Fetal Death, Fetal Pain, and the Moral Standing of a Fetus

North American Philosophical Publications

Fetal Death, Fetal Pain, and the Moral Standing of a FetusAuthor(s): Stephen GriffithSource: Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 115-126Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435909 .

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Public Affairs Quarterly Volume 9, Number 2, April 1995

FETAL DEATH, FETAL PAIN, AND THE MORAL STANDING OF A FETUS

Stephen Griffith

continues to be controversial, but there is nevertheless an "established" view. This view is reflected in American law, most

prominently in the celebrated "Roe vs. Wade" decision of the United States Supreme Court, and in the writings of a clear majority of opinion-makers in both journalism and academe. It is for the most part the view charac- terized by Sumner as the "liberal" view of abortion, according to which a fetus has "no moral standing."1 On this view, "a fetus is not the kind of

entity whose rights or interests are properly taken into consideration in determining the morality of abortion." Abortions "require no special justification," because "the only party whose rights or interests are at stake is the pregnant woman." Those who oppose abortion, on the other hand, tend to claim that a fetus is a person, so that it is extremely difficult if not

impossible to justify abortion in most cases. These opponents of abortion

may be right, but I shall argue only that the fetus does have some moral

standing (whether or not it is a person with rights) which must be taken into account in determining the morality of abortion. In late abortions, the fetus has some such standing simply because we have good reason to believe that it is a sentient being and is thus capable of feeling pain, and in all abortions it has some such standing simply because it is a living being with a life of its own.

At what point in its development does a fetus become sentient?2 Al-

though neurophysiological facts concerning fetal development are clearly relevant here, it is important to realize that this is ultimately a philosophical question which requires us to begin by distinguishing between behavioral, neurophysiological, and subjective accounts of pain, according to which pain is to be defined in terms of behavior, neurophysiological states, or subjective feelings, respectively. One difficulty with a purely behavioral account of pain is that we know from our own experience that we are

capable both of feigning and of masking pain, so that there is not a one-to- one correspondence between pain itself and its most common behavioral manifestations. The difficulty with a purely neurophysiological account is

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that it does not appear to be empirically testable, especially among creatures who are incapable of understanding, much less indicating to us, that they are in pain. How can we empirically verify that pain (in the subjective sense) occurs within an organism when and only when its central nervous system is in such-and-such a state if the only thing we can observe is that state itself?

This difficulty need not be worrisome for practical purposes when we are dealing with highly developed organisms which are sufficiently mature physically. In these cases, it seems reasonable to assume that if an organism responds behaviorally to an external stimulus in the same way that we would respond if that stimulus were to cause us pain, then that organism is also feeling pain. It is especially reasonable to assume so if there is no reason to suppose that this response is a deliberate attempt to deceive. Otherwise, we would never learn how to use the word "pain" ourselves, since no one would ever know when to tell us that we were experiencing it. But for relatively primitive or immature organisms, the situation becomes much more problematic. Do insects, for example, feel pain? They exhibit some of the same behavioral tendencies which we exhibit toward certain sorts of sensory stimulation, which would suggest that they do, and yet their "nervous systems," if we can even call them that, are quite different from ours, and much less highly developed, which might lead neurophysiologists to believe that they do not.

With regard to a human fetus, we know that at some stage of its development, prior to the stage at which some abortions are performed, the fetus exhibits brain activity and responds to tactile stimulation, and these responses are similar to those responses that more highly developed organisms exhibit when they experience pain. Although this does not prove that such a fetus experiences pain, it does at least suggest that it might. More- over, there are at least two additional points to be considered here. The first, which pertains to a neurophysiological account of pain, is that for any physical phenomena which occur in varying degrees of intensity, such as those which neurophysiologists tend to associate with subjective feelings of pain, and for any empirical means of detecting such phenomena, there is a threshold below which those phenomena are undetectable by that means. Although we may not be justified in assuming that there are subjective phenomena associated with such undetectable physical phenomena, neither are we justified in assuming that there are not, especially if we assume that such a connection obtains when these physical phenomena are detectable. In other words, even if we are justified in associating or iden- tifying subjective feelings with certain neurophysiological occurrences or states, our inability to detect any such occurrences or states in some particular case does not necessarily imply that these feelings do not then occur.



THE MORAL STANDING OF A FETUS 1 1 7

The second consideration, which pertains to a behavioral account of pain, is that, for all we know, any subjective states which have behavioral manifestations can and probably do occur at an earlier stage of development than these manifestations themselves. Thus, the subjective experience of pain could antedate its initial behavioral manifestation. It is not unrea- sonable to assume that an organism might be able to feel pain before it has

developed sufficiently to be able to respond behaviorally to that pain in a

way characteristic of more mature members of its species. If an infant can

experience pain without being able to verbally express that fact, then why not assume that a fetus might be able to experience pain without being able to exhibit those sorts of pain-behavior characteristically exhibited by infants, such as crying and avoidance behavior?

Given the relevant information concerning some of the more common methods of performing abortions, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for

relatively late abortions, that is, those performed in the second or, very rarely, the third trimester, significant fetal pain occurs.3 It also seems reasonable to conclude that we are not justified in assuming that our inability to observe any behavioral manifestations of pain or to detect those neuro-

physiological structures and phenomena thought to be associated with feel-

ings of pain in mature individuals implies that pain does not occur when abortions are performed at earlier stages. It does seem that the likelihood of significant fetal pain diminishes the earlier an abortion is performed, but we should not be too confident that we know exactly at what stage of fetal

development fetal pain is possible nor how intense this pain might be. The

important point here is that a human fetus quite probably becomes sentient, and thus gains moral standing, sometime prior to the stage of fetal devel-

opment at which some abortions are performed. A second consideration which confers moral standing on a human fetus

is that it is a living organism having a life of its own. This might seem

obvious, but those who condone abortion sometimes maintain that a fetus is nothing but a "piece of tissue" which happens to be implanted in a woman's body, a piece of tissue which she can deal with as she sees fit. If this is true, abortion is nothing but the surgical removal of unwanted tissue.4 The advantage of describing abortion in this way, from the point of view of those who condone abortion, is that we need not mention death. The

"piece of tissue" is not killed; it is simply "removed." The difficulty here is that this way of speaking is not intellectually defensible. Although it is true that a human fetus is composed of living tissue, this much would be true even if a fetus were simply a part of a woman's body, such as her

appendix or her hand. But if a fetus were simply a part of a woman's body, it would be "alive" only in a derivative sense. Its "life" would not be its own. Just as, in the Aristotelian sense, my hand is a part of me (or of my body), only because it is physically connected in the appropriate way to the



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rest of my body (and functions like a hand?), so too my hand is "alive"

only because it is a part of me (or of my body) and I am alive. If I were not alive, my hand would not be alive either (unless it were to become, by means of advanced surgical techniques, someone else's hand), and if my hand were to become permanently severed from my body (and all other human bodies) it would thereby no longer be alive.

To sever a hand, however, is not to kill it; it is simply to render it lifeless. To sever a hand is not to take a life, for the hand did not have a life of its own to take. The only life my hand has in any sense of the term is my life, and to sever my hand is not necessarily to take my life nor any other life. Severing my hand might causally bring about my death, but it need not do so, and even if it did, the only death which would occur would be my death, not the death of my hand. The severed hand would then be lifeless simply because it had been severed, and my other hand would be lifeless because I would be lifeless, but neither hand would have been killed.

A human fetus differs from a human hand in this respect. A human fetus has a life of its own. It does receive its sustenance entirely from the mother, but not its life. The life of a fetus is sometimes causally but never conceptu- ally dependent on the life of the mother. Although the mother's hand is "alive" only because it is a part of the mother's body (and she is alive), a human fetus does not "borrow" its life in this way. It is both logically possible and technologically feasible to produce so-called "test-tube babies" which develop from the moment of conception in what might be called an artificial placenta or womb. Such babies would be alive, but from whom (or what) would they "borrow" their lives? Their inability to sustain their own lives (or perhaps even to try) does not imply that they would not have lives of their own.

The possibility of test-tube babies shows that a fetus need not be "viable" in order to have a life of its own. To say that a fetus is "viable" is

normally taken to mean that it is capable of surviving "on its own" outside of the mother's body, without receiving any sustenance from her. Con-

versely, to say that a fetus is not viable is ordinarily taken to mean that it is not capable of surviving outside the mother's body. There is a sense, however, in which all animate organisms depend on other living things, since they must regularly consume "organic" material in order to survive. This dependency obviously does not imply that they are not living things. Parasites, for example, are living organisms having lives of their own, and some parasites spend their entire lives totally dependent on one particular host. Thus, the fact that a human fetus depends entirely on the mother for its survival during the first two trimesters of pregnancy does not imply that a fetus does not then have a life of its own.

To prove conclusively that a human fetus has a life of its own, it would




probably be necessary to define both the concept of "life" and the concept of an "organism" more precisely, but for the purpose of this paper, it is

probably sufficient to note that a living human fetus seems to have every feature which is normally thought to be essential to any sexually repro- duced living organism. In particular, a human fetus has a full complement of chromosomes and is genetically programmed to develop into a mature human being without any prescriptive or informational "input" from external sources. I therefore conclude that a living human fetus, unlike the various parts of a living human body, has a life of its own, so that abortion is not just the destruction or alteration of living tissue, but is the destruction of a living thing, the taking of a life. This fact should not be obscured, as it often is, by referring to abortion cosmetically as the "termination of a

pregnancy." So far I have argued that at some stage of development prior to that at

which late abortions are performed, a human fetus has moral standing sim-

ply because we have good reason to believe that it is a sentient being, and that all human feti have some such standing simply because they are living beings with lives of their own. But why? It would be beyond the scope of this paper to argue these points in detail, but I shall mention and attempt to give some intuitive backing for two principles which support this conclusion. To say that a being has moral standing is simply to say that the overall effect that a particular course of action has on that being is one of those things which must be taken into account in determining the morality of that course of action. In particular, it is to say that it would be at least

prima facie wrong to do anything which has a detrimental overall effect on that being. I shall take it as a fundamental moral principle that it is

prima facie wrong to inflict pain. I shall also take it as a fundamental moral principle that it is prima facie wrong to kill things. The point here is not that it is necessarily wrong to inflict pain or to take a life. The point is that taking the life of or inflicting pain upon any sort of creature requires moral justification. With regard to killing, suppose that a small boy is about to amuse himself by attempting to smash a toad on the sidewalk with a hammer. Many of us would be inclined to discourage this sort of behav-

ior, presumably on moral grounds. If we ask this boy to refrain from this

behavior, he might ask us why, and there are many reasons which we might give, but one natural response would be simply to say "because the toad is a living thing." The appropriateness of this response seems to suggest that the mere fact that the toad is a living thing is a reason, though not a

conclusive one, for not smashing it, a reason which is independent of any other reason we might have. If, for example, the boy attempts to justify his behavior by claiming that the toad will not feel any pain (because its death will be instantaneous) or that it will not be fearful (because he will ap-



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proach it stealthily from behind), this might make it easier to justify his behavior, but it would not obviate the reason which we have already given, a reason which still counts against his smashing the toad. Since this reason does not depend in any way upon any feature of the toad other than the fact that it is a living thing, it would seem that we would have the same reason for not killing any living thing whatsoever, although we would usually have additional reasons for not killing (or possibly for killing) that thing as well. But this is just another way of saying that living things, just because they are alive, have some moral standing.

Concerning pain, most would agree that it should not be inflicted upon persons without justification, but it is difficult to see why the same principle should not be extended to any creature capable of feeling pain.5 Any morally decent person would surely agree that it is wrong to torture animals for fun, but if, as a purely intellectual exercise, he or she were to ask why, it would suffice to say simply "because the animals are feeling pain." Thus, for example, if the youngster in our previous example were about to amuse himself by sticking the toad with a pin, we would probably be inclined to discourage him from doing this also, and the reason stated above is one reason we could give. In other words, if the infliction of pain were the only effect an action had, then the action would be wrong, so that even when it is not the only effect, the fact that it causes pain still counts against doing it. This is true even though there might be other effects which out- weigh this effect and thus ultimately render the action morally justifiable.

Notice that we can legitimately give this reason even if we are not able to prove that the toad would feel pain. The mere logical possibility that it might would not be sufficient. However, given the previously mentioned difficulties concerning the ascription of pain to immature or primitive organisms, it is prudent to assume that such an organism feels pain in circumstances which would produce pain in a more mature or highly developed organism unless we have an adequate reason for believing that it does not. In other words, if we have any reason at all to believe that doing a certain thing might cause pain, and no stronger reason to believe that it will not, we have a moral reason, though not necessarily a conclusive one, for not doing that thing. Thus, in order to determine the morality of any action which produces pain on the part of any organism, we are morally required to take that pain into account, and this is just another way of saying that the organism has moral standing.

Abortion necessarily involves the deliberate killing of a living human fetus, a being which is sometimes sentient and always has a life of its own. If fetal death were not one of the intended consequences of abortion, we would not refer to one of those rare instances in which a fetus survives the various medical procedures involved merely as an attempted abortion, nor would we regard these procedures as not completely effective in such




cases, but we do. Given the two principles alluded to above, it follows that abortion itself is in need of moral justification, whether a fetus is or is not a person. But at this point, we might say the same of swatting flies or of the practice of slaughtering animals for food. Both of these activities involve killing living creatures and possibly causing them pain, and yet most of us do not regard these activities as immoral. The point here is that nothing which I have said so far necessarily implies that abortion is immoral. I have argued only that abortion is in need of justification, not that no such justification can be given.

What role can the considerations introduced in this paper play in an attempt to determine the morality of abortion? If abortion were simply a matter of removing some part of a woman's body under anesthesia, which it is not, no death would occur, no pain would be inflicted, and there could be no objection to abortion based on these considerations. Moreover, if new medical techniques were developed which enabled physicians to guar- antee that no fetal pain occurred in abortions, fetal pain would no longer be an issue, even if a fetus is sentient, and if techniques were developed which made it possible to transplant a human fetus into another potential "mother" or into an "artificial womb" without serious risk of fetal pain or death, neither fetal pain nor fetal death would be an issue, since in this case the moral standing of the fetus would have been taken into account. But since abortion as now practiced involves killing and possibly inflicting pain upon a fetus, it can only be justified to the extent that we can justify killing and inflicting pain upon living creatures in general, and the question becomes one of determining the extent to which and the circumstances under which this would be morally permissible.

Whenever we attempt to justify inflicting pain or death upon a living creature, there are two things which we tend to take into account. The first is that failure to inflict pain or death upon one creature would be (or would be likely to be) to bring about the inconvenience, pain, or death of some other living creature. Thus, for example, some animals are slaughtered for food, presumably because such food is thought to be necessary or at least beneficial to the life and health of human beings and other animals; preda- tors are often killed to protect domestic livestock, which are in turn to be used for food; some living organisms (such as rats and mosquitoes) are killed to prevent diseases which might bring about the pain or death of human beings or other animals; and some animals are slaughtered simply for convenience, as when they are killed for their skins. (It is also true that animals are sometimes killed or maimed simply for pleasure, but this is at best a dubious justification for doing so, if it is any justification at all.)

The second is that there is a sort of hierarchy among living creatures which, together with the sorts of justification mentioned above, gives rise to a set of priorities which may be used in deciding when it is morally



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permissible to inflict pain or death upon a living creature. Thus, for example, we might kill a poisonous snake to protect a dog, but we would seldom kill a dog to protect a poisonous snake. We might kill a flea to prevent or alleviate the discomfort of a dog, but we would never provide a dog for a flea even if it were necessary for the survival of the flea. Thus, if we must choose between the life of one creature and the life of another creature of a different sort, we might justify our choice by claiming that one of the creatures has greater moral standing than the other. We might even claim that the moral standing of one sort of creature is so much higher than another that we can justify killing the latter simply to prevent the pain or discomfort of the former. It might sometimes be very difficult to make a decision of this sort, of course. Suppose, for example, that we must choose between the life of a dog and that of a cat, or between the life of a fish and the pain of a cat? The point here is not that there is a precise, complete, and determinate hierarchy or set of priorities which will always enable us to reach a correct decision in such cases. The point is simply that, whenever we attempt to make such decisions, we are likely to appeal to these considerations, among others. If we now ask how such considerations apply when human beings are involved, most of us would presumably agree that human beings are the highest form of life, so that if we must choose between the life of a human being and that of another sort of creature, we would nearly always prefer to preserve the human life.6 Moreover, we would often be willing to kill and inflict pain upon non-human creatures simply to avoid or prevent the pain of a human being. Mosquitoes, for example, might be destroyed even if they were not a threat to health, simply because they are an annoyance. Concerning higher forms of life, the grounds for doing so would presumably have to be stronger, but a vicious dog, for example, might be destroyed simply because it had inflicted pain upon human beings, even if there were little likelihood that it posed a threat to human life itself. Ultimately, however, we must ask the following question: Are human beings so superior to other forms of life that we are morally justified in inflicting pain and death upon non-human creatures for any and every conceivable human purpose? If not, where do we draw the line? It seems to me that there is a limit to the amount of suffering and death that we can justify inflicting in any given case, and it depends on the moral standing of the creature in question and on the nature of the human purpose involved. I do not know of any reliable principle which could be used to determine exactly where the limit lies in any given case, nor do I intend to propose one, but it might be helpful to discuss some specific examples.

Let us suppose that the family dog has gradually become a serious nuisance. Suppose, for example, that although it never bites, scratches, or jumps on people, and thus poses no threat of bodily injury to anyone, it is



THE MORAL STANDING OF A FETUS 123

nevertheless a nuisance in that it constantly barks, refuses to be housebro- ken, and is destructive of furniture, clothing, and other household items. What sort of remedial action would be morally justified in response to this sort of behavior? Some people might readjust their values and their life- styles to accommodate such behavior and regard it simply as part of the price of owning a dog. Others might attempt to minimize the destructive effects of the dog's behavior by purchasing more durable furniture or con- fining the dog in some way. Still others might attempt to modify the dog's behavior by training or discipline which might involve inflicting certain amounts of pain on the dog in certain circumstances. This much, at least, most of us would regard as justifiable (indeed, we might respond in the same way to our own children in some cases). Let us suppose, however, that these methods all prove to be ineffective, and that the continued pres- ence of the dog constitutes a serious threat not only to our lifestyle, but to our mental health as well. What further steps could we justify?

In the first place, we might simply send the dog away, to another household or to a humane society. As a last resort, if no other home could be found, we might reluctantly decide to have the dog destroyed by a veteri- narian, in a way which is presumably painless for the dog. If no veterinar- ian were available, or if it were too costly to dispose of the dog in this manner, we might simply shoot it, which would again be relatively painless for the dog. Could we, however, justify any action more severe than this? Could we justify, for example, inexpertly stabbing the dog with a kitchen knife until we manage to kill it? Could we justify poisoning the dog in a way which did not bring relatively instant and relatively painless death?7 Could we justify dousing the dog with gasoline and setting it afire?

I do not wish to claim that if we arrange these possible courses of action in order of increasing severity, we will be able to agree upon a definite point beyond which the proposed courses of action cannot be justified and

prior to which they can. I do wish to claim, however, that for any person having any moral sensitivity whatsoever, there will be some limit beyond which he would not regard the proposed course of action as justifiable in this case.

What this suggests is that there is a limit in any given case to the amount of pain and death which can be justifiably inflicted on living creatures for the sake of human convenience and mental health. As previously mentioned, this limit depends partly on (1) the moral standing of the creature which is "inconvenienced" (in this case, a human being), and (2) the moral standing of the creature upon which pain or death is inflicted. It should now be obvious that this limit will also depend on (3) how much inconvenience there will be if nothing is done, and (4) the amount of pain which must be inflicted to remove the inconvenience, either by killing this creature or by transforming its behavior. Finally, this example also seems to




suggest that a particular course of action is justified only if there is no other course of action which would also remove the inconvenience but have less serious consequences to the creature in question. In other words, other things being equal, it would seem that (1) the creature should not be destroyed unless absolutely necessary for the purpose in question, and that (2) whether it is destroyed or not, whatever we do should be done in the least painful way.

How does all this apply to abortion? It would seem that the first question to be considered concerns the relative moral standing of the fetus. We have assumed, for the sake of argument, that a fetus is not a person. If a fetus were a person, then killing it or inflicting pain upon it would have to be justified in exactly the same way that we might attempt to justify killing or inflicting pain upon persons in general. If, however, a fetus is not a person, what then? How does a fetus compare to a dog or an earthworm? In the first place, one might note that if a fetus is not a person, then it is presumably inferior to a person. Thus, other things being equal, we should prefer fetal death to the death of a person, and fetal pain to the pain of a person. The crucial point to notice here, however, is that a fetus, even if it is not a person, will eventually develop, under favorable conditions, into a person.8 Although this fact alone may not elevate the status of a fetus to that of a person, it certainly does elevate it to a considerable degree. If so, then a human fetus, because of its potential for further development, has greater moral standing, at any stage of its development, than any creature which will never reach a level of development superior to that of the fetus at that stage, and its moral standing is probably also higher than that of some creatures which have already reached a higher level of development but do not have the capacity to develop any further. Thus, even if a fetus is not a person, its moral standing approaches that of a person as it develops, and is always higher than it would be solely as a result of its actual development at any given stage because of its potential for further development. This may also help to explain why there is a tendency to feel that it is more difficult to justify abortion at later stages of pregnancy.

We can now draw some tentative conclusions concerning the morality of abortion. I believe we can agree that if a fetus is a person, abortion is homicide and requires a very strong moral justification. In this paper, I have argued that even if a fetus is not a person, abortion is still in need of moral justification because it involves killing and possibly inflicting pain upon a living creature which is a relatively high form of life. Moreover, it would seem that abortion can be justified only to the extent that we can justify subjecting certain other highly developed forms of life (such as the family dog) to similar treatment. Finally, it seems unlikely that we can justify doing this simply for the sake of human convenience. How, then, can we justify abortion itself?



THE MORAL STANDING OF A FETUS 125

Pregnancy seldom causes death, although it may cause considerable discomfort and inconvenience. The question is, can we justify killing a human fetus by subjecting it to the methods normally used in performing abortions simply to avoid this discomfort and inconvenience? Could we justify subjecting the family dog to this treatment if it were responsible for an equal amount of discomfort and inconvenience, as it very well might be? It might be objected that the real discomfort and inconvenience comes after childbirth, when the mother is responsible for roughly twenty years of childrear- ing; but in this case, there might be preferable alternatives. As long, for example, as there continue to be waiting lines for infants answering certain descriptions at adoption centers, performing an abortion (on a pregnant woman who would otherwise be likely to give birth to an infant of this sort) simply because of the inconveniences encountered after childbirth is comparable to stabbing the family dog with the kitchen knife instead of giving it to the child next door. Abortion is clearly not the most justifiable way of avoiding these inconveniences.

I must now attempt to summarize the conclusions which I have reached in this paper. In the first place, I would like to reemphasize the fact that

my argument, unlike most arguments against abortion, is not based on the claim that a human fetus is a person. It might be that a fetus is a person, and this would in turn make abortion very difficult to justify; but my argument does not presuppose this, and can be accepted or rejected inde-

pendently of whether a fetus is a person. Furthermore, I would like to point out that my argument, unlike many of those directed against abortion, does not presuppose that a human fetus has a right to life, or any other rights, for that matter. It may be that a fetus does have this and other rights, whether or not it is a person, but I have not claimed that this is so, nor does

my argument presuppose that it is. Finally, I have not argued that abortion cannot be justified, and is thus necessarily immoral. My conclusion is the more modest one that abortion is in need of moral justification, and my argument suggests that the justifications that are ordinarily given may not be sufficient.9

Lycoming College Received November 19, 1993

NOTES

1. L. W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 15-19.

2. See Rick Kaufman, "Fetal Pain," Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 23 (1985), pp. 305-3 11, for an enlightening discussion of this issue.




3. Two methods of abortion are "dismemberment and evacuation" and "saline injection." In the former method, the fetus is simply dismembered in utero and the body parts subsequently suctioned out of the uterus. The latter method, used primar- ily after the fetus has grown too large to be disposed of by means used earlier in its development, involves replacing the amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus with a saline solution, which slowly poisons the fetus to death. The subsequent death of the fetus then causes the mother to miscarry.

4. Cf. Sumner, op. cit., "On the liberal view abortion is morally on a par with appendectomy," p. 15

5. Cf. Kaufman, op. cit., "This moral injunction against the infliction of pain is commonly taken to apply to sentient beings in general, not just to persons." (p. 305)

6. 1 can imagine possible exceptions to this. Suppose we had to choose between the lives of two convicted mass murderers who were scheduled to be executed in a few minutes anyway with no hope of reprieve, and the sole surviving breeding pair of Bengal tigers? Or suppose that we have a one hundred and ten year old bachelor with no living friends or relatives who is suffering through the final stages of terminal cancer? The situation becomes even more complicated if we imagine that we are dealing not with a single member of some species, but with an enormous number of specimens of the same or different species, such as a herd of ten thousand Indian elephants.

7. These two descriptions correspond roughly to the definitive actions involved in the two methods of abortion described in footnote 3.

8. Cf. Don Marquis, who points out that a fetus has "a future like ours." Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (1989), pp. 183-202

9. I am indebted to my colleagues Owen Herring and John Whelan for their criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.



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Fetal Death, Fetal Pain, and the Moral Standing of a Fetus