Fao-human Dimension of the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries

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Cover photos: (from top left, clockwise)

A woman collects salted fish at a fishing village, Pante Raja Barat, Pante Raja subdistrict in Pidie, Indonesia(FAO/A. Berry). Fishermen in India who lost their homes, boats and livelihoods in the 2004 tsunami try to catchfish with nets in front of boats destroyed during the tsunami (FAO/A. Vitale). A Cambodian fishing village(courtesy of A. Charles). Sunset on the coast of British Columbia, Canada (courtesy of A. Charles). A view of amarina in Mexico (courtesy of A. Charles).

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Human dimensions ofthe ecosystem approachto fisheries: an overviewof context, concepts,tools and methods

byCassandra De YoungFishery Policy AnalystFisheries and Aquaculture Economics and Policy DivisionFAO Fisheries and Aquaculture DepartmentRome, Italy

Anthony Charles

FAO Visiting ExpertManagement Science/Environmental StudiesSaint Mary’s UniversityHalifax, Nova Scotia, Canada

Antonia HjortFAO VolunteerMunkarp, Sweden

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Rome, 2008

FAOFISHERIES

TECHNICALPAPER

489





iii

Prparati ti ct

This overview o social, economic and institutional aspects o an ecosystem approachto isheries (EAF) was initially prepared to acilitate the work o the FAO ExpertConsultation on the Social, Economic and Institutional Considerations o Applying theEcosystem Approach to Fisheries held in Rome, Italy, rom 6 to 9 June 2006. The reportwas used as the primary background material and source o concepts and reerences or thesupplemental EAF guidelines discussed at the meeting. Comments and additional inputs tothe drat were received during the meeting rom the Expert Consultation participants.

The Annex “Process-oriented methodologies and inormation management tools oruse in EAF implementation” was prepared by Patrick McConney (University o the WestIndies) with Merle Sowman (University o Cape Town), Cassandra De Young (FAO)and Anthony Charles (St. Mary’s University), based on the original Expert Consultation

background document and other reerences. John M. Ward (National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration – NOAA) provided the graphic “Interdependent inluenceso EAF management” during the Expert Consultation.



i

Atract

This document aims to provide a better understanding o the role o the economic,institutional and sociocultural components within the ecosystem approach to isheries(EAF) process and to examine some potential methods and approaches that may acilitatethe adoption o EAF management. It explores both the human context or the ecosystemapproach to isheries and the human dimensions involved in implementing the EAF. For theormer, the report provides background material essential to understand prior to embarkingon EAF initiatives, including an understanding o key concepts and issues, o the valuationo aquatic ecosystems socially, culturally and economically, and o the many policy, legal,institutional, social and economic considerations relevant to the EAF. With respect toacilitating EAF implementation, the report deals with a series o speciic aspects: (1)determining the boundaries, scale and scope o the EAF; (2) assessing the various beneits

and costs involved, seen rom social, economic, ecological and management perspectives; (3)utilizing appropriate decision-making tools in EAF; (4) creating and/or adopting internalincentives and institutional arrangements to promote, acilitate and und the adoption o EAF management; and (5) inding suitable external (non-isheries) approaches or inancingEAF implementation.

De Young, C.; Charles, A.; Hjort, A.

Human dimensions o the ecosystem approach to fsheries: an overview o context,concepts, tools and methods. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper . No. 489. Rome, FAO. 2008. 152p.



Ctt

Preparation o this document iiiAbstract ivPreace ix

PART IThe humAn ConTexT foR An eCosysTem APPRoACh To fIsheRIes 1

1. Itrcti a ackr 3

Introduction 3

Understanding the compleities and contets 5

Key concepts and issues 5

EAF management 5

Social, economic and institutional considerations in EAF 7

EAF, the livelihoods approach and integrated management 7

Conclusions 9

2. ha a ct ric 11

Introduction 11

Ecosystem services 11

The value of ecosystem services to human well-being 12

Methodologies for assessing the value of fisheries ecosystems 15

How ecosystem valuation can help in implementing the EAF 17

Conclusions 17Appendi 2.1 – Eamples of the use of valuation tools in fisheries 18

3. Pic, a a itittia rark 25

Policy frameworks affecting EAF 25

Millennium Development Goals 25

Precautionary approach 26

Management and co-management approaches 27

International policy frameworks 29

“Pro-poor” policies 30

Institutional and legal frameworks affecting EAF 30

Good governance 31Nested institutions 32

Within organizations 32

Conclusions 33

4. scia a cic cirati 35

Introduction 35

The particular situation of artisanal and small-scale fisheries 36

Employment, livelihood and regional aspects 37

Poverty and social security/services 39

Food security 41

Cultural and religious considerations 42

Indigenous people and traditional knowledge 43



i

Distributional aspects 46

Conclusions 47

PART II

fACIlITATIng The ImPlemenTATIon of The eAf 495. Iitia tp i ipti t eAf 51

Boundaries, scale and scope 51

Boundaries 51

Scale 52

Scope 52

Conclusions 53

6. Ai t ipact eAf aat 55

Benefits and costs of EAF 55

Measuring benefits and costs 57

Decision-making tools for assessing EAF 58

Goal ranking 58

Problem trees 58

Cost-benefit analysis 59

Social impact assessment 59

Indicator frameworks 59

Socio-economic monitoring 61

Systems of national accounts 64

Scenario modelling and simulations 66

Bio-economic models 66

The discount rate 67

Conclusions 69

Appendi 6.1 – Benefits and costs arising in the EAF guidelines 70

Appendi 6.2 – Related environmental decision-making tools 75

Appendi 6.3 – FAO indicators for sustainable development ofcapture fisheries 80

7. Icti cai r appi eAf 81

Introduction 81

Types of incentives and their EAF implications 82

Institutional incentives 83

Legal incentives 95

Financial/material incentives 97

Social incentives 104

Perverse incentives 106

Conclusions 106

Appendi 7.1 – An economic analysis of the need for appropriate incentives 107

Appendi 7.2 – Kenya and Lake Victoria 110

Appendi 7.3 – The Bunaken National Marine Park co-management initiative 111

8. etra iaci r t eAf 115

Introduction 115

“Polluter pays” financing 115Eternal conservation financing 115

Conclusions 117



ii

Appendi 8.1 – The global environmental facility and the EAF 120

Appendi 8.2 – Debt-for-nature swaps – how they work 123

9. sti a ia rati 125

Summing up 125Key aspects 126

Entry points 126

Human realities 127

The importance of policy, institutions and incentives 127

Information needs for decision-making 128

Closing comments 129

Rrc 131

A – Prc-rit ti a iratiaat t r i eAf iptati 141

Process methodologies 141

Conflict management and negotiation 142

Consensus building 143

Delphi method 143

Facilitation 144

Visioning 145

Information acquisition and dissemination 145

Asset mapping 145

Brainstorming 145

Communication strategy 146

Focus groups 146

Institutional analysis 147Participatory monitoring and evaluation 148

Poverty assessment 148

Rapid and participatory rural appraisals 149

Risk and vulnerability assessment 150

Social mapping 150

Stakeholder analysis 150

Survey methods 151

Transect diagram and walk 152

Workshop methods 152





i

Prac

The original version o this document was prepared as a background document or use byparticipants in the FAO Expert Consultation on the Social, Economic and InstitutionalConsiderations o Applying the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) held in Romerom 6 to 9 June 2006. That irst document was also used as the primary background materialand source o concepts and reerences or the supplemental EAF guidelines (FAO TechnicalGuidelines or Responsible Fisheries No. 4 Supplement 3 – The human dimensions o theecosystem approach to isheries1) discussed at the meeting. The objective o this document,as with the Expert Consultation itsel, is to provide a better understanding o the role o the economic, institutional, and sociocultural components within the EAF process, and toexamine some potential methods and approaches that may acilitate the adoption o EAFmanagement.

These goals, in turn, relect the state o the world in terms o EAF implementation, asdescribed in the Prospectus or the Expert Consultation:The concept of an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) is reaching a point of general acceptance by

those involved in fisheries and their management. There is general agreement that fisheries management

must incorporate the complicated and often not-well-understood links between human activities and the

environment. However, although the EAF approach is now commonly discussed in international colloquia,

and excellent guidelines have been produced, most discussion has revolved around biological and

environmental components (or biotic and abiotic compartments) of EAF. As a primary goal of an ecosystem

approach is “to balance diverse societal objectives”, social, economic and institutional information form an

essential component of the information necessary for policy making. Such information is essential in order

to evaluate the various benefits and costs related to any management decisions. Such benefits and costs

include positive and negative externalities of ecosystem-based management as well as the benefits and costs

directly incurred by individuals.

In considering the interaction o social, economic and institutional actors with the EAF,our major “entry points” might be envisioned:

1. social, economic and institutional actors are oten driving orces behind the need orEAF management;

2. the potential costs and beneits to individuals and society o applying the EAF willhave social, economic and management components, as well as ecological ones;

3. social, economic and institutional instruments are all useul in the application o EAF, and in particular are relevant in creating incentives or EAF adoption; and

4. social, economic and institutional actors can all play roles in supporting orconstraining the implementation o EAF management.

In other words, social, economic and institutional elements can be simultaneouslydrivers, constraints and/or supports or EAF implementation and, in addition, there canbe social, economic and institutional outcomes o that implementation. All o these “entrypoints” need to be taken into account in EAF discussions.

This document thereore attempts to compile a selection o available ishery-speciic, aswell as non-ishery speciic, literature (and methods) relating to how economic, social andinstitutional aspects: (1) drive EAF; (2) are valued and distributed among direct and non-direct users; (3) can be used as instruments in the application o EAF; and (4) are relatedto existing institutions. The document also explores possible means o inancing the EAF,given that the costs and beneits related to EAF management have both private- and public-good aspects at local, regional, and global levels.

The document is divided into two main parts. The irst part provides introductoryand background material essential to understand prior to embarking on EAF initiatives.

1 In preparation.



This material includes: (1) concepts, issues and considerations relevant to the EAF;(2) discussion o how aquatic ecosystems are valued, socially, culturally and economically,as well as the various non-market and market valuation techniques or assessing that value;(3) policy, legal, institutional; and (4) social and economic aspects relevant to the EAF, and.

The second part covers the key issues acilitating the implementing the EAF: (1) deiningthe boundaries, scale, and scope o the EAF at hand; (2) the various beneits and costsinvolved in EAF, rom social, economic, ecological and management perspectives, andthe decision-making tools that can assist EAF implementation; (3) internal incentives andinstitutional arrangements that can be created and/or utilized or promoting, acilitatingand unding the adoption o EAF management; and (4) external (non-isheries) approachesor inancing EAF implementation. The material presented in the two main parts o thereport is complemented by an annex that reviews methods commonly used to meet twospeciic operational needs in EAF implementation – smoothly-running policy and planningprocesses and eective inormation acquisition and utilization.

It should be noted that this report is designed to cover a wide range o topics accessible

to those in all ishery areas and disciplines, rather than to relect the detailed state-o-the-art research on any one topic. Despite its breadth, however, there are certainly relevanttopics not covered here. For a comprehensive treatment o the subject, the reader isencouraged to read this report in conjunction with the above-mentioned Guidelines as wellas the FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4 – Fisheries management(1997 – hereater, the FM Guidelines) and No. 4 Supplement 2 – The ecosystem approachto isheries (2003 – hereater, the EAF Guidelines) and the FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 443 – The ecosystem approach to isheries: issues, terminology, principles, institutional,oundations, implementation and outlook (FAO, 2003a).



1

PART I

The humAn ConTexT foR An

eCosysTem APPRoACh TofIsheRIes





3

1. Itrcti a ackr

InTRoduCTIonIn 2000, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity1 (CBD) deined theecosystem approach2 (EA) as “a strategy or the integrated management o land, waterand living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitableway” and chose the EA as the primary ramework or the CBD implementation;stressing a multidisciplinary collaboration to achieve the CBD objectives.3

In the ishery sector, the ecosystem approach has been similarly accepted as one o the key “vehicles” or developing and improving isheries management. There have

been, however, a multitude o variations on the deinition o an EA; some have ocusedmore on the natural science ecosystem components, while others stressed a moreholistic and integrated (interdisciplinary) interpretation. In response to an internationalcall or assistance to clariy what is meant by an EA in the isheries context, the FAOpublished guidelines on the ecosystem approach to isheries4 in 2003.

Recognizing the wide range o interpretations o the approach, the FAO proposed theollowing deinition, which is aligned with the more general EA but seeks a pragmaticbalance by ocusing the EAF on aspects within the ability o isheries managementbodies to implement, even while recognizing the isheries sector’s responsibility incollaborating in a broader multisectoral application o the EA:

an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking

account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems

and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologically meaningful

boundaries

It is important to note that the concepts and principles o an EAF are not new –they are already either explicitly contained in a number o international and nationalinstruments and agreements (e.g. as in the case o the CBD above) or implicitlymaniested through local, regional, and international actions5 – whether or not theseexplicitly used the term “EAF”.6

In particular, other sector-speciic applications o the EA include those to urbanmanagement, to drylands, to orestry, and to human health. Each o these is naturallyinterpreted rom the perspective o the particular sector – albeit generally incorporatingthe trio o ecological, social and economic considerations. For example, the ecosystem

approach to human health incorporates “human health considerations into the dynamicinterrelations o ecosystem analyses” and “places humans in the centre o a series o

1 http://www.cbd.int and CBC (2000). Report o the ith meeting o the Conerence o the Parties to theConvention on Biological Diversity. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23.

2 For an historical description o the EA, see FAO (2003b).3 Which are “the conservation o biological diversity, the sustainable use o its components and the air

and equitable sharing o the beneits arising out o the utilization o genetic resources, including byappropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transer o relevant technologies, taking intoaccount all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate unding.”

4 FAO (2003); hereafter referred to as the EAF Guidelines.5 For brie presentations on national and international eorts at implementing the EAF, see the report

rom the Seventh meeting o the United Nations Open-ended Inormal Consultative Process on Oceans

and the Law o the Sea (12-16 June 2006) available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/consultative_process.htm.

6 Similar or related concepts include the ecosystem-based isheries management (EBFM), environmentalmanagement, ecosystem management, sustainable management and biodiversity management.



Human dimensions of the ecosystem approach to fisheries: an overview of context, concepts, tools and methods4

nested spheres, which can negatively andpositively inluence health and well being”as shown below.7

From the above discussion o EA

and EAF concepts, the next step lies inunderstanding what the approach meansin practice. This report is grounded in thebelie that the application o the EAF mustbe holistic, integrated, participatory, andadaptive, and builds on the EAF Guidelinesby providing here a ocus on the humandimensions (i.e. political, legal, cultural,social, economic and institutional aspects)o such an application.

Speciically, this report acknowledges

the ollowing “entry points” o humanconsiderations – social, economic andinstitutional – into the implementation o an EAF:

1. Social, economic and institutionalobjectives and actors may bedriving forces behind the need orEAF management;

2. The costs and benefits o applying the EAF, whether to individuals or tosociety, have social, economic and institutional impacts and implications;

3. Social, economic and institutional instruments are all crucial or successulimplementation o the EAF; and

4. Social, economic and institutional actors present in ishery systems can playeither supporting or constraining roles in EAF implementation.

In other words, social, economic and institutional elements can be simultaneouslydrivers, constraints, and/or supports or EAF implementation, and in addition, therecan be social, economic and institutional outcomes o that implementation. All o these“entry points” need to be taken into account in EAF discussions.

Basically, the EAF takes place in the context o societal and/or community objectives,which inherently relect human aspirations and values. As implementation o the EAFis a human pursuit, the social and economic orces at play need to be understood,the incentives and disincentives driving human behaviour need to be investigated,and actions need to be undertaken in terms o ishery governance and corresponding

institutional arrangements – all so that management can induce outcomes in the isherycompatible with societal objectives.In addition, although ocusing on the isheries sector, EAF will have inter and

intra-sectoral process components that must be taken into account, even i beyond thescope o the isheries managers’ direct responsibility. However, the more integratedor cross-sectoral the approach taken is, the more likely the attainment o sustainabledevelopment goals.

Certainly, the need to incorporate human components o the ishery system into anecosystem approach is clear as humans are part o, depend on, and aect the ecosystemin which they live, work, and play. The challenge lies in implementation. This reportseeks to provide support in meeting that challenge, by consolidating a range o availableknowledge and experience relevant to EAF implementation, rom social, economic and

7 The Ecosystem Approach to Human Health and Neurotoxics Working Group – http://www.unites.uqam.ca/neuro/.

FIGURE 1

frark r a ct apprac

t a at

biosphere

global ecosystem

regional ecosystem

local ecosystem

community

home and workplaceb i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s

g e o p

h y s i c s

c h e m

i c a l

p o l l u

t i o n

s o c i o - p

o l i t i c a

l

s i t u a

t i o n

c u l t u r e

e c o n o m i c s

health andwell-being



Introduction and background 5

institutional viewpoints, and examining the manner by which these aspects can bepractically incorporated, as well as highlighting the remaining gaps in both knowledgeand implementation.

undeRsTAndIng The ComPlexITIes And ConTexTsIn any given ishery in which implementation o EAF management is being planned,it is important to understand the current state o the ishery and its natural and humanenvironment (the starting point) – the context in which EAF is being developed. Thismust be the irst step in interpreting the EAF or the given situation.

For example, knowing the context will help clariy i the particular EAF will be:incremental or wholesale, intersector or intra-sectoral, local or international, involvingintensive scientiic research or relying on the best available inormation, etc. Establishingthis EAF context will involve not only understanding the ishery/ecosystem rom boththe natural science and human perspectives, but also society’s goals and values withrespect to ecosystem goods and services; the socio-economic context (at the micro and

macro levels) in which the ishery operates; the policy and institutional rameworks inplace; as well as the political realities and power dynamics aecting the governance o resources. A good understanding o these issues and other realities surrounding the useo aquatic resources is essential to guide EAF policies, objectives and plans – in theirabsence, policies and plans may very likely ail to assist in the move towards sustainableisheries.

The human aspects that play a role in determining an EAF include the power andgovernance structures in place, the economic “push” and “pull” mechanisms driving theishing activities, the socio-cultural values and norms associated with ishing, and theexternal contexts ( e.g. global markets, natural phenomena, emergencies, and politicalchanges) that impact on our ability to manage our isheries. Chapters 2 through 4describe many o the human dimensions and the techniques available assisting their

evaluation, surrounding the EAF context.The context also includes the motivation or the EAF. The list o potential actors

driving isheries managers, a community, or a society to adopt the EAF is as extensiveand varied as the list o potential reactions to these drivers. These drivers may includehuman as well as biological actors, at any scale (rom local to international), and may bereactionary or orward looking. For example, countries may be reacting to internationaltreaties or conventions, to crises and conlicts within and around the isheries, or tolobbying rom special interest groups. Alternatively, countries may be adopting theEAF as part o a uture ramework or achieving sustainable development.

Key ConCePTs And Issues

This part o the report discusses (i) the idea o an EAF management, highlightingthe role o human aspects, (ii) key underlying issues in implementing the EAF (i.e.,boundaries, scale and scope), and (iii) the relationship o the EAF to complementaryapproaches that also include broader looks at the components and interactions in theishery (the livelihoods approach and integrated management).

eAf aat

The word “management” has been purposely let out o the term “EAF” as theapproach is not limited to management but applies to policy, legal rameworks,development, planning, etc. However, some o the early motivation or the EAF lay inthe recognition that single-species stock assessment and management (what is reerredto in the EAF Guidelines as “Target Resource Oriented Management” or TROM)could be insuicient and that there was a need to look more broadly at the surroundingecosystem – prey and predator species, oceanographic eects, environmental impactso other human activities, etc.




This broadening o attention rom individual species to multiple ish species andecosystems includes the management o a range o human interactions with the isheryecosystem, whether technical, economic, social or institutional. Furthermore, the EAFmust deal to some extent with interactions with other uses o the aquatic environment,

and with linkages throughout the ishery system (e.g. to the post-harvest sector and thesocioeconomic environment o the ishery).

Overall, then, the EAF must incorporate whatever ecosystem and humanconsiderations are o direct relevance to isheries management, i.e. which will typicallyneed to be taken into account or eective isheries management. This is not really anydierent rom the situation in conventional ishery management, which also needs totake human considerations into account to be successul (even i this has not alwaysbeen achieved – see, e.g. Charles, 1998a; Cochrane, 2000). However, as pointed out inthe EAF Guidelines, the challenge is that much greater in EAF, given the consequentbroadening o attention that is needed, to include aspects o ecosystems and o corresponding human elements.

There has been some progress in meeting this challenge, both in terms o movingtowards an improved understanding o social, economic and institutional aspectsrelating to ishery management (and EAF in particular), and in terms o developingtools and instruments to improve management by taking this understanding intoaccount. On the other hand, even with conventional management and certainly withEAF, there remains a gap between words and deeds when it comes to incorporatingsuch aspects into ishery management. One indication o this gap is the recurringpleas rom social scientists, over the past several decades, or increased progress inthis direction.

The eorts o countries to address aspects o EAF have arisen in three maincategories:

1. Issue-based technically-oriented actions, such as:

• reducing the impacts on bycatch species;• increasing the selectivity and decreasing the harmul impacts o ishing gear;• protecting and restoring critical habitats and species interactions;

2. Implementation o institutional changes as part o national EAF measures,such as:

•changing isheries policies to include EAF and precautionary principles; • increasing stakeholder involvement in isheries management; •creating multidisciplinary and/or intersectoral advisory groups/committees; • taking part in multicountry projects aiming at harmonizing management at

the large marine ecosystem level; •using community-based management tools; and

3. Broadening the nation’s inormation systems to include: •multispecies or ecosystem models (looking at changes across the ood web); •bio-economic models (looking at changes across the ish and the ishing

industry); • incorporated qualitative and quantitative models, such as people’s

perceptions; •multidisciplinary inormation in risk assessments and cost-beneit analyses; • local and/or traditional knowledge; • integrated indicator systems; •participatory inormation systems.

While there seem to be ew examples to date o a comprehensive adoption o the EAFin all aspects o the ishery system (i.e. rom the policy realm to implementing adaptivemanagement operationally, and also adjusting institutional and other supportingrameworks), there have been many incremental moves, and the momentum is buildingtowards broader use o the EAF in many isheries.



Introduction and background 7

scia, cic a itittia cirati i eAf

A wide range o social, economic and institutional considerations may be relevant tothe implementation o an EAF:

1. First, EAF must take place in the context o societal and/or community

objectives, which inherently relect human aspirations and values.2. Second, as EAF takes into account interactions between isheries and

ecosystems, this includes a wide range o complexities relating to humanbehaviour, human decision making, human use o resources, and so on.

3. Third, implementing the EAF is a human pursuit, with implications in terms o the institutional arrangements that are needed, the social and economic orcesat play, and the carrots (incentives) and sticks (e.g. penalties) that can induceactions compatible with societal objectives.

Indeed, the latter aspect – that o institutional arrangements – highlights the need inEAF or structured decision making processes, grounded in the accepted set o societalobjectives, and governed by a suitable set o operating principles – what has been

reerred to as a “ishery management science” approach (Lane and Stephenson, 1995).The ishery objectives being pursued underlie the criteria or judging success, whichare in turn needed in order to decide on the best management approach. Parallel to theobjectives are principles governing ishery management, which inluence the choicesmade o policy and management measures to best meet the stated objectives – these aredrawn rom a range o sources such as national legislation, international conventions,and “approaches” including the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach.

Such processes must take place in a world o complexity, and the hope is thatEAF provides an eective vehicle to better recognize and address the wide range o complexities in isheries, complexities that can bear directly on the success o isheriesmanagement. Social, economic and institutional aspects contribute as much to the seto complexities aced within ishery management as do those relating to ish species and

the aquatic environment itsel. For example, a ishery typically aces the complexitieso: (a) multiple and conlicting objectives; (b) multiple groups o ishers and ishingleets and conlicts among them; (c) multiple post-harvest stages; (d) complex socialstructures, and socio-cultural inluences on the ishery; (e) institutional structures, andinteractions between ishers and regulators; and () interactions with the socioeconomicenvironment and the larger economy (Charles, 2001).

eAf, t ii apprac a itrat aat

The move towards a broader approach to isheries management relects the undamentalgoal o sustainable development, in keeping with WSSD objectives. To this end, it isuseul to look at the ecosystem approach

to isheries in comparison with two majormultisectoral thrusts in global discussionsrelating to natural resource and spatialarea management: the livelihoods approachand the integrated management approach.These complementary and overlappingapproaches, and interactions with the EAF(Figure 2), are discussed in this section.

The livelihoods approach Just as the ecosystem approach hasdeveloped rom an understanding o theneed to manage target ish stocks and ishingin the broader context o the ecosystem,similarly the livelihoods approach (Ellis,

FIGURE 2Ratiip a t eAf, t lA a Im

Ecosystem

approach

to fisheries

Sustainablelivelihoods

approach

Integrated

management




2000; Allison and Ellis, 2001) grew rom a recognition o the need to place isheriesin a larger context o households, communities and socio-economic environments.Adopting a livelihoods thinking into EAF implies that isheries management mustlook at ishers and ishing leets in the context o where ishers live, in households,

communities and ishery-based economies – just as it deals with the ish in the contexto where the ish live, the ecosystem. Fisheries management thus deals with the isheryas one o a portolio o livelihood sources (i such alternatives exist) and as potentiallylinked, through livelihoods, to other economic sectors.

A livelihoods approach can inorm isheries management in a number o ways,which may, i desired, be incorporated as well into EAF management:

•demographic: population and population trends, migration, age and genderstructure;

• sociocultural: community objectives, gender roles, stratiication, social cohesion;• economic: income and its distribution, degree o ishery dependence, markets;• institutional: community organization and inrastructure, involvement o

women;•marine Inrastructure: wharves, markets;• community inrastructure: cultural acilities, schools, religious institutions;•non-ishing activities: boatbuilding, agriculture, tourism, industry; and•policy: linking ishery objectives to broader regional and national policy goals.

Integrated management Integrated management (whether o oceans, coasts, watersheds, etc.) is an approach,or mechanism, to manage multiple (competing) uses o a certain designated area – usessuch as isheries, aquaculture, orestry, oil and gas, mining, agriculture, shippingand tourism. This involves managing multiple stakeholders8 (e.g. local communities,industries) as well as interactions among people and ecosystems, and among multiple

levels o government. The integrated management approach is typically characterizedby attention paid to a multiplicity o resources (e.g. soil, water, ish stocks, etc.) ando habitats (e.g. open ocean, estuaries, wetlands, beaches, lakes, rivers, etc.), as wellas a range o environmental actors (e.g. changes in water temperature, turbidity andacidity, chemical pollutants and water lows).

Typically, integrated management – like the EAF and the sustainable livelihoodsapproach – involves processes or participatory decision making and conlict resolution,and requires a range o inormation on characteristics o the designated area, rom thelocal climate and the state o the ecosystem, to the relevant natural resources, and thehuman community (cultural, economic, social).

A key aspect o integrated management is the implementation o an institutional

ramework in which to manage the mix o components and interactions withinthe relevant system, incorporating these aspects within a wider context o human-environment interactions, institutional linkages, multiuse conlict, multistakeholdergovernance systems and the like. This aspect o integrated management, involvinginstitutional rameworks and managing multiple uses, is similar to that o EAF, butoperating in a multisectoral context (i.e. isheries together with other marine, coastaland/or watershed uses, such as shipping, mining, etc.), rather than solely within theishery sector. Thus, EAF and integrated management are very much complementary,needing to operate in synchrony even while their scope diers with respect to what isbeing managed.

8 The concept o stakeholders comprises all interested parties, whether they are classiied as primary,secondary or tertiary stakeholders.







11

2. ha a ctric

InTRoduCTIonThat ecosystems provide services9 to human beings (e.g. ood, recreation, water,aesthetics) is indisputable. The question o whether and how to ormalize the valueso these services to society remains a diicult and, at times, controversial subject. Thischapter will present briely: 1) an overview o potential services provided by ecosystems;2) an overview o the various classiications, rom the point o view o economists, o

the values that humans may attribute to these services; 3) the methodologies in use toestimate these values, qualitatively or otherwise; and 4) how this inormation can helpin implementing the EAF.

eCosysTem seRvICes

Ecosystem services are a sub-set o the intricate workings o ecosystems in that theyare those beneits, both tangible and intangible, provided by ecosystems or whichthere is an explicit demand by humans (MEA, 2005a)10. Trying to make sense o andorganize conceptually the myriad o such services provided would be a complicatedtask or any natural resource manager. Fortunately, in undertaking a global review o ecosystems and their services, the Millennium Assessment (MEA, 2005a) has reviewedvarious classiications o ecosystem services and suggested a set o our, sometimes

overlapping, categories:•Provisioning – the products obtained rom ecosystems, including ood and

ibre, uel, genetic resources, bio-chemicals, natural medicines, pharmaceuticals,ornamental resources, and resh water;

•Regulating – the regulation o ecosystem processes including those relating toair quality, water, climate, human diseases, erosion, biological controls, and stormprotection;

•Cultural – the nonmaterial beneits people obtain rom ecosystems through,or example: spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, relection, recreation,and aesthetic experiences, including cultural diversity, spiritual and religiousvalues, knowledge systems, educational values, inspiration, aesthetic values, social

relations, sense o place, cultural heritage values, and recreation and ecotourism;and•Supporting – the beneits “that are necessary or the production o all other

ecosystem services. They dier rom provisioning, regulating, and culturalservices in that their impacts on people are either indirect or occur over a verylong time.”

Fishery-related ecosystem services would be a urther sub-set relating to theecosystem services o importance to isheries. The deinition o this sub-set would becontext speciic and could range, depending on the scope o the EAF, rom being very

9 The term “services” includes tangible goods (ood, water, etc.) as well as intangible services (cultural,

ecological, etc.).10 Boyd et al. (2004) note that “it is the services created by ecological characteristics that will be explicitly

tied to social value” and make the distinction that “ecosystem services are the outcomes o ecosystemunctions that yield value to people.”




narrow, only including aspects o the target and related species, to a broader inclusiono the entire gamut o ecosystem services, however linked to the isheries at hand.Ideally, one should move as ar towards the latter deinition as possible, to incorporateas integrated an EAF implementation as possible. When making decisions about certain

isheries, isheries managers and other stakeholders would need to know the impacts o their decisions (or lack o decisions) on other sectors and/or beneit holders, in termso the stream o services provided. Activities meriting management could include, orexample, (1) upstream agriculture runos impacting the ishery ecosystem’s ability toregulate water quality and hence support abundant populations o the targeted species,or (2) destructive ishing practices, such as dynamite ishing harming coral systems,which negatively impact the tourism sector or other members o the community whobeneit rom the coastal region.

Every time a decision is made, whether it be to start, stop, or change an activity, thedecision will impact the stream o services provided by the natural system and, eitherdirectly or indirectly, human welare. Behind any decision, there may be winners and

there may be losers in terms o welare and there will certainly be tradeos. Decision-makers in isheries need to understand what services the aquatic ecosystems provide,to whom (e.g. the isheries, the communities and economies dependent on them, andothers who hold value or these services), and how the distribution o these serviceswill change once the decision is implemented.

The vAlue of eCosysTem seRvICes To humAn well-beIng

Just as it is useul to categorize ecosystem services to aid in understanding what theyare, so too is it useul to categorize the types o values individuals and societies hold orthese services. An attempt at such a categorization is presented in Figure 3, providing

TV

categories

Example

Fisheries

ecosystem

services

Common

valuation

method

USE VALUE NON- USE VALUE

Direct use value

Consumptive,

non consumptive

Indirect use

value

Option and

quasi-option

Bequest value

Existence

•Habitats and biological

regulation

•Employment/livelihoods

•Food chain/global life

support

•Transportation

•Local/National/Int’l

relations

•Intrinsic

preservation

•Biodiversity

•Social Identity

•Religious and

cultural identities

• Capture/Recreational/

Aquarium fishing (food,

income)

•Ornamental resources

•Medicinal resources

•Tourism/Recreation

•Culture/heritage/spiritual

•Science and Education

•Preservation for future

uses

•Stewardship

•Precautionary or

risk/uncertainty

reduction

•Future knowledge

potentials

M, P, HP, TC, CV,

CJ, Ranking

AC, P, CV, CJ, Ranking AC, CV, CJ, Ranking CV, CJ, Ranking

FIGURE 3Tta a a iri ct

Sources: adapted from MEA, 2005b; Farber et al ., 2006

Notes: M = market methods, P = Production approaches, HP = Hedonic Pricing, TC = Travel Cost, CV = Contingent Valuation, CJ =

Conjoint analysis, AC = Avoidance Cost



Human values of ecosystem services 13

a schematic ramework or the various categories o values that humans may hold orecosystem services.

The ramework is divided into use values and non-use values or a particularecosystem’s services. Use values occur when individuals and societies derive beneits

and, hence, have value or ecosystems services they use or interact with directly, such asor ood, or recreational activities and relaxation, and or other tangible products thatcome rom these ecosystems (direct use). Non-use values, on the other hand, relectsituations in which we value the services indirectly or their supporting and regulatingunctions, such as maintaining water quality and community traditions (indirect use).

Individuals and societies also value ecosystems or what they represent or theuture. Some may value today the knowledge that their grandchildren will beneitrom these services and others value having resources available in the case theybecome necessary or their direct use in the uture (reerred to as “option value”). Inaddition, some value the services independently o anyone’s current or uture useso these services (“existence values”). This category represents a philosophical value

o the inherent right o ecosystems and communities to exist now and in the uture.This perhaps vague but very important value can relect the idea that each part o theecosystem exists or a reason, whether we are aware o the reason or not, and thereoreshould be valued as part o the ecosystem.

The above ramework may assist in determining the list o ecosystem servicespotentially aected by management actions. In this regard, two points should be noted.First, it is important to dierentiate between the values o a given individual, and thosecollective values o a community, or o society as a whole. Second, one can expectdebates to occur over the balancing o the various values described here – use, non-use,existence and option values. Overall, the key act o bringing together the multisectoral,multidisciplinary stakeholders involved, to identiy the various values linked to anecosystem and to consider which are likely to be aected by management decisions (and

how) is one step in understanding the interactions o the ishery and its ecosystem.The next step in the management process stems rom limitations imposed by two

realities: 1) that inancial and human resources are not unlimited, and 2) that oten wecannot improve everything all the time (i.e. there will be tradeos attached to eachdecision). Because o such constraints, decision-makers need some way o prioritizingthe changes to the various ecosystem services.

There exist techniques to identiy the EAF “issues” and risks in speciic isheries andto determine preliminary priorities or those issues, such as check lists and problem/component trees combined with risk assessments11,12. Component trees assist inorganizing the scoping and understanding o the services provided by ecosystems. Forexample, a top level o the tree may branch out into three categories: ecological well-

being, economic well-being, and ability to achieve; ollowed by successive branchesorganizing ecosystem services urther, such as in Figures 4a and 4b. Stakeholders woulduse these trees to organize their thoughts regarding the ecosystem in question.

Once the (probably) large number o services has been identiied, some sorto prioritization would need to take place beore investing in additional analyses.Fletcher et al. (2002) propose analysing the magnitudes and probabilities o change inservices rom implementing a management decision (or not) through risk assessmenttechniques. This risk assessment would help pull out the relatively highly importantservices that would require immediate additional consideration.

11 For example, see the methods used in the ecologically sustainable development (ESD) process or

isheries in Australia; http://www.isheries-esd.com.12 The EAF Guidelines promote this approach and it has been used by FAO in a number o case studies,

including the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem programme. In addition, the FAO is developingmore globally applicable problem trees based on the Australian ESD trees.




Fishery ecosystem

Ecosystem Well-being Human Well-being Ability to achieve

Retained species

Non -retained species

General Ecosystem

Indigenous

Community

National

Governance

Exogenous Impacts

FIGURE 4A

Top eve component tree for understanding the contributions of a fishery ecosystem to we-being

Source: Adopted from Fletcher et al ., 2002

Community Well-being

Industry Community

(i.e. people directly employed and families)

Local/regional Communities

(as relevant to particular fishery)

Fishery/Industry Dependent/sensitive communities Less dependent/sensitive communities

Economic benefits

Income

Lifestyle

Work-related injuries

Attachment to lifestyle

Industry structure

Employment

Distribution

Community A Community B Community A Community B

Resource Dependency

(e.g. employment economics)

Social capital

Other values (e.g.

positive/negative feelings)

Other values

FIGURE 4B

lower eve component tree for understanding the contributions of a fishery-reated ecosystem

to socio-economic we-being

Source: Fletcher et al ., 2003




The ollowing section describessome o the methods (quantitativeand qualitative) available or urtheranalysis in order to assist decision-

makers when contemplatingmanagement actions.

meThodologIes foRAssessIng The vAlue of

fIsheRIes eCosysTemsAs it is impossible to maximize allsocietal objectives concurrently,tools are necessary to describe thesocial, economic, and environmentaltradeos involved with each

management alternative. For example,in Figure 5, three managementalternatives are presented in terms o their attainment o environmental, social and economic goals. Each alternative has itsown mix o impacts. In order to make comparisons among the possible alternatives, it isuseul to have a standardized basis or comparison between two or more states o goodsand services provided by an ecosystem. This section presents a ew methods commonlyused in economics to provide standardized inormation or decision making.

Given that the cost-beneit ramework13 is currently the most common method orcomparing alternatives in decision making, the issue o standardizing the values o services becomes imperative, as important values may be ignored i they are not placedinto the cost-beneit language. The rational or this economic valuation 14 approach

includes the assumptions that 1) in the absence o such valuations, potential changes inecosystem services may be otherwise attributed either a zero or an ininite value in acost-beneit analysis decision-making process; 2) such an approach provides a commonunit o measurement (either monetary or ranking) or understanding the contributiono isheries ecosystems to human well-being and understanding the potential tradeosamong these contributions linked to management choices; and, 3) human beings makedecisions in line with the incentives they ace, so understanding such incentives wouldenable decision makers to understand current ishery ecosystem use choices andpotential changes in these choices i such incentive structures evolve.15

Figure 3 above, matched the use and non-use categories o ecosystem services witha ew o the common methods used to evaluate these services. These methods may

be grouped into (1) those that estimate a monetary value or a service and (2) thosethat do not attempt to place a nominal value but try to provide relative values. Theormer group estimates how much people are willing to pay or a service or a changein a service and include market-based as well as non-market-based methods. Market-based values are relatively easier to estimate, as quantitative values exist already in oneorm or another, although they may require some iltering in order to isolate the valueo the service at hand. For example, the value o a healthy bay may be nested withinthe real estate values surrounding the bay. Additionally, the value o a ishery may betheoretically relected in the value o the use rights to the ishery.

13 See Chapter 6 or urther details on cost and beneits related to the EAF as well as cost-beneitanalyses.

14 Economic valuation diers rom other disciplines’ values (e.g. ecological value) in that it is ocused onhuman preerences and is measured in terms o how much individuals are willing to orego in other goodsand services to obtain a given good or service (Lipton et al ., 1995).

15 See Chapter 7 or a discussion on the use o incentives or obtaining management objectives.

Economic Objectives Attainment

Social Objectives AttainmentEnvironmental ObjectivesAttainment

Current Scenario

Alternative Scenario 1

Alternative Scenario 2

FIGURE 5

eap tra rprtati atrati

aat cari




Non-market-based methods are necessary when the ecosystem service in questionis not traded in a market. Examples o such services include the cultural identityo coastal communities, the preservation o ecosystems or their intrinsic value, orchanges in water quality. Although without established prices, these services may behighly valued. Non-market based methods tend to ocus on creating ictional marketsor the service in question in that people are asked to contemplate how much o market

BOx 1

sap ti r ai a iri ct

t a -i

Conventional economic valuation

Revealed-preference approaches

Travel cost: Valuation o site-based amenities are implied by the costs people incur to

enjoy them (e.g. improved sports ishing activities, whale watching);

Market methods: Valuations are directly obtained rom what people must be willing to pay

or the service or good (e.g. ecolabelling price dierentials, increased value o a ishery);

Hedonic methods: The value o a service is implied by what people will be willing to pay

or the service through purchases in related markets, such as housing markets (e.g. vessel

purchases, housing purchases on coastal areas and waterronts); and

Production approaches: Service values are assigned rom the impacts o those services on

economic outputs (e.g. increased eiciency rom bycatch reduction methods, improvedCPUE in a ishery).

Stated-preference approaches

Contingent valuation: People are directly asked their willingness to pay or accept

compensation or some change in ecological service (e.g. coastal ree preservation,

endangered species protection); and

Conjoint analysis: People are asked to choose or rank dierent service scenarios or

ecological conditions that dier in the mix o the conditions (e.g. marine protected areas

with varying levels o permitted human activities).

Cost-based approaches

Replacement cost: The loss o a natural system service is evaluated in terms o what itwould cost to replace that service (e.g. alternative coastal livelihoods); and

Avoidance cost: A service is valued on the basis o costs avoided, or the extent to which it

allows the avoidance o costly averting behaviours, including mitigation (e.g. participatory

isheries management reduces conlicts, health beneits o ish products).

Non-monetizing valuation or assessment

Individual index-based methods, including rating or ranking choice models, expert opinion

( e.g. expert review o sea turtle stocks, their conservation, status, and major threats).

Group-based methods, including voting mechanisms, ocus groups, citizen juries,

stakeholder analysis ( e.g. isheries management advisory councils, GIWA LMEassessments).

Notes: Examples have been changed to relect isheries aspects. For a concise review o these methods

including limitations, see Pagiola et al . (2004).

Source: Farber et al. (2006).




goods, which have established prices, they would be willing to orego in exchange orthe service. For example, an individual can conceptualize oregoing a meal in order tosupport the conservation o a marine mammal. I on average, this person spends $30 ona meal, they would be willing to pay $30 or the conservation activity.

Non-monetary methods ocus on the relative values o services in that they provideinormation regarding one ecosystem service relative to another ecosystem service (e.g.it would be more detrimental to well-being to lose service A than service B).

The box below lists some o the methodologies in use or assessing values o isheries ecosystems to human well-being. Each approach is replete with its own set o limitations, criticisms, and cost implications, and the application o each will dependon the speciic issue at hand. Appendix 2.1 provides examples o isheries-related casestudies in which these methodologies have been applied. These examples have beenchosen to represent the wide-range o methodologies and their application to multipleisheries-related issues; however, they do not ully represent the limitations andassumptions associated with each methodology.

how eCosysTem vAluATIon CAn helP In ImPlemenTIng The eAf

Such valuation methods would provide nominal or relative value estimates, which wouldthen be incorporated into a broader evaluation or into decision-making mechanisms,such as cost-beneit analyses, indicator rameworks, national accounting systems,asset mapping, and bio-economic models. As mentioned previously, such mechanismswould allow the decision-makers to better understand the social, environmental, andeconomic tradeos related to any management alternatives. The use o such broaderevaluation mechanisms in EAF management will be discussed in Chapter 6. A completereview o conceptual and practical issues regarding cost-beneit analyses with specialregard to the environment may be ound in Pearce et al. (2006).

There are various caveats to emphasize. First, the valuation o many ecosystem

services, especially non-market beneits, is complicated and oten costly and will notresolve all decision-making questions. Many, indeed, are ethically opposed to the ideao placing a value on the ecosystem or on cultural values. Furthermore, other ethicalissues, such as balancing existence and bequest values against use values, or treating thewinners and losers o management measures equally, may remain at the discretion o decision-makers. Second, many o these methods are based on individual preerencesand values, which are then aggregated by the number o individuals “aected”. This isnot necessarily the same value as a societal value o a service.

ConClusIons

The EAF calls or the inclusion o a wide range o ecosystem services in planning,

management, and development. Many methods exist or assisting in deepeningour knowledge o the value o ecosystem services to individuals, communities, andsocieties. These values may then be placed into the appropriate decision-makingtools in order to understand the possible trade-os and impacts o the managementoptions under evaluation. Unortunately, such inormation comes at a price; thereore,proper thought and planning are necessary beore investing in the data collection andanalysis process. Included within this planning is the explicit identiication by isheriesmanagers o their objectives and needs with respect to data collection in the search orthe most appropriate (and least cost) methods or obtaining these data.




APPendIx 2.1

eap t aati t i iri

Ca t – Contingent valuation: cic a -crcia i

Situation – Rivers in the Four Corners Region (United States o America) provide

2 465 river miles o critical habitat or nine species o ish that are listed as threatened or

endangered. Continued protection o these areas required habitat improvements, such as

ish passageways, as well as bypass releases o water rom dams to imitate natural water

lows needed by ish. A contingent valuation survey was used to estimate the economic

value or preserving the critical habitat.

Application – Survey respondents were provided detailed maps that highlighted the areas

designated as critical habitat units or the ish. They were told that some State and Federal

oicials thought the combined costs o the habitat improvements and the restrictionson hydropower were too costly and had put orward a proposal to eliminate the critical

habitat unit designation. They were asked i they would contribute to the Four Corners

Region Threatened and Endangered Fish Trust Fund.

Respondents were also told that eorts to raise unds would involve contributions

rom all United States taxpayers. I a majority o households voted in avor o the und,

the ish species would be protected rom extinction. This would be accomplished through

water releases rom Federal dams timed to beneit ish, and through the purchase o water

rights to maintain instream lows. Also, within the next 15 years, three ish species would

increase in population to the point that they would no longer be listed as threatened

species.

On the other hand, i a majority o households in the United States voted not to

approve the und, the critical habitats shown on the map would be eliminated. This wouldmean that water diversion activity and maximum power production would reduce the

amount o habitat or these nine ish species. Respondents were told that i this occurred,

biologists expected that our o the nine ish species would likely become extinct in 15

years.

The exact wording on the questionnaire was: Suppose a proposal to establish a Four

Corners Region Threatened and Endangered Fish Trust Fund was on the ballot in the next

nationwide election. How would you vote on this proposal? Remember, by law, the unds

could only be used to improve habitat or ish. I the Four Corners Region Threatened

and Endangered Fish Trust Fund was the only issue on the next ballot and it would cost

your household $______ every year, would you vote in avor o it? (Please circle one.)

YES / NOThe dollar amount, blank in the above illustration, was illed in with one o 14 amounts

ranging rom $1–$3 to $350, which were randomly assigned to survey respondents.

Results – The questionnaire was sent to a random sample o 800 households in the Four

Corners states o Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (with the proportions based

on the states’ relative populations). An additional 800 households were sampled rom

the rest o the United States. The average willingness to pay was estimated to be $195

per household. When extrapolated to the general population, the value o preserving the

habitat areas was determined to be ar in excess o the costs.

Source: King and Mazotta, Undated.




Ca t – Conjoint analysis: cic aat t

Pcic etar st, n yrk

The situation – The environmental and natural resources o the Peconic Estuary System

(United States o America)—the bay waters, beaches, wetlands, ecosystems, habitats, and

parks and watershed lands—provide many services to the public. The Peconic Estuary

Program was established under the National Estuary Program, to create a conservation

and management plan or the environment and natural resources o the Estuary.

The challenge – In order to develop a management plan that best serves the public,

inormation was needed about the value that the public holds or the ecosystem serviceso the Estuary.

The analysis – Several studies were conducted to estimate the uses and economic

values associated with the Estuary, including a contingent choice survey to estimate the

relative preerences and economic values that residents and second homeowners have or

preserving and restoring key natural and environmental resources: open space, armland,

unpolluted shellish grounds, eelgrass beds, and intertidal salt marsh.

The results – Early discussions revealed that the public has a strong attachment to

environmental and amenity resources o the Peconic Estuary, even i they do not use

these resources directly. Most respondents to the survey (97 percent) supported at least

one hypothetical action to protect resources, and indicated they would inancially supportsuch actions. The relative priorities o respondents or protecting natural resources,

in order, were or armland, eelgrass, wetlands, shellish, and undeveloped land. The

estimated per acre dollar values were about $13 000 or undeveloped land, $30 000 or

unpolluted shellish grounds, $54 000 or saltmarsh, $66 000 or eelgrass and $70 000 or

armland. The survey results indicated that the resource priorities, or relative values o

resources, are more reliable than are the dollar estimates o values, and thus the researchers

recommended that relative values, rather than dollar values, be used in the process o

selecting management actions.

Source: King and Mazotta, Undated.






Ca t – dtrcti a ct cra r i t Piippi

• Healthy coral rees can produce, on a sustainable basis, 20 tonnes or more o ish

and other edible products per square kilometer per year; once destroyed by use o

dynamite or cyanide or ishing, production is reduced to less than 4 tonnes/km2/yr.

The sustainable catch rom a good ree over ten years is about 200 tonnes while a

destroyed but recovering ree catch over the same period is only 72 tonnes – the loss

being 128 tonnes o ish with an estimated value o US$192 000 (US$19 200 yearly)

at current (year 2000) market prices or ree ish.

• The net present value o beneits per km2 rom blast ishing to individuals over 25

years (assuming a ten percent discount rate each year) is only US$14 600. This smallgain is compared to losses o: US$400 000 rom loss o tourism potential, more than

US$190 000 rom loss o coastal protection and about US$108 000 rom oregone

sustainable ishery income, all dependent on a healthy coral ree.

• Bacuit Bay, Palawan was the subject o a study that determined that over a ten-

year period ree isheries and tourism would generate US$41 million more than

logging the orests in the watershed aecting the bay. Logging in this case caused

sedimentation that would have destroyed the coral rees or both isheries and

tourism in the bay.

Source: compilation o studies by White et al., 2000




Ca t – Travel cost tiati: tr r rtrati prjct

i Capak ba

The situation – For nearly hal a century, oyster harvests (and stocks) have been declining

in both Maryland and Virginia (United States o America). Three actors have led to the

decline o the oyster: over harvest, disease, and sedimentation. Because o the decline in

oyster stocks, today’s harvests are one percent o levels orty years ago. Closely associated

with the decline o the oyster population is the destruction o three dimensional oyster

rees due to commercial harvest o oysters or their meat, the harvest o oyster shell as

road substrate, and the clearing o navigational obstructions. In response, the states o

Maryland and Virginia in cooperation with the United States Federal Government havebeen investigating several options to restore the oyster populations; one o which is the

creation o artiicial ree substrate combined with an aggressive seeding program. The high

costs related to ree creation are relatively easy to estimate (almost US$15 000/acre or a

total o approximately US$30 million) but the beneits (e.g. oyster resource, inish habitat

improvements, overall ecosystem productivity) are more diicult to evaluate. Thereore,

estimates o the beneits o ree restoration are necessary to determine a positive beneit-

cost ratio o such projects.

The analysis – A subset o the beneiciaries o an improved oyster ree project included

angler ree ishers through potentially improved catch or water quality. The study irst

linked the policy variable (creation o oyster rees) to anglers’ preerences or ishing, then

use a travel cost model to estimate the willingness to pay per trip or an oyster restorationproject under two scenarios: the irst in which historical catch rates do not change and

the second in which stock level increase. In both cases, it is assumed that the number o

trips/angle would remain constant.

The results – Total annual willingness to pay by recreational ishers in the Chesapeake

Bay was estimated or the two scenarios at approximately US$638 000 and $5 000 000,

respectively. Under the irst scenario, the anglers’ willingness to pay would cover 50

percent o the total restoration costs within thirty years. Under the second scenario

(albeit highly speculative) the ull restoration costs would be covered within less than ive

years.

Source: Hicks et al., 2004




Ca t – grp-a aati ct ric:

P Ia, maactt (uit stat Arica)

The situation – Natural and human-based changes have aected the capacity o an

estuarine drainage basin to provide ecosystem services, such as gas, disturbance, and water

regulation, water supply, ood production, recreation, aesthetics, and spiritual and holistic

services. Several management alternatives could be used to address various objectives each

with related tradeos, such as increasing water supply while maintaining adequate river

low, preserving open space, and maintaining a productive estuarine clam ishery. Two

such alternatives are analysed through a services-based approach: business as usual and

replumbing sewer and stormwater systems.

The analysis – The eects on ten ecosystem services are scored rom -3 to 3 or both the

business as usual and the replumbing alternatives. Weights, rom 0 to 3, are used to rank

each service in terms o its importance. A “value” o each service change is then estimated

as the weighted sum o the changes in services.

The results – While the total score or each scenario was negative (-94 or business as

usual and -67 or replumbing), the results suggested that replumbing, which would allow

continued suburbanization but with adequate river low, avoids more losses in services

than the business as usual scenario. Speciic valuation o each service would need to be

undertaken; however, such a matrix allows or a relatively inexpensive ranking o scenarios,

importance weighting o ecosystem services, and the inclusion o both quantiiable andnon-quantiiable values.

Source: Farber et al ., 2006





25

3. Pic, a a itittiarark

PolICy fRAmewoRKs AffeCTIng eAfThe ecosystem approach to isheries is not an end in itsel, but rather a mechanismintended to help better achieve societal objectives through producing more responsibleisheries, and in particular through broadening conventional isheries management intoan integrated, participatory ramework that takes better account o the interaction o isheries with aquatic ecosystems, as well as with interacting human uses.

As such, EAF interacts with other approaches that have been implemented, orare emerging, in the world’s isheries – such as the precautionary approach and co-management approaches – as well as interacting with international conventions (suchas the Convention on Biological Diversity), regional initiatives (such as RegionalFisheries Management Bodies) and particular national legal and regulatory rameworks.This section reviews some o these interactions, rom the perspective o policyconsiderations, while the ollowing section o this chapter ocuses on institutionalaspects o the relevant linkages.

The speciic policy rameworks and approaches discussed here are:•Millennium Development Goals•Precautionary approach•Management and co-management approaches• International policy rameworks•“Pro-poor” policies

mii dpt ga

The Millennium Development Goals impact signiicantly on policy priorities globally,in particular renewing the ocus on seeking an appropriate balance o humandevelopment and environmental conservation – a balance that developed rom theBrundtland Commission and on through the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, nowbeing relected in the Goals themselves:

•Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger•Achieve universal primary education•

Promote gender equality and empower women•Reduce child mortality• Improve maternal health•Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases•Ensure environmental sustainability•Develop a global partnership or developmentImplementation o EAF its closely within the balance noted above, in that it seeks

(1) to ensure the sustainability o ishery use, i.e. o the beneits to people accruingthrough ishery activities, in particular by ensuring that ishing practices do notcompromise ecosystem health and by limiting negative impacts on ishery ecosystemsarising rom outside the ishery sector, while (2) being implemented in keeping withsocietal objectives, however deined (and oten relecting many o the above MillenniumDevelopment Goals, such as poverty reduction and ood security).

While EAF is certainly broadly compatible with these goals, it is neverthelessimportant to assess the beneits and costs o EAF implementation with respect to




these goals. In other words, any given policy or operational management mechanismto implement EAF may have positive impacts on one or more o the goals, but mayalso have costs involved. A wide range o possibilities may arise. It is possible, orexample, that an initiative to protect a depleted population o a certain species, through

EAF measures, would produce positive results in terms o goal #7 (Environmentalsustainability), but may restrict harvesting activities so that (at least in the short term)the catch o other species is reduced, which could have a negative impact on goals #1and #4 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, Reduce child mortality). Alternatively,a “win-win” EAF measure, such as reducing unwanted bycatch in oshore ishingactivities, may be positive on all counts – improving environmental sustainabilitywhile also improving the ood supply in the short term (there being immediately moreish available to small-scale coastal ishers) and in the long term (with less pressure onbycatch species, leading to stock rehabilitation).

Prcatiar apprac

The precautionary approach (Garcia, 1994; FAO, 1995a) provides a policy andmanagement ramework or dealing with the various orms o uncertainty aced inisheries management (Francis and Shotton, 1997; Charles, 1998b and 2001). Aspectso this range rom appropriate risk assessments to robust and adaptive isherymanagement methods, to appropriate institutions capable o implementing such amanagement approach. As FAO (1995a, p.6) notes:

Management according to the precautionary approach exercises prudent foresight to avoid

unacceptable or undesirable situations, taking into account that changes in fisheries systems are only

slowly reversible, difficult to control, not well understood, and subject to change in the environment

and human values.

Precautionary management involves explicit consideration of undesirable and potentially unacceptable

outcomes and provides contingency and other plans to avoid or mitigate such outcomes. Undesirable

or unacceptable outcomes include overexploitation of resources, overdevelopment of harvesting

capacity, loss of biodiversity, major physical disturbances of sensitive biotopes, or social or economic

dislocations. Undesirable conditions can also arise when a fishery is negatively influenced by other

fisheries or other activities and when management fails to take action in the face of shifts in the

external conditions affecting, for example, the productivity of the fish stocks.

Some aspects o implementing the precautionary approach are analytical in nature.For example, a major ocus o attention in isheries has been on eorts to operationalizethe precautionary approach in terms o determining and setting suitable limits on catch,ishing mortality or ishing eort. This involves a combination o risk analysis andrisk management, with methods such as management procedures providing analyticalrameworks to support the implementation o a precautionary approach.

Equally important is the implementation o the precautionary approach at a policylevel. This deals not with analytical matters but rather with the various assumptionsand approaches underlying ishery decision making – and how to determine suitable“rules” governing decision making (as opposed to decision rules per se). This involvesquestions o the burden of proof and the standard of proof , the latter relating to “theresponsibility or providing the relevant evidence and the criteria to be used to judgethat evidence” (FAO 1995, p.6). Speciically, “the standard o proo to be used indecisions regarding authorisation o ishing activities should be commensurate withthe potential risk to the resource, while also taking into account the expected beneitso the activities”.

Properly putting the precautionary approach into practice requires new inormationand research. For example, the FAO (1999a) has described a number o implications onthe work o Regional Fishery Bodies, e.g. that “uncertainty should be systematicallyinvestigated”, “outputs should be identiied corresponding to objectives”, “target andlimit reerence points should be established”, “robustness o management regime to (a)



Policy, legal and institutional frameworks 27

overishing and (b) environmental change should be assessed” and “contingency plansshould be developed”.

The link between the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach is alogical one: the irst calls or suitable use o precaution in decision making, while the

second calls or suitable breadth in what is considered within the decision-making.Together, the two approaches imply a signiicant challenge – to assess and manage aset o uncertainties and risks, but at a broader scale and with a broader scope, coveringa range o possibilities larger than what would have been considered in conventionalishery management.

A key beneit o this combination lies in the inherent desirability o integratingapproaches or addressing two major realities o isheries – uncertainty (the precautionaryapproach) and complexity (the ecosystem approach). On the other hand, there can becosts as well. One such cost arises as a result o combining the greater inormationneeds implied in implementing EAF management (relative to conventional isherymanagement) and the reality that such a level o inormation is oten unavailable. In

this case, the manner by which one applies the precautionary approach becomes a keyissue. For example, in the extreme, being highly precautionary within a situation o great ignorance (e.g. a lack o inormation on all aspects o the ecosystem) could beaccompanied by the risk o high costs arising rom oregone economic activity andlivelihoods, and lowered ood security.

From the perspective o social, economic and institutional considerations involvedin EAF implementation, the precautionary approach implies a need to take intoaccount a broad set o risks, including (a) those that might arise in ishery use, in termso environmental impacts, (b) those posed by aspects outside the ishery, such as othereconomic sectors, but which might impact negatively on the ishery, and (c) thosethat arise in EAF implementation itsel, such as the risk o possible negative social oreconomic impacts rom changes initiated to meet EAF goals.

maat a c-aat apprac

The nature o ishery management systems evolves over time, drawing on lessons romhistory and on trends in management and governance in the broader society. Four aspectso management and governance, and their interaction with EAF implementation, arenoted here: the particular jurisdiction that is responsible or management, the degreeo centralization or decentralization o management, the degree o integration withinthe management approach, and the breadth o participation o stakeholders in isherymanagement.

1. There are many variations around the world in how isheries managementits within a governmental system. In many locations, isheries management

is a national responsibility, and is ound within a ministry o isheries, or as acomponent o a ministry o agriculture. In other locations, isheries managementmay be a responsibility at a provincial/state level, or (as or coastal isheries in thePhilippines) at a local, municipal level. Whether or not ishery management – orat least some management unctions – has been partly or largely devolved toindustry or community entities (see below), government will be involved in acoordinating or policy-level role, and in particular, within EAF management,there is an important role in interdepartmental and/or intergovernmentallinkages with respect to the impact o isheries on the aquatic environment andthe impacts o other aquatic (and land-based) activities – rom aquaculture andshipping to tourism and agriculture – on ish stocks and on isheries. There areimplied beneits rom such policy and operational coordination, although it isimportant to assess the costs involved in this as well.

2. The ecosystem approach to isheries management must be able to beimplemented both in isheries that are managed by a central agency and




ones in which management is decentralized, as well as combinations in-between. However, whether the ishery management system is centralized ordecentralized, it still must deal with ecosystems o varying sizes and scales – itis not the case that central management need only deal with larger-scale

ecosystems, or conversely, that a decentralized management arrangement mustonly deal with smaller-scale ecosystems (e.g. on a more local basis). The actis that any management system will need to approach EAF implementationbased on the scale needed to address each problem arising. This certainlyhas implications or the linkage between decisions about boundaries (orecosystems versus or jurisdictions) and about scale (how large should be thearea considered in an EAF process, to be compatible with both the ecosystemrealities and the management regime in place?). This in turn implies a need –whatever the degree o management centralization – or mechanisms to scale-up or scale-down management decision making. There will also be questionso the eiciency o the management arrangement – which may interact in

rather complex ways with the level o centralization and the level o EAFimplementation. In any case, EAF is applicable to all isheries systems, andits implementation must be compatible with a recognition o the variety o dierent ishery systems that exists.

3. The structure o the isheries management agency, and the isheries scienceinrastructure, must be taken into account in considering EAF implementation.The FAO approach to EAF implementation has been to build on existingmanagement structures and processes. The nature o these existing structuresand processes will aect the beneits and costs, and the time rame, o EAFimplementation. For example, i management and/or scientiic aspects arecarried out on a species-by-species basis, a mechanism is needed eitherto transorm this into an ecosystem approach, or to “scale down” EAF

implementation to provide some elements o an EAF even within a single-species approach to management and science. A shit rom a single-species to amultiple-species approach is to be encouraged, but there may be constraints tothis that cannot necessarily be overcome in the short term.

4. Also relevant to EAF implementation is the degree o stakeholder involvementin the ishery management system. The FAO Guidelines on EAF call or theuse o participatory approaches within EAF management, but the degree towhich this exists varies rom ishery to ishery – according to the extent towhich co-management and participatory research have been introduced. Theidea o co-management is the creation and implementation o managementarrangements through which a set o agreed-upon stakeholders – ishers, isher

organizations, communities, corporations, nongovernmental organizationsor other entities – share decision making and management unctions withgovernment, and work jointly to develop and enorce ishery regulations andmanagement measures (Charles, 2001). There are many nuances to the co-management concept, some displayed in the ollowing mutually-compatibledescriptions o co-management:

…an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the

government and user groups. (Sen and Nielsen, 1996, p. 406)

…the collaborative and participatory process of regulatory decision-making among

representatives of user-groups, government agencies and research institutions. (Jentot et

al ., 1998, p. 423-4)

…various degrees of delegation of management responsibility and authority between

the local level (resource user/community) and the state level (national, provincial/state,

municipal). (Pomeroy, 1995, p. 150)




…a partnership arrangement using the capacities and interests of the local fishers and

community, complemented by the ability of the government to provide enabling legislation,

enforcement and conflict resolution, and other assistance. (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997,

p. 465)

Those involved in co-management have both rights and responsibilities, withthe rights in this case being management rights – the right to be involved in designand implementation o management measures. The motivation or co-managementinitiatives includes their potential (1) to reduce conlict between stakeholders andgovernment, as well as between stakeholders themselves, by clearly deining rights andresponsibilities, by providing an institutional orum or discussion among decisionmakers, and by encouraging support or the management process, and (2) to build aconservation ethic, by bringing ishers and others into the decision making process, sothey share responsibility or sustainability in the ishery.

The co-management approach can be applied at any scale, rom that o a single

component (leet sector, gear type, geographical area) o a single ishery, through tomultistakeholder multiresource multiuse situations, as arise within the context o integrated management. Implementation o EAF – typically involving interactionso a ishery with its environment, interactions among a range o isheries, and/orinteractions with sectors impacting on (and aected by) the isheries – thus can utilizea co-management approach, albeit with potentially greater challenges than might beaced in a simpler within-ishery context.

These challenges may arise through the need to develop suitable policy orcooperative management within an enlarged orum (e.g. between isheries rather thanonly within a single ishery), as well as suitable institutions within which this can occur.O course, it should be noted that even in a management system operating completely atthe governmental level (i.e. without co-management) similar issues o coordination arise

with respect to implementation o EAF, since – as noted earlier – multiple ministries o government will need to interact together (even i EAF is led by a isheries agency).

Itratia pic rark

Some policy initiatives discussed above – notably the Millennium DevelopmentGoals and the precautionary approach – arise rom or are closely related tointernational conventions or policy discussions. Certainly, a number o internationalconventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, inluence the isherypolicy environment. However, as noted in FAO (2005a):

At the international level, EAF is reflected mainly in voluntary instruments such as the Rio

Declaration, Agenda 21, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the Reykjavik

Declaration and the 2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on SustainableDevelopment.

Also relevant to EAF implementation are UNCLOS and the UN Fish StockAgreement, as well as the World Trade Organization and a range o trade agreements.

At the regional level, the various regional ishery bodies (RFBs)/regional isherymanagement organizations (RFMOs) play a key role in EAF implementation onscales above the national. In recent years, RFBs have begun incorporating reerencesto the EAF in their Conventions or Agreements16, creating subcommittees andworking groups on the EAF, implementing regional EAF projects, and co-operativelydeveloping and adopting EAF objectives; however, progress has been slow towardsincorporating EAF considerations into RFB decision-making (FAO, 2007a).

16 Note that the 1980 Commission or the Conservation o Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)Convention comprised many o the EAF principles.






g rac

Guiding the prospective adaptation o the institutional and legal rameworks, to anecosystem approach to isheries management, should be the idea o “good governance”.Governance is a term describing how political, economic, administrative and other

orms o power or authority is exercised to manage a country’s resources and aairs.Thus governance comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through whichcitizens and groups voice their interests, mediate dierences, exercise their legal rightsand meet their obligations (AusAID, 2000). This broad term is used to explain, amongstother things, to what extent governments are accountable to, and allow participationby, the public (Coey, undated).

While the concept o “governance” is descriptive, the idea o “good governance”is standard-setting, i.e. normative in nature. The exact meaning o “good governance”varies according to the policy area in question but the general principles o goodgovernance are seen to involve (UNESCAP, 2007; OECD, 2007): accountability;transparency; responsiveness; eectiveness and eiciency; rule o law. The OECD

(2007) expands on these ive aspects as ollows:•Accountability: the governing body should be able and willing to show the extent

to which its actions and decisions are consistent with clearly-deined and agreed-upon objectives.

•Transparency: the governing body’s actions, decisions and decision-makingprocesses should be open to an appropriate level o scrutiny by other partso government, civil society and, in some instances, outside institutions andgovernments.

•Responsiveness: the governing body should have the capacity and lexibility torespond rapidly to societal changes, and take into account the expectations o civil society in identiying the public interest, and should be willing to criticallyre-examine the role o the governing body.

•Eiciency and eectiveness: the governing body should strive to produce qualitypublic outputs, including services delivered to citizens, at the best cost, and ensurethat outputs meet the original intentions o policymakers.

•Rule o law: the governing body should enorce equally transparent laws,regulations and codes.

Further principal elements o “good governance” are: consensus-orientation,participation, equality and inclusiveness, decentralisation (UNESCAP, 2007; CoeyUndated), and orward vision, the latter implying the governing body’s ability toanticipate uture problems and issues based on current data and trends and developpolicies that take into account uture costs and anticipated changes (e.g. demographic,economic, environmental, etc.) (OECD, 2007).

Good governance is an element needed in implementation o EAF management.In isheries, where management and exploitation occur largely out o public viewand scrutiny (even given that the ishery is oten managed by the public sector),accountability is o great importance. As a means o ensuring accountability, access toinormation and transparency in policy are critical. This access is also a preconditionor meaningul public participation in decision-making. Policy eectiveness can beimproved by decentralised management, as measures can be tailored to local needs andincreased opportunities be given local stakeholder participation in decision-making(Coey, Undated). In terms o the legal ramework or good governance withinisheries management, the FAO Code o Conduct on Responsible Fisheries, althoughnon-binding, reers to the need or increased transparency within the decision-makingprocesses and to ensure that timely solutions to urgent matters are achieved. Inaddition, states are called upon to acilitate consultation and eective participation indecision-making (Article 6 o the Code) (Coey, Undated).




nt ititti

I governance describes how a resource sector, isheries in this case, is governed, andthe principles o good governance suggest the ways in which a resource ought to begoverned, then an understanding o how institutions interrelate is vital in moving

orward. Such an understanding will assist in highlighting negative interrelationshipsas well as the interrelations that contribute positively to governance.

It is suggested that institutions operate at multiple levels o jurisdiction (Scott,1995, in Hersoug, 2004) and that they work at dierent levels o society. Because theyare linked to each other, and thus orm networks, they should be analysed as opensystems, which receive impulses rom the outside, i.e. rom other institutions, in theorm o impacts, resources and ideas (Scott 1992, in Hersoug, 2004). As they do not“exist in a cultural, social and institutional vacuum”, institutions are never ully sel-controlled (Hersoug, 2004: p. 212). This conclusion is o importance when consideringinstitutional adaptation to EAF management, as any successul change requiresunderstanding o how the institutional system really works and which actors need to

be considered.An institutional system can be divided into two levels – a practical level and ahigher, political level. Institutional change may originate at both levels. I, or example,technological change has undermined established institutions at the practical level,corrective actions may be needed at the political level. More general institutionalreorm may originate at the political level, which could convey changes to institutionsat the practical level which were, in their original orm, considered legitimate by theirmain users. Sometimes a required reorm at the practical level needs to await a shitat the political level in order to take place. Institutional change may also occur at thepractical level, without it being noticed or sanctioned at the political level. Importantly,however, there will be rules structuring the relationship between the levels, decidingor example which issues at the practical level will be considered at the political level,

the procedures or this, who is allowed to participate in decision-making, etc. (Holm,1995).

A high degree o interconnectedness between institutions can produce dynamicchange patterns – changes in one part o the system may have eects on other parts o the system and a new balance may be established. Likewise, a small change in one parto the system may lead to cumulative eects on the system as a whole. For example,by allowing an increased scope o stakeholders to participate in the decision-makingprocedures, greater changes to the system o management institutions may be elt to berequired in order or it to be viewed as legitimate. On this matter, it is also relevant tohighlight the point made by Easter and McCann (2007) that “Inormal institutions suchas norms and culture aect which laws and policies can be implemented. …changes in

ormal institutions that contradict norms are unlikely to be successul.” (p. 10-11).

witi raizatiAs a way o identiying problem areas in the institutional ramework in relation to theattainment o good governance, the ield o organization theory can give some insightinto what it is about organizational behaviour that gives rise to unsustainable natural-resource policies and practices (Ascher, 2000). In terms o lessons that may be useulor EAF management, organization theory suggests the need (Ascher, 2000) to:

1. establish simpler, non-competing mandates or agencies;2. provide inormation to many governmental and non-governmental actors;3. Restructure intra-governmental arrangements to reduce the opportunities or

interagency jurisdictional conlicts;4. restructure organizational incentives to create longer time horizons or agency

leaders and personnel;5. liberalize to reduce rent-seeking alliances that promote corruption.




Chapter 7 will speciically address adjustments to current institutional rameworksin the move towards EAF management. Two key questions to be addressed are:

1. What kind o new institutional mechanisms are warranted, or how wouldexisting institutions need to change, in order to acilitate an implementation o

the EAF?2. What examples are there o the practical use o EAF-riendly institutional

mechanisms or rameworks?

ConClusIons

As mentioned in the beginning o this chapter, EAF management is not an end initsel but simply a mechanism in moving towards sustainably managed isheries. Thediscussion above on the policy, institutional, and legal rameworks o the ecosystemapproach to isheries management, has set out the context within which this broadermanagement approach is to take place. In the discussion, general ways orward havebeen suggested, and problem areas highlighted. Whether a desirable result is achieved

or not, will however depend on the success o implementation. However, success willbe more likely given an ability to work within broadly accepted policy rameworks,and to develop or reinorce institutional and legal arrangements that allow or goodgovernance, or eective nested institutions (outside and between institutions), and orappropriate organizational structures (inside institutions and/or agencies). In addition,there will always be a need to deal with problems arising through gaps between policyand management (e.g. lack o capacity), legal ailure and a lack o compliance (e.g. dueto lack o capacity), and the possibility o institutions being aected by power andpolitics. All these aspects orm the reality within which EAF implementation musttake place.





35

4. scia a ciccirati

InTRoduCTIonThe ecosystem approach to isheries (EAF) management has been advocated widely,on the basis o its potential to meet a range o broad objectives relating to ecosystemhealth, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable natural resource use, among others.These general beneits can in turn be broken down into more speciic beneits, includingthose relating particularly to human considerations, such as greater employment and

income generation as a result o rehabilitated ecosystems, reduction in the risk o ishery collapses, aesthetic beneits, etc. At the same time, there are potential costsinvolved in implementing EAF, ranging rom direct costs o implementation (e.g.increased management costs) to possible indirect or induced costs, resulting rom howthe EAF is implemented (e.g. reduced employment and/or revenues in the short term,as well as ethics and equity-related considerations).

Accordingly, this chapter discusses some o the social and economic considerationsthat can inluence the orm and extent o EAF implementation. The particular aspectsdiscussed here include: (a) employment, livelihood and regional eects; (b) impacts onpoverty levels, e.g. resulting rom changes in income or employment; (c) impacts onood security, e.g. resulting rom short-term decreases in catch levels, i they occur inshiting to an ecosystem approach to isheries management; (d) cultural actors that

may aect EAF implementation; (e) use o traditional knowledge and managementpractices; and () impacts on the distribution o beneits and costs related to EAFimplementation.

O course, the overishing and ecosystem degradation that typically underlie theneed or EAF result in immediate economic losses or the isheries, and a disruptiono livelihoods, community well-being and traditional ways o lie. Likewise, applyingthe ecosystem approach, while aiming to contribute to sustainable development in thelonger term, will also undoubtedly result in costs, at least in the short term – particularlysince one implication may be a reduction o ishing eort and output. However, thereare also possible long term social beneits such as an improved quality and diversityo ish stocks (e.g. increased size o individuals and greater abundance o higher value

species). Improved quality may, or example, lead to increased income or ishers. Actualimpacts on eort and catch will depend on many actors, including the nature o theecosystem and the state o exploitation at the time o implementation o EAF.

This chapter attempts to raise some social and economic issues that may need tobe addressed in the application o EAF, such as the social impacts o any decreases inishing eort that may prove necessary. In examining these issues, one should keepin mind that the implicit assumptions in moving to EAF management are: 1) that inthe long term, EAF will promote the attainment o the ultimate objectives, such asreducing poverty and hunger; and 2) that ailing to implement EAF will eventuallyhave serious negative impacts on those whose livelihoods depend on aquatic resources.Furthermore, it is useul to note that the FAO Code o Conduct or ResponsibleFisheries (FAO, 1995b), in highlighting the relationship between isheries and oodsecurity, and the need or transparency in decision-making processes and or eectiveparticipation o interested parties, provides helpul guidance on the social aspects o applying the EAF.




The PARTICulAR sITuATIon of ARTIsAnAl And smAll-sCAle fIsheRIes

In the developed as well as in the developing world, artisanal and small-scale isheriesserve important roles in terms o providing employment, income and ood security, aswell as maintaining cultural/traditional practices (Berkes et al., 2001). Their key role

has been acknowledged in the above-noted FAO Code o Conduct:6.18 Recognizing the important contributions of artisanal and small-scale fisheries to employment,

income and food security, States should appropriately protect the rights of fishers and fishworkers,

particularly those engaged in subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fisheries, to a secure and just

livelihood, as well as preferential access, where appropriate, to traditional fishing grounds and

resources in the waters under their national jurisdiction.

Five key points that have been raised pertaining to implementation o EAF in thecontext o small-scale isheries in developing countries are as ollows:

•For developing countries, there is a particularly great need or isheries managementto ocus on and take into account the human dimension in the isheries sector. Asisheries in coastal areas in developing countries contribute to poverty alleviation

and ood security, it is diicult to reduce the ishing leet, especially as theState might have scarce resources or creating alternative employment. Coastalisheries may also constitute a better opportunity or people in other areas, withoccupations that cannot provide a basic livelihood, thus leading to migrationinto ishery areas, as experienced, or example, in countries such as China, India,Madagascar, Peru and Senegal (Mathew, 2003).

•Small-scale isheries, even those that inancially generate only marginal proitlevels, may have signiicant comparative advantages over industrial isheries in theorm o greater economic eiciency; ewer negative impacts on the environment;a wider distribution o economic and social beneits (being geographicallymore spread out and decentralized); and their contribution to cultural heritage,including ecological knowledge (FAO, 2005b).

•Although small-scale isheries most oten are ocused on supplying ish andishery products to local and domestic markets, and or subsistence consumption,export-oriented production has increased in many o these isheries during the lastone to two decades as a result o greater market integration and globalization. Forexample, isheries products, especially rom the small-scale subsector, are one o the ew areas where Arican, Caribbean and Paciic countries have seen their shareo world trade increase (Mathew, 2003; FAO, 2005b).

• It has been noted that rom an ethical point o view, applying the ecosystem approachglobally will require that industrialised countries take some responsibility – orexample, by not selling their excess ishing capacity to developing countries atlow prices, or giving it away as an article o aid. On the contrary, establishing

an “international isheries management assistance und” has been proposed tosupport developing countries in the management o overexploited isheries ina consultative manner, using the ecosystem approach as a ramework (Mathew,2003). For example, inancing rom development banks and development-orientedinancial institutions could be a way o easing many small-scale isheries’ transitiontowards a more sustainable use o living resources (FAO, 2005b). At the sametime, where easible, it will be helpul or governments in developing countries toinvest more in isheries management rom existing revenue resources, particularlyin cases where net earnings rom isheries exports are high. Accompanying this isa need or dissemination o inormation regarding the value o the resources, anda need or education in order to explain how an ecosystem approach can improvethe state o the resources (Mathew, 2003).

•A key challenge or small-scale isheries in applying the EAF is dealing withimpacts caused by actors beyond their control, or outside their territories,such as pollution and habitat destruction rom land-based activities, destructive



Social and economic considerations 37

practices o non-ishery activities within aquatic environments (e.g. impacts o oilexploration and extraction and oshore mining activities), and destructive ishingpractices by large-scale isheries. An example o the latter is when industrialishing vessels encroach on inshore areas previously only used by traditional

ishers, in order to make up or a shortage o resources in their original territory.Possible implications o this include a reduction o resources, destruction o ishing gear, damage o habitats, etc. Such implications could result in an addedeconomic burden to the small-scale ishers, ranging rom needing to replace gear,through to a loss o livelihood (FAO, 2005c).

emPloymenT, lIvelIhood And RegIonAl AsPeCTs

Shiting isheries to EAF management, with its broadened attention to ecosystem eectsand interactions with other economic sectors, may well have impacts on employment,livelihoods and regional economies. While in some countries, the isheries sectorcontributes relatively low proportions o national employment and economic activity,

the regional implications within a given nation o a transition towards responsibleisheries may be more severe, as employment tends to be concentrated where ewlivelihood alternatives exist (OECD, 1997). This is a major issue when an EAF leadsto reduced levels o employment, and indeed labour stickiness, ew employmentalternatives and low education levels are some o the obstacles or a smooth transitionin these regions (OECD, 1997).

Impacts on employment stem rom the need to reduce ishing eort, which mightbe carried out through direct controls on eort (input controls) or indirectly throughoutput controls, or with technical measures, including closed areas, etc. Below aresome examples o employment impacts o input and output controls:

1. Direct eort controls may result in immediate reductions in employment, i thelimits on eort are applied in terms o labour inputs, or applied to all inputs.

On the other hand, i eort is reduced by decreasing capital inputs rather thanlabour inputs (e.g. by shiting to less capital-intensive vessels), employmentmay not be much aected.

2. An output control in the orm o a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) that is set belowcurrent harvest levels will initially lead to a decline in harvesting employment,to the extent that such a quota induces less ishing activity (as opposed to merelyinducing highgrading o the catch). However, as the stock recovers, eort willlikely increase along with employment, perhaps to above the previous level. I a TAC limit applies at the same time as a “race-to-ish” occurs, there could be ashortening o the ishing season, leading to a situation with higher employmentin numbers but o shorter duration. With individual quotas, there will also be

initially reduced employment as the TAC decreases. This will be exacerbated,i quotas are transerable in the marketplace; a concentration o control in theishery can lead to extensive employment losses (although such losses maybe reduced somewhat in the long run by a possible lengthening o the ishingseason). Another orm o output control is that o individual, or vessel, catchlimits restricting landings per day, week or month. While the eect o catchlimits o this sort on leet size and harvest employment are not deinitive, suchan approach may have the stabilizing beneit o providing a mechanism orequitable access to ishery resources, one that may avour small producers overlarge, thereby protecting owner-operated ishing vessels (OECD, 1997).

Employment impacts, particularly in ishery-dependent regions, are driven bycharacteristics o the labour orce:

• In some regions, there are ew employment alternatives or ishers, and wherealternatives do exist, these may require employees with higher levels o educationthan that held by the ishers. While only a ew countries have published sector-




speciic data on the level o education among ishery workers, this data does suggestthat the assumption o low-level education amongst ishers is correct (OECD,1997). O course, in addition to their level o ormal educational attainment, theishers may have inormal learning and experience that equips them with skills o

use in other sectors.•The average age o ishery owner-operators is oten greater than that ound in

the working population at large (although the average age o hired workers is notsigniicantly dierent rom elsewhere) and re-employment in another occupationbecomes more diicult the older a person is (OECD, 1997).

•The level o labour-stickiness is high in such areas due to strong roots incommunity or (amily) tradition, reducing the willingness to move in order toind similar or alternative employment elsewhere, and thus also making it morediicult to reduce ishing eort (OECD, 1997).

•While adjustment to reduced ishing eort levels may be easible i there is aunctioning social security system or some kind o adjustment programme, poorer

countries and regions may not have the same possibility o providing such aid totheir ishers. [In OECD member countries, or example, adjustment problemshave been approached through such means as extended-term unemploymentbeneits or younger workers; programmes or retraining; early retirementpackages or older ishermen whose vessels have been withdrawn; and investmentin inrastructure, tourism and other regional and rural development (OECD,1997).]

Changes to isheries in the course o implementing the EAF may have morewidespread eects than just in the ishers’ livelihoods (FAO, 2005b). This is becausechanges in demand and production have impacts not only on producers themselves, butalso indirect impacts through the commodity supply chain. This includes the supply o inputs to the ishing operation through “upstream” activities such as (a) investments

in vessels, engines and gear, (b) operational costs (uel, ice, ood, bait; labour costs),and (c) maintenance costs, as well as through “downstream” activities ollowing theharvesting.

There can also be major interactions o gender and employment that inluence thenature o EAF-related impacts. In terms o “downstream” activities, such as post-harvest processing o ish and ishery products, as well as marketing, women otenplay a predominant role (TABFM, 2006; FAO, 2007b). Impacts o implementingEAF management on the “downstream” activities, e.g. by a reduction in employmentopportunities caused by a change in the ishery management regime, may thus aectood security indirectly, as women tend to spend more o their income on eeding theiramilies than men (see case studies in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay: Josupeit, 2004).

Women also tend to be less educated, and less able to migrate or work due to social/cultural/traditional/religious reasons, thus urther reducing their mobility in terms o labour.

Boxes 2 and 3 provide an example o the livelihood consequences o conservationmeasures and a brie outline o the sustainable livelihoods approach to isheries, as anexample o an approach that can be used when attempting to understand the nature o people’s livelihood opportunities.

In summary, attention to alternative livelihoods is o crucial importance in movingto an EAF, and more generally to changing towards more sustainable ishery practices,by reducing the number o people dependent on ishing as their sole income andthus reducing barriers to change. However, there is no easy answer to the challengeo introducing alternative livelihoods in situations o ishery dependency – barrierssuch as labour stickiness and low levels o education among the ishing populationhave to be acknowledged, as does the reality that no single “solution” will work in allcircumstances. Undoubtedly, a customized approach must be adopted.






isheries ollowing their needs. On the other hand, a commonly-advocated elemento applying the ecosystem approach is to restrict access to the resource, e.g. throughlimited rights systems (FAO, 2005b). The latter move can produce signiicant impactson the poor, i people are excluded when limited access is introduced. Alternatively,ishermen may migrate to other areas where they can access, and ish rom, the samestock, thereby maintaining livelihoods but ailing to limit resource exploitation). Andurthermore, since small-scale isheries take place along thousands o kilometres o coasts where enorcement and surveillance costs are high (Berkes et al ., 2001; Castillaand Deeo, 2001, in Deeo and Castilla, 2005), how easible is it to move to limited

BOx 3

staia ii apprac t iri

As mentioned in Chapter 1, a sustainable livelihoods perspective may be useul in theapplication o the EAF as it highlights people’s livelihood situations, the actors aecting

these, how these can be improved or maintained, and linkages to ecosystem health. The

use o such an approach may clariy impacts rom a change in isheries management

on poor people’s livelihoods, and their ability to deal with such a change. For example,

i applying the ecosystem approach means more conservative levels o ishing, what

alternative income sources exist, and how plausible are these options?

In this approach, “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required

or a means o living” (FAO/DFID, 2000, p. 2). In brie, the sustainable livelihood

ramework consists o ive elements:

• People’s livelihoods depend upon assets. These can be natural (e.g. isheries resources),

inancial (e.g. cash or credit), physical (e.g. ishing gear), human (knowledge o whereto ind ish and how to catch it), and social capital assets (e.g. traditional management

mechanisms, co-operative arrangements).

• The transorming structures and processes inluencing the access people have to the

dierent assets. Examples o these are the institutions, policies and regulations which

inluence the livelihood approaches people adopt and how they make use o their

livelihood opportunities.

• The livelihood strategies are the options and the combination o options people

have and adopt in order to make a living. For example, a community may rely on

combining ishing or parts o the year with agriculture or the rest o the year in

order to have an income throughout the whole year.

• Livelihood outcomes are the result o the strategies people adopted.

• The vulnerability context is made up o the actors (e.g. loods and droughts ininland isheries) in the external environment which may aect the success o people’s

livelihood strategies.

People seek desired livelihood outcomes, such as an increased income, by exploiting

available assets through various livelihood strategies. However, poor people are generally

vulnerable to external impacts (e.g. natural disasters), trends (e.g. resource depletion,

population change), and seasonal change (e.g. ood availability and prices) hence their

desired livelihood outcomes may not always be attainable, and these may also luctuate.

A sustainable livelihood would enable poor people to become more resistant or at least

resilient to changes, trends and external shocks, so that they can maintain or enhance

their assets and capabilities. The SLA is valuable in assessing the likely impact o potential

or actual interventions, and may thereore be useul in moves towards an ecosystemapproach.

Sources: Glavovic, 2006; FAO/DFID, 2000




access? The dilemma, then, is how to devise an eective, equitable way to implementEAF management in such isheries.

Below ollows an example o a tool or identiying areas in which there may be ahigh correlation between poverty and resource depletion. Related tools or inormationacquisition and management are provided in the Annex to this report.

food seCuRITy

Since 1973, the consumption o ish as ood has doubled globally, and the developingworld has been responsible or over 90 percent o this growth, largely rom small-scaleisheries. Small-scale isheries contribute ity percent o all ood-ish, and almost allish rom small-scale isheries is used or ood. Fish orm a crucial part o the diet o millions o the world’s poor (FAO, 2005b). Indeed, in 2001, more than 400 millionpeople received more than 50 percent o their protein rom isheries (FAO, 2005c).

There are two ways in which ishing can contribute to ood security – directlythrough the supply o ish itsel (i.e. sel-consumption), and indirectly through revenuesgenerated rom production and related processing and marketing activities, dependingon whether individuals are sel-employed or paid wages, which can then be used to

BOx 4

Prt appi

Poverty mapping is a tool used by various organizations such as IUCN, the WorldResources Institute, the World Bank and FAO. It can be used to identiy areas globally

where there might be speciic problems in applying the EAF due to high levels o

poverty, but at the same time indicating important social and conservation reasons or

implementing the EAF. Such areas will thereore be high priorities or external support,

unique and practical local solutions, or both.

One example is the IUCN Poverty-Conservation Mapping. Poverty in combination

with high population density, in areas o high levels o biodiversity, is o particular concern

as these areas are o great value in themselves, but are also exposed to high pressure rom

the people who may want to exploit the resources as a source o livelihood. As high level

o poverty oten suggest that employment opportunities are ew, and the ones that do

exist are thus very important, a measure o reduction in ishing eort may thereore bediicult to implement without some kind o community aid in the shape o alternative

employment creation etc. In such cases, models can be developed to help predict causal

relationship between socio-economic variables (e.g. poverty) and environmental change

(e.g. biodiversity loss, decreasing ish stocks, damaged rees). For example, the World

Resources Institute (WRI) has used a mapping system to make an assessment o the health

o many ecosystems’ goods and services globally. In combination with poverty data,

ecosystems in need o “pro-poor ecosystem management” can be ound. Another related

use could be that o linking biological resources data with that o poverty and nutrition,

thus inding potential biological resources-ood security relationships. These maps may in

that way constitute an aid in identiying where poor people largely depend on biodiversity

assets, and where they will beneit rom ecosystem management.

This type o mapping is an analytical tool which can provide inputs in examinationo poverty issues, or example in a sustainable livelihood approach. However, it should

be remembered that although this tool is useul or exploring spatial relationships (visual

correlations) between indicators, the maps do not in themselves show causal relationships.

Thus, there is a risk o misinterpretation.

Sources: IUCN, 2004; FAO, 2003c.




purchase ood (FAO, 2005b). At a national level, direct domestic consumption o ishcan be encouraged (e.g. sel-suiciency o ishing communities) and/or exports o highvalue ish species can enable imports o low value ish species and other ood types.

Various possible impacts o EAF on ood security could occur. For example, i EAF

leads to decreases in available ish landings (whether only short term or both short-and long-term), the result is less access to ood/protein (even i only temporarily)or a certain raction o those who rely on ish as a key protein and ood source. Onthe other hand, i applying the EAF would lead to greater abundance o higher valuespecies, this could possibly lead to increased export revenues. These revenues couldthus lead to increased opportunities o purchasing low value ish species and other oodtypes, hence increasing ood security.

CulTuRAl And RelIgIous ConsIdeRATIons

Another social consideration when applying the ecosystem approach to isheries is howthe religious practices or cultures o certain ishing communities may be aected, or

may bear on EAF implementation. Fishing activities oten have a cultural or religiousvalue and these may contribute to, or perhaps hinder, the adoption o an ecosystemapproach. At the very least, such aspects must be understood in order to acilitate achange in management approach.

Traditional belies regarding isheries have developed through processes o associationand interpretation o natural phenomena, and they oten play an essential role indeciding how people use isheries resources, or at least in justiying and explainingresource use. Thereore it is vital to have some understanding o existing belies andcustoms regarding isheries resources when presenting ideas or management, as thesewill provide key inormation on what may be acceptable to the local community(FAO, 1998).

The religious structure o the community may have important implications or the

way in which isheries resources are exploited – both in the ishing activity and theconsumption o ish products. For example, religious proscriptions which orbid theconsumption o shellish, molluscs or particular types o ish may mean that ishingeort is concentrated on other species, hence increasing the chances o depletiono those stocks. Local belies and customs may also impose other limits on ishingactivities or on participation in isheries (FAO, 1998).

The practice o a particular ishery may be at the centre o people’s belies andcustoms, and the use o a particular gear may be based on traditions and belies, resourceknowledge or skills which oten have been passed rom generation to generation. Insuch cases, people’s attachment to the ishery on which they depend oten goes beyondthe economic beneits derived rom it. An example o this is salmon ishing by native

Americans and Canadians on the west coast o North America, where the importanceo the ishery or indigenous cultural values has been recognized in current eorts tomanage the ishery (FAO, 1998).

Attempts to alter patterns o isheries which orm an important part o local culturesmay be resisted i they are interpreted as a threat to the social and cultural independenceand distinctiveness o a community. Thus, the success or ailure o managementmeasures will oten ultimately depend on the extent to which those aected by themunderstand their unction. However, scientists’ understanding o isheries resourceissues and artisanal ishers’ understanding will oten dier quite radically. Thereoreit is important to seek out common ground and ind ways in which “scientiic”management measures may translate into a locally appropriate orm (FAO, 1998).

For example, in an attempt to establish a way to harvest mussels sustainably orsubsistence needs, in an area on the east coast o South Arica, harvesters participatedin an experiment which was designed to visually demonstrate appropriate harvestlevels. This was done by allowing dierent levels o harvesting intensities in dierent




sub-zones, which then clearly showed how intense harvesting could lead to over-exploitation. In order to ensure an understanding o the activity, role-playing wasused both beore and during the experiment. Results rom the experiment werealso presented at joint committee workshops by using images, models and clearly

intelligible graphs, as well as translating the indings into Zulu. It was noted thatalthough traditional knowledge played a valuable role in the project, it was said to belimited to observable phenomena. It was thereore elt that providing harvesters withscientiic inormation would help them better understand the resource and participatein management decisions (Harris et al., 2003).

Some urther actors may provide guidance on the level o adaptability, andunderlying attitudes, towards management measures such as the ecosystem approach:

•Skills and knowledge regarding ishing techniques and isheries resources willoten be passed rom one generation to the next at the household level. The extentto which this takes place, and the patterns o inheritance o occupational skills,will inorm on how an understanding o management issues will be passed rom

generation to generation.•Where isheries resources are in decline, or access to isheries is threatened,

it can be important to provide opportunities or youth to have the educationneeded to shit to non-ishery activities more easily. This o course also dependson the availability o schools and/or the opportunities a household has to sendits children to school, as well as traditional/cultural/religious attitudes towardseducation, particularly o girls/women.

•As people’s attitudes towards authority will play a great role in shaping theirresponses to eorts to manage their ishing activity, this would mean that i aparticular institution is perceived by ishers as being either not trustworthy ordominated by particular sets o interests which are not necessarily sympathetic tothe needs o ishers, co-operation is likely to be hindered (FAO, 1998).

• In terms o introducing changes to the customs o a society, it should be rememberedthat the culture o a society is not an accidental collection o customs and habits,but rather something that has been evolved by the people to help them in theirconduct o lie. There is a deinite purpose and unction behind each aspect o theculture o a society. Social structures, in general, need to be understood in orderto gain appreciation o who does what in a community, who makes decisions, andwho (rom within the community or rom outside) may inluence the communityto accept change. Such structures may be based on sex, religious and ceremonialgroups, age, kinship/kinship groups, grouping on the basis o common residence,etc. I there is a reluctance to change within the community rom the beginning,unoreseen diiculties in attempts to achieve EAF management may cause urther

reluctance to change.In Box 5, an example is given o a theoretical ramework which can inorm theimplementation o EAF management, by highlighting cultural and religious actors ina local/traditional community context.

IndIgenous PeoPle And TRAdITIonAl Knowledge

In addition to the role that cultural or religious practices may play in the applicationo an ecosystem approach to isheries, the knowledge held in local communities andby indigenous peoples is also important. Mechanisms to use this appropriately need tobe developed.

It is well-known that many indigenous people or local communities have a prooundempirical knowledge o the environment in which they live, one central reason beingthe act that their survival may depend on their understanding o how dierentpatterns o resource use will aect the sustainability o resources in the uture. Theirunderstanding o the environment is oten close to the conceptual basis or integrated






or holistic management. A gender aspect o this local knowledge is that women otenexploit resources and ecological niches which men may have little or no knowledgeo. This special knowledge, and women’s skills in exploiting it, may provide importantinput into isheries management decision-making (FAO, 1998).

It has also been suggested that conservation measures can support the recognition

and guarantee o the rights o indigenous people (IUCN/WWF, 1999). One can indsimilarities between aspects o the ecosystem approach and the approaches o manyindigenous and other traditional peoples’ organizations (Berkes, 1999) - or example,with respect to protected areas within their territory. The concept o sustainableuse o resources is most oten an inherent part o the traditional/indigenous way o thinking as they eel connected to the land/water, as a home to their ancestors but alsoto their children, suggesting that certain restrictions to the use o the resource may beacceptable as it would beneit uture generations (Borrini-Feyerabend et al ., 2004).

Some o the ingredients considered important in this regard are:• that their rights to the territory, and their rights to control and co-manage the

resources and determine their own development priorities, are recognized;•

participation o traditional institutions in co-management arrangements isallowed;•prior inormed consent; and• sustainable use o natural resources that have been used traditionally by indigenous

people is incorporated in the management plan whilst maintaining the integrity o the ecosystem (IUCN/WWF, 1999).

In applying the ecosystem approach and reducing ishing pressure where needed,traditional knowledge can oten provide suitable management options. For example,there may be rights-based isheries in place, oten based on rotational access to isheriesresources – although this system is more easily applied to non-mobile gear and speciesand oten ocuses on mitigating conlicts between user groups over access rather thanreducing overishing pressures (Mathew, 2003).

Box 6 describes an example o a local community’s eort to adopt the ecosystemapproach to isheries.

communities and natural areas to thrive, and on the other hand it might instead threaten the ecosystem

and community viability. This component describes what orm external social, economic and political

orces may take. Such orces need to be acknowledged, and preerably addressed, in order to enhance

ecosystem and community viability.a) Social orces – can work in two extreme ways: (i) policies promoting the conversion o natural

areas to commodity goods may be avoured by a public that seek ast economic growth at

the expense o nature conservation, or (ii) people may be willing to sacriice the sustainability

o local communities and their culture or nature conservation. Thus the social values o the

public can provide an indicator or predicting whether certain projects will have the support

o the society at large.

b) Economic orces – Financial incentives oten contribute to the destruction o natural

ecosystems.

c) Political orces – It has been suggested that national and international laws and policies are the

most powerul external actors that impact ecosystem- and community viability. This type o

orce can be, or example, national land policies which encourage migration to remote areasand the clearing o orests in exchange or land, but also international policies, such as trade

liberalization and structural adjustment.

Source: Michaelidou et al., 2002






4. Form of the benefits: What is the distribution of benefits across the varioustypes?The various beneits and costs o EAF implementation relect the range o human values o isheries ecosystems, as discussed in Chapter 2. Thereore it

is important to recognise that the beneits could arise in any o the ollowingorms:Use values: • net economic beneits o ishing, including income and employment• ood provision and ood security beneits• non-ishing use values that arise rom isheries ecosystems, e.g. tourism,

aquaculture• the values o isheries ecosystems as mechanisms or social interaction and

as local “commons”, as well as providers o livelihoodsNon-use and existence values:• cultural beneits o isheries ecosystems (e.g. or artistic expression or

ceremonies)• aesthetic and existence beneits (e.g. the value o watching a sunset by the

sea, or o knowing that whales are swimming in the sea)• option value (i.e., the value o maintaining isheries ecosystems in terms o

possible uture beneits that might be realized as a result)

ConClusIons

This chapter has explored a wide range o social and economic considerations thatcan inluence the orm and extent o EAF implementation. Speciically, the ollowinghave been discussed: (a) employment, livelihood and regional eects, (b) impacts onpoverty levels, (c) impacts on ood security, (d) cultural actors that may aect EAFimplementation, (e) use o traditional knowledge and management practices, and

() impacts on the distribution o beneits and costs related to EAF implementation.This list o themes can be viewed as a orm o checklist to consider in moving to anEAF management ramework. However, it must be noted that (i) since only brie overviews o each topic have been provided here, in practical EAF implementation,more in-depth understanding o each topic will be required, and (ii) no claim is madehere to the completeness o this list o topics, as isheries have within them a verywide range o social, economic and cultural considerations. Nevertheless, the materialpresented in this chapter represents a starting point in incorporating relevant actors inthe move to EAF management.





49

PART II

fACIlITATIng The

ImPlemenTATIon of The eAf





51

5. Iitia tp i iptit eAf

Moves to EAF management can take many orms – rom small steps to introduceecosystem considerations into conventional management, through to major eortsto re-design isheries management institutions, regulations, and processes. Decisionsconcerning the extent o EAF implementation will need to take into account actorssuch as the easibility o the time rames involved, the budgets and human resourcesavailable, the administrative and political realities o the situation, among otherconsiderations.

boundARIes, sCAle And sCoPe

The EAF, and indeed any orm o isheries management, aces an initial challenge o deining the relevant “ish stock” to manage, i.e. setting the right boundaries, as wellas deciding on the appropriate scale and scope within which to manage. Oten, as timepasses, these matters are seen as resolved – isheries management proceeds and suchissues are no longer the subject o debate. However, moves to an EAF re-open thediscussion, since dealing with ecosystems and “ishery systems” leads to questionso ecosystem boundaries (as opposed to ish stock boundaries) as well as potentiallyenlarging the spatial scale o management (e.g. to better incorporate certain ecosystems)and adjusting the scope o management (e.g. to include human impacts on ecosystemsthat have not been traditionally managed). These matters are explored briely here.

bari

To study or manage any system – whether it be an ecosystem, a coastal zone oran economy – requires speciying its boundaries. There is a continual challenge o determining appropriate boundaries around any given ecosystem, or in determiningsuitable boundaries speciying who are to be included as human participants in “theishery”. The challenge is compounded in meshing together ecosystem boundaries withsocial, economic and institutional boundaries. Speciically, management units might bedeined to relect biological stock units and oceanographic realities, or on the basis o human actors (to relect, or example, the cohesive nature o a ishing community, or

jurisdictional lines).

Can boundaries simultaneously relect ecological, economic, socio-cultural,institutional and political considerations? I not, is one way o deining boundariesintrinsically better than another, or how do we balance the “natural” delimitations o watersheds, coastal zones, etc., on the one hand, and the boundaries o the system romthe perspective o human populations and activities, on the other? What actors are o greatest importance in setting boundaries?

An example o these challenges has arisen in EAF implementation eorts in theBenguela region o southern Arica. These eorts have recognized the importanceor management o taking into account the boundaries relecting the two primaryecosystems o Angola, Namibia and South Arica, i.e. (1) the Benguela upwellingsystem in the central and southern part o the region and (2) the warmer ecosystemnorth o the Angola Front which typically occurs in southern Angola. However, suchboundaries cross national jurisdictions o coastal states, thereby requiring cooperativelinkages among nations in the region.




sca

The scale o a ishery system can vary greatly. On the one hand, a discrete small-scale ishery may be based in a small bay or lake, with its local ish resources and acorresponding ishing community. On the other hand, there are isheries at the scale o

a province/state or a nation, or those on an even larger scale o regional multinationalishery organizations such as the European Union or the FAO’s regional isherymanagement organizations. The question o scale arises in three ways regarding theEAF:

First, it is important to understand whether the many social, economic andinstitutional considerations in implementing the EAF vary depending on the scale o the ishery (e.g. local, national, regional, or even broader, scale), and in what manner.

Second, in implementing the EAF it will be important to address the challengesin managing isheries in which (a) human (social, economic and institutional) scalesare dierent rom that o the resource, or that o the harvesting activity, or (b) therecan be dierences in the scales that are appropriate to deal with each component o a

ishery – ish stocks, ishers, science, enorcement, policy, etc.Third, management o a given ishery may be required at multiple scales, and thismay involve a process o “scaling up” or “scaling down”. For example, i isheriesmanagement (and an EAF) is already implemented at a broad geographical scale(e.g. state, province or nation), this may need to be scaled to work at a local level.Equivalently, when local-level or community-based management is in place within localecosystems, this may need to be “scaled up” while allowing or spatial heterogeneityand diering human and institutional arrangements. These situations may imply aneed or “cross-scale linkages”. For example, i local or decentralized approaches to

management are needed to account orlocal conditions, but the ish stocksrange over larger geographical areas, an

institutional arrangement may be neededto help coordinate across boundaries. Thiscould be the case or a ishery on a highlymigratory stock, such as tuna. In thatcase, biological aspects are on a largescale, crossing national boundaries, whilea national or sub-national scale may it orthe ishers and the management system,and indeed very local management o leets may also be eective.

scpThe scope o the ishery system is alsocrucial to determine. What is included orexcluded? An EAF broadens the scopebeyond seeing a ishery as simply “ishin the sea, people in boats”, beyondconsideration only o commercially-important species, beyond managementeorts directed solely at the harvestingprocess. In other words, it becomesimportant to include interactions betweenthe core o the ishery – ish and ishers –and other elements o the ecosystem andthe human system relevant to management(Figure 6). To neglect such interactions

Industrial development

Forestry

Agriculture

Aquaculture

Coastal

development

habitats

stocks

cohorts

COMMUNITY

a n t h r o p o g e n i c

i n fl u e n c e s

b i ol o gi c al c on s i d er a t i on s

FIGURE 6

Itrpt ic eAf aat







55

6. Ai t ipact eAfaat

benefITs And CosTs of eAfAs discussed earlier, the ecosystem approach to isheries (EAF) has the potential toproduce a variety o beneits, both general (e.g. ecosystem health, sustainable naturalresource use) and more speciic, notably those relating to human considerations (suchas greater employment and income generation, aesthetic beneits). On the other hand,potential costs o implementing EAF include direct costs o implementation (e.g.

increased management costs) and indirect or induced costs (e.g. the risk o reducedemployment and/or revenues in the short term). To assess the consequences o movingto EAF management, it is necessary to (1) determine what are the relevant beneits andcosts, and then (2) measure each o these and draw conclusions rom comparing thebeneits and costs.

Consider the irst o these steps. While this can only be carried out ully given thedetails o a speciic ishery, it is possible to consider in general the various possiblebeneits and costs that might arise rom EAF management. Table 1 lists some o these beneits and costs, grouped under the our headings: ecological, management,economic and social.

Two points must be noted here. First, this is simply a generic listing o possibilities,with no claim to being exhaustive. Second, the categories used here are intuitively

sensible, but are not those typically used in ormal cost-beneit analysis or socialimpact assessment (methods that are discussed below). For example, in cost-beneitanalysis, economists view “economic” costs and beneits as all those o a societal or“global” nature (thus including most ecological and social aspects) while “inancial”costs and beneits are monetary aspects as seen rom a private perspective.

For some entries in Table 1, an indication is given o the conditions or particularsituations that may produce the beneit or cost in question, but ultimately the potentialmagnitude o the beneit or cost, and its probability o occurrence, will depend on

TABLE 1

s pi it a ct eAf iptati

ecica it a ct

bit Ct

Healthier ecosystems (directly or with EAF linkages toeffective ICOM)

Increased global production of goods and services fromaquatic ecosystems (a global benefit)

Improved fish stock abundance (due to healthierecosystems)

Reduced impact on threatened/endangered species

Reduced bycatch of turtles, marine mammals, etc.

Less habitat damage (due to more attention to fishingimpacts)

Lower risk of stock or ecosystem collapseReduced contribution of fisheries to climate change (if EAFleads to lower fuel usage)

Improved understanding of aquatic systems

Decreased fish stocks (if fishery management is now lesseffective than previously)

Increased habitat damage (if management is now lesseffective or creates induced impacts)

Shift in fishing effort to unprotected areas, leading to a lossof genetic biodiversity

Greater highgrading/dumping, and thus more wastage (ifcatch and/or bycatch is restricted)

Reduced fish catches (if more predators – e.g. seabirds,seals – due to better protection




maat it a ct

bit Ct

Better integration in management across fisheries, otheruses, etc.

Clearer epression of management objectives, leading togreater societal benefits

Better balancing of multiple objectives

Better balancing of multiple uses, leading to increased netbenefits

More robust management due to broadening from single-species tools

Improved compliance due to more “buy-in” to management,through better participation

Increased cost of management

Increased cost of research

Increased cost of data collection and data management

Increased cost of coordination across fisheries & aquaticuses

Increased cost of additional and more participatorymeetings

Increased cost of monitoring, observers, etc.

Increased risk of non-compliance (if regulations too compleor unacceptable)

Increased risk of collapse of management system (if toodemanding of resources)

Risk of management failure (if ecessive faith placed in“new” EAF paradigm)

Poor management results and loss of support (if EAFimposed or implemented improperly)

ecic it a ct

bit Ct

Increase in benefits to fishers per fish caught (bigger fishfrom a healthier ecosystem)

Increased catches (especially in long term)

Increased contribution to the economy (especially longterm)

Reduced fishing costs (if EAF results in reduced bycatch)

Increased net economic returns (if EAF involves reducedfishing effort, towards MEY)

Higher-value fishery (if increased availability of food to toppredators increases stock sizes)

Greater livelihood opportunities for fishers (e.g. in tourism,if charismatic species abundances increase through EAF)

Increased non-use (e.g. cultural) and eistence values (thelatter resulting from appreciation of healthier aquaticsystems and a greater abundance of aquatic life, etc.)

Reduced catches (especially in short term)

Loss of income to negatively affected fishers

Increased income disparity among fishers (if EAF impactsare uneven)

Reduction of government revenues from licenses, etc. (if

there is reduced effort)

Reduction in benefits to fishers (if lower governmentsupport)

Reduced contribution to economy (short term)

Reduced employment in short term and possibly long term

scia it a ct

bit Ct

Positive impacts on food supply in long term (if greatercatches become possible)

Synergistic positive effect of coordinated EAF across fisheriesand/or nations (LME)

Greater resilience (if there is emphasis on multiple sourcesof fishery livelihoods)

Greater resilience (if increased bycatch results in morelivelihood opportunities)

Reduced conflict (if EAF processes deal effectively withinterfishery issues)

Negative impacts on food supply in short term (and risk ofthis also in long term)

Greater inequity (if EAF favours those able to invest inappropriate technology)

Greater inequity (if there is mis-placed allocation ofresponsibility for EAF costs)

Increased poverty among those adversely affected by EAF(short term, or both)

Reduced benefits to fishers (if EAF linked to ICOM, andtradeoffs detrimental to fishers)

Greater conflict (if EAF leads to enforced interaction amonga larger set of societal and/or economic players)

TABLE 1 (cont.)



Assessing the impacts of EAF management 57

the speciics o the ishery and o EAF implementation. Note that in the case o acost o EAF, or a given ishery, the product o the probability o occurrence and themagnitude o the cost represents the “risk” associated with that cost.

While the above listing o possible beneits and costs o implementing EAF was

organized according to ecological, management, economic and social categories, anotherroute to viewing beneits and costs is by organizing them according to speciic stagesand actions involved in implementing the EAF. Through a step-by-step examination o FAO’s EAF Guidelines, a set o ive tables has been created, listing EAF considerationsthat have implied beneits and/or costs on the ollowing themes:

1. Moving towards EAF management (rom Guidelines section 1.4)2. Options to manage ishing (rom Guidelines section 3.2)3. Legal and institutional aspects o EAF (rom Guidelines section 4.2)4. Research or an improved EAF (rom Guidelines section 5)5. Threats to implementing EAF (rom Guidelines section 6)

The tables are contained in Appendix 6.1 to this chapter. Note that each o these

represents a template to be completed in a speciic ishery/ecosystem situation – i.e.,each includes a set o elements arising in EAF implementation, or each o which it isnecessary to determine (a) whether the element is applicable in the particular isheryor ecosystem under discussion, and (b) i so, what are the relevant beneits and costsarising or that element (measured qualitatively or quantitatively).

meAsuRIng benefITs And CosTs

A wide variety o potential beneits and costs o EAF were listed above, but howeach o these is actually measured in practice is another matter, as is the subsequentdecision-making challenge o comparing among the various beneits and costs in orderto come to appropriate conclusions. We consider here the easibility o measuring thebeneits and costs described in Table 1 that deal with management, economic and social

aspects.Among Management benefits and costs, several o the costs (e.g. or management,

research, data handling, additional meetings, monitoring and observers) are readilyassessed rom governmental sources o inormation, possibly supplemented by suitablesurveys. Other costs (e.g. the risks o non-compliance or o collapse o the managementsystem) are diicult to measure objectively, but may be amenable either to modellingor to surveys and interviewing. Most o the beneits listed (e.g. better integration inmanagement across isheries, clearer expression o management objectives, betterbalancing o multiple objectives and o multiple uses, etc.) are diicult to assessobjectively, although some (e.g. improved compliance through better participation) canbe assessed based on available data (e.g. inractions reports).

Economic benefits and costs are generally easier to measure. First, some are amenableto standard ishery data gathering – e.g. or beneits or costs at the isher level (suchas changes in income per ish caught, in catch levels, and in ishing costs), and orthose at the sector level (such as changes in employment, net economic returns, andcontribution to the economy). Some measures can be obtained through governmentalaccounting systems (such as changes in the revenues rom licenses, etc.). Still othersmay require more speciic data collection, e.g. through surveys to assess changes inlivelihood opportunities or ishers, or in increased income disparity among ishers.

The Social benefits and costs noted above are generally much more challenging toassess. This is certainly the case, or example, with changes in management eiciencyand overall resilience o the human system. However, eects on the ood supply, onpoverty levels, on levels o inequity and on conlict all have objective methods ormeasurement. Thus there is likely to be a wide variation in the capability to measuresocial beneits and costs.




A wide range o methodologies could be used in measuring the social, economic,and management beneits and costs o EAF implementation. These come rom a widerange o disciplinary traditions and approaches, and many are similar to those listedin Chapter 2 or valuation o aquatic ecosystem services. Some possibilities are as

ollows:•direct isheries measures•direct governmental accounting• socio-economic surveys• cost-beneit analysis• social impact assessment• indicator rameworks• contingent valuation and travel cost methods• attitudinal and stated preerence surveys•bioeconomic models• structured or semi-structured interviews•

asset mapping•national systems o accountsThe choice among these methods will vary rom case to case. Note that those

methodologies o a particularly broad nature such as bioeconomic models, nationalsystems o accounts and indicator rameworks (as described in Chapter 2) havethe potential to provide cross-cutting approaches to assessing and monitoring themanagement, economic and social aspects in Table 1. A more detailed look at some o the major methodologies is presented in the ollowing section.

deCIsIon-mAKIng Tools foR AssessIng eAf

There are various analytical rameworks available to assist in the decision-makingprocess relating to EAF implementation. This section considers a sampling o decision-

making tools, such as cost-beneit analysis, social impact assessment, indicatorrameworks, socio-economic monitoring, systems o national accounts, simulation andbio-economic models. Each o the tools is discussed in sequence below, and in mostcases, sources or urther inormation are provided. Furthermore, a set o additionaldecision-making tools is presented in Appendix 6.2; with some adjustment in theirapplication, these may be relevant or EAF as well.

ga raki

Goal ranking is designed to make goals and expectations explicit, and to assistin discussing them with others, oten as a means to collectively reach agreementon priorities. Without a systematic method o prioritization it may be diicult

to preerentially and eiciently allocate attention or resources to the goals thatstakeholders deem most important. A goal ranking exercise can address this situation.Goal ranking can be used in the early steps o the policy and planning processes in EAFwhen several competing or perhaps conlicting goals have been identiied. Ranking byvoting or other numerical processes can be supplemented with negotiation to arrive atconsensus goals. It is also possible to use the ranking or assigning weights to goals inorder to assist selection.

Pr trThe problem tree is an analytical tool, usually done as part o a participatory planningprocess, to logically and visually identiy the root causes o observed problems bylinking and hierarchically clustering a series o problems. It can complement severalother tools, and orms an important part o the planning toolkit, particularly in Rapidor Participatory Rural Appraisals, where the visualization lends itsel to use in theield with any stakeholder group. Problem trees are useul in planning EAF where




there are multiple problems, the relations between which are not easily discernible tostakeholders. Using the problem tree method shows participants that their problems arebeing taken seriously. Relating problems to each other is a useul means o emphasizingthe shared ownership o agreed upon issues.

Ct-it aaiThe most common and, in theory, complete decision-making tool used to determinethe economic eiciency o choice sets aced by decision-makers is cost-beneit analysis(CBA). CBA, or economic eiciency analyses, orm one instrument or evaluatingpotential projects. The streams o uture costs and beneits are estimated, summed, andplaced into their “current” year value, entitled the net present value (NPV = the streamo beneits minus the stream o costs, discounted to relect the uture point in time inwhich the various beneits or costs are to occur). The NPV o the status quo alternativemay be compared with the NPV o several alternative projects or scenarios; however,and commonly, an individual project NPV is calculated without bases or comparison.

In the ormer, the alternative with the highest NPV would be the preerred choice;while in the latter use, projects with positive NPV would be accepted. Variant measureso economic eiciency include the ratio o beneits to costs or the estimated internalrate o return;17 since these are non-denominational, this makes ranking across projectseasier. Sumaila (2001) presents a brie overview o the CBA approach, a suggestion onhow to deal with discounting beneits accrued by uture generations, and an applicationo this adjusted CBA to a hypothetical case o marine ecosystem restoration.

As a complete CBA would estimate all beneits and costs related to managementalternatives, it will be necessary to apply several o the valuation tools mentionedearlier in this chapter. Given the cost implications o a complete CBA, these tend to bepartial analyses (especially with regard to beneits), which may at least provide lowerbound estimates. When a management agency is aced with budget constraints, a pre-

and non-monetary evaluation o potential costs and beneits and their relative priorityranking would assist the agency in appropriately allocating limited unds.

scia ipact at

As described by TICPGSIA (2003), a social impact assessment (SIA) ocuses on humanenvironment issues and their resolution. It constitutes a tool in decision-making, aidingthose aected and responsible agencies, in assessing the impacts and desirability o aproposed action. An SIA looks or social and cultural actors that need to be consideredin a decision, and providing a mechanism or incorporating appropriate knowledge andvalues into the decision. In general, SIA assists in the identiication o the most sociallybeneicial course o action. Some o the principles and related guidelines o SIA (see

below) can be used in considering social implications o applying the EAF.

Iicatr rarkIndicators rameworks constitute a useul guidance tool in the decision-makingprocess in that they can “communicate ecosystem service beneits, and support....the communication o spatial interdependencies to decision-makers and stakeholdergroups” (Boyd et al., 2004). Being used to enhance transparency, communication andeectiveness in natural resource management, indicators provide help in the assessmento the perormance o isheries policies and management at all levels. In relation tosustainable development goals, indicators can illustrate the trends and state o a speciicresource, or the sustainability o ishery activity, or they can be analysed at a broadersocietal or ecosystem level (FAO, 1999b).

17 To estimate the internal rate o return, the NPV is ixed at zero, and the discount rate is determined thatmakes the present value o lows o costs and beneits equal over the lie-span o the project.




BOx 7

scia ipact at

Some principles and related guidelines o SIA are as ollows:

1. Achieve extensive understanding of local and regional settings to be affected by the action or policy

• Identiy and describe interested and aected stakeholders and other parties, and understand

their interests and values (e.g. social groups aected by outcomes o an action, e.g. transition to

EAF).

• Develop baseline inormation (proiles) o local and regional communities (e.g. existing conditions

and past trends associated with the relevant human environment).

2. Focus on key elements of the human environment

• Identiy the key social and cultural issues related to the action or policy rom the community and

stakeholder proiles (carried out with public involvement, producing a list o the most signiicantimpacts in order o priority, and all signiicant impacts or all interested and aected parties).

• Select social and cultural variables which measure and explain the issues identiied (pointing to

measurable change in human populations, communities, and social relationships).

3. Identify research methods, assumptions and significance

• Research methods should be holistic in scope (describing all social impacts related to the action or

policy, so decision-makers and the aected public are given the chance to evaluate them).

• Research methods must describe cumulative social eects related to the action or policy (resulting

rom the incremental impacts o an action added to other past, present or oreseeable uture

impacts).

• Ensure that methods and assumptions are transparent (and replicable)

• Select orms and levels o data collection and analysis appropriate to the signiicance o the actionor policy.

4. Provide quality information for use in decision-making

• Collect qualitative and quantitative social, economic and cultural data suicient to useully

describe and analyse all reasonable alternatives to the action.

• Ensure that the data collection methods and orms o analysis are scientiically robust

• Ensure the integrity o collected data

5. Ensure that any environmental justice issues are fully described and analyzed

• Ensure that research methods, data, and analysis consider underrepresented and vulnerable

stakeholders and populations.• Consider the distribution o all impacts (whether social, economic, air quality, noise, or potential

health eects) to dierent social groups (including ethnic/racial and income groups) - identiying

those whose adverse impacts might be lost in the aggregate o beneits.

• Undertake evaluation/monitoring and mitigation

• Establish mechanisms or evaluation and monitoring o the action, policy or program

• Where mitigation o impacts may be required, provide a mechanism and plan or assuring

eective mitigation takes place – such as avoiding the impact; reducing the impacts by redesigning

the project or policy; or compensating or irreversible impacts (e.g. by providing alternative

employment or ishers who may lose their job because o changes in ishery management).

• Identiy data gaps and plan or illing these data needs.

Source: adapted rom TICPGSIA (2003)




In applying the ecosystem approach, there will be the need to move away rom asole ocus on biological indicators, such as target species, towards ecological, societal,economic and institutional indicators that relect broader sustainability objectives.However, this transition may be diicult as the existing problems with developingsocio-economic indicators are plentiul, such as: lack o data availability due toconidentiality issues and lack o primary inormation; the non-market nature o certain eects; and the diversity o local contexts (isheries), which complicates thedeinition o common indicators or international comparison (IEEP, 2005).

Various indicator rameworks exist and the choice o ramework may relect policypriorities or ocus within the organizations and countries using or proposing them.IEEP (2005) suggests that, depending on the reerence ramework, indicators aredeined by ield (social, economic, institutional) or by type (pressure-state-response[PSR] or driving orces-pressures-state-impact-response [DPSIR]) (IEEP, 2005). Abrie review o selected indicator rameworks is presented in Box 9. The FAO indicatorsor sustainable development o marine capture isheries are attached as Appendix 6.3at the end o this chapter.

sci-cic itri

Socio-economic monitoring is the continuous or regular collection and analysis o social, cultural, economic and governance data o people, groups, communities andorganizations, usually at speciied intervals. An example o this is the internationalSocio-economic Monitoring Initiative or Coastal Management (SocMon) (Bunce etal ., 2000; Bunce and Pomeroy, 2003). SocMon, which is being implemented at global

BOx 8

A ap t cia ipact at iti iri.

The Tortugas Ecological Reserve was created in the Florida Keys (United States o America) as theresult o a 3-year collaborative process called “Tortugas 2000” to deal with problems such as a degrading

marine environment, and commercial and recreational ishing pressure that had reduced the average size

o some ish species. This reserve is a “no-take” area, created to protect the critical coral ree ecosystem

o the Tortugas, thus preserving species diversity and health o ish stocks, to help ensure the stability

o commercial and recreational isheries, and to provide opportunities or education and research. As a

part o the collaborative process, and to develop a preerred alternative, a working group was established

composed o commercial and recreational ishers, conservationists, scientists, divers, concerned citizens

and government agencies. An “ecosystem approach” was used which meant recommending alternatives

based on natural resources instead o jurisdictional boundaries, and ecological as well as socio-economic

inormation was gathered and considered during the meetings o the working group. In order to

determine the socioeconomic impact o a closure on ishermen within the sanctuary, a social impactassessment was carried out through a system o surveys and inormal conversation. A consultation o

ishermen, charter boat captains, scientists etc. helped to identiy what areas were being ished, which

ish were ound in those areas, and how much the ish were worth, and additionally the demographics

o the ishermen were recorded. The inormation ound was used to minimize the impact o no-take

zones on the ishing community. Through this assessment, the ollowing impacts o a no-take regulation

were ound: (1) moderate impacts on ishermen (mostly lobster and handline ishermen) and some

recreational charter operators. (2) minimal or small impacts on recreational ishermen, commercial

shippers, and treasure salvors. Due to the educational and research value o an ecological reserve, the

potential beneits to non-consumptive users and scientists were deemed to be high. Through long-term

isheries replenishment, it was also suggested that positive eects to the surrounding areas were likely.

Sources: NOAA (2000) and NOAA Web site (2006)




BOx 9

sct iicatr rark

The FAO Sustainable Development Reerence System (SDRS) integrates the our dimensions o sustainability: ecosystem, economy, community and governance. Basing indicators on a small number

o key criteria or variables, appropriate indicators and related reerence points (e.g. threshold values)

can then be deined, depending on their purpose. The aim is to have a reerence system that acilitates

assessment o progress towards sustainability goals and evaluation o eiciency o management

measures. This ramework can be deined as a pressure-state-response (PSR) ramework, which

considers the pressure imposed by human activities on some aspects o the system, the state o that

aspect and the actual or desired societal response. Deining indicators o pressures or driving orces may

be useul as such orces are oten the subject o management intervention.

The OECD ocuses on the need or integrating social and economic components in the analysis, using

two types o rameworks that link objectives, indicators and results: Firstly, an accounting ramework

aiming at integrating environmental aspects into public accounting, in physical and monetary units (e.g.the accounting o ishery resources in Australia). Secondly, an analytical ramework in which the choice

o indicators is related to the analysis o interactions between causes, eects and actions. The pressure-

state-response (PSR) and the driving orces-pressure-state-impact-responses (DPSIR) rameworks can

be used in the identiication o such interactions.

However, some researchers suggest these are not well adapted to identiy the dynamics o the socio-

economic components as they were originally used to take into account environmental aspects in public

policy development and not speciically or the socio-economic aspects.

As an additional tool, the OECD suggests the use o some indicators called “resources-results”, in

evaluating the preservation o environmental, economic and social assets.

The International Council or the Exploration o the Sea (ICES) is building rom the precautionary

approach ramework to a ramework which also considers societal beneits. In doing so, ICES is

including a wider understanding o institutional and economic dynamics in a more comprehensivesystems approach to isheries management. As the ormer indicator ramework ocused mainly on

biological sustainability, this systems approach integrates issues o uncertainty, risk, etc. to examine

perormance o ishery systems.

Australia provides one o the irst examples o an indicator ramework being implemented and

adapted to the local context, and it is also being used to develop the FAO ramework urther. The

Australian National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) contains three key

objectives: intra-and intergenerational equity; enhancement o community well-being and welare; and

protection o biological diversity. The tree-shaped ramework is divided in categories (e.g. contribution

o the ishery to ecological well-being), and each category into components (e.g. retained species). By

adapting each tree to the speciic context o a ishery (management unit), criteria and indicators can be

deined to ollow up progress towards ESD objectives.Yet another approach, being developed by Resources or the Future, is ecosystem beneit indicators,

which are based on both biophysical and socioeconomic data, constructed and manipulated with GIS

tools. Some indicators relate to the underlying production o the ecosystem and others relate to the

demand or, and value o, the service. This ramework can help identiy beneit “hotspots”, i.e. areas

that generate valuable ecosystem services, by overlaying multiple maps o the relevant ecological and

socioeconomic indicators. Criteria or what level o hotspot classiication would trigger opposition to

habitat alteration permits could possibly be developed through an expert consultation.

Sources: FAO (1999b), IEEP (2005), and Boyd et al. (2004)

and regional levels, is a set o guidelines or establishing socio-economic monitoringprogrammes at the coastal management study site level. It provides a methodology orregularly collecting basic socio-economic data useul or coastal management at the site




level, and provides a basis or a regional system by which site-level data can eed intonational, regional and international databases or comparison. SocMon is also intendedto provide insight to managers, many o whom come rom biology backgrounds, intowhat “socio-economics” means, how socio-economic inormation can be useul totheir management, and what socio-economic data might be useul or management attheir site.

The SocMon initiative uses a standard set o variables that can be tailored to site-speciic situations. It can be used in EAF to monitor and evaluate the perormance o interventions on speciic geographic areas paying special attention to communities andhouseholds within and outside o the isheries sector. Some typical SocMon variablesinclude:

BOx 10

eaati mPA aat cti

The evaluation o marine protected area (MPA) management eectiveness is about assessing the degreeto which management actions are achieving stated goals and objectives (Pomeroy et al., 2004). This

tells us how well an MPA is doing by measuring perormance through a series o indicators related to

generic goals and objectives normally written in MPA management or strategic plans. Evaluation o

MPA management eectiveness can be a component o the EAF system o indicators wherever MPAs

are used as part o the management approach, oten within the wider context o integrated management.

MPAs are implemented or a myriad o reasons, and hence they dier in size, management structure

and management and conservation goals among other eatures. However, rom the perspective o

human dimensions, the socio-economic and governance indicators (see table below) will be relevant to

most MPAs even where the bio-physical characteristics are markedly dierent.

sci-cic Iicatr grac Iicatr

Local marine resource use patterns

Local values and beliefs re: the marine resources

Level of understanding of human impacts

Perceptions of seafood availability

Perceptions of local resource harvest

Perceptions of non-market and non-use value

Material style of life

Quality of human health

Household income distribution by source

Household occupational structure

Community infrastructure and business

Number and nature of markets

Stakeholder knowledge of natural history

Distribution of formal knowledge to community

Percent of stakeholder group in leadershippositions

Changes in conditions of ancestral and historicalsites, features, and/or monuments

Level of resource conflict

Eistence of a decision-making and management body

Eistence and adoption of a management plan

Local understanding of MPA rules and regulations

Eistence and adequacy of enabling legislation

Availability and allocation of MPA admin resources

Eistence and application of science research and input

Eistence and activity level of community orgsanisations

Degree of interaction between managers and stakeholders

Proportion of stakeholders trained in sustainable use

Level of training provided to stakeholders in participation

Level of stakeholder participation and satisfaction inmanagement process and activities

Level of stakeholder involvement in surveillance, monitoring,and enforcement

Clearly defined enforcement procedures

Enforcement coverage

Degree of information dissemination to encourage stakeholdercompliance

A well-established process o evaluation has been developed, which can be tailored to the situation

at hand, and underscores the need to clariy the management questions beore deining the relevant

indicators (see corresponding guidebook or details on the method).

Sources: Pomeroy et al. (2004)






Four categories o accounts exist (FAO 2004a):1. Asset accounts – inormation about stocks and changes in stocks o natural

resources.2. Flow accounts or pollution, energy and materials – inormation about the

use o energy and materials as inputs to production and inal demand, and thegeneration o pollutants and solid waste.

3. Environmental protection and resource management expenditure accounts – inormation about expenditures o industry, government and householdsor protection o the environment or management o resources. Taxes andproperty income received rom the sale o ishing licenses or purchase o theright to ish etc. are also included in this account.

4. Environmentally-adjusted macroeconomic aggregates – adjustments toexisting country-level key inancial and economic data or the depletion anddegradation o environmental assets.

According to FAO (2004a), the SEEAF asset accounts cover:

1. Produced assets – capital used or ishing and manuacturing o ish products(e.g. boats, ishing gears), and cultivated isheries (e.g. aquaculture).2. Non-produced assets – e.g. wild ish stocks, water ecosystems (providing

habitats or ishery resources).while the SEEA flow accounts cover:1. Expenditures or protection o ish habitats and resource management accounts

by industries and households.2. Activities o industries that provide environmental protection services.3. Environmental and resource taxes and subsidies.

How can these satellite accounts aid policy-makers? SEEA is a useul tool orministries when attempting to coordinate policies in cases o cross-sectoral impacts, asit provides inormation or weighing alternatives and making trade-os. An example

o this could be when considering changes in land use in coastal areas. By being ableto assess the economic value o ishing in this broader sense, policy-makers can easierlink inormation about isheries to the broader economy, and thus possibly integrateisheries policy with national development in a more plausible way (FAO, 2004a).

Which are the main areas or improvement in the use o isheries accounts orpolicy analysis? Firstly, these accounts are still only being used by a small number o countries, partly due to the small economic role o isheries in most countries, andpartly because o the amount o uncertainties relating to stocks, uture stocks, andthe value o stocks. Secondly, little research has ocused on artisanal and subsistenceisheries. This possibly stems rom the oten low economic value o small-scale andsubsistence, however, they may be vital in terms o providing livelihoods in both

industrialized and developing countries, and are likely to expand because o populationgrowth and improved access to better ishing equipment. Thirdly, sustainable isheriesmanagement requires taking into account o all environmental services such the valueso existence, tourism and recreation, to a greater extent. Fourthly, a speciic problemlies in creating accounts or straddling and highly migratory stocks, and high seasish stocks, outside EEZs, as there is, at the present, very little inormation about thevalue o these ish stocks (FAO, 2004a). Related to this is also the issue o “double-accounting” o straddling stocks, meaning that the same stock is accounted or in morethan one country’s accounts.

Further areas which provide complex topics or discussion are: irst, the valuationo non-market beneits (e.g. biodiversity) – it has been suggested that nationalaccountants’ reluctance to put monetary values on such beneits stems rom thegreat degree o judgment which is required in the estimation o non-market values(Atkinson, 2000); second, the attribution o production to the country o residence o the operator, and not to the country o registration o the vessel, due to the problem o




“lags o convenience”, however the determination o residence o the operator o theishing vessel has no reerence to where the ish is caught or landed.

scari i a iati

Given the complexity o ishery systems, it is diicult to predict possible uture changesin the ishery, and particularly the likely outcomes o management interventions,without systematic tools to assist. This complexity increases in the EAF as a broaderrange o actors needs to be considered. However, it is still important to be able toexplore EAF situations or scenarios in a suiciently simple manner, without beingsimplistic – so that well-inormed policy and planning decisions can be made by avariety o stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. In this context,scenarios and simulations are important and powerul tools or supporting decision-making.

Scenarios and simulations are based on the idea o a “model” – a tool to represent thereal world in a orm that can be analysed reasonably easily, thus allowing us to explore

the implications o management options prior to implementing them in practice.A model can be expressed verbally (in words), diagrammatically (using graphs),physically (in scale models) or with mathematical notation and computer programs.The latter type o model allows us to experiment with isheries management optionsthrough a “sae” computerized approach that avoids the cost, time, and potentialdanger o implementing un-tested management directly in the ishery. With a computermodel, one can use “simulation” to explore a range o “scenarios” – potential uturerealities, based on assumptions about how the world will evolve, together with a choiceo management decisions – to see what implications might arise or each scenario.

Since scenarios typically involve both ecosystem and human elements o the ishery,an important orm o model is the “integrated” model which – in contrast to purelyeconomic or biological models – combines the various components o the ishery in a

single model. Integrated models (such as bio-economic models, discussed elsewhere)provide the means to examine the many interrelationships among ish, ishers, leetsand post-harvest elements o the ishery. In this way, simulations mimic the dynamicso actual isheries – changes over time in ish populations, ishing leets, people in theishery, and management agencies – so as to predict the eects o ishery managementdecisions.

In general, it is desirable or ishery models to be such that (a) inormationrequirements are not excessive, (b) the model can be directly used in or adapted to arange o isheries, and/or (c) participatory processes are used in creating the model. Itis useul to note as well that scenario modelling or simulation analysis requires “itting”the model, and this in turn requires a range o suitable time series o data, including

some not always associated with the ishery itsel (such as regional labour conditions,migration rates and human population trends, where relevant).

bi-cic

Bio-economic models are representations o the biological and economic structureand dynamics o isheries. These models expressly link economic aspects with theirbiological oundations and range rom relatively simple models o proit maximizationsubject to ish population dynamics, to more complicated multileet, multispeciesmodels with complicated growth unctions and interaction variables. Tractability,representative capacity and data availability, with their related costs, o these modelsare major actors in determining their degree o descriptive power.

Seijo et al. (1998) provide a review o the theory and practice o static and dynamicbio-economic models and their use in management planning. Such models are verypowerul policy analysis tools in that economic eiciency gains and losses maybe estimated or a variety o possible ishery management portolios, institutional




structure, and biological growth assumptions. These models lend themselves to graphicrepresentation, allowing or pictorial descriptions o changes in ishery outcomes romany changes within and without the ishery.

Bioeconomic models are now being applied to EAF-related topics. For example,Boyd et al. (2004) present a bio-economic model that shows how the quality o theecosystem aects ishery activities – speciically how ishing eort is aected by changesin habitat (either in quality or quantity), as well as changes in management rameworkand in knowledge about stock dynamics. Box 11 presents a graphic representation o this model showing the eects o habitat changes on ishing eort under open-accessand regulated access situations.

T ict ratAs mentioned above, the costs and beneits o implementing the EAF, or anymanagement decision or that matter, will have a time dimension that will need to be

BOx 11

grapic rprtati rt a prit ca i a i-cic

The ollowing igure demonstrates the economic eiciency loss rom ishery habitat loss(in quality or quantity) in a regulated (assumed proit maximizing) ishery. The lower total

revenue curve per unit o ishing eort (rom TR0 to TR1) is caused by the reduced ability

o the ecosystem to sustain the original ish species abundance. The rotating upward o

the total cost curve (rom TC0 to TC1) is, or example, due to increased congestion among

the vessels ishing in smaller zones.

Fishing eort goes down rom E0 to E1 (this eort probably being displaced to other

isheries) and net proit decreases rom shaded area Proit0 to the shaded area Proit1;

representing a loss to society.

Source: Boyd et al. (2004)

Fishing effort

$

TC0

TC1

TR0

TR1

E0

E1

Profit0

Profit1

Habitat loss

Congestion




considered. The time element comes rom the act that a management action today mayhave immediate beneits and costs, beneits and costs that arise ar in the uture, or anymix between the two. I people valued events in the uture as they value events in thepresent, this time spread o costs and beneits would not be an issue. However, this is

not the case and, in act, poses some undamental ethical questions. I, or example, thedecision was taken today to exhaust a ishery resource in order to provide ood orthe immediate generation but would make it more diicult or uture generations toish or ood, how should one weight the impacts on the various generations? Do wecare more, less, or equally about current generations or uture generations? What i amanagement action were to imply high immediate costs and beneits only in the long-term, say, in three generations? Should we still undertake this action?

Complicating the issue is that no two individuals or groups share exactly the samevalues or costs and beneits along a time line. A politician may have no value or impactsoccurring ater his political liespan. A conservationist may value any improvementsin ecosystem services, regardless o when they occur. A large ishing corporation may

value the resource only during the expected lietime o the corporation. Traditionalishers may value the resource or their own use but also eel a responsibility tomaintain the resource or use by their children, grandchildren, and so on. A ishmongermay preer to sell ish today in order to invest the money in a dierent activity. Anygiven stakeholder has his own time value, whether deined consciously or not.

To acknowledge that a “dollar tomorrow” does not have the same value as a “dollartoday”, a discount rate is used in decision-making tools that compare costs and beneitsacross generations, such as those mentioned previously. The higher the discount rate,the less value we place today on costs and beneits that will come at some point inthe uture. I the discount rate is zero, uture costs and beneits have the same value(are weighted equally) as immediate costs and beneits. I greater than zero, then the“present value” (as seen today) o a particular cost or beneit that occurs in a uture

year is lower than the equivalent “present value” o the same cost or beneit i it occurstoday.

Thereore, any positive discount rate will avour actions with short-term beneitsor long-term costs. Actions having short-term costs and long-term beneits will have aharder time being accepted until the cost-beneit ramework. As ecosystem restorationor preservation projects entail long-term beneits with short-term costs, these projectswould look less interesting rom an economic perspective than other projects withshort-term beneits, such as those that would immediately use ecosystem services.

A challenge in implementing the EAF lies in the dierence between “social” and“private” perspectives on discounting. Whatever may be the societal view o thebalance o present and uture generations, EAF management must deal with the reality

that rom a private viewpoint (Sumaila, 2005):•people are generally impatient and display a preerence or having their beneits

today rather than tomorrow (due to uncertainty, high debt levels, poverty, etc.);and

•money might otherwise be invested elsewhere (the opportunity cost o capital)with even higher interest on the investment.

In a ishery context, the irst o these could imply a relatively high discount rateamong ishers, and thus a challenge in gaining support or longer-term objectives o ecosystem health. The second will vary depending on the circumstances in which theishery and ishing community/industry inds itsel and its eect on ishing activitiesis less straightorward.

How to determine a suitable discount rate to meet societal needs has been a subjecto abundant discussion in isheries and indeed throughout society. For example, Farberand Hemmersbaugh (1993) present some o the practical and philosophical issues inusing and choosing discount rates, and Pearce et al. (2006) address some current issues




o the debate as well as providing some guidance or decision-makers on the choice anduse o discount rates. In isheries, the policy implications can be enormous. Sumailaand Walters (2005) note that sustainability mandates around the world, including EAF,require “that uture generations have the beneit o inheriting ‘healthy’ natural and

environmental resources”. However, Cochrane (2006) notes that when no alternativesto ishing exist and/or individuals are highly dependent on isheries to meet basicneeds, special consideration is needed – in such cases, private discount rates tend to bevery high and policy remedies are particularly diicult.

ConClusIons

This chapter has ocused on understanding, measuring and assessing the impacts o moving to the ecosystem approach to isheries, including a set o decision support toolsor EAF. The irst part o the chapter provided an examination o the various potentialbeneits and costs o EAF management, rom social, economic and managementperspectives, as well as in terms o implications within the current EAF guidelines

themselves, together with a brie discussion o the practical challenges involved inmeasuring these various beneits and costs. The second part o the chapter ocused onmethods or assessing the consequences o EAF management, and thereore makingdecisions about EAF implementation. These methods and approaches included cost-beneit analysis, social impact assessment, indicator rameworks, systems o nationalaccounts, bio-economic models, and applying the discount rate.

It should be highlighted in closing that the discussion in this chapter provides onlysome starting points or addressing the major challenges involved in predicting andassessing the impacts o EAF implementation. Only brie outlines were given o eachapproach presented here, there are other methods to be considered beyond these, andthe discussion here has been generic in nature, with the speciics o a given isheryneeding incorporation or any practical analysis o EAF implementation. Nevertheless,

it is hoped that the material in this chapter can be built upon to support those engagedin developing and implementing EAF management.




APPendIx 6.1

bit a ct arii i t eAf ii

This appendix extracts some speciic pieces o the current EAF guidelines with

particular implications, whether in terms o beneits and/or costs (Tables 1–3), areas o research that could improve EAF implementation (Table 4) or human considerations

TAble 1

mi tar eAf aat (scti 1.4 i t fAo eAf gii)

1.4.1 T iri aat prc

…Recognizing the broader economic and social interests of stakeholders under EAF, the setting of economic and socialobjectives will need a broader consideration of ecological values and constraints than is currently the case. This will requirea broader stakeholder base, increased participation and improved linkages of fisheries management with coastal/oceanplanning and integrated coastal zone management activities…

1.4.2 biica a irta ccpt a ctrait

Current management practices tend to give insufficient recognition to the fact that many components are intrinsicallylinked… in a comple flow of material, energy and information.

…to be able to implement EAF at an operational level, delineation of the “boundaries” is required and can be achieved bya sensible consensus based on proposed EAF objectives.

1.4.3 Tcica cirati

Gear modifications, such as those used to selectively harvest the target species and minimize unwanted bycatch… will takeon increasing importance as ecological objectives are broadened...

The impact of some fishing gear and methods on the bottom habitat (biotic and abiotic) can often have a negative effecton the ecosystem…the introduction of restrictions may be necessary and, where possible, new technologies that mitigateany negative impact will need to be developed.

Fishing operations may also cause other negative impacts to the environment... Minimizing such impacts will requiredevelopment and successful introduction of alternative cost-effective technologies and fishing practices.

Many ecosystems, especially those in coastal waters, are impacted not only by fisheries, but also by other users, includingupstream land-based activities.

1.4.4 scia a cic ii

…as the overarching goal of EAF is to implement sustainable development, the shift to EAF will entail the recognition ofthe wider economic, social and cultural benefits that can be derived from fisheries resources and the ecosystems in whichthey occur.

The identification of the various direct and indirect uses and users of resources and ecosystems is a necessary first step toattain a good understanding of the full range of potential benefits.

Many ecosystem goods and services are not traded, and therefore need to be valued through means other than marketprices.

The consideration of a broader range of ecosystem goods and services necessarily implies the need of addressing a widerrange of trade-offs between uses, non-uses, and user groups.

EAF provides a framework within which traditional fisheries management practices can be recognized and strengthened toaddress some of these problems.

EAF is better suited… to handle impacts arising from destructive fishing practices, habitat degradation and pollution, andto use traditional ecological knowledge...

EAF must… take into account the dependence of artisanal and small-scale fishing communities on fishing for their life,livelihoods and food security.

1.4.5 Itittia ccpt a cti

One of the implications of implementing EAF is an epansion of stakeholder groups and sectoral linkages. This may have

substantial impact on institutional structure and process, in terms either of creating new structures or strengthening eistinginstitutional collaboration.

An effective ecosystem approach will depend on better institutional coordination (e.g. between ministries).

A greater emphasis on planning at a range of geographical levels that involves all relevant stakeholders will be required...

Management units may need to be redefined geographically or, at the very least, coordinated within a larger-scale planningprocess.

In most countries, EAF will require considerable capacity building. This will include… training managers and regulators todeal with a broader range of options and trade-offs, conflicts, rights and regulations; and enhancing stakeholder capacityto participate.

1.4.6 Ti ca

The FM Guidelines recognize three time scales of immediate relevance to the fisheries management process… These willalso apply to EAF…

1.4.7 Prcatiar apprac

Under EAF… the principle is much broader than just environmental degradation, and applies to any undesirable outcome(ecological, social or economic)...

1.4.8 spcia rqirt pi ctriThe challenge to implement improved fisheries management… may be particularly formidable in small-scale fisheries, wherethe difficulty and costs of the transition to effective management may outweigh the available capacity and short-termeconomic benefits derived from it.




that could pose threats to successul implementation o EAF (Table 5). The ollowingive themes are covered:

1. Moving towards EAF management (rom EAF Guidelines section 1.4)2. Options to manage ishing (rom EAF Guidelines section 3.2)

3. Legal and institutional aspects o EAF (rom EAF Guidelines section 4.2)4. Research or an improved EAF (rom EAF Guidelines section 5)5. Threats to implementing EAF (rom EAF Guidelines section 6)

TAble 2

opti t aa ii (scti 3.2 i t fAo eAf gii)

3.2.1 Tcica ar

3.2.1.1 gear modifications that improve selectivity

Size selectivity of target species

Non-target species selectivity

3.2.1.2 Other gear issues

3.2.1.3 Spatial and temporal controls on fishing

“Area closures that permit some fishing may require a large enforcement effort and can therefore be costly. Allowingcertain categories of fishing activity can also create loopholes which undermine the intentions of the closure. Managementauthorities need to consider the likely degree of compliance and enforcement costs in establishing closures...”

3.2.1.4 Control of the impact from fishing gear on habitats

“Fishing gear that touches or scrapes the bottom during fishing operations is likely to produce negative impact on the bioticand abiotic habitats... Use of towed gear with reduced bottom contact is a technical option in such areas. Prohibition ofcertain gear in some habitats is another, e.g. trawling in coral reef and seagrass areas. A third option is to replace a high-impact fishing method with one with less impact on the bottom, e.g. trapping, longlining or gillnetting.”

3.2.1.5 Energy efficiency and pollution

“Energy optimization can be achieved through improved efficiency of fishing gear as well as through improved managementthat lead to less fishing effort being required.”

3.2.2 Ipt (rt) a tpt (catc) ctr

3.2.2.1 Controlling overall fishing mortality

Capacity limitation

Effort limitation3.2.2.2 Catch controls

3.2.3 ect aipati

3.2.3.1 Habitat modifications

Preventing habitat degradation

Providing additional habitat

3.2.3.2 Population manipulation

Restocking and stock enhancement

Culling

Intentional introductions

3.2.4 Rit-a aat apprac

“Each type of use right has its own properties, advantages and disadvantages, and the ecological, social, economic andpolitical environment varies from place to place and fishery to fishery. Therefore, no single system of use rights will workunder all circumstances. It is necessary to devise the system that best suits the general objectives and contet for each case,

and this system may well include two or more types of use rights within a single fishery or geographic area.”EAF requires that all the uses and users of a fishery resource be considered and reconciled, and that interactions betweendifferent fisheries within the designated geographic area be taken into account.




TAble 3

la a itittia apct eAf (scti 4.2, fAo eAf gii)

4.2.1 la

EAF is… likely to require more comple sets of rules or regulations that recognize the impacts of fisheries on other sectorsand the impact of those sectors on fisheries. It may be desirable to regulate the major and more or less constant intersectoral

interactions through the primary legislation. This could apply, for eample, to laws controlling coastline development andcoastal habitat protection, the establishment of permanent MPAs, and the creation of cross-sectoral institutions.

4.2.2 Itittia

The development and implementation of EAF policy and legislation will most naturally be undertaken by the nationalfisheries department or designated management agencies (at national level) and the fisheries management organizations(at regional level). A major problem in EAF development may stem from disparities between the ecosystem and jurisdictionalboundaries and these disparities will need to be addressed…

The number of conflicts will inevitably increase under EAF as the number of stakeholders and objectives increase.

EAF will require adherence to the same principles of transparent and participatory management… such as devolutionof decision-making and management responsibility; building capacity at the devolved level; appropriate participationof stakeholders in decision-making; improved transparency and dissemination of more information; establishment (orconfirmation) of appropriate systems of user-rights.

While some level of devolution of responsibility and authority to the lowest levels (the local community) will be desirable,this decision must be reconciled with the need to ensure that management decisions and actions are coordinated andconsistent at the higher levels required by EAF in each case. This will require effective institutional structuring to coordinatedecisions and actions at the broader geographical and fishery scales required by EAF.

Limiting access and implementing appropriate systems of access rights are essential for successful and responsible fisheriesunder TROM (FM Guidelines, 3.2) and are epanded for EAF. Under EAF, it must be recognized that the access rights systemwill frequently need to encompass other uses in addition to the use of the target resources currently included in TROM.

4.2.3 ecati a iri takr

Successful implementation of EAF will require that stakeholders (including management agencies) understand and acceptthe need for this more inclusive approach to fisheries management, and management agencies should actively promotesuch understanding and acceptance.

Conversely, scientists and management authorities need to appreciate and use the knowledge of fishers themselves aboutthe ecosystem, along with that of their representatives and communities.

4.2.4 ecti aiitrati trctr

Administrative structures under EAF will continue to reflect the variety of government systems that eist under TROM andrelated management approaches. However, they will have to be better integrated with more effective roles in auditing oroversight.




TAble 4

Rarc r a ipr eAf (Captr 5 i t fAo eAf gii)s rat ara rarc tat a t ipr aiit t ipt cti eAf ar it . T rr t rct a particar pririt.

5.1 ct a ir ipact at

1. Obtain better information on how ecosystems function, especially in terms of interspecies interactions, and how theselead to higher ecosystem properties.

2. Epand knowledge of how fishing impacts target stocks.

3. Conduct research into the impact of fishing on non-target species through bycatch and discarding and what it is doingto food-web interactions, habitats and biodiversity.

4. Develop appropriate multispecies bio-economic models, as well as etended ecological models that include the economicand social dimensions.

5.2 ci-cic cirati

5. Conduct research into the factors that influence the day-to-day behaviour of vessel operators/skippers, especially withregard to the choice of fishing gear and fishing ground, and levels of discarding.

6. Apply economic valuation methods, including the pros and cons of different methods in different circumstances.

7. Apply an integrated environmental and economic accounting framework to the assessment and analysis of the interactionbetween fisheries and other sectors of the economy.

5.3 at aat ar

8. Conduct research and develop technology in the area of fishing gear and practices to improve gear selectivity and reducethe impact of gear on ecosystems.

9. Develop strategies/procedure to assess and integrate traditional ecosystem knowledge into management.

10. Identify the species (and ecosystems) that are suitable for restocking/ stock enhancement programmes, and developmore adequate release strategies for them.

11. The potential of MPAs (a biodiversity conservation measure) as a fisheries management measure needs to be betterassessed, including research to clarify where MPAs will be most effective.

12. Artificial habitats are another area for research in terms of their usefulness and effectiveness for fisheries.

13. Culling is controversial topic requiring further research. A thorough review of global eperiences would beinformative.

5.4 at a ipri t aat prc

14. The many steps in the management process itself… could benefit from further research. For instance, research is neededon how better to compile data for management plans, how to evaluate management performance, and how to includeuncertainty and risk assessments in the process.

15. Development of better participatory processes is critical, and sociological research on how to improve the consultation

process with stakeholders will become increasingly important. Sociological research will also be required for assessing theimpact of different management measures on the varied stakeholders and minimizing undesirable impacts.

16. Better ways of communicating the implications of different management strategies need to be developed.

5.5 itri a at

17. The broadening of issues to be considered in the contet of EAF will also require the development of simpler, more rapidappraisal methods [and] adaptive management approaches to assist with data-poor situations.

18. Develop several analytical techniques to underpin the decision-making process, including analyses to assist in settingreference points, and to evaluate potential decision rules.

19. Although specific objectives, indicators and reference points will vary among fisheries, a set of generic indicators needsto be identified.






APPendIx 6.2

Rat irta cii-aki t

The ollowing are decision-making tools that are commonly used in environmental

economics/decision making, which, with certain adjustments in their application, maybe relevant or an EAF context. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this appendixhas been abridged rom Pearce et al. (2006).

eirta ipact at (eIA) r irta at (eA)

EIA is a systematic procedure or collecting inormation about the environmentalimpacts o a project or policy, and or measuring those impacts. It ignores non-environmental impacts and it ignores costs. It may not account in a detailed way or theways in which impacts vary with time. EIA is an essential input to CBA. Most EIAsdo make an eort, however, to assess the signiicance o environmental impacts. Somemay go urther and give the impacts a score (the extent o the impact) and a weight

(its importance). Weights might be derived rom public surveys but more usually aredetermined by the analyst in question. Unlike CBA, EIA has no ormal decision ruleattached to it (e.g. beneits must exceed costs), but analysts would typically argue thatits purpose is to look at alternative means o minimising the environmental impactswithout altering the beneits o the project or policy.

stratic irta at (seA)

SEA is similar to EIA but tends to operate at a “higher” level o decision-making.Instead o single projects or policies, SEA would consider entire programmes o investments or policies. The goal is to look or the synergies between individualpolicies and projects and to evaluate alternatives in a more comprehensive manner.An SEA is more likely than an EIA to consider issues like: is the policy or project

needed at all; and, i it is, what are the alternative options available? In this sense,SEA is seen to be more pro-active than EIA which tends to be reactive. Proactivehere means that more opportunity exists or programmes to be better designed (roman environmental perspective) rather than accepting that a speciic option is chosenand the task is to minimise environmental impacts rom that option. Again, while itencompasses more issues o concern, SEA remains non-comprehensive as a decision-guiding procedure. Issues o time, cost, and non-environmental costs and beneits donot igure prominently. Relative to the benchmark o CBA, SEA goes some way toconsidering the kinds o issues that would be relevant in a CBA.

Cati ipact at (CIA)

Cumulative impacts or eects assessment (CIA) reers to systems or measuring impactson the natural and social environments that either (a) take place so requently in timeor so densely in space that they cannot be assimilated; or (b) occur when the impactso one activity combine with the activities o another in a synergistic manner (CEARC,1988). Signiicant cumulative environmental impacts are oten the result o aggregatedor synergistic individual impacts, even i one by one, they are considered insigniicant.Hence it is essential to eectively assess and manage or cumulative impacts, notonly their individual components. However, cumulative eects can be diicult andexpensive to assess. Methods are required which can address multiple projects, multipleresources and the interactions among impacts. Employing CIA may be necessary inEAF due to the large number o activities impacting on any ecosystem.

li cc aai (lCA)LCA is similar to EIA in that it identiies the environmental impacts o a policy orproject and tries to measure them. It may or may not measure the impacts in the same




units, any more than EIA tries to do this. Typically, when attempts are made to adoptthe same units they do not include money, although some LCAs have done this. Thechie dierence between EIA and LCA is that LCA looks not just at the impacts directlyarising rom a project or policy, but at the whole “lie cycle” o impacts. Included in the

analysis would be the environmental impacts o primary resource extraction and theimpacts rom landill, incineration etc. LCAs proceed by establishing an inventory o impacts and then the impacts are subjected to an assessment to establish the extent o impact and the weight to be attached to it. Relative to the benchmark o Cost-BeneitAnalysis, LCA is essentially the physical counterpart to the kind o environmentalimpact analysis that is required by a CBA. In itsel LCA oers no obvious decisionrule or policies or projects. Though widely advocated as a comprehensive decision-guidance tool, LCA does not (usually) consider non-environmental costs and beneits.Hence it is not a comprehensive decision guide. However, i the choice context is onewhere one o several options has to be chosen, then, provided other things are equal,LCA operates like a cost-eectiveness criterion (see below).

Rik at (RA)

Risk assessment involves assessing either the health or environmental risks (or both)attached to a product, process, policy or project. Risk assessments may be expressedin various ways:

•As the probability o some deined health or ecosystem eect occurring, e.g. a 1in 100 000 chance o mortality rom continued exposure to some chemical.

•As a number o incidences across a deined population, e.g. 10 000 prematuredeaths per annum out o some population.

•As a deined incidence per unit o exposure, e.g. X percent increase in prematuremortality per unit air pollution.

•As a “no eect” level o exposure, e.g. below one microgram per cubic metre there

may be no health eect.Risk assessments may not translate into decision rules very easily. One way they

may do this is i the actual or estimated risk level is compared to an “acceptable” levelwhich in turn may be the result o some expert judgement or the result o a publicsurvey. A common threshold is to look at unavoidable “everyday” risks and to judgewhether people “live with” such a risk. This may make it acceptable. Other procedurestend to be more common and may deine the acceptable level as a no-risk level, or evena non-risk level with a sizeable margin or error. Procedures establishing “no eect”levels, e.g. o chemicals, deine the origin o what the economist would call a “damageunction” but cannot inorm decision-making unless the goal is in act to secure thatlevel o risk. Put another way, “no eect” points contain no inormation about the

“damage unction”.

Cparati rik at (CRA)CRA involves analysing risks but or several alternative projects or policies. The issue isthen which option should be chosen and the answer oered by CRA is that the optionwith the lowest risk should be chosen. Eorts are made to “normalize” the analysis sothat like is compared to like. For example, one might want to choose between nuclearenergy and coal-ired electricity. One approach would be to normalise the risks o onekilowatt hour o electricity and compute, say, deaths per kWh. The option with thelowest “death rate” would then be chosen. However, in this case, the normalizationprocess does not extend to cost, so that CRA may want to add a urther dimension,the money cost o generating one kWh. Once this is done, the ocus tends to shit tocost-eectiveness analysis – see below. A urther problem concerns the nature o risk.“One atality” appears to be a homogenous unit, but i people are not indierent to




the manner o death or whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily borne, then, in eect,the normalization has ailed. Once again, one can see that CRA is not a comprehensivedecision-guide since the way it treats costs (i at all) may not be all-embracing. Norwould CRA deal with beneits.

Rik-it aai (RbA)RBA tends to take two orms, each o which is reducible to another orm o decisionrule. In other words, RBA is not a separate procedure. The irst meaning relates tobeneits, costs and risks, where risks are treated as costs and valued in money terms.In that case the ormula or accepting a project or policy would be: [Beneits – Costs– Risks] > 0. This is no dierent to a CBA rule.

In the second case the RBA rule reduces to CRA. Beneits might be standardized,e.g. to “passenger kilometres” and the risk element might be atalities. “Fatalities perpassenger kilometre” might then be the thing that should be minimized. As with CRA,cost may or may not enter the picture. I it does, then RBA tends to result in CBA or

cost-eectiveness analysis.

Rik-rik aai (RRA)

RRA tends to ocus on health risks and asks what would happen to health risks i somepolicy was adopted and what would happen i it was not adopted. The “with/without”ocus is amiliar in CBA. The novelty tends to be the act that not undertaking a policymay itsel impose costs in terms o lives or morbidity. For example, a policy o banningor lowering consumption o saccharin might have a justiication in reducing health risksrom its consumption. But the with-policy option may result in consumers switchingto sugar in place o the banned saccharin, thus increasing morbidity by that route. Theadvantage o RRA is that it orces decision-makers to look at the behavioural responsesto regulations. Once again, however, all other components in a CBA equation are

ignored, so the procedure is not comprehensive.

hat-at aai (hhA)

HHA is similar to RRA but instead o comparing the risks with and without thebehavioural reaction to a policy, it compares the change in risks rom a policy with therisks associated with the expenditure on the policy. As such, it oers a subtle ocus onpolicy that is easily overlooked. Since policies costs money, the money has to comerom somewhere and, ultimately, the source is the taxpayer. But i taxpayers pay parto their taxes or liesaving policies, their incomes are reduced. Some o that reducedincome would have been spent on lie-saving or health-enhancing activities. Hencethe taxation actually increases lie risks. HHA compares the anticipated saving in lives

rom a policy with the lives lost because o the cost o the policy. In principle, policiescosting more lives than they save are not desirable. HHA proceeds by estimating thecosts o a lie-saving policy and the number o lives saved. It then allocates the policycosts to households. Lie risks are related to household incomes through regressionanalysis, so that it is possible to estimate lives lost due to income reductions. Onceagain, the procedure is not comprehensive: policies could ail an HHA test but pass aCBA test, and vice versa.

Ct-cti aai (CeA)

The easiest way to think about CEA is to assume that there is a single indicator o eectiveness, E, and this is to be compared to a cost o C. Suppose there is now just asingle project or policy to be appraised. CEA would require that E be compared to C.The usual procedure is to produce a cost-eectiveness ratio (CER). Notice that E is insome environmental unit and C is in money units. The act that they are in dierent




units has an important implication which is, unortunately, widely disregarded in theliterature. A moment’s inspection shows that the ratio is perectly meaningul– e.g. itmight be read as US dollars per hectare o land conserved. But the ratio says nothingat all as to whether the conservation policy in question is worth undertaking. In

other words, CEA cannot help with the issue o whether or not to undertake anyconservation. It should be immediately obvious that this question cannot be answeredunless E and C are in the same units. CEA can only oer guidance on which o severalalternative policies (or projects) to select, given that one has to select one. By extension,CEA can rank any set o policies, all o which could be undertaken, but given that atleast some o them must be undertaken.

A urther issue with CEA is the process o selecting the eectiveness measure. InCBA the principle is that beneits are measured by individuals’ preerences as revealedby their willingness to pay or them. The underlying value judgement in CBA is“consumer” or “citizen sovereignty”. This amounts to saying that individuals are thebest judges o their own well-being. Technically, the same value judgement could be

used in CEA, i.e. the measure o eectiveness could be based on some attitude surveyo a random sample o individuals. In practice, CEA tends to proceed with indicators o eectiveness chosen by experts. Rationales or using expert choices are a) that expertsare better inormed than individuals, especially on issues such as habitat conservation,landscape, etc., and b) that securing indicators rom experts is quicker and cheaper thaneliciting individuals’ attitudes.

mticritria aai (mCA)

MCA involves multiple indicators o eectiveness, and is one o the more widely usedmeans o selecting among very dierent alternatives aced by decision-makers. In MCA,dierent eectiveness indicators, measured in dierent units, have to be normalised byconverting them to scores and then aggregated via a weighting procedure. Policy or

scheme cost in an MCA is always (or should always be) one o the indicators chosen.The steps in an MCA are as ollows:

•The goals or objectives o the policy or investment are stated.•These objectives are not pre-ordained, nor are they singular (as they are in CBA

which adopts increases in economic eiciency as the primary objective) and areselected by “decision-makers”.

•Generally, decision-makers will be civil servants whose choices can be argued torelect political concerns.

•MCA then tends to work with experts’ preerences. Public preerences may ormay not be involved.

•“Criteria” or, sometimes, “attributes” which help achieve the objectives are

then selected. Sometimes, objectives and criteria tend to be used, making thedistinction diicult to observe. However, criteria will generally be those eatureso a good that achieve the objective.

•Such criteria may or may not be measured in monetary terms, but MCA diersrom CBA in that not all criteria will be monetised.

•Each option (alternative means o securing the objective) is then given a scoreand a weight. Pursuing the above example, a policy might score 6 out o 10 orone eect, 2 out o 10 or another eect, and 7 out o 10 or yet another. In turn,experts may regard the irst eect as being twice as important as the secondbut only hal as important as the third. The weights would then be 2, 1 and 4respectively.

• In the simplest o MCAs, the inal outcome is a weighted average o the scores,with the option providing the highest weighted score being the one that is “best”.More sophisticated techniques might be used or more complex decisions.




•To overcome issues relating to the need or criteria to be independent o eachother (i.e. experts’ preerences based on one criterion should be independent o their preerences or that option based on another criterion), more sophisticatedtechniques might be used, notably “multiattribute utility theory” (MAUT).

MAUT tends to be over-sophisticated or most practical decision-making.




APPendIx 6.3

fAo iicatr r taia pt captr iri

ecica critria

Catch structure catch structure refers to the size of fish, species composition and numbers, and the trophiclevel of each species in the catch. Shifts in the catch structure are strong signals of potential non-sustainabilityin the fishery.

Area and quality of important or critical habitats critical habitats (e.g. Mangrove systems or coral reefs)provide critical and direct support for fisheries production and are important for biodiversity in general andas source of food for eploited species. Change in the area of habitat, as measured using habitat inventorytools, can indicate changing conditions in the environment that could be caused by fishing, or might affectfishing activities.

Fishing pressure - fished vs. Unfished areas not all areas within any given fishing grounds are fished withequal intensity as fishing grounds are not usually considered to be homogeneously productive. Thus someareas will be more intensively fished because of a greater perceived return or catch rate. In addition, reservesetc. are used to protect spawning stocks, or sensitive young life stages from harvesting or other detrimentaleffects.

ecic critria

Profitability in the absence of major market distortions such as etensive subsidies or the eistence of price

controls, profitability is the single most important economic criteria. Low or negative profitability usuallyindicates that fish stocks are eploited in an economic wasteful manner and fishing capacity and effort areecessive on both economic and biological grounds.

Value of fishing entitlements where management is done through transferable entitlements such asindividual transferable quotas, the resource rent becomes capitalized in the value of the entitlement. Intheory, the entitlement is worth the sum of the discounted stream of future profits or rent (i.e. The netpresent value). In the absence of speculative trading, a change in the market price of quota entitlement, thus,reflects a change in the, by market participants, estimated profit potential of the fishery. Such a change canoccur as a result of a decline in stock abundance, a drop in fish prices or an increase in fishing costs.

Subsidies apart from failing to effectively regulate access to the fishery, the single most important cause foreconomic waste and overfishing is the provision of subsidies for fishing inputs such as for fuel and for theconstruction and purchase of fishing vessels and gear.

scia critria

Employment changes in the total amount of paid labour or employment in a fishery can be an indicator ofboth the condition of a fishery and its value to the local populations that may be dependent on fisheries fortheir livelihood.

Protein consumption change in per capita fish consumption, and fish consumption as a proportion of totalprotein consumption, are important criteria that relate to the significance of the contribution of fisheriesto the livelihood of coastal communities, and can be related to the community pressure for sustainabledevelopment of fisheries.

Tradition and culture the loss of traditional practices can indicate substantial changes in fishing practices, andmay signal the loss of traditional fisheries management systems and reduced controls in loosely organizedand subsistence fisheries.

grac/itittia critria

Capacity to manage the capacity to manage fisheries depends on available human and financial resources aswell as on the eistence of competent institutions. An economically sound fishery should make acceptablereturns on investments after the costs of management are accounted for. In many fisheries, however, returnsare marginal or negative and, as a consequence, the costs of management are considered to be an etraburden. Fisheries management also requires an adequate institutional base, including a set of regulationsand a system to generate and enforce them.

Compliance regime compliance regimes assess the etent to which the rules designed to keep fisheriessustainable are applied in practice. The eistence and effectiveness of compliance assessment regimes can

be evaluated by eamination of fisheries management plans and, in subsistence fisheries, eamination oftraditional practices.

Transparency and participation fisheries managed eclusively by “top-down” approaches are found to be athigh risk of non-sustainability. Transparency and participation do not guarantee sustainability, but fisheriesare unlikely to achieve sustainability without them. Transparency and participation can be evaluated byassessment of the fishery’s management plan, particularly in the structural and functional elements thatpermit effective participation of fishers in the decision-making process.



81

7. Icti cai rappi eAf

InTRoduCTIonThe previous chapter discussed the range o beneits and costs involved in implementingthe EAF. It was noted that these beneits and costs arise over varying time rames –some in the short-term, some only ater considerable time has passed – and at variousscales (e.g. local, regional, national, international), impacting in diering ways on themany individuals and entities within the ishery – thus having signiicant distributional

implications. These realities lead to a challenge in implementing the EAF, namely thatnot all participants will necessarily see the prospect o receiving positive net beneitsrom EAF management (in the short term, at least). There is, in other words, a gapbetween the shits in behaviour needed or ull EAF implementation, and what can beexpected to occur “naturally” simply as a result o individuals pursuing their own sel-interest as driven by the set o EAF beneits and costs.

There will be a need or additional measures o various sorts to induce isheryparticipants (and others) to change behaviour in keeping with EAF management. Suchmeasures supporting positive behavioural change could be socio-cultural, economic,legal or institutional in nature. This chapter reviews a range o such measures, all o which involve the use o “incentives” towards behavioural change, i.e. considerationsthat an individual will actor into their decision making and which lead to a result

more in keeping with desired societal directions (in this case, eective implementationo EAF).

As FAO (2005a) notes: “Incentives work indirectly through aecting thoseactors that lead to particular individual or collective choices…”. From an economicsperspective, one might view an incentive as an inluence on the proit-maximization o aishery participant (i.e., increasing proits or EAF-compatible actions and conversely),while rom a sociological perspective, incentives might be social constraints onbehaviour (e.g. resulting rom peer pressure and cultural institutions).

Oten those speaking o incentives are implicitly reerring to “positive incentives”,i.e. those that reward participants (perhaps by giving them something, such asishing rights) rather than negative incentives which penalize them (e.g. with ines

or undesirable behaviour). In reality, however, both o these orms are incentivesto modiy behaviour. From the perspective o EAF implementation, then, a keyrequirement is to determine which set o incentives provides the most eective resultswith the least negative impacts.

The above has provided general motivation or the role o incentives – and indeedthe ull range o social, economic and institutional measures – in inducing behaviourin support o EAF objectives. But what exactly are these measures seeking to achieve?What behaviour is it that needs to be modiied? First, looking broadly at the isheryreality, a key element is to encourage a longer-term view, placing greater value onecosystem health and sustainability o ish stocks. This may require certain ormso incentives, such as use rights, management rights or community stewardshipactions, to increase the possibility that participants choose to engage in long-termconservation. Second, there is a need or modiications to speciic behaviour – e.g. toreduce dumping, discarding and high-grading o ish, or to restrict ishing gear that isparticularly damaging to aquatic ecosystems. Incentives to achieve such ends may need




to be careully targeted on speciic situations and speciic participants. Overall, then,we can envision an “incentives toolkit” rom which appropriate incentives are drawnto meet speciic requirements.

As noted above, incentives are oten classiied as “positive” or “negative”(“disincent

ives”). These may also be considered as “carrots” and “sticks”, with the “carrots” beingpositive incentives that induce desired behaviour (just as a carrot hanging in ront o ahorse can induce it to move orward) and the “sticks” being disincentives in the orm o penalties or undesirable behaviour (a stick being used on a horse that will not move inthe desired direction). The major ocus o conventional natural resource managementhas been on establishing sets o regulations, with penalties (“sticks”) imposed or non-compliance with the regulations, i.e. or illegal activities. This is a similar situation tothat o pollution regulation, in which polluters are penalized, i caught, or exceedingprescribed levels o pollutants.

However, in a ishery context, with a large number o participants, ranging overlarge areas, apprehending the rule-breakers (i.e. creating adequate enorcement o the

disincentives) has proven a challenge. This reality has led to a recognition that the useo “sticks” needs to be balanced with greater use o “carrots”, the positive incentivesinducing desired behaviour, in the hope that the need to ind and punish rule-breakerswill diminish. Indeed, it has been suggested that suitable incentives will provide “isherswith the incentives and the mandate to be co-custodians, with other stakeholders, o the marine environment” (Graton et al ., 2005).

On the other hand, the trend towards the use o positive incentives has created arisk o over-reliance on such measures, just as in the past there was an over-reliance ondisincentives (“sticks”). The theory o crime and punishment indicates clearly that nomatter how rules or regulations are ormed, there will always be a certain proportion o those subject to the rules and regulations who do not comply with them. It is importantto the integrity o the entire management system, and the continuing support o law-

abiding participants, that these rule-breakers be apprehended and punished as muchas possible. Thus, despite the diiculties noted above with enorcement o negativeincentives, suitable “sticks” are crucial.

Note that the need or a balance o both “carrots” and “sticks” holds whether oneis dealing with a centralized or a decentralized ishery management system. Indeed,law-abiding ishers in a co-management arrangement, those involved in their own sel-regulation, are the irst to call or strict enorcement o rules, and large penalties or rule-breakers. It is thus important to seek out an appropriate balance in a context-sensitivemanner. As FAO (2005a) notes: “Making better use o incentives, in conjunction withappropriate enorcement systems, could help to improve compliance and regulation.”

This chapter will thus discuss both the “carrots” – positive incentives or shiting

isheries towards EAF – and the “sticks” in the orm o disincentives. The ollowingsection briely reviews options or inancial, social, and institutional incentives in theapplication o EAF management, while the subsequent section ocuses on the economicanalysis o some speciic incentives.

TyPes of InCenTIves And TheIR eAf ImPlICATIons

The EAF Guidelines touch on some measures to align incentives in support o EAF – such as improving the institutional ramework, developing collective values,and creating and using market and non-market incentives. The idea o measures to“align incentives” is to provide a more eicient alternative to conventional top-down“command and control” approaches to isheries management. The latter have hadlimited success in meeting sustainable development objectives, due to a range o actorsincluding insuicient inormation about the resources, inadequate control eorts,



Incentive mechanisms for applying EAF 83

and lack o political will38. Ward et al. (2004) discuss the desirability o shiting theocus rom conventional “incentive blocking instruments” towards more “incentiveadjusting instruments”.

This section urthers the coverage o incentives in the EAF Guidelines by discussing

social, economic, legal and institutional incentives that may help explain what drivesindividual and group behaviour. With this understanding comes urther knowledgeon what policy and management tools could be used as incentives to induce isheryparticipants to adopt speciic EAF-appropriate measures, or more generally to supportimplementation o EAF management. Some speciic examples o possible incentivesmay include:

•providing educational programs, or adults and or children, to raise awareness o the role o healthy ecosystems in supporting isheries, and the impacts o ishingand other human activities on those ecosystems;

•developing legal rameworks and participatory governance arrangements (co-management) that involve stakeholders in developing regulations or ishery

management, and EAF in particular, thus building support (“buy-in”) or thatmanagement;•providing secure access rights to ishery participants, so their decisions will be

made on a longer-term basis rather than in a situation in which uture access isuncertain;

•developing positive economic incentives to make behaviour in accordancewith EAF more proitable (i.e. to increase beneits or decrease costs o EAFimplementation); and

• imposing disincentives against illegal behaviour, in the orm o appropriatepenalties (e.g. monetary ines, social exclusion or imprisonment) along witheective enorcement.

From this range o possibilities, we see that incentive systems can involve:• Institutional incentives (e.g. isheries management systems and participatory

governance arrangements that induce support rom stakeholders);•Legal incentives (e.g. eective legislation creating positive “carrots” as well as

“sticks” in the orm o signiicant penalty structures with eective enorcementcapability);

•Financial/material incentives (e.g. win-win measures, such as the use o excluderdevices in ishing gear, which can actually increase proits, by reducing ishingcosts, even as they meet the goal o reducing bycatch); and

•Social incentives (e.g. community-based institutions and social environmentsthat create peer pressure on individuals to comply with agreed-upon communityrules).

It is clear that incentives can take many orms – some being o quite generalapplicability, and others being very speciic to particular circumstances. For theremainder o this chapter, we ocus on the commonly-advocated approaches orcreating incentives supportive o policy goals, such as EAF, clustered into the ourincentive systems mentioned above.

Itittia icti

Institutional ailures have been pointed out as the main obstacles to eective isheriesmanagement. In particular, rather than limited biological knowledge being the majorreason behind the lack o implementation o EAF management or the ailure to achievemanagement objectives, more important are institutional causes such as: low levelso compliance due to limited legitimacy o the management process and objectives,

38 See, or example, Kompas and Gooday (2007), Graton et al. (2005), and Ward et al. (2004).




conlicts that have not been mediated or resolved, lack o enorcement mechanisms inplace, inadequate institutional set-up or management due to it having been importedrom a dierent context, etc. (Degnbol, 2004). On the lip side, an institution thatpromotes transparency, cooperation, trust, and participation on the part o stakeholders

can help create the incentives necessary or application o the EAF.This section relects on some o the ways that proper institutional arrangements

can promote sustainable use o resources through the holistic, integrated, andparticipatory application o the EAF. Mechanisms discussed here include coordinationand integration o planning and management, devolution o decision-making andmanagement responsibility, conlict resolution, knowledge management, monitoringand control, education, stakeholder involvement, capacity building, and use andmanagement rights. Most o these are in act relevant to any orm o management,although some are especially necessary in the ace o the increased complexities,uncertainties, stakeholder groups implied within the EAF.

Increased coordination, cooperation and communication between relevant institutionsDue to its wider scope o management, the ecosystem approach requires increasedcoordination, cooperation and communication between relevant sectors (agriculture,tourism, commercial- and non-commercial isheries, communities etc.) and regulatoryinstitutions (ministries, etc.), on and between regional, national and sub-national/community levels, in order to manage isheries eectively.

Increased cooperation is needed because the increased management scope requiresmore assistance rom every institution, stakeholder and use sector. There also needsto be coordination between, and clarity o, the responsibilities o each player in theprocess (e.g. inormation gathering, research, management, law enorcement) in orderto ensure coherency in management o the resources, and improved eiciency in the

application o such management.At a regional level, one actor that increases the need or coordination and

cooperation between sectors and other institutions is the disparity between ecosystemand jurisdictional boundaries (such as exclusive economic zones [EEZ]). Not only doesthis require intersectoral and institutional coordination and cooperation nationally butalso internationally.

Flexibility in the cooperation and coordination is also needed as ecosystemboundaries (e.g. those o a large marine ecosystem [LME]) may vary seasonally andannually, requiring lexibility in agreements between relevant agencies and nations(EAF Guidelines).

As the development and implementation o EAF policy and legislation will oten be

undertaken by the national isheries department or designated management agenciesat a national level, and by regional isheries management organizations at the regionallevel, these institutions will need to cooperate and coordinate their work (EAFGuidelines).

At a sub-national level, it has been suggested that devolution o decision-making andmanagement responsibility to organizations or groups lower than the central nationallevel, or example to coastal communities, may improve compliance, improve thecost-eectiveness o management and make use o traditional management practices.A decentralization o management responsibility will, however, need to account orecosystem boundaries which perhaps will require intercommunity coordination andcross-scale linkages (EAF Guidelines).

Increased information and managing uncertainties in the decision-making processMoving rom conventional isheries management to EAF management requires moreinormation not only on species interactions, critical habitats, etc., but also on how




dierent sectors and stakeholders beneit rom and impact on ecosystem services.This inormation will aid in the process o taking decisions on the most appropriatemanagement measures and use o resources within a multiobjective context, but it mayalso assist in raising awareness o the need or management among the public at large

and at a community level. Inormation thus needs to be gathered and disseminated atall relevant levels o governance.

In addition, a desire to incorporate a broader range o ecosystem actors into themanagement process, in the absence o a complete inormation set, will require theability to manage resources within a context o increased uncertainty. Hence, themanagement ramework will need to acknowledge these uncertainties and incorporatethem into the decision-making process.

Increased stakeholder involvement As an increased scope o management o the sort needed in the EAF, requires abroadened deinition o stakeholders, mechanisms will be needed to allow or this

range o stakeholders to be included in the management process, to improve theeectiveness o EAF.The beneits o increased stakeholder involvement are numerous and include the

ollowing, as presented in FAO (1995c):• ensuring that alternatives serving a broad range o interests are considered;•helping to gather data or inormation, identiy gaps in data or inormation, and

identiy those who might provide data or inormation in the uture;•providing transparency and accountability regarding the decisions taken and the

process by which those decisions were reached;• accustoming stakeholders to the need or diicult choices in order to manage

aquatic resources eectively; and•building a broad base o commitment to chosen options, by creating an

environment that rewards participation in discussions o beneits, risks and costso the various options, and that provides a meaningul basis or inormed consentto recommendations.

However, it is important to realize that a participatory approach may lead to highercosts o management. These can stem rom, or example, an increase in the numbero meetings held during the planning process and a more developed inormationdissemination eort. In addition, an increased number o stakeholders means anincreased number o objectives and interests to be balanced. In order to reconcilemultiple objectives/interests, mechanisms or conlict resolution may be necessary.

Institutional mechanisms for facilitating the implementation of the EAF

In acing the above-noted additional challenges to be addressed institutionally in themove towards EAF management, what mechanisms can be used, or what changes canbe made to existing rameworks in order to address these issues? Some o these areconsidered here.

Coordination and integrationTo address the need to increase coordination and integration, through suitable strategiesat the various dierent levels o governance, Scialabba (1998) distinguishes two broadinstitutional set-ups or increased coordination and integration:

1. Multisectoral integration involves translating common goals into independentsectoral planning. This can be done by coordinating the institutions, sectorsand/or agencies that are actually in charge o managing isheries and/ormultisectoral uses o the ecosystem, through a common policy. It can alsooccur by bringing related stakeholders, institutions and/or sectors together toagree on strategies or working towards common goals.






and (2) such administrative changes are accompanied by capacity-building among localdecision-makers (FAO, 1998), as well as other human and financial mechanisms.

In addition, moves to more devolved management may need to deal with problemsrelated to existing local structures. For example, situations could arise in which local-

level institutions are dominated by members o a certain social or economic group,who may or may not ully represent the interests o all those likely to be aected bya change in isheries management. Thereore, it is important that local institutionsand stakeholder representatives responsible or isheries management are trusted andrespected by all stakeholders, especially in cases o decisions regarding the distributiono compensation and access to resources (FAO, 1998).

Conflict resolutionEstablishing mechanisms or conlict resolution can be important in stakeholderinvolvement processes, by aiding in the reconciliation o multiple objectives.Administrative procedures and dispute resolution oices may be ormal ways o

anticipating and resolving conlicts between and within institutions.Also at a local level, traditional/religious institutions (e.g. customary courts andassemblies) may provide appropriate and respected conlict resolution mechanismsor certain kinds o disputes. However, in terms o dealing with resource distributionand control, the appropriateness o such institutions will depend on the extent towhich the authorities o such tribunals are seen as representative and independent,without vested interests or inluence by a certain group o the community (FAO,1998). Understanding o local institutions and cultures is a necessary ingredient in thedevelopment o devolved management processes.

Whatever structure is used at a local or community level, additional unding may berequired or conlict resolution (Scialabba, 1998). This would be needed to cover thecosts o:

•building up local capacity or conlict resolution, by training and educating thirdparties or mediation, acilitation and arbitration in disputes; and

• carrying out the negotiations, including locating mediators or experts – potentiallyexternal i local expertise is lacking.

Knowledge managementIn applying the EAF, it is clear that more and/or dierent inormation will beneeded to assist the decision-making process. Managing a more complex system,with interactions between an increased number o stakeholders and also betweencomponents o the ecosystem itsel, conveys a need or a new dimension o knowledgethat goes beyond ocusing solely on natural science and technology. In addition to

the need/desire or increased knowledge o this complex system, there will also be anincreased need or dealing with uncertainty in the decision-making process. A gooddeal o this inormation may be supplied by existing research institutions; however,research may not be suicient to solve all issues o uncertainty or, additional researchmay come at too high a cost. In these cases, the best available inormation should beused, implying both scientiic research as well as the use o traditional knowledge. Inthe case where uncertainty still exists, this knowledge gap would have to be dealt withthrough the decision-making process (Degnbol, 2002).

To urther this point, Degnbol (2004) suggests that, ultimately, there will be economiclimitations i the requirements or understanding, precision and implementationeiciency are to be maintained, while the complexity o issues to be addressed increasesas well as the number o stakeholders involved. Given the complexity o the systems tobe managed, it is thus not easible to depend on a management approach based solelyon quantiiable predictability, but rather, there is a need to accept an approach basedon weak predictability and adaptation.






governmental institutions in sharing decision-making, planning and implementationroles. Co-management was discussed as a policy ramework in Chapter 3.

EAF management can incorporate all o these orms o participation, perhaps indierent orms or dierent contexts. Shared decision-making should help in the

application o agreed-upon management plans, as acceptance will have been osteredthrough the participation process. However, naturally, it will be diicult to achieveconsensus among an increased number and variety o stakeholders; thereore, it isimportant to allow suicient time or a participatory process to work properly, likelymore time than in top-down management systems.

Examples exist in which stakeholders, including the ishing industry, have led thepromotion o change, such as through creating “best practice” guidelines, and this kindo leadership may prove to be an important actor in the application o the EAF.

From an institutional perspective, FAO (2005a) has identiied that successulco-management requires not only empowerment o the community/ies throughdevolution o power to a local level, but also:

•

Eective institutions, particularly local institutions – e.g. who acilitates theprocess and the scale o the process, i.e. what should really be addressed underco-management.

•Adequate resources or implementation, since participation in meetings,monitoring, enorcement and management involve costs which can be high.

•An enabling policy and legislative environment, including a robust enorcementmechanism and sanctions system to ensure compliance with locally agreed rules.

An example o the institutional set-up o co-management within one multisectoralexample is presented in Box 12.

Communities and other resource users are to a certain extent empowered bybecoming co-managers o resources, yet urther strengthening o their organizations andcapacity enhancement is required or a successul continuation o this co-management

(Kumar, 2005). Empowerment requires both interventions at the community level andoutside the community:

• Interventions at the community level include increasing the sense o unity throughimproved organization, assistance in capacity development, etc.

•More broadly, community organizations can be involved in networking at village,local, regional and national levels.

•At a governmental level, work can be done to create an enabling environment byproviding conducive policies, and a legal and regulatory ramework, etc.

In co-management as well as in the empowerment process, it is important torecognize the act that women and youth tend to be underrepresented in traditionalinstitutions and decision-making mechanisms or dealing with natural resource use.

However, such decisions still aect these groups (FAO, 1998).

Monitoring, control and surveillanceOnly in the recent past has monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) been recognizedas an integral part o isheries management and not merely a police unction to punishlaw breakers. MCS is now being recognized not only or its role in protecting isheriesrom IIU ishing, both national and international, but also or its role in providingnecessary biological, economic, and social inormation or management and as a meansto provide a backbone to management implementation. In act, without MCS, therecan be no certainty that pre-determined management objectives will be realized. Forsimplicity, MCS has been described by its three components (Flewwelling, 1995):

•Monitoring ishing activities, notably ishing eort characteristics and resourceyields;

•Control over the regulatory conditions under which the exploitation o theresource may be conducted; and




•Surveillance – the speciics o observations required to maintain compliance withthe regulatory controls imposed on ishing activities.

There are two parallel approaches to eective MCS – one is the preventive approacho compliance measures, and the other is the deterrent/enorcement approach. The irstapproach includes (adapted rom Flewwelling et al ., 2002):

−enhancement o community/isher awareness and understanding o managementpractices and MCS through seminars, public awareness and inormation,education, and communication campaigns;

BOx 12

wt Cat vacr Ia Aqatic maat bar

In a move to develop an integrated and participatory approach to the management of coastalactivities affecting marine resources on the West Coast of Vancouver Island (WCVI), in

British Columbia, Canada, an initiative in community-based co-management began in 2001.

Approval by multiple levels of government of the terms of reference for the regional Aquatic

Management Board was seen as an important step forward. These Terms of Reference (ToR)

state that the aquatic resources should be managed on an ecosystem basis.

The Board unctions as a orum or shared decision-making - in which “those with

authority to make decisions, and those who will be aected by that decision, will jointly

seek an outcome which reconciles/accommodates all interests concerned”. On the Board,

coastal communities and others aected by aquatic resource management can work

with governments in matters o integrated management o aquatic resources in relevant

management areas.The Board consists o 16 members – eight rom governments and eight non-

governmental. The ormer include two representatives each rom the ederal, provincial,

regional and aboriginal (indigenous) governments. The non-governmental representatives

relect a diversity o geographical locations and resource interests in the management area.

The Board members are to be appointed on the basis o the Board’s vision and purpose,

their skills, knowledge and experience, and base o support, rather than to represent

individual groups or organizations.

Some o the principles mentioned in the ToR are as ollows:

• Shared Responsibility – the governments, coastal communities, and other stakeholders

aected by the use o the aquatic resources are jointly responsible and accountable

or integrated resource management.

• Inclusivity – coastal communities and others aected by the resource managementshould have the opportunity to participate in the ormulation and implementation

o management decisions.

• Flexibility – administrative structures and processes should be lexible and expected

to evolve in order to accommodate the continuous management process.

Some o the key objectives are to:

• consolidate inormation relating to dierent aquatic resource uses and utilization to

provide a holistic picture o the health o ecosystems within the management area;

• integrate expertise and knowledge rom First Nations (indigenous people/tribe),

local, scientiic, and other sources;

• ensure opportunities or coastal communities and others aected by the resource

management to participate in all aspects o integrated management, protection andrestoration o aquatic resources.

The Board has been operating or several years and received a positive review rom a

recent independent assessment body (see Pinkerton et al., 2005). For more inormation,

visit the Board’s website: http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca




−participatory management development to promote ownership o themanagement regime and input into the regulatory/control aspect o management(laws and regulations) in preparation or acceptance by the ishers o their joint“stewardship” role or the management o their isheries in partnership with

government;−peer pressure towards voluntary compliance and support or the management

regime;−the institution o accurate and veriiable data collection regimes; and−surveillance and veriication or compliance.

On the other hand, the deterrent/enorcement approach, seeks to ensure complianceby ishers who resist the regulatory regime. This approach includes inspection,investigation, prevention and court proceedings to enorce the law. It is a necessarycomplementary approach to that o voluntary compliance, which would ail i stakeholders see non-compliant ishers successully evading the law and receivingeconomic returns rom their illegal activity, at the expense o the ishers who comply

(Flewwelling et al ., 2002).In establishing and operating an MCS system, in addition to inrastructure andequipment costs, those on the human side include (Kelleher, 2002):

•Development o institutions and human resources, which oten includescoordination among institutions responsible or MCS at the national (orinternational) level, and practical training o isheries inspectors and operationalpersonnel;

•Personnel – in general terms it can be said that the higher the incomes in a country,the greater will be the proportion o the recurrent MCS costs attributable to sta;

•Administration and coordination – the administrative costs o MCS are diicultto isolate rom those o other administrative tasks, as they are closely intertwined;and

•Costs to ishermen – a restriction on a isherman’s activities incurs a cost. I thecosts o compliance are high, the risk o violation is also high.

In order to achieve an eective MCS system, one must bear the ollowing indingsin mind (Flewwelling et al., 2002):

•Each MCS system must be adapted to the cultural, geographic, political and legalramework o the state or region concerned as there are no universally applicablemodels;

•An absolute requirement or a successul MCS system is political will o the state,or strong national government support o a regional body;

•The operational character o the system will depend on management decisions;•When establishing an MCS system, legal and policy considerations must always

be taken into account;•National and regional MCS activities must complement each other; and•Stakeholder involvement is key to successul implementation o management and

MCS plans.In terms o legislation, an MCS system needs to be based on clear legal rules that

set out the rights and responsibilities o the various parties, in order to be eective.These rules should provide eective and eicient legal procedures and mechanisms orimplementing those rules consistently. It is thereore important to review the existingdomestic legislation to ensure that it prescribes norms that are appropriate to achievethe desired isheries management objectives and contains provisions that acilitateeective enorcement (Flewwelling et al ., 2002). As a part o the coordination process,there needs to be an agreement on who is responsible or what (e.g. jurisdictionalboundaries) – i.e. what roles dierent institutions should have (Scialabba, 1998).

In general, strengthening a national MCS regime will involve addressing theollowing key issues:




a) ensuring that isheries administrators and enorcement oicers can exerciseall powers available to coastal, port and lag States under international law(this will usually require reviewing the powers o enorcement oicers underdomestic law and strengthening procedures under which the States grants

authorization to ish);b) increasing regional and international cooperation in order to reduce the

incidence o IUU ishing, including measures to support the enorcement o isheries conservation and management measures on the high seas and in areasunder the jurisdiction o other States;

c) increasing the transparency o ishing eorts by improving monitoringprograms (particularly by requiring the use o VMS);

d) acilitating the use o inormation derived rom monitoring and surveillance(particularly rom new VMS technologies) to promote compliance; and

e) strengthening existing sanctions and extending the range o compliancemechanisms available to enorcement oicers (adapted rom Flewwelling et al .,

2002).In order to attain a cost-eective MCS system, the cooperation o the ishing industryand ishers is essential. Lack o participation in isheries management, including MCSplanning and implementation exercises, may oten result in non-compliance. It is thusvital that stakeholders are involved in the development o acceptable, responsible andsustainable management planning and implementation. Involved stakeholders willnot only know and understand the rules and the rationale or their development, butwill also be more inclined to comply with them voluntarily. This may increase oreven reduce the costs o the MCS, whilst simultaneously increasing its eectiveness(Flewwelling et al ., 2002; Gitonga, undated).

Capacity-building

As mentioned throughout this document, the EAF will require a more holisticand integrated way o thinking about isheries management, in order to take intoconsideration the multiple needs and desires o societies, beyond conventional isheryaspects. It will thus also require increased stakeholder involvement/participation inorder to achieve this “new” way o thinking, and setting economic and social objectives.Within the institutional ramework, capacity-building may be required in relation to:

• Improved institutional linkages within the isheries management system: capacityis needed particularly to build the ecosystem-wide and cross-sectoral skills andexperience needed to smooth the way towards applying a holistic and participatoryapproach to isheries management (Scialabba, 1998).

•Participation: capacity building is needed both to acilitate such a process

(mediation, negotiation, conlict resolution, etc.) and in order or the participantsto have suicient inormation/training to be able to participate in a meaningulway.

•Monitoring, Control and Surveillance.•Research: the capacity is needed to undertake new areas or research, such as

cross-sectoral disciplines.In addition, there are the requirements o capacity development in certain technical

areas that require more emphasis on understanding ecosystem structures, habitatrestoration methods, marine protected areas, and measures to deal with bycatchreduction, etc. (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003).

Institutions involved in isheries management, both in industrialized and developingcountries, may thereore need to change to allow or these new requirements. However,it is not simply about adjusting institutions according to new needs – equally importantis building/developing capacity to handle these new requirements. Capacity must bedeveloped to translate the underlying principles o EAF management into policy goals




and then into operational objectives that can be achieved by applying managementmeasures (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003).

Capacity development has been deined as “the process by which individuals,groups, organizations, institutions, and societies develop their abilities – both

individually and collectively – to set and achieve objectives, perorm unctions, solveproblems and to develop the means and conditions required to enable this process”(UNDP, 1997, in Macadyen and Huntington, 2003). This deinition highlights twoimportant eatures o capacity development: Firstly, this is a process and not a passivestate – individual development becomes a part o a sustainable shit in perormanceand collective behaviour (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003). Secondly, there are thusour levels at which capacity development can take place. These are: in individuals, inorganizations/institutions, in sectors and networks, and in the overall environment inwhich the irst three unction (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003):

•At the individual level , the ocus is on enabling individuals to embark on acontinuous process o learning, building on existing knowledge and skills, and

extending these in new directions (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2001). This level reers to theindividuals operating within the other three levels, or being aected by them.•At the sector/network level, there is a need or coherent sector policies and

strategies, as well as co-ordination across sectors. Thus, initiatives may ocus onissues such as policy reorm or service delivery as a way o increasing capacity atthe sector level (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003).

•At the organizational/institutional level, organizational structures, processes,resources and management issues have been o great importance and the ocus hasbeen on assistance in the orm o technical assistance, budgetary or inrastructuresupport, or support or institutional linkages (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003).Existing capacities or initiatives should be sought out and allowed/encouragedto develop, considering the construction o new institutions only i this is not

easible (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2001).• In order to create an enabling environment, initiatives at the societal level tend

to ocus on the principles o good governance. High levels o commitment andmechanisms to resolve conlict support an enabling environment, whereas lowaccountability and high levels o corruption contribute to disabling the policyenvironment (Macadyen and Huntington, 2003).

Capacity building must involve a process o individual capacity development,during which new knowledge and the abilities o individuals eventually eed into andcontribute to an institutional, sectoral or societal change, be it a systemic or a structuralimprovement. At the same time, a change in the collective behaviour may support newlevels o perormance and orm new patterns o behaviour. This process is not linear

and individuals need to continue building on existing core skills and capacities, so theprocess requires time. Another aspect linked to the time requirement is that capacitydevelopment as a process may produce uncertain or intangible results that are not easilymeasurable. Quick-ixes with predictable and easily measurable results are thereorenot easible. Lastly, the permanence and sustainability o capacity development, and thechanges it entails, depend on ways to retain the acquired knowledge/abilities/capacities(e.g. keeping institutional knowledge in the ace o high turnover) (Macadyen andHuntington, 2003).

Capacity development is not a new concept and the ollowing key lessons, adaptedrom Macadyen and Huntington (2003), have thus been drawn rom previousactivities:

•Capacity development initiatives must be participatory in design, implementationand monitoring. Initiatives must build on core capacities and be a two-wayprocess o knowledge transer.




• Initiatives must provide or lexible and suitable learning pathways, i.e. capacity-building must be adapted to the local situation and local requirements. One sizedoes not it all.

•Approaches must take cognizance o the overall societal/political context in which

initiatives operate.•There is need or much better integration o initiatives based on regional,

geographical, intra-sectoral, intersectoral, and vertical linkages.•Appropriate incentives must be built into capacity development initiatives.•Those delivering capacity development may themselves require capacity

development or eective delivery.Askvik (1993, reerenced in Hersoug, 2004) presented some general problems in

the process o capacity development that merit consideration when designing andimplementing a capacity building programme:

•Rapid turnover o sta due to qualiied people disappearing during the projectperiod. Since the people taking part in the training oten acquire valuable

qualiications, they may be ound attractive in other work areas and may betempted by higher salaries oered in those other areas.•Knowledge, per se, does not always give authority in an organization/institution.

Sometimes newly trained sta cannot apply this new knowledge in the organization,e.g. because the leader has not given his consent. A way o getting around this,though, is to start by training the top leadership.

•A lack o coordination in the process may lead to increased dierences in the sameinstitution.

As an end note, it should be stressed that attaining adequate institutional capacityis vital, not only to achieve a well-unctioning system o EAF management, but alsoin order to sustain it. It is, however, important to bear in mind that it is not easibleto expect the creation o a completely new system. Changes will more oten be

incremental and build on existing capacities, because institutional adjustments andrelated capacity development are costly and time-consuming, and may thereore berestrained by lack o inancing.

Use and management rightsRecognizing and/or assigning rights in isheries represents a mechanism to be clearabout who has access to the ishery (i.e. to go ishing) and to what extent, as well aswho has the right to be involved in isheries management itsel. While the existence o rights over the use and management o the ishery does not necessarily constitute anincentive as such, once in place, the hope is that they will create desired incentives.

Some key considerations with regard to rights arrangements (see Charles, 2002) are

as ollows:•A system o use rights is an institutional mechanism by which ishers, isher

organizations and/or ishing communities hold rights and some security o tenureover access to a ishing area, the use o an allowable set o inputs, or the harvesto a quantity o ish. I use rights are well established, there is increased claritywith respect to who can access the ishery resources and how much ishing each isallowed to do. This implies that ishers will have greater security; they know thatwith use rights, they are securely in the ishery or a certain time period to come.

•Management rights – rights to be involved in managing the ishery – relects theneed, as noted in the Code o Conduct (Paragraph 6.13), to “acilitate consultationand the eective participation o industry, ishworkers, environmental and otherinterested organizations in decision-making with respect to the development o laws and policies related to isheries management…”. This has led notably tothe emergence o co-management arrangements involving joint development o management measures by ishers, government and possibly local communities.




Through use rights and management rights, it is hoped that greater incentives willbe in place to increase the possibility that participants will:

1. adopt a longer-term perspective on the ishery, since (with conditions o openaccess removed) their use rights are secure over a longer-term, so protecting

“the uture” becomes more compatible with their own long-term interests, inkeeping with the Code o Conduct or Responsible Fisheries,

2. support and comply with management regulations, since those with managementrights have been involved in developing the regulations in the managementprocess, and

3. engage in greater cooperation, since one’s well-being may become more closelyintertwined with that o others.

Use rights can be divided into two sub-components (Charles, 2002): access rights –e.g. territorial use rights (TURFs) and limited licensing – and withdrawal rights (urtherseparated into input and output rights). For a review o experiences with use rights andoutput (quota) rights in isheries management, see FAO 2000a and 2001b, respectively.

FAO (1982) provides a discussion on the conditions aecting the successul creationand maintenance o TURFs, which may be ound across the globe and have usuallydeveloped in situations with historic roots o community-based management o naturalresources.

While use rights and management rights have been well-discussed in the generalfisheries literature, there are some specific considerations that need addressing withrespect to EAF implementation. In particular, as EAF implies a broader scope of fisheriesmanagement (to include multiple species, the aquatic ecosystem, the range of societalobjectives, and any interactions with other economic sectors, amongst other aspects),use and management rights within such a context will need to deal with other “users”of the ecosystem beside the specific stakeholders in the fishery being addressed. Otherfisheries, aquaculture, offshore oil and mining activities, eco-tourism and/or coastal

tourism, shipping, urban development, coastal industries, and other aquatic-basedhuman endeavours all vie for resources and impact on the ecosystem along with fisheries.

Just as rights may be allocated to use specific fishery resources and to be involved inmanaging those resources, so too may there be rights arrangements for others – perhapsin the context of integrated coastal and ocean management, or integrated watershedmanagement. While this goes beyond EAF per se, clearly it is a reality that must be takeninto account, and which bears very much on the broader goal of ecosystem health, whichnecessarily involves more than just those within the fishery.

In summary, the judicious recognition or adoption o use rights and managementrights can help align incentives to desired EAF policy, but this is not a simple task, andindeed taking the wrong approach can produce results contrary to the aims o EAF

management. In particular, a rights system will always have accompanying beneitsand costs (and varying distributional impacts o each) so there is a need to assessthese aspects (as well as monitoring any negative impacts o the measures). Thus it isimportant to understand the relationship between rights and incentives, which willvary rom case to case.

la icti

The long-term prospects o applying EAF will be enhanced by clear and acilitatinglegal arrangements, supporting the corresponding policy rameworks (see Chapter 3)and institutional rameworks (discussed in this chapter). A supporting legal rameworkcan provide the legal basis or many o the required changes by, amongst other things:

•providing a ramework or coordination and integration;•deining roles and responsibilities;•providing a ramework or the management processes; and•providing legal mechanisms or conlict resolution.




At an international level, the EAF is currently supported mainly through voluntaryinstruments – such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Code o Conduct orResponsible Fisheries and the Reykjavik Declaration – rather than in bindinginternational law. This results in little explicit recognition o EAF within the legal

rameworks o regional isheries organizations and arrangements (FAO, 2003a).At a national level, the EAF is requently not an integral part o national isheries

policy and legislation. This leads to weak capability or cross-sectoral consultation andcooperation, and the ailure to consider, or a legal inability to act on, external inluencessuch as pollution and habitat deterioration in current ishery management regimes.Furthermore, implementing EAF eectively not only requires suitable isherieslegislation but would also beneit rom suitable legal rameworks in other sectors.Thus, existing legal instruments in isheries, and in other sectors that interact with orimpact on isheries, need to be assessed and adjustments to those instruments madewhere needed and where possible (FAO, 2003a).

This section will briely discuss the role o a supporting legal ramework in

implementing EAF.

How can a legal framework help in the implementation of EAF?A legal ramework can speciy the policy-making entity, the geographical area thepolicy covers, the stakeholders bound by the policy, the institutions respectivelyresponsible or implementing and or enorcing the management plan, and howinterinstitution jurisdictional disputes will be resolved. This reduces overlap andconlicts both between sectoral management institutions and between dierent tiers o government, by delineating roles and responsibilities (FAO, 1997).

The legal ramework should provide the legal backbone or implementing EAF andits relevant principles and policies by supplying the ollowing support:

•Coordination and integration, roles and responsibility

As mentioned above, eective application o EAF will require coordination andintegration o sectoral and institutional responsibilities and activities as a way o dealing with the increased management scope. The legal ramework can acilitate thisby deining interconnections and integration o management authorities (broadeningrom a traditional single-sector ocus). By deining the institutional structure orisheries management and empowering this structure with the corresponding authority,roles are set out at each level o governance, which is essential as it sets out who isentitled to administer and control the use o the isheries resources (FAO, 1997).

•Framework for management processesA legal ramework can also provide a ramework or management processes. For

example, it can supply the basis or ormulation, monitoring and implementation o

isheries management plans, including the necessary powers to ormulate appropriatemanagement measures and enorce the related isheries regulations (FAO, 1997).•Legal status of rights systemA legal ramework provides the legal status o a rights system. For example, it may

set out who is in charge o determining allocation o total allowable catch (TAC), andwhat the guidelines or such allocation are (Van Anrooy et al ., 2006).

•Pro-poor legislationA legal ramework constitutes a way o supporting small-scale isheries, o which

many are poor, by legislating pro-poor policies, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Forexample, the legal ramework can ensure that various rights o small-scale ishers andishworkers are enshrined in law, thereby preventing an erosion o such rights throughsocial, economic and political marginalization (FAO, 2005b).

• International norms and agreementsA legal ramework describes the requirements (e.g. at a national level) or the

application o international norms and agreements, including recommendations byregional isheries bodies.




•Conflict resolutionAnother important unction o any isheries legal regime is to establish the

institutional arrangements and procedures necessary to reduce potential conlicts andacilitate their resolution when they occur. As conlicts between dierent stakeholders

are likely to arise, having ormal procedures and a transparent dispute settlementprocess may acilitate the implementation o EAF (FAO, 1997).

What is required of the legal framework?•FlexibilityThe legal ramework needs to be lexible and responsive to various changes, or

example changes in the knowledge base, and biological, ecological and socio-economicchanges. However, simultaneously it needs to be stable enough to provide continuity.At a national level, the primary legislation lays down principles and policies and isgenerally broad in scope, and should speciy the “unctions, powers and responsibilitieso government or other institutions involved in isheries management” (Chapter 4.3.1

iv o FAO, 1997). It may also relect varying degrees o detail o implementation, suchas the main eatures o a speciic mechanism (e.g. that controlling the allocation o ishing rights). Responsible isheries management requires, however, that the primaryisheries legislation should, as ar as possible, not be subject to requent changes, hencethe primary legislation may provide the necessary continuity (FAO, 1997). As manyinteractions between isheries and other sectors will be dynamic, it may be preerable torely on agreed rules instead. This is consistent with the advice in the EAF Guidelines,namely that routine management control measures needing requent revision should beincluded in subordinate legislation, rather than in the primary legislation.

•HarmonizationAs ecosystems are oten covered by several overlapping legal regimes (maritime,

orestry, water, agriculture, etc.), and also requently overlapping national legislation,

there is a need or harmonization between isheries legislation and the other sectors’sets o legal instruments, both within and between nations (FAO, 1997). One exampleo such harmonization is a project set up in the Benguela Current Large MarineEcosystem (BCLME) region. This ecosystem is shared by three countries – Angola,Namibia and South Arica. The aim o the project is to acilitate harmonization o these countries’ national environmental policies and legislation or marine mining,dredging and oshore petroleum exploration and production activities in the region.The project has identiied areas o similarity and dierences in terms o policies andlegislation, and their implementation, and drew up drat guidelines on areas whereregional harmonization would be beneicial, e.g. standardized water quality criteria andenvironmental management reporting (BCLME Programme website).

fiacia/atria icti

Financial incentive mechanisms that are created outside existing markets are basedon the idea o establishing a situation in which economic actors/agents are convincedthat it is in their private interest to make the socially correct choices.39 The underlyingrationale, rom an economics perspective, or why such incentives are needed isdescribed in Appendix 7.1. The key point is that in the absence o incentive-aligningcorrections, market ailures will continue to exist, leading to outcomes that are notsocially optimal.

In the EAF Guidelines, the discussion on inancial measures is divided into twocategories: market-based incentives (e.g. ecolabelling and tradable rights) and non-market-based incentives (taxes, subsidies). The distinction is made to relect the idea

39 For example, these may be market-based incentives, which contrast with “command and control”approaches that may have excessive inormation and MCS demands on the governing and governedbodies. For urther discussion o market-based approaches, the classic reerence is Tietenberg (2004).




that, in the ormer, a buyer and seller interact in the market to determine the price o a good or service; whereas, in the latter, it is the governmental authority deining andimposing changes to the proit unction o the ishery.

In this report, the discussion has been separated into “carrot” and “stick” incentives

categories – we reer below to “economic incentives” as the “carrots” that promotedesired behaviour, and “economic disincentives” as the “sticks” that penalizeundesirable behaviour.

Positive monetary incentives (the carrot)The use o positive incentives may be split into three categories: conservation pricedierentials, best-practice/conservation payments, and rights-based incentives. Froman economic perspective, all o these seek to shit cost and revenue curves with the aimto attaining a socially optimal level o ishing eort. In addition, positive economicincentive instruments would, in theory, allow actors to determine or themselves theleast cost means o obtaining a given management objective.

Price differential payments are one orm o recognition by consumers o the valuesthey hold or ecosystem goods and services, and serve as market signals to industry andgovernments. For example, these payments may take the orm o higher prices paidor “ecolabelled” products, which establish a mechanism or identiying sustainablyproduced products and may relate to price premiums or export certiicates. The mostwell-known environmental labelling standard40 or sustainably managed isheries isthe Marine Stewardship Council ecolabel, which is an attempt to allow consumers topromote environmentally responsible stewardship o isheries resources. The impacton the international market has begun to make itsel elt as large retailers pick up onthe movement and, perhaps, the price dierentiation.

In his July, 2000 article, J. Kurien voiced several concerns regarding market-based incentives, such as eco-labels, and their role in sustainable development.

Many o these concerns were mirrored and discussed in the FAO Technical Paper,“Product Certiication and Ecolabelling or Fisheries Sustainability” FAO (2001a).Box 13 provides a brie summary o the opportunities and concerns voiced regardingecolabelling schemes.

A similar labelling system exists in the marine aquarium ishery sector through theMarine Aquarium Council (MAC) certiication label. From its Internet site41 the MACmission is “to conserve coral rees and other marine ecosystems by creating standardsand certiication or those engaged in the collection and care o ornamental marine lierom ree to aquarium”.

Other attempts to aect consumer choices include air-trade labels, good ishguides42, and the ish airs, such as the Slow Food/Fish movement. Such instruments are

geared towards the providing o inormation to consumers regarding the circumstancesleading to the availability o oered products (e.g. ishing practices, stock status, andmanagement regimes). The air-trade labels and Slow Food/Fish movement dier romthe ecolabels and purchasing guides in that the ocus is on the social and economic sideo the ishery, as apposed to mainly biological arguments. For example, the FairtradeLabelling Organization (FLO)43 “exists to improve the position o the poor anddisadvantaged producers in the developing world, by setting the Fairtrade standardsand by creating a ramework that enables trade to take place at conditions respecting

40 Other labelling schemes or capture isheries exist, such as the Frozen at Sea Fillets Association’s OceanWild Mark and the Earth Island Institute “Dolphin Sae” label.

41 http://www.aquariumcouncil.org/42 These guides present lists o ish products ranked by some measure o biological sustainability and are

usually ocused on speciic markets to assist consumers in their consumption choices o ish productscommonly ound in local markets or supermarkets.

43 http://www.airtrade.net




their interest”. The FLO estimated premiums or air-trade labelled coee o overUS$22 million in 2003. I applied to isheries, such labels may support small-scaleisheries using traditional sustainable ishing practices.

Best-practice/conservation payments are transers to individual ishers and/orthe ishing industry/community as a whole, rom governments or other institutions,to compensate or some or all costs o implementing sustainable ishing practices.Such practices may include the use o best-available technologies (e.g. turtle exclusiondevices, VMS) or restrictions on ishing patterns (e.g. no-take zones or seasons). Thesetransers may be considered as payments rom those who beneit rom conservation orbest-practices to those who bear the direct costs o their implementation.

Along these lines are competitions to engage and reward the ishing industry in thedesign o ishery-speciic technology. Such crossroads between regulatory mechanisms(i.e. the requirement o technological change) and allowing industry participationthrough the design o the most appropriate and lost cost options have met with some

BOx 13

Pi pprtiti a ccr rri cai i prct

OpportunitiesEnvironmental

• Ecolabelling could provide the needed economic incentives or better long-term

stewardship and availability o natural resources important or national economic

welare

• Ecolabelling may generate political support or improved environmental management

and to raise environmental standards through consumer choice

Economic

• Ecolabelling provides one o the least-coercive market-based mechanisms to improve

conservation outcomes

• The economic beneits rom ecolabelling may not be limited to price premiums

received through ecolabels.• Additional inancial and technical resources may be mobilized in the ecolabelling

process

• Consumer consciousness o environmental concerns is likely to grow in both the

North and the South

Concerns

• Lack o transparency and opportunities or participation in the development o

products standards

• Trade imbalances and decreased competitiveness may occur through the misuse o

ecolabelling schemes

• High costs o bringing isheries management practices into compliance with

ecolabelling schemes, ollowing the certiication process, and maintaining certiiablestatus; which may all disproportionately on small suppliers

• Inadequate institutional rameworks may make individual, voluntary compliance

diicult

• Lack o international standards/guidelines may increase the burden on governments

to monitor multiple schemes

• Consumer price premiums might not translate into higher incomes or the ishers

• National management sovereignty may be aected

Source: FAO, 2001a




success as creativity rom within the industry is rewarded and the process tends toincrease acceptance o use (see, or example, NFCC, 1994).

Conservation payments can occur when the non-use/existence beneits o certainresources are higher than the extractive use beneits. In these cases, the opportunity

costs o not using the resources need to be compensated, either through direct orindirect transers. This is especially important in small-scale isheries that depend onthe extractive uses or their livelihoods. Direct payments have been used by speciicconservation projects in which ishing communities are paid to maintain a givenhabitat or not to use a resource. Unortunately, such payments are usually constrainedby the longevity o the given project, in that once the project has inished, so do theconservation payments. Ferraro and Kiss (2002) present a review o current debatesregarding direct payments to conserve biodiversity.

Other conservation payments have ocused on indirect transers ocusing ontraining or other livelihood diversiication methods, based on the thesis that reducingishing communities’ vulnerability will naturally increase their ability to sustainably

use and management isheries resources (SFLP 2006).Eco-tourism is another market-based conservation mechanism targeting thesubstitution o extractive uses o resources to non-extractive uses. Essentially, paymentsrom tourism compensate or lost ishing revenues and may provide or alternative ordiversiied livelihood sources. Box 14 provides the results o one review analyzing thepotential o eco-tourism as a substitute or commercial whale shark ishing. However,as is oten the case or substitutes, negative impacts on ecosystems may occur (e.g.pollution, crowding, and noise rom boats and divers), thereby warranting caution intheir use. In addition, the demand or eco-tourism may not be suicient and stableenough to guarantee conservation o habitats and commercial species and this demandmay only pertain to highly valued species, such as sharks, whales and turtles.

Monetary disincentives (the stick)Economic disincentives within an EAF context mirror the “polluter pays” and“user pays” principles (PPP and UPP, respectively) used in the allocation o costs o pollution prevention and control measures and sustainable development paradigms. 44 These principles attempt to correct or existing market ailures by internalizing intothe production decision-making process the costs o using natural resources and o negative impacts on the ecosystem. Such principles have become standard policy indealing with issues o water and air pollution, and hazardous chemicals/waste, whiletheir application to the isheries sector has been slower to materialize.

Coey and Newcombe (2001) have provided an analysis o the current and potentialuse o PPP in European isheries and the generalized results are presented here. The

authors dierentiate among a number o objectives or the use o economic instruments(e.g. taxes, charges, and levies45) in line with the PPP/UPP: in this discussion we look at(a) cost recovery or isheries management, (b) paying or resource use, and (c) payingor environmental damage prevention or alleviation.

Cost recovery or isheries management46 is generally through taxes/levies; whilenot really a “stick” incentive measure, this will change the private proit unctions

44 The polluter pays principle means that the polluter bears the expenses related to any pollution preventionand control measures; meaning that these costs are relected in the cost o goods and services which causepollution in production and/or consumption. The user pays principle is a variation on the polluter paysprinciple that “calls upon the user o a natural resource to bear the cost o running down natural capital”(UNSD, undated).

45 The word taxes will be used interchangeably in the text or taxes, charges, ees, and levies.46 In Australia, or example, cost recovery or isheries management “means that the commercial ishing

industry pays or those costs directly related to ishing activity, while the Commonwealth governmentpays or management activities that may beneit the broader community (as well as the industry) and thatsatisy a range o speciic community service obligations” (Cox, 2000).






occurring.48 However, in cases where revenues are collected rom isheries activities,more oten than not these revenues go directly to the central government budget and,thereore, the link between beneits and costs o management services cannot be madeand isheries authorities continue to base their management activities on governmental

appropriations.Paying for resource use – oten through license/access ees, taxes, and tradable

or auctioned quotas – is an acknowledgement within the isheries sector o the valueo natural resources, much as in the use o land, water, or other natural resources.Historically, access to isheries resources was ree and all proits rom the use o theseresources were either dissipated, in the case o open access isheries, or kept by theishing industry. Governments and, hence, societies, had not insisted on payments orthe use o these natural resources. However, with the onset o the Law o the Sea in198249 and the idea o national ownership/stewardship o marine resources, the idea o private individuals paying society or the use o natural resources has gained ethicalacceptance and jurisdictional backing.

The level o such payments would depend on the particular ishery and the economicconcept o resource rent, which is the return to the resource owner50 rom the use o anatural resource. In an open access ishery, rents are largely dissipated, i.e., there wouldbe little or no rent to be had, and thus no rent extraction is possible. Moving rom anopen access isheries to a socially regulated ishery would increase the available rents,all or some o which can be collected by society through appropriate rent collectionin the ishery.

As an example o rent in isheries, a review o capture isheries management systemsin the Indian Ocean countries (FAO, 2006a) revealed that resource rent recoveryschemes, other than license ees, were uncommon within the large-scale and small-scale capture isheries o the region. However, such schemes have been used withinthe recreational isheries sub-sector. This dierence between the sub-sectors may

relect whether access to the resources is assumed as a right (without payment) or as aprivilege.

Third country access agreements (i.e. oreign leets paying or the right to ish inanother country’s EEZ) have been used in cases where national ishing leets do nothave the capability o exploiting certain stocks and the coastal nation could beneitrom rent extraction through collection o lump-sum ees and taxes. These agreementshave been wrought with criticisms (e.g. IEEP, 2003) but with the growth o inormationsharing51 experience and monitoring capabilities52 such agreements may be able tobeneit national economies while ensuring sustainable harvest levels.

Paying for environmental damage prevention or alleviation – either throughbearing the costs o appropriate technology or through paying ines or damages

inlicted – can be a politically palatable use o economic incentives, as it relates to agiven “bad” action. The ining o actions that have negatively aected ecosystems isquite common; however, these cases tend to involve actors outside o the ishing sectorwho have damaged habitat, such as oil spills or dock building.53

48 See, or example, the analysis by Keizire (2001) o isheries management inancing in Uganda, and theAsia-Paciic Fishery Commission (APFIC, 2005) work regarding the implementation o isheries co-management.

49 United Nations Convention on the Law o the Sea o 10 December 1982. See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm

50 “In relation to isheries, a “rent” is generally thought o as the dierence between total revenues obtainedrom the ishery and the total costs (estimated at their opportunity costs) o employing the variousactors o production that together make up the enterprises participating in the ishery.” FAO (2000b)

51 To this aim, WWF has created a “Handbook for negotiating fishing access agreements” (Martin et al., 2001). 52 See FAO (2002) or guidelines on monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) aspects within access

agreements.53 See Chapter 8 External Financing or the EAF.




Fining o ishing activities that have harmed the ecosystem (e.g. dynamite ishing,destructive anchoring, discarded bycatch, and incidental ishing o marine mammals)could be implemented. However, is more common at present or eort to ocuson attempting to limit such actions through regulations such as no-take zones,gear restrictions and bycatch limits. This may be because a regulatory approach isadministratively easier to implement (Coey and Newcombe, 2001) or perhaps thecalculation o ines is excessively complicated, e.g. i the necessary knowledge regardingthe value o lost ecosystem goods and services54 is not available.

One economic disincentive in use with respect to harmul ishing activities is the useo trade barriers. An economic incentive in support o sustainable ishing practices is the

granting o export permits or the Convention on International Trade in EndangeredSpecies o Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)55 listed species. CITES was developed tominimize the eect o international trade on commercial species threatened withextinction (Appendix I species) or exploited unsustainably (Appendix II species).Trade in Appendix I species is all but prohibited; while trade is permitted or AppendixII-listed species i the related ishing practices are proved sustainable (i.e. the species“was legally obtained and i the export will not be detrimental to the survival o thespecies”). I the potential exporter is unable to prove the sustainability o the ishery,exportation rights are not granted. In theory, sustainable management o isheriesshould keep the commercial species rom being placed on the CITES listing. Box 15presents one example in which a sustainable management regime has enabled the

Jamaican Queen Conch ishery to be labeled as a ishery o “least concern” or itsqueen conch resources.

54 See Chapter 2 Human Values o Ecosystem Services.55 See http://www.cites.org/

BOx 15

CITes’ rar r taia Q Cc iri aat i Jaaica

Until 1999, Jamaica was the world’s largest producer o queen conch. Most o thiswas ished on the Pedro Banks, a large undersea area that is the habitat or one o the

Caribbean’s largest and most important queen conch stocks. In the early 1990s, Jamaica’s

landings o Pedro Banks conch topped 3 000 tonnes per year. Jamaica also conducted its

irst conch stock assessments in the early 1990s. Recognizing a decline in the resource, the

Jamaican government introduced annual catch and export quotas, implemented in 1994

in Jamaica’s irst conch ishery management plan. MSY or queen conch was calculated

at 700-1 300 mt/year. Unortunately, illegal ishing is now rampant on the Pedro Banks,

much o it by oreign vessels that simply ignore Jamaican law. In the years 1999-2002,

illegal harvest was estimated to account or 40 percent o the conch ishing on the Pedro

Banks. Jamaica conducted its third conch stock assessment in 2003. Although this stock

assessment suggested a total allowable catch o 900 tonnes, Jamaica set its conch exportquota at 500 mt to allow or some inevitable losses to illegal ishing. The Caribbean

Fishery Management Council’s regional workshop on queen conch stock assessment

and management noted that Jamaica employs a visual-census conch survey as a ishery-

independent monitor o conch populations. Based upon the indings o its September

2003 Signiicant Trade Review, CITES considers Jamaica to have an adequate conch

management regime and relatively healthy queen conch populations. Jamaica is one o

only two Caribbean conch-exporting nations to earn the CITES designation o “least

concern” or its queen conch resources.

Source: extracted rom Cascorbi, 2004.




The current lack o inormation regarding the social and economic impacts o CITESlisting inhibits making conclusions regarding its role as an incentive or implementingEAF management with regards to traded species. FAO (2004b) provides a brie description o three categories o increased costs related to CITES listing: administrative

costs (start-up training and capacity building and recurring research, processing, andmonitoring and control costs); management impacts (developing eective managementwithin and without the isheries sector) and social and economic implications (short-term impacts on employment, income, and ood security versus long-term positiveimpacts on stock productivity, the possible creation o legal markets, and the shitingo ishing eort to substitute isheries).

Other trade barriers, such as the United States dolphin-sae tuna policy, createincentives to implement sustainable ishing practices. However, the eectiveness o suchpolicies on sustainable practices may prove ineective i other markets are available.

Although the PPP concept may now be ound in more and more nations’ isherieslegislation, and is applied in relation to the impacts o non-isheries activities on

isheries habitats56

, it is diicult to claim a wide-spread use o such economicinstruments. Coey and Newcombe (2001) presented a ew considerations as to whythe use o economic disincentives with respect to environmental damage/control mayprove diicult and these have been summarized and complemented in Box 16. Implicitin the shit towards PPP is the removal o perverse incentives (minimizing “harmul”subsidies) as, without doing so, eort will continue to rise; making ineective andineicient attempts to internalize the environmental costs o ishing activities.

Markets and pricesThe role o market prices in sustainable development has tended to be understated. Theabsence o a market can cause problems, as noted in Chapter 2 concerning the challengeo placing proper values on ecosystem services when markets or these services do

not exist. However, even when they are present, markets may provide incorrectsignals regarding ecosystem services. Price ceilings or price loors set by governments,subsidies, and market ailures send signals to users o ecosystem services that dierrom what the true or societal value/price would dictate. Under-pricing o ecosystemservices leads to overuse and probably waste o these services. Equally important,over-pricing may impact people’s ability to use the services or basic needs, such as orood and livelihoods, even while these higher prices would beneit those selling goodsproduced rom the ecosystem services.

It is important to note that prices, such as ishery input prices (e.g. petrol, kerosene,labour), directly impact on ishers’ production activities. Prices also impact our abilityto manage resources. I, or example, prices are very high or a certain species o ish,

management measures aiming to reduce eort in this ishery will prove diicult, as theincentive to cheat is correspondingly high.As shown in the next section, prices and their related proits are not the only

motivating actor driving individual decisions, but they are certainly importantenough to seek an understanding o them, and include them when designing anyEAF management plan. Not only will management and policy measures relating toecosystem services impact markets and trade, but markets and trade will impact on ourability to manage.

scia icti

Whereas economic incentives imply material rewards or punishment, social incentivestypically imply more intangible social rewards or punishment (i.e. approval ordisapproval rom others, and the related eelings o pride or shame) (Lindbeck, 1997).

56 See Chapter 8 External Financing or the EAF.




BOx 16

Ca i appi t PPP t t eAf aat

Linking cause and effect• impacts o ishing practices on ecosystems may be slow to appear and diicult to pinpoint

due to ineective monitoring, uncertainty regarding causes and eects, and a general lack o

inormation

• unlike most point-source damage, the source o damage in isheries cannot easily be traced back

to an individual, although it may be possible to identiy groups o vessels or leets that have been

ishing in a deined area

Institutional considerations

• command and control regulations may be easier to administer than taxes (e.g. gear and temporal

restrictions)

•

politically acceptable tax levels may be too low to serve as disincentives (i.e. better to risk the inei caught)

• setting taxes at appropriate levels may be diicult in the ace o damages to non-market values and

services (i.e. where does the social cost curve lie?)

• perverse subsidies may be in place; hence, contradicting or rendering ineective the PPP

• economic instruments are not the panacea and should orm one part o a complete management

regime

Social considerations

• small scale operators may face special difficulties in adapting to changing environmental requirements

and may have a limited ability to pass on the costs of compliance or taxation to consumers

• certain taxes, such as lat taxes, may be regressive and aect the small-scale isheries

disproportionately• i stakeholders are not included in the process leading to a tax, great resistance will be met in cases

where access to the resources was previously eectively ree, i.e. ishing seen as a right and not a

privilege and, thereore, rent ree

• there may be large up-ront eects on the ishing industry (i.e. changes in eort levels)

• dierent taxes (i.e. whether direct or indirect, or whether targeting access, output or input)

will aect individual choices dierently; thereore, the tax system applied must depend on the

characteristics o the ishery

Unintended consequences

• taxing one activity may incite individuals to misreport that activity or shit to other activities that

are not taxed and which may have stronger negative impacts on the ecosystem• there is a risk of double taxation if a new tax is established in a management regime already using

licence fees or other forms of fishing rights; hence already capitalizing on the fishery’s rent capacity

Source: amended rom Coey and Newcombe (2001)

Social incentives relate to the ways group behaviour and group interactions occur andorm the context in which an individual makes decisions. Such incentives include moralstructures, religious belies, peer pressure, gender relations, policy, social preerences,norms, rules, ethics, traditional value systems, social recognition, trust among thevarious stakeholders, and common interests. Each one o these incentives may havestrong impacts on how an individual or a group makes decisions.

Religious belies, or example, may orm the basis o how a community relates tothe environment, ranging rom the idea o the world being created or human beneit,




to that o humans being a part o nature, that is to be respected. In other words, one’sbelies can lead to strong environmental consciousness or to a sense that ecosystemscan be exploited without limits based on ensuring sustainability o the resources.

Much o the previous discussion relating to institutional incentives overlaps with

social incentives in that the institutional incentives aect groups o individuals,such as public awareness, transparency, education, capacity building, participatoryprocesses, and sense o ownership/stewardship. These are all example o positive socialincentives.

Moral structure, ethics, social relations, and peer pressure are also powerulincentives to engage or not to engage in an activity. Human beings are gregarious bynature, so the need to conorm to what the society or community expects o them canbe very strong. Risk o social ostracism can be a very strong deterrent against breakingestablished rules. Understanding the social organizations and, hence, social incentivesin place will help decision-makers understand how individuals and communities makechoices regarding their use o ecosystem services.

Social incentives may prove as potent as their monetary cousins in inluencingindividual and social behaviour and may lead to collective action impacting decision-makers in a common move towards sustainable development (Graton et al., 2005).

Prr icti

Perverse incentives are, rom an EAF point o view, any policy or managementmeasures that incite people or groups to act in a way that negatively impacts on anecosystem’s ability to provide services or, in other words, that lead to ineicient use o ecosystem resources. Examples o perverse incentives include:

• subsidies leading to over-investment in ishing capacity in a ishery in whichmanagement is unable to control ishing eort;

• buy-back programmes in which receipts rom the sale o older boat are reinvested

in modernized boats, thereby increasing ishing capacity• contradictory regulations leading people to ignore the laws all together;• laws against selling o bycatch that lead to increased discards; and• governmental inducements or use o ishing methods with relatively great

negative impacts on the ecosystem (e.g. modernization subsidies leading to greateruse o bottom-contact gears).

Logical reasoning would suggest the abolishment o existing perverse incentives asa irst step to EAF management. This could also provide substantial budgetary savingsand greater credibility in the governance system.

ConClusIons

The our categories o incentives discussed above (legal, institutional, economic, andsocial) require dierent sets o procedures and knowledge bases, and aect individualsand groups dierently. Thereore, some incentives may be more eective than othersdepending on the situation at hand. In addition, no one single incentive measure willmake an unsustainable ishery sustainable. Thoughtul and creative mixes o theseincentives will increase the probability o obtaining desired results. The elimination o perverse incentives, and eorts to obtain a better understanding o the motivations o ishers and other users o ecosystem services, will help determine which incentives toconsider.




Notes: “Private” indicates the perspective of the fishing industry in which eternalities of fishing activities have not been taken into

account; “Conventional Management” indicates a fishing industry in which some eternalities have been incorporated throughthe management system; and “EAF” indicates a fishing industry in which all eternalities have been incorporated (i.e., is socially

optimal).

- For a discussion of applied fisheries models and their assumptions, see Hannesson (2003).

APPendIx 7.1

A cic aai t r apprpriat icti

From an economics perspective, the need or appropriate incentives arises rom the

need to address a range o market ailures caused by the realities o public goods,externalities, monopolies, etc. – ones which are such that the costs and/or beneits tosociety o individual actions are not internalized (i.e. not relected in the price), leadingto results that are not socially optimal.

The most obvious isheries example o such market ailures is the “ailure o thecommons”, in which the race to ish (i.e. i isherman X does not ish the ish, ishermanY surely will) is ed by an inability o the resource users to maximize the value (rent)o the aquatic resources. Waiting or a ish to reach a mature post-spawning stage, or ahigher price class, means risking not catching that ish at all. This situation is classicallyportrayed as in Figure 7 by the open-access level o eort, EOPEN, at which all economicrent is dissipated and ishing eort is both economically and biologically excessive.

In this same igure, EMEY-P represents the proit maximizing eort level that wouldoccur i, or example, the actors in the ishery were able to control ishing eort to the“maximum economic yield” level, representing a move towards economic eiciency.However, at this level o ishing eort, it is possible that some impacts to society werenot incorporated into the private decision making process; thereore, representinga socially sub-optimal level o ishing eort. The results o such market ailures inisheries may include discarded bycatch, incidental ishing o marine mammals andbirds, and impacts on habitats in which the social costs o ishing are higher than theprivate costs imposed by the market.

This may be represented in Figure 7 by the dierence in ishing eort EMEY-P – EEAF

> 0, where EEAF represents the theoretically socially optimal level o ishing eort inwhich all social costs have been incorporated into the ishery.

An intermediary eort level – representing what could be the output o currentisheries management in which some sustainability concepts have been incorporated

Fishing effort

Revenue

$

TC Private

TC EAF

TR

E MEY-PE EAF

TC Conventional management

E CM

E OPEN

FIGURE 7

T eAf a t gr-scar m




FIGURE 8

hpttica ap aat ar a tir ct t cia

ptia ii rt

Example 1 Implementation of bycatch reduction devices

Example 2 Creation of a marine reserve

Difference EAF-Privateafter

Fishing effort

TCPrivate

TCEAF

TRPrivate

EMEY-PEEAF

TCPrivate /

TCEAF /

EMEY-P / EEAF

/

Difference EAF-Privatebefore

EOPEN

Fishing effort

TCPrivate

TCEAF

TRPrivate

TCEAF /

EMEY-P / EEAF

/

TRPrivate /

EMEY-PEEAF EOPEN

Difference EAF-Privateafter

Difference EAF-Privatebefore

Revenue$

Revenue$

Note: the symbol ‘/’represents the value of the variable after the given change (i.e. TR shifts to TR/ after

the creation of the marine reserve.

into isheries management and have maniested themselves through, or example, taxes,ees or quotas – would be ECM. The existence and placement o the underlying TotalCost curve (TCConventional Management) would depend on the current management regime ina given ishery.

Moving rom EOPEN to EMEY-P (or ECM) could be associated with the implementationo traditional isheries management practices, independently o an ecosystem-basedmanagement regime. Moving rom EMEY-P to EEAF could represent the incrementalchanges that would relect an ecosystem-based management regime.

In order to demonstrate the eects o EAF-based management measures on isheriesproduction unctions and, hence, eort levels, two ictitious and simpliied examplesare provided in Figure 8: one in which bycatch reduction devices are introduced into aisheries and one in which a marine reserve system is put into place. The ormer aects




the cost unction o the ishery; while the latter aects its revenue unction. Both relateto technical measures within the management “tool box” available to isheries managers(the reader is reerred to Chapter 3 o the EAF Guidelines or urther discussion.

In the irst hypothetical example, it is assumed that bycatch reduction devices lower

the Total Cost to society (TCEAF) o the ishing activity by, or example, decreasingbycatch or ishing mortality o non-targeted species. The Total Private Cost (TCPrivate)is assumed to decrease with the use o bycatch reduction devices due to, or example,increases in ishing eiciency and decreased time dedicated to culling unwantedbycatch (other things being equal).

Total net social welare increases when the dierence (EMEY-P – EEAF) > (EMEY-P/

– EEAF/). O course, the ultimate eect on eort in the ishery would depend on the

biological and production unctions o the speciic ishery and, in the case where eortdecreases, the resulting social and economic impacts would need to be addressed. 38

In the second hypothetical example, a marine reserve is created to improve theproductivity o the given ecosystem by protecting speciic ishery grounds and

allowing spill-over o the increased production. In such a case, the revenue unction orthe ishery, thereore, shits outward; beneiting the ishery. The example assumes thatthe cost structure o the ishermen has not changed but that the Total Cost to Societydecreases due to increased habit and species protection.

In both cases, the inal eort level in the ishery, EMEY-P, may not be identical to thesocially eicient level, EEAF; however, the dierence between the two has decreased.As with any management regime, a suite o management tools would be necessary toclose this gap.

38 Valdimarsson and Metzner (2005) present a matrix describing ways in which EAF management mayaect social welare and commercial proits.




APPendIx 7.2

Ka a lak victria

Despite attempts to control ishing pressure through setting and implementing

isheries regulations, the Kenyan government continued to observe declining ishstocks in Lake Victoria. A new approach was introduced by the Fisheries Department(the Department) – stakeholder participation in the isheries management as a way toassure sustainable resource use was applied to various isheries ecosystems. In 2000,the Department began consultations with communities at a grass-roots level in orderto increase awareness o both the ish stock trends, and o the role communities couldplay in reversing this trend.

A stakeholder meeting or the Kenyan section o Lake Victoria was organized bythe Department in 2001, which was attended by all stakeholders and key players inthe industry, including Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) Secretariat andthe research coordinators or the Lake Victoria (regional) research and environmental

management projects. The main outcomes o this meeting were various isheriesmanagement measures which could possibly reverse the decline.One suggested measure consisted o closed seasons and areas. At the end o the

irst closed season, there was an abundance o good quality target ish and a recoveryo non-target ish such as tilapia. During the closed period, the ishers participated inthe surveillance and law enorcement, or example by reporting those who violated thenew regulation with respect to closed seasons. The second closed season, in 2003, wasthereore less resisted and through general consensus, it was also decided to ban anytrade in the target ish (omena) during the closed season to discourage illegal ishingactivity due to available market.

Another outcome o the meeting was an expressed willingness o ishers to activelyparticipate in the management o the Lake Victoria isheries. This resulted in the

ormation o Beach Management Units (BMUs), which are being developed to assistcommunities in taking the lead in isheries management. The results o this approachwere:

•A decline in destructive ishing gears.•An increase in resource riendly gears.•The apparent decline in Nile perch landings which could be attributed to the

integrated concerted law enorcement eort that reduced the harvesting o largevolumes o immature ish, whose market has been signiicantly reduced.

•Facilitation o development o strategies or conlict resolution and sustainable ishstocks utilization in several Kenyan isheries waters, which could be attributed tothe ongoing isheries stakeholders’ meetings.

•

Higher compliance, achieved due to involvement o stakeholders in the policy-making process rom the outset. Resource users ended up policing themselves,encouraged by the sense o ownership stemming rom the participatory approach.This lightens the government’s burden in regard to law enorcement.

It should be noted that there are still prevailing surveillance weaknesses to beaddressed, resulting rom lack o surveillance acilities such as patrol boats and enginesor both the Department o Fisheries and the ishing community.

Source: (Gitonga, undated)




APPendIx 7.3

T bak natia mari Park c-aat iitiati

In 1991, Bunaken National Park (BNP), Indonesia, was ormally established as a

marine national park and has since become one o Indonesia’s most well-known marineecotourism destinations. Within the park there are 22 villages with more than 30 000inhabitants o whom most make a living rom a combination o ishing and arming.Due to a history o insuicient stakeholder involvement, the park has suered requentconlicts and ineective park management. Beore 1998, the management was in thehands o the Ministry o Forestry’s Bunaken National Park Oice (BTNB). Local parkusers, especially ishers and the dive tourism industry, were not eectively involved inthe management process. In addition, there was minimal unding or conservation andmanagement industry, the enorcement system was ineective, and the park zoningsystem was either misunderstood or ignored by the local people.

Conversely, the goal o the Bunaken National Park initiative was to develop

an eective and sustainably inanced model o multistakeholder co-managemento a national marine park, in collaboration with the USAID’s Natural ResourcesManagement Program (NRM). Below ollows a description o the components o theco-management initiative, and thereater a list o lessons learned rom the project.

Cpt t C-maat Iitiati•Participatory zonation revision of BNP. NRM assisted the BNP Oice (BTNB)

to work with the two primary park user groups (local villagers and the marinetourism sector) to revise the park’s zonation system, realizing that a well-designed,easy to understand and thoroughly socialized zonation system is the oundationor eective management o the park.

• Improved villager involvement in BNP management decisions through

institutional development of the BNP Concerned Citizen’s Forum (FMPTNB).The FMPTNB is now active in all 22 villages in BNP and serves to represent theaspirations o approximately 30 000 villagers in management decisions, as well asserving to socialize management policy to its constituents.

•Fostering private sector involvement in BNP management. NRM providedtechnical assistance to the North Sulawesi Watersports Association (NSWA)and actively ostered the involvement o other private sector groups in BNPmanagement.

•Facilitation of multistakeholder co-management of BNP via institutionaldevelopment of the BNP Management Advisory Board (DPTNB). NRM provideddevelopment support to the executive secretariat o the DPTNB, which consisted

o representatives rom national, provincial and local government agencies, villagestakeholders, the private tourism sector, academia, and environmental NGO’s. TheDPTNB represented a drastic departure rom the traditional Indonesian model o top-down management o MPAs, and strived to make decentralized, participatory,transparent and accountable MPA management a reality.

•Development of a portfolio of sustainable conservation financing mechanismsfor BNP. A ground-breaking decentralized park entrance ee system placedthe DPTNB on the road to inancial sel-reliance. Other components in thedeveloping inancing portolio include an international volunteers system tolower management costs, diversiied government agency support, in-kind supportrom the local dive tourism sector, national and international grant support, visitorcenter merchandising and a possible endowment und.

•Development of an effective 24-hour patrol system for BNP. An experimental joint patrol system involving park rangers, water police oicers and local villagersproved highly eective in decreasing destructive ishing practices in the park.




• Institutionalization of a scientific monitoring program to monitor effects of management activities on park resources. In conjunction with WWF Wallacea,NRM is supporting park stakeholders in monitoring coral condition and ree ishstocks.

l ar• It is necessary to balance ecological values with socio-economic values to generate

essential stakeholder political support or conservation o protected areas inregions with population pressures and/or priorities on economic growth anddevelopment.

•Building inormed participation is a long-term process, requiring extensivecapacity building and acilitation. Villagers, government and non-governmentstakeholders with long-term involvement in conservation management providemore innovative solutions and productive support or conservation management.

•Park managers and the rangers tasked with ield management o the park

commonly lack the community acilitation skills critical to ensuring broadstakeholder support and understanding o park management objectives. Trainingin acilitation skills or these park management personnel is an essential capacity-building measure beore co-management can be eectively implemented.

•Co-management starts with the development o constituency-based partnerships,and then evolves to true co-management when the constituency-based partnershipsthen start working with each other. The evolution to co-management resultsin collaboration among oten competing constituencies. Strong constituencypartnerships provide a solid oundation or co-management.

•Community conservation campaigns through schools, mosques and churches canbuild eective local support or and pride in conservation initiatives. People willsupport conservation o their environment i they take pride in it. O course, pride

alone will not achieve conservation. Also important are economic incentives andenorcement o rules and regulations.

•Decentralization o conservation management works when roles andresponsibilities are clear, and when there is a shared vision o goals and objectives.Decentralization does not work when there is competition over managementauthority or signiicant divergence in goals and objectives. Decentralization alsostimulates stronger grass-roots democracy and principles o good governance.

•Co-management requires active involvement o all relevant stakeholders. Thisis site speciic in nature. In Bunaken it includes dive operators, communities,dierent levels o government, universities and NGOs.

•The composition o multistakeholder co-management boards is absolutely

critical to their success. The optimal ratio o governmental to non-governmentalrepresentatives and those advocating dierent unctions o the protected area(economic development, conservation, sustainable resource use) will vary rom siteto site, but will have proound consequences or the eectiveness o these boards.There must be a balance among the competing interests – this will not alwaysimply equal numerical representation; in many cases the stakeholder group(s) thatare the most hesitant to advocate strong positions may require a larger allocationo seats on a multistakeholder board to achieve truly equal representation.

•Community stakeholders support patrol and enorcement programs, as they aredirectly linked to increased livelihoods. Many illegal activities within protectedareas come rom outsiders. Communities with a stake in conservation managementor sustainable utilization o park resources have a strong and rational interest inseeing rules and regulations enorced so natural resources are sustained.

•“Alternative livelihood programs” aimed at stakeholders currently involved indestructive activities in the coastal zone are ineective and largely rejected by local




communities. Community conservation/improvement programs should ocuson rewarding those that have chosen sustainable livelihoods, while those thatpersevere with destructive activities should be dealt with by a strong enorcementsystem.

•Local sel-inancing mechanisms are key to providing local stakeholders with theuel to manage local conservation interventions. Decentralized co-managementrequires the capacity to generate and then manage inances locally.

•Development-oriented stakeholders, particularly rom government, supportconservation when it can be linked to regional economic development.

Source: Adapted rom Erdmann et al ., undated.





115

8. etra iaci r t eAf

InTRoduCTIonIn Chapter 6, a range o potential costs and beneits related to EAF management weredescribed. Chapter 7 described mechanisms to internalize – through suitable incentivemechanisms – some o these costs and beneits into the ishing actor’s decision makingprocess, thereby addressing some o the costs related to the EAF (e.g. cost-recoveryand rent recovery). As great a use as possible o these mechanisms, to internalize thecosts o EAF implementation, minimizes the need or external unding. Such sel-sustainability is a desired route to EAF implementation.

However, i internal mechanisms cannot cover all implementation costs – apossibility given the potential or additional EAF-related costs (administrative,cultural, educational, and physical) and varied scales o beneits (local, regional, andglobal) – those costs will need to be covered either (1) through general governmentcoers and through the relevant authorities’ budgets, or (2) through external inancingarrangements. The appropriate route to inancing will depend not only on the inancialsituation at hand (e.g. whether or not a government is able to cover EAF implementationcosts) but also on the question o who should be paying those costs – and in particularthe extent to which the beneiciaries o adopting an ecosystem approach to isheries arein act those who pay the costs o implementing it.

This chapter considers these matters, identiying potential sources o unding tocomplement government and isheries’ sources. These sources are organized into two

categories: (1) the polluter pays principle; (2) conservation mechanisms.Many o the inancing sources described here are derived rom their use in other

sectors, such as orestry and agriculture; however, experience in their applicationto aquatic ecosystems is being gained as recognition o their value (as described inChapter 2) is increasing. Examples o their application to isheries ecosystems arepresented within the text.

“PolluTeR PAys” fInAnCIng

Financing EAF implementation through a “polluter pays” approach involves collectingrevenues rom those using the natural resource and/or causing ecosystem damage,and using those unds to inance positive moves to EAF management. In addition

to the polluter-pays and user-pays incentive mechanisms described in Chapter 7,governments and isheries associations have begun reclaiming the restoration costsin dealing with ecosystem damage inlicted by actors outside o the ishery sector(e.g. upstream activities, changes to habitats, pollution, and destructive practices).Individuals convicted o damaging are required to either pay ines, which may or maynot be directly related to damage costs, or more directly to repair the damage or payor work related to the conservation and protection o the aected habitat. Box 17provides a ew examples o penalties imposed on non-isheries sectors rom ecosystem-damaging activities and how the resulting unds have been kept within the isheriessector to improve ish stocks and ish habitat.

exTeRnAl ConseRvATIon fInAnCIng

Two realities come together to inluence the potential to inance EAF through anotherchannel, that o “conservation inancing”. First, related to “polluter pays” is the idea




o “beneiciary pays”, in this case implying that those receiving the beneits o EAFimplementation should pay the costs required to achieve those goals.

Second, given a global increase in environmental awareness (i.e. the recognition o the goods and services provided by ecosystems and the need to minimize damaging

impacts on these ecosystems), a desire to improve human conditions (i.e. decreasinghunger and poverty: improving livelihoods), and the hopes o holistic, decentralizednatural resource management (i.e. through good governance, participatory processes,community-based management, and integrated resource management), the possibilitiesor garnering international unding sources or EAF activities are numerous (e.g. donorcountries, international trust unds, development banks, unding acilities).

Combined, these two possibilities may lead to initiatives or the global communityto inancially support EAF eorts, particularly in jurisdictions that otherwise might beunable to aord such eorts. However, three caveats need to be considered:

•First, understanding the various and appropriate sources o unding requiresa large and, perhaps, daunting investment on the part o isheries managers.

For example, some unding sources may target sector-speciic activities; whileothers, may target speciic issues, such as biodiversity or marine protected areas.Accounting systems and even vocabulary may vary signiicantly across sourcesand unding sources may or may not be tied to certain conditions, economic orotherwise.

•Second, as EAF management is likely to comprise both development andconservation components; no one source o unding is likely to cover all EAFneeds. Hence, a portolio approach to unding will be necessary; however thisincreases the time and energy devoted to developing and using these unds.

•Third, there is a crucial issue o institutional sustainability to consider whenutilizing external unds – i.e., ensuring that long-term arrangements are in placeso that EAF implementation is not jeopardized when the speciic unding periodends.

In recognition o these complexities, guides to inding relevant inancing sourceshave been developed and many o which are reely available on-line; although not

BOx 17

eap -iri ptr pai r ir ct aa

Canada – Under the Federal Fisheries Act, the Department o Fisheries and Oceans(DFO) Canada uses ines rom habitat violations to restore damaged ish habitat. The

convicted oender pays money directly to repair ish habitat or enhance ish stocks, oten

through local non-proit environmental groups. For examples o such convictions, see

DFO (2004).

United Kingdom – the Anglers’ Conservation Association (ACA) represents its members

in court cases against private and public entities polluting British lakes and rivers. Money

collected is kept within member ishing clubs and used in rehabilitation trust unds. See

http://www.a-c-a.org/whatwedo.html or examples.

United States of America – The Columbia River Estuarine Coastal Fund was establishedin 2004 through the collaboration o the Foundation, the Service and the US Attorneys

or Oregon and the Western District o Washington rom ines imposed on shipping

companies that illegally discharged oily waste into the Paciic Ocean near the mouth o the

Columbia River. Conservation and restoration projects will be unded with $1.2 million in

community service payments rom polluters. See http://www.nw.org



External financing for the EAF 117

necessarily directed towards isheries and the EAF. The ollowing guides are ocusedon conservation and protected areas unding sources. Very importantly, some o theseguides provide detailed business planning or marine protected areas and other skillsto assist isheries managers in planning their inancial needs assessments and donor

unding requests. These guides can be used to enhance the innovation o stakeholdersin collective or collaborative inancing initiatives to diversiy unding sources. O particular interest may be private-public partnerships that appeal to both oundationsand bilateral donors. Perhaps most critically, the guides can be used to suggest easibleoptions or sel-inancing and reducing dependence on external unds over the mediumto long term.

The major categories o international unding described in these guides are:•Bilateral & Multilateral donors•Biodiversity Enterprise Funds,•Debt or nature/environment swaps,•Environmental Funds,•

the Global Environmental Facility, and•Foundations.A sampling o inancing guides available on-line include the ollowing:•WWF Guides:

(available at http://www.worldwildlie.org/conservationinance/)Financing Species ConservationFinancing Marine Conservation: A Menu o OptionsRaising Revenues or Protected AreasCenter or Conservation Finance Business PlanConservation Finance e-Resources

•Conservation Finance Alliance Guide (with a special ocus on marine parks/reserves):

http://www.conservationinance.org/•Debt or nature/environment swaps guide:

Debt Swaps or Sustainable Development - A Practical Guide or NGOshttp://biodiversityeconomics.org/inance/topics-42-00.htmInstitutions that can support dept swapshttp://www.undp.org/seed/unso/concepts&programs/pub-htm/swap-eng6.htm

•GEF unds guides:The A-Z o the GEF - An NGO Guide to Participation in the GEFhttp://www.geweb.org/Partners/partners-Nongovernmental_Organ/ngo_guide/ngo_guide.html

•

EU unds guide:http://www.hbl.lv/engl/esondi/ondi-zi.phphttp://ec.europa.eu/comm/isheries/news_corner/corner_en.htm

Appendices 8.1 and 8.2 provide a irst-glance look at the GEF and at “debt ornature” or “debt or environment” swaps. Boxes 18 and 19 include examples o theportolio approaches to unding used or MPA and coastal resource management.

ConClusIons

Since EAF implies a broadening o attention in isheries management beyond simplyish stocks and ishing leets, to matters relating to aquatic ecosystems and relatedhuman systems, there is oten an assumption that the costs o implementing EAFwill be higher than under conventional management. While this is not necessarily thecase, certainly there needs to be attention paid to inancing the introduction o newapproaches. This chapter has accordingly ocused on how to make EAF easible interms o provision o inancing rom outside the ishery sector itsel – complementing




BOx 18

Cata rrc aat iaci i t Piippi

Salamanca and Luna (2002) presented an historical perspective o coastal resourcemanagement (CRM) in the Philippines and discussed “the actors that are thought to

have played crucial roles, the ormal institutions that underpin its development, and the

issues that need to be addressed or CRM to ully succeed.” Within this report and a

related background article (Salamanca, 2003), the authors estimated the inancial needs

and sources o unding or 290 coastal resource management projects and activities rom

1974 to 2000. Over this period, approximately US$230 million were spent on activities

undertaken to manage the coastal zone and its resources through various implementers

(i.e. integrated, multisectoral, government-led, NGO-initiated, and isherolk-led) and

various ocuses (i.e., livelihood, education, research, advocacy, conservation, population,

etc.). The authors estimated that approximately US$9 000 per km2 o coral ree was spent

over the sixteen-year period to protect the nation’s 26 000 km2

o rees.While studying the inancial investments, the authors also investigated the sources

o unds and ound that 63 percent o the unding came rom 44 international sources

(i.e. bilateral and multilateral sources, debt or nature swaps, the international NGO

community, and international philanthropic organizations); 36 percent rom the Filipino

government, and one percent rom local donors; thus, highlighting the importance o

international sources o unding.

Sources: Salamanca and Luna (2002); Salamanca (2003)

BOx. 19

mari prtct ara ct a iaci i t mitrraa

In 2006, the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Centre or Mediterranean Cooperation

organized the Conerence on Sustainable Funding o Protected Areas in the Mediterranean

Region. A background document (Lopez Ornat and Jimenez-Cabellero, 2006) was

prepared to estimate the costs necessary to “properly” manage marine protected areas

in the Mediterranean, the available budgets across the region, the gaps in inancing, and

potential sources o unds.

Based on the budgets calculated or three marine national parks, our marine reserves,

and three high seas isheries reserves in the Mediterranean, the authors estimated that

the costs required or protecting and managing high seas isheries reserves would rangerom approximately US$1 to $12/hectare/year; while marine parks and reserves costs

would range rom $60 to $1 200/ha/yr. The wide ranges derive rom dierences in size,

intensity o protection measures, surveillance and control needs, research activities, and

management responsibilities. From these cost estimates, the authors estimated total costs

or MPAs in the Mediterranean o approximately $200 million/year to over $600 million/

year; one-third o these costs to be borne by non-EU countries. The authors estimated

that current public and international sources o unding in the non-EU countries cover

only 15 percent o what would be needed to maintain MPAs in their countries.

The authors then proposed a unding strategy that would decrease reliance on

governmental budgets and oundation; using international unds in the medium-term; and

moving towards market-based unding (e.g. conservation subsidies, concessions and ees,

and the tourism sector) in the long run.

Source: Lopez Ornat and Jimenez-Caballero (2006)




the discussions earlier in this report on using incentives and institutions internally inthe ishery to support EAF implementation.

The search or EAF inancing rom outside the ishery that is not only one-timebut actually sustainable in nature, is clearly a daunting task. In reviewing the literature

on the topic, and drawing on discussions o the Expert Consultation connected withthis document, several issues appear, both with regard to the external unding o EAFactivities (the ocus o this chapter), and more broadly, the balance o incentive-based(internal), governmental, and external unding sources. The ollowing are some o theissues arising:

•Under what circumstances can EAF implementation be sel-inancing throughsuitable incentive arrangements? I there is remaining inancing needed or EAFimplementation, how should the balance o beneits and costs involved in EAFmanagement be relected in the balancing o sources or this inancing?

• I external inancing is needed, how do we ensure post-project sustainability oncethe unding ends? Is this really possible?

•

Will basing unding on incremental costs bias projects towards high-technologysolutions over low-cost, indigenous solutions?•How can the environmentally-based projects that are part o EAF implementation

properly address poverty issues and other human-oriented goals?•Given imperect monitoring and control, how can unds being spent be utilized

most eectively? Will success indicators be incorporated automatically intoprojects to limit “donor atigue”?

•Since reducing pressure on the ishery resources is a common component o EAFimplementation, and this implies a need to shit ishery inputs into other uses, arethere enough alternative livelihood possibilities and eco-tourism to go around?

These issues relect some o the key challenges o EAF management – rom thedistributional impacts, to use o appropriate technology and management schemes,

to the links o isheries to the broader socio-economic environment and alternativelivelihoods. All o these need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis in order to makethe implementation o EAF both easible in the short term and sustainable in the longterm.




APPendIx 8.1

T a irta aciit a t eAf

T itittia trctr gef

A complete and up-to-date description o the GEF may be ound at http://www.geweb.org/.

In brie, GEF is the inancial mechanism or the implementation o our internationalconventions: the Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change; the United Nations Convention to CombatDesertiication; and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. TheGEF provides grants to pay or the incremental costs (i.e. those beyond status quo or“normal” activities) o implementing these conventions.

The GEF structure ollows a mix o the UN Assembly and World Bank Councilormats. The Council comprises 32 member countries (generally representing blocks o members), meets twice a year, and is the main governing body, setting policy directions

as well as approving any ull-size projects. The Assembly is made up o every memberstates (176), meets our years, and sets the overall priorities o the Facility. The GEFSecretariat, inter alia, coordinates all projects and drats the policies and strategies.

The Implementing Agencies (IA) (i.e. World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP) areresponsible or creating project proposals and or managing GEF projects along withthe Executing Agencies (e.g. FAO, ADB). Implementing Agencies have direct accessto GEF unds (i.e. do not need to pass through another agency to have money), whilethe Executing Agencies (EA) are moving towards direct access arrangements (e.g. FAOhas direct access to GEF project unds in restricted ocal areas).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are highly encouraged to participate inGEF activities and assist in the design, execution, and monitoring o projects, althoughthere are certain complications vis-à-vis governments and the national Focal Points.

The Scientiic and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) provides technical advice tothe GEF and comprises, inter alia, a roster o experts who review ull-size projectproposals. This roster system is currently under review and may have impacts onisheries-related projects, depending on the experts chosen to review projects.

The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit is a detached unit within GEF that conductsevaluations of GEF projects. The last review of GEF itself was conducted by anindependent external evaluation firm but the hope is that the M&E Unit would take overthis role. The review concluded that some positive environmental impacts could be seen,linked to GEF projects; however, there remained coherency and cohesiveness problemsacross the portfolios and that there was a need for systematic reporting on indicators tomonitor and evaluate GEF projects. The M&E Unit performs an annual review of GEF

projects and noted that, on average, the project preparation process lasts three years. Thislengthy time frame came up as a major concern repeatedly throughout the familiarizationseminar. The GEF Secretariat hopes to improve this time frame in the future and promotesthe use of small grants programme (http://sgp.undp.org/), the Development MarketplacePartnership programme, and the Small and Medium Enterprise Programme (http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EFG/GEF-SME-Program/gef-sme-program.htm) to shorten the process(i.e. small sums involved and no Council approval needed).

T gef prjct cc

The ollowing is a graphic presentation o the GEF project cycles or ull- and medium-sized projects. The rectangles represent executing/implementing agency input and thecircles represent GEF secretariat interventions.

The Project Development Facility unds may be used in the development o aproject concept document and include three size categories, leading to a range o project types:




- Full-sized Projects (> US$1 million)- Medium-sized Projects (< US$1 million)- Enabling Activities under expedited procedures (varies but <US$500 000)- Small Grants Program (<US$50 000)- Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Program.

Icrta ct a c-iaci

Incremental cost and co-inancing o projects are integral to the idea o GEF; however,they may also be the most diicult to understand or estimate. The oicial deinitionsprovided by GEF are the ollowing:

Incremental cost - The additional cost that the GEF unds between the cost o an

alternative project that a country would have implemented in the absence o globalenvironmental concerns, and a project undertaken with global objectives in mind.Co-financing - Non-GEF resources committed to a project. Sources o co-inancing

include implementing agencies, other bilateral or international unding agencies,recipient countries, NGOs, and the private sector.

It is well advised to review existing GEF project documents or examples relating toisheries and the EAF. One example relating to incremental costs analysis rom a GEF-inanced project on conservation and sustainable use o the Belize barrier ree complexand a spread-sheet example or co-inancing calculations (UNEP budget sample) maybe ound at http://dge.unep.org/kc/remanuals/.

Aata a iaata gef i

As is the case with all unding sources, planners should understand the pros and consbeore investing in processes. The Conservation Finance Alliance Guide oers theollowing list or consideration:

FIGURE 9

T gef prjct cc

Project

Closing &

Evaluation

Project Concept

Development

Project

Preparation

Project Approval,

Implementation,

Supervision &

Review

1

2

3

4

GEF Project Cycle

GEF Secretariat Review for

PDF B/C

GEF Secretariat Reviewfor Work Program

Inclusion

GEF Secretariat Review

for CEO Endorsement

GEF M&E Unit

Project Review

GEF M&E Unit

Review of Terminal

Project Report

GEF Secretariat Review for

Concept Agreement

Project

Appraisal




gef iri-rat prjctPast, current, and pipeline isheries- and aquatic resources- related projects mainly allwithin the Biodiversity and International Waters ocal areas o GEF. A list o GEF co-unded projects relating to EAF is available through the GEF project database: http://geonline.org/home.cm. Note that experiences may be gained rom non-isheriesprojects, such as those touching on community-based integrated terrestrial ecosystemmanagement.

Aata diaata

The GEF is an important source of large-scale grantfunding.

Can take a long time (three years or more) andsignificant commitment of resources to securefunding, particularly for full-size projects.

The GEF structure, grant selection process, andportfolio is publicly accessible. Information on allpast and present projects can be found on the GEFweb site.

The diverse range of actors involved in the projectcycle can make project approval a comple process.

The GEF seeks to “mainstream” global biodiversityconcerns into the regular project portfolios of thethree IAs.

Project proponents must learn to successfullynegotiate comple project development proceduresof IAs.

The GEF funds a wide variety of institutions, includinggovernments, NGOs, and the private sector. Inparticular, the GEF has become an important sourceto support NGO-led conservation projects.

Only incremental costs related to realizing globalbiodiversity benefits are funded directly.

GEF has been the major funder of ConservationTrust Funds (see chapter on CTFs).

Short funding cycle limits potential to achievefinancial sustainability.

GEF provides funding to support other innovativefinance mechanisms, such as environmentalinvestment funds, and is currently eamining otherinnovative opportunities for deploying its capital.




APPendIx 8.2

dt-r-atr ap – t rk

The ollowing text is taken directly rom Resor (1997). Another interesting article on

debt-or-nature swaps and protected areas is Thapa and Sasidharan (2003).A debt-or-nature swap involves purchasing oreign debt, converting that debt into

local currency and using the proceeds to und conservation activities. The key to thetransaction lies in the willingness o commercial banks (or governments) to sell debtat less than the ull value o the original loan. This seems counterintuitive: why wouldany lending institution holding a promissory note or US$1 million, or instance, bewilling to part with it or just hal that amount? The answer lies in the hard economicact that many developing countries have not been able to repay their debts in ull, andmay never be able to do so. As a result, commercial banks may preer to sell debts at adiscount rather than wait or an uncertain repayment in the uture.

While no two debt-or-nature swaps are the same, they usually include the ollowing

steps:1. An indebted country establishes general guidelines or a debt-or-natureprogramme and invites participation rom conservation organizations.

2. An international conservation organization and local private and publicorganizations reach agreement on a conservation programme.

3. The participating conservation organizations veriy that suicient unding willexist or the debt purchase or that debt donations or partial orgiveness may bepossible.

4. The partners request government approval or the swap, usually rom thecentral bank and the Ministry o Finance, and oten rom the governmentministry that has jurisdiction over the relevant sector where the proceeds willbe used.

5. Speciic terms o the swap are negotiated, including the exchange raterom oreign currency to local currency, the redemption rate and the localinvestment instrument. The purchase price depends on the secondary marketprice o the debt, which is determined by the market’s view o the credithistory and repayment expectations or the particular country. The amounto conservation unds generated depends on the redemption rate, which isthe percentage o the ace value debt that is redeemed in local currency. Theredemption rate is sometimes 100 percent o the ace value debt, but it is otenless depending on negotiations among the parties involved. The redemptionrate must exceed the purchase price o the debt by a large enough margin tomake the transaction worth while.

6. The debt is acquired and is presented to the central bank o the indebtedcountry which cancels the debt and provides unds in local currency, either inthe orm o cash or bonds.

7. The conservation projects are implemented over the lie o the agreedprogramme.





125

9. sti a ia rati

summIng uPIn isheries worldwide, the ecosystem approach has been increasingly accepted as akey “vehicle” or developing and improving isheries management. Relecting thisdirection, the FAO published in 2003 its Technical Guidelines on the EcosystemApproach to Fisheries (EAF). Those guidelines, in deining what is meant by the EAF,ocus on aspects within the ability o isheries management bodies to implement, whilerecognizing the isheries sector’s responsibility to collaborate in a broader multisectoralapplication o the EA. That deinition lays out a bold vision or the EAF:

an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by takingaccount of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems

and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologically meaningful

boundaries

This makes clear that implementation o the EAF is a human pursuit, taking placein the context o societal and/or community objectives, which inherently relecthuman aspirations and values. Thus to be successul in an EAF process, the socialand economic orces at play need to be understood, the incentives and disincentivesdriving human behaviour need to be investigated, and actions need to be undertakenin terms o ishery governance and corresponding institutional arrangements. Allthis is needed so that management can induce outcomes in the ishery compatiblewith societal objectives, by managing a range o human interactions with the ishery

ecosystem, whether technical, economic, social or institutional. Furthermore, anecosystem approach, even i ocusing on the isheries sector, must deal to some extentwith interactions with other uses o the aquatic environment; it is bound to lead intointeractions with multiple sectors o human activity beyond the ishery.

Indeed, adoption o EAF management will, on the one hand, ensure that we takeinto account impacts o the larger system (the ecosystem and relevant human elements)on ishery management, and at the same time, ensure that the broader consequenceso management actions are assessed. The EAF deals with the “bigger picture” aroundisheries, speciically to allow us to encompass relevant actors aecting and interactingwith management rom across the ishery system and beyond. EAF management (1)looks at managing target ish species and ishing activity within the context o the

ecosystem, (2) looks at the ishery within a larger context o households, communitiesand the socio-economic environment and (3) considers ishery management in abroader institutional context o managing multiple resource uses.

Given this, the need to understand the human components o the ishery systemin implementing an ecosystem approach is clear, as humans are part o, depend on,and aect the ecosystem in which they live, work, and play. The challenge lies inimplementation.

This report has attempted to provide support in meeting that challenge, by buildingon the EAF Guidelines, providing a ocus on the human dimensions (i.e. political,legal, cultural, social, economic and institutional aspects). Grounded in the belie thatthe application o the EAF must be holistic, integrated, participatory, and adaptive, thereport has consolidated a range o available knowledge and experience relevant to EAFimplementation, rom social, economic and institutional viewpoints, and examined themanner by which these aspects can be practically incorporated, as well as highlightingthe remaining gaps in both knowledge and implementation. The report has covered





Synthesis and final observations 127

• social, economic and institutional instruments are all useul in the application o EAF, and in particular these arise in terms o the institutions utilized within EAFmanagement and the incentives that are created or drawn upon or EAF adoption;and

• social, economic and institutional actors can all play roles in supporting orconstraining the implementation o EAF management – these can include powerand governance structures, economic “push” and “pull” mechanisms drivingishing activities, sociocultural values and norms associated with ishing, andexternal contexts ( e.g. global markets and political changes) that have an impacton isheries.

ha raiti

As noted at the beginning o this report, the EAF needs to incorporate the human (andecosystem) considerations that have a clear interaction with isheries management, i.e. which will typically need to be taken into account or eective isheries management.

To this end, three human-oriented realities must be taken into account in theimplementation o an EAF:•First, EAF must take place in the context o societal and/or community objectives,

which inherently relect human aspirations and values.•Second, as EAF takes into account interactions between isheries and ecosystems,

this includes a wide range o complexities relating to human behaviour, humandecision making, human use o resources, and so on.

•Third, implementing the EAF is a human pursuit, with implications in terms o the institutional arrangements that are needed, the social and economic orces atplay, and the carrots (incentives) and sticks (e.g. penalties) that can induce actionscompatible with societal objectives.

T iprtac pic, ititti a ictiThe ecosystem approach to isheries can be operationalized at very concrete levels,such as measures to reduce bycatch or to reduce impacts o isheries on the oceanhabitat. These can be important and immediate measures to improve ecosystem health.At the same time, however, it is crucial to look at a broader picture in the ishery – athow policy is ormulated, how institutions are unctioning, and how incentives movethe ishery in a desired or undesirable direction.

Consideration o policy and institutional aspects highlight the need in EAFor structured decision-making processes, grounded in the accepted set o societalobjectives, and governed by a suitable set o operating principles. Fishery objectivesunderlie the criteria or judging success, while principles inluence the choices made

o policy and management measures to best meet the stated objectives. These aredrawn rom many sources, such as national legislation, international conventions, and“approaches” including the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach.

In implementing the EAF, each jurisdiction or community must weigh its optionsand choose what is considered the best direction, to meet objectives in a mannercompatible with principles. This eort will involve making trade-os (e.g. betweensocio-cultural, ecological and economic objectives) and taking into account thepossibilities or cooperation (or conlict) with other jurisdictions/communities.

In considering EAF policy, it is important to note that this can be developedat multiple scales, rom the international to the national, district or local scales.Governance must be “nested” across these various scales, as well as being linked acrosssectors, i.e. connecting the ishery to other components o aquatic use, recognizing thatother national policies (beyond isheries) also relate to ecosystems.

With respect to institutions or EAF, these can be ormal (e.g. governmental),inormal (e.g. based on community cultural systems) or economic (e.g. markets). A




undamental requirement is legitimacy o the institutions, notably whether they areseen to be air and transparent, with suitable participation o those aected. In thelatter regard, co-management and community-based management can be key policydirections, where appropriate. This leads into the key question o who is or should be

involved in the EAF policy domain. There will likely be more players than is typicallythe case in conventional isheries management, particularly when EAF examinesaspects that cross sectoral lines. Indeed, there will eventually need to be linkagesbeyond isheries to multisectoral institutions, to assess the impacts o interactions andcumulative impacts, while developing cohesive and integrated policy, e.g. in a contexto integrated coastal and ocean management

Finally, with respect to incentives, the report has emphasized that these can comein many orms, rom legal to social and cultural, to economic and inancial. The keychallenge is to create or reinorce incentives that shit human behaviour in a way thatsupports the goals o the EAF. To accomplish this, clearly one needs to know notonly what instruments can be utilized, but also how people are likely to respond to

those measures. In other words, it is not enough to simply promote incentives as atool or EAF – one must understand both the tools available and the context o theishery. There is no single answer to the question o incentives: or example, ishinguse rights systems are oten advocated as a means to provide suitable incentives, butmany choices are to be made in this regard, such as those between individual rights orcommunity rights, and between various co-management systems. One needs to assessthe objectives, the principles being ollowed, and the context o the ishery and itsbroader environment, in order to make wise choices in this regard.

InfoRmATIon needs foR deCIsIon-mAKIng

A major factor inhibiting the adoption and implementation of EAF management isa sense that the information requirements are simply too great for it to be feasible.

After all, if an adoption of the ecosystem approach in a given fishery requires a deepunderstanding of the related ecosystem, how many fisheries around the world would beready? In a data-sparse fishery, it might be argued that while the EAF may be suitablein better-studied or wealthier fisheries, it could not work in a fishery with a limitedknowledge base. However, in the well-studied and heavily-managed fishery, it can still befelt that the knowledge of the ecosystem is insufficient for EAF implementation. In otherwords, every fishery might be considered lacking in information needed for the EAF.

So how much and what kind o inormation is really required to implement andsustain EAF? It is important to recognize that the EAF is an “approach” not a set-in-stone methodology that must be applied in an all-or-nothing manner. The “toolkit”described in this report, and the material ound in the various isheries management

and EAF guidelines, can be utilized on any scale (e.g. rom a local community isheryto a national or regional scale) and to any extent, rom a small incremental movebeyond conventional management through to a wide-ranging and comprehensiveimplementation. For example, a modest ocus on dealing with bycatch issues, ratherthan all multispecies interactions, in a given ishery, or a pilot project to look at EAFmanagement in a local bay, rather than a whole nation, both relect less data-intensiveand indeed less expensive means to progress on EAF management.

Speciically in the case o developing countries, applications o the EAF that are lowin data needs may be most appropriate. For example, instead o demanding extensivequantitative measurements o each relevant actor, it can be possible to work withchecklists based on qualitative assessments. The more limited is the inormation base,the more important is the idea o a “risk analysis” that ocuses, or example, not oncalculating precise ish stock predictions, but rather on assessing the risks inherent ineach scenario being considered. This is very much in the spirit o the precautionaryapproach: taking action on conservation decisions despite the uncertainties being aced,



Synthesis and final observations 129

and lacking the inormation that would be preerred. The question becomes: in theace o many uncertainties, and with various choices available in terms o managementactions, what level o risk is society willing to accept, and what does this tell us aboutthe management choice?

O course, over time, there will be a need or research within EAF management.This can be carried out with a multidisciplinary approach, to connect and integratethe analyses o the various scientists into a single management model, reconcilingthe various underlying assumptions, perspectives, and biases. Such an approach ispreerred over having those studies independent o and divergent rom one another,in which case there is a risk that managers will miss the overall message. To this end, amultidisciplinary team approach to research and analysis can be eective. For example,sociologists and anthropologists can identiy the relevant groups in a communityand their goals and objectives. Biologists can develop the stock dynamics aectingproduction. Economists can provide a ramework or integrating these dierent resultsinto a cohesive model. These and other necessary ields can be used to develop a single

set o outcomes rom an assessment o management alternatives.

ClosIng CommenTsIn recognizing that the EAF is indeed an “approach” rather than a strict recipe tobe ollowed, and can be either costly or inexpensive depending on the extent o itsimplementation, it becomes clear that an ecosystem approach, to some extent, isindeed appropriate or adoption in every ishery. While some isheries may embark ona major shit to EAF management, changing processes rom data collection throughto institutional design, in other isheries (notably data-sparse small-scale isheries), alow-cost EAF implementation that is less demanding o inancial and human resourceswill be more suitable. The key point is that the EAF “way o thinking” can be adoptedin all cases.

What is crucial, however, is to realize that the various human dimensions – thesocial, economic and institutional aspects – will vary rom ishery to ishery. Whileinormation on these may be limited, they need to be taken into account as much aspossible, right rom the start, so EAF implementation can proceed in a easible andeective direction. Furthermore, on an ongoing basis, use o adaptive management andlearning processes, to build and improve EAF over time, can allow EAF systems toadjust over time, as new experiences and new knowledge become available.

It is worth noting in conclusion that there has been some progress in meeting thechallenge o EAF implementation, both in terms o moving towards an improvedunderstanding o social, economic and institutional aspects relating to isherymanagement (and EAF in particular), and in terms o developing tools and instruments

to improve management by taking this understanding into account. As noted earlier,eorts o countries to address aspects o EAF have arisen in three main categories:• Issue-based technically-oriented actions, such as reducing bycatch, increasing gear

selectivity, reducing harmul impacts o ishing gear, and protecting and restoringcritical habitats;

• Implementation o institutional changes as part o national EAF measures,such as increasing stakeholder involvement in isheries management, creatingmultidisciplinary and/or intersectoral advisory committees, and using community-based management tools; and

•Broadening national inormation systems to include actors such as ecosystemmodels, multidisciplinary inormation in risk assessments and cost-beneitanalyses, local and/or traditional knowledge, and participatory inormationsystems.

There is much still to be done globally to bring the human dimensions more ullyinto consideration in implementing EAF management. Nevertheless, there have




been many moves in this direction, and the momentum is building – with the clearrecognition that a better understanding and incorporation o the “people side" iscrucial to EAF implementation in isheries worldwide.



131

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Annex 143

C iiWhat is it?Closely related to conlict management, consensus building is the term used or anumber o collaborative decision-making techniques in which a acilitator or mediator

assists diverse or competing interest groups to agree on contentious policy issues,management objectives, or other matters or which consensus rather than majoritydecisions are being pursued. Visioning and collaborative problem solving are exampleso consensus processes (Susskind et al ., 1999). Consensus building tends to be a airlyinormal, but structured, process or discussing issues and sharing perspectives whilerespecting interests and seeking ways o working together or mutual beneit.

Why is it important?Similar to conlict management, consensus building plays an important role in helpingdecision processes to be more positive and productive. It can be employed prior to aconlict developing and hence reducing the need or conlict management. It is oten

essential to reach consensus rather than a majority decision when the dissenters havethe power to thwart the decision that they disagree with, or to instigate and uel levelso conlict that de-rail the process.

How is it used in EAF?In EAF, consensus building is especially important at the levels o policy goals andplan objectives where reaching harmonious agreement on big issues paves the wayor subsidiary agreements on numerous smaller technical and institutional issues. Forexample, an agreement on how agricultural and isheries development should meshwith tourism may set the stage or comprehensive watershed and coastal managementencompassing both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Without consensus at a higherpolicy level on how these economic sectors are either related or integrated, using and

interpreting sectoral perormance indicators could be diicult.

dpi tWhat is it?The city o Delphi was where people came to consult the oracle housed in Apollo’stemple who orecasted the uture. The purpose o the Delphi technique is to elicitinormation and judgments rom a group to acilitate problem-solving, orecasting,planning, and decision-making (Neuman, 1994). It oten involves paneling a group o experts on a particular topic to determine consensus on an issue. This method is usedboth or inormation acquisition and in process.

Why is it important?There are many variations o the Delphi method, and while some can be used inace-to-ace meetings, most seek to avoid physically assembling the experts. Instead,inormation is exchanged via email these days. This takes advantage o experts’creativity while acilitating group involvement and interaction. Delphi is designed toreap the beneits, but reduce the liabilities, o group problem-solving. This is importantin EAF because ordinary meetings o diverse experts with dierent disciplinarybackgrounds and academic or proessional status can be diicult to manage even witha acilitator. Such meetings are expensive to organize i the experts reside in dierentcorners o the world.

How is it used in EAF?The Delphi technique can be used in the EAF to overcome many o the constraintsassociated with getting the best available scientiic advice in the most cost-eectiveand eicient manner (Landeta, 2006). I, or example, expert opinion were required on




some aspect o ecosystem interactions at a particular site, a panel o careully selectedexperts would be assigned to answer a series o questionnaires in which the questionsare usually ormulated as hypotheses or propositions. Each round o questioningis ollowed with the eedback on the preceding round o replies, usually presented

anonymously. Thus the experts are encouraged to revise their earlier answers in light o the replies o other members o the group. During this process the range o the answerswill normally decrease, and the group will converge towards consensus. Ater three orour rounds the process is usually complete and the median scores determine the inaloutcome that relects the best available advice rom the group. Sotware is available tosupport the Delphi technique. It can be used at several points in policy, planning andmanagement cycles.

faciitatiWhat is it?As a critical supporting skill in SEI research with human subjects, acilitation helps

exchanges, meetings or decision-making to run smoothly and reach desirable ends.Facilitation, by itsel, does not mean problem-solving. The role o the acilitator is notto control a group or make the inal decision on anything. The acilitator is trainedto be responsible or ensuring that group processes are inclusive, productive, andeective.

Why is it important?Many o the policy and management planning processes in EAF involve groups o diverse stakeholders trying to resolve conlicts or reach decisions. It is useul to havea trained acilitator guide participants, and so reduce claims o lack o objectivity ortransparency (McConney et al ., 2003). The acilitator should have a eel or the social,cultural and institutional landscape, and possess the skills to work with diverse groups

o stakeholders and under sometimes very diicult circumstances, such as when thereis conlict. The skills and abilities are dierent to those o a chairman.

How is it used in EAF?It is used in all processes, such as a group o resource users, ishery and coastalmanagers, interests rom outside the isheries sector and environmental NGOs tryingto decide upon management or policy objectives at a national workshop. However,acilitation skills are also useul on the beach with a group o ishers in the midst o anargument with watersports operators about the use o coastal areas. The opportunitiesor use in EAF are numerous given the several groups involved. It is important to havea trained acilitator, who:

•

Distinguishes process rom content•Manages the client relationship•Prepares thoroughly or planning•Uses time and space intentionally•Evokes participation and creativity•Maintains objectivity at all times•Reads underlying group dynamics•Releases blocks to the process•Adapts to the changing situation•Shares responsibility or process•Demonstrates proessionalism•Shows conidence and authenticity•Maintains personal integrity



Annex 145

viiiWhat is it?Visioning is a group exercise, oten used in the initial stages o strategic planning andother goal-oriented processes, to deine and communicate to create a sense o shared

ownership a desirable uture.

Why is it important?It is important or stakeholders to actually see the end point o their eorts andnot only a path that may lead to it. The more stakeholders there are, the moreimportant it is to share a vision early in the process.

How is it used in EAF?Visioning provides a rame or reerence or strategizing the outcome that EAFstakeholders want to achieve. Vividly describing and then agreeing upon the con-ditions o the uture as i they could be seen in the present, makes easier to devise

the path (through mission, goals, objectives, activities and tasks).

InfoRmATIon ACQuIsITIon And dIssemInATIonInormation acquisition covers a variety o means o collecting and converting datainto inormation. It is oten the irst step in policy and planning processes such asthose described above. Inormation dissemination or communication is a similarlymultiaceted term used to describe means o communication to diverse audiences, otenby several channels, pathways and products (FAO, 2006b). Some agencies go a stepurther beyond outputs to address inormation uptake and knowledge mobilizationsuch as to produce management or policy outcomes.

At appi

What is it?An asset map is typically an inventory o the eatures and relationships o a communityas perceived by the people in that community (Guy et al., 2002). Mapping assetsinvolves:

• collecting an inventory o positive aspects o a community• ranking aspects o the community valued the most by members•determining why people place high value on certain assets in the community

Why is it important?Asset mapping provides a shared community view o what are the important assets o the entire community, highlighting interconnections among assets and revealing how to

access those assets such as or use in livelihood or coping or community developmentstrategies.

How is it used in EAF?An asset map can be used to devise collaborative strategize about how to build on assetsin order to sustain and enhance community development. The process is oten one o empowerment and reveals the relationships that communities have with ecosystems.

braitriWhat is it?Brainstorming is process or creatively generating many alternative ideas or solutionsor a speciic topic or problem. It can be used by individuals, but is oten a groupprocess. Ater ideas are generated they are oten categorized, discussed and prioritizedor urther analysis.




Why is it important?Good brainstorming exercises can produce very innovative ideas or solutions. It is anequitable method in that any person can participate. Criticism is not allowed duringbrainstorming and this ree lowing participation can also be useul or building

teamwork.

How is it used in EAF?Employed mainly in planning processes, brainstorming can quickly generate a serieso objectives and activities or closer examination aterwards. I the stakeholders arediverse the mix o ideas can be quite varied. The best ideas, “outside o the box”, maycome rom those who are not experts.

Cicati tratWhat is it?A communication strategy is a summary ramework that sets out, oten in a matrix

or table, the key elements and relationships o any initiative to share inormation toachieve expected outcomes. Elements typically include target audiences, objectives, keymessages, products and pathways with appropriate budgets.

Why is it important?Unless a strategy is devised, it is likely that simply disseminating inormation (suchas in technical reports or scientiic articles) will result in key audiences (e.g. policy-makers, resource users) being overlooked or not communicated with eectively. It isimportant to ensure that key stakeholder groups are kept inormed o progress andproblems with the EAF.

How is it used in EAF?

Especially during the early introduction o an EAF it will be necessary to keep allstakeholders well inormed, and inormation will need to be packaged in dierent waysto meet the needs o dierent audiences. Using a communication strategy will assist inclearly setting out who needs what inormation in what orm, and acilitate budgetingor it rather than leaving communication as an aterthought. Monitoring and evaluatingcommunication outcomes can be part o a participatory strategy to keep stakeholdersinvolved.

fc rpWhat is it?Focus groups are an interactive orm o group interviewing. Group interviewing

involves interviewing a number o people at the same time, the emphasis being onquestions and responses between the researcher and participants. Focus groupshowever rely on interaction within the group based on topics that are supplied by theresearcher (Morgan, 1997).

Why is it important?The ocus group is important in providing a means o collecting data that more closelyresembles daily interactive conversation and inormation sharing than the standardindividual interview, especially in some cultures. Oten a ocus group may be the bestway to solicit inormation when, or a variety o reasons, respondents may be reluctantto participate in individual surveys. Unlike the latter or simple group interviews,ocus groups encourage the respondents to react to each other, share knowledge, tradeopinions and so on, all without the obligation to reach a group decision or consensus.



Annex 147

How is it used in EAF?In EAF it may be useul to have a variety o stakeholders that meet the basic ocusgroup criteria or respondent selection gather to answer questions concerning, orexample, the multiple uses o a particular ree or estuary. They may have very dierent

views that will be revealed in the ocus group session without the need or a “correct”answer or to achieve consensus.

Itittia aaiWhat is it?Institutional analysis is the investigation o how ormal and inormal social rules(institutions) shape human behaviour. Institutional analyses ocus on how individualsand groups construct institutions, how institutions operate by patterns o interaction,how they are linked and the outcomes generated by institutions. As an exampleo institutional analysis the International Centre or Living Aquatic ResourcesManagement (ICLARM) and Institute or Fisheries Management and Coastal

Community Development (IFM) (ICLARM and IFM, 1998) developed a methodologyor institutional analysis that has been employed particularly or research into co-management arrangements and conditions or success (Figure Annex 1).

The set o contextual variables shown on the let describe the ishery system that,inluenced by external actors, results in incentives or ishery actors to interact or notin various patterns that have observable outcomes which eedback into the system thatis constantly adapting.

Why is it important?Without institutional analysis a clear understanding o the complex interactionsand relationships among the actors in isheries is not likely to be achieved. Thisunderstanding is even more important as EAF encompasses a greater number o actors

including those in other sectors.

How is it used in EAF?It is used in EAF to determine what institutions are involved in policy, planning andimplementation within the contexts o the key attributes o the ishery system. It

FIGURE ANNEx 1

mii IClARm/Ifm Itittia Aai a di Rarc frark

Environmental, ecological

and technical attributes

Market and other

economic attributes

Social, cultural and

political attributes

Stakeholder institutional and

organizational arrangements

External institutional and

organizational arrangements

Incentives to

coordinate,

cooperate

and contribute

Patterns of

interaction

among

stakeholders

O UT C OME S

Exogenous

factors

MODIFIED INSTITUTIONAL

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK




allows interventions to be designed, monitored and evaluated in a systematic ashionthat acilitates learning and adaptation. The main aspects o institutional analysisconducted within the ramework introduced above or investigating co-managementare as ollows (ICLARM and IFM, 1998).

• Institutional arrangements analysis: This links the contextual variables thatcharacterize key attributes o the resource and the resource users with managementinstitutions (ishery rights and rules). These arrangements and contexts aect howresource users and isheries authorities use incentives and penalties to coordinateand cooperate in resource governance, management and use. Incentives inluencethe patterns o interaction and behaviour o the co-management partners, i.e. thetype o co-management arrangement and how it unctions.

•Co-management perormance analysis: The co-management produces outcomesthat eedback to impact upon contexts and the behaviour o all stakeholdersincluding isheries authorities. Contexts that change over time may changeinstitutional arrangements. These aect incentives, patterns o interaction and

outcomes. Co-management outcomes can be evaluated in terms o managementeiciency, and the equity and sustainability o resource utilization. Analysingsuccessul outcomes is particularly useul or learning and adapting.

Participatr itri a aatiWhat is it?Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) involves the assessment o changethroughout processes that involve many people or groups, each o whom is aectingor aected by the impacts being assessed. Negotiation leads to agreement on howprogress should be measured and the indings acted upon. It is a challenging processor all concerned as dierent stakeholders must examine their assumptions about whatconstitutes progress – and together deal with the contradictions and conlicts that can

emerge (Guijt , 1999).

Why is it important?It promotes transparency and accountability while ensuring that the stakeholders andbeneiciaries are ully engaged in the initiative. Where there are signiicant dierencesin the perspectives or backgrounds o participants it allows or inormation exchangeocused on assessment in a way that may, by its objectivity, acilitate consensusbuilding.

How is it used in EAF?Within the policy and planning cycles PM&E can be used throughout implementation

or at particular milestones to assess progress particularly prior to taking decisions onadaptive management action. It is one o the methods that osters institutional andsocial learning and can contribute towards stakeholder empowerment.

Prt atWhat is it?Poverty assessment encompasses a diverse suite o tools used to measure the complexmultidimensional attributed o the state o relative deprivation deined in various waysas poverty with reerence to a standard such as the “poverty line”. The assessmenttools address matters o income, nutrition, health, power, services and other aspectso quality o lie, with areas o emphasis and approach (e.g. participatory or not) otendepending on the method, purpose and agency doing the assessment.






•mapping techniques;•diagrams and graphics; and•understanding processes and change.

Rik a raiit atWhat is it?Risk assessment is the term used to describe either a process or a product (o riskanalysis), used in risk management. Risk assessment essentially determines whether theprobability o a particular hazard, in relation to the severity o its impact, is consideredacceptable or not when compared to some standard or benchmark. It is employed toguide decision-making. When the emphasis is on vulnerability as a special attribute o risk it is termed vulnerability assessment.

Why is it important?Risk is a complex concept with a large perceptual component. It is important to

systematically assess risk, usually quantitatively but also qualitatively, so as to removesome o the subjectivity ound in the casual estimations o risk that people routinelymake. Vulnerability, the lip-side o resilience, is important or noting the weakest links(those even more at risk) in a chain or system.

How is it used in EAF?Decisions that utilize, or can beneit rom, risk and vulnerability assessment occur atall levels o policy and planning in an EAF. These assessments, used at the policy level,can assist in selecting policies that have the least problematic impacts on the poor orwomen, or example.

scia appi

What is it?Social mapping is a visualization technique closely related to stakeholder analysisand cognitive mapping. It allows stakeholders to draw maps illustrating theirinterrelationships and their relationships to natural resources or other eatures o aparticular location.

Why is it important?The importance o social mapping, like many other visualization tools, lies in theability to elicit inormation rom stakeholders in a ormat that is easily understood andshared. This can serve as the basis or ruitul discussions and decision-making.

How is it used in EAF?When dierent stakeholder groups (e.g. ishers and hoteliers), or people with dierentattributes within the same group (e.g. men and women) in an EAF each produce asocial map their outputs can be compared in workshop sessions to determine anddiscuss reasons or similarities and dierences. Since social maps relect perceptions,attitudes, belies and values the inormation shared can assist the various parties tounderstand each other better and assist researchers or planners to take these dierencesinto account in their work.

stakr aaiWhat is it?Stakeholder analysis helps to systematically determine who needs to be a partnerin the management arrangement, and whose interests are too remote to make thisnecessary. In doing this it also examines power, conlict, relative incentives and otherrelationships.



Annex 151

Why is it important?The importance o stakeholder analysis lies mainly in its ability to ensure that the manyactors in an EAF are properly identiied and characterized in terms o their interestsin the particular circumstance and some o their interactions that relate especially to

power. Without stakeholder analysis being done at the start o the policy and planningcycles it is likely that critical actors will be omitted rom the processes and that this willlead eventually to problems with the EAF. It is an important analytical tool that alsohelps to promote transparency.

How is it used in EAF?There is no single best method o stakeholder analysis. Situation-speciic common sensemust be applied. Special care must be taken to ensure that voiceless and disadvantagedgroups that may include women, youth, the elderly and poor people, are not excludedrom the analysis. Multiple group memberships are common, especially in smallcommunities. In such cases it will be necessary to be certain “who is speaking” at any

given time (McConney

et al ., 2003). Stakeholder analysis poses questions such as:•Who is directly aected by the problem situation being addressed?•What are the interests o various groups in relation to the problem?•How do groups perceive the management problem to aect them?•What resources do groups bring to bear (or good or bad) on the problem?•What organizational or institutional responsibilities do the groups have?•Who should beneit, or be protected rom, management interventions?•What conlicts may groups have with each other and management strategies?•What management activities may satisy the interests o the various groups?

sr tWhat is it?

Survey research is the collective term or a large variety o measurement methods inapplied social research that involve asking questions o respondents, oten combinedwith making observations (Converse and Presser, 1986). A survey method can rangerom a brie inormal interview yielding purely qualitative data to an intensive in-depth questionnaire that is highly quantitative in content and analysis. There aremethods or the scientiically rigorous treatment o both types o data. In addition, asurvey can elicit inormation rom the entire population o interest or may be basedon samples, the costs o which will depend on the population o interest and otheractors.

Why is it important?

Surveys present opportunities to elicit a great variety o data and inormationrom respondents that provide insight useul or problem-solving and decision-making. Dierent groups o people can be compared and contrasted over a range o conceptually relevant variables oten as part o hypothesis testing. Since managersinvolved in EAF will almost inevitable come across survey results, even rom othersectors, it is important that they understand the beneits and limitations o surveys,when they should or should not be used, and how they can be abused.

How is it used in EAF?In EAF, surveys are oten part o larger methodologies, such as socio-economicmonitoring and economic valuation. They can be part o any investigation in whichthe views o people or learning about their attributes are useul (Villareal et al ., 2004).This can start with basic demographic and socio-economic data available rom nationalpopulation and housing census surveys that tell how many people reside in or usethe area in which EAF will be introduced, and what their characteristics are. This




inormation can be used to design the policy and planning processes to ensure that allrelevant aspects o the human dimension are addressed.

Tract iara a ak

What is it?A transect diagram is a cross-section illustration o an area such as on a line runningrom the nearshore to some distance inland. Bio-physical, inrastructure and socio-economic eatures are inserted to show the social-ecological characteristics o thatsection. A walk along the transect can be used to either construct or validate it, orboth.

Why is it important?It is a useul low cost method or gathering and sharing inormation in which allstakeholders can participate.

How is it used in EAF?Transects o various parts o coastline can be used to enhance learning aboutecosystems. I digital photographs or measurements are taken, the transects can be usedin monitoring trends similar to ecological sampling stations. In this case the samplescan be o human activity. The walks can be used or both inormation acquisition anddissemination while planning in a participatory manner.

wrkp tWhat is it?Workshop method is the collective term or a suite o ways in which to get a groupo people, normally with the assistance o a acilitator, to participate actively andeectively in tasks such as visioning, strategic planning, problem-solving, reaching

consensus or other desirable end points.

Why is it important?The event o “holding a workshop” should have associated with it a structuredmethodology to reach a pre-determined end point. Even brainstorming is structured toprovide the latitude or creativity. It is not an unstructured process without rules. Henceit is important or isheries manager to be amiliar with various workshop methods andthe extent to which they can meet the requirements o the EAF processes.

How is it used in EAF?Workshops may occur in many parts o the EAF policy and planning cycles. For

example, a visioning workshop may be held at the start o the policy and planningcycles to construct a shared perspective on what a variety o stakeholders see beingput in place as a result o the implementation o EAF. Workshops are also an eicientway o sharing inormation with stakeholders as well as maintaining buy-in/interestthroughout the EAF process.



Documents

Fao-human Dimension of the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries