Failures and shortcomings of the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority: An overview

March 2018

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Failures and shortcomings of the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority: An overview

Contents

Introduction Why an independent inquiry into the CAA is required

Integrity Two significant failures

Safety The deterioration in Safety Culture and the use of the Health and Safety Act

Failures to respond to safety related, client-supplied reports

Failure to develop a safer means of radio communications (the National CFZ proposal)

The lack of an independent, confidential incident reporting system

Reliability Breaches of privacy and confidentiality

Prosecutions, infringement notices and withdrawn fines

Needlessly aggressive enforcement

Regulation as a substitute for oversight

Faulty regulations

Unlawful Advisory Circulars

The misuse of the Official Information Act and the Privacy Act

Failure to honour Service Charter obligations

AOCs and SMS: A worrying picture of systemic CAA inconsistency

Accountability Customer satisfaction surveys

Consultation

Lack of consultation over the allocation of airspace

Customer complaints

Affordability Fees and charges

Efficiency and cost-reduction failures

CAA relocation

Other hidden costs

Summary and Conclusion

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About the GAA

Annex

SSC report – CAA release

Peter Rhodes’ letter to Minister of Transport, 24 March 2014

Peter Rhodes’ letter to the Coroner, 16 June 2014

Background document – The case for a confidential aviation reporting system

AOC applications and SMS implementation plans: Systemic CAA inconsistency – report

GAA letter to Nigel Gould regarding a client satisfaction survey Nigel Gould’s reply

Part-012-Consolidation.pdf

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Introduction

This document records some (but by no means all) notable CAA shortcomings and failures observed since the General Aviation Advocacy network began monitoring the Authority in 2012 (although we refer to earlier events where considered relevant).

We have excluded evidence that cannot be admitted, either because the informants kept inadequate records or to protect identifiable persons who expressed concern about possible retaliation (not necessarily by the Authority, but more likely – they believe – by certain CAA employees).

Frequent reference is made to the GAA Independent Client Satisfaction Survey of the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority. The report of survey findings accompanies this document.

Both documents contain evidence supporting serious and legitimate concerns about the reliability and integrity of New Zealand’s aviation regulator.

Taken together, we believe they show that the Authority in its current state is not fit for the purpose of regulating General Aviation.

We believe these matters should be addressed by an independent public inquiry into the CAA.

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Integrity

During 2017, we witnessed two particularly serious examples of a lack of integrity displayed by senior people within the Civil Aviation Authority and its governing Board.

First, a flight operations inspector falsely claimed qualifications that he did not hold, as part of CAA proceedings against an operator and, second, the Board’s deputy chairman failed to correctly manage a conflict of interest.

Paul Mitchell Jones was employed by the CAA as a flight operations inspector on what the Authority termed an “equivalent” to an ICAO professional licence (ATPL or CPL), the equivalency being his UK Army helicopter pilot qualification.

At a later time, Jones claimed civilian licences which he did not hold. The false qualifications (Airline Transport Pilot Licences for fixed wing aircraft and helicopters) were mentioned in a sworn court affidavit.

http://www.stuff.co.nz/taranaki-daily-news/news/93425533/Court-of-Appeal-allows-fraud-case-against-Civil-Aviation-Authority-to-go-ahead

These spurious qualifications were also shown in the CAA’s safety oriented Vector magazine (September 2016).

Yet they went unquestioned within the Authority - until evidence at a Court of Appeal hearing revealed them - even though they were apparently not in his original job application or his employment file.

https://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/93824772/civil-aviation-authority-inspector-not-as-qualified-as-claimed

The resignation of Peter Griffiths as deputy board chairman in September 2017 again revealed serious shortcomings within the Authority, and particularly at board level.

Griffiths had a conflict of interest between his board position and his involvement with Great Barrier Airlines, a competitor of Sunair which was grounded by the CAA, with virtually no notice. Griffiths had privileged knowledge of the Sunair decision and misused it by informing his own company before Sunair had learned of its grounding. Griffiths’s company, GBA, was also in competition with two other operators, the CAA’s treatment of whom gave rise to media comment, for example in the National Business Review.

https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/09/19/48660/caa-director-resigns-after-airline-grounding

We strongly disagreed with the board chairman, Nigel Gould, that Griffiths’s resignation had put an end to the matter, telling him that further investigation was essential in light of other alleged CAA actions relating to competitors of Griffiths’s business interests and his length of tenure on the board. We stated that an inquiry was necessary to reassure participants in the aviation system, as well as the general public.

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1602/S00460/nzog-chairman-peter-griffiths-steps-down-unexpectedly.htm

It is totally unacceptable that a board member could be allowed to interact in any way with the Authority’s day-to-day business. The board’s terms of reference prohibit it. The board failed to monitor and correctly manage one of its members’ conflicts of interest. Responsibility for this lapse in good governance rests on the board chairman and the then Minister of Transport, Simon Bridges.

Both these incidents generate public anxiety about the CAA as guardian of our aviation system’s regulatory integrity - domestically and internationally.

However, this is not the first time the CAA has found itself in trouble over conflicts of interest:

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Annex: SSC Report (CAA media release)

We agree with the CAA’s stated view that some knowledge of the aviation industry can be useful in a board member, provided that adequate control is maintained.

What we cannot agree with is the board’s acceptance of any member who also has a financial interest in any commercial operation linked to the aviation industry. Such an interest should lead to automatic rejection, dismissal or compulsory resignation. This restriction would have avoided the problem which Peter Griffiths created for the CAA through his involvement with Wings over Whales, Great Barrier Airlines and Z Energy.

GBA and Wings over Whales have competitors who during his board tenure attracted the attention of the CAA’s inspectorate. Z Energy, of which Griffiths is the “independent board chairman”, plays a significant role in the supply of aviation fuels. The exclusion of Griffiths from the CAA board, when his aviation-related interests became known, would have precluded any suspicion.

After Griffiths resigned, the board chairman initially rejected an investigation. In doing so, he raised the level of doubt and suspicion and lowered the degree of public confidence in himself, his board and the Authority.

Later, however, a Queen’s Counsel, Mary Scholtens, was appointed to look into the Griffiths affair.

This was a positive move, but it still fell short of a fully independent inquiry. The Board dictated the terms of reference and these terms prevented a wider investigation into other claims made against Griffiths.

The Scholtens report came into the GAA's hands less than 24 hours before the publication of this document. It was therefore not possible to carry out an in-depth assessment. However, we note that in relation to Sunair, Griffiths is found to have committed a breach involving a conflict of interest.

The findings and conclusions appear to support the GAA's major objections to the current conduct of the CAA Board; in particular, we note the QC's concerns about the appointment of people holding financial interests in aviation-related activities and the negative public perceptions that may arise from such appointments (perceptions which she firmly established to be genuine, during her examination of the Griffiths affair).

The aviation system is exceptionally complex.

We believe that the CAA Board must always include more than one person with hands-on aviation experience. Ideally, they should understand not only how to fly, but also be familiar with the wider aviation environment – including the regulatory regime. The Board should specifically include a representative of General Aviation.

Crucially, the slightest scintilla of any conflict of interest must now be eliminated, even if this entails the departure of currently serving members.

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Safety

The deterioration in Safety Culture and the use of the Health and Safety Act

The New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority appears to be behaving like the “Policeman of the Air” rather than working with the GA industry to improve aviation safety, as a collaborative activity.

One example is a skydive fatality at Wanaka (15 Nov 2012). This was investigated by the CAA under the Health & Safety in Employment Act, during which investigation the risk of prosecution for manslaughter was made known to the operator by the CAA investigators.

Shortly afterwards, the company’s owner/operator (David Hall) committed suicide.

After CAA investigators explained that he could be prosecuted for manslaughter and sentenced to up to 15 years in prison if found guilty of an offence under that Act, it is said that Mr Hall was affected to a point which led him to take his own life a few days later.

Refer to: Peter Rhodes letter to Minister of Transport, 24 March 2014, and Peter Rhodes letter to the Coroner, 14 June 2014, in Annex

What is also troubling about the skydive cameraman fatality is that the CAA has done nothing to prevent a similar accident.

The cause of it was the cameraman using incorrect equipment. CAA Rules still only address the tandem parachute equipment used by the skydiver and the attached paying public parachute rider, not the equipment which caused this fatality.

A second suicide, directly related to a CAA investigation, occurred after a helicopter pilot was killed when his machine struck an overhanging wire that had been erected by a farmer. Subsequent to the CAA investigators advising the farmer that they would be prosecuting him under the HSW Act and he could potentially be in court facing manslaughter charges, the farmer took his own life.

Two families were thus left without husbands and fathers.

After the CAA had been told by a widow to back off because it had “already exacted the death penalty”, the Authority withdrew its threat.

The current CAA culture is the wrong way to improve aviation safety, given the proven and long-established prior history of how aviation safety was successfully developed.

There is never a case for hiding or avoiding clearly negligent or wilful acts that cause an accident or safety related event, which could be handled as a police investigation with provision for protection against self-incrimination. The safety record of aviation has been built on a threat- and blame-free exchange between aviation operators and the regulatory authority, and this is reflected in ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) Annex 13.

https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Pages/Documents.aspx

If a case exists for Health and Safety legislation’s use in investigating aviation safety related incidents or accidents, it must exclude all threats of prosecution. Otherwise, there is little hope of a free and transparent exchange of information or evidence.

The GAA believes that the present CAA regime neither owns nor encourages a safety culture which fosters an environment where the industry and the regulatory authority are united in advancing aviation safety.

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The record of prosecutions or threats of prosecution by the CAA is contrary to the standards set by the ICAO’s Annex 13, as well as the New Zealand legislation that reflects this in Annex 13 of the TAIC Act

http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0099/latest/whole.html

and CAA Rules Part 12:

Annex: Part-012-Consolidation.pdf

The CAA’s position is that, under the Health and Safety Act, it has no obligation to prove non-compliance or negligence by an operator; merely that they could have taken another practical or reasonable step. In the Authority’s view, an operator can be entirely compliant with its CAA exposition, the CAA rules and all relevant aviation legislation, yet still be prosecuted.

The Authority, in administering the current Health and Safety Act alongside its own regulatory framework, is trying to deal with two competing and incompatible philosophies.

Aviation legislation is prescriptive because this has been found globally to deliver the best safety outcome.

Health and Safety legislation is performance-related and punitive. It says: “Perform. If you don't, you will be prosecuted”.

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Failure to respond to safety related, client-supplied reports

The GAA has come into possession of a cockpit video recording showing a near-miss between two light aircraft, operating in clear conditions in uncontrolled airspace. The MP4 video file forms part of the annexes. The source of this information has requested anonymity. The incident location is known to the GAA, as is the identity of the video-recording aircraft. We have been asked to keep that information confidential.

The cockpit video recording was taken on a GoPro-type camera fixed in an aero club’s aircraft. The two aeroplanes involved were initially on a collision course.

The near-miss alarmed the crew with the camera, who reported it to the Authority on a CA005 incident report form.

What is remarkable about this event is that it occurred three years ago, and those who reported it have never received any response from the CAA.

To make matters worse, it happened when both aircraft were on different radio frequencies because there was – and still is – no Common Frequency Zone covering the area, which is a popular unofficial transit lane.

The CA005 form sent to the Authority after the 2015 incident specifically recommended the introduction of a CFZ. It stated: “This area … could benefit from a CFZ! It is unclear as to which of several frequencies is best to use.”

The Authority, for all that is known so far, turned a blind eye. Either the form was mislaid, or perhaps the CAA felt this was too hot a potato, given the widespread controversy over a national network of CFZs at the time. The Common Frequency Zone is a matter of public safety that we will next address.

This is a vivid example of a number of serious allegations made by responders in the GAA’s Independent Client Satisfaction Survey of the NZ CAA. The survey contains 30 claims that safety reports (and sometimes multiple reports) have not been properly responded to by the CAA or, in a number of instances, not even acknowledged.

In one, a respondent claims that a report was ignored and that, subsequently, an accident claimed two lives.

We submit that these claims require independent investigation because of their serious implications for flight safety.

Related information

The MP4 cockpit video recording is viewable at www.caa.gen.nz

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The CAA’s 20-year failure to develop a safer means of radio communications (the CFZ proposal)

The use of different radio frequencies within a common geographical area is a danger that has greatly concerned general aviation pilots in New Zealand for two decades. It was first raised at the CAA in 1998.

In 2010, after a 2006 double-fatality collision between two training aircraft in the Manawatu (and, in 2010, another near Feilding that killed an instructor and student), Massey University suggested to the CAA and the general aviation sector the establishment of a national network of geographically defined common frequency zones (CFZs). A formal request was made to the CAA in 2011. The CAA refused to progress it because of “staff levels and higher priority work.”

Massey continued to promote the CFZ network at industry forums and in aviation publications. A formal letter was sent to the CAA on 5 September 2012 requesting further action on the concept. This was followed by a CAA meeting with Massey University School of Aviation staff.

The discussions identified the key safety issue as confusion about the appropriate radio frequency for use in uncontrolled airspace. The meeting also covered the use of the Flight Information Service and a review of existing CFZs.

The CAA proposed an alternative solution using the Flight Information Service ‘with improved coverage’. It issued a discussion document (DW1259145-0) in April 2013, inviting feedback.

The CAA’s Manager Aeronautical Services made the following comments:

� CFZs are not enabled under CAR Part 71 and there are no associated pilot requirements under CAR Part 91. For a rule change to progress a CAA policy decision is needed and Ministry of Transport approval for the project and associated funding. Rules are developed by CAA under contract to the Ministry of Transport.

� CFZs are a New Zealand specific type of airspace which means that overseas pilots operating here would not be familiar with them and that NZ pilots used to using them would not have these when operating overseas.

� Establishment of multiple CFZs require additional aviation radio frequency allocation, which lowers available aviation radio spectrum.

� The large number of frequencies raise human factors issues if pilots continually need to change frequencies.

� The volume of CFZs and associated frequencies would be difficult to clearly put on visual navigation charts and may increase clutter.

� A CFZ has no single monitoring agency and thus no alerting or emergency response.

Nowhere did he mention flight safety.

Ninety seven submissions were received. Sixty five were in favour of the Massey CFZ proposal; 18 favoured the CAA FISCOM proposal; 14 suggested alternatives.

Most submissions supporting the CFZ proposal noted widespread confusion about which frequency to use (especially with 119.1, the nationally accepted frequency in uncontrolled airspace) and when to use FISCOM.

The CFZ proposal was accepted as simple and easy for a pilot to understand.

The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) submission stated that “we need a plan that increases safety and decreases the likelihood of two aircraft in Class G airspace on different radio frequencies.”

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FISCOM was acknowledged as needed for flight information, NOTAM and weather. Several submissions mentioned that general aviation pilots seldom operate above 3000 feet - perhaps we could use a CFZ below a certain height and FISCOM above it?

The General Aviation Advocacy group provided a range of replies from supporters and submitted that CFZs should be legitimised, CFZs extended to cover areas of hazard and FISCOM handled as a separate issue.

Major representative bodies supporting the CFZ proposal included AOPA, Canterbury Aero Club, Nelson Aviation College, NZ Agricultural Aviation Association, NZ Helicopter Association, the Recreational Aircraft Association of NZ and the RNZAF (Ohakea).

The CAA went on to discuss radio frequency use at three flight instructor seminars. Feedback showed a wide disparity in views and mixed support for either CFZ or FISCOM. However, one key message was that inappropriate and unnecessary radio chatter on 119.1 was increasing and was a safety concern.

Subsequent correspondence with the CAA indicated that neither the Massey CFZ proposal nor the CAA FISCOM proposal would be looked at again until the 2014-2016 National Airspace Review Plan was completed. Then Airways extended the timescale for its its PBN implementation plan and the National Airspace Review was “re-titled” to the 2015-2018 Airspace Review Plan.

Since then, piecemeal additions have been made to Common Frequency Zones.

The CAA insists that the primary means of avoiding mid-air encounters is a good lookout. Some who oppose the CFZ concept argue that too much time is spent looking at in-cockpit aids such as EFIS. Both points of view are to some extent valid. However, the continuing introduction of more accurate navigation aids in the most basic of light aircraft means that they are much more likely to be following the same path, which increases the risk of close and opposing proximity. This is a factor long ago recognised by air traffic controllers and the designers of airways. Those inherent risks are now rapidly moving to a lower level of aviation, and must be addressed by implementing discrete localised radio frequencies that unambiguously assist VFR pilots to maintain their awareness of other traffic.

In short, 20 years since this hazard was recognised, it has still not been coherently addressed and a widespread flight safety hazard remains.

Another deadly air-to-air collision may eventually focus the minds of bureaucrats and politicians. But is it really necessary to suffer more fatalities to achieve a definitive solution?

We submit that the CAA, despite all the evidence showing a clear and present danger, is guilty of neglecting its duty to improve flight safety in this respect by not overriding Airways Corporation’s work on airspace revision and insisting that CFZ development take priority.

Related information

The timeline covering this subject can be found here:

http://www.caa.gen.nz/cfz-network-ga-won-caa-denies-safer-place-fly/

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The lack of an independent, confidential incident reporting system

The Authority refuses to consider an independent, confidential, no-blame incident reporting system. It relies on outdated research stating that such a body would not be cost-effective and it ignores all the potential benefits in terms of safety, proven over decades elsewhere in the world. The result is a general reluctance to report incidents, because of the risk that an informant could face prosecution. This can only have a detrimental effect on operational safety, as well as an erosion of trust in the CAA.

Among developed countries, NZ stands alone in lacking such a system.

After the 2003 fatal Air Adventures accident on the approach to Christchurch Airport, the Coroner made the following recommendation:

That consideration be given to the feasibility and desirability of establishing an independent confidential air safety incident reporting system in New Zealand, taking account of previous difficulties with the system known as Icarus, and/or an Office of Aviation Ombudsman.

The Ministry’s response was to identify “a gap” in previous research. It said that a cost-benefit analysis had not been conducted. Such an analysis was completed, and it concluded that the cost-benefit of a stand-alone CIRS would be marginal.

And so New Zealand remains without a confidential incident reporting system, purely on the basis of it being “cost-marginal” in the eyes of office-bound bureaucrats with little or no aviation experience. The CAA acquiesced in this, saying in effect that costs are more important than safety. (This may also partly explain why so many incident reports are allegedly going unanswered, as highlighted in Part 4 of the GAA Independent Client Satisfaction Survey of the NZ CAA.)

The GAA’s survey of the CAA, conducted from December 2017 to February 2018, revealed a disturbing reluctance to provide safety related reports, often because of a fear of prosecution or retribution by CAA personnel.

In the survey, CAA customers were asked:

On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is "very unlikely" and 10 is "very likely", how likely would you be to make a voluntary safety report (e.g. alert the CAA in the case of non-compliance with regulatory obligations) in situations of material non-compliance with safety regulations?

Respondents returned a negative score of 4.5. Comments included:

Not while there is a threat of prosecution under the Health & Safety Act

I reported a near miss I had with a drone which was potentially fatal, but sadly not even an acknowledgement of the report filed – so why bother?

CAA and the NZ Police need to understand Just Culture, not just pay lip service to it. Absolutely no way would I file a safety report. Who would trust what the CAA might do with it?

The survey asked: On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is “very dissatisfied” and 10 is “very satisfied”, how satisfied were you with the response to your safety report?

The score was 3 out of 10.

No response to 3 reports. CAA’s own SMS material suggests that it’s vital for an effective reporting system to provide feedback to those who input into it, yet they fail to follow what they expect operators to do

Very dissatisfied – my 005 which involved a near-collision was “lost” in the system

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My CA005 had no reply and no outcome. My ARC also has had no outcome

Never had any feedback on multiple CA005 reports

In the past, I have made such reports and even phoned directly. In one of those, we ended up in an “I told you so” situation with a double fatality after CAA ignored our concerns

The survey sought to determine the level of support for a voluntary incident reporting system run by an independent organisation such as the Transport Accident Investigation Commission. More than 80% were in favour, and 90% thought it should be non-punitive and protect the sources of information.

Many years ago, the US regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), realised that its regulatory and enforcement roles would discourage the aviation community from trusting and using its new safety-reporting programme if the FAA operated it. The FAA asked the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to act as the highly respected, independent third party to administer the programme and fulfil the role of honest broker, attending to the interests of both sides. NASA, a research organisation with no regulatory or enforcement role, saw a unique opportunity to enhance its research capability through access to the human factors data generated by this new system.

The ASRS has been emulated by aviation systems worldwide and is being modelled in industries outside aviation.

Our CAA fully understands the incident reporting problem, but refuses to do anything about it.

The GAA submits that action is now urgently required.

Related information

Annex : Background document – The case for a confidential aviation reporting system

The GAA Independent Client Satisfaction Survey of the NZ CAA – Part 4

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Reliability

Breaches of privacy and confidentiality

There have been several egregious breaches of privacy involving the CAA. In one, medical records were revealed to the wrong person.

Far more seriously, the name of an informant was revealed to a defendant who, it was subsequently discovered, had criminal convictions including one for firearms offences. This left the informant and his family in fear for their property and their personal safety. Despite strenuous efforts by the GAA, the Authority declined to offer a plausible explanation for the informant’s unredacted letter having fallen into the hands of the defendant, and claimed that evidential records relating to the case could not be found.

In another, the name of an informant was revealed to the defendant, who telephoned the whistle-blower in an attempt to get him to change his testimony. The informant has a senior position in an important and sensitive public service.

The GAA holds a record of the communications between itself and the CAA on the two most serious incidents, and can provide it on request.

We could speculate endlessly about these troubling matters, but what is beyond doubt is that the CAA’s inability to explain itself satisfactorily (and even admitting to having lost its own records while apparently making no demonstrable attempt to trace those sent to the Crown Solicitor) suggests it cannot manage these issues with any guarantee of confidentiality or diligence.

We mention the Crown Solicitor’s Office because it must have been involved in the transmission of information, supplied to it by the CAA, which ended up in the hands of defendants in both the serious cases we describe.

Prosecutions, infringement notices and withdrawn fines

The Authority has been responsible for errors and ill-advised legal action.

For example:

Despite having a range of alternative resolutions and in the face of significant public opposition, the CAA prosecuted Dave Armstrong of Kaikoura Helicopters for what later emerged to be a paperwork breach of the rules committed while he conducted a rescue operation that saved the life of an injured man.

This prosecution inflicted serious damage on the Authority’s public image. It was so severe that the defendant’s legal costs were met by public subscription, and even the sentencing judge appeared to feel awkward about the case. The prosecution was, in many people’s opinion, quite unnecessary.

http://www.stuff.co.nz/sunday-star-times/latest-edition/latest-news/73230436/Judith-Collins-v-Phil-Goff-CAA-leaves-turbulence-in-its-wake

Armstrong’s conviction achieved nothing. The Director had been repeatedly warned, but he nevertheless badly misread the public mood.

In the case of the Wellington Airport runway extension and its proposed safety run-off distance, the Director was found, on appeal, to have acted wrongly.

http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/87647482/CAA-must-review-safety-areas-at-Wellington-Airport-Court-of-Appeal-rules

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The company Heli-logging was given leave to appeal against a CAA decision that effectively grounded its operations and put it into bankruptcy. There are grave concerns regarding the evidence provided by the CAA in this case, as well as what may amount to perjury by a former Flight Operations Inspector who claimed in an affidavit qualifications he did not hold, ostensibly as a means of reinforcing the credibility of his evidence against the company.

http://www.stuff.co.nz/taranaki-daily-news/news/93425533/Court-of-Appeal-allows-fraud-case-against-Civil-Aviation-Authority-to-go-ahead

If civil action is successful, the penalties could have a significant impact on public finances.

Needlessly aggressive enforcement

The matter of reporting aircraft operating statistics to the CAA is significant because it encompasses and illustrates several CAA failures:

• A flawed methodology that led to a bad regulation. The statistics derived from such reports only cover about two thirds of aircraft operating in the New Zealand system

• An inequitable set of punishments that do not match the offence of late- or non-reporting

• A example of the CAA’s heavy-handed methods of dealing with customers, revealed by the way it issued infringement notices and fines

• Mishandling of the resulting client push-back, which damaged the CAA’s public image

Under Rules Parts 12 and 19, operators are required to provide quarterly operating statistics for each of their aircraft. The CAA claims that these statistics are an important component of its policy to improve aviation safety, but the Authority has not explained why or how they are used. There is a suspicion within the industry that these statistics are more important for revenue-gathering than they are for safety.

Of the New Zealand aviation fleet, 32% (1449) of registered aircraft are not included in the requirement for operators to file activity reports because their machines fall outside having a standard or restricted category airworthiness certificate. These are mostly microlight aircraft, which not only account for a rapidly increasing part of the overall national fleet (in fact, microlight aircraft are the most rapidly expanding type of small aeroplane in use throughout the world). Such ultralight aircraft are also increasingly being used for ab initio flight training. If ever there was a need to more closely monitor flight training aeroplanes in particular, the microlight sector is the obvious place to examine.

Bewildering as it might seem, no statistics on microlight activity are required or gathered by the CAA.

This means that, for many years, the Authority has been presenting a statistically inaccurate (and therefore virtually worthless) picture of general aviation activity. So it is very difficult to understand how its statistics can be used to enhance aviation safety.

Failure to observe the deadlines for reporting can incur a fine, per aircraft, of $1500 for commercial operators and $250 for private operators. These penalties were proposed by the CAA’s authors when they wrote the draft regulation and presented it for government approval.

It is accepted that government ministers are compelled to be multi-taskers, that they cannot be expected to have an in-depth knowledge of their portfolios and instead must heavily rely on expert advisors, whenever they make regulatory decisions.

We can therefore partially forgive the Minister of Transport at the time for not closely examining the penalties for non-compliance in this matter, and not asking why a private operator should be fined $250 while a commercial operator should pay $1500 for committing precisely the same offence.

Neither did that minister carefully consider the severity of the misdemeanor, which in the view of any reasonable person cannot be judged as more serious than a parking ticket (since the CAA has never explained what hazard to public safety might result from failure to supply the paperwork on time).

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Now, when challenged about the level of fines, the CAA says that this is a matter for ministers because it was their decision, and/or the legislation was signed as an Order in Council. Not our problem, they say, whenever a piece of faulty legislation is exposed. Yet they were the original authors of it. Early in 2018, the Manager – Regulatory Investigations Unit (Acting) began issuing infringement notices to commercial operators who had failed to provide operating statistics on time. In one case reported to the GAA, an operator was served with a fine of $6000. These notices and fines resulted in an outcry from victims, some of whom told the GAA that the CAA had failed to send out its usual reminders. More than one alleged that the failure to issue reminders had been deliberate:

“Dear Mr Harris

Thank you for your reply.

From my personal experience both as Treasurer of the FlyDC3 Inc and as a private owner I can vouch that no requests for data were received in 2017, no reminder received and no warning of a possible infringement notice. Had any one of these occurred they would have been actioned immediately as there is no unwillingness to provide the data on any of our part. I can also advise that if this change in approach was, as you contend, “… widely advised to the sector…” then how is it that we were unaware of it until this year? On a personal basis there has been no reminder sent to file a return despite them now being overdue. Is it your intention to fine me and others for this breach?”

“I have received an infringement notice of $3000 which is a gross injustice for a small statistical oversight, an oversight that I don’t make a habit of, I make every attempt to comply with every current and new rule as it is incorporated. I was not asked for this information so did not supply it to you.”

And from the largest industry body, Aviation New Zealand, in a newsletter to its members:

“Disappointing to learn this week that CAA is not accepting some reasons for the late return of statistics, is reaffirming the notice and telling companies that they can deny liability and seek a court hearing or admit liability but seek to have the Court consider written submissions as to penalty or otherwise. Formal advice too from CAA that they won’t be issuing reminders that these returns are due. This seems draconian advice and there appear to be some issues with what you might consider fair and just process. We’ll be taking this further. Please make sure you copy these formal responses from CAA to us.”

We have other messages that say more or less the same. The notices and fines arrived as a bombshell.

Aviation NZ and the GAA took the matter up with the CAA Director, who suddenly issued an amnesty offering 14 days grace for supply of information, cancelling the fines and suspending action against the second tranche of alleged offenders – the private operators, whose deadline fell a little later than that for commercial operators. Private operators were evidently next in the firing line.

The Director, in one email we have on record, referred to recidivists who regularly failed to meet the deadline, inferring that the intention was to clamp down on them and that his amnesty had achieved the desired result.

However, the claim that this was a focused approach seems disingenuous. Rather, it looks more like a scatter-gun attack. The GAA has a letter of withdrawal of notice and fine, sent before the amnesty, which states that the intended punishment would be dropped in view of the victim’s previous good record.

On 18 March - long after the amnesty had expired - the CAA’s Chief Legal Counsel answered a letter from the GAA sent on 10 February. He said that reminder letters had been sent on two occasions. Not one of our complainants says that any reminder was received. In fact, the lack of a reminder had incensed them almost as much as the threatened fine.

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The GAA believes that the system of aircraft operating statistical reporting is fatally flawed and, if retained, should be amended to include all aircraft on the register. The CAA must also either explain how it uses this data to improve aviation safety, or abandon the requirement.

The GAA believes that the level of fines for non-compliance is unfair, unbalanced and excessive, and should be reduced.

What has occurred here breaches an oft-expressed CAA principle: Any and all action must be proportional to the regulatory risk.

The CAA should have a verifiable system ensuring that the issuance of reminders is timely and guaranteed, on all issues that require a client to respond.

The action of a senior CAA employee was recognised by clients as arrogant, unexpected and unfair. It resulted in further damage to the Authority’s already fragile relationship with them, and it demonstrated yet again the top-level management’s inability to professionally control the CAA’s public image.

Regulation as a substitute for oversight

After the Fox Glacier skydiving tragedy on 4 September 2010, the CAA sought to clamp down on the adventure sector, through its Part 115 legislation introduced in 2012.

It also generated an expensive dispute with an operator who argued that his training flights, including aerobatics, were not adventure flights as the Authority claimed. Facing the implacable might of the CAA, he eventually called it quits. So another small business (and a highly qualified pilot) had found it impossible to make a profit or contribute to our GDP.

The adventure aviation legislation did not prevent multiple fatalities such as the Masterton hot air balloon crash of 2012, caused by the pilot’s drug abuse (undetected by the CAA) and the Fox Glacier helicopter accident of 27 June 2015

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Fox_Glacier_helicopter_crash

which claimed seven lives and is yet to be fully explained.

What we perceive is a state-owned entity preferring regulation and bureaucratic form-filling to regular, on-the-spot, pragmatic oversight, including not only that of CAA clients, but of the CAA personnel who inspect and monitor them.

The CAA appears to lack sufficient personnel with a sufficient level of expertise and maturity to take consistently applied, pre-emptive and balanced action.

Instead, it places ambulances at the bottom of the cliff, manned by box-tickers. If an unfortunate event occurs, the box-tickers can point to fully ticked boxes - and a Blame Culture persists.

This reliance on regulation with an accompanying lack of practical, day-to-day oversight has also recently led to the virtually overnight forced closure of long-established operators, costing them and our economy literally millions of dollars.

Such decisions take only a moment to make, but their reversal can take so long and cost so much that an individual may be left unemployed or the company driven into bankruptcy.

This is not the way to improve our country’s general aviation environment, in terms of better safety or competitiveness. It is also diametrically opposed to the concept of a Just Culture, which is practised far better in other aviation jurisdictions than it is in New Zealand.

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Faulty regulations

The Authority has a habit of trying to place responsibility for flaws in regulation on its Minister, and not the regulation or its authors. It is important to make this distinction.

Our previous two ministers of transport had no aviation experience at all (apart from Gerry Brownlee, who famously breached airport security at Christchurch International Airport).

It should be noted that while ministers sign off regulations for government approval, they do not write them. The CAA and the MoT does that. Flawed or perfect, a law once passed assumes an authority that cannot be owned by the bureaucrat or politician who wrote or approved it.

For example, when we successfully challenged the unlawful wording of a Rule regarding private pilots being able to use the privileges of a lower licence (the Recreational Pilot Licence), we were told that whilst the CAA saw “an anomaly”, the “intent” of the Rule was the Minister’s and not the CAA’s - so its hands were tied.

The CAA, having written the Rule, had it checked by the MoT and signed off by a minister, claimed that technically it had become the Minister of Transport’s rule. The CAA’s legal team wrongly uses the term “intent”. What is critical in legal terms is the “purpose” of the law. That has nothing to do with any minister’s “intent”.

When anomalies or errors in CAA Rules are exposed, it is extremely difficult to have them corrected.

To change a Rule can take many years. As a work-around to the particular licence problem outlined above, we petitioned the Director to use his power of exemption. He said that in these circumstances, he wasn’t able to use the power.

We showed him an exemption that he signed in 2014 to rectify a similar set of circumstances. Confronted with that, he subsequently admitted that we had a point and would “have another look at it”. The exemption was subsequently granted, allowing private pilots to use the privileges of a lower licence – the RPL – without having to apply and pay for another licence (and go through yet another Fit and Proper Person assessment).

Unlawful Advisory Circulars

The CAA issues advisory circulars containing guidance and information about standards, practices, and procedures that the Director considers to be an acceptable means of compliance with the associated rules and legislation.

However, the information in the advisory circular does not replace the requirement for participants (and the CAA) to comply with their obligations under the Civil Aviation Rules, the Civil Aviation Act 1990 and other legislation.

An advisory circular reflects the Director’s view on the rules and legislation. It expresses CAA policy, not the law, on the relevant matter. It is not intended to be definitive.

It is this last sentence that creates considerable difficulty because CAA staff have been shown to treat these ACs as the new Rule. ACs have also been written containing unlawful content, disregarding the actual wording of the Rule – the definitive legislative instrument.

The language used by the CAA in writing ACs is often ambiguous. For example, the CAA confirmed that the update of AC61-20 would reflect the rule as it is written, “i.e. That a CPL with a flight instructor rating, who is exercising RPL privileges, could act as a flight instructor.”

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In using the auxiliary verb “could”, the CAA carelessly introduced an element of ambiguity because whilst a flight instructor “could” act as a flight instructor, it doesn’t necessarily mean that it is lawful for him/her to do so. It would be more clearly defined by saying a CPL with a flight instructor rating, who is exercising RPL privileges, is permitted in accordance with the CARs to act as a flight instructor.

The unlawful wording in the AC delivered incorrect advice to instructors unable to pass a Class 1 medical. The AC has been used as the definitive reference by the CAA licensing unit and this in turn has resulted in the loss of many older and very experienced flight instructors from General Aviation. Had they not been seriously misled, they might have continued flying using the privileges of a PPL or a RPL on a lower class of medical certification.

Whilst a flight instructor exercising the privileges of a RPL or a PPL cannot receive remuneration when acting as PIC, they may be legitimately remunerated for the ground time they spend with their student or a pilot on whom they are carrying out a proficiency test.

This would normally include the time spent on a pre-flight briefing before an exercise, pre-flight inspection of the aircraft, and post-flight analysis of the training exercise or a flight check such as a BFR. The time spent on the ground will often exceed that spent in the air and it is appropriate that a flight instructor be remunerated for his/her time if he/she so wishes. Not all instructors may wish to make a charge for their time. Some may prefer to carry out training or checking on a pro bono basis as a way of giving something back to the GA sector, in the same way that some lawyers volunteer their time and expertise on a similar basis.

AC61-20 states under General:

However, the information in the advisory circular does not replace the requirement for participants to comply with their obligations under the Civil Aviation Rules and the Civil Aviation Act 1990 and other legislation.

The Director and his staff are equally bound by the Rules and the Act.

AC61-20 went beyond its purpose of expressing the CAA’s view of an acceptable means of compliance. For the RPL, it attempted to negate some Rules and to give misinformation on others. AC61-20 purported to decree that Rule 61.41 did not apply to a Recreational Pilot Licence (RPL). Consequently, this required CPL and ATPL holders to apply for a RPL instead of allowing them to exercise the privileges of a lower licence.

This was another serious error that amounted to an unlawful instrument. The error has since been corrected, as a result of GAA action.

The misuse of the Official Information Act and the Privacy Act

The CAA’s resort to what we believe to be misuse of the Official Information Act and the Privacy Act is so regular that it appears to be almost a reflex action when the Authority is faced with even the most benign enquiry. This is a delaying tactic that is useful in discouraging investigation or complaint, and it is becoming common practice among bureaucrats internationally.

The international advocacy group Reporters Without Borders issued a report blaming state secrecy for reducing New Zealand to number 13 in the 2017 World Press Freedom index. It was number five in 2016.

Given the CAA’s record of dealing with the GAA, we’re happy to support a highly respected international and United Nations-recognised organisation’s claim that New Zealand legislation intended to increase transparency is being misused to make it more opaque.

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Failure to honour Service Charter obligations

There is a persistent failure on the part of CAA personnel to observe the Authority’s service charter, and in particular the obligations relating to correspondence.

Despite the Director’s reassurances, the 10-day acknowledgement of receipt rule is regularly breached; there appears to be a policy of not providing a definitive response until the last day of the 20-working-day deadline; and in the worst cases, no response is forthcoming.

AOCs and SMS: A worrying picture of systemic CAA inconsistency

A report released in November 2017 stated that inconsistent actions and conflicting demands by CAA officials are causing confusion and stress, wasting time and costing the CAA and its customers thousands of dollars.

In a 5000-word document sent to CAA Director Graeme Harris, exposition-writing consultants Walter Wagtendonk and Ian Wood highlighted – and rejected – the behaviour of some CAA personnel who assess Air Operator Certification applications and Safety Management Systems.

The report revealed:

� Questionable interpretation of Rules

� Discrepancies in requirements and assessments by one official versus others

� Wasteful comments and demands “that can only be described as nitpicking”

� Tendency of some officials to enforce their own opinions

� Disregard for the need to use scaling when dealing with small operators.

One inspector disputed the use of only odd numbers in an exposition’s paragraphs, saying it would confuse readers – despite the fact that the authors were correctly following the CAA’s own numbering convention when it writes Civil Aviation Rules.

Another objected to a Flight and Duty time scheme, saying it was incorrect with regard to night operations – despite the fact that the applicant company operates only during the day, under Visual Flight Rules.

The report lists numerous occasions where one inspector’s assessment differed from another’s. One official made three adverse comments in his critique of ‘Becoming aware of a hazard’, while another noted “Very good” on the same text.

Some demands are described by Wagtendonk and Wood as “How long is a piece of string?” Others are said to be impracticable and indicating unfamiliarity with the most basic knowledge of aviation.

They say CAA officials are wasting everyone’s time with silly questions such as how a fuel tank dipstick is to be used, should steps be specified for fuelling a low-wing light aircraft, and whether ‘must’ should be used instead of ‘may’.

“The associated CAA fees at the rate of almost $300 an hour are a waste of money,” the report says.

There is evidence that officials are enforcing their own opinions. In one absurd incident, a CAA employee demanded the removal of “Chief Engineer” from a flowchart textbox, which could have led to an unworkable maintenance situation for the operator.

In another, a husband and wife company operating one helicopter had their training syllabus rejected and replaced with demands that were “excessive and totally beyond the requirements”. But an identical training syllabus had been approved without query for another small operator only weeks earlier.

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The authors say: “On a number of occasions, the CAA has stressed the need for scaling when designing SMS for small operators. As consultant writers, we have tried to comply with that logic; but instead of simplification, most of the CAA officials we have dealt with presented us with numerous items that added to the expositions.

“There is a need for inspectors to realise that we are not dealing with Boeing 747s on intercontinental operations. The vast majority are two- and three-person operations where communication is an everyday occurrence, where training doesn’t have to match intricate airline and IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) aspects, where change is discussed and agreed upon without having to spell it out in detail and where supervision by the CEO or Operations Manager is part of daily habit.”

The report says there is sufficient evidence to show that the CAA needs to improve staff compliance with its own rules and operating principles.

If the examples had applied to GA operators, they would have been designated as ‘findings’ during audits and if non-compliance was ongoing, the AOC would be withdrawn (as recently evidenced by a number of grounded companies).

“The report has identified a number of failures which, in many instances, can be put down to lack of supervision by senior management and the apparent freedom for lower-level officials to express personal opinions and interpretations, and insist on compliance with them.

“The best response would be an acceptance of the need to rein in those officials who are over-zealous in their critiques or make demands that far outstrip those applicable to small organisations. It must be ensured they thoroughly understand the meaning of ‘scaling’. This requires firm control by management. If that is not forthcoming, the outlook for cooperation and progress is bleak.”

The General Aviation Advocacy Group of New Zealand says there must be ‘One CAA’; in this case a single, unequivocal policy giving compliance direction in every aspect of AOCs and SMS. There is no place for a plethora of personal opinions from CAA employees dictating what they believe will achieve compliance.

Annex: The Inconsistency Report

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Accountability

Customer satisfaction surveys

In 2012, the CAA chose Colmar Brunton to conduct a “Feel Safe” Confidence Survey of Users (the travelling public), which cost $40,045 of public funds.

There has been no survey of CAA client (system participant) satisfaction since 2003, when the results did not reflect well on the Authority. This may explain its refusal to contemplate another – even after a gap of 15 years.

The GAA found itself in the unusual position of having to conduct a satisfaction survey of the CAA’s clients for the Authority instead, using much of the questionnaire material of the 2003 survey, as well as content from Australia’s CASA surveys in more recent times. Our survey cost little more than $400 (paid for by private donors).

Board chairman Nigel Gould made nebulous reference to improvements in communications but provided no relevant supporting detail. He told National Business Review (September 27 2017) that the CAA has undertaken “an extensive programme on surveillance and audit analysis and the board and management are constantly looking at further means by which the close engagement within the sector can be further extended”.

That statement is incoherent and meaningless. Mr Gould mentions some vague concept of engagement, but he does not mention his own Authority’s client satisfaction.

The day after Mr Gould’s comment, the CAA launched a Colmar Brunton survey – about its own public communications programme, and whether or not it should use Facebook or Twitter (where messages are limited to between 140 and 280 characters, which is hardly adequate to promulgate CAA information in any detail).

The CAA’s stance regarding customer satisfaction surveys is also in stark contrast to that of other government departments and agencies.

Refer to: The GAA Independent Client Satisfaction Survey of the NZ CAA – the CASA connection, and Background to the survey

Annex: GAA letter to Nigel Gould regarding a client satisfaction survey Nigel Gould’s reply

Consultation

The CAA relies on government guidelines in relation to consultation periods, even though many of the aviation subjects being “consulted” about are exceptionally complex. Often, the time allowed is seriously inadequate. There have also been instances where the consultation period included Christmas holidays, effectively reducing many people’s ability to be involved by two weeks, and sometimes more.

To be fair, the Authority has on occasion extended a period of consultation, but usually as the result of protest.

The CAA finds it easy to run annual safety seminars at provincial centres, but it confines consultation meetings on more important matters to the larger towns and cities. This means, for example, that an operator in Gisborne may find the nearest discussion about CAA pricing proposals is taking place in Palmerston North, or someone in Hokitika must travel to Christchurch (and often on an impossible working day or at a difficult hour).

They are thus effectively disenfranchised.

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http://www.caa.gen.nz/pilot-caa-radio-check-caa-pilot-unreadable/

This does not sit comfortably alongside Mr Gould’s claim of close engagement with the sector.

The CAA has been repeatedly told about this problem but has declined to do anything about it, citing prohibitive costs. Money is apparently no problem with the safety seminars, whose free beer and sausage rolls afterwards are legendary, and budgeted-for.

One recent exception to the pattern of exclusion from face-to-face consultation has been the seminars covering New Southern Skies, the blueprint for airspace reform to be introduced in New Zealand. This is a critical issue for all aviators in New Zealand, but when the original schedule of seminars was published, it did not include Hawke’s Bay and the East Coast of the North Island. Following an objection by the GAA, and in co-operation with us and local aviation interests, the CAA staged a well-attended seminar at Hastings.

Lack of consultation over the allocation of airspace

The GAA received an email from a group of aviators based in Northland who were concerned about the CAA’s issuing of a large swathe of airspace, which had been reclassified from class G airspace to restricted airspace active via NOTAM, to a private company for the purpose of UAV (drone) testing. The area covered almost all of the scenic and historic Hokianga Harbour, along with extensive coastline north of the harbour entrance and enormous areas of the Hokianga hinterland. The area has been designated NZR191 and has vertical limits extending to 3,000 ft.

The CAA’s document, Guidelines for the establishment of temporary restricted airspace, June 2013, section 6.2, states the following:

“There is no justification to designate airspace where an applicant may gain a commercial advantage.”

In contrast to this CAA guideline, the granting of the whole of the harbour and surrounds, to an altitude of 3000 feet, is clearly more to do with what the administering authority, Paua Interface Ltd, actually wants to use NZR191 for. The perception is that it wishes to charge individuals and companies (New Zealand-based as well as overseas interests) to come use ‘their’ airspace for trialling and developing drone technology while the company, as the administering authority, stands to gain financially as a result. This is obvious when you visit the Paua Interface Ltd website. The site, labelled “Incredible Skies Project’, blatantly promotes its operation as commercial in making use of NZR191. The website promotion states:

874 sq km / 543 sq miles uncongested airspace in New Zealand

for BVLOS UAV trials

End-to-end trial and logistical support, certifications and permissions. Open to local & global companies. Progressive regulatory environment. Political and economical stability. Environmentally responsible operations. Stunning location with variable terrain. Dunes. Ocean. Harbour. Native and

exotic forests. Farmland. Starry night vista. No smog. No tourists. World Bank 2017 select NZ as best place to do business!

Its banner headline on that website clearly states: “commercial drone services”.

In a letter of 18 December 2017, the GAA asked the CAA:

Was consultation carried out with Northland pilots and operators before this restricted airspace was granted to a commercial company, if so who with and by what means?

The Deputy Director Aviation Infrastructure & Personnel replied:

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It has been established that no direct formal consultation was carried out by the CAA with Northland pilots and operators before NZR191 was granted to Paua Interface Ltd, although the applicant did note that they consulted with three local aerodromes in their application. Internal enquiries within the CAA did not identify any known significant other aviation activity taking place in the area. Notwithstanding that point however, the CAA assessment is that this does not meet the processes outlined in Civil Aviation Rule Part 71, Designation and Classification of Airspace, nor the processes set out in relevant internal CAA policy and procedure documents relating to airspace decision making. This situation is unacceptable from my perspective and I have advised the Director of Civil Aviation of the matter for his full awareness. The CAA intends to use this as a learning opportunity and will ensure that any future applications for designations of restricted airspace are processed in accordance with Civil Aviation Rule requirements and relevant CAA policies and procedures. I will also be seeking a report on the specific actions involved before a decision was made on this particular matter. As I have outlined above, regulatory decision making of this nature without an appropriate level of consultation is not considered acceptable.

This was, in short, a serious lapse in governance.

Customer complaints

There is no customer complaints department within the CAA, and no complaints entity with independent and direct access to the board. Such an entity is fundamental to a ‘Just Culture’, which is expected from an internationally accredited State body.

If it existed, it might be overwhelmed.

Australia has an independent aviation complaints authority, whereas in New Zealand, we only have recourse to the Ombudsman, the Privacy Commissioner and the District Court.

The handling of complaints emerged as a particular concern in the recent GAA survey of CAA clients in general aviation. In terms of dealing efficiently with clients, the Authority was ranked at just over 3 out of 10.

Asked if New Zealand’s aviation system would benefit from having an independent aviation complaints authority, the result was a 97.55% vote in favour. Respondents also heavily supported the introduction of a Civil Aviation Authority Industry Complaints Commissioner (ICC) reporting directly to the Board.

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Affordability

Fees and charges

The CAA’s 2012 fees review introduced a number of dramatic increases, as well as new fees. One was a medical application fee of more than $300. This hugely increased costs for private pilots (particularly the over-40s who had to pay an additional $600-plus per year) and is believed to have been the major factor in the swift departure of more than 1200 private pilots from the register.

It was a major loss, and we firmly place the blame on the CAA.

Many aviators opted for a recreational pilot licence or microlight licence, with their less onerous medical requirements. Others quit flying altogether.

During this time, authorities in the USA and the UK were in the process of scrapping PPL medical requirements altogether. Only now is the NZ CAA considering the abolition of Class 2 medicals, conducting its own research (a version of reinventing the wheel) and apparently ignoring overseas experience.

In 2012, the CAA and the Treasury strongly rejected the GAA’s claim before the Regulations Review Committee that there was an element of public good in the pilot medical regime. We argued that aviation medicals also benefited the public, and therefore the full cost of them should not fall upon the aviator.

Three years later, the CAA admitted that a public good existed, and “reduced” the application fee. In the meantime, pilots had either paid this fee, or rejected it and taken lesser privileges, or quit flying. Some of these departures included experienced flight instructors.

Further investigation by the GAA and others established that, due to a sleight of hand, the real cost of the application fee had not been reduced. It had, in fact, increased in real terms.

The CAA’s 2012 fee increases caused serious damage to aero clubs and flight training (in some cases such as New Plymouth, it was fatal) and to private aviation across the board.

http://www.stuff.co.nz/taranaki-daily-news/news/8655599/Ailing-aero-club-finally-gives-up-the-struggle

That was not the only cost-related problem that befell general aviation.

Around 2010/11, the CAA withdrew funding for Metflight aviation weather services. In August 2011, MetService introduced an annual fee to general aviators, including recreational pilots. This resulted in a dramatic fall in Metflight usage (with its implied safety implications). In 2014, MetService increased the annual fee by 4%, bringing it to more than $100. This led to a further decline in use.

More than four years after the original blunder, MetService dropped all charges to private GA operators because its user-pays service model had failed. All the while, boaties had continued to get their marine forecasts free of charge, an anomaly the then Minister of Transport, Gerry Brownlee, could not or would not justify.

We noted that there are far more floating voters than flying ones.

http://www.caa.gen.nz/the-efb-state-of-the-art-metservice-state-of-the-archaic/

http://www.caa.gen.nz/revealed-pilots-pay-weather-forecasts/

http://www.caa.gen.nz/metflight-ga-free-celebrate-step-safer-flying/

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The root cause of this needless problem was the CAA Director’s decision to withdraw MetService funding for GA weather forecasts. Why did the Minister of Transport, his ministry, MetService and the CAA never address loud and legitimate complaints until the User Pays model crashed? The short answer is that they all ignored the problem until the disuse of MetFlight made it unsustainable and embarrassing. The U-turn had nothing whatever to do with general aviation safety. It was more concerned with pursuing the User Pays doctrine.

Transport Minister Gerry Brownlee, the CAA Director Graeme Harris and the management of MetService were jointly responsible for that debacle.

In its latest funding review, the CAA has introduced a new set of levies on commercial aviation, and in particular the agriculture and tourism sectors. These levies are driven by a Treasury-led, user-pays doctrine that is anomalous to civil aviation. They are a tax on commercial general aviation, with government-owned enterprises getting a reduction in charges, in real terms.

They further adversely affect our industry’s competitiveness with Australia in particular, where the CASA funding model is radically different and, in our view, fairer to everyone.

The Authority’s charge-out rate – even for the most basic clerical functions – for full cost recovery now stands at more than $400 an hour. Its 2017 actual hourly rate is $284 inclusive of GST, and is charged for even the most lowly clerical work. This is widely regarded as grossly excessive.

In December 2016, a Part 115 operator queried a CAA invoice for processing a change of address notification. The operator had moved from one hangar at Ardmore to another on the same airfield.

He was charged $355 for a simple amendment to the address shown on his Part 115 Adventure Aviation Certificate.

Related information:

http://www.caa.gen.nz/youve-changed-address-my-my-rocket-science/

The CAA hourly rate is far in excess of what is charged by comparable aviation authorities in Australia or the United Kingdom, for example. The CAA seems unable or unwilling to explain why its charges are so high, apart from repeating the User Pays mantra.

Refer also to: GAA Independent Client Satisfaction Survey of the NZ CAA, Part 1

Efficiency and cost-reduction failures

In August 2014, the GAA sought information from the CAA to ascertain what progress the CAA had made over the previous two and a half years to achieve economies and efficiencies outlined in the Martin Jenkins Value for Money Review of 28 February 2011.

The questions fell under the following headings:

CAA funding Medical Certification processes Personnel licensing Data capture Finance and HR Systems Consultancy Certification Hourly charge-out rate Employee remuneration

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The CAA replied:

“Because of the scope of the information covered by your request, it will be necessary to impose a charge for making the information available to you. The CAA charges are consistent with the Ministry of Justice’s Charging Guidelines for Official Information Act 1982 Requests.

We estimate that it will take 40 hours to process your request. The standard charge imposed for Official Information requests by the CAA, in accordance with the Ministry’s “Charging Guidelines” is $76.00 per hour; this puts the total estimated amount to be charged at $3,040.00.

Under section 15(3) of the Act, the CAA requires 50% of the estimated charge to be paid in advance, with the balance payable on invoice once the final charge has been calculated.

We would be grateful if you could confirm that you are willing to pay these charges. If you do not wish to pay, your request will be declined under section 18(f) of the Act on the basis that it will require substantial collation and research.”

The CAA clearly does not monitor itself particularly well. It also apparently expects private individuals to pay the Authority to research itself.

After five years of observation and enquiries, the GAA can find no significant evidence of either cost-saving or efficiency improvements at the CAA.

It is time to call the Authority to account, in detail, for this. At the very least, a repeat of the Martin Jenkins exercise is now overdue.

CAA relocation

A case of failure to control costs, which we have investigated, relates to the relocation of the CAA offices from the comparatively low rent district of Petone to prime real estate in the heart of the Wellington CBD.

In October 2007, with leases on its premises due to expire and space constraints being experienced (due no doubt to an expanding bureaucracy), the CAA began a process to determine its accommodation options. In August 2008, the Authority made a decision to lease space in a building under construction at 55 Featherston St, Wellington. This project would culminate in the CAA moving out of its premises in a previously converted warehouse in January 2011 to the central Wellington location to “provide a more productive and efficient work environment”.

At the time of the decision by the CAA Board and the Director, a Labour-led government was in power. In true “Yes Minister” style, where the tail wags the dog, the Minister of Transport (Annette King) signed off on it.

None of the CAA board members at that time are on the current board. The Director of the CAA at the time was Steve Douglas, who also departed subsequent to implementing the decision to relocate.

So, in essence, all the major players made an expensive decision to relocate, then bailed out before the repercussions occurred, or in the vernacular, the brown stuff hit the fan. Similarities exist in the way former Prime Minister Dame Jenny Shipley and other independent directors resigned from the Mainzeal board, one day before the company was placed in receivership.

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Minister not impressed with CAA relocation costs Thursday, 30 April 2009, 3:01pm Press Release: New Zealand Government

Hon Steven Joyce Minister of Transport

Transport Minister Steven Joyce says he is “not at all impressed” with the $8.5 million cost for the Civil Aviation Authority to move from its current Petone location to a new, multi-storied building in downtown Wellington.

The rental costs in the new building will be considerably higher on a per square metre basis than the CAA’s current facilities in Petone.

The decision to relocate was made last year, prior to the general election, and was supported by the then Transport Minister Annette King.

The move is scheduled for the end of next year.

“I am not impressed that these costs are being incurred to this level and at this time when New Zealanders are having to tighten their belts in the current global economic recession,” says Mr Joyce.

About 90% of CAA revenue comes from industry fees and charges, including the domestic passenger levy.

Mr Joyce says he has made his views on this matter very clear to the Civil Aviation Authority.

“I have tested the options to amend or not go through with this move over a period of time with the Chair of the CAA. Unfortunately commitments were made with the support of the previous government that are unable to be changed.

“The CAA has assured me that everything possible will be done to contain costs going forward from here.”

ONE News discovered that in July 2008, Audit New Zealand questioned whether it was appropriate to use passenger levies to pay for the new buildings. The CAA got around that by paying higher rent over time, instead of a lump sum.

Steven Joyce became a minister later that year, but by then it was already a done deal and they had to carry on or be sued for around $27 million.

"It is the lesser of two evils," said Joyce.

In the 2009-10 Annual Report of the Civil Aviation Authority, section 7.2, there is information regarding the relocation of the CAA. Under the subject heading of identified internal risks, it is stated:

The CAA has exposed itself to financial risk associated with new buildings, fit-out costs, etc., at a time when its revenue flows have diminished.

The way in which the CAA planned to manage those risks was stated as below:

The costs estimated by the CAA for relocation have been rigorously reviewed, managed to reduce costs below its budget, and monitored within the budget set for the relocation. The funding of the ongoing accommodation costs is considered as part of the analysis of future revenues and costs being undertaken as part of the Funding Review mentioned in Safety Levy Revenue risks.

The identified risks from the Safety Revenue were:

That Levies may not be sufficient to finance the required CAA capability in the medium term.

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So, having identified that risk, the CAA then reduced the Safety Levy imposed on the airlines which, incidentally, had the means to recover their costs from passengers should the levy have been raised.

At Petone, the CAA was paying between $146 and $192 per square metre for its two offices. At the Asteron Centre in the CBD, the lease rental was more than $550 per square metre in 2013, and it may have increased since then.

The GAA says that no prudent Board of Directors or CEO of a business would willingly increase the overheads of its business by locking in a rental increase of more than 300% unless:

1. That business was in the privileged position of being a SOE Regulator.

2. The client base of that business was “captive” without any options of taking their business elsewhere should they not wish to accept increases in fees, levies and charges.

3. The only means of objection that “clients” had to increased fees, levies and charges was the daunting prospect, for most people, of laying a complaint using legislative channels such as the Regulations Review Committee, the Office of the Attorney General or by Judicial Review.

Other hidden costs…

Another worrying ‘twist’ in the CAA issue has emerged, in connection with bankers, financiers and lessors to the general aviation industry.

The propensity for CAA personnel to arrive on an operator’s doorstep and - without notice - close the operator down and put him out of business is said to be eroding financiers’ confidence in the industry.

At best, interest rates and fees may escalate to reflect the perceived risk.

This could be another stealthy cost the CAA imposes on general aviation, irresponsibly, with impunity - and probably totally unaware of the indirect damage it might inflict.

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Summary

There are major faults and inadequacies within the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority.

� The CAA Board fails to meet the required standard of governance or provide sufficiently detailed information to the public. The chairman, in particular has adopted an evasive or obstructive manner when confronted with questions, requests of complaints. Yet he oversees a director whose Authority has international obligations

� The Board has been proved incapable of controlling its members, but adept at protecting itself

� The rules governing qualification for board directorship must be revised to specifically exclude persons holding any financial interest in aviation companies or any associated commercial activity

� The Civil Aviation Authority is not providing an adequate service because:

� there has been a serious deterioration in the relationship between the CAA and its GA clients

� the severe increases in CAA charges to GA between 2012 and 2017 have not been matched by improvements in the quality of service – in fact, quite the contrary

� the Authority consistently refuses to follow international best practice relating to safety related incident reporting systems and the demands of a Just Culture

� it cannot be trusted to maintain client confidentiality. The CAA, and perhaps the Crown Solicitor, have betrayed the trust of whistle-blowers on two known occasions, exposing them to threat, and the CAA has failed to adequately explain how this occurred

� the judgement of senior management personnel has been proven faulty in legal cases, to the extent of reducing public confidence in the Regulator

� the CAA cannot simultaneously administer its own safety related regulations and those of the Health and Safety at Work Act. The legal frameworks are different and incompatible. Change is essential. The suicides of two people have been linked to CAA investigations.

� there are numerous claims that the CAA fails to properly monitor its inspectors and auditors

� there is evidence of regulations being misunderstood or misinterpreted by CAA personnel, resulting in the imposition of unlawful or irregular demands and unfair costs on CAA clients, in some instances causing harm to their business and staff

� the misuse of Advisory Circulars has been proved, and it is admitted by the Authority

� the CAA misappropriates the Official Information Act and the Privacy Act, to serve its interests and hinder the exchange of information

� the CAA regularly fails to honour its Service Charter’s commitment to clients

� the CAA refuses to measure its clients’ satisfaction levels, and does not diligently consult them on other important matters

� the CAA has no client complaints procedure and rejects requests to implement one

� the CAA does not deliver value for money. It has the highest hourly charging rate of any authority in the developed world, but offers no justification for this apart from seeking “full cost recovery” under the User Pays mantra

� it can show no statistical evidence of attempting to control costs

� it can show no evidence of having improved efficiency either in human resource management or the introduction of process-based information technology

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Conclusion

The Civil Aviation Authority and the issues we have raised can only be fully and impartially examined through an independent inquiry.

We believe, based on evidence collected over more than five years, that the CAA is dysfunctional in its role as the regulator of General Aviation in this country.

The Authority requires close examination by a panel of unbiased experts, whose findings and recommendations must result in the reform of significant areas of the CAA’s operations and governance.

At the very least, a repetition of the Martin Jenkins Value for Money study is called for, but the issues raised in this report and in the client satisfaction survey that accompanies it extend far beyond finances.

Some materially involve the livelihoods of people working within New Zealand General Aviation, and others affect the safety of aviation operations and the general public.

It might be thought by some that General Aviation in New Zealand is of minor importance to the wider economy, or a playground for wealthy individuals.

Consider this alternative view:

In March 2018, a UK Parliamentary group of 141 MPs and peers expressed concern that General Aviation there is not yet classified as ‘national infrastructure’ and a National Planning Policy Framework has been revised to state that planning policies should “recognise the importance of maintaining a national network of general aviation facilities – taking into account their economic value in serving business, leisure, training and emergency service needs, and the Government’s General Aviation Strategy”.

The same must hold true for New Zealand, albeit on a smaller scale. This country requires a GA strategy and a regulatory authority that recognises GA’s position in the economy (as well as its potential) and works with the industry instead of appearing to obstruct it.

We need a radical change of emphasis from policeman to partnership (and perhaps even a change of name, from Authority to Administration). Bureaucrats cannot make such a change. It can only be imposed from above.

Des Lines and Brian Mackie, GAA co-principals

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About the GAA

The GAA is a voluntary social network for people involved in New Zealand General Aviation. It has more than 2000 registered supporters.

It has no constitution, no formal membership and no fees. It has no income and it seeks no profit. It exists to independently promote and defend GA in New Zealand by monitoring, analysing and publicising aviation issues, challenging authority, and often personally advocating on behalf of “the little people” in our aviation system – many of whom find it hard to confront seemingly powerful bureaucrats.

GAA supporters are concerned about the Civil Aviation Authority – its poorly controlled overheads, its inadequate service levels, its red tape and its escalating fees. Many are worried about CAA policies that threaten general aviation-related businesses and may damage the future of the next generation of amateur and professional aviators.

The GAA aims to encourage constructive dialogue among everyone involved in our nation’s aviation – including bureaucrats, politicians and established aviation organisations.

GAA supporters include:

� Airline pilots of all ranks, based in New Zealand, Australia, and around the world

� Helicopter pilots based in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia

� PPL and RPL holders, and microlight pilots

� Homebuilt aircraft pilots

� Instructors and student pilots

� Balloon pilots and operators

� Glider pilots

� Skydivers and skydive operators

� Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers

� Flight training schools

� Fixed base helicopter operators

� Maintenance organisations, and

� Small commercial aircraft operators

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Annex

SSC report – CAA release

Peter Rhodes letter to Minister of Transport, 24 March 2014

Peter Rhodes letter to the Coroner, 16 June 2014

Background document – The case for a confidential aviation reporting system

AOC applications and SMS implementation plans: Systemic CAA inconsistency – report

GAA letter to Nigel Gould regarding a client satisfaction survey Nigel Gould’s reply

Part-012-Consolidation.pdf

04/12/03 04 DECEMBER 2004 MEDIA RELEASE on behalf of CAA

CAA addresses SSC report findings The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has already taken significant steps to address the issues covered in an independent review of the CAA, released today by Authority Chairman Rodger Fisher. Mr Fisher asked for the State Services Commission (SSC) review following concerns about the way the CAA handled conflicts of interest. The review was conducted by Douglas White QC. “Even before asking for the SSC review I instructed the CAA’s chief legal counsel to review the organisation’s conflict of interest policy and recommend improvements. As a result a new and much clearer conflict of interest policy was developed and was ratified by the Authority in June. “The review acknowledges this and recommends some further enhancements to the policy, which we will adopt. “We also intend to thoroughly review the policies, procedures and practices for special purpose inspections and investigations relating to the suspension of aviation documents and the guidelines for fit and proper person investigations. We will make any necessary changes, consistent with the report’s recommendations.” Mr Fisher said the review also made findings that were critical of decisions made by the Director of Civil Aviation Mr John Jones and of actions by a CAA investigator who has since been dismissed. “These are significant criticisms which the Authority takes very seriously. “We have carefully considered the report in relation to the actions of the Director of Civil Aviation and have taken the following steps:

The Director has received a formal warning. The Director will be required to demonstrate that the Authority’s concerns in

relation to the report’s findings are fully addressed. The Director has been advised of the process to be followed to do this. The Director’s compliance with the Authority’s requirements will be independently

monitored so the Authority may have confidence the requirements are fully met.”

CAA Director John Jones said he accepted the reports findings and the actions taken by the Board. “I acknowledge that I made errors of judgement and will work closely with the Authority to implement the necessary changes and ensure that public confidence in the CAA is retained,” said Mr Jones. Mr Fisher said the issues relating to the former CAA investigator were more serious and as a result of information that came to light through the review, the CAA had already dismissed the person. “The Director and the inspector both committed serious errors of judgement, but this is not what led to the inspector’s dismissal. The inspector was dismissed because he misled both the CAA and the reviewer as to the true extent of his involvement with the company at the centre of the review. The circumstances that led to the CAA’s decision are covered in the report.” The Chairman said he regretted the damage done to the reputation of the CAA but that the public could have confidence in the integrity of the system. “The fact that the CAA called for this review; has released the report; accepts the findings fully and has taken a number of steps already to address the issues shows that we are willing to be accountable for our actions and to examine systems and procedures and make improvements where necessary. “I think the flying public should be greatly reassured by that openness and the willingness to identify shortcomings and put them right,” said Mr Fisher. Contact: Rod Scotts Network Communications (04) 382 6612 027 433 0386 Attachments: 1. Executive Summary of the Report for the State Services Commissioner on Civil Aviation policies, procedures and practices relating to conflicts of interest and conduct of special purpose inspections and investigations by Douglas White, QC. 2. Review Terms of Reference Note: The full report is available online at the State Services Commission website: www.ssc.govt.nz

Attachment 1

REPORT FOR

STATE SERVICES COMMISSIONER ON CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

POLICIES PROCUEDURES AND PRACTICES RELATING TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND

CONDUCT OF SPECIAL PURPOSE INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS

_____________________________________________________

DOUGLAS WHITE QC 28 NOVEMBER 2003

INDEX Section Page 1. Executive summary 3 Conflicts of interest in the CAA 3 Policies, procedures and practices for 4 special purpose inspections and investigations relating to the suspension of aviation documents Other cases investigated 6 Guidelines for fit and proper person 7 investigations following suspension of licence

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conflicts of interest in the CAA

1.1 For the reasons given in section 4 of the report, I have reached the

following conclusions –

• In May 2002 the CAA had no conflict of interest policies or procedures

in place relating to CAA staff other than provisions of the staff

collective employment agreement and individual employment

agreements: paragraphs 4.14 and 4.28-4.29.

• The provisions of the staff collective employment and individual

employment agreements provided some guidance as to the

identification and management of conflicts of interest: paragraphs

4.15-4.17.

• There were several conflicts of interest in the case which gave rise to

the review: paragraphs 4.18-4.27.

• To the extent that the provisions of the investigator’s employment

agreement were appropriate and were followed by the parties, they

were not effective: paragraphs: 4.30-4.36.

• The Director, in the case which gave rise to the review, was wrong to

consider there was no real conflict of interest, erred in giving his

approval to the engagement of the investigator as a part-time

consultant, and the investigation which he later undertook for the

Authority was inadequate: paragraphs 4.30-4.40.

• The CAA’s current policies and procedures for identifying and

managing conflicts of interest are a considerable improvement on the

position in May 2002, but they could be further enhanced in certain

respects: paragraphs: 4.39-4.44.

Policies, procedures and practices for special purpose inspections and

investigations relating to the suspension of aviation documents

1.2 For the reasons given in section 5 of the report, I have reached the

following conclusions –

• The CAA had a number of policies and procedures in place in May

2002 which related to surveillance, spot checks, the suspension of

aviation documents, and investigations: paragraphs 5.3-5.14.

• The policies and procedures were adequate, but could be improved in

certain respects: paragraphs 5.5, 5.7-5.8, 5.10-5.11 and 5.13.

• The CAA had a number of policies and procedures in place in May

2002 which related to “fit and proper person” investigations:

paragraphs 5.16-5.19.

• The policies and procedures were adequate in respect of applications

for or renewals of aviation documents, but did not address all the

issues which are likely to arise when a person’s status was under

review following suspension: paragraphs 5.16-5.20.

1.3 For the reasons given in section 6 of the report, I have reached the

following conclusions –

• The covert spot check of the aviation company in the case which gave

rise to the review complied in general terms with the relevant policies

and procedures, but if devices such as aviation radio frequency

scanners are to be used by CAA investigators the CAA needs to have

a policy relating to them: paragraph 6.2.

• The special purpose audit or inspection of the aviation company dated

3 May 2002 complied with the relevant policies and procedures:

paragraphs 6.3-6.4.

• There were no appropriate or effective policies or procedures in place

in May 2002 relating to the appointment of a person to conduct a “fit

and proper person” investigation of the suspended owner of the

aviation company: paragraphs 6.6-6.8.

• There were no appropriate policies or procedures in place in May 2002

relating to the question of disclosure to the owner’s employer of his

suspension or investigation: paragraph 6.9.

• There were appropriate policies and procedures in place in May 2002

relating to the need to interview the suspended person for the purpose

of the “fit and proper person” investigation, but the policies and

procedures were not effective because they were not followed:

paragraphs 6.10-6.15.

• The CAA failed to comply with s 10(5) of the Civil Aviation Act 1990 in

that the “fit and proper person” report contained information that was or

might have been prejudicial to the suspended owner, but was not

disclosed to him: paragraphs 6.16-6.20.

• There were no policies and procedures in place in May 2002 relating to

negotiations between the CAA and the suspended owner as to his

licence: paragraphs 6.21-6.22.

• The question whether such negotiations should be permitted requires

careful consideration by the CAA: paragraphs 6.23.

Other cases investigated

1.4 For the reasons given in section 7 of the report, I have reached the

following conclusions –

• In one other “fit and proper person” investigation the CAA investigator

had inappropriately disclosed to the pilot’s employer the nature of the

recommendation in his report to the Director which was also

qualitatively deficient: paragraphs 7.2-7.8.

• In another “fit and proper person” investigation the CAA investigator

may have inappropriately disclosed confidential information in the

course of a third party interview and again written a qualitatively

deficient report: paragraphs 7.9-7.14.

• A suggestion that the CAA had a systemic conflict of interest because

it regulated design organisations while it was also itself in the design

modification business and competing for business with organisations

which it regulated did not raise concerns within my terms of reference

because the steps taken by the CAA and Director were authorise by

the current statutory and regulatory framework: paragraphs: 7.18-7.26.

Guidelines for fit and proper person investigations following suspension of

licence

1.5 Section 8 of the report contains suggestions for the purpose of providing

some assistance to the CAA in developing appropriate guidelines for “fit

and proper person” investigations following suspension of the person’s

licence.

Attachment 2

Terms of Reference for Review of Civil Aviation Authority

Introduction

The Civil Aviation Authority ("the CAA") is established under the Civil Aviation Act 1990.

The CAA's principal function is the promotion of safety in civil aviation, at a reasonable cost. In furtherance of that function, the CAA is responsible for, among other things, establishing safety and security standards relating to the civil aviation system, and monitoring adherence to those standards.

The Director of Civil Aviation also has specific statutory functions and powers relating to the control of entry to the civil aviation system through the issue of aviation documents and enforcement of the requirements of the Act which includes monitoring of performance through inspections and audits.

Background to Review

In May 2002, following the conduct of a Special Purpose Inspection and the Director's suspension of aviation documents related to an aviation company, a person employed by the CAA as a Flight Operations Inspector, who was also the Team Leader for the inspection, entered into an agreement with that company to assist it in the preparation of certain manuals necessary to obtain an air operator certificate under the Civil Aviation Act.

The Chairman of the CAA has asked the State Services Commissioner to review the conflicts of interest on the part of the Flight Operations Inspector and/or the CAA. The Chairman's request is made under section 11 of the State Sector Act 1988.

Terms of reference

Conflict of interest

To review and make recommendations regarding:

1 The CAA's internal policies and procedures for identifying and managing conflicts of interest, current in May 2002, with particular regard to:

1.1 whether those procedures adequately identified the conflicts likely to arise in a regulatory and monitoring agency such as the CAA;

1.2 whether there was a conflict of interest in the case in question;

1.3 whether those procedures were appropriate, effective and followed in that case;

1.4 whether the Director acted properly in that case.

2 The adequacy of the CAA's current policies and procedures for identifying and managing conflicts of interest.

Special Purpose Inspections and Investigations

To review and make recommendations regarding:

3 The adequacy of CAA's internal practices, including policies and procedures, for the conduct of:

3.1 Special Purpose Inspections, and

3.2 investigations relating to the suspension of aviation documents,

3.3 with regard to the case in question or to any other case that may be drawn to the reviewer's attention.

4 Whether those internal practices, policies and procedures relating to the conduct of Special Purpose Inspections, and investigations relating to the suspension of aviation documents were appropriate, effective and followed in the case in question.

General

5 Any other matter concerning the CAA, including the Board, the Director or the employees of the CAA that the reviewer considers relevant to the foregoing questions.

Reviewer

Douglas White QC

Appointed by the State Services Commissioner pursuant to section 25 of the State Sector Act.

Under section 25 of the State Sector Act, the Commissioner and persons he appoints under section 25(2) of the State Sector Act have the same powers to summon witnesses and to receive evidence as are conferred on a Commission of Inquiry by the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908.

1

Peter M. Rhodes P.O.Box 326 Wanaka

OTAGO 9343 Tue 25 March 2014 Hon Gerry Brownlee Minister of Transport Parliament Office Private Bag 18888 Parliament Building WELLINGTON 6160 Dear Minister.

NZ CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY: SAFETY CULTURE DETERIORATION

Our New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority appears to be behaving like the “Policemen of the Air” rather than working in partnership with the industry to improve aviation safety as a joint activity. There are two recent examples of this, one, being the prosecution of a Pacific Blue pilot by CAA following a departure late in the day out of Queenstown in marginal weather conditions, and two, is the skydive fatality at Wanaka. This latter investigated by CAA under the Health & Safety in Employment Act during which the risk of prosecution for manslaughter was made by the CAA investigators resulting in the company owner (David Hall) committing suicide. Since the 1920’s the aviation industry has progressed to improve aviation safety based on the investigation/reporting of safety events, occurrences and accidents with an aim of finding the cause rather than apportioning blame. This international standard is reflected in the ICAO Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident & Incident Investigation) to which New Zealand is a signatory. Our TAIC Act and NZCAA Rules Part 12 are the recognition of this ICAO Annex 13 document. My 60 yr aviation background is an RNZAF trained pilot, which included being loaned by the NZ Government to the Malaysian and Australian Air Forces. As a civilian, being trained in Australia as an air accidents investigator followed by further training at the University of Southern California and University of Aston (UK) and advanced air accident/safety training at Canberra ACT. I flew for Air NZ for twenty years on international flights and trained pilots for All Nippon, Ansett Australia, Air Pacific, Saudia Airlines and Garuda Airlines(Indonesia). Since living in Wanaka I have been involved with many General Aviation companies and of recent years been a CAA Approved Quality Assurance person. One such company was Wanaka Skydive which had a fatal death of a cameraman in Nov 2012. The CAA investigators who attended this cameraman fatality advised the company owner and me that they were conducting this investigation under the Health & Safety in Employment Act. It was very apparent that this did not mean a great deal to the owner or me so the CAA investigators explained to us that we could be prosecuted for manslaughter, and sentenced for up to 15 yrs gaol, if found guilty of an offence under that Act This was a totally new experience for me after 45 years of air safety experience where the aim has always been to find the cause rather than to

2

apportion blame. The company owner was affected to the point that he committed suicide a few days later. It must be emphasized that the CAA investigators advice to us about the risk of prosecution appeared to me as educational, and was totally new to me. I was expecting the investigation to be conducted under the NZCAA Rule Part 12, which specifically includes reference to Part 115 Adventure Aviation certificated organisations, and applied to this company. However, the owner, who set very high professional standards, felt threatened enough to commit suicide. The case of the pilot flying out of Queenstown I understand is being addressed by the NZ Airline Pilots Assn along the same lines as this letter. No further comment is made by me. Sufficient to say that the CAA has done a lot of damage to their credibility as an Authority to which the industry can freely exchange its safety/incident/accident information. This culture in NZCAA is contrary to the international standard to which New Zealand is a signatory. The CAA culture is totally the wrong way to improve aviation safety, given the proven and long established history of how aviation safety has, very successfully, progressed. On the other hand there is never a case for hiding or avoiding clearly negligent or willful acts that cause an accident or safety event, which can be handled as a police investigation with provision for protection against self-incrimination, but the safety record of aviation has been built on a threat free exchange between the industry and the legislative authority, and is reflected by the ICAO Annex 13. If there is any case for the Health & Safety in Employment Act use for investigating aviation safety events/incidents/accidents then it would be better to remove any threats of prosecution if there is any free exchange of information/evidence to be made. What is frustrating about the skydive cameraman fatality is that the NZCAA have done nothing to prevent the same accident again. The cause of this accident was the cameraman using incorrect equipment. The NZCAA Rules at present only address the tandem parachute equipment used by the skydiver and the attached paying public parachute rider. This skydive company has adopted a procedure to require the solo cameraman equipment and the public use tandem equipment to be maintained to the identical system, thereby preventing a similar accident. There is nothing that CAA has done to prevent this accident occurring to another skydive company in New Zealand. In summary, it is my contention that the NZCAA is failing to have, or encourage, a Safety Culture that creates an environment in which the industry and the legislative authority are as one in advancing the progress of aviation safety. The record of prosecutions, or threats of prosecution. by the NZCAA is contrary to the standards set by the ICAO Annex 13, and the NZ legislation that reflects this Annex 13 in the TAIC Act and NZ CAA Rules Part 12. A counterproductive fear exists of communicating any safety event within the aviation industry to the CAA. Sincerely, Peter M. Rhodes. NZCAA 13585 NZ Society Air Safety Investigators (MO0694)

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Peter M. Rhodes. CAA 13585. P.O.Box 326 Wanaka

9343 OTAGO Mon 16 June 2014

Coroner D.O.CrerarLevel 1. Dunedin District Court DUNEDIN

Dear Coroner Crerar

Report CSU-2012-DUN-000468: DAVID HALL; Finding :13 Feb 2014

Your report was been given to me by David Hall’s widow some time ago and I have taken time to consider my thoughts, and whether there is anything to be gained by writing to you. However, I do believe the NZ Civil Aviation Authority (NZCAA) contributed to David’s suicide and we still have a problem within the NZCAA and their longer term attitude towards aviation safety.

At the time of the NZCAA investigation of Lake Wanaka Skydive cameraman’s death (Nino Arilotta – Nov 2012) I was the company Quality Assurance person. My background is over fifty years in aviation as an RNZAF pilot, flying instructor, airline pilot, airline training captain for Air New Zealand, qualified air accidents investigator (International Society Air Safety Investigators M06594), contract training captain to Garuda Indonesia, Saudia Arabia, All Nippon, Lufthansa, Air Pacific, QANTAS, Malaysian and Ansett Australia, airline companies. My whole civil aviation career has been conducted under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards, to which New Zealand is a signatory.

When the NZCAA officials arrived in Wanaka to investigate the fatal accident to Nino they had an introductory briefing with David Hall, me, and some others. It was during the subsequent investigative time that the NZCAA investigators made us aware that they were working under the Health and Safety in Employment Act. This was a total surprise. ALL other aviation accidents I have been involved in as a witness or investigator have been conducted under the NZCAA Rules (Part 12) which specifically state the purpose of the investigation is to find the cause, not to apportion blame. The sole aim being to prevent the same, or similar, accident/incident happening again. New Zealand is a signatory to the ICAO Annex 13 (Air Accident Investigation Manual) which is reflected in our law under the Transport Accident Investigation Commission legislation. (TAIC Act) as well as the NZCAA Act and Rules part 12.

At no stage did I personally take the NZCAA investigators attitude as being threatening, but was very surprised at the frequent reminder that we could be prosecuted for manslaughter and sent to jail for up to 14 or 15 years if found guilty of an offence under this Health and Safety Act.

David took this threat very seriously and was clearly upset by it. In view of my previous, and somewhat entrenched, experience in aviation accident investigation which includes working within aviation systems in other parts of the world I considered the attitude of the NZCAA investigators somewhat of a strange way to conduct this investigation. David and I had several lengthy discussions about this. As Lake Wanaka Skydive was new to the NZCAA regulatory system (Certificated under NZCAR Part 115 in April 2012, only seven months earlier) David’s clear unease about the NZCAA investigation procedure is something, with hindsight, I should have spent more time trying to clarify.

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Again. I repeat that I did not take the NZCAA investigators advise about the investigation being under the Health and Safety Act as being other than them trying to educate David and me in an area that I was, certainly, largely ignorant.

Following David committing suicide the reaction from other parts of the aviation industry has been swift and a detriment to aviation safety. Few are willing to raise safety issues, or trust the NZCAA to handle safety reports in a positive, “find a fix”, manner. The whole industry has been used to a safety reporting system that is blame free with a view to accident/incident prevention. This does not excuse willful or negligent acts for which the NZCAA Rules make separate provision but even then, evidence collected for safety investigation cannot be used for legal or prosecution action. This has to be conducted separately with normal legal protection against self incrimination etc.

I have written to NZCAA to express my concern about the degraded standard of safety culture within the NZCAA. The Director NZCAA has written that there was no evidence to indicate that the investigators commented that we could be subject to prosecution and jail for an offence under the Health and Safety Act. - Really ??!!

Well, - - - David committed suicide, with no indication that the high standards he set, and professional organization he owned with his wife, Jules, were recognized by the NZCAA. They reminded us that they would conduct the investigation under the Health and Safety Act under which we could be jailed if found guilty of manslaughter. Nothing in my professional or private association with David gave me the slightest cause for concern about David. I do consider that the way the NZCAA conducted this investigation is NOT a way of having an open safety reporting system with the aviation industry or to find ways to improve aviation safety. Safety is a two way street. NZCAA and the aviation industry must work together. Inappropriate legislative Rules can be, and are, as hazardous as defective aviation equipment or maintenance

One final comment, as an example of my concern about the NZCAA. The fatal accident to the cameraman (Nino) was due to his using improper equipment. Under the current NZCAA Rule Pt.115 only the tandem parachute (paying passenger) equipment is required to be designed and maintained to an approved standard. Skydive Wanaka has implemented a procedure that has the camera persons equipment and tandem parachute equipment maintained to the same standards. NZCAA have NOT introduced this under the Rules so the potential exists for the same type of accident again in another skydive company in New Zealand.

Have no objections to your discussing this with me or referring this letter to others if you wish. I cannot bring David back but if a similar accident can be avoided and the safety culture with in the NZCAA improved then that would be a fitting memorial to David’s contribution to a safer part of NZ aviation

Kind regards,

Peter Rhodes

The case for a confidential aviation reporting system New Zealand is conspicuously absent from membership of the International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems Group (ICASS).

It would appear, from an initial examination, that New Zealand does not have a confidential aviation safety reporting system sufficient to invoke an invitation for membership of (ICASS) and if this is the case, New Zealand is falling short in the development of aviation safety systems that have been in place in other developed countries for many years.

If our analysis is correct, we consider that it is of the utmost importance that this subject be re-examined, articularly with regard to the new HSW legislation and the introduction of Safety Management Systems by the CAA.

Confidential Aviation Reporting Systems

Our investigation began with a complaint from an operator that he had filed an Aviation Related Concern (ARC) in the form of a handwritten letter against a pilot who was carrying unsafe and unlawful practices. A copy of that letter subsequently fell into the hands of the pilot who was the subject of the ARC.

The underlying factor behind Mr X’s complaint against the CAA is its lack of any ethical, robust systems to prevent the unfettered movement of confidential information from one department to another and then to yet another party outside the CAA, in this case, the Crown Solicitor. The result has been that Mr X now faces the risk of retribution. He has been personally harassed, and suffered significant humiliation, injury to his feelings and loss of dignity.

Mr X’s handwritten letter was sent directly to the Senior Technical Specialist Agriculture. The recipient obviously gave little or no thought to the ethics involved in forwarding this safety related complaint containing confidential and personal information directly to the regulatory investigation and enforcement section in unredacted form. A perceived lack of integrity of CAA employees in the way safety related complaints are handled, along with robust confidentiality systems within the Authority, has been brought to light by this incident. What we are referring to is a “Chinese wall” - a term which, in an emailed reply of 2 March 2016, the CAA Chief Legal Counsel admitted he did not understand.

His statement that “I do not understand what you are referring to in your reference to a Chinese Wall” disturbs us greatly, if we interpret his words either literally or even within the concept of a safety management system for which the Chief Legal Counsel bears some responsibility.

In the legal profession, the code of conduct relating to conflict of interest is very clear. In the New Zealand aviation system, however, voluntary safety reporting is entirely reliant on a "Chinese wall" within the CAA, if the Regulator is to have any hope of identifying unsafe conditions and precluding avoidable danger.

This is why we believe it essential to spend some time fully acquainting the reader with the term and the concept of a “Chinese wall”, and an example of a successful voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) which can be found in the USA, where it has been operating since 1976.

Chinese walls: Maintaining client confidentiality

What is a Chinese wall?

A Chinese wall is an internal measure adopted by an organisation to ensure that personal identifiable information gained while acting for one client (an informant) does not leak to people in another part of the same organisation (enforcement) who are acting to build a prosecution against another client to whom that information may be highly relevant. Any personal, identifiable information disclosed could be used by the person under investigation to inflict retribution on an informant.

The principal aim of a Chinese wall is to protect the informant’s confidentiality. Maintaining confidentiality is critical to any organisation, but is particularly vital for an aviation regulator.

The US regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), soon realised that its regulatory and enforcement roles would discourage the aviation community from trusting and using its new safety-reporting programme if the FAA operated the system. So it asked the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to act as the highly respected, independent third party that would administer the programme and fulfil the role of an honest broker attending to the interests of both sides. NASA, a research organisation with no regulatory or enforcement role, saw a unique opportunity to enhance its research capability through access to the human factors data generated by this new system.

The ASRS model

The ASRS has been emulated by aviation systems worldwide, and is now being modelled in industries outside aviation. It is simple and straightforward:

• When organisations and industries want to learn more about safety incidents and why people did what they did, the best approach is to ask the participants.

• People are usually willing to share their knowledge if they are assured their identities will remain confidential and, ultimately, they remain anonymous and the information they provide is protected from disciplinary and legal consequences.

• A properly structured confidential, voluntary and non-punitive incident reporting system can be used by any person to share information.

• The system offers a way to ask, and often answer, the question of “why?” There is no substitute for knowing why a system failed or why a human erred.

• A voluntary incident reporting system cannot succeed without the confidence, cooperation, oversight and guidance of the community that will use it. It must be viewed as a safety information resource which is accessible and responsive to all.

• A voluntary reporting system will usually exclude from its protections some types of incidents, such as criminal acts and intentional unsafe acts. In certain systems, such as the ASRS, this exclusion extends to legally defined accidents.

• The safety data gathered from incident reporting can be used to identify system vulnerabilities and gain a better understanding of the root causes of human error. Incident reporting data is complementary to the data generated by mandatory, statistical and monitoring systems.

• The ultimate achievement of an incident reporting system is that it can prevent accidents and fatalities.

From the above, it is clear that in the absence of an independent third party to administer such a programme (the cornerstone of any NZ CAA effort to promote a voluntary safety reporting system), it depends entirely on the operation of a Chinese wall within the CAA and the integrity of the regulator's employees who receive confidential information.

One such organisation in New Zealand that could be tasked with the receipt of safety related concerns is the Transport Accident Investigation Commission. However, to use the TAIC in a similar role to that of NASA in

the American FAA system would involve a major policy change with changes to the CAA Act and the Transport Accident Investigation Act. These changes are unlikely to occur in either the short or medium term, due to legislative and administrative inertia.

Coroner’s Report – June 2003 Air Adventures aircraft crash

The GAA is not the only organisation to question the lack of a confidential reporting system within the CAA.

In May 2006, the Coroner reported on the June 2003 Air Adventures aircraft crash at Christchurch International Airport. At the Minister of Transport’s request, the staff of the Auditor General looked at how the Civil Aviation Authority and the Ministry of Transport considered, responded to, and reported on each of the Coroner’s recommendations.

Coroner’s recommendation

That consideration be given to the feasibility and desirability of establishing an independent confidential air safety incident reporting system in New Zealand taking account of previous difficulties with the system known as Icarus, and/or an Office of Aviation Ombudsman.

Paragraph in the Coroner’s report: 575

The Ministry’s response

The Ministry reviewed international requirements and the intended purpose of Confidential Incident Reporting Schemes (CIRS). It noted that Australia, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom operate successful CIRS schemes.

The Ministry reviewed previous work on CIRSs in New Zealand, identifying the reasons for the failure to continue two previous CIRSs – the Independent Safety Assessment Scheme introduced in 1987 and the Information Confidentially Accepted then Reported Universally for Safety (Icarus) introduced in 1996.

Ministry’s response to the Coroner’s recommendations

• the outcome of two reviews in 2001 that recommended Transport Accident Investigation Commission establish a voluntary CIRS; and

• that the issue was included in the 2003 Government Transport Sector Review but was not addressed in the review team’s recommendations. In considering the second part of the recommendation, the Ministry looked at the purpose of other Parliamentary Ombudsmen and noted that they provided opportunities for individuals to resolve disputes without going to court. The Ministry concluded that there was a gap in past analysis in that a cost-benefit analysis had not been done. Such an analysis has since been completed, and has established that the cost-benefit of a stand-alone CIRS is marginal.

The Ministry concluded that the philosophy behind the Ombudsman schemes, which is based on disputes resolution, does not offer a good fit with the goal of gaining information about incidents to provide safety information to the aviation sector.

Action taken by the Ministry

The Ministry prepared a briefing paper to the Minister of Transport outlining the analysis done and recommending a cost-benefit analysis. This paper was posted on the Ministry’s website, and public comment was invited.

A further briefing paper was prepared in August 2007 detailing the method and findings of the cost-benefit analysis. The briefing paper sought the Minister’s agreement that, pending the outcome of the CAA information management project, no move be made to establish a new CIRS in the medium term.

A final report that detailed the action taken for this recommendation and sought the Minister’s agreement to closing the recommendation was approved by the Minister of Transport in February 2008.

Coroner’s recommendation

That the Minister of Transport review whether the law enforcement role currently carried out by the Civil Aviation Authority should be separated from the safety enforcement management role.

Paragraph in the Coroner’s report: 548

The Ministry’s response

The Ministry determined that the Coroner’s intent with this recommendation was to enable the Law Enforcement Unit to take timely and appropriate action against operators who persistently and deliberately broke Civil Aviation Rules.

The Ministry noted that the CAA had restructured to create a Safety Information Group that comprised Communication and Safety Education, Law Enforcement, Safety Analysis, and Safety Investigation. The group was headed by a new general manager and became effective on 16 July 2007.

The Ministry considered that the changes made by the CAA enabled more effective and transparent relationships between its investigation and safety information functions and that the CAA was in a better position to effectively manage its business in the way the Coroner intended.

The safety information collected by the CAA was able to be assessed and channelled to the appropriate group and acted on to enable the CAA to respond to safety issues in individual cases (for example, air operators) as well as trends in the safety of the civil aviation system. This change in approach ensured that the CAA analysed and acted on safety-related information in a more effective way than would be achieved by completely separating the safety reporting management and law enforcement groups, as advocated by the Coroner. The new structure enabled a more informed assessment of the importance of the information for aviation safety and the appropriate action taken.

Action taken by the Ministry

A paper was given to the Secretary for Transport and was posted on the Ministry’s website for public comment. A final report detailed the action taken for this recommendation and sought the Minister’s agreement to closing the recommendation, which was approved by the Minister of Transport in February 2008.

GAA comments

In essence, the Ministry and the CAA officials have chosen to ignore the Coroner’s recommendations by putting their own “spin” on what they perceived the Coroner was suggesting. In doing so, they have seemingly ignored (by using the excuse that the cost-benefit of a stand-alone CIRS is marginal) a well-respected model of a successful voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) which can be found in the USA, where it has been operating since 1976.

Furthermore, we should examine the Ministry’s statement that “The Ministry considered that the changes made by the CAA enabled more effective and transparent relationships between its investigation and safety information functions and that the CAA was in a better position to effectively manage its business in the way the Coroner intended”.

Effectively, rather than incorporating an in-house confidential safety reporting system such as a “Chinese wall”, the CAA has opted to have a “transparent relationship” between its investigations and safety information functions, thus allowing the unrestricted flow of confidential information from one department to another.

Extract from CAA Level 2 – Executive Management Policies – 21 August 2009

5.6 Legal Protections for Safety Data and Information supplied to, and held by, the CAA

Data and information supplied to the CAA by requirement of the Civil Aviation Act 1990 or by way of CAR Part 12 reports do not have specific disclosure protections in law. Accordingly, the Civil Aviation Act 1990 affords no specific privilege or protection to data and information that is disclosed to the CAA by aviation participants. The CAA is subject to the Official Information Act and the Privacy Act. Accordingly, there are

statutory controls and requirements provided for in those Acts that apply to the way in which data and information may be disclosed to other people or organisations.

The CAA may also be required to disclose information and data in the course of legal proceedings, consistent with the requirements of governing law.

5.7 De-identification of Safety Data and Information

The CAA will, where it is appropriate, de-identify safety data and information that is disclosed to parties outside of the CAA. The CAA will de-identify data and information where it is necessary or appropriate to protect the identity of the submitter. However, the de-identification of safety data and information can only be done within the limits of governing legislation.

The GAA comments:

It is our contention that in Mr X’s case, the trust he placed in there being a confidential reporting system within the CAA which would guarantee him the protection of confidentiality was woefully betrayed by CAA executive management policies.

Mr X is a CAA client, and not an employee; therefore, he is not covered by the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 (commonly called the “whistleblowers” Act) whereby he would have been afforded key protections of confidentiality and the application of the anti-victimisation provisions of the Human Rights Act 1993.

The actions or inactions of the Ministry’s and the CAA employees have contributed to New Zealand not intoducing a voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in line with the Coroner’s well-founded suggestion that “consideration be given to the feasibility and desirability of establishing an independent confidential air safety incident reporting system in New Zealand taking account of previous difficulties with the system known as Icarus, and/or an Office of Aviation Ombudsman.”

From a safety management perspective, we could not be more scathing in our comments about how the Ministry and the Regulator have got this wrong on so many different levels. What compounds the whole appalling debacle is the mandatory introduction by the CAA of safety management systems into aviation-related organisations.

At the heart of any good safety management system is the concept of a properly structured, confidential, voluntary, non-punitive incident reporting system that can be used by any person to share information.

As evidenced by what has happened to Mr X through the release of his unredacted handwritten letter to parties outside the CAA by a person or persons within the Authority, no such structure is in place within the CAA, the very organisation charged with the introduction of SMS.

This we view as a glaring indictment of the lack of robust systems or persisting integrity within the present framework of the CAA, as it struggles to juggle the requirements of its regulatory and enforcement roles and those of a confidential reporting system.

We are convinced that these conflicts are unlikely to be resolved within the existing framework of the CAA unless the safety management reporting systems are placed in the hands of a third party, as happens in the USA.

The Authority should understand that when our aviation community comes to know about the pitfalls of using an unreliable system, which lacks confidentiality, the flow of information volunteered would dramatically reduce, if not entirely cease.

We ask: “Is this really the outcome a self-professed safety-conscious Regulator (which trumpets its support for Just Culture) would wish for?”

email: airfabrico@xtra.co.nz or admin@caa.gen.nz

Website: www.caa.gen.nz

AOC applications and SMS implementation plans: A worrying picture of systemic inconsistency Report to the Director, Civil Aviation Authority by Walter Wagtendonk and Ian Wood, consultant exposition-writers

In association with the General Aviation Advocacy Group of New Zealand November 2017

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Contents Introduction 3 A Interpretation of Rules 3 B Discrepancies in requirements and assessments by one official versus others 4 C Wasteful comments 6 D Tendency of some officials to enforce their own opinions 7 E Scaling for small operators 9 F Findings 10 G Recommendations 10 Conclusion 11 About the authors 12

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Introduction This report has been prepared following repeated instances of divergence and inconsistency in comments, demands and instructions from CAA officials who deal with documentation associated with Air Operator Certification (AOC) applications and Safety Management Systems (SMS) implementation plans. This has caused confusion and stress, resulting in many hours of frustrating work for officials, applicants and exposition-writing consultants. To support the accuracy of examples in this report, frequent reference is made to documents and dates but not to names of CAA officials or industry persons associated with the examples. The reason for this is that divulging names might lead to accusations of discrimination, real or imagined, by officials when they deal with those General Aviation persons in the future. However, the names may be presented to the Director on a ‘for-his-eyes-only’ basis if requested. It should be noted that no GA party was involved in the preparation of this report. It is also important to note that the report is not submitted in an effort to unfairly criticise individual officials or to be personal. The overriding objective is to highlight the problems that have arisen and to do everything possible to help solve them. The number of examples has been restricted, to identify the issues as briefly as possible. It is far from a complete list of all known problems. The examples are grouped as follows:

a) Debatable interpretation of Rules

b) Discrepancies in requirements and assessments by one official versus others

c) Wasteful comments and demands that can only be described as nitpicking

d) Tendency of some officials to enforce their own opinions

e) Disregard for the need to use scaling when dealing with small operators A. Interpretation of Rules

This is an age-old problem that hasn’t gone away. Recent examples:

i. A Part 135 exposition manual assessment by an official highlighted numerous instances where the responsibility for the airworthiness and maintenance of aircraft lay in the hands of the Maintenance Controller, whereas the exposition placed this responsibility in the hands of the CEO.

Part 135.403 clearly states that the holder of an AOC is responsible for the airworthiness and maintenance of aircraft operated by the holder. A legal opinion has confirmed the correctness of the wording in the exposition: the “holder” is/are the Director(s) of the company, which for almost all our clients is the nominated CEO.

ii. An official insisted that the authorisation for Pilot Maintenance rested with the Maintenance Controller and the Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (LAME) involved, whereas the exposition correctly stated this to be the responsibility of the Operator consistent with Part 43.51(c)(1).

iii. It was pointed out by an official to a new AOC applicant that initial training would apply to all persons who would be working under the AOC. The example is expanded in paragraph D (iii).

iv. A CAA inspector noted that paragraphs in the exposition used only odd numbers, and that this could be confusing to the reader. When it was pointed out that this is how Civil Aviation Rules are numbered, he said that this was explained in the Rules and likewise it should be explained in the exposition. We are not aware of where it is explained in the Rules and we cannot see where confusion arises.

v. A CAA inspector required that the Operational Management System flowchart be altered to show that all senior persons report directly to the CEO. The flowchart does indeed reflect this requirement but functions such as Air Operations and Maintenance generally overseen by the Operations Manager are listed via the Operations Manager and then to the CEO. This ensures, for example, the

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connection between Maintenance Controller, via the Operations Manager, to the CEO. Part 119.101 (a) defines the duties of the CEO in (a) (1) and those for the Operations Manager in (a) (2), i.e. only two persons. Part 119.101 (b) refers to Senior Persons, with an "s". Part 119.101 (b) (1) (iii) includes Maintenance, Air Operations and so on which according to “persons” can be part of the duties or responsibilities of the CEO or Operations Manager. Thus the flowchart currently in our exposition manuals is compliant. Moreover, it describes the practicality for small operators where in some cases there is a nominated CEO who is not on-site every day.

If the responsibilities and functions under the Operations Manager need to be altered as demanded to by-pass the latter, there is a need for almost daily input from a CEO who may not be available. This example shows a lack of understanding of GA by some officials or an inability to see the pitfalls in their demands.

We could mention more examples where the amount of time wasted by officials and writers, due to inadequate knowledge or misinterpretation of the Rules, was needless and costly.

B. Discrepancies in requirements and assessments by one official versus others This is perhaps one of the most common and frustrating problems highlighting a distinct lack of communication and, dare we say, absence of supervision within the CAA. It is galling to note these shortcomings within the authority because when it comes to SMS for GA participants, the insistence on good communications and strict oversight of senior management are frequently mentioned preconditions. We submit that the CAA should be just as committed to the SMS principles as industry participants and ensure that its officials speak with one voice. Recent examples:

i. An official suggested that Health and Safety (H&S) and Worksafe are introduced as part of SMS discussions. This is also in line with Evaluation Tool para 1.1.2 that mentions workplace Health and Safety. Nevertheless, two other officials stated in August 2017: “It is not a Worksafe concern; it is about aviation safety risks only”.

ii. Word was received that a paragraph in the Flight and Duty (F&D) Time scheme in the exposition was incorrect with regard to night operations. The reason for such a comment was difficult to understand, since the company concerned operates under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), day only. Nevertheless, we had to make a correction and the exposition was re-submitted. Four hours later, a CAA official rang to say that the person who demanded the change was wrong. So we had to change the text again, reassemble the exposition and resend it.

iii. Part 135 matrices and CAA critique comments: The tables below show how one inspector accepts one thing and another accepts something else. The matrix comments were in respect of matrices submitted to the CAA recently and within less than three months of one another. The Yes/No columns show differences in acceptance of compliance with Rules by two inspectors.

Maintenance Matrix

Matrix Reference Operator A Operator B

12.57 (a) (1) No Yes

43.101 (a) Yes No

43.105 Yes No

91.617 Yes No

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Internal Training Matrix

Matrix Reference Operator A Operator B

135.553 (a) Yes No

135.557 Yes No

135.559 Yes No

135.561 Yes No

135.565 Yes No

These are by no means the only examples where differences in compliance assessments occur, but they clearly show an undesirable trend. For example, one official made three adverse comments in his critique on “Becoming Aware of a Hazard” whilst another noted “Very good”.

iv. An example relating to an official’s demand that aircraft must be named on the maintenance programme. For example: “Robinson R44 Series – Maintenance Programme” would change to “Robinson R44 ZK-XXX – Maintenance Programme”. If the demand were insisted upon, there would need to be separate maintenance programmes for each aircraft. The official is in direct conflict with advice from the CAA over many years that a maintenance programme relates to a type of aircraft and that the exposition must include information regarding which aircraft is covered by which maintenance programme (which includes items and components applicable to each aircraft). Accordingly, Section 5 of exposition manuals contains the following statement:

The aircraft operating on Air Operations and maintained under the provisions of this manual and the associated maintenance programme (see Section 9 page H1) are: … then follows the list of aircraft and their serial numbers.

The exposition therefore clearly identifies the connection between programme and aircraft.

v. Another example highlights a problem with regard to procedures that have been accepted as compliant in expositions for at least 15 years. The comment made by an official reads:

Each company procedure listed in the manual should be able to be clearly identified and followed by the staff member using the manual; e.g. the procedure, the scope of the procedure and if necessary what the procedure is for, the person responsible for the procedure (the owner) the people required to follow the procedure, how the procedure is performed.

VFR Operations Matrix

Matrix Reference Operator A Operator B

119.101 (b) (1) (ii) Yes No

119.105 Yes No

119.115 Yes No

119.161 Yes No

119.165 Yes No

135.73 Yes No

12.101 Yes No

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This is an impossible ‘How long is a piece of string?’ demand. The manuals do indeed contain many references to procedures, but the detail demanded in that comment is staggering.

Some procedure examples:

Pre-flight inspection. It would take a full page to describe the procedure in the required detail.

Moreover, it is a procedure taught from the earliest student pilot training days and is contained in the aircraft Flight Manual for quick reference if necessary.

Cockpit check. To describe the procedure and its scope, who does it and what it is for and how

it is performed, would again be to describe the obvious. The manual states “Estimating weight of objects to be carried in the aircraft from remote

locations can be achieved using a spring scale when practicable”. Does the manual need to state the obvious, that the pilot does the weighing? Should it describe how the scale is to be used?

Cleaning of fuel jerry cans. The manual states these shall be emptied, cleaned and inspected every six months. Is it really worth the space and effort to elaborate on who does the cleaning, with what sort of water, how and why?

Procedure for retention of work records by the Maintenance Contractor. Does the official really

mean that the manual should describe who shall attend to the filing of these records, why they should be filed and retained, and how the procedure is carried out? Clearly, this requires the operator to be at the contractor’s base to ensure that the procedure is carried out as written in the exposition and, more to the point, if the contractor changes the “who shall do the filing”, an amendment to the exposition is then required.

The manual contains maintenance programmes which include the requirement for various

inspections. Is it the official’s objective that the manual describes how a 50-hour inspection is carried out, who does the inspection, why it is done and who is the person responsible for it? (“The owner” - the Chief engineer - would have something to say about that!)

The list could go on and on, but we submit that the official’s demand is impracticable and indicates unfamiliarity with the most basics of aviation. But the crown jewel lies in his final comment:

The content of the manual appears to be unduly complex for the size of operation. This issue is not one to be ignored. Based on previous experience, it is a foregone conclusion that a future CAA official will question some details in the procedures or add to the list and then expect that an amendment be submitted.

vi. Hazard Registers. Confusion exists here as to whether the hazard register is required to be included in the exposition. Both a yes and a no answer have been received from different CAA inspectors at face-to-face meetings within the last four months.

C. Wasteful comments Collectively, the time spent by officials zealously focusing on matters of little or no concern, and the time spent in responding by writer and operator, is considerable. The associated CAA fees at the rate of almost $300 per hour are a waste of money. Recent examples:

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i. The exposition states that fuel contents are checked by calibrated dipstick. The CAA comment was “How”. This procedure is drilled into student pilots from Day 1 and “How” indicates that the official had little knowledge of it. To make matters worse, the next comment was:

ii. “Should fuel steps be listed for refuelling?” asked an inspector, referring to what any pilot could immediately recognise as a low-wing aircraft. The question was plainly ludicrous. Both examples show a total lack of understanding of procedures and equipment used by small aircraft operators. The respect for expertise that should be due to CAA officials is badly eroded by such comments.

iii. The responsibilities listed in expositions for the Maintenance Contractor contain the sentence “the Maintenance Contractor shall ensure that aircraft are maintained in accordance with CARs, Airworthiness requirements, manufacturer‘s instructions and this manual.” Back came the comment: Change “manual” to “exposition”.

iv. A CAA inspector did not like the exposition wording “aircraft logbooks may not be carried in the aircraft.” He wanted the word “may” to be changed to “must”. Eve was told that she may not eat that apple and, judging by the consequences, there was no misunderstanding of “may” in the command. Are these the sort of things we should be wasting time on?

D. Tendency of some officials to enforce their own opinions As with many of the above topics, this problem is long-standing and indicates a lack of managerial oversight and control.

i. A simple example is the opinion of an official that the contents of a flowchart textbox should be altered, in spite of the fact that, for years, inspectors have understood the correctness of the contents. The textbox shows:

The instruction from the official was to delete reference to the Maintenance Contractor Chief Engineer, i.e.

A large majority of AOC holders are two- and three-man operators who need to spread responsibilities for various tasks over a small number of persons and in many cases the CEO or Operations Manager is also the Maintenance Controller. Consider a situation where the CEO pilot who is also the Maintenance Controller experiences a problem in the field. According to the official’s demand, he has to contact himself and explain the problem. Even if the Maintenance Controller is someone else but for is for some reason unavailable, the pilot must under no circumstances contact the chief engineer. The example shows the official’s complete lack of practical experience or, if he has such experience, an inability to think things through. Most importantly, was the instruction discussed among inspectors or with senior management before becoming an actual demand?

ii. A more serious example relates to Internal Training programmes. Part 135.553(a) requires each

holder of an AOC to establish a training programme; 553(b) requires each crew member to be trained in accordance with the training programme; 135.553(c) requires the programme to be

Pilot contacts Maintenance Controller or Maintenance Contractor Chief

Engineer regarding problems experienced in the field.

Pilot contacts Maintenance Controller regarding problems experienced in

the field.

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controlled by the AOC holder; and 135.553(d) (1) and (2) permit the option for the AOC holder to conduct the training programme or contract it out to a Part 141 organisation. In line with Part 135.553, the exposition manuals, in Section 3, clearly describe the requirements including the option which the AOC holder has adopted. In almost all cases, the use a Part 141 organisation is stated. In addition, an Internal Training programme was developed in 2015 (as part of expositions, and filed with the CAA) which resulted in the following comment from the CAA in an e-mail dated 21 September 2015: Forgot to say Walter, more of those training programmes you can get out to the operators that can be tweaked to their own operations the better. Regards Marty Gambrill Flight Operations Inspector - Helicopter and Agricultural Unit

This leaves no doubt that the programme was suitable and in line with Part 135.553. It should be noted that the Rule does not specify the requirement for a structured syllabus. It simply requires a programme and that was developed and accepted.

It was therefore disturbing to receive the following comments (stated here exactly as received) dated 10 October 2017 from an official who assessed the Training matrix for the applicant of a GA AOC: … training programme not found to meet current standards required for detail, comprehensiveness etc. Duties do appear to be defined in Categorisation system but not linked to training programme. Ommissions [sic] noted for pilot duties such as detail on human factors training including fatigue management which would require training to carry out proficiently. And… … some initial training subjects found but not structured syllabus which needs to cover all flight crew duties including aircraft and equipment normal and emergency procedures. Syllabus should include training objectives, training material and standards, order, timeframes etc. The demand is excessive and totally beyond the requirements for the AOC applicant concerned (a husband and wife team, a loader driver and one helicopter). Moreover, it dismissed the acceptance of the existing training programme and confronted the applicant with a fait accompli, with no warning and without any regard to the submission that was presented to the official concerned after the comments were originally received. It is interesting to note that, a matter of weeks before the comments were received, a different operator applied for the five-yearly renewal of its GA AOC, which included the assessment of matrices including Internal Training, identical to the applicant mentioned above. Every rule was marked “OK” and the new certificate was issued. This example highlights a serious issue where - at the whim of one inspector - an accepted programme is wiped without consultation and presented to the AOC applicant as a stop to progress of the application. And when the applicant advised that he was quite unqualified to develop the in-depth syllabus, he was told to get someone to do it for him. It is not hard to understand that the required task would be time-consuming and expensive. The detail required in the demand is extreme, considering that the part of the training programme that effectively applied to the applicant company is the recurrent training conducted once yearly at the midway point between annual pilot competency checks. For one pilot and one helicopter! More to the point, the applicant had elected the option for the contracted Part 141 organisation to do all training (and checking, for that matter). Investigations were conducted into the training syllabuses commonly used by a number of Part 141 organisations, one of whom had received renewal of their certificate within recent weeks. It showed

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that, in compliance with Part 141 requirements, the CAA has accepted simple and brief syllabuses and in one case none at all. Moreover, some of the contracts contain, amongst others, the following clauses which surely must have been vetted by the CAA before Part 141 certificates were issued: Initial training. When contracted to provide this training, the CFI will discuss the scope of training required with the Part 135 organisation concerned and a detailed syllabus will be agreed. Transition training. The transition training must be recorded on the Transition/Recurrent training form, see Appendix page 31. (Note that there is no mention of a syllabus at all, which is consistent with Part 135.559 as well as Part 135.561.) Recurrent training. When contracted to provide recurrent training the instructor will discuss the scope of the training required with the certificate holder and a syllabus for this training will be agreed. The option for using Part 141 organisations for training was obviously designed to cater for those applicants who have no instructor qualifications, expertise in training or ability to develop in-depth syllabuses. Yet here we have a situation where a CAA official demands that the applicant designs or buys syllabuses that far outweigh those used and presumably approved for Part 141 organisations. As mentioned before, the applicant did have an Internal Training programme, as required by Part 135, and designed for use by operator and Part 141 organisation to cover the activities conducted by the operator. This issue has a serious potential impact on all Part 135 operators. If cancellation of previously approved syllabuses was deemed necessary, it should have been subject to discussion with the industry at best, or failing that, introduced to the industry in a letter similar to the one that was circulated when the title “Operational Instructor” was introduced. Since no such common sense procedure was employed, it can only be assumed that the CAA official concerned acted upon his own opinion. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that, within a matter of weeks, the originally approved syllabus was accepted for the five-yearly renewal of an AOC for one operator, but not for the other AOC applicant. We now return to SMS principles and specifically to Communication and Management of Change procedures. The example here has far-reaching ramifications and should have been subject to scrutiny within the CAA before accepted syllabuses were cancelled and the requirement for more detailed syllabuses was promulgated. Clearly, communication and Management of Change principles were not complied with inside the CAA yet when it comes to GA operators, such lack of compliance would not be tolerated.

iii. Referring to paragraph A (iii) and associated with the Internal training programme, the following comment was received from an official on 25 October 2017 by an applicant for a new GA AOC:

As this is an initial application all requirements in the initial training programme apply as nobody will have worked under the new AOC before.

We are aware that, under Part 135.557(a), initial training is required before operating under a new GA AOC, but the official neglected to mention Part 135.557(b) which allows a variation in the syllabus if the variation and the reason for the variation are recorded in the pilot’s training record. The pilot who will work under the AOC has more than 3000 hours total time including hundreds of hours under Part 135 in the same helicopter that is listed in his new exposition completed while he was working under his previous employer. We consider that the official, in not mentioning Part 135.557(b), was devious and deliberately misleading.

E. Scaling for small operators

On a number of occasions, the CAA has stressed the need for scaling when designing SMS for small operators. As consultant writers, we have tried to comply with that logic; but instead of simplification,

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most of the CAA officials we have dealt with presented us with numerous items that added to the expositions. There is a need for inspectors to realise that we are not dealing with Boeing 747s on intercontinental operations. The vast majority are two- and three-person operations where communication is an everyday occurrence, where training doesn’t have to match intricate airline and IFR aspects, where change is discussed and agreed upon without having to spell it out in detail, where supervision by the CEO or Operations Manager is part of daily habit and where the required procedures described in B (v) above are superfluous. As an example, on a number of occasions during an audit, the officials repeatedly used the phrase “in larger organisations” which clearly showed their entrenched rejection of scaling for the three-man organisation they were auditing. (Diary notes were made of these comments and their frequency). The apparent lack of experience and knowledge of GA by various CAA officials described in this report are not helpful in ensuring that scaling principles are actually employed. The results are felt in many hours of needless work and heavy expenses.

F. Findings

Based on the examples highlighted above and realising they are but the tip of the iceberg, there is sufficient evidence to show that the CAA needs to improve compliance with its own rules and operating principles. If the examples had applied to GA operators, they would have been designated as ‘findings’ during audits and if non-compliance was ongoing, the AOC would be withdrawn (as recently evidenced by a number of grounded companies).

G. Recommendations

It is in no one’s interest to see a continuation of the problems described above. For that reason, we ask that the following principles are considered by the CAA, implemented and enforced. This is particularly important considering the time and effort involved in getting all small operators ultimately certified under SMS.

i. If officials are shown to have demonstrated a lack of industry knowledge or understanding of how GA works, they should be retrained in exactly the same way as demanded by the CAA when a similar shortcoming shows up in a GA operation. Failing improvement, they should be re-assigned.

ii. No demands for changes to new or existing accepted expositions and their procedures should be tolerated unless those demands comply totally with the Rules.

iii. Instructions for any changes to procedures in expositions that are seen as “acceptable to the Director” must be subject to prior CAA senior management perusal. In accordance with the Management of Change principles, such changes should be made known to every person in the CAA who is associated with exposition assessment and critique writing. If accepted, this recommendation would go a long way towards standardisation.

iv. There must be a recognition that many, if not most, small GA operators are untrained and often

unable to write exposition manuals or amendments to such manuals. Failing to recognise this unfortunate fact and expecting operators to deal directly with CAA officials is time-wasting, frustrating and costly. As with accountants authorised to deal directly with the IRD, it should be CAA policy that operators are permitted to authorise consultant writers to deal efficiently and speedily with problems on their behalf. This in no way means that operators are less conversant with their expositions and procedures. Any well-respected writer knows that client understanding and participation are essential ingredients for success.

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v. There must be an improvement in coordination between sections and persons within the CAA who deal with GA. The syllabus example in paragraph D (ii) highlights the fact that Part 141 organisations have not been made aware of “training programme not found to meet current standards required for detail, comprehensiveness etc”. A reference such as this, highlighting “standards”, needs to identify the particular standards by reference to a CAA-produced document. Otherwise, the statement is completely meaningless and requires hours of dialogue to establish what the CAA official is referring to. Yet another example of waste. Better in-house coordination would surely have alerted Part 141 organisations to the change in training programmes, but none of the organisations we approached was aware of the new requirements.

Conclusion

As stated in the introduction, the intention is to highlight – without rancour – many serious and worrying CAA inconsistencies. They can only be fully understood by using examples. There is no doubt that many of the problems described have involved large amounts of time which, with respect to the CAA itself, must have collectively involved tens of thousands of wasted dollars. It is also unfortunate that most applicants for AOCs and SMS certification are reluctant to openly object because of perceived repercussions if “the boat is rocked”. The CAA and General Aviation are together involved in substantial work associated with SMS and continuation of the current flawed methodology within the CAA will hinder progress. This is of no benefit to either the CAA or GA. The report has identified a number of failures which, in many instances, can be put down to lack of supervision by senior management and the apparent freedom for lower-level officials to express personal opinions and interpretations, and insist on compliance with them. The worst response to this report would be a war of words; that would ultimately prove useless and costly. The best response would be an acceptance of the need to rein in those officials who are over-zealous in their critiques or make demands that far outstrip those applicable to small organisations. It must be ensured they thoroughly understand the meaning of “scaling”. This requires firm control by management. If that is not forthcoming, the outlook for cooperation and progress is bleak.

12

About the authors

Walter J Wagtendonk came to New Zealand as a 21-year-old in late 1951 and the following year was accepted for pilot training in the RNZAF. He graduated in March 1953 and became a flying instructor that same year. After eight years’ service, predominantly as an instructor, he retired with the rank of Flight Lieutenant and an A2 instructor rating (2nd highest possible).

Rather than entering airline service, Walter elected to stay with instructing, originally with the Nelson Aero Club and subsequently with the Nelson Aviation College which he founded in 1978. He held a civil A-category Instructor rating (the highest possible) and an Instrument rating. The Nelson Aviation College remains a successful and highly respected educational institution. Walter retired from the college in 1991 and started writing aviation text books covering Private Pilot, Commercial Pilot and Instrument Rating subjects. Under the brand name PilotBooks, he authored seven manuals including Principles of Helicopter Flight which is currently published in the USA and widely used worldwide as an official reference. He also co-authored five other training manuals.

While still involved with publishing, he became involved (and is still active) in exposition manual-writing for aviation companies wishing to obtain General Aviation Air Operator Certificates.

Walter was awarded the OBE for services to aviation and specifically for his work towards flight safety.

Ian Wood has been known as Iggy since his early days in the RNZAF. He began his flying career in gliders while at high school and soloed at Ardmore in mid-1965. He joined the RNZAF and trained on Harvards and Devons at Wigram before moving on to Vampires and then Skyhawks at Ohakea. As a flying instructor, he completed instructional tours at Wigram and at Changi (on loan to the Singapore Air Force).

On return to New Zealand, he conducted fighter lead-in instruction on the Strikemaster at Ohakea. After a couple of ground tours, he returned to Ohakea as a squadron commander, flying the Strikemaster, providing ab-initio and operational flying instruction. A tour at RNZAF Headquarters in Wellington was followed by four more years at Ohakea as the Officer Commanding Strike Wing with five flying units in the wing. During this time, he was involved in the move of RNZAF flying training from Wigram to Ohakea. He left the RNZAF in 1998 with 31 years of service, a total of 4100 hours military flying, qualified as PIC on eight different types.

Iggy joined CTC Aviation Training (NZ) Ltd at Hamilton in 2005 as the chief ground instructor. At CTC, he ran the ground school which taught PPL, CPL, IR and ATPL topics to the New Zealand and United Kingdom requirements. With the help of six staff, about 550 candidates were trained during a period of five years.

In 2010, Walter Wagtendonk offered Iggy the opportunity to assist in exposition manual-writing. Aerostandards Ltd was formed and Iggy now has about 40 air operators who ask him to maintain their Part 135 expositions. He has written expositions for a few Part 115 and Part 141 operators and is quality assurance manager for two aviation operators.

While his CPL, IR, and B-cat instructor ratings have lapsed, Iggy continues to fly gliders, adding to his 380 glider hours on 26 types, and is an active glider tow pilot with more than 2600 tows.

  The GAA is a social network of more than 2000 pilots, engineers and operators. It exists to help protect and promote New Zealand general aviation.

email: airfabrico@xtra.co.nz or admin@caa.gen.nz

Website: www.caa.gen.nz 1199 Tram Road Swannanoa RD6 Rangiora 7476 Nigel Gould Chairman Civil Aviation Authority PO Box 3555 Wellington 6140

13 January 2017 Dear Mr Gould CAA Client Satisfaction Surveys

In a letter of 22 December 2016, regarding Client Satisfaction Surveys, Mr Peter Mersi, CEO of the Ministry of Transport, replied:

I note your comments about the merits of conducting client satisfaction surveys and your suggestion that the Ministry should instruct the CAA Board to undertake them (among other things). Whilst I understand the reasons you have suggested this, this would not be consistent with the legal framework for Crown entities. You may be aware that this covered by the Crown Entities Act 2004, and responsibility for the operation of a Crown entity rests with the Board of the entity. Accordingly, it is up to the Board of the CAA, which makes delegations to its Chief Executive, to determine the type of surveys it undertakes.

As the Board now comprises several new members since the last survey was carried out some 13 years ago, we feel that it is important to include some background information.

The Authority engaged Colmar Brunton to undertake a client satisfaction survey in 1995, 1998 and five years later in 2003, the same research company carried out a similar survey.

On 21 May 2016, we wrote to the Director of the CAA and asked if there had been similar client satisfaction surveys carried out since 2003. The Director opted to make this a request under the Official Information Act 1982.

The OIA Officer responded on 16 June 2016 to our letter as below:

We regarded your request for information as twofold:

  The GAA is a social network of more than 2000 pilots, engineers and operators. It exists to help protect and promote New Zealand general aviation.

1.

If there have been other client satisfaction surveys carried out, on what appeared to be a previously established five-yearly cycle, would you please advise why they do not show up when carrying out a search on the CAA website; and

The Client Satisfaction Surveys conducted in 1998 and 2003 were seemingly brought about as a performance measure under agreement with the Minister of Transport. When this agreement ended, new performance measures would likely have been established with different methods of determining performance.

The CAA has continued to conduct various public opinion surveys, with Colmar Brunton’s assistance, but for different reasons. For example, the Feel Safe Survey was conducted in 2011, 2013 and 2014 in order to determine how safe people feel whilst flying and to gauge their impressions of CAA and AvSec’s effectiveness.

If they have been carried out, would you please forward copies of those survey results to us. We have a recollection of a Colmar Brunton poll being carried out in 2013, which would fit the five-yearly cycle.

2.

As per the above answer to Question 1, the 2013 survey was a Feel Safe survey and not a client satisfaction survey.

This part of your request is refused under section 18(e), as the information does not exist or, despite reasonable efforts to locate it, cannot be found.

With reference to the above reply, we are concerned that our questions have in part, been answered in vague terms with no specifics. As he has said, “seemingly” an agreement was made between the Minister at the time and the CAA to measure the Authority’s performance. Also it was the assumption of the OIA officer that when this agreement ended, new performance measures would “likely” have been established with different measures of determining performance. No specific details were provided as to what the new arrangements between the Minister of Transport and the CAA are.

A likely result of the new arrangement for measuring the performance of the Authority was that it continued to do various public opinion “Feel Safe” surveys in 2011, 2013 and 2014. These public opinion surveys look at the performance of the CAA from an entirely different perspective to those of a client satisfaction survey.

Since 2003, no survey of the CAA’s clients, that is to say those stakeholders who hold aviation documents of various kinds, has been carried out.

As we have said, in 1995, 1998 and 2003, Colmar Brunton conducted research for the CAA to measure levels of staff and customer satisfaction. Beyond simply understanding and improving levels of satisfaction, these studies led to changes and improvements being made within the organisation of the CAA itself.

It was a priority to update the CAA’s understanding of how customers perceive and experience the services and provision of services from the CAA. To this end, in 2003, Colmar Brunton was commissioned to conduct research among all key customer groups to measure levels of satisfaction, and compare these levels to the 1995 and 1998 studies to monitor changes over time. Further, a study of staff attitudes was also conducted. The CAA’s customer base is spread across New Zealand and encompasses a broad range of organisations and stakeholder types. These include key stakeholders such as:

  The GAA is a social network of more than 2000 pilots, engineers and operators. It exists to help protect and promote New Zealand general aviation.

• Aircraft owners

• Air traffic controllers

• Pilots

• Maintenance engineers and inspectors

• Security services

• Flight engineers

• Medical staff

• Service providers and aircraft suppliers

It is our opinion that survey findings should become an important part of the CAA’s business planning, highlighting areas in which it is doing well, as well as those that need to be focused on and improved. To cite an example of how another Government department actively seeks feedback from its clients, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has, for many years, had a system in place whereby after every investigation, an inspector is required to send a client satisfaction survey to all parties involved. In similar manner, it would be a very valuable tool for the Director of the CAA to receive feedback on, to quote just one example, the knowledge and performance of auditors and the way they interrelate with aircraft operators and aircraft maintenance facilities.

A client feedback system also provides valuable information to the various senior managers of departments to gauge the performance of individual staff members for the purposes of their yearly performance reviews.

The importance of the feedback emanating from client satisfaction surveys is that it also allows the Minister to head off problems similar to that being currently experienced in Australia. An alliance of Australia's major aviation association bodies has called on the government to reform the aviation regulator CASA and to put in place a 100-day plan to help revive the country's flagging general aviation industry.

In the UK, as a result of extensive feedback from cross-sector aviation groups, the British Government in April 2011 initiated an aviation “cut the red tape challenge” which has been specifically aimed at the smaller operators and businesses for whom regulatory issues can be frustrating and restrictive. The general aviation theme was open and rather than be presented with a list of specific regulations, participants were able to comment on issues faced in the following themes:

• general aviation pilots

• general aviation airfields

• maintenance

• Civil Aviation Authority

• airspace management

  The GAA is a social network of more than 2000 pilots, engineers and operators. It exists to help protect and promote New Zealand general aviation.

• training and instruction

• historic aircraft

• innovation

As it is now more than 13 years since stakeholders have been given the opportunity to express their level of satisfaction with the performance of the Authority, it is our wish that the Board gives full and earnest consideration to instructing the Chief Executive to:

1) Re-introduce client satisfaction surveys so that areas that need to be focused on can have improvements tracked.

2) Introduce a client satisfaction survey that is sent to the party involved at the end of all audits, medical conclusions, airworthiness issues, pilot licensing and in particular those interactions which have not been of a straightforward and routine nature.

3) Consult with the Minister with the view to introducing an aviation “cut the red tape challenge” in similar manner to the very successful UK model.

Yours sincerely

Des Lines Co-principal

s-so4s-0 I /5 (Dw1 342366-0)

9 February 2017

crynIl ctvtL AVtATtoN AUTHORTTY

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Des LinesCo-principalGeneral Aviation Advocacy Group of New Zealandll99 Tram RoadSwannanoaRD6Ransiora 7476

Dear Mr Lines

GAA Glient Satisfaction Surveys

Thank you for your letter on this topic dated 13 January 2017 . Your interest in surveys istopical as the CAA will shortly be repeating its flagship 'Feel Safe' survey conducted byColmar Brunton. Management are currently planning on supplementing the survey, or evensplitting its content, so that while retaining its prior focus on the CAA's ultimate customer(the public) it also provides more information from the aviation sector. As you will be aware,at the end of each audit or inspection, the CAA already surveys the parties involved in orderto gather information on their views on the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulatoryintervention they have just been involved in. While that provides limited information aboutthe performance of one regulatory function, we are interested in gathering a broader range ofviews to inform risk management and decision-making. Both the management and Board ofthe Authority recognise the importance of such information from the sector to inform ourplanning and improvement efforts. In part, this is one of the reasons we place so muchimportance on the relationship with representative bodies like the Aviation CommunityAdvisory Group.

On the information theme, please note that management is also introducing a 'balancedscorecard' to improve the information available on organisational performance. While not yetcomplete, over the next 12 months you can expect to see information being sought from thesector and others to inform the assessment of matters such as regulatory effectiveness,efficiency and regulatory burden. A final factor, which unfortunately might introduce somerisk of 'survey fatigue', will be the planned replacement of the Authority's business systemsin coming years. During this process we will seek considerable input from the sector on theirpreferences for how we interact with them, to inform the design of new business processes.

Finally, you raise the issue of the UK 'red tape reduction' model. This is already a well-established concept within the Authority. I point to the content of the 'Small Issues' ruleproject in the current rules programme to illustrate outcomes from this approach. There are atleast two elements of that project: the reduction in the frequency of reviews of airworthinessfor standard category aircraft engaged exclusively in recreational activity and the removal ofthe requirement for balloons with a capacity in excess of 10 persons to be maintained by a

Ef;J tevel 1 5, 55 Featherston Street, Wellington 601 1 - PO Box 3555, Wellington 6140, New Zealand

fff fet: +64 4 560 9100, Fax: +64 4 569 2021, Email: info@caa.govt.nz, Web: www.caa.How.nzNewZeatand Government

2.

Part I45 organisation that result from the desire to minimise uffeasonable regulatory burden.In addition, while the CAA does not determine the content of the rule development/amendment programme, we will be recommending the inclusion of a rules project to changethe medical certification standard for PPLs in the next (20I7l18) rules programme.

Given the above, I am confident that the issues you raise are already under action or areplanned for the near future.

Yours sincerely

fu"Nigel GouldChairman

Published by the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand

Part 12 CAA Consolidation

30 October 2017

Accidents, Incidents, and Statistics

Civil Aviation Rules Part 12 CAA Consolidation

This document is the current consolidated version of Part 12 produced by the Civil Aviation Authority, and serves as a reference only. It is compiled from the official ordinary rules that have been signed into law by the Minister of Transport. Copies of the official rule and amendments as signed by the Minister of Transport may be obtained from the Civil Aviation Authority or may be downloaded from the official web site at: www.caa.govt.nz

30 October 2017 2 CAA of NZ

DESCRIPTION

Part 12 prescribes rules for the – · notification, investigation, and reporting of accidents and incidents · preservation of aircraft, aircraft contents, and aircraft records

following an accident or serious accident · reporting of aircraft operating and statistical data

Civil Aviation Rules Part 12 CAA Consolidation

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Bulletin This Part first came into force on 1 April 1997 and now incorporates the following amendments: Amendment 1 30 April 1999 Amendment 2 22 June 2006 Amendment 2 (corrected version)

22 June 2006

Amendment 3 9 October 2008 Amendment 4 23 October 2008 Amendment 5 25 March 2010 Amendment 6 1 November 2010 Amendment 7 10 November 2011 Amendment 8 1 August 2015 Amendment 9 Amendment 10

24 September 2015 30 October 2017

Summary of amendments: Amendment 1 Rule 12.151 is revoked and

substituted.

Amendment 2 (3/CAR/4)

Amendment 2 (Corrected version)

Rules 12.1, 12.3, 12.55, 12.57, 12.59 and 12.105 are revoked and substituted.

Corrects 12.51(b) to reinstate paragraphs (13) and (14).

Amendment 3 (4/CAR/3)

The definition of cargo security incident is inserted in rule 12.3, rule 12.55 is revoked and replaced, paragraph (h) of Appendix A is revoked and replaced, new paragraph (i) is inserted.

Amendment 4 (99/CAR/1333 & 99/CAR/1334)

Rules 12.1, 12.3, 12.55 and 12.103 are revoked and replaced. Appendix A is revoked and replaced.

Amendment 5 The definition of Flight crew

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(9/CAR/1) member is revoked. Rule 12.55 is revoked and replaced.

Amendment 6 (EDTO – Docket 0/CAR/1354)

Rule 12.55 and Appendix A are revoked and replaced.

Amendment 7 (5/CAR/1)

Rules 12.1, 12.55 and 12.151 are revoked and replaced.

Amendment 8 (15/CAR/1)

Rule 12.1(b)(1) replaced.

Amendment 9 (14/CAR/3) Amendment 10 (16/CAR/10)

Rule 12.151 replaced.

The definition of Freight is inserted after the definition of Facility malfunction incident, rule 12.151 is revoked and replaced.

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List of Rules

Subpart A — General 6 12.1 Purpose ................................................................................................ 6 12.3 Definitions ........................................................................................... 6

Subpart B — Notification, Investigation, and Reporting, of Occurrences 9 12.51 Notification of accident........................................................................ 9 12.53 Details of accident ............................................................................. 10 12.55 Notification of incident ...................................................................... 10 12.57 Details of incident .............................................................................. 13 12.59 Investigation and reporting ................................................................ 13 12.61 Confidentiality of persons submitting information ............................ 14 12.63 Non-prosecution ................................................................................ 14

Subpart C — Preservation of Aircraft, its Contents, and Records 15 12.101 Access to aircraft involved in an accident .......................................... 15 12.103 Preservation of records ...................................................................... 16 12.105 Retention of defective products and components ............................... 16

Subpart D — Statistics 17 12.151 Aircraft operating statistics ................................................................ 17 12.153 Confidentiality of statistical reports ................................................... 19

Appendix A — Information Required for Initial Notification of Incidents 20

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Subpart A — General 12.1 Purpose (a) Subject to paragraph (b), this Part prescribes rules for the—

(1) notification, investigation, and reporting of accidents and incidents; and

(2) preservation of aircraft, aircraft contents, and aircraft records following an accident or serious incident; and

(3) preservation of records relating to an accident, facility malfunction incident, an airspace incident, or a promulgated information incident; and

(4) reporting of aircraft operating and statistical data.

(b) This Part does not apply to an incident that is associated with any of the following operations that are not conducted under the authority of an adventure aviation operator certificate issued by the Director under the Act and Part 115:

(1) gyrogliders and parasails, unmanned aircraft, kites, and rockets operated under Parts 101 and 102.

(2) microlight aircraft operated under Part 103:

(3) gliders operated under Part 104:

(4) parachutes operated under Part 105:

(5) hang gliders operated under Part 106.

12.3 Definitions In this Part—

Aircraft incident means any incident, not otherwise classified, associated with the operation of an aircraft:

Aerodrome incident means an incident involving an aircraft operation and—

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(1) an obstruction either on the aerodrome operational area or protruding into the aerodrome obstacle limitation surfaces; or

(2) a defective visual aid; or

(3) a defective surface of a manoeuvring area; or

(4) any other defective aerodrome facility:

Airspace incident means an incident involving deviation from, or shortcomings of, the procedures or rules for—

(1) avoiding a collision between aircraft; or

(2) avoiding a collision between aircraft and other obstacles when an aircraft is being provided with an Air Traffic Service:

Bird incident means an incident where—

(1) there is a collision between an aircraft and one or more birds; or

(2) when one or more birds pass sufficiently close to an aircraft in flight to cause alarm to the pilot:

Cargo security incident means an incident involving cargo or mail that is carried, or has been accepted by a regulated air cargo agent or an air operator for carriage, by air on an aircraft conducting an international regular air transport operation passenger service, and—

(1) there is evidence of tampering or suspected tampering with the cargo or mail which could be an act or an attempted act of unlawful interference; or

(2) a weapon, explosive, or other dangerous device, article or substance, that may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference is detected in the cargo or mail:

Dangerous goods incident means an incident associated with and related to the carriage of dangerous goods by air after acceptance by the operator, that—

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(1) results in injury to a person, property damage, fire, breakage, spillage, leakage of fluid or radiation, or other evidence that the integrity of the packaging has not been maintained; or

(2) involves dangerous goods incorrectly declared, packaged, labelled, marked, or documented:

Defect incident means an incident that involves failure or malfunction of an aircraft or aircraft component, whether found in flight or on the ground:

Fatal injury means any injury which results in death within 30 days of the accident:

Facility malfunction incident means an incident that involves an aeronautical facility:

Freight means any property carried on an aircraft from one location for the purpose of unloading at another location.

Occurrence means an accident or incident:

Promulgated information incident means an incident that involves significantly incorrect, inadequate, or misleading information or aeronautical data promulgated in an aeronautical information publication, map, chart, or otherwise provided for the operation of an aircraft:

Prosecution investigation means an investigation carried out to establish whether an offence against the Act has been committed:

Security incident means an incident that involves unlawful interference:

Serious incident means an incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred:

Serious injury means any injury that is sustained by a person in an accident and that—

(1) requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; or

(2) results in a fracture of any bone, except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose; or

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(3) involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; or

(4) involves injury to an internal organ; or

(5) involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5% of the body surface; or

(6) involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation:

TAIC means the Transport Accident Investigation Commission, which is established by section 3 of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990.

Subpart B — Notification, Investigation, and Reporting, of Occurrences

12.51 Notification of accident (a) Each pilot-in-command of an aircraft that is involved in an accident or, if that person is fatally or seriously injured, or if the aircraft is missing, the operator, shall notify the Authority of the accident as soon as practicable.

(b) The notification under paragraph (a) shall be in a manner acceptable to the Authority and contain, where ascertainable, the—

(1) date and time of the accident; and

(2) nature of the accident; and

(3) type, nationality, and registration marks of the aircraft; and

(4) names of the aircraft owner and operator; and

(5) position or last known position of the aircraft with reference to an easily defined geographical point; and

(6) name of the pilot-in-command of the aircraft; and

(7) type of operation; and

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(8) last point of departure of the aircraft; and

(9) next point of intended landing of the aircraft; and

(10) description of the sky condition, precipitation, wind velocity, and visibility; and

(11) number of persons on board the aircraft; and

(12) number of crew and passengers killed or seriously injured as a result of the accident; and

(13) number of persons killed or seriously injured as a result of the accident that were not crew or passengers; and

(14) details of damage to the aircraft.

12.53 Details of accident (a) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft that is involved in an accident or, if that person is fatally or seriously injured, the operator, shall provide the occurrence details requested on form CA005 to the Authority within 10 days of the accident—

(1) on form CA005; or

(2) by a means acceptable to the Authority.

(b) The details required by paragraph (a) shall include a statement by each flight crew member who was on the aircraft at the time of the accident, detailing the facts, conditions, and circumstances relating to the accident.

(c) Where a flight crew member is incapacitated, the statement required by paragraph (b) shall be submitted as soon as the flight crew member is able.

12.55 Notification of incident (a) A holder of a certificate issued by the Director under the Act and the following Parts must notify the Authority as soon as practicable of any associated incident if the certificate holder is involved in the incident and the incident is a serious incident or is an immediate hazard to the safety of an aircraft operation:

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(1) Parts 115, 119, 129 and 137— aircraft incident, or dangerous goods incident:

(2) Part 172— airspace incident:

(3) Parts 171 and 174 — facility malfunction incident:

(4) Parts 19, 47, 115, 119, 129, 137, 145, 146, and 148 — defect incident:

(5) Parts 119, 129, 139, 140, 171, and 172 — security incident:

(6) Part 139 — aerodrome incident:

(7) Parts 139, 171, 173, 174, and 175 — promulgated information incident:

(8) Parts 119, 129, and 109 — cargo security incident.

(b) A person who is involved in an incident that is a serious incident or an immediate hazard to the safety of an aircraft operation must notify the Authority of the incident as soon as practicable if the person—

(1) operates, maintains, services, or does any other act in respect of an aircraft, aeronautical product, or aviation related service; and

(2) is not employed by, or associated with, the holder of a certificate referred to in paragraph (a); or

(3) has responsibilities under Part 95.

(c) A pilot-in-command of an aircraft that is involved in an airspace incident or a bird incident must notify the Authority of the incident as soon as practicable if the incident is a serious incident or an immediate hazard to the safety of an aircraft operation.

(d) The notification of an incident required by paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) must be conveyed by a means acceptable to the Authority and contain, where ascertainable, information in accordance with the following:

(1) for an airspace incident, Appendix A(a):

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(2) for a defect incident, Appendix A(b):

(3) for a facility malfunction incident, Appendix A(c):

(4) for an aircraft incident, Appendix A(d):

(5) for a security incident, Appendix A(e):

(6) for a promulgated information incident, Appendix A(f):

(7) for an aerodrome incident, Appendix A(g):

(8) for a cargo security incident, Appendix A(h):

(9) for a dangerous goods incident, bird incident, or any other incident, Appendix A(i).

(e) Despite paragraph (a), a holder of—

(1) an air operator certificate issued by the Director under the Act and Part 119 must notify the Authority of an aircraft incident or a defect incident within 72 hours of the incident occurring if the incident is associated with an aircraft that is performing or is used to perform an EDTO and the incident involves—

(i) an in-flight shutdown of a propulsion system; or

(ii) a diversion or a turn back; or

(iii) an in flight, inadvertent fuel loss or unavailability of fuel or an un-correctable fuel imbalance; or

(iv) a malfunction of an EDTO significant system; or

(v) any other occurrence which affects the safety of an EDTO; and

(2) an aircraft maintenance organisation certificate issued under the Act and in accordance with Part 145 must notify the Authority of a defect incident within 72 hours of the incident occurring if the incident is associated with an aircraft that is used to perform an EDTO and—

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(i) the incident involves a malfunction of an EDTO significant system; or

(ii) any other defect that could affect the safety of an aircraft performing an EDTO.

12.57 Details of incident

(a) Notwithstanding the notification of a serious incident or an immediate hazard to the safety of an aircraft operation under rule 12.55, the following persons who are involved in an incident must provide the Authority with the applicable details of the incident in accordance with information requested on the applicable form specified in paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2):

(1) a holder of a certificate referred to in rule 12.55(a):

(2) a person referred to in rule 12.55(b):

(3) a pilot-in-command referred to in rule 12.55(c).

(b) A person who is required under paragraph (a) to provide the Authority with details of an incident must provide those details within 14 days of the incident—

(1) on form CA005; or

(2) on form CA005D for a defect incident; or

(3) by another means that is acceptable to the Authority.

12.59 Investigation and reporting A holder of a certificate referred to in rule 12.55(a) who is required to provide details of an incident to the Authority under rule 12.57 must, unless otherwise notified by the Authority,—

(1) subject to section 14 of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990, conduct an investigation to identify the facts relating to its involvement in the incident and establish, so far as those facts allow, the cause or causes of the incident; and

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(2) on completion of the investigation, submit a report of the investigation to the Authority no later than 90 days after the incident—

(i) on form CA005; or

(ii) on form CA005D for a defect incident; or

(iii) by a means acceptable to the Authority; and

(3) advise the Authority of any actions taken to prevent recurrence of a similar incident.

12.61 Confidentiality of persons submitting information The Authority shall, when confidentiality is requested by a person submitting information under 12.55 or 12.57—

(1) as soon as practicable, remove any information that might reveal the identity of the source; and

(2) not make any other record of the information removed under subparagraph (1).

12.63 Non-prosecution The Authority shall not use or make available for the purpose of prosecution investigation or for prosecution action any information submitted to it by a person under this Part unless—

(1) the information reveals an act or omission that caused unnecessary danger to any other person or to any property; or

(2) false information is submitted; or

(3) the Authority is obliged to release the information pursuant to a statutory requirement or by order of a Court.

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Subpart C — Preservation of Aircraft, its Contents, and Records

12.101 Access to aircraft involved in an accident (a) Except as provided in the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990, and paragraphs (b) and (c), no person shall access, interfere with, or remove, an aircraft or its contents that is involved in an accident unless authorised to do so by the Authority.

(b) Subject to the limitations contained in the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990, the Authority may, for the purpose of its investigation, access, inspect, secure, or remove, an aircraft or its contents that is involved in an accident.

(c) A person may, subject to paragraph (d)—

(1) remove persons or livestock from the aircraft or wreckage; or

(2) protect the aircraft, wreckage, or contents, including mail or cargo, from further damage; or

(3) disconnect or deactivate any cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, or emergency location transmitter; or

(4) prevent obstruction to the public or to air navigation where no practical alternative is available.

(d) Any aircraft wreckage, mail, or cargo removed under paragraph (c) shall—

(1) be moved only so far as necessary to ensure its safety; and

(2) be kept in separate distinct areas to indicate from which part in the aircraft it has been taken; and

(3) where possible, have sketches, descriptive notes, and photographs made of their original position and any significant impact marks.

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12.103 Preservation of records (a) The holder of a certificate of registration of an aircraft that is involved in a serious incident or accident must preserve all records, including all recording media maintained for the operation and maintenance of the aircraft, for at least 14 days after the serious incident or accident unless otherwise notified by the Authority.

(b) The holder of a certificate issued in accordance with—

(1) Part 171 that is involved in a facility malfunction incident or an accident; or

(2) Part 172 that is involved in an airspace incident or an accident; or

(3) Part 173 that is involved in a promulgated information incident or an accident;

must preserve all records, including log entries, electronic recordings, technical and other relevant data relating to the incident or accident for at least 14 days after the incident or accident unless otherwise notified by the Authority.

(c) A person who is involved in a promulgated information incident or an accident involving responsibilities under Part 95 must preserve all records, including log entries, electronic recordings, technical and other relevant data relating to the incident or accident for at least 14 days after the incident or accident unless otherwise notified by the Authority.

12.105 Retention of defective products and components A holder of a certificate of registration for an aircraft, and a holder of a certificate issued in accordance with Part 145, Part 146, or Part 148 who is required to submit a defect incident report to the Authority under rule 12.59(2) must retain the defective product or component that is associated with the defect incident for a period of at least 14 days after submitting the report unless otherwise notified by the Authority.

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Subpart D — Statistics 12.151 Aircraft operating statistics (a) Except for gliders that are not being operated for hire or reward, an operator of an aircraft must provide the statistical data and information for each aircraft as specified in Table 1, and at the periods and due dates specified in Table 2 for an aircraft being operated for hire or reward, and Table 3 for aircraft that are not being operated for hire or reward.

Table 1 – Statistical data and information required for each type of aircraft operation:

Aircraft Operation Statistical Data and Information

New Zealand registered aircraft operated on air operations to, from, and within countries outside New Zealand

· aircraft registration marking · the hours flown · the number of flights carrying

passengers · the number of flights carrying

freight only · the total tonnage of freight carried

on all freight-only flights

New Zealand registered aircraft operated on domestic air operations

· aircraft registration marking · the hours flown · the number of flights carrying

passengers between 2 different aerodromes

· the number of flights carrying passengers originating and ending at the same aerodrome without an intermediate landing

· the number of flights carrying freight only

· the total tonnage of freight carried on all freight-only flights

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Non-New Zealand registered aircraft operated on freight-only air operations from, and within New Zealand

· aircraft registration marking · the number of flights carrying

freight- only flight · the total tonnage of freight carried

on all freight-only flights

Aircraft operated on an adventure aviation operation (other than parachutes)

· aircraft registration marking or aircraft identification markings if the aircraft is not required to be registered in accordance with Part 47

· the hours flown · the number of flights carrying

passengers

Parachutes used on an adventure aviation operation

· the parachute identification marking

· the number of tandem parachute descents

New Zealand registered aircraft issued with a standard category airworthiness certificate or a restricted category airworthiness certificate used on other operations not listed above.

· aircraft registration marking · the hours flown

Table 2 – Reporting periods for aircraft that perform any hire or reward operations:

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Report Period Covered Due Date

1st Quarter 1 Jan through 31 Mar 1 May

2nd Quarter 1 Apr through 30 Jun 1 Aug

3rd Quarter 1 Jul through 30 Sep 1 Nov

4th Quarter 1 Oct through 31 Dec 1 Feb

Table 3 – Reporting periods for aircraft that do not perform any hire or reward operations:

Report Period Covered Due Date

Annual 1 Jan through 31 Dec 1 Feb

(b) The reports required by paragraph (a) must be submitted—

(1) on form CAA605; or

(2) by electronic or other means acceptable to the Director.

(c) To avoid doubt, an operator of an aircraft that has not flown during the reporting period specified in either Table 2 or Table 3 must continue to submit aircraft operating statistics for that aircraft.

12.153 Confidentiality of statistical reports (a) The Authority or any person employed by the Authority shall not communicate to any person outside the Authority any information provided in statistical reports that identifies any individual aircraft operator except—

(1) with the consent of the aircraft operator; or

(2) in accordance with Article 67 of the Convention; or

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(3) pursuant to a statutory requirement.

(b) The Authority may provide to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation statistics that relate to international air transport operations.

Appendix A — Information Required for Initial Notification of Incidents

(a) Airspace incident – The following information is required for notification of an airspace incident under rule 12.55(d)(1):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of events:

(3) aircraft nationality, registration, radio call sign, flight number, and type:

(4) name of the aircraft operator:

(5) aircraft position and altitude:

(6) name of the pilot-in-command:

(7) phase of flight:

(8) effect on flight:

(9) flight rules under which the aircraft was operating:

(10) aircraft point of departure and destination:

(11) location, type, and class of airspace, and the ATS unit involved:

(12) any other relevant information submitted by the pilot concerned.

(b) Defect incident – The following information is required for notification of a defect incident under rule 12.55(d)(2):

(1) date and time the incident was detected:

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(2) brief description of events:

(3) aircraft nationality, registration, and type:

(4) name of the aircraft operator and owner:

(5) location of the aircraft, part, or equipment at the time of the incident:

(6) phase of flight:

(7) effect on flight:

(8) aircraft point of departure and destination:

(9) name of the manufacturer of the aircraft, part, or equipment, and where appropriate, the part number, its modification standard, and its location on the aircraft:

(10) description of the incident, its effects, and any other relevant information:

(11) whether the person or organisation making the notification has instituted an investigation into the defect and expected time of completion:

(12) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(c) Facility malfunction incident – The following information is required for notification of a facility malfunction incident under rule 12.55(d)(3):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of events:

(3) aircraft nationality, registration, radio call sign, flight number, and type:

(4) name of the aircraft operator:

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(5) aircraft position and altitude:

(6) name of aerodrome and runway used:

(7) name of the pilot-in-command:

(8) phase of flight:

(9) effect on the flight:

(10) identification, type, name, frequency, and provider of the aeronautical telecommunication facility involved:

(11) whether the person or organisation making the notification has instituted an investigation into the incident and, if so, expected time of completion:

(12) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(d) Aircraft incident – The following information is required for notification of an aircraft incident under rule 12.55(d)(4):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of events:

(3) aircraft nationality, registration, radio call sign, flight number, and type:

(4) name of the aircraft operator and owner:

(5) aircraft position and altitude:

(6) phase of flight:

(7) if applicable, name of aerodrome and runway used:

(8) effect on the flight:

(9) name of the pilot-in-command:

(10) type of operation being conducted:

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(11) number of persons on board the aircraft:

(12) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(e) Security incident – The following information is required for notification of a security incident under rule 12.55(d)(5):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of events:

(3) aircraft nationality, registration, radio call sign, flight number, and type:

(4) name of the aircraft operator and owner:

(5) aircraft position and altitude or place of incident:

(6) name of the aerodrome or aeronautical telecommunication facility if applicable:

(7) name of the pilot-in-command:

(8) phase of flight:

(9) effect on the flight:

(10) type of operation being conducted:

(11) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(f) Promulgated information incident – The following information is required for notification of a promulgated information incident under rule 12.55(d)(6):

(1) date and time the incident was discovered:

(2) brief description of events:

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(3) details to identify the publication, map, chart, or other means by which the information or aeronautical data was promulgated:

(4) details relating to the information or aeronautical data that gave rise to the incident:

(5) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(g) Aerodrome incident – The following information is required for notification of an aerodrome incident under rule 12.55(d)(7):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of events:

(3) name of the aerodrome:

(4) description and the location of the reported defect or obstruction:

(5) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(h) Cargo security incident – the following information is required for notification of a cargo security incident under rule 12.55(d)(8):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of the nature of the incident:

(3) details, if known, of where the incident may have occurred:

(4) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

(i) Dangerous goods, bird, or other incident – The following information is required for notification of a dangerous goods, bird, or any other incident under rule 12.55(d)(9):

(1) date and time of the incident:

(2) brief description of events:

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(3) name, organisation, and contact details of the person notifying the incident.

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