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Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi- sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke, Rodrigo Rodrigues MPI-SWS

Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP [email protected] Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

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Page 1: Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi-sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP [email protected]

Trusted Storage

Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke, Rodrigo Rodrigues

MPI-SWS

Page 2: Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi-sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP [email protected]

ApplicationDatabase

Complex storage system

Operating SystemNFS

Lines of code

50K-10M10-50M30-100K

10KNet ProtocolNet Driver 10K

Operating SystemNFS

File SystemDisk Driver

Bugs, exploits, operator error threaten data integrity, durability, confidentiality

File SystemDisk Driver

3rd-party storage service

Page 3: Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi-sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP [email protected]

Certificate:Full path namePolicyContent hashPhysical layoutAccess history

Policy:IdentityHW/SW ConfigurationQuotaTimeLocation

Trusted StorageTrusted primitives provided by storage device

ApplicationDatabase

Operating System

Trusted storage deviceEnsure data integrity, confidentiality, accountability

independent of higher software layers

File SystemDisk Driver

Page 4: Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi-sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP [email protected]

Example: Ensuring integrity of backup data

Threat:Software bug, virus or operator error corrupts online backup data

Time-based Policy: No writes before a pre-determined expiration date of the backup

Page 5: Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi-sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP [email protected]

Example: Ensuring integrity of executable files

Threat:Virus replaces executable file with a Trojan

Identity-based Policy: Disallow writes unless signed by vendorand version number is at least current - 1

Page 6: Feb. 16th 2012FAST’12 WiP vahldiek@mpi-sws.org Trusted Storage Anjo Vahldiek, Eslam Elnikety, Ansley Post, Peter Druschel, Deepak Garg, Johannes Gehrke,

Feb. 16th 2012 FAST’12 WiP [email protected]

Summary

• Trusted storage provides storage level accountability and enforcement of application policies

• Guarantees independent of higher software layers• Implementation in progress– 0.05% NAND flash memory– < 3% performance overhead

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