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Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 1 Chapter 20: Firewalls Chapter 20: Firewalls Special Thanks to our friends at The Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden for providing the basis for these slides.

Fall 2004CS 395: Computer Security1 Chapter 20: Firewalls Special Thanks to our friends at The Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden for providing the

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Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 1

Chapter 20: FirewallsChapter 20: Firewalls

Special Thanks to our friends at

The Blekinge Institute of Technology, Sweden for

providing the basis for these slides.

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 2

OutlineOutline

• Firewall Design Principles– Firewall Characteristics– Types of Firewalls– Firewall Configurations

• Trusted Systems– Data Access Control– The Concept of Trusted systems– Trojan Horse Defense

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 3

FirewallsFirewalls• Effective means of protection a local

system or network of systems from network-based security threats while affording access to the outside world via WANs or the Internet

• Information systems undergo a steady evolution (from small LAN`s to Internet connectivity)

• Strong security features for all workstations and servers not established

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 4

Why?Why?

• Systems provide many services by default– Many workstations provide remote access to

files and configuration databases (for ease of management and file sharing)

– Even if configured only for specific users, they can sometimes be tricked into providing services they shouldn’t

• E.g. missing bounds check in input parsers

– Also, users sometimes forget to close temporary holes

• E.g. leaving file system remote mountable for file sharing

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 5

Why?Why?• Firewalls enforce policies that centrally

manage access to services in ways that workstations should, but don’t

• Which services?– Finger– telnet: requires authentication, but password sent in

clear– rlogin: similar to telnet, but uses IP address based

authentication (Bad!)– ftp: Tricky because two connections, control channel

from sender, and data connection from receiver. (passsive ftp has both sender originated)

– X Windows– ICMP

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 6

Firewall DesignFirewall DesignPrinciplesPrinciples

• The firewall is inserted between the premises network and the Internet

• Aims:– Establish a controlled link– Protect the premises network from

Internet-based attacks– Provide a single choke point

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 7

Firewall CharacteristicsFirewall Characteristics• Design goals:

– All traffic from inside to outside must pass through the firewall (physically blocking all access to the local network except via the firewall)

– Only authorized traffic (defined by the local security police) will be allowed to pass

– The firewall itself is immune to penetration (use of trusted system with a secure operating system)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 8

Firewall CharacteristicsFirewall Characteristics• Four general techniques:• Service control

– Determines the types of Internet services that can be accessed, inbound or outbound

• Direction control– Determines the direction in which

particular service requests are allowed to flow

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 9

Firewall CharacteristicsFirewall Characteristics

• User control– Controls access to a service according

to which user is attempting to access it

• Behavior control– Controls how particular services are

used (e.g. filter e-mail)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 10

Firewall LimitationsFirewall Limitations• Cannot protect against attacks that

bypass the firewall– E.g. an internal modem pool

• Firewall does not protect against internal threats

• Firewall cannot protect against transfer of virus infected programs– Too many different apps and operating

systems supported to make it practical to scan all incoming files for viruses

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 11

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls

• Three common types of Firewalls:– Packet-filtering routers– Application-level gateways– Circuit-level gateways– (Bastion host)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 12

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls

• Packet-filtering Router

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 13

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Packet-filtering Router

– Applies a set of rules to each incoming IP packet and then forwards or discards the packet

– Filter packets going in both directions– The packet filter is typically set up as

a list of rules based on matches to fields in the IP or TCP header

– Two default policies (discard or forward)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 14

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Advantages:

– Simplicity– Transparency to users– High speed

• Disadvantages:– Difficulty of setting up packet filter rules– Lack of Authentication

• Who really sent the packet?

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 15

Firewalls – Packet FiltersFirewalls – Packet Filters

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 16

Firewalls – Packet FiltersFirewalls – Packet Filters

• Can be clever:– Allow connections initiated from inside

network to outside, but not initiated from outside.

• Traffic flows both way, but if firewall only allows incoming packets with ACK set in TCP header, this manages the issue.

• Problem: some apps require outside node to initiate connection with inside node (e.g. ftp, Xwindows), even if original request initiated by inside node.

• Solution (sort of): allow packets from outside if they are connecting to high port number.

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 17

Stateful Packet FilterStateful Packet Filter• Changes filtering rules dynamically (by

remembering what has happened in recent past)

• Example: Connection initiated from inside node s to outside IP address d. For short time allow incoming connections from d to appropriate ports (I.e. ftp port).

• In practice, much more caution– Stateful filter notices the incoming port requested

by s and only allows connections from d to that port. Requires parsing ftp control packets

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 18

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls

• Possible attacks and appropriate countermeasures– IP address spoofing

• Discard packet with inside source address if it arrives on external interface

– Source routing attacks• Discard all source routed packets

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 19

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Possible attacks and

appropriate countermeasures– Tiny fragment attacks

• Intruder uses IP fragment option to create extremely small IP packets that force TCP header information into separate packet fragments

• Discard all packets where protocol type is TCP and IP fragment offset is small

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 20

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls

• Application-level Gateway

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 21

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Application-level Gateway

– Also called proxy server– Acts as a relay of application-level traffic– Can act as router, but typically placed

between two packet filtering firewalls (for total of three boxes)

• Two firewalls are routers that refuse to forward anything from the global net that is not to gateway, and anything to global net that is not from gateway.

• Sometimes called a bastion host (we use the term differently)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 22

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Advantages:

– Higher security than packet filters– Only need to scrutinize a few

allowable applications– Easy to log and audit all incoming

traffic

• Disadvantages:– Additional processing overhead on

each connection (gateway as splice point)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 23

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls

• Circuit-level Gateway

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 24

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Circuit-level Gateway

– Stand-alone system or– Specialized function performed by an

Application-level Gateway– Sets up two TCP connections– The gateway typically relays TCP

segments from one connection to the other without examining the contents

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 25

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls• Circuit-level Gateway

– The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed

– Typically use is a situation in which the system administrator trusts the internal users

– An example is the SOCKS package

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 26

Types of FirewallsTypes of Firewalls

• Bastion Host– A system identified by the firewall

administrator as a critical strong point in the network´s security

– The bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level or circuit-level gateway

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 27

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• In addition to the use of simple configuration of a single system (single packet filtering router or single gateway), more complex configurations are possible

• Three common configurations

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 28

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Screened host firewall system (single-homed bastion host)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 29

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration

• Firewall consists of two systems:– A packet-filtering router– A bastion host

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 30

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Configuration for the packet-filtering router:– Only packets from and to the bastion

host are allowed to pass through the router

• The bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 31

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Greater security than single configurations because:– This configuration implements both

packet-level and application-level filtering (allowing for flexibility in defining security policy)

– An intruder must generally penetrate two separate systems

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 32

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• This configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access (public information server, e.g. Web server)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 33

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Screened host firewall system (dual-homed bastion host)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 34

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration– If the packet-filtering router is

completely compromised, you’re still OK

– Traffic between the Internet and other hosts on the private network has to flow through the bastion host

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 35

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Screened-subnet firewall system

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 36

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Screened subnet firewall configuration– Most secure configuration of the three– Two packet-filtering routers are used– Creation of an isolated sub-network

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 37

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Advantages:– Three levels of defense to thwart

intruders– The outside router advertises only the

existence of the screened subnet to the Internet (internal network is invisible to the Internet)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 38

Firewall ConfigurationsFirewall Configurations

• Advantages:– The inside router advertises only the

existence of the screened subnet to the internal network (the systems on the inside network cannot construct direct routes to the Internet)• Reduces ``chewyness’’ of inside

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 39

Why Firewalls Don’t WorkWhy Firewalls Don’t Work• Assume all bad guys are on outside, and

everyone inside can be trusted.• Firewalls can be defeated if malicious

code can be injected into corporate network– E.g. trick someone into launching an

executable from an email message or into downloading something from the net.

• Often make it difficult for legitimate users to get their work done. – Misconfiguration, failure to recognize new

app

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 40

Why Firewalls Don’t WorkWhy Firewalls Don’t Work• If firewall allows anything through,

people figure out how to do what they need by disguising their traffic as allowed traffic– E.g. file transfer by sending it through

email. If size of emails limited, then user breaks them into chunks, etc.

– Firewall friendly traffic (e.g. using http for other purposes)

• Defeats effort of sysadmin to control traffic • Less efficient than not using http

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 41

Trusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• One way to enhance the ability of a system to defend against intruders and malicious programs is to implement trusted system technology

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 42

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Through the user access control procedure (log on), a user can be identified to the system

• Associated with each user, there can be a profile that specifies permissible operations and file accesses

• The operation system can enforce rules based on the user profile

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 43

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• General models of access control:– Access matrix– Access control list– Capability list

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 44

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Access Matrix

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 45

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Access Matrix: Basic elements of the model– Subject: An entity capable of accessing

objects, the concept of subject equates with that of process

– Object: Anything to which access is controlled (e.g. files, programs)

– Access right: The way in which an object is accessed by a subject (e.g. read, write, execute)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 46

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Access Control List: Decomposition of the matrix by columns

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 47

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Access Control List– An access control list lists users and

their permitted access right– The list may contain a default or

public entry

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 48

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Capability list: Decomposition of the matrix by rows

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 49

Data Access ControlData Access Control

• Capability list– A capability ticket specifies

authorized objects and operations for a user

– Each user have a number of tickets

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 50

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• Trusted Systems– Protection of data and resources on

the basis of levels of security (e.g. military)

– Users can be granted clearances to access certain categories of data

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 51

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• Multilevel security– Definition of multiple categories or levels of

data

• A multilevel secure system must enforce:– No read up: A subject can only read an

object of less or equal security level (Simple Security Property)

– No write down: A subject can only write into an object of greater or equal security level (*-Property)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 52

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• Reference Monitor Concept: Multilevel security for a data processing system

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 53

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 54

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• Reference Monitor– Controlling element in the hardware

and operating system of a computer that regulates the access of subjects to objects on basis of security parameters

– The monitor has access to a file (security kernel database)

– The monitor enforces the security rules (no read up, no write down)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 55

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• Properties of the Reference Monitor– Complete mediation: Security rules are

enforced on every access– Isolation: The reference monitor and

database are protected from unauthorized modification

– Verifiability: The reference monitor’s correctness must be provable (mathematically)

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 56

The Concept ofThe Concept ofTrusted SystemsTrusted Systems

• A system that can provide such verifications (properties) is referred to as a trusted system

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 57

Trojan Horse DefenseTrojan Horse Defense

• Secure, trusted operating systems are one way to secure against Trojan Horse attacks

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 58

Trojan Horse DefenseTrojan Horse Defense

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 59

Trojan Horse DefenseTrojan Horse Defense

Fall 2004 CS 395: Computer Security 60

Recommended ReadingRecommended Reading

• Chapman, D., and Zwicky, E. Building Internet Firewalls. O’Reilly, 1995

• Cheswick, W., and Bellovin, S. Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison-Wesley, 2000

• Gasser, M. Building a Secure Computer System. Reinhold, 1988

• Pfleeger, C. Security in Computing. Prentice Hall, 1997