rejecting cultures are likely to engage in constituency-building to shore up widespreadsupport for their policy concerns.

6. Concluding remarksThe objective of this paper has been to propose a theoretical framework as a helpful starting

point for investigating the effects of national culture on firms political actions. The frameworkdoes not claim to provide definitive conclusions about the impact of national culture on corporatepolitical activity. Indeed, from an empirical perspective, surveys of politically active managerssocialised in a wide range of culturally diverse countries need to be conducted to test the validityof the propositions suggested by the framework. Such empirical studies should hold constantfactors such as firm size, industry membership and financial resources, to rule these out as rivalexplanations for any variations in CPA observed. They should also focus on managers politicalactivities in a common political arena (e.g. the World Trade Organisation, the European Union)


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to rule out differences in political systems as an explanation for any observed differences inpolitical behaviour.

Future empirical work should also seek to identify the moderating factors that determine inwhich contexts or situations national culture is the most important factor explaining CPA. This isimportant, for example, since American managers (socialised in individualistic cultures) have

been shown to engage in collective political action (e.g. [Getz, 1993] and [Schuler and Rehbein,1997]) and Chinese managers (socialised in collectivist cultures) have been shown to engage inindividual political action (e.g.Kennedy, 2008). Determining when national culture has moreinfluence over CPA than other variables could be achieved by conducting in-depth case studiesof policy negotiations involving firms and testing the cultural framework of CPA sketched outabove against other the competing theories addressed in reviews of the mainstream CPAliterature.

From a theoretical perspective, future research could build on the framework presented in Fig. 1by addressing the criticisms levied at the use of cultural classification systems in general, and atHofstede's cultural dimensions in particular. As discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g. Holden,2002), the use of such typologies has been criticised for reducing the complexities of national

culture to simplistic and overly generalised conceptualisations. In response to this criticism, themodel could be enhanced by incorporating theoretical insights from other cultural categorisationstudies, thus providing a more sophisticated analysis of the effects of culture on political action.For example, since CPA involves influencing business environments the dimension of internalversus external control, as developed byTrompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997), could beused to uncover managerial perceptions regarding the value of CPA. Specifically, scholars couldinvestigate whether managers socialised in internalistic cultures (whose members believe theycan control and manage the environments in which they operate) attach more importance to CPAthan managers socialised in externalistic cultures (whose members believe people cannot shapetheir destinies but must simply adapt to external circumstances). Although incorporating a widerrange of cultural dimensions could potentially provide richer explanations of the effects ofculture on managers political objectives and strategies, care should nonetheless be taken to

avoid the pitfalls of some cross-cultural research, as discussed by Taras, Rowney, and Steel(2009) andTaras, Kirkman, and Steel (2010), unworkably bulky by including additional culturaldimensions.

Since the use of cultural dimensions has also been criticised for magnifying national stereotypesand overlooking the cultural heterogeneity that can exist within countries (e.g. [Kirkman et al.,2006], [McSweeney, 2002],[Shenkar, 2001] and [Taras et al., 2009]), the model could also beadapted so that it pays greater attention to the inherently multi-level character of culture. Giventhe amount of business lobbying undertaken by industry-specific trade associations, onepotentially interesting avenue of research, based on research conducted into industrycultures (e.g.[Chatman and Jehn, 1994] and [Phillips, 1994]), could involve developing a framework toascertain whether and to what extent managers socialised in the same industry-specific cultural

milieus within and across given countries respond to strategic political choices in the same way.

These further improvements notwithstanding, it is nonetheless hoped that this paper has servedits original purpose, namely to sensitise CPA scholars to the importance of national culture forunderstanding cross-national variations in corporate political strategising and open up interestingand valuable avenues for future research.


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Help

Volume 30, Issue 5, September 2006, Pages 579603

The role of culture and personality in choice

of conflict management strategy

Ritu Kaushal , ,

Catherine T. Kwantes

a University of Windsor, Windsor, Ont., Canada

Received 12 October 2005. Revised 17 January 2006. Accepted 20 January2006. Available online 17 April 2006.

AbstractGlobalization has led to an increased emphasis on cultural diversity and its influences onpersonal, social, and organizational practices. As the world becomes a smaller place, thepotential for conflict in our daily interactions is increasing. Research investigating the influenceof culture on conflict management and resolution behaviors has demonstrated that individualismand collectivism do indeed influence a person's style of conflict resolution behavior. However,these findings have not been linked to the related constructs of vertical and horizontalindividualism and collectivism [as defined by Triandis, H.C. (1994) Culture and social behavior.New York, NY: McGraw-Hill] which introduce the concept of accepting authority within a focuson the self versus the group. A strong parallel exists between the vertical and horizontaldimensions of individualism and collectivism and power distance. The salience of this power

variable may differ from one culture to the next, and influences not only the nature of the conflictprocess itself, but also the conflict resolution strategies adopted. In addition, studies exploringthe influence of various dispositional measures such as self-monitoring and emotionalintelligence have linked them to both cultural variables and styles of conflict resolution.Although each finding that links a single personality or cultural variable with a particular style ofconflict resolution is indeed useful, it is also limiting. This study explored the relationshipsamong culture, power, personality, and styles of conflict resolution. Relevance of the findingsand their implications with respect to conflict management and resolution issues across culturesare discussed.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=HelpURL&_file=browse_open_doc.htm&_btn=Y&_zone=TopNavBar&_origin=article&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=3839915&md5=4016bd5c3fd69183346a9888d4e70bb6http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01471767/30/5http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01471767/30/5http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http://www.scopus.com/scopus/inward/author.url?partnerID=10&rel=3.0.0&sortField=cited&sortOrder=asc&author=Kaushal,%20Ritu&authorID=14321949800&md5=1e68c55b3e56ddb86e5dc43edafd4d6f&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_userid=3839915&md5=82a94cfacb7a307b756cd0758b884ac8http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http://www.scopus.com/scopus/inward/author.url?partnerID=10&rel=3.0.0&sortField=cited&sortOrder=asc&author=Kaushal,%20Ritu&authorID=14321949800&md5=1e68c55b3e56ddb86e5dc43edafd4d6f&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_userid=3839915&md5=82a94cfacb7a307b756cd0758b884ac8http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http://www.scopus.com/scopus/inward/author.url?partnerID=10&rel=3.0.0&sortField=cited&sortOrder=asc&author=Kwantes,%20Catherine%20T.&authorID=6507940902&md5=a269ebde81d1076daf231b752c816aa1&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_userid=3839915&md5=68be1e3fe8c5e2f4266d348370dacda3mailto:[email protected]://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176706000058#cor1http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=HelpURL&_file=browse_open_doc.htm&_btn=Y&_zone=TopNavBar&_origin=article&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=3839915&md5=4016bd5c3fd69183346a9888d4e70bb6http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01471767/30/5http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http://www.scopus.com/scopus/inward/author.url?partnerID=10&rel=3.0.0&sortField=cited&sortOrder=asc&author=Kaushal,%20Ritu&authorID=14321949800&md5=1e68c55b3e56ddb86e5dc43edafd4d6f&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_userid=3839915&md5=82a94cfacb7a307b756cd0758b884ac8http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=RedirectURL&_method=outwardLink&_partnerName=27983&_origin=article&_zone=art_page&_linkType=scopusAuthorDocuments&_targetURL=http://www.scopus.com/scopus/inward/author.url?partnerID=10&rel=3.0.0&sortField=cited&sortOrder=asc&author=Kwantes,%20Catherine%20T.&authorID=6507940902&md5=a269ebde81d1076daf231b752c816aa1&_acct=C000061509&_version=1&_userid=3839915&md5=68be1e3fe8c5e2f4266d348370dacda3


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Keywords Conflict;

Conflict style;

Conflict strategy;

Conflict management;

Conflict resolution;

Culture, diversity;

Cultural values;

Cultural beliefs;

Cultural cognitions;

Personality;

Individual differences;

Self-monitoring;

Emotional intelligence

1. IntroductionGreater globalization has led to increased attention being paid to cultural diversity and itsinfluences on personal, social, and organizational practices. As the world becomes a smallerplace, the potential for conflict across cultural boundaries in our daily interactions is increasing.Research investigating the influence of culture on conflict management and resolution behaviorshas demonstrated that cultural factors such as individualism and collectivism and power distance(as defined by Hofstede, 1980) do indeed influence a person's style of conflict resolution

behavior (as originally defined byBlake and Mouton (1964) and later reinterpreted by Rahim,1992). Cultural factors also interact with personality (Triandis, 1994), however, and thisinteraction needs to be taken into account when examining choices of responses to conflict aswell. Accordingly, this study explored the relationships among styles of conflict resolution,culture, power, and personality. The aims of this study were to explore the influence of cultural(values and beliefs) and personality variables (self-monitoring and emotional intelligence (EQ))on choice of conflict resolution strategy. Specifically, the extent to personality factors predictedconflict resolution strategy over and above that predicted by cultural factors was explored.

1.1. Conflict

Conflict is a common facet of our everyday lives. Seen as a perceived incompatibility ofinterests, conflict is often caused by a misalignment of goals, motivations, or actions betweentwo parties that can be real or only perceived to exist (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Whether itoccurs in the form of a difference of opinion, harsh words, or a form of direct action taken toresolve competing goals, it has the potential to exist in the many domains of our lives. Over theyear, busier lifestyles have translated into less time for ourselves and the people around us,leaving a precarious balance between work, family, and everything in between. This increasedsense of time urgency has left many scrambling, not having the time to speak with familymembers, friends, and co-workers in order to maintain personal needs and the needs of others


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nor to clarify the motivations and intentions behind any behavior, thus increasing the potentialfor misperception and miscommunication, some of the negative aspects of conflict.

Although often seen in a negative light, conflict can be both positive and negative. More oftenthan not, it is perceived as the root of disagreements, negative emotions, and maladaptivebehavior, even though it is just as likely to foster needed change through creativity and

innovation. With the hope of being able to maximize the positive aspects of conflict, it isimportant to work toward minimizing its negative aspects and thus minimizing its dangerousimplications within the family, school, and work environments (interpersonal) as well as theglobal community as a whole (intergroup).

At the interpersonal level, conflict researchers have identified a number of resolution strategiesthat can be utilized in conflict situations. The number of potential strategies identified rangesfrom 17 (Sternberg & Dobson, 1987) to five (Rahim & Bonoma, 1979). Outlining a set ofstrategies that are used to resolve conflict,Sternberg and Dobson (1987) have identifiedeconomic action, physical force, wait and see, acceptance, stepping down, third party,undermining esteem, withholding, bargain/compromise, avoidance, giving in, manipulation,verbal force, prior history, confrontational discussion, mutual discussion, and separation as 17

specific conflict resolution strategies that people engage in when dealing with conflict. Similarly,Rahim and Bonoma (1979) have outlined five styles of dealing with conflict (obliging,integrating, avoiding, dominating, and compromising), each ranging on a set of dimensions thateither emphasize a concern for personal needs or the needs of others. These conflict resolutionstyles are based on the distinctions first introduced by Blake and Mouton (1964)outliningdifferent styles of handling conflict. The authors are credited with expanding on the originaltheory, identifying each conflict resolution strategy as a function of the degree of concern for selfand the degree of concern for others. Although these strategies are usually applied toorganizational settings, it is possible to generalize them to any settings involving interpersonalinteractions.

Just as conflict can occur at both the intergroup and interpersonal levels, the reasons for conflict

may range from social to personal. At the social level, the effects of cultural variables mayinfluence the way a person approaches a social interaction, how s/he perceives the situation, andthe manner in which s/he chooses to resolve this situation. The same scenario may result inentirely different reactions in one society than another. For example, disagreeing with a parentmay be entirely acceptable in Canada and not at all condoned in Africa. At the same time,individual difference variables may also play a role in how a person responds to a conflict.Whether a person is more or less assertive, self-conscious, or empathetic will no doubt influenceany interpersonal interaction s/he engages in. For example, even within Africa, a child who ismore assertive will respond differently when arguing with a sibling who is more docile in nature.Thus, in predicting conflict behavior, it is important to acknowledge both group-level (cultural)and individual-level (personality) processes.

1.2. Cultural variablesThe conflict process is greatly influenced by social culture. A number of researchers haveexplored the influences of social culture on the different ways of handling interpersonalinteractions (Leung & Fan, 1997; Leung & Wu, 1990; Leung et al., 2002; Rahim, 1992; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991). Kwok Leung and his colleagues have looked at the roles of proceduraljustice, fairness, trait attributions as well as responsibility attributions in determining choice ofconflict strategy. For example, in their comparison of preferred conflict management strategiesbetween Hong Kong and the US, Leung and Lind (1986)found that Americans demonstrated a


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preference for adversarial techniques over non-adversarial techniques whereas people fromChina did not. Along similar lines, Leung and his colleagues moved beyond the simple EastWest comparison by comparing individualistic and collectivistic cultures with similar cultures todetermine that the former prefer confrontational approaches to conflict management and thelatter prefer strategies that are harmony-inducing (Leung, Au, Fernandez-Dols, & Iwawaki,1992). A person's cultural background will influence every aspect of the conflict process, rangingfrom the goals that are considered incompatible, why they are seen as so, what one chooses to doabout it, and whether the outcome is considered to be satisfactory or not. As such, the nature ofconflict itself is seen very differently across cultures. Where it may be emphasized in oneculture, it may be swept under the rug in another.

1.2.1. Values

Whether one's priority is a personal or a group goal can often determine a person's strategy fordealing with conflict. For example, people from individualistic cultures are more likely toresolve conflicts using a dominating or obliging style, whereas those from collectivistic culturesare more likely to do so using an integrating or avoiding style (Rahim, 1992). Similarly, Leung(1987) demonstrated a relationship between collectivism and dispute processing such that

collectivistic cultures like China preferred to engage in conflict management strategies thatworked to reduce the animosity between parties moreso than individualistic cultures like the US.These findings, however, have not been linked to the constructs of vertical and horizontalindividualism and collectivism (as defined by Triandis, 1994), which expand on the originaldefinitions by introducing the concept of accepting authority within a focus on the self versus thegroup. A strong parallel exists between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of individualismand collectivism and the cultural factor of power distance. To some extent, every interpersonalinteraction (at home, at school, at work) can contain some element of power within therelationship. The salience of this power variable may differ from one culture to the next, andinfluences not only the nature of the conflict process itself, but also the conflict resolutionstrategies that will be adopted. For example,Kramer (1989)has demonstrated that centralized, or

autocratic, decision-making leads to more assertive and less accommodative styles of dealingwith conflict.

Hofstede's (1980) cultural taxonomy has added to the conflict literature when exploring the manydifferent ways that conflict may be influenced by culture. Each of the five dimensions includedin Hofstede's (1980) framework (individualismcollectivism, power distance, masculinityfemininity, short- and long-term orientation, and uncertainty avoidance) has been explored in aneffort to relate it to conflict behavior. Of these dimensions, the constructs of individualismcollectivism (the extent to which an emphasis is placed on the self versus the group) and powerdistance (the extent to which an emphasis is placed on hierarchy) have demonstrated the mostpromise in linking conflict behavior with culture. Studies have shown that people fromcollectivistic cultures such as Japan are more likely to utilize the avoidance conflict management

strategy with the goal of maintaining a positive relationship (Ohbuchi, Shizuka, & Tedeschi,1999).

The relationship between conflict and power distance is not as clear, although research hasdemonstrated that collectivistic cultures tend to emphasize hierarchy (high power distance) moreso than individualistic cultures, which tend to place less of an emphasis on hierarchy (low powerdistance; Triandis, 1994). In their study exploring the effects of nationality, individualismcollectivism, and power distance on conflict management behavior, Ohbuchi et al. (1999)demonstrated that their American participants (who scored higher on the power distance


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dimension) were more likely to use assertive tactics in conflict resolution, opting more often forthird-party involvement than the Japanese (low power distance). However, these findings alsodemonstrated that even though the two cultures used in the study exhibited differing conflictresolution strategies depending on their orientation toward hierarchy, they were still bothrelatively high on the power distance dimension (Ohbuchi et al., 1999). This inconsistency mightbe explained by the fact that it is possible for cultures that are individualistic to be rated as bothlow and high on the power distance dimension. In this respect, the constructs of vertical andhorizontal individualism and collectivism as introduced by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, andGelfand (1995) might be a more appropriate alternative to the power distance dimension.Although the scale itself has not been widely used in the literature due to its recent development,it seems to be a more appropriate way to measure individualismcollectivism and powerdistance, while at the same time acknowledging the relationship between the variables. Thisconceptualization of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism was furtherdeveloped by Triandis and Gelfand (1998), who explored the implied emphasis or de-emphasison hierarchy in certain cultures and demonstrated that it is possible for the four dimensions toexist in different contexts, even those considered Western and non-Western. Finding linksbetween these constructs and those of the vertical/horizontal self (Fiske, 1992; Rokeach, 1973),

these researchers provided evidence for convergent and divergent validity and thus offered amore complete picture of the individualism and collectivism dimensions (Triandis & Gelfand,1998).

When considering the potential relationship between the newer concepts of vertical andhorizontal individualism and collectivism and conflict resolution strategy, it becomes apparentthat the concern for self and concern for others dimensions are applicable to both constructsof cultural values and conflict resolution styles. This overlap may in fact help us to understandthe nature of this relationship and allow for more specific predictions to be made. A high scoreon the vertical collectivism dimension implies that even within a group-oriented culture, thereis still an awareness of individual needs. This apparent paradox is reflective of a high concern forthe self within a group orientation and may be more likely to result in a dominating or integrating

conflict resolution strategy. On the other hand, scoring higher on the dimension of verticalindividualism would suggest a strong focus on the individual. This combination reflects a lowconcern for the other over and above a high concern for the self and may be more likely to elicita dominating or avoiding conflict resolution style. A similar examination of the horizontalindividualism and collectivism constructs reveal a high concern for the other and a low concernfor the self, respectively, as the former is indicative of a strong emphasis on the collective andthe latter suggests a focus on the group beyond that of the individual. Thus, the former would bemore likely to result in an integrating or obliging strategy of conflict resolution, whereas thelatter would more often lead to avoiding or obliging. Overall, it seems that a collectivisticorientation is associated with the group taking priority over all else (even in the case of verticalcollectivism); however, with an individualistic orientation, there is room for a higher concern forthe self as well as the group. This is perhaps reflective of a higher freedom to choose one'svalues, be they self- or group-oriented, within individualistic versus collectivistic societies.

1.2.2. Beliefs/cognitions

A recent avenue of research examining the ways that culture affects individual behavior focuseson beliefs or cognitions rather than values. Values have an evaluative component to them,determining that something is either good or bad, whereas beliefs incorporate information aboutantecedents and consequences as well as the causes and cures of psychological problems(Leung & Bond, 2004, p. 131). Beliefs and cognitions are the things people perceive and know


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and the shared beliefs that make up different social and organizational cultures (Nystrom &Starbuck, 1984). Leung et al. (2002) suggest that, because of the emphasis on cognitions ratherthan values, this approach may be expected to have more functional utility in predicting humanbehavior than values. Cognitions are more concrete and more comprehensive than values, andthis may result in individuals accessing cognitions as a guide to behavior more readily thanaccessing values (Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003).

Since these beliefs are learned through experiences and socialization, the context in which anindividual develops these beliefs is important (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson(2004) andBond et al. (2004)). Specifically, cultural context provides the setting in whichindividuals view the consequences of specific actions or attitudes and formulate theirunderstanding of the world and how contingencies operate. Culture therefore has a strong effecton individuals understanding of what the results may be of a given choice of action, and it maybe through this route that culture affects choices of conflict style management.Leung et al.(2002) developed the Social Axiom Scale (SAS) to measure culturally learned beliefs. Thismeasure is made up of five factors (cynicism, social complexity, reward for application,spirituality, and fate control). It has been suggested that the use of beliefs may provide greaterexplanatory power for social behaviors when used in addition to values (Bond et al., 2004).Comprised of theory-based and empirically derived categorizations, the SAS is intended as apan-cultural measure of culture-based beliefs. The SAS has been used in research studies whichhave shown that these factors are able to predict particular behaviors, such as interpersonal trust,volunteerism, superstitious practices, and vocational choice (Leung et al., 2002; Singelis et al.,2003). This measure has also been used within a Canadian context (Kuo, Kwantes, & Towson,2005; Kwantes, Karam, Kuo, & Towson, 2005; Kwantes, Towson, & Kuo, 2004).

Previous research has established that culturally taught values and beliefs are related to conflictbehaviors. Bond et al. (2004) examined the extent to which social beliefs, as measured by theSocial Axioms Survey, could add predictive power to a set of values, as measured by the revisedSchwartz Value Survey (1992), in explaining social behaviors including choice of conflictmanagement strategy. They concluded that assessing the contribution of both beliefs and values

in a predictive model may provide more predictive power than the values alone. With respect tothe social axioms, they found that reward for application was associated with an accommodativeapproach to conflict management, while spirituality was associated with both an accommodativeand a competitive approach. Social cynicism was related to both compromising and collaborationefforts to manage conflict, as was social complexity.

When exploring the relationship between beliefs or cognitions and styles of conflict resolution,some theoretical connections do exist between the two sets of constructs that may help to explainthis relationship and allow for certain predictions to be made. Allowing us to better understandthe nature of this relationship, these connections relate certain cultural beliefs and cognitions andthe motivations behind them to the set of conflict management styles. Reflecting a sense ofmistrust, social cynicism can be linked to a low concern for others and thus may result in a

dominating or avoiding conflict resolution strategy. Social flexibility implies that the world is acomplicated place with multiple ways to achieve the same end and, as such, individuals scoringhigh on social flexibility may be more likely to engage in an integrating or compromisingstrategy of conflict resolution. Reward for application is associated with a sense of fairness inwhich people desire to please both themselves as well as those around them in a manner that issatisfactory to all interacting parties. This may be more likely to elicit an integrating orcompromising strategy. A belief in spirituality is rooted in a do good for others approach,which can be linked with a high concern for others and thus may more often result in integrating


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or obliging. Fate control is associated with a belief that our lives are predetermined and, as aresult, reduced efforts are made to please others. As such, a high score on fate control may belinked with a dominating or avoiding conflict resolution strategy. Lastly, a belief in interpersonalharmony is clearly reflective of an increased concern for others and the maintenance ofinterpersonal relationships, and may result in integrating, obliging, or compromising as a conflictresolution strategy. Table 1includes an overview of the hypothesized connections betweencultural variables and styles of conflict resolution.

Table 1. Hypothesized connections between conflict style and cultural variables

Conflic

t style

(Rahi

m,

1992)

Vertic

al

collec

tivism

Vertica

l

individ

ualism

Horiz

ontal

collec

tivism

Horizo

ntal

individ

ualism

Soci

al

cyni

cism

Soci

al

flexi

bility

Rewa

rd for

applic

ation

Spirit

uality

Fat

e

con

trol

Interpe

rsonal

harmo

ny

Highconcer

n for

self

Lowconcern

for

others

Lowconcer

n for

self

Highconcern

for

others

Mistrust

of

other

s

Manyways

to do

thing

s

Fairne

ss

Dogood

for

others

Less

effo

rtsto

plea

se

othe

rs

Highconcern

for

others

Domina

te+ + + +

Avoid + + + +

Integra

te+ + + + + +

Oblige + + + +

Compr

omise+ + +

Note: A + sign denotes a hypothesized positive relationship.

Full-size table

1.3. Personality variables

Just as the conflict process may be influenced by a group-level variable such as culture, it mayalso be influenced by variables that operate at the level of the individual. Personality variablessuch as self-monitoring and EQ may also influence the social interactions that take place on adaily basis, including those that are categorized as conflict-based.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176706000058http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176706000058


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1.3.1. Self-monitoring

Developed by Snyder (1974), the concept of self-monitoring outlines the susceptibility of anindividual's behavior to internal versus external cues. The focus of this theory is placed on thestability or flexibility of one's persona across situations. Whether one chooses to alter behavior inorder to maintain a positive impression in the interests of image management depends on the

individual. High self-monitors are usually the chameleons of the world, readily changing theirbehavior according to the specific environment in which they are placed. According toSnyder(1974), three characteristics of an individual scoring high on self-monitoring are: (1) a concernfor behaving in an appropriate manner, (2) a sensitivity to cues in the environment, and (3) achange in behavior according to what the environment demands. These characteristics are linkedto the ability and motivation behind reading situational cues and gearing one's actions in such away as to maximize the likelihood of a positive outcome (Snyder, 1974).

High self-monitoring has been linked to more favorable outcomes at work, as those individualswho are more likely to alter their behavior based on the particular scenario in which they findthemselves are also more likely to resolve conflict by engaging in collaboration and compromise(Warech, Smither, Reilly, Millsap, & Reilly, 1998). These findings are not restricted to the

organizational setting, however, as high self-monitoring has been linked to better interpersonaleffect