Felix Bautista Angelo - The Lawyer & the Independence of Our Judiciary

8/11/2019 Felix Bautista Angelo - The Lawyer & the Independence of Our Judiciary

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realm of judicial deliberation which may also serve as a guarantee tojudicial independence. These constitutional safeguards are the most im-portant.

Our Constitution establishes three important safeguards to secure the

independence of our judiciary: the immobility of our judges, the tenureof office, and the provision against any diminution of their salaries duringtheir continuance in office. These safeguards-it is felt-are sufficient toaccompli sh this fundamental purpose if respected and maintained in thespirit in which they have been conceived. They have served their pur-pose in jurisdictions where they have been similarly adopted and it ishoped that they w ill achieve the same purpose in this jurisdiction. Tokeep and preserve them inviolate is the paramount task of the SupremeCourt .

The precept of the immobility of judges is embodied in the follow-ing proviso: No judge appointed for a particular district shall be desig-nated or transferred to another district without the approval of the Sup-reme Court. The consensus of the bench and the bar is that thisprecept precludes any measure which may wrest from the SupremeCourt the privilege of determining the places to which judges may beassigned . The proposition to give this privilege to a representative ofthe Chief Executive has been assailed as violative of this constitutionalprovision, Such is the issue raised in a case decided by our SupremeCourt.s Judge Borromeo. a district judge was offered a promotion to

another district, but in so doing, his consent was not obtained. Ashe was ordered to move by the Secretary of Justice, he instituted quowarranto proceedings to test the validity of his transfer, and the Sup -reme Court upheld his stand. It was in the course of the decision thatthe Court in no uncertain terms condemned the obnoxious practice of , rigodon de jueces which in a sense tends to undermine the inde -pendence of the judiciary. With such practice, the Court remarked, Ajudge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney, orofficial, could, by the insistence of the disgruntled party, be removedfrom one district, demoted and transferred to another district. He isplaced at the mercy of the appointing power, and his only alternative to maintain his self-respect would be to vacate the office and leave theservice. Such practice should be avoided as it tends to destroy the in-dependence of our inferior courts. Thus, this constitutional precept hasbeen somewhat subverted with the establishment of the so-cal ed judgesat large or auxiliary judges who may be assigned to any district uponthe designation of the Secretary of Justice, but our lawmakers, consciousof this subversion, have at last attempted to propose a remedy in therecent judiciary revamp.

Art. VIII, Sec. 7, Constitution of the Philippines.2 Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil . 328 (1921) .


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THE LAWYER AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR JUDICIARY 659

An interesting incident has arisen in connection with the concept re -garding the tenure of office. This was brought about by the desire ofCongress to eliminate the positions of judge at large and cadastral judgesin the new judiciary revamp by converting their positions into districtjudges. The question that arose was: Can the incumbents be swept out

of office, reaardless of their tenure of office, simply because of the des ireof Congress to reorganize our judiciary? The case involves a clash o ftwo important provisions of our Constitution: one which gives to Con -gress the power to create, abolish, and reorganize our inferior courts ,and the other which guarantees to the incumbents a definite tenure ofoffice. The issue is of paramount importance, for, irrespective of itseffect on the parties affected, it may mean the consecration of the prin-

ciple which underlies the independence of the judiciary or the openingof the door to congressional interference which, no matter how lofty itspurpose, may spell its destruction. These two provisions are apparently

conflicting or contradictory, but because the prevalence of one may meanthe repudiation of the other, it is the bounden duty of the SupremeCourt to seek the way by which they could be harmonized and be given

force and validity to accomplish the vital purpose which they intend toserve,

Three different theories have been advanced regarding the power

of Congress to abolish an inferior court and terminate the tenure ofoftice of the judge presiding over that court . Some American courts

entertain the theory that Congress may abolish an inferior court because

of the principle that the power to create carries with i t the power toabolish, and that this power may be exerc ised without any restriction

in the sense that, once the court is abolished, any unexpired term of

the incumbent judge is deemed terminated.t

The second theory is that, although Congress may abolish an inferior

court , it can not, however , do so when its effect is to terminate the

tenure of office of the incumbent judge because such tenure is guaran-

teed by the Constitution.'

And the third theory entertains the view that Congress may abolish

a court and terminate the unexpired term of the judge provided thatthe abolition of the court is done in good faith. If immediately after

the office is abolished another office is created with substantia lly the

same duties and a different individual is appointed, or if it otherwise

appears that the office was abolished for personal or political reasons ,

the courts will intervene.

Which of these theories should be adopted by our Tribunal?

3 Cherokee County v. Savage, 32 So. 2d., 803 (1947) . Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Pa, 343. Garvey v. Lowell, 199 Mass 47, 85 N .E. 182 , 127 A .L.R . 468 (1908); State v .

Edward. 40 Mont. 287, 106 Pac. 695, 19 R .CL. 236 (1910).


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The first theory is unsound because it destroys the independe nceof t he judiciary and constitutes a direct attack against the te n u re ofoffic e g uaranteed by our Constitution. It is obnoxious because it placesstatuto ry courts at the mercy of Congress. This theory subve rt s the

found ation stone on which the stability of a constitutional fo rm ofgovern ment is based. It would spell the doom of democracy an d markthe ris e of oligarchy or other tyrannical forms of government . As C hiefJustice Snodgrass has aptly said, The only argument for the pre serva-tion of the (judicial) system is its constitutional establishment o v e r andagainst the power of the legislature to abolish it, when establishe d, dur-ing th e existence of any term. It is not a question of trusting th e legis-lature not to do it; it is a question of its power to do it, agai nst thepositiv e provision that those courts must exist by the preservative clausevesting in them the jurisdiction when created. No other con clusionmeets this difficulty, and no argument has been made or could be madewhich obviates it . 6

Th e second theory, while it respects the tenure ot office clause,howev er suffers from the infirmity that Congress cannot abolish a courteven unnecessary, or its purpose has been accomplished, simp ly be-cause of the barrier planted by the tenure of office. This is in imicalto a s ound and practical government for It would completely tie upthe h ands of Congress against constructive legislation. This is co ntraryto th e principle that where there is no court there cannot be an y such

office a s judge of such court, because the right to hold an officedepe n d s upon the existence of that office. This principle a d mits ofno arg ument. It is axiomatic. In such a case, tenure of office wouldonly be available as a defense if it is shown that the abolition of theotfice has been made for personal or political reasons. This wou ldbring us to the consideration of the third theory.

T his theory holds that the office of a judge may be abolis hed, butthat th e abolition be made in good faith. This is the middle groundbetwe en the two theories. While it allows the termination of t he term

of of f ice even if guaranteed by the Constitution, it however wa rn s thatthai : can only be done in good faith, or when necessary bec ause thepurp ose of the office has ceased to exist . At times this step may befound necessary in the interest of good government, as in the cases ofthe C ourt of Appeals and the People's Court. These courts wer e createdto f ill an imperative need and when this was met, they were a bolishedand th e incumbent judges swept out of office. No one has lifted afinger pointing to the unconstitutionality of such action. The se areinstan ces of abolition of an office or a judge for a good and sou nd pur-pose. This power of Congress has been impliedly recognized in t h e case

6 McCulley v. State, 102 Tenn., 509, 53 So., 184, diss. op.7 Perkins v, Corbin, 45 Ala., 102.


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of Zandueta v. De Ia Costa,S wherein, although the majority opin io n. d id not p a ss squarely upon the constitutionality of the Act reorgan izingthe courts of first instance, however, the concurring opinion of Ju s t ic eLaurel categorically upheld the constitutionality of said reorganiz a t io nact. Which of these theories should be adopted IS an issue which th e

S u pr e me Court is now called upon to determine m the important cas enow before it. 9

The provision aga inst d iminution of the salary of judges dur in gthe ir continuance in office has been the subject of interesting deba teso n the part of members of the bar and bench. The extent and scop eof t his prov ision have been brought to the fore in important ca s e s inth is jurisdiction and elsewhere. and one can see that while it has be enor igin a lly conceived as a safeguard against any attempt to encroach o nthe independence of the judiciary, yet it has been assailed many a ti m eu n der the cloak of financial necessity by placing judges on the sam e ootrng as ordinary citizens and, testing their sense of patriotism, b ymak ing them share their proportionate burden in the expense of theGovernment.

The first attempt was made in July, 1862 when a statute was passe dsu b ject ing the salaries of civil officers of the United States to an i n com etax of 3 per cent which revenue officers construed as including th eco m pensation of judges. Chief Justice Taney protested against such a nattempt invoking the principle of separation of powers and the ind e-pendence of the judiciary. The protest remained unheeded until i n

1869 when Attorney General Hoar rendered an opinion agreeing w it hthe Chief Justice. For half a century thereafter, the salary of judge swas not taxed as income.

In 1919, the attempt recurred when the Federal Income Tax A ctwa s approved providing therein that taxable income shall include t h ec o mpensation of all judges. Under such Act, Walter Evans, a Un itedS ta tes judge, was taxed and he sued to recover the tax paid under pro -te st. This gave rise to an epoch-making decision wherein for the f ir stt ime it was explained the purpose, history and meaning of the Const i-tut ion forbidding the impairment of judicial salaries even by way o f

In c ome tax.l?The issues that were posed before the court were:

With what purpose does the Constitutio .n provide that the

compensation of the judges shall not be diminished during their con -

tinuance in office? Is it prim a rily to benefit the judges, or ra ther

to promote the public weal by giving them independence wh ich makes

fo r an impartial and courageous discharge of the judicial function?

Does the provision mere ly forbid direct diminution, such as expressly

866 Phil . 615, (1938).9 The Supreme Court has ruled on the question. See Recent Documents section

of this issue.-Editor s note. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).


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reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per year, and

thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution , such

as withholding or calling back a part as a tax on the whole? Or does

it mean that the judges shall have a sure and continuing right to the

compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for his support during

his continuance in office, not that he may need have no apprehension

lest his situation in this regard may be changed to his disadvantage?

The particular need for making the judiciary independent was

pointed out elaborately by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalis t , No .

78, from which we quote:

At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer,

legislator, and chief justice, tersely said: 'Our courts are the balance

wheel of our whole constitutional system; and ours is the only con-

stitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional sys-

tems lack complete poise end certainty of operation because they lackthe support and interpretation of authoritative undisputable courts

of law. It is clear beyond all need of exposition that for the definite

maintenance of constitutional understanding it is indispensable, alike for

the preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the preservation

of the integrity of the powers of the government, that there should be

some non-political forum in which those understanding can be impar -

tially debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There

the individual may challenge the legality of governmental action and

have it adjudged by the test of the fundamental principles , and that

the test the government must abide; there the government can check

the too aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish itspower upon lines which all can comprehend and heed. The constitu-

tional powers of the courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of

individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It is in this

sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system;

it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights

and governmental powers which constitutes polit i cal liberty . '''

These considerations make it plain that the primary purpose of the

pr ohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges but , but like

th e clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to

the bench , and to promote that independence of action and judgm en tw h ich is essential to the continuance of the guaranties, limitations, and

pe rvading principles of the Constitution, and the administration of jus -

tic e w ithout respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor

and the rich. The independence of the judiciary was upheld once mo re.'

In 1939, foiled in their previous attempts, the revenue men per-

sist ed and succeeded in including in the Revenue Act of 1 93 2 a

cla use taxing the salary of judges taking office after JWle 6, 1932. This

att empt was made in the salary of Judge Joseph W. Woodrough . Thi s

tim e , the attempt of the revenue men succeeded for the Supreme C ourt

tu


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of the United States ruled against the judge, declaring that Congres sh ad the power to adopt the law.P The Court said:

To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of

judges w h o took office after Congress had thus charged them with

the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot

share of the cost of maintain ing the Government , is to trivialize thegreat historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of

Article 3, Section 1 . To subject them to a general tax is merely to

recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular func-

ti on in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with

their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose

Constitution and laws they are charged with admin istering.

That was the situation in the United States when in 1947 our o wnColl ec tor o f Internal Revenue required the late Justice Gregorio Perfec to

to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the Supreme Court. Asa l aw abiding citizen, he pa id the tax, but brought suit for its recove ry.The demise of Jus t ice Perfecto relieved his fellow members of the e m-barr assment of passing upon a claim of a colleague, yet adjudication m ay

not be decl ined even if he had survived because there is no other tribun alwhich may be called upon to make the adjudication.P Precedents arenot wanting in the United States where the Supreme Court has decid edsimil ar disputes affecting some members of the judiciary. The Suprem eCour t faced the issue frontally and courageously citing historical pre ce -dents and bec a use of the O'Malley decision it was thought that th e

case might be easy and the result could be taken for granted, but o ur

Cou r t did not toe the line; instead, it chose to stick to the doctrine lo ngsanc tified as a preservative measure of judicial independence by de -c lari ng that the O'Malley case did not cover the situation of judge sa lre ady in office but only of those who would assume office after thea ppr oval of the law. This was declared to be within the power ofCon gress, and in upholding for the first time the immunity of judge sfrom income tax, our Supreme Court said:

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution ifthey did not percei v e and block encroachments upon their prerogatives

in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries

is not a mere privilege of ju d g e s-personal and therefore waivable -

but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed inthe public interest.

Because of this veiled pronouncement that Congress may validly d e-clare by law that salaries of judges appointed thereafter are taxable asinc ome, Congress approved a law declaring in an unequivocal mann erth a t it is the desire of Congress to legalize the collection of income ta xon t he salaries of judicial officers, and that the payment thereof is n otto b e considered a diminution of their compensation as fixed by law or

12 O Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838 .1 3 Perfecto v. Meer, G.R. L -2348, Feb . 27, 1950.


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by the Cons t itu t ion . And armed wi th t his new w eapon , t he Col lec to rof I nternal Revenue proceeded to collect in come ta x o n the sal ariesof tw o just ices of our appellate court . A s i s to b e expe cted , th e se twounassum ing jud ic ial officers c a me to th e Suprem e Court for a id and

its de c ision was not to be long awaited. It decl a red the law vo id andunconsti tut ional not only because it is an invas ion of the well -definedand e s ta bl ished province and jurisdiction of the judiciar y but a fl agrantencroa chm e nt on the provision of the Constitut ion wh ich p ro tects thesalaries o f judges against d im inution during their continuance in o ffi c e. 14

O ur Court made this te r se pronouncement: '' We ha v e alr e a d y saidthat th e Legislature und e r our fo rm of governme n t is ass igned th e taskand th e pow er to make and enact laws, but no t to in terpret t h e m. Thisis mo re true w it h regard to the interpret ati on of th e b asic law. the Con-stituti on , w hi ch is not w ith in the sphere of the leg islat ive dep artment .If the L eg islature may declare what a law means, or what spec if ic por-tron o f the Constitution mea n s, es p e c iall y a f te r t he courts h ave in anactua l c ase ascertained its mea n in g by interpretation and app li e d it ina decisio n . this w ould surely cause confusion and i n st a b il ity in judicialprocess e s and court de ci s ions. x x x That w ould b e n e ither wisenor de s ir able, bes ide s clearl y v io la tiv e of the fu n d a me ntal prin c iples ofour con sti tution a l system of govern m ent, particul arl y tho s e co v er ing theseparati on of powers .

J u d g es had been a s s ail ed as l ac king in p a tr iot ism bec a u s e o f their

defiance of the la w r e moving this exempt ion from inco m e tax us ing-s othey say -the C on s ti tu t ion as a sh ie ld. But the exe m p ti on is n o t en -joyed by the m e mbers of the Supreme Cou r t al one bu t a lso e xtendedto o th e r const i tu ti onal officers like the President of the Repub li c , theAuditor Gener al , the members of the Commission on E le ctio n s , and pos -sibly th e m em ber s of the Bo a rd of Tax A ppeals, Publ ic S ervi c e Com-mission, and Cou r t of Industri a l Relations . This exe m p tio n is als o en-joyed by jud g e s of first inst a nce, municipal judges , a nd justice s o f thepeace . Consider ing exemption in the abstr a ct, there is nothing u n u sualor for eign in i t , as long as it is based on publ ic pol ic y and so cial in-terest . And as to tax exempt ion, there are not a fe w w ho e njoy thisexemp tion. Pe r sons, natural or juridical, are exempted from ta xes ontheir l ands , bu ildings and improvements w hen u s ed exclu s ive ly fo r edu-cati onal purposes. Holders of government a l bonds are exempt e d fromtax .o n the in c ome or interest they rece ive ther e from. P aym e nts ofany in come rece ived by any person residing in the Ph il ippine s und e r th elaws of the United States administered by the U n ited S ta tes V eteransAdmi n istration are exempted from taxation. Funds received by offi-cers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Ar med

14 En d encia v . Dav id, G.R . No s. L - 6 3 55 6356 , Aug. 31 , 1953; 49 O.G . (11),482.


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F orces of the United States are exempted from taxation for a certa innumbe r of years. In other words, for reasons of public policy and soc ialin terest, a citizen may, justifiably, by constitutional provision or statute ,be e x empted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his incom e.U n der the same public policy, and perhaps for the same if not highe r

c o nsideration, the framers of the Constitut ion deemed it w ise and ne-c es sary to exempt judicial office rs from p a y ing taxes on the ir sa lar ie ss o as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the inde -pe ndence of the judiciary. And so jud icial independence once mo retriu mphed in this jurisd iction.

What c a n t h e l aw yers do to maintain and preserve inviolate th isind e pe n dence of the jud iciary? A lawyer is not only a public offic erw ithi n the statutory meaning of the term, but an officer of the cour tex e rcis ing a privilege or a franchise. His office is indispensable to theadministr a tion of justice and he holds a peculiar re lation to the we l l-

b ein g of the court. The obligation of a lawyer when he is admi t te dto th e bar is not simply to be obed ient to the Consti tution and law s,b ut t o maintain at all t imes the respect due to the courts of just ic ea nd to jud icial officers. The rules of court make it the du ty of a law-y e r t o ma intain the respect due to the courts of justice and jud ic ialoff icers. 1 5 While the lawyer owes entire devotion to h is client, h isd uty to the courts is no less sacred, and can only be maintained b yre n dering such serv ice which would accord to it high respect and ut -mo st consideration. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and mor aldu ty to help build the h igh esteem and respect towards the courts soesse n tial to the proper adm inis tration of justice.

The Canons of Profession a l E thics contain the following resum eof th e duties of the l aw yer to the courts: It is the duty of the law y e rto mai ntain towards the courts a respectful atti tude, not for the s ak eo f the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the mai n-te nance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free tod e fe n d themselves, are pecu li ar ly entitled to rece ive the support of th eba r against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper groundfor s erious complaint of judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the

la w y er to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In suchcases, but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and theperson making them should be protected.

The task of our judges in ma intaining an unsullied and independentjud ic iary is pregnant w it h unpleasant expe r iences. Theirs is an ordealw h ic h requ ires patien c e a nd endurance. They are placed in a pred ica -m e nt where they are c a lled upon to listen to an array of conflictingwitnesses bent on impress ing them with their testimony whether trueo r f ab r icated. They need the wisdom of Solomon to discern the truth

15 Rule 127, Sec. 19 (b) .


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from the fake and in this task they have to muster all their re se rv oi ro .{knowledge and experience. They are even subjected, much to t heirdiscomfort, to the ordeal of li s tening to a tedious and vexatio us c ro ss -exam ination . But they suffer all this with patience and perseveranceeven at the peril of their health because of their earnest des ire to f in d

out the truth . And when they pass judgment upon the contro v ersy t h elosing party who cannot see eye to eye with the Judge can s til l fi n dreason to impute an unholy motive to his situation . It seems na tural for litig a nt to feel distressed in the face of adversity, but it is u n k in d forhim to dispa rage against t h e Judge. Much of this unpleasant e xperi e nc ecan be assuaged throu g h counsel and enlightenment on the p art o f th emembers of the bar.

Judges are human and may err in their appreciation of the e vi denceand in the application of the law. This is unavo idable in th e m ass n f

legal and hum a n problems th at are presented before them for det e r -mination. Th is shortcoming is but the result of human frailt ies an d themultifarious vic is si tudes co n fronting our judges. But while jud ges ma yerr in the ir ac tuatio n s, litigan ts are not justified in criticising them be-cause their remedy is to a ppeal from their decisions. Judges are pre-sumed to h a ve acted in good faith and in accordance with t h e ir con -science and their conviction. and the litigant who disputes their cha rac te rand probity should bring them to the corresponding authorities for of fi c ia linvestigation. But they a re not justified in criticising them, muc h l e s sexposi n g them to public co n tempt and ridicule. Sound rules o f et hics

do not sanction such a step as it would only tend to undermine the faithoi the peop le i n the a dministration of justice.

Jud g es should not begrudge any crit icism of their dec is io n a fte rthey had become fin a l p rovided it is made in the proper sp irit an dwith in the bounds of propr iety. Sound and constructive crit icism sh ou ldbe we lcomed, for that is conducive to a sound administra tio n o f jus-tice, but the criticism should not be contemptuous nor cas t a spe rs ion011 the integrity and character of the judge. The members of the barwould do well in keeping in mind this line of distinction to avo id un-pleasant incidents as the one which was recently brought befo re theSupreme Court for determination .

Of late, there seems to be a tendency on the part not o nl y ofregular newspapers, but also of those published in the tablo id fo rm, tocritic ize decis ions of courts regardless of whether they are st ill pe n d-ing or have not yet re a ched their final stage, which either place the pa r -ties in some embarras si ng situation or cast an unsavory reflectio n agai ns tthe judge who has rendered them. Such newspaper criticisms a re notallowed by the rules of ethics because they may interfere w ith a f airtrial and due adm inistration of justice. Generally, they are condemned

or looked at with disfavor. It is true that the constitutional guarante e


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of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent,hut license of abuse or liberty of the press and of the citizen should notbe confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the main-tenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the

citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. 16The same attitude should be observed in connection with the con-

duct of bar examinations by our Supreme Court. . As you well know,a committee of examiners is constituted every year, under the c h a ir-manship of a member of the Supreme Court, to conduct the examina-tion. The selection is made by the Court itself from a list of distinguishedmembers of the bar. The selection is made with utmost care and cir-cumspection, and yet during or immediately after the examinations younow and then come across with some notorious headlines exposing, w ithor without ground or evidence, or merely based on rumors or gos s ips,the commission of some - irregularities. Naturally, such publication cau s esalarm or creates in the mind of the readers an adverse reaction to thecleanliness or regularity in the conduct of examinations and, in the lastanalysis, the victim is the Supreme Court for it is its prestige that isplaced on trial at the bar of public opinion. And yet, when the caseis investigated, the publisher would merely come across with the flimsyexcuse that under the Sotto law he cannot be compelled to reveal thesource of his information. Such is not the way of a barrister worthyof his name. A barrister should not sacrifice truth for technicality.

Publications of this nature, even if their purpose is to serve the interestof the paper, should be avoided because they are not only unfair andunjust but tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the peoplein the Supreme Court as regards the conduct of bar examinations. Mern-bers of the bar should rally behind the Court when it is unjus t ifi a blyassailed to the end that its name may be preserved and the court mayremain always as the citadel of public jus t ice and public security, andthe last bulwark of democracy in our country.

I will close with the following warning of a great jurist: If ourconstitutional form of government is to survive and the fundamental

rights of the people are to prevail, there must be support and re s pectfor the judiciary on the part of the people and the government, and itmust be kept firm and strong so that it may withstand the most severeassaults of passion or malevolence and thus preserve sacred and in-violate those rights and Uberties without which life is not worth living .

ln re Sotto, 46 O.G., (6), 2574.17 R .A. No. 53.