Eye on Sacramento Report

8/11/2019 Eye on Sacramento Report

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An Eye on Sacramento

Policy Report On

Measure L

The Sacramento Checks and Balances Act of 2!"

Presentedat the

The EOS #orum on Measure L

$%& p'm'( Octo)er 2( 2!" Clunie Clu)house

Mc*inley Park

$! Alham)ra Boule+ard

For further information on this Report, please contact:

Craig K. Powell, President Dennis Neufeld, Director of Research

Phone: (9!" #$%&'&' Phone: (9!" &9%')*%mail: craig+eeonsacramento.org *%mail: d%neufeld+comcast.net

For further information a-out *e on acramento, please contact:

/isa 0arcia, 1ice%President, Communit 2utreach *e on acramento, !3' &th 45enue, uite K, acramento, C4 9$33Phone: (9!" )'&%'93 % *%mail: lgarcia9!+ahoo.com % www.eeonsacramento.org
http://www.eyeonsacramento.org/http://www.eyeonsacramento.org/


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TABLE O# CO,TE,TS Pa-e

.' E/ecuti+e Summary "

..' Eye on Sacramento0s Prior Position 1 Current Role Scope of Re+ie3 $4 Role of EOS $

4 ,ature and Scope of Re+ie3 $

4 EOS0s 5istoric Position on E/ecuti+e Mayor Proposals $

...' A Short Primer on the E+olution of Measure L 6

4 The City Council .nsists on Some T3eaks 7

.8' 9hat :oes Measure L Actually Entail; !

4 Summary of the Sacramento Checks and Balances Act of 2!" !

E/ecuti+e Mayor Pro+isions !

City Council Pro+isions !Redistrictin- Pro+isions !

Ethics and


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Pa-e

4 .mpacts on Council Mem)ers 2&

4 .mpacts on ,ei-h)orhoods 2"

4 .mpacts on City Employees 2?4 .mpact on Senior City Mana-ers 2

4 .mpacts on nions 2

4 .mpacts on :e+elopment .nterests 1 Proect Re+ie3s 2

8...' 9ill 9e 5a+e an AdeDuate Pool of ualified E/ecuti+e Mayor

Candidates; 26

.F' Ethics Pro+isions( Corruption 1 Cronyism Risks 27

4 Ethics Reforms in Measure L 27

4 The Risk of Corruption and Cronyism &

F' Measure L and 9anin- :emocratic 8alues in City


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EFECT.8E SMMARG

. *2 -elie5es that the acramento cit charter should not -e o5erhauledwithout a showing - proponents of good cause and strong 6ustification for doing so. 7he

campaign literature of the 8es8 campaign argues that the current charter is 8outdated8and that while the cit is not -roen, ;easure / 8is 6ust -etter.8 s core 6ustifications are that the measure will impro5ego5ernment accounta-ilit, responsi5eness, efficienc, effecti5eness and transparenc.

&. s chief e=ecuti5e officer is an importantindicator of accounta-ilit, we -elie5e that real accounta-ilit in5ol5es 8-eing held toaccount8 for performance. 2n that score, we find that a cit manager is su-6ect to fargreater accounta-ilit than an elected e=ecuti5e maor.

). 0o5ernmental responsi5eness comes in se5eral forms: responsi5eness tociti?ens needs, responsi5eness to the polic preferences of citi?ens and, importantl toacramento, responsi5eness to opportunities for economic growth. s current council%manager sstem is liel to -e more responsi5e to the needsof citi?ens, -ut that there would liel -e no apprecia-le difference in each sstem>sresponsi5eness to the polic preferences of citi?ens. 4n e=ecuti5e maor ma -e moreresponsi5e to opportunities for economic growth.

. Research clearl demonstrates that cities that emplo cit managers are moreefficient and effecti5el managed than cities run - e=ecuti5e maors.

!. Components of ;easure / will increase the transparenc of cit go5ernment,-ut the details % and thus the effecti5eness % of such components are left largel to thefuture discretion of the cit council.

#. ;easure / would liel reduce the power and influence of councilmem-ers toa considera-le degree. ince the influence of neigh-orhoods depends tremendousl onthe power and effecti5eness of councilmem-ers, we conclude that ;easure / willsignificantl reduce the influence of neigh-orhoods on cit polic. 7he possi-le creationof a neigh-orhood ad5isor committee will liel do nothing to arrest a decline in theinfluence of neigh-orhoods under ;easure /.

$. ;easure / ma politici?e the appointment of senior cit managers and result ina loss of manager professionalism and potential difficulties in management recruitment.4t the same time, ;easure / ma open up management positions for dnamic andaction%oriented managers from the pri5ate sector.

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9. ;easure / ma weaen the -argaining position of cit go5ernment in la-ornegotiations due to political influence of pu-lic safet unions on an e=ecuti5e maor,potentiall leading to higher ta=paers costs and@or reduced ser5ice le5els.

'. ;easure / ma 5er well lead to an accelerated processing of de5elopment

pro6ects through the cit>s en5ironmental and planning processes, and could possi-l leadto a lowering of en5ironmental and planning re5iew standards.

. At is highl uncertain whether a sufficient pool of Bualified candidates formaor will run for office following adoption of ;easure /. Af Bualified candidates do notrun for maor, the cit will almost certainl e=perience a deterioration in the Bualit ofcit management.

3. 7he creation of an independent redistricting commission and a strong code ofethics, as called for - ;easure /, will impro5e the integrit and transparenc of citgo5ernment. owe5er, the cit council must trul commit to creating an ethics

commission with the authorit to enforce a code of ethics.

&. 7he increase in maoral powers under ;easure / will liel lead to increasedpolitical fundraising - the maor and greater riss of corruption and 8pa to pla8a-uses in5ol5ing pri5ate interests seeing ta=paer su-sidies for pri5ate pro6ects,increasing the importance of a strong and effecti5e ethics code and ethics commission.

). *2 has ma6or concerns o5er the stead erosion of democratic 5alues anddemocratic practices in cit go5ernment in recent ears.


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..' Eye on Sacramento0s Prior Position 1 Current Role Scope of Re+ie3

Role of EOS

*e on acramento is a California nonprofit pu-lic -enefit organi?ation with threefunctions: " to ser5e as a watchdog of the actions and policies of local acramentogo5ernment and to help eep acramentans informed on such mattersE 3" to offerpragmatic polic solutions to challenging municipal pro-lemsE and &" to engage incommunit outreach.

An our wor as a ci5ic watchdog, *2 is 5er selecti5e in the matters it chooses tore5iew or in5estigate. 2ur polic is to focus our limited time and resources on thoseci5ic matters that are of pu-lic importance, -ut which are not recei5ing adeBuate scrutin

- media, go5ernment or concerned citi?ens. An short, we tr to shed light on theshadows of local go5ernment, -ased on the wise ad5ice of upreme Court ustice /ouisGrandeis that 8sunlight is said to -e the -est disinfectant.8

,ature and Scope of Re+ie3


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ince the announcement of the original e=ecuti5e maor initiati5e - ;aorohnson in anuar 3''9 through to the present da, *2 has consistentl supported the-asic democratic right of acramento 5oters to decide for themsel5es how the should -ego5erned. 2nce count elections officials certified that more than &),''' registered cit5oters had signed petitions seeing a 5ote on the e=ecuti5e maor initiati5e, it -ecame, in

our 5iew, the dut and responsi-ilit of elected cit officials to honor and respect thee=pressed aspirations of the 5oters - placing the measure on the -allot. 7he councilma6orit>s repeated refusals to do so o5er the ears led to prolonged (and unnecessar"council turmoil and frustrated democrac. s unwa5ering support of placing the proposal -efore the 5oterswas ne5er an endorsement of the meritsof the proposal itself, a distinction we ha5e goneto great lengths to mae clear o5er the ears.


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...' A Short Primer on the E+olution of Measure L

7o understand the contents of ;easure /, it is helpful to understand how ite5ol5ed politicall since its origins in 3''9. An the 3''$ maoral race, ;aor Ke5inohnson openl campaigned in fa5or of a strong or e=ecuti5e maor re5amp of the citcharter. e announced in anuar 3''9, 6ust one month into his term as maor, hissponsorship of an e=ecuti5e maor initiati5e and soon thereafter su-mitted petitionssigned - o5er &),''' registered cit 5oters, a num-er sufficient to Bualif it for a spot onthe -allot as a charter amendment.

4 legal challenge -rought - the acramento Central /a-or Council led to a courtruling which found that the initiati5e (since du--ed 8trong ;aor Anitiati5e .'8 or8;A .'8" was an unlawful attempt to -roadl 8re5ise8 rather than more narrowl

8amend8 the cit charter. nder state law, a proposal to re5ise a cit charter can onl -eplaced on the -allot - action of the cit council or - the action of a 5oter%appro5edcharter re5iew commission, not - 5oter petition.

trong ;aor Anitiati5e .' (or ;A .'" was drafted - the maor>s pri5ateattorne and had recei5ed no pu-lic 5etting prior to the circulation of initiati5e petitions.At proposed to grant the maor e=tremel -road e=ecuti5e powers, including the power todirectl hire and fire se5eral hundred senior le5el cit managers and staff. At alsocontained no maoral term limits and none of the ethics%enhancing features (or8sweeteners8" included in toda>s ;easure /.

4 ear or so after ;A .' was sidetraced - the courts, the maor returned tothe cit council with a retooled proposal, du--ed ;A 3.'. At dramaticall reduced thenum-er of cit managers and staff directl under maoral control. 4fter a num-er ofcouncil hearings and e=tensi5e de-ate, the council turned down the maor>s reBuest toplace the measure on the -allot, leading to a 5er pu-lic maoral rant against his councilcolleagues that -ecame legendar.

An 3'3, a group aligned with the maor emerged to pu-licl propose et anotherstrong maor proposal, du--ed ;A &.'. 7his effort in5ol5ed much more communitoutreach than pre5ious 5ersions and the proposal itself included se5eral modificationsthat addressed some of the concerns of the opponents of ;A 3.', including the additionof term limits, a pro5ision calling for an independent redistricting commission, anindependent -udget analst, an ethics code and other ethics%enhancing measures. An a -itof council sleight of hand, a council ma6orit dodged the tough political issue of placing;A &.' on the -allot - placing, instead, on the No5em-er 3'3 -allot a measure asing5oters if the wished to create a formal charter re5iew commission which would itselfha5e the power to place charter re5ision proposals on the cit -allot.

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7he maneu5er allowed the then council ma6orit to wash their hands of the strongmaor issue - claiming that it was now up to the 5oters to decide whether the wantedto create a charter re5iew commission to consider ma6or re5amps to the charter, includinga strong maor proposal. 4s there was 5er little popular support at the time for creatinga charter re5iew commission and no real campaign to support it, the commission proposal

was trounced at the polls, lea5ing the strong maor issue in lim-o once again.

7he No5em-er 3'3 elections, howe5er, changed the mae%up of the cit council,with strong maor opponents and heed and Ro- Fong lea5ing the council and the4llen s sha 6ustification for such a long limit was that 8itwould be difficult for the mayor of Sacramento to go through the ranks of national and

statewide offices and reach the top position of such organizations in just two terms.8Aronicall, it was onl si= months later that Ke5in ohnson was elected President of the.. Conference of ;aors, two ears into his second term as the 8wea8 maor ofacramento.

An short, the tri-ute e=acted - the cit council for placing ;A ).' % ;easure / %on the No5em-er 3') -allot was:

(" eliminating an 5oter controls o5er their own pa,(3" cutting the num-er of reBuired council meetings - more than ' percent,

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(&" dodging term limits on themsel5es, and()" adding that the 8ma8 create an ethics commission to monitor their ethics.At was certainl not the council>s finest hour. Gut it did finall li-erate the strong

maor issue from its status as a cit council%held hostage and pa5ed the wa for 5oters todecide for themsel5es how the wished to -e go5erned.

.8' 9hat :oes Measure L Actually Entail;

Summary of the Sacramento Checks and Balances Act of 2!"

7he changes that ;easure / would mae to the cit charter -rea down into fourstructural components (-ased on summaries pro5ided - the cit attorne>s office":

E/ecuti+e Mayor

7he maor would -e the cit>s chief e=ecuti5e officer.

7he cit manager would -e the cit>s chief administration officer and report

directl to the maor. 7he cit manager would -e appointed - the maor, su-6ect to council

confirmation, and ma -e fired - the maor with '%das prior notice to thecouncil.

7he maor, through the cit manager, would propose the -udget at least 9' das

-efore the -eginning of the fiscal ear. 7he maor would ha5e 5eto power, including line%item -udget 5eto.

No person could ser5e as maor for more than three full terms, not counting terms

started prior to ;easure />s appro5al.

City Council

*ight%mem-er council (now without maor"

No mechanism for -reaing )%) tie 5otes (which could create no end of

difficulties" 7he council would select its own council president and 5ice%president

7he council must deal directl through the maor e=cept that councilmem-ers

ma deal with department directors 7he council would appro5e -udget on a ma6orit 5ote, su-6ect to a maoral 5eto,

which can -e o5erridden - 5ote of si= mem-ers (&@)ths superma6orit of aneight%mem-er council"

7he council would appoint the head of newl%created 2ffice of Andependent

Gudget 4nalst 7he council would continue to appoint and dismiss cit attorne, cit treasurer

and cit cler.

Redistrictin-

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*sta-lishes a nine%mem-er independent redistricting commission.

7he council must pass ordinance esta-lishing mem-er Bualifications and method

of selectionE maor and council, howe5er, ma not -e in5ol5ed in their selection. 7he council must pass an ordinance that reflects, without alteration, -oundaries

adopted - the redistricting commission. Creation of redistricting commission is not su-6ect to 8sunset8 pro5ision and is,

thus, permanent. Ethics and sneigh-orhoods.

7he council must pass a 8unshine 2rdinance8 which shall 8li-erall8 pro5ide for

pu-lic access to cit meetings and records. 7he council must hold at least two meetings per ear outside of its cham-ers.

7he maor must hold at least two town hall meetings per ear.

7he maor must hold a pu-lic meeting for the pu-lic to Buestion the Bualifications

of cit manager candidates. 7he council must hold a pu-lic meeting for the pu-lic to Buestion the

Bualifications of cit attorne, cit cler and cit treasurer candidates. 7he council must hold at least two pu-lic hearings on the maor>s proposed

-udget. 4 -alanced -udget must -e adopted - une &'th.

Sunset Pro+ision

4ll pro5isions of ;easure /, other than the redistricting commission, will sunset

in si= ears, on Decem-er &, 3'3', unless the 5oters appro5e a permanenc 5oteno later than No5em-er 3, 3'3'.


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8' 5a+e Proponents Made the Case for O+erhaulin- City


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councilmem-ers". 4t the same time, the charter was modified to elect our maors 5iacit%wide 5ote instead of tapping the top 5ote%getter in council elections as the cit>smaor.

4-andoned ustification: 7he Cit is GroenE . 4t a panel discussion on ;A 3.'

in 3', C Communications Professor Gar-ara 2>Conner, a co%chair of acramento7omorrow, made the statement that ;A was needed -ecause cit go5ernment was8broken,8 a sentiment shared - acramento Gee columnist Dan s condition has impro5ed

significantl since Professor 2>Conner>s 8-roen8 cit comment, to the point where the8es8 campaign has a-andoned its 8-roen cit8 6ustification and shifted to another: 8Thecurrent system isn't broken, Measure is just better.8 (from a 8es8 on ;easure /ad5ertisement, Anside Pu-lications, Anc., 2cto-er, 3')". 7hat>s not terri-l helpful to5oters looing for tangi-le 6ustification for o5erhauling the cit charter.

7he /egitimate, Core 4rguments in Fa5or of ;easure /. /ooing -eond thesha campaign rhetoric crafted - the 8es8 campaign>s political consultants, thesupporters of ;easure / claim that it will mae cit go5ernment more accountable,responsi!e( transparent( ethicaland better at meeting the growing and increasingly

comple" needsof acramento. 7hese are all legitimate claims with some real -asis infact and we will e=amine each in turn in the following section, entitled 8/iel LPotential Ampacts on Core *lements of Cit 0o5ernance.8

4 local critic of ;easure /, former assistant state treasurer ;ar Paul, asserts thatthe 8es8 campaign has deploed such good go5ernment terms as 8accounta-ilit,88responsi5eness,8 8transparenc8 and the lie as mere 8talismans,8 sei?ing upon them soas to preempt their use - the opponents of ;easure /. (;ar Paul, 8trong ;aor,


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8.' Likely 1 Potential .mpacts on Core Elements of City s power in cit go5ernment to the le5el at which most 5oters thin italread e=ists, reducing the pu-lic>s widespread present misunderstanding of howacramento cit go5ernment operates.

Cit managers function more lie prime ministers in a parliamentar sstem.


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Gut accounta-ilit implies much more than 6ust initial, direct selection - 5oters.At most criticall means -eing 8held to account8 for poor performance. 2nl ifconseBuences are meted out for poor performance can a chief e=ecuti5e -e fairlconsidered to -e 8accounta-le.8 Gut meted out how and - whomJ An a council%maorsstem, a council super%ma6orit can Buicl remo5e a cit manager. 7he acramento

cit council essentiall e=ercised such power to change cit managers twice in the twoears preceding hire>s appointment as cit manager.

Gut in a strong maor sstem, 5oters ha5e onl two means of meting ourconseBuences to a poorl performing maor: the can turn him out of office - electionon the fourth ear anni5ersar of his initial hiring or the can pursue the e=treme remedof remo5ing him from office 5ia a recall election.

an Diego faced a real constitutional crisis last ear when then maor Go- Filner,who wielded e=ecuti5e maor powers appro5ed - an Diego 5oters in 3'', -ecame thesu-6ect of an a5alanche of se=ual harassment complaints and accusations of shaing

down de5elopers for contri-utions to charities fa5ored - Filner. Protracted negotiationsled to a deal in which the Cit of an Diego essentiall paid for him to resign from office,picing up his legal costs and limiting his ci5il lia-ilit.

7ossing a maor out of office - election is also no eas tas and one that willliel -ecome more difficult if ;easure / is adopted. 0reater maor power is liel toresult in more ro-ust maoral fundraising, as contri-utors tend to gi5e more to thoseofficials who wield greater power than those with less power, particularl contri-utorswho ha5e dealings with the cit such as cit unions and su-sid%seeing de5elopers.s defeat of incum-ent eather Fargo", it will liel -ecome somewhat moredifficult in a post%;easure / en5ironment.

At seems clear that a cit manager, su-6ect to termination on an gi5en 7uesdanight, is su-6ect to greater accounta-ilit for his or her performance than an e=ecuti5emaor who is securel ensconced in a four%ear term of office. Ne5ertheless, thecouncil>s e=ercise of o5ersight authorit o5er a cit manager is one step remo5ed fromo5ersight - 5oters themsel5es. An a strong maor sstem, e=ecuti5e o5ersight, thoughgreatl diminished, is left to the 5oters themsel5es.

9ho To Blame 9hen the City Performs Poorly; The Pro)lem of :iffused

Responsi)ility

7here is one area in which ;easure / will help clarif and increase accounta-ilitin cit go5ernment. Currentl when something goes 5er wrong, mem-ers of the citcouncil will often -lame the cit manager (or one another", the cit manager willo-liBuel -lame council mem-ers, others will -lame the cit attorne>s office, while stillothers will -lame line managers in the departments in5ol5ed in the scandal. At is 5erdifficult in such circumstances for the pu-lic and the media to determine who should -earultimate responsi-ilit for the cit>s failure.


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4n e=ample of such finger pointing occurred three ears ago when *e onacramento re5ealed the terms of a prime gar-age contract that were e=tremel onerousto the cit and its ratepaers, and which has led to hies in cit gar-age rates. 7he citappro5ed a 3'%ear e=tension % on a no%-id -asis % of a contract with G/7 *nterprises,

Anc. that loced in s high rates for the disposal of gar-age collected - cit gar-agetrucs. (7he contract has since -een transferred to ens

s concerns is -etter under one form of go5ernment or the other. Gasedon our e=perience and familiarit with the worings of cit go5ernment, we -elie5e it isliel that constituent ser5ice would -e superior under the current council%managermodel than it would -e under an e=ecuti5e maor sstem.

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nder the current sstem, a citi?en has three potential points of access to the cit-ureaucrac for help in resol5ing pro-lems:

the maor>s office,

the citi?en>s councilmem-er>s office, or

direct contact with the -ureaucrac.

Direct contact with the -ureaucrac is complicated - the fact that man callersha5e little to no nowledge of which cit official to contact for help in addressing theirparticular issue. (7he cit refuses to post on the cit>s we-site its internal phone directorof managers, 6o- titles and contact information that would help citi?ens identif anddirectl reach the cit official the need to contactE the cit director is a5aila-le,howe5er, on *2>s we-site at www.eeonsacramento.org". Calls to the cit>sunderstaffed & information line are often su-6ect to wait times of '% minutes.

Calls to the maor>s office for assistance come from all parts of the cit, forcing

receptionists to direct calls Buicl either to & or to cit departments while pro5idinglittle to no direct help or ad5ice to callers.

Calls to indi5idual councilmem-er>s offices, howe5er, are treated Buite differentl.Councilmem-ers and their staffs are uniforml sensiti5e to calls for assistance fromconstituents, each of whom is a potential future 5oter for (or against" the councilmem-er.Council staff learn how to na5igate the cit -ureaucrac on -ehalf of constituents and areBuite sillful and moti5ated to find the right person to help the caller with their pro-lem.1er often, staff mem-ers call the rele5ant cit office or -ureaucrat directl on -ehalf ofthe constituent.

An our e=perience, cit emploees place the highest priorit on addressing callsfor assistance the recei5e from councilmem-ers or mem-ers of their staff. s focus is eepingthe mem-ers of the cit council % his -osses % happ with his 6o- performance. Citemploees now that if a councilmem-er e5er lodges a complaint with the cit managera-out a cit emploee who has -een neglectful of a councilmem-er>s reBuests for help,that emploee will -e in serious hot water with the cit manager, which is ne5er a goodcareer strateg.

An an e=ecuti5e maor sstem, the cit manager wors at the pleasure of themaor, not the mem-ers of the cit council. ConseBuentl, his focus and priorit will -e

on eeping the maor continuousl happ, not responding to reBuests for help fromcouncilmem-ers. 7hat shift of the cit manager>s focus from ser5ing the council toser5ing the maor will liel -e Buicl internali?ed - cit emploees up and the downthe cit hierarch. ConseBuentl, the alacrit with which cit emploees currentl worto sol5e constituent pro-lems passed along to them from councilmem-er>s offices willliel diminish, reducing the cit>s responsi5eness to the concerns of indi5idual citi?ens.

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Constituent ser5ice ma also decline for constituents of councilmem-ers who endup 8on the outs8 with an e=ecuti5e maor for, sa, failing to support the maor>slegislati5e agenda. An a strong maor sstem, councilmem-ers who 8cross8 a strongmaor politicall can pa a 5er hea5 price. 4 cit -ureaucrac that was oncecooperati5e with the councilmem-er can turn chill and uncooperati5e. 4ccess to 5ital

information, all of which is controlled - the maor in an e=ecuti5e maor sstem, can -edenied. Former and current elected officials from a num-er of cities ha5e uniformle=pressed concern to us with -eing denied access to information in strong maor%runcities. 4nd in politics and go5ernment, information is power.

7his is not merel a hpothetical ris. An a recent column, acramento Geecolumnist ;arcos Greton made the point that councilmem-er te5e ansen, a leader ofthe campaign against ;easure /, will ha5e committed 8political suicide8 if ;easure /passes. 4s Greton put it, 8if 'strong mayor' passes, it almost certainly would mean#ansen would be buried so deep in the City Council chambers they would ha!e to pipe

light down to him.8 Greton e=pressed his assessment of the future woring relationship

-etween the maor and ansen: 8$nd the idea of being able to work with %ohnson onceyou'!e crossed him like this& .%. don't play that game.8 (;arcos Greton, 8ansen7aes a Ris in 2pposing ohnson on trong ;aor,8 acramento Gee, 4ugust 9, 3')".


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political leanings of ,!'' .. cities and towns. 7he then e=amined the tpes ofgo5ernment structures used in each of those municipal go5ernments. Finall, thegauged the social, political and en5ironmental policies enacted - each of thosego5ernments.

7he authors> conclusion: that all municipal go5ernments, irrespecti5e of structure,tend to implement policies that align with the political ideolog of their constituents. 4sam urgis of Cit /a-s put it, the found that 8all local go!ernments are more or lesse(ually good as listening to their !oters.8 (am urgis, Cit /a-s, ul &, 3')".8These results ... cast doubt on the hypothesis that simple institutional reformsenhance responsi!eness in municipal go!ernments,8 7ausano5itch and 5iews - mo5ing polic in the direction of those 5iews.8

urgis writes that 8these results do suggest Sacramento !oters ought to beskeptical of the idea that the o!erall policy direction of the city will change

dramatically if they grant the mayor more e"ecuti!e power. $s these political scientistsput it, they could get rid of the mayor altogether and it probably wouldn't make much

of a difference, policy)wise8 (turgis, supra".

2n the one hand, the stud should ease the concerns of those worried that;easure / will lead to a ma6or shift in the policies of cit go5ernment. 2n the otherhand, the stud ma disappoint those who ma -e counting on ;easure / to lead to ama6or change in the direction of cit polic. 2ne conclusion seems fairl clear: ;easure/ will liel ha5e little effect on the polic direction of the cit as current polic is lielalread reflecti5e of, and responsi5e, to the polic preferences of acramento residents inmost cases.

Responsi+eness to Opportunities for Economic


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7he maor>s natural instinct for action was met with the realit of go5ernment%-%consensus acramento. 7he maor sees a need for acramento to ha5e a single leaderwho can, first, define a 5ision and then act upon it. ;aor 0reg Gallard of Andianapolisput it this wa in remars Buoted in a Gee article this wee:

8*t is important that somebody, in collaboration with others, sets the !ision forthe city and has the mechanisms to dri!e it forward. *f people don't like +whatthey do, !ote them out.8 (acramento Gee, 8;aors Conference


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strong, almost coerci5e maoral power o5er the de5elopment of cit polic. Gut that>snot where the cit is toda.

C' Efficiency and Effecti+eness of


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ome of these reform proposals ha5e -een percolating up through the politicalprocess for ears. 7hree ears ago, in the aftermath of the cit council>s redistrictingfiasco which led to record protests at cit hall, *2 teamed up with minorit leaders inthe area to launch 8*mpower acramento,8 a citi?ens reform group led - *fren0utierre? and initiall focused on adoption of a cit charter amendment creating an

independent redistricting commission. 7he goal was to persuade the cit council to placethe proposal on the cit -allot. *2 did the leg wor of researching and e5aluatingindependent redistricting efforts in other California cities and crafting a charteramendment. 4fter recei5ing the support of the maor>s office for our proposal, *2 and*mpower acramento was surprised to find that our proposal had -een -olted onto thelatest 5ersion of the maor>s strong maor proposal, which effecti5el too the politicalwind out of the sails of our effort to place a stand%alone independent redistrictingcommission proposal on the -allot.

7he strateg, of course, of the proponents of ;easure / has -een to pacage asman appealing good go5ernment features as possi-le with the core strong maor

proposal.


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cit pu-licl release the terms of all ma6or proposed cit contracts at least ' das priorto the council appro5ing such contracts.

7his feature would force the council, for the first time, to seriousl address issuesof cit go5ernment transparenc with a deadline. 7he resulting ordinance would ha5e to

meet ;easure />s mandate of 8li-erall8 pro5iding for greater cit transparenc. 7here isno wa a stand%alone measure could e5er replicate the pressure to impro5e cittransparenc that ;easure / pro5ides.

Mandated Pu)lic Meetin-s

;easure / includes a slew of mandates for additional pu-lic hearings, each ofwhich address a recogni?ed cit short%coming in assuring open go5ernment. Fore=ample, the mandate that the maor produce a proposed -udget 9' das -efore the-eginning of a new fiscal ear would reBuire release of the proposed -udget - 4pril 3nd,a month earlier than the current mandated release date of the draft -udget. ;easure /

also mandates that there -e two pu-lic hearings on the -udget. opefull, such meetingswould -e in the nature of town hall meetings where citi?ens will ha5e -road input into thesetting of cit -udget priorities.

7he measure also reBuires that the maor hold a pu-lic meeting where the pu-liccan e=amine the Bualifications of candidates for cit manager, addressing the pro-lem ofthe cit council hiring a cit manager -ehind closed doors with ?ero pu-lic input. 7hecouncil would -e reBuired to hold similar pu-lic meetings to 5et the Bualifications ofcandidates for cit attorne, cit treasurer and cit cler.

4 more sm-olic pro5ision reBuires that the maor hold two pu-lic town hallmeetings each ear and that the council hold two council meetings awa from cit hallseach ear.

8..' Likely and Potential .mpacts of Measure L on 8arious Parties

.mpacts on Councilmem)ers

;easure / will almost certainl lead to a considera-le loss of power forcouncilmem-ers. First, the cit manager will no longer wor for, report to or -eaccounta-le to councilmem-ers as the council will lose the power to dismiss the citmanager. Anstead, the cit manager will wor for, report to and -e accounta-le to thee=ecuti5e maor. ;uch of councilmem-ers> current power lies in their ultimate authoritto remo5e the cit manager if he does not perform to their satisfaction. s shift of -road -udgetar power from the cit manager to the maorwill also diminish councilmem-er power. Now, the cit manager taes significant timeduring the course of each ear (more than si= months" to methodicall gauge the -udget

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priorities of council mem-ers, which leads to the release of a draft -udget that the citmanager alread nows will -e fa5ora-l recei5ed - a council ma6orit. nder ;easure/, the cit manager will -e preparing the -udget proposal for a constituenc of one: his-oss, the e=ecuti5e maor. ConseBuentl, councilmem-er influence on the de5elopmentof the -udget will drop dramaticall.

0i5en the maor>s power under ;easure / to 5eto a -udget not to his liing andthe e=traordinaril high &@)ths ma6orit council 5ote (! out of $ mem-ers" reBuired too5erride a maoral 5eto of the -udget, the maor need corral onl three council 5otes todefeat an o5erride of his 5eto of the -udget.

/ittle media attention has -een paid to ;easure />s grant of line%item 5eto powerto the maor. nder a line%item 5eto, the maor can ?ero out an one or more of thethousands of line items in the cit>s massi5e annual -udget. 7he council would ha5e tomuster a &@)ths ma6orit to o5erride each indi5idual line item 5eto. 4s a practical matter,under ;easure / not a penn is liel to -e spent - the cit without the appro5al of the

e=ecuti5e maor. From a raw power perspecti5e, the a-ilit of a maor under ;easure /to ?ero out spending and pro6ects that -enefit a single council district will pro5ide himwith tremendous coerci5e power o5er a recalcitrant councilmem-er. *5en the threat ofsuch action will often -e enough to -ring councilmem-ers into line.

Not e5er councilmem-er>s power will diminish under ;easure /. 7hosecouncilmem-ers who -ecome uniforml loal to the e=ecuti5e maor and ne5er wa5er inthat support will liel see little to no change in their power and influence. Gut theirfreedom and fle=i-ilit to represent the interests and 5iews of their constituents willliel -e compromised and su-ordinated to their primar loalt to the maor and hisagenda.

An short, ;easure / will liel lead to a significant reduction in councilmem-erpower and influence o5er cit go5ernment. Perhaps the council>s decision to put apro5ision in ;easure / reducing the num-er of reBuired council meetings from onceweel to 6ust twice monthl was a recognition that the wouldn>t ha5e as much to doafter passage of ;easure /.

2ne aspect of ;easure / which will mitigate the liel loss of councilmem-erpower is a pro5ision reBuiring the creation of an 2ffice of Andependent Gudget 4nalstunder the direct control of the cit council. 7he cit -udget analst will -e a chec on ane=ecuti5e maor>s -road control of the cit>s -udget process and should help offset, tosome e=tent at least, councilmem-ers> liel reduction in full and eas access to citfinancial information under an e=ecuti5e maor sstem.

.mpacts on ,ei-h)orhoods

4s noted a-o5e, ;easure / will liel reduce the power and influence ofindi5idual councilmem-ers. 7his reduction in the power of councilmem-ers will liellead to a corresponding fall in the influence of neigh-orhoods and neigh-orhood

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organi?ations at cit hall. s positions.

G contrast, maors are tpicall less connected on an indi5idual or retail -asiswith their cit%wide constituents. 7he spend more time than councilmem-ers withrepresentati5e of 5arious cit%wide interest groups and less time than councilmem-erswith representati5es of neigh-orhood groups. ;aors also tend to -e more reliant oncampaign fundraising for their political continuit than councilmem-ers. Running cit%wide campaigns are an e=pensi5e proposition while council district races are far lesse=pensi5e and are less dependent on prodigious fundraising.

4s a result of these different influences, councilmem-ers tend to -e highlsensiti5e to, and focused on, neigh-orhood concerns, while maors, as a general rule,tend to focus more on cit%wide issues of concern to a maor>s interest group donors andissues relating to the Downtown core where man of his contri-utors ha5e economicinterests. ConseBuentl, an reduction in the power or influence of councilmem-ers willlead to a decline in neigh-orhood influence on cit go5ernment and an increase in theinfluence of interests concerned with Downtown interests.

upporters of ;easure / mae the case that the current structure of citgo5ernment leads to an e=cessi5e focus on parochial neigh-orhood interests and aninsufficient focus on cit%wide issues. 7here is some merit to that argument, particularlsince onl the maor, presentl a largel ceremonial post, is the onl mem-er of thecouncil elected in a cit%wide 5ote. tdisguised their almost monomaniacal focus on matters concerning their district ande5incing far less concern with cit%wide issues. 2ne such mem-er>s most memora-le andre5ealing standing line was, 8s in it for m district.8

;ost councilmem-ers, howe5er, are Buite conscientious a-out their dualresponsi-ilit to represent -oth their district and the cit as a whole. District

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parochialism ma ha5e -een a concern some ears ago, -ut we>5e see little e5idence of itin recent ears. Af it is seen again as a ma6or concern, it could perhaps -e more easiladdressed - increasing the si?e of the cit council from nine to, sa, & mem-ers andha5ing the four additional councilmem-ers elected 5ia a cit%wide 5ote.

4n additional o-ser5ation: if a councilmem-er happens to -e on the 8outs8 withan e=ecuti5e maor, that councilmem-er and his neigh-orhood constituents will lielsee their influence at Cit all drop much more precipitousl.

7he cit council threw a -one to those concerned a-out the waning influence ofacramento>s neigh-orhoods under ;easure / - adding a last%minute a pro5ision to themeasure that pro5ides that the cit council 8ma8 esta-lish - ordinance a Neigh-orhood4d5isor Committee for the purpose of considering the interests of the cit>sneigh-orhoods. 7hat>s it. Not a single further word flushing out the composition,staffing, -udget, scope or -rief of such a committee. 7he use of the word 8ad5isor8sends the clear message that the committee will ha5e no authorit whatsoe5er, 5irtuall

guaranteeing that its influence will -e the same as all other cit ad5isor committees,which is ?ero. 7he addition of the pro5ision was a transparent effort to mislead 5otersinto -elie5ing that neigh-orhood 5iews will actuall count for something as aconseBuence of the creation of such of a committee

At is particularl galling % and re5ealing % that the council couldn>t e5en muster thewill to actuall commit to creating such a powerless, superfluous committee. Gpro5iding that the council 8may8 create such a committee, the signal a lac ofseriousness, commitment and credi-ilit. 7he council 8ma8 create a neigh-orhoodad5isor committee on an gi5en 7uesda night. 7o add such meaningless fluff in acharter amendment is a ci5ic em-arrassment. 7hat a recent acramento Gee editorialsupporting ;easure / cited this pro5ision as a -eacon of hope that neigh-orhoodconcerns will recei5e a fair hearing at cit hall % e5en though the influence of theircouncil representati5es will -e diminished - the measure % is either naO5etM ordisingenuousness.

.mpacts on City Employees

Cit emploees tae their cues from their -oss, the cit manager.


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at an one time, as si= 5otes are what>s reBuired to dismiss a cit manager". is multiple%-oss challenge maes him more cautious in de5eloping and implementing polic.

nder ;easure , such polic am-iguit or caution will -ecome largel a thingof the past. 4n e=ecuti5e maor will liel ha5e relati5el free rein in summoning the

-ureaucrac to act upon his polic directions. 7his could -ecome a particularl 5alua-letool in responding Buicl and effecti5el to opportunities to recruit new -usinesses or torespond to rapidl de5eloping crises.

.mpact on Senior City Mana-ers

2ne of the ma6or concerns with a change from a council%manager to an e=ecuti5emaor is whether it will lead to political and cron appointments to managementpositions in cit go5ernment. 7he cit manager controls the hiring and firing of hundredsof senior cit managers and staff. nder the cit>s current personnel policies andpractices, we ha5e a senior cit staff that is highl professionali?ed, well%trained and

largel free from political influence. 7he cit manager currentl ser5es as an effecti5e-uffer -etween senior cit staff and the rough and tum-le world of cit council andmaoral politics. 7hat insulation will liel end with the passage of ;easure /. 7hemaor will -e free to appoint whome5er he wants to these positions.


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;an in the en5ironmental communit ha5e e=pressed concern that an e=ecuti5emaor, who will liel -e the recipient of significant campaign contri-utions fromde5elopment interests and firms in the construction industr, will use his power to reducethe current le5el of staff, planning commission and council scrutin of de5elopment

proposals as the mo5e through the cit>s en5ironmental re5iew and planning process. Atis 5er possi-le that an e=ecuti5e maor would use his powers to e=pedite re5iews andreduce the time pro6ects spend in the re5iew process.

An our 5iew, that would not -e an unhealth de5elopment. 7here is an old (andtrue" adage in the de5elopment -usiness: 8time ills all pro6ects.8 De5elopers tie upconsidera-le capital, incur su-stantial de-t and e=pose themsel5es to ma6or riss in-ringing pro6ects to maret (as e5idenced - the large num-er of local de5elopers whofailed in the 0reat Recession". Delas add to pro6ect costs, increase uncertaint andreduce the tempo of -eneficial de5elopment and economic growth.


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responsi-ilities. 7he>5e had their talents, character and mettle tested in multiplepositions o5er the course of decades.

Af we were to assess honestl all the maors who ha5e ser5ed acramento o5er thepast )' ears (;arriott, Asen-erg, Rudin, ;iller, erna, ee, Fargo and ohnson", could

we honestl conclude than an one of them came into office with the reBuisiteBualifications needed to assume immediate full e=ecuti5e leadership of cit go5ernmentJt thin that we could.

o if we conclude that none of the indi5iduals on the roster of past acramentomaors had the Bualifications to ser5e effecti5el as chief e=ecuti5e maors ofacramento, what assurances do 5oters ha5e that we will see an adeBuate pool of futuremaoral candidates surface who will ha5e the Bualifications needed to assume suchresponsi-ilitiesJ 7he fact is there are no assurances that candidates of such cali-er willsee the office.

Proponents of ;easure / assert that there are directors of ma6or departments ofstate go5ernment and other go5ernmental units who would -e encouraged - the passageof ;easure / and the resulting enlargement of maoral authorit to run for maor. 2rthat there are ci5ic%minded C*2>s of larger corporations with the reBuisite sills whowould see the office following adoption of ;easure /. Perhaps. 7he -usinesscommunit largel a-andoned its pre5ious acti5ist role in cit go5ernment se5eraldecades ago with the shift awa from at%large to district election of councilmem-ers.;eanwhile, the increasingl com-ati5e nature of electoral politics dampens the am-itionsof possi-le candidates from the -usiness world.

Proponents claim that smart maoral candidates will hire competent ande=perienced cit managers to ser5e under them and who will carr out the da%to%daresponsi-ilities of running the cit. 7hat ma help mae up for some, -ut certainl notall, of the shortcomings of maoral candidates who personall lac the reBuisiteBualifications to ser5e as the cit>s C*2. At is also uncertain whether acramento couldattract a high Bualit pool of candidates to fill a position that will -e, at most, asu-ordinate chief administrati5e position or, perhaps more liel, a de facto chief of staffposition.


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8su-stantiall 5iolates8 the Code. 7his assures that the Code will ha5e some real teeth toit. owe5er, the fact that the council included a mere promise to adopt such a Codeinstead of e=erting the effort of actuall writing it and enshrining into the cit chartershows a certain lac of seriousness of purpose. 7he implicit message is that 5otes ha5e toagree to mae the maor stronger -efore we>ll tae steps to mae cit go5ernment more

ethical.

7he council included a related section in ;easure / which pro5ides that the8may8 create an ethics commission. 7here are multiple pro-lems with this pro5ision.First, - using the weasel word 8ma,8 the council laced the fortitude to full commit tocreating an *thics Commission. s use of the cit treasur andta=paer mone to su-sidi?e pri5ate de5elopment pro6ects % a form of 8cron capitalism8that has -een pro5en in stud after stud to -e not onl monumentall wasteful, -utcorrosi5e of the pu-lic trust, particularl when the recipients of such ta=paer largessegi5e campaign contri-utions to the officials with the power to grant such largesse.


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noticed, for e=ample, that ;ar Friedman, the in5estor in the Kings ownershipresponsi-le for o5erseeing de5elopment of the new Downtown arena, has -een a ma6orcontri-utor to the ;easure / campaign. 7he owners of the Kings, including ;r.Friedman, are the -eneficiaries of hundreds of millions of dollars of ta=paer su-sidies.7hat ;r. Friedman is now contri-uting o5er ',''' to the ;easure / campaign appears

5er much lie a return fa5or for the su-sid that he recei5ed from cit ta=paers.

Af ;easure / passes, it will -e imperati5e for the cit council to tae seriousl the6o- of crafting a Code of *thics to eliminate not onl classic Buid pro Buo e=changes, -utto eliminate the appearance of 8pa to pla8 corruption and fa5or trading, particularl asmaoral political fundraising increases and the cit continues to engage in ill%concei5edand wasteful su-sidies of pri5ate de5elopment pro6ects.

F' Measure L and 9anin- :emocratic 8alues in City sispanic 5oters to the 5er cusp of illegalit under federal and state 5oting rights laws.


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the future.

Documents

Eye on Sacramento Report