FHSMUN SARASOTA 17 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL …

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FHSMUN SARASOTA 17

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

Authors: Heather Ahles, Lucas Ballestín & Brian D. Sutliff

Introduction

The countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan lie in central and southern Asia, a region

defined not only by rugged mountains and valleys, but also by rugged and persistent peoples. For

centuries, the area has been a point of contention for the major powers of each age. As a result of

this, the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan have frequently encountered difficulty exercising

full sovereignty over their territory. Despite the numerous states that have risen and fallen across

the land and the centuries, Afghanistan and Pakistan today still struggle for unity and

sovereignty. The mere mention of the words Afghanistan and Pakistan in Washington DC,

Ottawa, London, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi can be vexing to

policymakers bent upon bending the Afghan and Pakistani peoples and political scenes to their

preferred outcomes. The Fund for Peace recently ranked Afghanistan 3rd and Pakistan 23rd in

its annual list of “fragile states”1; the resurgent violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan has wrought

havoc in the political and security machinery at the United Nations, for the Trump

Administration, and in various Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

and surrounding countries’ governments.

Scale of the Problem: Afghanistan

Afghanistan has not known peace for 40 years. Various regions have been relatively calm

and peaceful during different periods of the seemingly endless series of wars, but no region has

been fully spared from devastation and misery. In his June 2019 report to the Security Council

on the situation in Afghanistan, then Secretary-General Antonio Guterres noted that the total

number of “security-related incidents” in the first half of 2019 decreased by 7% from the same

period in 2018 but that “the southern region saw the highest number of incidents, followed by the

eastern and western regions; together those regions accounted for 71 per cent of all incidents.”2

Preventing violence against civilians, particularly in light of recent reports of record violence

against civilians3, as well as Afghan and international security forces remain critical priorities; as

the 2014 projected exit for international forces approached, meaning that the responsibility for

security would have become the exclusive domain of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and

related security forces, NATO member states believed it essential to examine the readiness and

capabilities of those security forces, particularly given that approximately 70% of attacks on

1 Fund for Peace, “2019 Fragile States Index,” 2019. Found at: https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/ 2 Antonio Guterres, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for

international peace and security”, A/73/902-S/2019/493, p. 5. 3 Reuters, “Afghanistan Suffers Record 4,300 Civilian Casualties in Three Months: UN”, October 17, 2019.

https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/

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security forces were directed against Afghan army and security personnel.4 The precarious

security situation combined with political instability and the ennui that typically accompanies

extended foreign military and peacekeeping operations present the UN Security Council with

critical stumbling blocks that must be cleared before Afghans and the international community

can enjoy peace and sustainable development.

“The Great Game”

In the eighteenth century, contemporary Afghanistan and much of the surrounding region

was heavily contested by the British and Russian empires who struggled to dominate the central

Asian location, in addition to their desire to control a direct route into northern India. Over the

course of centuries, these two world powers sought to dominate the region through commercial

domination and military incursion alike. This finally culminated in a series of treaties aimed at

defining Afghanistan’s boundaries. Border agreements were reached with Russia (1885 and

1895), British India (the Durand Agreement, 1893), and Persia [Iran] (1905). The Anglo-Russian

Agreement of 1907 guaranteed the independence of Afghanistan, allowing for internal

sovereignty but placing the country’s foreign affairs under British control.5 This peace lasted a

decade until the Russian revolutions of 1917. Following the triumph of the Communists in the

Civil War, which saw American, British, French, Italian and Japanese intervention on the side of

the Royalist Whites, the diplomatic relationship between the Russian (now Soviet) and British

governments became much more strained, especially over the issue of spheres of influence and

Afghanistan.

Under the leadership of Amānullāh Khān, which lasted from 1919 to 1929, Afghanistan

regained control over its foreign affairs. Amānullāh Khān’s reign was one of progress and strong

attempts at modernization. Among other projects on the agenda were a strong constitution,

equality for women and increased trade relations with Europe and Asia. Khān was able to play

off foreign influences to Afghanistan’s benefit until he was deposed by conservative factions in

1929. It was under Khān’s relative and eventual successor that Afghanistan joined the UN in

1946. From 1947 until the early 1970s, Afghanistan remained neutral in the Cold War which

came to define international relations for four decades.6

The first “generation of Afghan children whose ears would know nothing but the sounds of

bombs and gunfire”7

The year 1973 saw a volley of economic problems beset Afghanistan as significant

droughts affected the region. As a result of King Muhammad Zahir Shah’s perceived

mishandling of this crisis, a military coup took place which invited chaos into the Afghan

political arena. After a couple of changes in the power structure, a pro-soviet Marxist

government came to power. It was at this point that the USSR entered Afghanistan in full

bellicose force.8 Citing the Brezhnev Doctrine of offering assistance to friendly Communist

regimes facing external and/or internal threats, Soviet military forces invaded Afghanistan,

triggering a decade long war that would claim hundreds of thousands of Afghan lives, force

several million Afghans to flee their home country, litter the country with landmines for decades

4 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General” A/66/855-S/2012/426 June 20, 2012, p. 6. 5http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 6 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 7Khaled Hosseini, The Kite Runner, Riverhead Books, New York, 2003, p. 36. 8 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html

http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html



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to come, and ultimately destroy the resilience of the Soviet economy and military. The United

States, seeing an opportune moment to weaken the Soviet Union through one of the Cold War’s

many proxy wars, funneled massive amounts of money and weapons, including shoulder-fired

Stinger missiles, from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the Pakistani Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) and ultimately to Afghan and foreign mujahedeen or Muslim holy warriors.

Pakistani military and intelligence officials frequently directed aid towards their favorite Afghan

commanders, primarily the most religiously zealous Pashtun Sunni Muslim commanders, thereby

creating vital ties that could be strengthened further in the 1990s.

The Soviet Union did not leave Afghanistan until 1989 and in its wake left a country that

was deeply divided and widely devastated. Regional factions quickly rose to power in their

respective areas of control. The war enacted an incredible toll in human, economic and structural

terms. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the official Afghan government increasingly

lost control of the territory, and by early 1992 the capital of Kabul had been captured, and the

guerillas set up a 50-member council to rule from Kabul. Burhanuddin Rabbani was named

interim president of this council. The creation of this council proved insufficient as a way of

uniting the diverse guerilla factions which still retained control of the country, and new attacks

began to occur between factions and against the ruling council itself. The nation-state effectively

became a loose network of fiercely independent regions, each with its own customs and rulers.

“Seekers of knowledge”9 led by the one-eyed mullah

It was in 1994 that a Pashtun militia of fundamentalist students, who styled themselves

the Taliban, began to rise to power, fueled by Pakistani military and intelligence assistance and

residual Afghan disgust for the corruption and hypocrisy exhibited by feuding warlords. In 1996,

under pressure from the increasingly powerful Taliban, a power-sharing accord was signed in an

effort to stem the rise of the movement. By September of 1996, however, the Taliban had

marched into Kabul and usurped what little power the central council had and declared itself the

legitimate government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Immediately, the Taliban, while

under the direction of Mullah Muhammad Omar, began to enact and enforce an extremely

puritanical interpretation of Sharia law in the sections of the country which they had managed to

bring under their control.10

From 1996 until 2001, the Taliban were engaged in a brutal war with the Northern

Alliance, the last remaining rival to their absolute control over Afghanistan. The Northern

Alliance, it should be noted, was the officially recognized legitimate government of Afghanistan

by the United Nations with Burhanuddin Rabbani as president. The Taliban controlled about

90% of the country in 2000. Throughout their reign, the Taliban became notorious for their

uncompromising imposition of a very harsh interpretation of shar’ ia, Islamic law; public

executions were conducted during sporting events, women and girls were not allowed to leave

their homes without being escorted by male relatives, and religious minorities such as the

Hazara, Afghan Shias, were killed in large massacres.11 This conflict caused one million Afghan

deaths, as well as three million Afghan refugees in the neighboring countries of Iran and

Pakistan. It was at this juncture that a devastating drought hit central Asia, with Afghanistan

suffering the worst effects. As the Taliban gained the upper hand, the world began to condemn

certain actions taken by the group, such as the destruction of two giant Buddhas carved into the

9 While the traditional English translation of “Taliban” is “students,” it also translates to “seekers of knowledge.” 10 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 11 Patrick Cockburn, “UN finds mass graves of Hazara killed by the Taliban”, The Independent, August 8, 2002.


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cliffs of the Bamiyan valley in central Afghanistan. On September 9th, 2001 Ahmad Shah

Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance and head of the resistance against the Taliban was

assassinated by Taliban soldiers. Two days later, the World Trade Center attacks took place,

which had been allegedly been coordinated with the help of Osama Bin Laden, the reputed leader

of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Immediately, demands of the Taliban to turn Bin Laden

over to the US were made, and the latest of the many conflicts in Afghanistan began.12

Within six days of the attacks, the U.S. leadership pointed to Osama Bin Laden as the

‘prime suspect’ in the investigation that immediately followed the attacks. Then-President

George W. Bush stated that the United States would seek justice and would pursue Bin Laden’s

capture, “Dead or Alive.”13 On September 20th, 2001, Bush delivered his now famous ultimatum

to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The demands included among other things the dismantling

of Al-Qaeda operations in the country, the handing over of Al-Qaeda leaders to the ‘proper

authorities,’ and that access be given to U.S. forces to verify that the camps had been shut down.

Bush included the remark: “They will hand over the terrorists or share in their fate.”

The first Security Council resolution to be passed after the September 11, 2001 attacks

directly pertaining to Afghanistan was resolution 1378 (S/RES/1378), adopted on November 14,

2001, but the United States would be able to cite the seminal resolution 1373 adopted on

September 28, 2011 as well as Article V of the North Atlantic Charter as bolstering its legal

rationales for initiating, or depending on the perspective responding to, military action against

the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The conflict began with a large-scale air attack, which was followed on the ground by

US, UK and allied troops advancing on Taliban targets. In conjunction with the Afghan

‘Northern Alliance’ the current war in Afghanistan began on October 7th, 2001. The air strikes

and subsequent invasion were a direct response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.

Intelligence from the U.S. government had indicated that a pre-emptive attack on Afghanistan

could be possible if it were deemed necessary to engage the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, which

had a great part of its operations in the country. In essence, Al-Qaeda relied on the Taliban

government in Afghanistan to provide a safe haven for its militant operations.14

The state of affairs in Afghanistan is in many ways a paradigm of the globalization

phenomenon. The internal relations among parties in the nations are astoundingly complex, as

different factions upholding different worldviews and inheriting differing historical legacies vie

for influence and dominance. It would be impossible for policymakers today to resolve conflict

within Afghanistan without becoming somewhat acquainted with the country’s history.

Afghanistan sits squarely in the center of the Old World, a crossroads of trade routes and a

strategic advantage to its possessor. As a result, Afghanistan has never quite been capable of

distancing itself enough from its neighbors and gaining enough sovereignty to chart its own path.

In more recent history, Afghanistan has undergone extended periods of occupation by both the

USSR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacebuilding mission known

previously as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and now as Resolute Support.

Most national governments are at least partially acquainted with the difficulties facing the

ISAF/Resolute Support troops in the country, including their efforts to destroy the Taliban

networks as well as gain the support of the populace. The current NATO-led ISAF states its

12 http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0856490.html 13http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/17/bush.powell.terrorism/ 14http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20020201.htm


http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/17/bush.powell.terrorism/

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mission as: “…to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in

exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for

reconstruction and effective governance.”15

In addition to a coalition of Western countries, ISAF included small but symbolic troop

contributions from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and a significant contingent from Turkey;

Resolute Support does not include contingents from Jordan or the UAE but both Armenia and

Azerbaijan currently contribute personnel to the mission.16 While Turkey’s total troop

contribution may not be as high as that of a number of its NATO allies, Turkey’s long history of

friendly relations with Afghanistan and status as the only Muslim majority member of NATO are

oft cited elements of ISAF’s/Resolute Support’s prospects for a successful mission.17 ISAF at

first was limited in its scope to the capital of Kabul and the surrounding areas, relying on allied

war chiefs to combat Taliban forces elsewhere. Local warlords typically maintain a local focus

except insofar as it may advance their own personal ambitions, namely, to become president of

Afghanistan or to acquire greater wealth. Whenever American or ISAF/Resolute Support

militaries pursue more traditional warfare, particularly using powerful air strikes to destroy

Taliban military capacities, they risk alienating local support because of widely publicized

reports of large-scale civilian casualties.18 Resolute Support’s long-term stability, much like

ISA’s previously, is threatened by its internal fragility; the war in Afghanistan is very unpopular

in many ISAF/Resolute Support countries and governments that support the war may fall in the

wake of scandals or casualties. On August 1, 2010, the Netherlands became the first ISAF

country to withdraw its troop contingent from Afghanistan, but it is clear that other governments

are considering following suit, particularly in countries where the war in Afghanistan is a

prominent electoral issue19; Canada removed its combat forces in 2011 and subsequently

removed its approximately 500 soldiers then in Afghanistan to assist in training of the Afghan

police. In June 2012, then French President Francois Hollande announced that all French troops

would leave Afghanistan by the end of 2012.20

Resolute Support’s stability was further threatened by command and control issues and

disputes over the appropriate strategic doctrine to be pursued; in June 2010, then US President

Obama relieved General Stanley McChrystal of command in Afghanistan after disparaging

comments about the Obama Administration and NATO allies surfaced in a Rolling Stone

interview. The corresponding political flap over McChrystal’s dismissal had barely subsided

before the publication of tens of thousands of pages of leaked documents as well as

disagreements within the US government and military over the appropriate pace of any planned

drawdown of forces from Afghanistan.21 Paramount among the concerns for all ISAF countries

in 2014 was the rising level of violence in Afghanistan, particularly when that violence takes the

lives of their soldiers, civilian personnel, and humanitarian aid workers.

15http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm 16 The full list of contributing countries(as of May 2017) may be found at:

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/20170523_2017-05-RSM-Placemat.pdf 17 Aydemir Erman, “How Turkey can help NATO in Afghanistan” Christian Science Monitor February 9, 2010. 18 The Economist, “Collateral damage of every sort” September 10, 2009. 19 Radio Netherlands Worldwide (RNW), “Netherlands: first NATO member to leave Afghanistan” August 1,

2010. 20 BBC News, “French troop pullout from Afghanistan to start in July” June 9, 2012. 21 Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, “US Military to Press for Slower Afghan Drawdown”

New York Times August 11, 2010.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm

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“Where liberty dies, evil grows”22

Developing a viable Afghan state and economy will require political stability in a country

where stability is a rare commodity. The hopes of the international community initially rested

upon the person of Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan since December 2001. Karzai

initially supported the Taliban during the mid-1990s for the same reason that many Afghans

originally supported the Taliban – they seemed like the only force that might guarantee peace

and that could end the fratricidal civil wars and corruption then plaguing Afghanistan. Within a

few years, Karzai would break with the Taliban and spend the years before the overthrow of the

Taliban in exile in western Pakistan. Karzai would reenter Afghanistan when the United States

launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 and would almost immediately be

wounded in a US missile strike. After receiving medical treatment outside of Afghanistan,

Karzai would return and be named the Chairman of the Transitional Authority at the Bonn

International Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001. Within a few months, Karzai would

be named Interim President and he would then be elected to a full term in 2004. Karzai’s first 7

years as president would be marred by repeated Taliban attempts to assassinate him. The

constant flanking of President Karzai by Western security contractors, primarily from Xe, the

former Blackwater, has been a further point of contention for the Afghan people and

government; allegations of human rights abuses, misappropriation of funds, and illegal weapons

smuggling have plagued Xe in Afghanistan, originally leading President Karzai to announce that

private security contractors will no longer be welcome in Afghanistan after 201023; after

receiving assurances that private security contractors would follow much stricter rules, Karzai

relaxed his outright ban, initially stating that the security contractors could remain until March

2012. In the wake of greater violence in 2011, Karzai further extended this deadline for private

security contractors until September 2013.24 While the relationship between Karzai and ISAF

countries, especially the United States, had been volatile for years, tensions really flared during

Karzai’s reelection campaign in 2009.

Then President Karzai was reelected in August 2009 in an election that was marred by

serious allegations of vote fraud, intimidation, and massive corruption. The international

community pressured Karzai to hold a run-off election against his opponent, Dr. Abdullah

Abdullah, but the run-off would never be held after Dr. Abdullah dropped out on November 2,

2009 and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) would summarily declare Karzai the

winner at the beginning of November 2009.25 Immediately, Karzai would face a series of

allegations of corruption, including involvement with the burgeoning heroin trade emanating

from Afghanistan.26 As accusations of corruption and misdeeds mount against Karzai and his

relatives, cooperation between the Afghan government and ISAF becomes increasingly

precarious. Relations between Presidents Obama and Karzai are clearly strained, especially

because American policy-makers are becoming increasingly frustrated with an apparent lack of

progress by the Afghan government at tackling corruption27, developing an effective military28,

22 Hamid Karzai. 23 Joshua Partlow, “Karzai wants private security firms out of Afghanistan” The Washington Post August 17,

2010. 24 Daniel Magnowski, “Afghanistan’s Karzai extends private security closure” Reuters December 11, 2011. 25 The Economist, “Karzai’s tattered victory” November 5, 2009. 26 The Economist, “Taming the mafia state”, November 19, 2009. 27 Dexter Filkins and Mark Mazetti, “Key Karzai Aide in Corruption Inquiry is Linked to CIA”, The New York

Times, August 25, 2010. 28 The Economist, “Fixing the Unfixable” August 19, 2010.

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and combating the cultivation and trafficking of heroin and Afghan anger over ISAF bombing

and raids that kill Afghan civilians.29 In August and early September of 2010, mounting concerns

over the perceived fragility of Afghanistan’s banking system prompted then President Karzai to

issue a public guarantee of the deposits at Kabul Bank, one of the largest and most troubled

banks in the country.30 With the long postponed parliamentary elections originally scheduled for

July 2018, and finally held in December 201831, Afghan civil society representatives and the

international community must rectify the problems plaguing the Afghan political system and

minimize the corruption and voting irregularities that marred the 2009 and 2014 presidential

elections. Improving relations between the current Afghan and Resolute Support governments

must be an absolute priority if the security situation in Afghanistan is to improve.

UN System Activities in Afghanistan

The UN System has maintained a critical presence in Afghanistan since the removal of

the Taliban from power in late 2001, with the Security Council, UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs

and Crime (UNODC) maintaining leading roles in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The Security

Council established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) through resolution

1401 on March 28, 2002. During the past 17+ years, UNAMA’s mandate has expanded to

include emphases on combating corruption, strengthening Afghanistan’s nascent human rights

machinery, encouraging political reconciliation and inclusion, election monitoring and

assistance, working with ISAF to improve the capacities of the Afghan army and police force,

and to implement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).32 Furthermore,

through its Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction program, UNAMA has prioritized the following

areas for Afghan reconstruction: “agriculture, energy, private sector development, capacity

building, and higher education and vocational training.”33 UNAMA’s mandate is primarily

political whereas ISAF’s mandate is more directly focused on addressing the immediate, medium

and long-term security concerns for Afghanistan.

Repatriating Afghan refugees has been an enormous task for nearly 20 years now and the

UNHCR continues to repatriate returning Afghans from Iran and Pakistan on a daily basis. On

August 27, 2010, UNHCR announced that over 100,000 Afghans had been voluntarily

repatriated in 2010, with approximately 95,000 of these refugees returning from Pakistan34; for

2019, approximately 6,000 refugees have resettled in Afghanistan with nearly 74% returning

from Pakistan and another 25% returning from Iran.35 Since the beginning of 2002, a record 5.7

million Afghan refugees have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR36, clearly an enormous

29 The Economist, “When Barack met Hamid” March 31, 2010. 30 Dexter Filkins, “Depositors Panic Over Bank Crisis in Afghanistan” The New York Times September 2, 2010. 31 Mujib Mashal and Fahim Abed, “Afghan Election Dispute Brews as US Pushes for Peace Talks”, New York

Times, December 6, 2018. 32 UNAMA’s mandate is currently set to expire on September 17, 2020. Delegates will want to examine Security

Council resolution 2489 for UNAMA’s current mandate. S/RES/2489, September 17, 2019. 33 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction” 2010.

http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1754 34 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Number of voluntary returns to Afghanistan tops

100,000” August 27, 2010. 35 UNHCR, “Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Afghanistan”, October 16, 2019. Found at:

https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/afg 36 UNHCR, “Afghan Solutions Strategy” 2012. Found at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4f9016576.html

http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1754

https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/afg

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4f9016576.html

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undertaking in any situation and even more daunting and laudatory given the geographic and

political obstacles involved in Afghan repatriation.

Pakistan is currently hosting over 1.4 million Afghani refugees, many of whom have

lived in Pakistan for decades.37 UNHCR is making every effort to address the needs of the

Afghan refugees and the Pakistan government through the regional Solutions Strategy for

Afghan Refugees (SSAR), the tripartite agreement on voluntary repatriation, and the government

of Pakistan's Policy on Afghan refugees. To complement UNHCR's efforts, the Pakistan

government has extended Afghan refugees' Proof of Registration (PoR) cards until the end of

June 202038, issued birth certificates to more than 800,000 Afghani refugee children, provided

land for several refugee villages, and given refugees access to public schools and health clinics.

In July of 2014, according to the United Nations News Center, the ongoing turmoil

between the Pakistani military and the militants in the North Waziristan tribal region forced more

than 75,000 people to flee their homes to seek shelter in Afghanistan. As of August 2014,

714,548 Afghans registered as internally displaced people (IDPs) in need of humanitarian

assistance; however, the environment in Pakistan remains volatile with fragile security, social,

and economic situations that make it difficult for humanitarian actors. UNHCR has been working

closely with local partners and government counterparts in order to improve outreach to

populations of concern and to build local capacities.39 While the pace of repatriation of Afghan

refugees has slowed considerably over the past 10 years, UNHCR notes that there are

approximately 315,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Afghanistan in the first

10 months of 2019 alone, meaning that solutions to these problems are likely to require many

more months and tens of millions of additional dollars; the current funding gap for 2019

operations is approximately $40 million USD, nearly 1/3 of the pledged total.40

UNDP’s multiple roles in Afghanistan are vital for long-term sustainable development in

Afghanistan but UNDP and its international and civil society partners will be ultimately

unsuccessful if the security situation does not improve rapidly. The UNDP Office in Afghanistan

is currently tasked with “stabilization, state building, governance and development, so far

disbursing approximately $1.5 billion” since 200241; with that funding data coming from 2009, it

is clear that total disbursement of aid is now over $2 billion USD. UNDP continues to assist

Afghanistan’s government further with the vital work of gender mainstreaming and developing

gender responsive budgets. As Afghanistan still depends heavily upon foreign donors for nearly

90% of the entire government budget and 100% of its development budget, cooperation between

the government and UNDP is an absolute prerequisite for sustainable development.

Recent discoveries of immense mineral wealth in Afghanistan provide crucial glimmers

of hope for the future but Afghanistan’ current formal and/or legal economic output remains

37 Zuha Siddiqui, “For Afghan Refugees, Pakistan is a Nightmare – and also Home”, Foreign Policy, May 9, 2019. 38 Reliefweb, “UNHCR welcomes Pakistan cabinet’s decision to extend stay of Afghan refugees”, June 28, 2019.

Found at: https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/unhcr-welcomes-pakistan-cabinet-s-decision-extend-stay-afghan-

refugees 39 26 October 2014 "2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Pakistan" UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. 40 UNHCR, “Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Afghanistan”, October 16, 2019. Found at:

https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/afg 41 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Country Programme Action Plan 2010-2013 Between the

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United Nations Development Programme” December

2009 p. 3. The full report may be found at:

http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2010-2013CPD/UNDPAFG_CPAP_2010-2013.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/unhcr-welcomes-pakistan-cabinet-s-decision-extend-stay-afghan-refugees

https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/unhcr-welcomes-pakistan-cabinet-s-decision-extend-stay-afghan-refugees

https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/afg

http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2010-2013CPD/UNDPAFG_CPAP_2010-2013.pdf

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anemic. By far the most profitable economic activities in Afghanistan are the cultivation of

poppy and the production of heroin and opium. According to statistics from the UN Office on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan accounts for nearly 90% of all “global illicit opium

production in recent years.”42 Combating the production, trafficking and distribution of opiates is

essential to reducing the influence of local warlords as well as preventing the pernicious effects

of both drug addiction and drug-fueled crime but any drug eradication scheme will only succeed

if viable economic alternatives are implemented for local farmers and their surrounding

communities. UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa has consistently argued that

there is “no quick fix” to the problems created by illicit drug cultivation and production in

Afghanistan, particularly as heroin production soars in the south of the country. At the Third

International GLOBSEC Conference in Bratislava, Slovakia in January 2008, Costa asserted that

it may take a full generation to comprehensively combat the effects of drug cultivation in

Afghanistan and that “therefore, the first element of any comprehensive plan for Afghanistan

must be to demonstrate to farmers that there are viable alternatives to growing poppy, and

serious risks if they do not switch to licit livelihoods.” 43 The most lucrative alternative crop for

Afghan crops is cotton; unfortunately, for the US Agency for International Development

(USAID), subsidizing Afghan cotton production, particularly if the Afghan government controls

significant amounts of production or ginning, has generated considerable opposition because it

might hurt US exporters as well as for a strong preference for privatization.44 Drug eradication

efforts in northern Afghanistan have been far more successful than in the south, especially in

Kandahar Province, the stronghold of the Taliban.

A Dangerous Neighborhood

Afghanistan’s critical, or cursed, geostrategic position combined with its chronic ethnic,

political, and religious divisions create tempting opportunities for Afghanistan’s neighbors, none

of whom may be remotely considered to be disinterested, to seek to increase their regional

influence. Pakistan’s policies are aimed at blunting the influence of India and to a lesser extent,

China and Iran; these aims are mostly readily achieved by maintaining strong ties to the Pashtun

communities in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has lessened

his criticisms of Pakistani for “tolerating sanctuaries within its borders for Taliban insurgents,”45

and Afghan-Pakistani relations have seemed to improve of late, potentially at India’s expense.

Any improvement in Afghan-Pakistani relations may also create diplomatic, political, and

security concerns for Iran. Tehran’s policies are designed primarily to limit the influence of

Russia and Pakistan as well as potentially hostile Arab and/or Sunni states throughout the Middle

East and Central and South Asia. Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors also present a panoply

of security quandaries, creating an undercurrent of further violence, lawlessness, and repression;

furthermore, the ethnic Tajik and Uzbek communities in northern Afghanistan often feel

excluded from critical political, security and economic decisions made in Kabul.

The complex and often tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan extend to the

Resolute Support countries involved in the region. Strong criticisms and accusations of

corruption, incompetence, and duplicity have frequently strained relations between the US and

42 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “World Drug Report 2010” p. 37. 43 Antonio Maria Costa, “Drugs and Insecurity in Afghanistan: No Quick Fix” Bratislava, Slovakia January 18,

2008. 44 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “AID and the Afghan Cotton Saga” The Globalist August 6, 2012. Found at:

http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=9708 45 The Economist, “Ganging up on India” July 1, 2010.

http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=9708

10

Pakistan. When US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in early May 2011 in Abbottabad,

Pakistan, many Pakistanis were upset by the US-led mission occurring on their territory;

furthermore, many Americans and Pakistanis wondered aloud how much Pakistani and American

government officials knew about bin Laden’s whereabouts and for how long.46 In November

2011, an American airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and Pakistan sealed off a crucial border

crossing into Afghanistan that NATO relied upon for shipping supplies into the field. After

months of diplomatic wrangling, the US government issued a formal apology to Pakistan for the

unintentional killing of its soldiers and agreed to a larger transit tax of $1500-$1800 USD per

NATO truck, a lucrative tax that may net Pakistan approximately $1 million USD per day47; the

reopening of the transit route also persuaded the US Congress to release hundreds of millions of

dollars in foreign aid that had been delayed at least in part because of the closed transit route.

While NATO’s leadership appears relieved to have at least temporarily resolved the transit route

impasse, there are still questions as to how effectively Pakistani security forces will monitor the

border and prevent “insurgents” from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from crossing into

Afghanistan.48 As NATO and affiliated governments with troops and logistical components,

including interoperability of weaponry and communications technologies,49 contemplate their

approaching deadlines for withdrawal, they must maintain and/or enhance their relationships

with Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. “All four border Afghanistan and have

provided NATO with essential supply routes and bases in return for generous financial and

political compensation.”50

Several regional powers, including India, Iran, and Pakistan, as well as all the Permanent

Members of the Security Council have considerable economic, political, and security interests at

stake in Afghanistan. Referring to Russia’s recent overtures to improve relations with

Afghanistan, Andrew Kramer notes that Russia is seeking contracts to renovate or refurbish

Soviet-era infrastructure and “the Kremlin is also looking to blunt Islamic extremism in Central

Asia, which poses a threat to Russia’s security, particularly in the Caucasus, and to exploit

opportunities in the promising Afghan mining and energy industries.”51 In 2010, then Russian

President Dmitry Medvedev hosted the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan to

address the problems stemming from “fighting terrorism and drugs spreading from

Afghanistan.”52 China maintains extensive interests throughout the region, in part as a check on

the growing power of India as well as to minimize its difficulties with its Uighur community in

western China; reports have surfaced at various points of Uighur fighters training and fighting

alongside the Taliban.53 The US, in addition to its immediate political and security interests,

recently identified enormous deposits of valuable metals and industrial resources with a current

estimated value of nearly $1 trillion USD.54 While mining companies from around the region and

around the world are already competing for access to these vital mineral deposits, “the problem

46 Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, “Amid Skepticism, Pakistan Calculates its Response” The New York Times May 2,

2011. 47 The Economist, “Keep on truckin’” May 16, 2012. 48 Dan Murphy, “Why the Taliban are Happy that the US and Pakistan Patched Things Up” The Christian Science

Monitor July 31, 2012. 49 Elizabeth Braw, “Next Steps for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, November 27, 2016. 50 Judy Dempsey, “No Easy Exit for NATO in Afghanistan” New York Times December 10, 2012. 51 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Pushes to Increase Afghanistan Business Ties” The New York Times August 18,

2010. 52 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Medvedev talks with Afghan, Pakistani leaders” The Washington Post August 18, 2010. 53 Thomas Joscelyn, “Evaluating the Uighur Threat” The Long War Journal October 9, 2008. 54 James Risen, “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan” June 13, 2010.

11

is companies remain hesitant about investing in the country whilst the current security issues

remain unresolved.”55 Ensuring that these minerals are extracted in a sustainable manner that

fosters rising living standards and real human development in Afghanistan, while preventing a

contemporary version of “the Great Game”, is a new and keystone challenge for NATO and the

international community.

Recent diplomatic initiatives have yielded some positive results and may provide impetus

for further peaceful interactions between Afghanistan and its neighbors. Secretary-General Ban

Ki-moon noted that “diplomatic engagement between Afghanistan and countries increased

significantly [during the first 6 months of 2010], with high-level political dialogue with India and

China on bilateral and regional cooperation and an increased frequency of exchange visits with

the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan.”56 Unfortunately, for every tentative step forward,

violent attacks seem to force a half-step back. In early December 2012, then Afghan President

Hamid Karzai claimed that the suicide bomber who attempted to kill Asadullah Khalid, head of

the National Directorate of Security, was Pakistani and “attack was organized with the help of a

sophisticated foreign intelligence service.”57 Improving and strengthening Afghanistan’s

relationships with its neighbors as well as the wider international community is an essential

component of any comprehensive solution to the political and security problems currently

plaguing Afghanistan.

The Other Side of the COIN

While success in Afghanistan ultimately hinges on resolution of thorny political and

economic problems, NATO’s tactics will be a critical component in determining the amount of

33James Melik, “Afghan wealth stifled by security fears” BBC News June 25, 2010. 56 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for

international peace and security” S/2010/127 March 10, 2010 p. 5. 57 Graham Bowley & Sangar Rahimi, “Karzai Implicates Pakistan in Suicide Bombing That Hurt Afghan Spy

Chief” New York Times December 8, 2012.

12

time that NATO has to achieve its goals of stabilizing Afghanistan and destroying terrorist safe

havens or sanctuaries. Within NATO, and most visibly within the US military and political

leadership, there have long been disagreements over the most effective way to prosecute the war

in Afghanistan. In the first eight years of the war (2001-2009), the predominant American

approach was to use high-altitude bombing along with light footprint operations designed to kill

as many Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives as possible. The high-altitude bombing campaigns

undoubtedly killed large numbers of Taliban and, to a lesser degree Al-Qaeda, operatives but

many shifted their operations to sanctuaries in Pakistan, thus presenting a more problematic

series of targets. Most critically, from the Afghan perspective, this high-altitude bombing,

combined with incomplete or flawed intelligence, led to hundreds of civilian deaths.58

After a palpable shift in the war in Iraq, based in part on a significant shift in US tactics

to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, many high-level US military leaders, including generals

David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, advocated introducing COIN into the Afghan theater.

While this advocacy of COIN was nowhere near universal within the US political and military

leadership, US tactics in Afghanistan largely shifted towards COIN in the first year of Obama’s

presidency, including the introduction of tens of thousands of “surge” troops. At the heart of

COIN is the concept that military operations must be centered on the protection of civilians in

order to deprive the Taliban and Al-Qaeda of local support or acquiescence. When McChrystal

introduced COIN into Afghanistan, he issued strict orders limiting the use of bombing because

he “wanted a rapprochement with Karzai, and he had come to believe the COIN axiom that

killing one civilian creates ten new insurgents.”59 While COIN may be linked to fewer civilian

casualties in Afghanistan, there remained significant concerns that with the then prospective

withdrawal of all ISAF combat forces by the end of 2014, there would not be sufficient time for

COIN to be successful.

Negotiating with Terrorists?

Electoral rhetoric aside, the question of whether to negotiate with those considered, by at

least one if not multiple, party[ies] to be terrorists is complex and troubling. Will the presumed

terrorists be further emboldened to carry out atrocities against civilians? Even if a negotiated

settlement is reached, will civilians and members of the security forces accept and implement the

settlement without reprisal attacks? Will those suspected of planning and carrying out terrorist

attacks be prosecuted, and if so, in what legal fora? What limits will be placed on the

interrogation and treatment of suspected terrorists? All these questions are directly pertinent to

the situation in Afghanistan as the Afghan government, Resolute Support, UNAMA, and the

Taliban must confront the consequences of engaging in, or boycotting, negotiations.

All negotiators prefer to initiate talks from a position of strength but the various actors in

the Afghan saga may not enjoy such luxury. President Karzai was “already not viewed as a

credible broker”60 by many of his erstwhile allies as well as his declared enemies and he was

constitutionally barred from seeking a third term as president. The stated deadline for NATO’s

withdrawal of all combat forces by the end of 2014 was intended to satisfy domestic political

constituencies as well as to ostensibly spur the Afghan National Security Forces (ANFS) to

58 BBC News, “Strike ‘killed 60 young Afghans’” August 26, 2008. 59 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan 2012. Kindle Edition – Loc.

563. 60 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan,” March

26, 2012, p. 25.

13

assume greater operational capability and responsibility for security in Afghanistan, but this

deadline was also been criticized as providing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with a greater incentive

to delay any negotiated settlement until the withdrawal of foreign combat troops. The Taliban

cannot be complacent, however, as the continuation of violence against Afghan civilians may

further erode their support in various parts of the country, ultimately depriving the Taliban of

domestic Pashtun support and making them essentially a pawn of Pakistani Pashtuns who may

find a weak and unstable Afghanistan to their own benefit. Furthermore, if the Taliban

miscalculate and ratchet the violence up to levels that Resolute Support countries find too

threatening, they may invite a very vigorous military response that degrades their operational

capabilities rapidly and dramatically. The Taliban is also not an entirely cohesive organization

and maintaining its potentially fragile cohesion may become less feasible the longer that the

conflict rages.

The January 2010 London Conference is still considered the roadmap for Afghan

reconstruction and development and it is essential that Security Council delegates accurately

appraise the progress to date as well as the obstacles that remain to successfully implementing

the “two-tiered” approach61 developed at the conference.62 While steady progress towards the

projected 2014 withdrawal of ISAF combat forces provided hope that the mission might be

wound down soon, many aspects of the political transitions and reconciliation and reintegration

of former Taliban fighters into Afghan society and the economy may need to be accelerated.

Speaking in October 2017, three years after his election to succeed former President Karzai,

current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, after proclaiming that he has “the worst job on Earth,”

asserted that all foreign troops could withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2021.63 Historian

and former Adviser to US forces in Afghanistan Carter Malkasian argues that a withdrawal of

US and international forces would likely be followed by Taliban military advances but that “over

the long term … the ledger might balance out….Afghans would be oppressed and deprived, but

alive” in the areas under Taliban control.64 Whether Afghan civilians, particularly women,

Hazaras, and other marginalized groups feel like that this ledger of violence, economic

development, and personal freedoms is balanced will be critical to determining whether any

peace deal or power-sharing arrangement, formal or informal, ultimately lasts.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that “eleven years into the international

engagement in Afghanistan, it is clear that political settlement without political incentives is a

non-starter.”65 Thus far, however, a climate of mistrust has dominated the sporadic negotiations.

Inclusive talks must bring together the diverse elements of Afghan society, including ethnic

Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras [Afghan Shia Muslims], the Afghan government, the Taliban,

Resolute Support, the UN, and Afghanistan’s neighbors. Even though the time period 2015-2024

has been designated as a “transformation decade”66 for the long-term peace and development of

61 Julian Borger, “Afghanistan conference sets out plan for two-tier peace process,” The Guardian, January 28,

2010. 62 Delegates may view the official communiqué issued at the end of the conference here:

http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference

%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf 63 Justin Rowlatt, “Ashraf Ghani: Afghan president has ‘worst job on Earth,’” BBC News, October 5, 2017. 64 Carter Malkasian, “What a Withdrawal from Afghanistan Would Look Like”, Foreign Affairs, October 21, 2019. 65 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan” March

26, 2012 p. 38. 66 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for

international peace and security,” A/66/855-S/2012/426, June 20, 2012, p. 10.

http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf

http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf

14

Afghanistan, maintaining the necessary political will to achieve that transformation will require a

long-term commitment to Afghanistan that will by definition transcend the current political and

military leadership on all sides. Former Senior Adviser to the US State Department Barnett

Rubin argues that “according to negotiators … the agreement [for withdrawal of foreign troops]

would rely not on trusting the Taliban’s promises but on carefully sequencing the components of

the agreement and insisting on monitoring mechanisms. The best counterterrorism program

would be a political agreement that stabilizes Afghanistan, puts an end to incentives to mobilize

terrorist support, and closes ungoverned spaces that terrorists can exploit.”67

How many sands remain in the international community’s hourglass?68

Delegates entrusted to deal with the delicate situation in Afghanistan must keep several

things in mind throughout the course of their discussions and negotiations. Some of these

important points concern the nature of the state of affairs on the ground in Afghanistan; these

issues have been described in detail above. The other points to remember are the current UN

resolutions and significant opinions on what is to be done to bring about a satisfying resolution to

the strife in this nation.

Former UN special representative to Afghanistan and head of the United Nations

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide addressed the Security Council in early

2010 and said the following:

“In the next five years, he said, the central goal of the Government would be preparing

for the transition to full Afghan rule by strengthening sovereignty and national ownership. He

called upon the international community to ensure that every action taken in the country was in

support of those efforts. Following President Karzai’s outlining of commitments and formation

of a new Government, the next priority would be to forge a compact between the international

community and Afghanistan that clearly defined the strategies and responsibilities of each.”69

In this way, Mr. Eide was pushing for a new Afghan sovereignty, a fundamental quality

of any state wishing to engage in diplomatic dialogue in the UN as well as a quality that has been

quite rare in modern Afghan history. In his efforts to assist President Karzai with his own vision

for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and rebirth, Mr. Eide was perceived to be sacrificing the larger

strategy in order to gain the trust and favor of the country’s rulers. As a result, conflicts arose

around the issue of the shifts in sovereignty such as the changing of foreign police for ISAF-

trained Afghan soldiers and similar duties that began to be returned to the Afghan authorities. In

general, policy makers should be cautious to balance their obligations as nation builders with

their duties as countries at war.

According to an official press release by the United Nations Department of Public

Information, “in his report, the Secretary-General says the controversial 2009 elections absorbed

tremendous political energy. Together with the volatile security situation, the protracted

electoral process contributed to a gloomy atmosphere. “If the negative trends are not corrected,

there is a risk that the deteriorating overall situation will become irreversible,”70 he says. “We

67 Barnett R. Rubin, “Negotiations Are the Best Way to End the War in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs, March 1,

2019. 68 Paraphrase of US Lt. General David Barno’s January 26, 2004 quote about “the sands in the hourglass of all of the

al-Qaeda senior leadership is [sic] running out." 69http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9834.doc.htm 70 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9834.doc.htm

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9834.doc.htm

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9834.doc.htm

15

cannot afford this.” To reverse the trends, a better coordinated international effort, within the

framework of a strategy of transition, was urgently needed.

“We are now at a critical juncture,” the Secretary-General argued in the report. “The

situation cannot continue as is, if we are to succeed in Afghanistan. Unity of effort and greater

attention to key priorities are now a sine qua non. There is a need for a change of mindset in the

international community, as well as in the Government of Afghanistan. Without that change, the

prospects of success will diminish further.”71

Recently an American military official who chose to remain anonymous openly discussed

the fact that among the American military’s leadership, it is no mystery that the strategies which

were devised and implemented in the years 2002 through 2006 were full of instances of “faulty

assumptions [which] gave rise to misjudgments, and how misjudgments cascaded into everyday

deadly encounters.”72 These are the sorts of issues that are crucial for policymakers to keep in

mind. The relations with internal factions, the population at large, and the historical legacy are

where the stress falls, and where diplomats must be very careful if they hope to display their

strategic acumen. The erroneous attitudes and grievous missteps of the initial planning among

the NATO-ISAF/Resolute Support leadership have become ever more apparent as the conflict

shows little signs of resolution so many years in. “The consensus was that little could be

accomplished in Afghanistan given its history, culture and composition, and there would be little

payoff beyond Afghanistan even if things there went better than expected,” Richard Haass, a

senior official at the State Department in the Bush administration who advocated the insertion of

a far larger force, wrote recently. He added: “They had no appetite for on-the-ground nation

building.”73This carelessness resulted in some shameful details, for instance, Afghan soldiers

were paid less than what Taliban soldiers were paid. Additionally, after a deceptively easy

victory over the Taliban within weeks of the invasion and working under the incorrect

assumption that the Taliban movement had been soundly defeated, the US and other troop-

lending nations refused to commit large numbers of troops to stabilize Afghanistan in the wake

of the initial bombings and land campaigns.

In 2012, renewed international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan were centerpieces at the

NATO Summit in Chicago in May and an international donors’ conference in Tokyo in July. At

the NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO pledged to continue funding the Afghan National

Security Forces (ANSF) to the tune of $3.6 billion USD annually for the next 10 years with the

Afghan government pledging an additional $500 million USD per year.74 NATO will continue to

provide approximately 2,000 military trainers in the country along with a projected 20,000 US

military forces that will occupy some of the 700 military bases now found in Afghanistan.

Concerns about whether these trainers will be pulled into live-fire operations persist as do

significant doubts about the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The

Tokyo donors’ conference yielded pledges of some $16 billion USD for Afghan development aid

but the total amount of aid pledged will at best erase the Afghan government’s current fiscal

deficit. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s economy remains extremely reliant on foreign aid, fueling

fears that a reduction or elimination of this foreign aid may devastate Afghanistan’s fragile

71 Ibid 72http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/weekinreview/01sanger.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=afghanistan%20surge&st=cs

e 73http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/weekinreview/01sanger.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=afghanistan%20surge&st=cs

e 74 The Economist, “NATO’s risky Afghan endgame” May 26, 2012.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/weekinreview/01sanger.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=afghanistan%20surge&st=cse




16

economy75 and may push more marginalized peoples to support the Taliban or to cultivate poppy

to survive.

Much rests on the outcome of the power plays taking place within Afghanistan and

Pakistan and it is paramount that policymakers discuss the problems plaguing the nation and

decide among themselves which of those problems should be given priority, always keeping in

mind that like most other situations in which an entire country is in question, all factors tend to

be related to one another. Expanding and improving the performance of the Afghan security

forces is/was clearly one of the highest priorities for the international community and especially

Resolute Support, and previously ISAF; unfortunately, as of October 2019, Afghan and

international confidence in the capacity and commitment of the Afghan security forces remained

low. While then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon claimed in August 2012 that recruitment of

Afghan military and police forces were ahead of schedule, he admitted that “along with numbers,

the orientation of the different security services has been the subject of vigorous debate, in

particular the need for a distinct civilian role for the police, with a further professionalization of

the force, strengthened oversight mechanisms and institutional reforms at the Ministry of the

Interior.”76 Attacks by Afghan troops and police officers on NATO soldiers and Afghan civilians

may also poison the relationships between the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and

Resolute Support.77 NATO member governments and Afghan political and security leaders and

civil society representatives must ensure that these Afghan military and police forces are

competent, properly equipped, paid on time and not effectively infiltrated by Taliban and/or Al-

Qaeda leadership.

In recent years, while the United States has been reducing their role in the Afghanistan-

Pakistan situation, China has assumed a larger role. "There's no guarantee things will change"

says an Afghanistan Analyst, "but it's certainly worth a try… the relationship between China and

Pakistan is much less tense than the U.S.-Pakistani relationship."78 As of November 1, 2014,

China has put forth a proposal for a peace and reconciliation forum that would gather

representatives from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and the Taliban command; however, due to

some initial resistance, President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan wishes to give Pakistan and the

Taliban more time to consider China's proposal.

On November 14, 2014, after visiting Beijing to discuss China’s larger role in the

conflict, newly elected President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan made a monumental visit to

Pakistan to meet with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, top officials of the Pakistani

Foreign office and finance ministry, and General Raheel Sharif – the army chief to strengthen

“security ties, including cooperation in training and border management, and promise states’

cooperation to jointly curb the menace of terrorism”79 while still noting the fragility of the

situation between the two states.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan at this point in time, all issues are as interrelated to the

extent that such isolation of one particular issue is indeed impossible. It is imperative that

countries work together in order to develop comprehensive solutions which while prioritizing

75 The Economist, “The hand that feeds” July 14, 2012. 76 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for

international peace and security” A/66/855-S/2012/426 June 20, 2012 p. 6. 77 Washington Post, “Gunmen in Afghan army uniforms kill US service member, Afghan defense minister steps

down” August 7, 2012. 78 Afghanistan Analyst, Reuters, 1 November 2014 79 The New York Times, “Afghan President Out to Ease Relations on Visit to Pakistan” November 14, 2014

17

also do not fail to consider any significant matter. Failure to take such matters into account will,

without a doubt, result in the failure of the entire effort, and at such a delicate time in the long

conflict which has most recently started in 2001 but goes back for decades for the Afghan

people, international coordination and concerted sacrifice is crucial if solutions will begin to

replace the failures that current policymakers have inherited. In the words of Immanuel Kant:

“You can because you must.”

Guiding Questions

1. How does the current security situation affect your country and/or region? Has your

country contributed financial, logistical, political, or security aid or forces to

Afghanistan? How might your country most effectively contribute to an improved

security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

2. What are the most significant successes and/or failures in the campaign in Afghanistan to

date?

3. How can NATO most effectively work with its Resolute Support partners, the Afghan

government and relevant international and domestic actors to ensure timely, free and fair

parliamentary elections in the future?

4. What are the most important points facilitating international cooperation in this time of

crisis? What are the most significant weaknesses confronting Resolute Support and/or the

international community? With what other countries might Afghanistan, NATO and its

Resolute Support partners, and the international community wish to engage and/or

negotiate to achieve a feasible and lasting solution and why?

5. What timetable, if any, should be constructed to administer the national development of

Afghanistan and the return of full sovereignty?

6. What are the limits of military action? What are the limits of civilian efforts?

7. How might the international community most effectively prepare to meet these future

challenges?

8. Is UNAMA’s mandate appropriate to meet the demands of the Afghan government,

domestic Afghan civil society partners, and the international community? If UNAMA’s

mandate needs to be revised, what would be the most important changes to improve

UNAMA’s effectiveness? How long will ISAF-UNAMA forces and civilian personnel

need to be in Afghanistan?

Resolutions:

United Nations Security Council resolution 2489 (S/RES/2489), “The situation in

Afghanistan”, September 17, 2019.


Afghanistan”, March 15, 2019.


Afghanistan”, February 24, 2018.


Afghanistan”, December 12, 2014.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2145 (S/RES/2145), "The situation in

Afghanistan", March 17, 2013.

18


Afghanistan", March 19, 2013

United Nations Security Council resolution 2083 (S/RES/2083), "Threats to International

Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts", December 17, 2012.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2082 (S/RES/2082), "Threats to International

Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts", December 17, 2012.


Afghanistan", October 9, 2012.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2041 (S/RES/2041), “The Situation in


United Nations Security Council resolution 1989 (S/RES/1989), “Threats to International

Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts”, June 17, 2011.


Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts”, June 17, 2011.








Afghanistan”, December 20, 2001.


Afghanistan”, November 14, 2001.


Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts”, September 28, 2001.

19

20