fighting and negociating in vietnam a strategy.pdf

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M EMORANDUMRM-5997-ARPAOCTOBER1969

PREPA RED FOR:

ARPAORDERNO. 189-1

FIGHTINGANDNEGOTIATINGINVIETNAM: A STRATEGY

V uVan Tha i

ADVANCEDRESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ R n n o ~ ANTA MONIC A CAL IFORN IA -- --TH IS DOC UM EN T HA S BEEN APPR OV ED FOR PUB LIC RELE A SE AND SALE; IT S D IST RIBU TION IS U NLI M IT ED .


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MEMORANDUMRM-5997-ARPAOCTOBER1969

ARPA ORDERNO . 18 9-1

FIGHTINGANDNEGOTIATINGINVIETNAM: A STRATEGY

This re search is su pported by th e A dvan ced Research P ro jects Agency under C ontra c tNo. D A H C IS 67 C 0142. Views or co nclusions con tain ed in th is st udy should no t be in te rp reted as representin g the official opinion or policy of A R P A .

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENTT his docum enthas bee nap pro ved for pub lic rt>lease and sale; it s dis tr ibu tion is un l imited.

VuVanTha i

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ R ~ n o ~ 70 0 MA. tN S l SANTA MO Nt CA CA. l lFO f !N IA 90406---


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This study is presented as a compe t ent treatment of the subject , worthy of pub-l icat ion. The Rand Corporation \'O uches for the quality of theresearch, withoutnecessari ly endorsing the opinions and conclusio ns of the authors.

Published by The R A N D C orporation


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PREFACE

This M em orandu m consolidates unpublished papers on Vie tnam pre-pared by th e author upon tw o occasions early in 1968: the Tet offen-sive and President Johnson's decision to reduce the bombing and ca l lfor negot iations . While some new ideas have bee n introduced in thein terim , and cer ta in parts c la r i f ied , l i t t l e more has been done to thearguments in the orig inal draf t s than to suppress a few sentences onthe to ta l bombing hal t and to update fo rmer reasoning, which in theau thor 's opinion has adequately withstood subsequent de velopment.The Soviet occupation of Czech oslo vakia , i n part icula r , did not affectthe au thor 's ea r l ie r vi ews co nce rnin g the des i rab il i ty of encouragingdiversi ficat ion of in te res t of the communist world in Southeast Asia.He thinks it essent ia l to en courage the developm en t of Russian in f luence in th is area. Also, in the l ig h t of the "Brezhne v Doctrine" andthe changin g character of Russian leadersh ip of the western communistmovements, itw il l be even more di f f icu l t for Russia and China topatch up thei r differences; China cannot accept, even ta c tical ly ,the Russian concept of leadership , and it i s now more d if f icu lt forRussia to m ake a special place for Chin a in a communist world other-wis e control led by the th reat of force.

The consolidated piece i s in the nature of a po l it i ca l essay,w ritten wit h the hope of stim ulating think ing on policy formulationan d s tra tegy during the present pha se of negot iat ions.

T he author i s awar e of some of the def ic iencies of the essay.Certain aspects only touched upon here, part icularly the analysis ofU.S. in te res t s and polic ies in Southeast Asia and the discussion ofthe socio-poli t ica l s truc ture of South Vietnam, deserve far deepertreatment. But since the main purpose i s to contribute to policyformulation during the nego tiat ions, time i s of the essence and thediscussion of these and other sim ilar top ics has bee n held to thes t r ic t m in im um necessary for c lari fy ing al l ied object ives and ex amininga stra tegy for "fighting and negotia ting ."


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M r. Vu Van Thai represente d the Republi c of Vietnam as Ambassadorto the United States from la te 1965 to early 1967, a t which time he resumed a career on the United Nations s t a f f , dealing with economicdevelopment. From 1950 to 1954, he was a non-communis t member of theCentral Committee of France of the Lien Viet (ear l ier , and moreco m m o nly, know n as the Viet Minh). After the Geneva negotiat ions of1954 (which he attended) , he joined the Diem government in Saigon andbecame Director of Budget and Foreign Aid unt i l he submitted his resignation in October 1960 (not accepted t i l l la te in 1961, when hejoined the United Nations). He has been a part- t ime consul tant toT h e RAND Corporat ion since 1967, an d i s principally occupied a t presentas consultant to the Administrator of the UN Development Pro gram.


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SUMMARY

This paper argues tha t there are promising opportunities forstrengthening the non-communist s tructure of South Vietnam, and forinducing and exploit ing in ternal conflicts among communist fac t ions,th rough a stra tegy of f ighting an d negotiat ing. United States policycan be designed to stim ulate favorable pol i t ica l de ve lopment andencourage a sett lement s t ress ing coexistence between communists andnon-communists. I t i s recognized that such a policy implies a r isktha t the communists might take over peacefully i f the non-communistsf a i l to strengthen themselves; but in the long run this r i sk inheresin any feasible policy. A r i sk taken no w for pol i t ica l development,while American m ili tary pressure is a t i t s peak, would be fa r lessthan a r isk postponed to a time w hen Am erican strength had beenreduce d to a token force.

In the long term, i f one admits that the United States cannotstay in Vietnam forever and tha t the communist re gime in North Vietnamcannot be destroyed, there are only tw o al ternat iv es : to withdraw,or to build up the socio-economic s t ruc ture of South Vietnam againstany fu rther communist subversion. From th is point of view, even acommunist "fade-out" or a t ruce must be considered as t ac tica l andinc idental. So long as the non-com munists in South Vietnam remainpol i t ica l ly weak, the communists w ill be motivated to maintain acer tain level of subversive ac t iv i t i e s , lying lo w w hen our m ilitarypressure is high, raising thei rs w hen we reduce ours.

Perhaps for the f i r s t time since America's entry into the V ie tnamese war , promising trends have developed towar d broadening theSaigon government. I t w as not coinc idental tha t these direct ly fo l -lowed President Johnson's decision to reduce the bombing and to moveto the negotiating tab le .

Observing past events, one i s led to feel that coalescence ofopinion among the population is possible and could be relat ive ly rap id .Take, for example , the momentum of the Buddhist and student m o v e m e n t s


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in 1963, or the popular acceptance of the Diem regime af te r the bat t leagainst the Binh Xuyen in Saigon in April-May 1955.

Concerning the emergence of enlightened leadership, fur therbroadening of the Huong Cabinet and, more importantly, moderation ofthe Saigon Government to allow po l i t i ca l personal i t ies to take a standon issues of war and peace an d socia l jus t ice might bring new leadersinto the forefront - - leaders ref lec t ing popular aspi ra t ions forpeace, socia l jus t ice , and a regime nei ther ruthless nor corrupt .

In South Vietnam the prospect of a forthcoming sett lement isalready beginning to sh i f t the pr ior i t ies of in te res t of the Saigonestablishment. As the conviction fades that the Americans wil l carryforever the burden of the struggle against communism, the mili taryregime may for the f i r s t time grant grea ter pr ior i ty to concern fornational survival an d less to concern for control of power an d conservat ion of the privi leges of the establishment. Replacement of thecolor less and obedient cabinet of Nguyen Van Loc by the far morerespectable cabinet of Tran Van Huong is a f i r s t important steptoward broadening the base of support of the government.

One must real ize that , because of his tor i ca l circumstances, ant i communism in Vietnam is closely associated with the conservation ofacquired privi leges . Power an d socia l pre-eminence in the government,in the army, and in business belong exclusively to one group of people.They are persons who, during the f ight for independence, chose tocontr ibute to the perpetuation of French rule , or a t l eas t to Frenchpresence, as a fac t of l i f e in order to obtain privi leged treatment- - in ei ther case cutt ing themselves off from the mainstream of Viet namese aspira t ions . There i s now close corre la t ion between a hardl ine on communism and the preservation of established priv i leges .Only fear for the i r own survival might force the present establishmentto re l inquish power to more moderate groups not hampered by vestedinterests in undertaking socia l reforms - - reforms that would makethe government more popular with the population. Such leadershipwould be in a posi t ion to seek a coalescence of major non-communist


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have seen since April 1968, the fight ing-and-negotiating process i smore favorable to su ch development than were pas t phases of purelym il i tary, an d increas ingly U.S., ef for t. This is not to say, ofcourse, tha t it is highly l ikely that the desired evolution of the GVNwil l be achieved - - yet it is perfectly feas ib le , and most of thediscussion re flec ts tha t premise.

In addit ion, decisions by the communists themselves have already generated potent ia lly exploitable t ime-pressures to achieve a se t t l ement.

Within the Communi s t Party of Vietnam, the successive decisionsto launch the Tet offensive ( interpreted as the f i r s t step 0f the"general uprising") an d to begin f ighting and negot iat ing representan important departure from the i r t r ad it ional caut ions. Rarely havethe communists made decisions tha t squeezed them or cut the i r abi l i tyto s tre tch out act ions over time. But now, in f ac t , they havenarrowed the i r freedom of decision in this regard. Having base d the i r propaganda and indoctr ination l i t e ra ture for so long on the ro le ofthe general uprising, and of fight ingand negotiating, in the f ina lphase of the conflict (the relat ion between the two concepts beingl e f t ambiguous), the wa r mu st now be concluded by successive waves ofgeneral offensive (m il i tary, pol i t ica l , or both) , or the negotia t ionsmust come to a favorable conclusion. One can reasonably expect , i fnei ther negot iations nor successive m ili tary offensives bring subs tan t i a l resul ts soon, tha t tensions between the advocates of aprotracted wa r and those who pushed for the Tet offensive and forfighting while negotiating wil l be exacerbated fu rther. And sinceavoidance of factionalism is a primary concern of communist p ar t ies ,th is might be an important factor in inducing the communist s to aset t lement .

Within the communist world, negotiation s and the prospect of asettlement in Vietnam might bring about divergent in te rests . Russianand Chinese in te res ts , fo r example , could becom e les s compatible.D istrust and a cooling off of re la t ionships between the DRV andCommun is t China are also l ike ly .


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A very hard l in e ~ a very soft line in our negot iating posit ionwould enc ourage unity in the communist c a mp . A f lexible posit ion,bringing into pla y th e confl ic t ing in te rests of adverse part ies , isboun d to foster differences of opinion among Hanoi 's leaders . Increasing tensions betwee n the Chinese and the Russians would forceHano i into d iff icu l t options l ikely to generate conf l ic ting viewsam ong the Vietnamese communist leadership.

Whatever the degree of control o f Hanoi ove r the NLF, suspicionand concern abo ut i t s progressive loss w ill be present in the mindsof th e L ao Don g party leaders during th e negotiatio ns. As for theNLF , although i t s basic f ide li ty to Hano i cannot be questioned, i twould probably favor a settlement that w ould ensure for i t se l f agreater degree of autonomy. This feeling is l ike ly to grow as Hanoi'ssuspicions and desire to preserve control becom e m ore ob vious duringthe negotiations.

The issue of unif icat ion is l ike ly to polarize points of viewbetween th e DRV and the NLF. A long and f lexible process of unif icat ion , through North-Sout h discussions co ncerning progressive confederat ion , would pro bably appeal more strongly to the NLF th an to theDRV, as suming that the NLF does not run the r i sk of being crushed inthe South and that i t has a fa i r expectation of playing a s ign if icantpoli t ica l role there. This point highlights the im po rtance of designin g clauses in the settlement tha t w ill tend to preserve the rightsof po l it ica l m inorities and protect them against persecution. Provid ed that a compromise settlement does no t predetermine the dominanceof one faction or another, both communists and non -communists w illfeel th e need for su ch a guarantee for the ir own security.

Thus, many factors are l ike ly to bring about internal divergencies of opinio n and interes t on th e communist side during the negot iat ions. I f our own internal s trength (on the a ll ie d side) is notweakened with ti me, we have an in te res t in prolongin g th e negotiat ions.

Without a soften ing of the position of the Sai go n government towar d the NLF, there is l i t t l e chance of sp l i t t ing the DRV and theNL F, and the prospect of a compromise settlem ent w ill remain dim.


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As uncertainty about i t s fu tu re re la tionsh ip with Chin a grows,Hanoi may diversify i t s trade and economic re lat io nsh ips in other areas .Th us, Hanoi may ha ve a growing inte re st in North-South t rade and economiccooperation, although the DRV mus t s t i l l be concerned about preservingi t s options for mending rela tionships with Chin a in the af termath of aset tlement.

The facto rs of change outl ined above show tha t a compromisesettlem ent should not be conceived as imposing s ta t ic l imi ts leadingto a frozen position , but ra ther as creating a f lex ib le frame adaptableto the po l i t ic a l environment in Asi a af te r the war. Such a set tlem entwould hav e to combine pa r t ia l containment of incompatible in te rests ofthe adverse part ies with a sor ting out of overlapping in te re s ts .Basically , th is means accepting some communist partic ipa tion in SouthVietnamese pol i t ic a l l i fe , or even ( less preferably) in South V ietnamese governmental a ffa irs , against communist concessions tha t would :

o Encourag e greater independence of the NLF from Hanoi, bymaking the part icipat ion of the NLF in the pol i t i ca l l i f e of South Vietnam dependent on the acceptance of certa inconcessions. Th ese would be desi gned to increase thel ikelihood tha t the pol i t ic a l structure of South Vietnamwould be basica l ly democratic and differen t from thepol i t i ca l structure in North Vietnam.

o Enc our age Nort h Vie tnam to maintain an independent l ine from China by (1) making North-South re lat ions a clauseof the settlement and (2 ) reinforcing th is clause byintroducing a plan for North -South cooperation in reconst ruction .

A l i s t of bu il t- in safeguards to these end s might include:o A lengthy schedule for U.S . troop withdrawal.o The preservat ion of a s ignif ican t non-communist army.o Consti tut ional and in te rnat ional guarantees against the

repression of m inority groups.


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o The r igh t of free trave l abroad for South Vietnamesec it izens .

o The guarantee of a South Vietnam open to a l l foreigninfluences and assistance .o Provisions for postwar reconstruction.o Provisions for economic cooperationwith other Southeast

Asian countries.o A f lex ib le and lengthy process of reun if ica tion .o Involving the USSR in an active ro le in peacekeepin g

in Vie tnam in the postw ar period.To bring a settlement of th is type in to being, our overa ll

stra tegy during the period of fighting and negotiating should have asi t s objec tives:

o To broaden the range of in te re s ts of the adverse part ies . o To change the po l i t ic a l context of the communist world and

of Southeast Asia, permitting diversif ica tion and d ivergence of in te re s t among the various communis t pa rties . Also, to increase the probab il ity of peaceful coexistencebetween North Vie tnam and i t s non-communis t neighbor, onthe one hand, and between non -communis ts and communists in Vietnam, on the other.

o To discourage communist expectations of complete controlof South Vie tnam, while creating incentives for coexistence and cooperation.

o To preserve the unity of the a l lied cause during thenegotia tions, regarding both i t s in te rna l opinions andre la tionsh ips be tween a l l ie s . Particu larly important in th is respect i s the objective of strengthening SouthVie tnam through negotia tions.


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o To stimulate favorable p o l i t i ca l developments in SouthVietnam. The United States would have to make clear i t sw illingness to write-off Vietnam i f it proves to be ameaningless cause, as well as i t s continued support i f there i s progress toward a government able to withstand pol i t i ca l competit ion from the communists .

To improve our chances for bringing about the condit ions of anoptimal set t lement, we must accept a time perspective lo ng enough forthe desired effec ts . Fighting and negot iat ing should be viewed as acontest of p o li t ica l at t r i t io n between developing "contradict ions" inthe communist camp and in ours. Our strategy should be designed tostrengthen our ab i l i ty to susta in a reasonably lengthy process ofnegot iat ions by strengthening points susceptible to communist erosion.The mos t essen t ia l factors are the unity of opinion in the UnitedStates , the mora le of the South Vietnamese army, and the pol i t ica lcoalescence of the South Vietnamese no n-c ommunists aro und a moderateSouth Vietnamese go vernment.

As for the chances of a peaceful aftermath, an agreement coveringa wide range of diversifie d in tere s ts would improve the chances ofim plementation by presenting the contendin g par t ies with a l ternat ivepol ic ie s , thus allowin g them to respect the ag reement without frust ra t ing v i ta l intere sts . One must nevertheless admit that , in acompromise settlement of th is nature , there is a d is t inc t poss ib i l i tyfor a f inal communist take-over of South Vietnam. But i f this wereto happen under the proposed condi t ions, it would happen gradually,over a period of t ime, without major violence or v iola t ion of theagreement. The loss of South Vie tnam under these circumstances wouldhave minimal impact on the evolution of Southeast Asia. The i nevi t able loss of morale might be rationalized by the conviction that U.S.commitments have l imi t s and tha t the Vietnamese no n-communists havehad t he i r chances; this may well stimulate Southeast Asian leaders toimprove the pol i t i cal appeal and efficiency of the i r regime. Thus,the resul t might be, over time, a stronger Southeast Asia than thepresent one . Of course the countries now strongly aligned with the


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Unit ed Sta tes might evolv e toward a more in dependent stand; but th is might ease a U.S. sh i f t of polic ies in the postwar period and favor

the launchin g of SoutheastAsian cooperation.


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PREFACESUMMARY .

SectionI

I I

I I I

IV

v

VI

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTIONTHE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT - - THE SPECTRUM OFINTERESTS OF THE ADVERSE PARTIES . .

U.S. Interes ts and F lexib ili ty of Aims Factors Affecting Vietnamese C om m unis tInteres ts and F lex ib ili ty . . .T he Interes ts of the Non-communists ofSouth VietnamSTRATEGIES FOR ENDING THE WAR

Alternative Strategies and the Lon g-term Outcom e . . . . . . .A Strategy of Negotiations .M ilitary StrategyPoli t ica l Strategy E conom ic StrategyDip lo matic Strategy

THE RANGE OF COMPROMISE SETTLEMENTSThe Opt imal and the Minimal AlternativesT he Strategic Provisions of a Com prom is eSettlement . . . . . . . . . .

THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EVENTUAL BREAK IN THENEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . .

iii

v

1

55

1322 28

2830 3233353840 4041

48T he Chances of an Escalation of the War 48The International Context and the Chancesof a Break . . . . . . . . . 51

THE RISKS OF VIOLATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF ASETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 56 T he Risks of Violation of the Agreement 57The Risk s of Non-ad here nce to the Conditi onsof the Cease-fire 63Consequences of an Eve ntual Loss of Sou th Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65


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I . INTRODUCTION

We are now entering a new phase of confrontat ion with the c om-munists. Most l ikely it wi l l be a phase of f ighting and negotia ting.Negotiations can be expected to be long and arduous. Meanwhile, thef ighting w ill go on , probably un t il a cease-f ire or truce has beenagreed to .

Under these conditio ns, to approach negot iations simply as at ac t ica l process of bargaining to reach a compromise agreement, usingthe leverage of our "cards" to obtain concessions from the adversary,might be shor t-s ighted. As the process of negot iations unfolds overa re l a tive ly lengthy period, the pol i t i ca l context in which the conf l i c t is taking place will change. This is the more l ike ly to be sosince the decision to move to the conference tab le might in duce theevolut ion of many pol i t ica l factors frozen till now by the prospectof uncompromising confrontat ion. By conceiving the Paris ta lksoutside the context of an overal l stra tegy to achieve s tab le longterm po li t i ca l goals, we might fa i l to influence the evolution of thebroad pol i t i ca l context in a favorable d irec t ion . T hus we might f a i lto create the conditions for a s tab le and peaceful aftermath.

In thei r doctr inal approach, the communists conceive of negotiations as a new dimension in thei r struggle for the control (and thecommunization) of South Vietnam, and , more broadly , as signify ing astep toward the expansion of thei r influence in Southeast Asia andother developing countr ies. In the i r expressed view, they do not haveas a pr imary purpose arr iv ing a t a set t lement. Fighting and negot ia t ing have always been represented as a stratagem to rel ieve pressureon t he i r m ilita ry effor t while they devise new m eans of accentuatingal l ied "contradict ions" ( that i s , devel0ping conflicting trends on our s ide) . In br ie f , th is is a st ra tegy for broadening thei r m e a ns ofstruggle , par t icu lar ly with regard to po li t ica l action, while limit ingthe range of our m eans of counteraction . The settlement is viewed asthe f inal step in consolidating the resul ts obtained during the negot ia t ing phase of the struggle .


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I do not fee l tha t the communists are entering in to th is ph ase inthe condition described by thei r doctrine as the f inal step teward victory. Bu t whatever the ir appraisal of the si tua t ion and whatever th econsiderations tha t led them to depart from doctr ine, one ca n be suretha t they will t ry to exp loit the negotiating posture to the maximumto achieve thei r pol i t ic a l goals and re lieve the ir own l im ita t ions .H istorica lly and s ty l i s t ica l ly , th e Vie tn amese are among the mos t sk i l l -fu l of communist parties in th e pragmatic use of tac t ics an d th e choiceof s tra teg ies . Thus th e ir s tra teg ic approach and even to a cer ta in .measure the ir objectives for th e ph ase of fighting and negotiatingmight depend to a s ignif icant degree upon the efficiency of our owncounterstrategy.

An unwise "bargaining approach" on our part mig ht resu l t in th eprogressive erosion of th e a l l ied position th rough communist m ilitary ,po li t ica l , psychological, and prop aganda moves. The communists mig htth en f ina l ly obtain a settlement tha t would enable them to la unch another ph ase of communist expansio n with respect, a t once, to the ir Vietnamese goals, the ir Southeast Asian goals , an d thei r worldwide goals.

The outcome of th e phase of f ighting and negotiating might dependin large part on whether our objectives an d the tac t ica l us e of ourmil itary , ec ono mic , diplomatic, and po li t ica l means are rea lis t ica l lyconceived for progressive strengthening as th e process of f ighting andnegotiating unfolds and tim e passes. I t will be of part icular importance to examine whether our objectives th ro ugh this phase are closelyadapted to th e fu ll po tent ial as well as th e lim itations of a fightingand-negotiating posture. This w ill necessita te clarifying what weconsider to be a favorable outcome both for th e Unit ed States and forfree Vie tnam. Even i f such a concept could be defined for the Unit edStates in ter ms of her long-range in te re s ts , for free Vietnam i t is very hard to decide which combin ation of aims represents the true inte res t of a non-communist Vietnamese nation. Yet we can not ignorethese questions, for we can be sure tha t communist effo rts during thephase of fighting and negotiating will fo cus on narrowing the base ofsupport of the Sa igon go vernment, whil e broadenin g differences between


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th e Saigon g@ vernmen t and the United States and increasing the gap between the American negot iating posit ion an d the mainstream of Vie tnamese popular asp ira t ions .

I f a m ilitary vic tory for ei the r side is to be ruled out there ,th e ph ase of f ighting and negotiating has, by necessity , lim ited objec t ives . For th e com munists th ese are clear ly to bring about a s i tu ation favorable to a communist takeover of Sou th Vietnam during th efo ll&Wing phase, while preparing th e way for further communist actionin -Southeast Asia.

To counteract the communist s tra tegy , we must think of f ightingan d negotiating as an integrated approach, where our military , economic,and po l i t i ca l actions are conceived an d articu la ted together to achievean important step to ward th e rea lizat ion of ou r long-term broad objec-

-t ives. The notion is to take fu ll opportunity of changi ng condi-t ions created by the in troduct ion of new dimensio ns of negotiationin to the Vietnam confl ict to in duce the desired process of evolutionof th e communist side and of our own. Th e im mediate goal w ill be tobring about conditions favorable to a compromise settlement desig nedto prepare th e climate for a peaceful ra pprochement of th e two Vie tnams,an d more broadly to promot e grea te r pol i t i c a l s tab i l i ty in SoutheastAsia in the postwar period.

This implies examinin g a l l ways and means by wh ich we could takeadvantage of a negot iating posture to influen ce:

Fi r s t , th e evolut ion of th e communist world towa rd aless aggressive stand in Vietnam and, more broadly, inSoutheast Asia. Second, the deve lap ll l@ nt of favorable trends to strengthenthe non-c om munis t soc io-poli t ica l structure of South Viet

nam and enable it to withstand peaceful competition withth e communists . Third, the establishment of a de-escalated po lit i ca l c l i mate, necessary to make possible a rea l compromise s e t t lemen t, th us enhancing th e chances of i t s im ple mentati onan d of a stable aftermath. The ta lks in Paris will th usnot be separated from the conduct of th e war an d of policyin Vietnam. All of these will become components of an


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overall s tra tegy of negot iations designed to end thephase of l im ited war and prepare the way for a global,and more speci f ical ly a Southeast Asian, policy towardcommunism .The present study aims a t identifying the main i ssues and factors

of such a stra tegy of negotiations, and a t analyzing the ir possible im pact in a changing pol i t i ca l context.

Much of the discussion that follows may appear naively optim ist ic unless a particu la r const rain t i s appreciated c lear ly a t the outset.Essen tia l ly none of the object ives described in this study can be a t tained from the communists by compromise, given communist hop es and aimsfostered by the present milita ry and pol i t ica l s ituat ion in Vietn am.Hopes on the GVN side to achieve a settlement - - short of a near-te rm,un ila tera l , loss-cutting U.S. withdrawal - - must re s t on the chancesof s igni f icant improvement in ei ther the m ilitary or the po l i t i ca l sphere, or both. Of the two, I believe tha t pol i t i ca l improvement i sa t the sam e tim e more atta inab le and more fu ndamental and cr i t ic a l .Thus, i t i s essent ia l, i f we are to achieve a settlem ent which preserves non-communist inte re s ts , that appropriate pol i t ic a l develo pmenttake place in South Vietnam during the process of figh ting and negot ia t ing . Indeed, as we have seen in the past year, th is process is(I would argue) more favorable to su ch development than wer e pastphases of purely m ilita ry , and increasin gly U.S., ef fo r t . This is notto say, of course, tha t i t is highly l ike ly that the desired im provement w ill be achieved, even i f (as a f i r s t step) th is is recognized asa crucial desideratum. Yet I believe tha t it is perfectly feas ib le- - and most of the discussion re f lec ts tha t premise.


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I I . THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT - - THE SPECTRUM OFINTERESTS OF THE ADVERSE PARTIES

A com prehensive analysis of th e in te rests of the principal antagonis ts , of the degre e of compatibility be tw een the different in te res ts of each, and of the factors tha t will influence the re la t ive p r io ri ty of an y one se t of in terests is essentia l for the formulation of adynamic counterstrategy. An understanding of these in te res ts is importan t not only because communist e ffo r ts w ill concentrate on broadenin gwhat they consider to be "contradictions" ( tha t i s , conflicting in tere stson our s ide) , but also because to appraise the ch ance s of in ducing aless aggressive s tra tegy from th e communist side we need a fu l l understanding of the ir diverse in te res ts and of the degree of com patibilitybetween th e m in a lte rna tive in ternational an d Vietna mese p o lit ic a l contex ts . Finally , i t is only in the degree to which the agreem ents re -spect the true de ep in terests of the non -comm unist Vie tn am ese andprovide for conditions favora ble to their further developmen t in thepostwar period tha t there is a chance of avoiding comm unization of thewho le of Vietnam in the lo ng run.

U.S. INTERESTS AND FLEXIB IL IT Y OF AIMSWhatever th e diversity of opinio n on the U.S . commitment in Viet- .

nam , there is general agreement tha t South Vietnam by i t s e l f hold sl i t t l e direc t in t e re s t for the United Sta te s; i t is important only inthe broader context of Southeast Asia. In turn, the long-range U.S .in te re s t in Southeast Asia i s rela ted to i t s worldwide policy towardco mmuni sm and communist countries, part icu larly Russia and Chin a.Despite the Sino-Soviet r i f t and th e trend toward polycentrism in thecommunist world, U.S. Asia n policy, bec ause of the legacy of past com -mitments and of the chain of events (par ticu lar ly in Vietnam), has notev olved s ign if ican tly from the basic concept of the period of the ColdW ar, w hen co mmunism was monolithic and the world bipolar ized .

A settlem ent in Vietnam could represent for the United States animportant op enin g for clearning past legacies and introducing new policy


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approaches to ward . Southeast Asia in the perspective of a changin gstra tegy tow ard a divers ified communis t world . Nevertheless, oneshould not conceive of an abrupt and dramatic turn in Amer ican policy .Realis t ical ly , there will be no d iscern ib le d iscontinuity from"during" to "after ' ' Vie tna m. Rather, the process of negotiat ion an dthe imple mentatio n of successive phases of a settlement will create achanging climate with opportunities for progressive ch ang e of emphas isand gradual in troduction of new elements of grea ter f lex ib il i ty in to ex is ting po lic ie s.

Although there are many varia t ions , the a lte rna tives for Am er icanpolicy are ro ughly three:

1. The continuation of a policy of r ig id containment, whichimplies the mainte nance of a milita ry presence complemented by economicaid to non- com munis t countries to strengthen the ir capacity to re s is tcommunist subversion.

2. A nee-iso la t ion ist policy . Basically , th is means a progressive disengagement from Southeast Asia couple d with a policy tha t will place the United States in a posit ion of arb i tra to r in the competitionbetw een Russia and Chin a.

3. A policy of progressive sh if ting from contain ment to a flexib le combinati on of containment, deterrence, cooperation, and coexistence - - coupled with a policy of encouragin g diversif ica t ion andin te res ts an d the evolution of communism to ward s a polycentrics t ruc tu re .

Appli ed spec if ical ly to a settlement in Vietn am, one can then seethree types of settlem ents:

1. A return to the s ta tus guo: two Vie tn ams, on e communist and one anti communis t, mutually an tagonis tic . This type of so lu tion i s very unlikely now , since it could be achieved only throughmili ta ry pressure su ff icien t to force the comm unist s to "fade out" of SouthVietnam. But even i f , unexpectedly, the present s ta r t to ward nego t ia tion fa iled and we wen t on to achieve such a fade-out, the followingco nsequences could be foreseen in the lo ng run.


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North Vietnam mig ht return to a close relat ionship with China,reversing the trend to wards polycentrism tha t was beginning to emergein the Asian communist m ove me nt since 1965. This trend wa s show n bydeclarat ions of independence fro m the Chinese l ine by the North Koreanan d the Japanese C o m m unis t Part ies in the wake of Chinese re jec t ion ofunity of action in support of North Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Vietnamesecommunists were evolvin g toward a doctrina l l ine increasingly independent of Chinese doctrine , par t icular ly regarding wars of l iberat ion .

In my view, Chinese and North Vietnamese in te rests would againbecome para l le l in th is case, for the following reasons. T he V ietnamese communist would then be f ighting for the very surv ival of the irregime in the North. Their present leadership has been so committedto the aim of "l iberat ion of the South," and the sacr i f ices by thei rfollowers both in North and South have bee n so grea t, tha t completefai lure of th is venture would shake the government and party s t ructureof the DRV to i t s foundations. Under these circumstances, the Partycannot but be concerned about preservin g i t s contro l over the populat ion of the North. Whatever the degree of divergence of the i r otherin te res ts , the Vietnames e and Chines e commun ist s wil l feel boundtogether by the im mediate th rea t of an American "victory" in the South.

Apart from future mili ta ry successes that might cause the VietGong to fade out, the fact re mains tha t the Vietnamese communistsfighting alone and only with aid from the communist world, hav esucceeded in sta lemating American counte refforts for a number of years.They have m a na ge d to bring in te rna l dissensions in the United States to the point where the single-minded pursuit of the war has had to beab andoned __and negotiat ions s tar ted to avoid in terna l conf l i c t s . What-ever the f inal ou tcome, the trauma of "never being again engaged in another Vietnam" is not l ikely to disappear easily from Americanopinion.

Taking a l l these considerat ions together , the mos t l ike ly conclusion to be drawn by the communists i s tha t , i f an iso la ted ef fortin a l im ited area , South Vietnam , can almost succeed, a more extendedat tack , obliging American forces an d resources to s t retch out over as


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many countr ies as possible, would make the margin for ult imate v ic tory .After a l l , the idea of '1rnore of the same" need not be res t r ic ted to ourown side in the breaking of stalemates. And on the communist side,following a provisional setback, an extended ef for t careful ly preparedin time and la unched in as many places of Southeast Asia as possiblemakes more sense than our perseverance in intensify ing the use of meanstha t have clear ly diminishing re turns. Also, in case of serious setback,the communists cannot survive without very s t r i c t adherence to the irdoctr inal l ine . In this case, emphasis on in ternatio nal communist so l idar i ty and the liberat ion of Vi etnam as part of the broaderstruggle in Southeast Asi a is the only way to maintain hope andgalvanize the energies of the i r cadres.

The Chinese cannot but encourage these Vietnamese t rends, whichboth bring them closer to the Chinese doctr in al l ine and serve thepurpose of protecting the ir secur i ty.

As for the Russians, they cannot l e t the North Vietnamese downwithout losing the confidence of a l l communist par t ie s .

Thus the f inal resul t of forcing the communists to fade out fromSouth Vi etnam would be a greater degree of unity in the communistcamp. This unity i s most l ikely to be directed to ward preparing andla unching sim ultaneous wa rs of l iberat ion in several Southeast Asiancountr ies, with the Vietnamese playing the spearheading and r isk -taking ro le and China act ing as the main controll ing force.

An al ternat ive course of events mig ht well be the collapse ofthe communist regime in North Vietnam as a r esu l t of the admissionof defea t im plied in a fade-out . In th is case, considerable turmoilcould be expected in the t e r r i to ry of the DRV, to which nei ther theChinese nor the GVN (with the ARVN) could be passive, thus creating apossibly serious in ternational cr i s i s . The United States mig ht evenfind i t s e l f in a si tuatio n of uncontro l lable clash with Chinese v i ta lin te res ts .

Besides, a fade-out might not bring the favorable po l i tica levolut ion that many Americans might expect in South Vietnam. As th is


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study w ill argue in i t s la te r part , an analysis of the power s tructure of the GVN and the motivations of differen t layers of the non-communistpopulati on indicates tha t the m ilitary would tend to recover whateverpart of authority th ey might ha ve relinquished to the c iv il ians . Sucha regim e wou ld rem ain poorly motivate d and weak for a long time. Arecurrence of communist subversion could be deterred only i f the Unite dStates wer e to continue to maintain a strong m ilitary presence. Animport ant m ilitary build-up would hamper the process of economic reconstruction and develo pment, and thus perpetuate the weakness of theSaigon regime.

2. A settlement on communist terms, leading to a progressivecommunist take-over of South Vietnam . This will happen i f , duringthe process of negotia tions, the po li t ica l context has not changed

tha t i s , i f : o The divergence of in te res ts inside the communist world fa i ls

to m ateria lize.o Po lit ica l developments in Sou th Vietnam do not change the

present power struc ture .o The negotiations re su lt in the establishment of a coali tion

govern ment, or in elections with Communis t Party participa tion , without a se t of bu il t- in clauses desig ned both to create in te re s t in coexistence betw een comm un ist s and non-communists and to provide effect ivesafeguards against the persecution of po li t ica l or other m inori ties . Th ese topics will be discussed in th e subsequent paragraphs.

A settlement on these terms might have the foll owing consequence .The Vietn amese communis ts wou ld have im mense prestige in te rnationally ,but enormous pro ble ms of reconstruction a t home. Most l ike ly , thereconstruction process in the North and South and the establishmentof communist ru le in South Vietnam would receive prior ity ; but theVie tn amese communis ts wou ld attempt to play an im portant ro le in Southeast Asia, a t lea st wh ere foreign ac t iv i t ies would not s tra in theresources required for the reconstruction of the countr y. I t is


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reasonable to expect more po l it ica l than m ili tary action from theVietnamese communists a fte r a settlem ent .

In Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand they might be expected to exportp o l i t i ca l and some mili tary cadres to strengthen the local communistinf rast ructure, ra ther than to attempt d irec t m ilitary intervention.{Nevertheless, North Vietnamese troops present ly in La os w il l perhapsnot be withdrawn.) One might also expect sizable shipments of surplusarms, i f the present equipment of ARVN fa l l s under communis t controlas a r esu l t of the settlement .

There might be some competition between China and North Vietna mover thei r relat ive role in Southeast Asia; but this is not l ikely togo very far , since for the next decade or so externa l assistan ce{except to Laos and Cambodia) w ill receive only second pr ior i ty am ongNorth Vietnamese policy object ives .

China would emerge in the immediate aftermath with a tr iumphantdoctrine of war of l iberat ion , which would put her in a favorableposit ion to play a leading role in the expansion of communist subversion in Southeast Asia. Also an intens if icat ion of the competitionbetween China and Russia for the contro l of communist movements indeveloping countrie s could reasonably be expected.

The mos t serious consequence for the United States might stemfrom pol i t i ca l developments in the free countries of Southeast Asia.Everywhere governments might look for some form of so ft accommodationwith China and be-moresuscept ible to Chines e pressure. Fro-Westernna t ional is t movements would be discredi ted, both because alignmentwith the United States had be en proven ineffective and because theywould be ident i f ied with those of the losing pro-Western nat ionalis tre gim e in China and in Vietnam. More genera lly , non-com munist move-ments to achieve national goals would lose c redib i l i ty , while communismwi l l appear as the champion of nationalism and as the most eff ic ien tsys tem for fu l f i l l ing national popular aspira t ions .

In view of these consequences, U.S. options in Southeast Asiawould be narrowe d to two extreme po l ic ies : (1 ) e i ther to harden the


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present lin e and substantially increase the U. S. mili ta ry presenceand commitment in Southeast Asia, in an attempt to rees tabl ish thecredib i l ity of U.S. determination to remain in the area (a policy ofmore inf lexib le contain ment) or (2) forced by changes in a t t i tudesamong Southeast Asian governments, to begin a progressive disengagement from the area.

United States withdrawal from Southeast Asia might r esu lt in awild struggle of influence betw een China and Russia. This could placethe United States in the posit ion of a rb i t rator . Also, the s t rugglecould oblige both Russia and China to take a strong anti-Western stand.The consequences of th is competition for world peace are unpredictablebut ominous.

In addition, pol i t ica l reactions in the United States to aVietnamese settlement tantamount to withdrawal are l ikely to exacerbatera ther than heal pol i t ica l divis ions . The already l imited optionsreferred to above might be narrowed again by the very div is ion of U.S.in ternal opinion. The United States might be driven in to a neei so lat ion is t posture by the fai lure - - because of in te rna l disunity to ac t decisively following a settlem ent in Vietnam.

3. A compromise settlement along tw o a lternat ive l ines of U.S.in te res ts .

One l ine i s to pursue a lim ited objective to f rus t ra te enoughcommunist ambitions to preserve the confidence of other Southeast Asia ncountries. In this case the stra tegy of negotiat ion would be focusedon improving the Western bargaining posit ion through a strengthenedmili tary posture and in terna l pol i t ic a l environment . Such a compromisesettlement i s d if f icu l t to conceive, but it might be nothing more thanan ex tended t ruce .

The a lte rnat ive l ine i s to extend the range of U.S. in te res t s ,creat ing an overlapping of common or para l lel in teres ts between theUnited States and South Vietnam, on the one s ide , and each of theseparate communist parties?on the other , while simultaneously playingup divergencies of inte res t am ong the communist par t i es . Such a se tof wide in teres ts would comprise:


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o The acceptance of a cer tain degree of communist participat ionin Sou th Vietnamese po l i ti ca l l i f e or even governmental a f fa i r s , agains tcommunist concessions on clauses guaranteeing the maintenance of divers i ty of trade and other relat ionships be tween South Vietnam and the re stof the world.

o Creating condit ions for greater in dependence of the NLF fromHanoi by making i t s par t icipa tion in the p ol i t i ca l l i f e of SouthVietnam dependent on the acceptance of concessions ensuring that thepol i t i ca l s truc ture of South Vietnam would remain basica l ly democraticand different from tha t in Nort h Vietnam.

o Encouraging North Vietnam to maintain an independent l inefrom Chin a by making North-South re la t ions a clause of the set t lement,and reinforcing th is clause by introduc ing a plan for North-Southcooperation in reconstruc tion.

o M a k i ng reunif ica tion a f lex ib le process of progressiveconfederation through North-South negot iat ions over a long period oftim e.

o Involving the USSR in an active ro le of peace-keeping in Vietnam in the postwar period.

Past experiences - - par t icu larly the Laotian c r is is of 1962-1963,the Sino-Indian con fl ict , and the Indo-Pakistan conf lic ts - - indicatetha t, as fa r as Southeast Asia i s concerned, Russian influence has as tabi l izing ef fec t . Since the begin ning of the Sino-Soviet r i f t ,Vietnam i s the only place where the Russians hav e been sq ueezed into an uneasy paral le lism with C om m u nist China. Relative to continen talChina, Southeast Asia is located ju s t on the other side of the Sino-Soviet border hence i t s im portance to any Russian policy of deterr ingChina from an aggressive policy.

I d o not m ean here tha t the Russians could be expected to adopta policy of cooperation or parallel ism with the Unite d Sta tes , butonly that Russian influence in Vietnam would be benefic ia l , fo r


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tw o ma in reasons. F irs t , it would tend to accentuate the divers i f ica-t ion of in te res t s of the communist world as a whole in Southeast Asia,thus emasculating (to a certa in degree) i t s aggressiveness. Second,in tim e of acute tensions, on e might expect para l lel action from theUnited States and the USSR to check an y dangerou s esca lat ion . Thiscould be expected eve n i f there is a temporary patch-up in the SinoSoviet r i f t , bec ause it i s in these circumstances tha t v i t a l Sino-Sovietintere s ts clash.

FACTORS AFFECTING VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST INTERESTS AND FL EXIBILITYThe pressure of pas t mistakes. Because of the Geneva agreements ,

which ended in the present war, and of the m odus vivendi signed withFrance in 194 6, which ended in the long and bloody eight-year waragainst the French, the communis t leadership w ill have great d iff icu ltysoftening t he i r four conditions for a settlem ent. Thus, on e mustexpect a hard, stubborn negotiating l in e for a lon g tim e. But when suff icien t ti me has elapsed and the com mun ists fee l th ey have anintere st in concludin g the negotiat ions, they w ill merely maintainthe form of the ir four points but soften the ir in te rpre tat ion . Infac t , the four conditions as they have been enunciated leave ampleroom for maneuver. There i s also the ambiguity introduced by tw o se tsof condi tions: the four points of the DRV and the f ive points of theNLF. This gives them the added f lex ib i l i ty of bei ng able to play upone se t or the other .

Nevertheless, because of the co llec t ive responsib ili ty of thepresent leadership (except for L e D uan ) in signing the Geneva Agree ments, they cannot be expecte d to take the responsibili ty of an agreem ent that does not provide substant ia l gains. Also, rememberingGeneva, where they were in duced to accept the agre ement by the Russiansand the Chinese, they wil l be carefu l in l is ten ing to external communistadvice, and wil l m ake certa in to appear as clear masters of the ir owngam e. The suspicion of fa ll ing in to a U.S.-USSR deal w ill be everpresent in the ir min ds.


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The homogenei ty and the so lida ri ty of communist leadersh ip. Theprospect of the death of Ho Chi Minh will influence the behavior ofthe communist leaders . Uncertainty about the evolution of the presents tructure of leadership once Ho ChiMinh disappears from the scenewill e i ther make the leaders cautious in taking a stand on a matter soimportant for the future of th e ir party as a sett lement of thewar, ortend to c ry s ta l l ize the fac tions contending for leadership .

One must also observe that the decision to en ter negotiationsbecame evident a f te r the 1968 Tet offensive. The change of strategyimplied by th is double move represented an important decision for the

communist leadersh ip . In fac t, they nar rowed th e ir freedom of decision

with regard to the time perspective . The Tet offensivemust have beenunderstood by a l l communist cadres ei ther as the general uprising oras i t s f i r s t phase. Now, successivewaves of general offensivemust follow or the negotia tions must com e to a favorable conclusion.Because of the inconclusiveness of the Tet offensive (whatever resu lts were achieved, they were not dec isive), tensions between the leaderswho ple aded for the new strategy and th e ir opponents must bemounting,because neither side can prove the otherwrong. These differencesmust be further polarized by the decision to move to the negotiatingtable .

To appreciate the fu ll meaning of these tw o successive ac tions,one must remember th a t one charac te r is t ic of the Vietnamese communists i s th e ir primary concern about keeping time on th e ir s ide. Rarely in the ir his to ry have they made decis ions that risked cutting th e ir ab i l i ty to s tre tch actions over a long period of time. This i s oneof Ho ChiMinh's deepest imprints on the communist party of Vie tnam.

I f negotiations and successivemilita ry offensives do not bring

substantia l resu lts in a re la tively short period of time, tensionsbetween the advocates of a protrac ted war and advocates of the Tetoffensive and the fighting-and-negotiating phase of the war w il l beexacerbated fu r ther . I t i s , then, important for us to observe communists tra tegy during the early period of negotiations for signs of impatience


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for progress in the negotiat ions; impatience would indicate factionaldispute.

Avoidance of fac t iona lizatio n has always been a primary concernof communist par t ies . This unanimity-mindednes s might consti tute animportant factor in in ducing the communists to a sett lem ent. Weshould study how to induce and en courage the developmen t of thesetrends . A very hard negotiating posi tion as well as a very soft on ewil l encourage unity in the communis t camp. A f lex ib le positionbringing into play a broad range of conflicting inte res ts of theadverse party is bound to fos ter differences of opinion among Hanoi'sleaders .

Increasing tensions betwee n Hanoi and China and increasing d ifferences be tween the Chinese and the Russians will force Hanoi into di f f ic u l t options that could generate conf licting points of view in the Vie tnamese communist leadership. Any in terna l divergence ofopinion and interes t on the communist side is l ike ly to be evidencedduring the process of negotiat ion . Thus, as suming that our owninterna l s trength (on the a l l ied side) i s not weakened wit h time, wehave an in te re s t in stretching the negotiations over a relat ive lylong period of time.

In teres ts in the DRV and of the NLF. Wh atever the degree ofcontrol of Hanoi over the NLF, suspicion and concern about progressiveloss of th is control and growing autonomy of the NLF will be presentin the minds of the Lao Dong party leaders during the negotiat ions.

As for the NLF, although i t s basic f ide l i ty to Hanoi cannot bequestioned, there wil l be some inc l ina t ion toward a sett lement tha twould ensure a grea ter degree of autonomy v is-a-v is Hanoi. Thisinc l ina t ion i s l ikely to increase as Hanoi's suspicions and desire topreserve control become more obvious during the negotiat ions.

The issue of unification i s l i ab le to polar ize differen ces inpoint of view between the DRV an d the NLF. Most l ike ly , a long andf lex ib le process of unificat ion through North-South discussions concerning progressive confederation would be more appealing to the NLF


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th an to the DRV, provided that the NLF members fee l they run no r iskof being cru shed in the So uth and ha ve a fa ir expectation of playinga s igni f ican t p o li t ic a l ro le in Sout h Vie tn am .

This point highlights the import ance of designing clausesguaranteeing the r igh ts of p o li t i ca l m inorities and protecting themagainst persecution. Both commu nists and non-communist s w ill fee l the need of such a clause for their own secur ity , in the context ofa true com promise se ttlement. I t is in fac t in the very nature of as tab le compromise to preserve for ea ch contending party a fa i r chanceof fu l l de velopm ent within the frame of la w and the dispositions ofthe agreement, while protecting m inorities from coercive pressureunder every a lte rna tive postwar po l it ica l evolution.

I t i s in my view import ant to introduce th is princ iple a t the ea r l ie s t stage of negotiat ions in order to create a climate of p o li t ica lde-esca lation between communists and non -com mun is ts in South Vie tna m.Also, without a softening of the posit ion of the Saigon go vernmen ttoward the NLF, there is l i t t l e chance of in ducin g divergencies ofin te res t betw een the DRV and the NLF. The prospect of a compromisesett lement w ill remain very dim .

We cannot accept NLF partic ipa t ion in the negotiations on communis t terms, but we have no in te re s t e i ther in regarding the NLF asonly a component of the DRV delegation. A sk i l l fu l compromise has tobe conceived tha t would grant the NLF separate s tatus from Hanoi,while not imply in g by th is move any recognition of i t s future ro le in So ut h Vietnam - - whi ch w ill re main op en to negotia tion .

Hanoi's relationship with Communis t China and the evolution ofNorth Vietnames e in te re sts during negotiations. There are clear indications tha t Hanoi has been taking an increasingly independentl in e fro m Chi na since 196 5. This is not mere ly a tac tica l movedetermined by the need for increasing aid from Russia; there has beena rea l doctrina l distancing betwee n Ha noi and Peking. On the v i ta l issue of agrarian s truc tu re , for exam pl e, although both part ie s s ta r tedwith the same model of agrar ian refo rm (the Chinese model), the Chinese


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have moved towar d the "commune" concept and the Nor th Vietnamese towarda f lexible "cooperative fa rm " concept. 1

With respect to guerri l la warfare and wars of l iberat ion , Hano ihas moved away conceptually from the Chin ese on the phases of guerri l lawarfare and the ro le of the c i t ie s and the countryside (in this respectthe Tet offensive might be expected to have st ir red renewed Chinesecri t ic isms). Hanoi i s giving far more emphasis than Peking to theworkers' ro le in spearheading co mmunization. More important, Hanoii s stressing i t s ow n "c rea t iv ity" in th is respect , an im plic it claimtha t there are in digenous ways to socialism. Although ithas s k i l l -fu l ly avoided entering into b i t te r ideological disputes with Chinabecause of the war, Hanoi has made i t s re jec tion of the "cul tura lrevolution" and of the "cul t of personality" very clear in an unequivocal and strong a r t ic le in Hoc Ta p. Hoping to stim ulate nat ional is tfervor, Hanoi emphasizes i t s or ig inal i ty in achieving a synthesisbetween the t radit io na l Vietnamese cul tu re and the Marxist cu ltu re ,while the Chinese attempt to destroy t he i r past values through thecul tura l revolut ion.

Even the most dogmatically "pro-Chinese" leaders in Hano i, suchas Truong Chinh and N guye n Chi Thanh (before h is death), have stressedth . d d f H . I h. k. 2e 1n epe n ence o ano1 s ow n t 1n 1ng .

In the minds of leaders both in Hanoi and in Peking the growingdoctr inal gap has fa r more serious meaning than differences on tac t ic sor po licie s .

I f Hanoi now decides to move toward a phase of negotia t ions, eveni f only for purely tac tica l reasons, it mus t have weighed and acceptedthe r i sk of cooling i t s re lat ionship with China. T im e and again Chinahas reaffirmed her opposition to any fGrm of compromise; i n fac t , her

1see R ene D um ont, "A gricultural Proble ms in North Vietnam,France, A sia," Asia (Autumn), No. 183.2Joh n C. Donnel l and Melvin Gurtov, North Vietnam : Left ofM oscow , Right of Peking, T he RAND Corporation, P-3 794, February 1968.Donald S. Zagoria, Vie tna m Triangle: M oscow, Peking, Hano i (New York:Pegasu s, 196 7 ).


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public stand has so frozen her posi t ion tha t world opinion and tha tof the varieus communist par t ies would interpret an y sett lement as aclear success for Russian influence and a serious setback for Chineseinf luence.

One might expect greater Chinese suspicion toward North Vietnamas negotiations progress, s ince in a l l l ikel ihood China wil l notaccept direct par t ic ipa t ion in any interna t ional conference relatedto a sett lement of the Vietnamese conf l ict (both because of heropposition to a negotiated settlement and because of the r i f t withRussia) . The Chinese might even attempt to put pressure on NorthVietnam as negotiat ions are making progress. I t seems unlikely tha tthese pressures would be of a mili tary character , unless China fee lsa t some stage that Hanoi i s joining an inc ipient United States-Sovietal l iance . Most l ike ly , Chinese advice to the DRV against concludingany agreement wil l become less and less fr iendly an d more an d morethreatening, perhaps followed by actual implementation of economicsanctions (under the form of progressive or abrupt cuts in Chineseaid and trade).

As uncertainty grows about i t s future relat ionships with China,Hanoi would have a growing in te res t in diversifying her t rade andattenuating her economic relationship with China. Thus, Hanoi wil lhave a growing in te res t in North-South trade and economic cooperation.

Although there are only a few instances where communist regimeswould sacr i f ice pol i t ica l object ives in favor of t rade interes ts(Hong Kong being on e of them), I believe tha t North Vietnam can becounted as one. Firs t , the Vietnamese communists are unusuallypragmatic in thei r pol ic ies while remaining radica l in the ir revolutionary purposes. Economic considerations have always affected the i rpast important decisions. They have not - - for instance in 1956-1957hesitated to stop and amend the i r agrar ian reform program when thesocio-economic and pol i t ica l r esu l t s were f e l t to be detrimental. In1960-1964, when they were pol i t ica l ly and doctr ina l ly aligned with theChinese, they were careful to maintain trade and aid with Russia andthe East European communist countr ies.


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Second and more important, the food d e f ic i t problem of Nor thVietnam wil l grow with time, and th is can be solved only thro ugh SinoNorth Vie tn amese trade or North Vie tnamese trade with the South orother Southeast Asian coun tries. Of course, in case of an agreementfrust rating i t s most v i ta l in te re s ts and with South Vietnamese bas i -ca lly host i le , the DRV will not grant p r io ri ty to trade and econ omicre lation ships. But in a compromise settlem ent tha t would open theway to the pursui t of a wide range of in te re s t s , as well as a l terna-t ive peaceful st rateg ies toward unif ica t ion and even possible com -munist do minance in the South, there i s no basic conf lic t of in te res tbetween trade and p o li t i ca l objectives. As we sha ll note la t e r , an ysettlem ent conceived along this l ine presents an inherent r i sk off inal communist take-over of the Sou th through peacefu l means i f noncommunists fa i l to unite and develop. Nevertheless, eve n in tha t case,on e might expect tha t trade re la tionships with the free countries wouldhave some transforming e ffec ts on the Vietnamese communists, as they didin the evolution of the East European countries in the past decade.

Also, in a l l l ike lihood the DRV i s concerned with preservingoptions fo r mending i t s re lat ionsh ip with Ch ina in the aftermath of asett lem ent. Thus Hanoi might be in teres ted in keeping i t s s ta tus asa "pure" soc ia l i s t country while using Sou th Vietnam as an ou tle t tothe cap ita l i s t world. In other words, Hano i might be interested inmaintaining a free Sou th Vietnam in the manner of China's Hong Kong .

I t should be noted tha t, in the ir s ta ted posit ions, Hanoi andthe NLF have carefully maintained the option of a free , neutra l SouthVietnam ope n to the free world. At the same time they have hinted a t the poss ibi l ity of a long process of reunifica t ion . 1

In the f inal analysis, the evolving relationship between NorthVietnam an d Ch ina i s one of the important dynamic factors of thenegotia tions for fac i l i ta t in g a s table compromise settlem ent. The

1 See Jean Lacouture, Vietnam : Between Two Truces (New York:Random House, 1966); Dou glas Pike, VietCong: The Organization andTechniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam(Cambridg e: M.I .T . Press, 1966).


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chances of pol i t ica l de-escalat ion between communists and non-communistsin South Vietnam wil l be enhanced by any emerging tension between Hanoiand Peking.

On the other hand, regardless of tensions that might developbetween Communist China and the DRV during the process of negotiat ions,the conclusion of a sat is factory compromise set t lement i s bound tocreate bi t terness and dis t rus t between the two governments. A sk i l l f u lU.S. and South Vietnamese policy exploi t ing this s ta te of affairsimmediately af te r a set t lement wil l have a good chance of inducirtgNorth Vietnam to divers i fy her in te res t s .

North Vietnamese interes ts in Southeast Asia. North Vietnam isambitious to play a pol i t ica l ly dominant ro le in the process of revolut ion in Southeast Asia. But following a sat is factory set t lement , itmight be induced to develop fr iendly re la t ions with Southeast Asiangovernments, par t icu lar ly in the f ield of t rade and other economicexchanges. These two in te res t s are incompatible with each other (asdemonstrated by the Russian experience, by the Chinese experience inBurma and Indonesia, and by the North Vietnamese and Chinese experiences in Cambodia). Their relat ive pr ior i ty depends, on the one hand,on North Vietnamese needs for economic reconstruct ion in the postwarperiod and, on the other , on the s ta te of i t s relat ionship with China.As we have s ta ted , i t i s l ikely that North Vietnam would give pr ior i tyto tasks of reconstruct ion and would undertake revolut ionary ac t iv i t iesabroad only to the extent that they do not compete with resourcesrequired for reconstruct ion. In addit ion, s traine d relat ionshipsbetween North Vietnam and China would inc l ine North Vietnam to givepr ior i ty to cementing re la t ionships with neighboring s tates (both forpol i t ica l reasons and for the purpose of divert ing t rade from Chinaand toward Southeast Asia). North Vietnam might even be interested insome form of cooperation among Southeast Asian countr ies , providedthat this scheme would not be control led by the United States and thata form of associat ion can be found which wil l not foreclose i t s chancesof mending, to a cer ta in degree, i t s re la t ionship with China.


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These considerations s t ress the importance of creat ing a climateof progressive pol i t ica l de-escala t ion during the negotiat ions, part i cu lar ly between the Vietnamese communists and non-communists, fol -lowed by an agreement providing for North-South economic exchangesand a sk i l l f u l policy (exploiting ful ly the inevitable coolnessbetween China and North Vietnam following a sett lement) of inducingthe DRV to establ ish t ies with the South and with other SoutheastAsian countr ies.

The need for economic assis tance in reconstructing the Vietnameseeconomy. Both the NLF and the DRV wil l recognize the need for economicassistance in the job of reconstruct ion. Jus t as dependence on Russianaid has affected Vietnamese communist pol ic ies since 1965, we mightalso expect tha t dependence on external assistance for reconstruct ionwil l influence Hanoi's and the NLF's decisions during the negotiat ions.As the negotiat ions progress, on e could expect closer re la t ionships todevelop between the DRV an d the Russians and other European communistcountr ies (another reason to arouse Chinese wrath). North Vietnamesein te res t in U.S. aid i s not to be ruled out . (Sihanouk's statementtha t North Vietnam wil l accept American aid i f the war is ended, madeduring De Gaulle 's v i s i t to Cambodia in 1966, was presumably notin i t ia ted by Sihanouk on h is own.)

North Vietnamese - Russian relat ions . Because of the North Viet -namese in te res t in Russian economic support in war and in peace, andthe uncertainty of re la t ionships with China during the period ofnegotiat ions and i t s immediate aftermath, the North Vietnamese wil lhave to maintain fr iendly re la t ions with the Russians, even i f th isshould increase Chinese displeasure or suspicion. Russia 's in i t i a lpolicy might be simply to back North Vietnamese posi t ions . But i fthe Sino-Soviet r i f t deepens during the negotiat ions, the Russianswil l have a growing in te res t , para l le l to tha t of the United Sta tes ,to encourage divergencies of point of view and functions betweenHanoi an d Peking.


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I t sh ould be observed that when the prospects of a rea l compromiseimprove, the fear of appearing to promote divisions of the communistmovement while it is under challenge in Vie tnam, thus serving U.S.in te res ts , will progressively decline . Thus a negotiated end of thewar might be expecte d to re su lt in a more active and less ambiguousRussia n policy in Southeast Asia. The d irection of th is policy - e ith e r temporary accommodat ionwith China, or increased competitionmight depend in great part upon Americanworld policy - - more spec if ica lly i t s Asian aspect in the immed iate postwar period.

In any case and part icu larly i f the Sino-Soviet r i f t widens, itw ill be more d if f icu lt in peacetime than in war time for North Vie tnamto preserve close t ie s with both Communist China and the USSR.Further, Russia n support cannot be expected to be without t ie s in thepostwar era .

THE INTERESTS OF THE NON-COMMUNISTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM

The South Vie tnamese po li t ic a l si tua t ion represents theAchillesheel in our negotiating position . One mus t remark that during theTet offensive of 1968 the most str ik ing fac t was the passiv ity of theurban population, which indicated c learly i t s refusa l to take sideswhen faced with a choice be tween the communists and the Saigon regime.In con tras t , they did not ha ve a passive a tti tude during the previousthree years, when tens of thousands and somet imes hundreds of thousandsof people demonstr ated for one issue or another, desp ite the use ofrepressive forces by the Saigon government . The a tt i tude of the crowdsduring the offensive could also be contrastedwith the ir a t ti tude during the fighting in Saigon a t the tim e of General Duong Van Minh'scoup against the Diem re gime in November 1963, or Genera l Thi's abortivecoup of November 1960 . In both instances the sympa thy and even theenthusia sm of the population for one side was obvio us.


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Inmy view the popular a t t i tude during the Tet offensive i s aclear indication that the population in the c i t i e s i s gr owing a l lergic to both the Saig on government and the communist government. Theresul t s of the 1967 elections indicate una mbiguously the lim ited appealof both regimes. In a rela t ively free bal lo t ing, where the communistsused the fu l l b las t of the i r propaganda and mobilized coercive meansto induce people to abstain from voting, the proportion of abstention(which could not be attr ib uted wholly to communist appeal an d coercion) was only about 10 percent . Communist sympathizers, when they did vote,must have voted for Truong Dinh Dzu , whose campaign was (openly orcovert ly) conceived to appeal to them and to the sentiment of ext remewar weariness. Thus Dzu's to ta l of 15 percent of the votes mustinclude some communist votes, in addit ion to the votes of those whowant peace a t an y price and ext reme protes ters against the Saigonre gime.

St i l l , in an un derdeveloped country where one would normallyexpect a sizable part of the population to be po l i t i ca l ly unawakenedand to follow o ff ic ia l in ducement, the Th ieu/Ky t icke t drew only oneth i rd of the votes, despite the tremendous advantage of having government machinery available for the ir campaign. No other candidate hadanything resembling a national campaign organization.

In my opinion, the future evolution of the segment of Vietnamesepopulation caught between the two extremes of communism and ant i -communism could have a determining influence both on the outcome ofthe phase of fighting and negotiat ing and on the s tab i l i ty of thepostwar period. One should note that , perhaps for the f i r s t timesince America's entry into the Vietnamese war, promis ing trends havede veloped toward broadening the Saigon government . I t was not coincidenta l tha t these dire ct ly followed President Johnson's decision tohalt the bombing and to move to the negotiat ing tab le . In SouthVietnam the prospect of a forthcomin g set tlement i s already beginningto induce a sh i f t in the pr ior i ties of in teres t of the Saigon establ ishment. As the conviction fades that the Americans w ill carryforever the burden of the strugg le against communism, the mil i tary


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regime may for the f i r s t time grant geater pr io r i ty to concern forthe ir survival and less to concern for contro l of power an d conservat ion of the pr ivi leges of the present establishment . Rep lacement ofthe color less and obedient cabinet of N g uye n Van Lac by the fa r morerespectab le cabinet of Tran Van Huang i s a f i r s t important step towardbroadening the base of support of the go vernment.

What is not yet clear i s wheth er the broadening process wil lresu lt in progressive moderat io n of the stand of the Saigon re gimetowar d som e form of accommodation with communist ele ments in SouthVietnam, or whether it w il l resul t in a progressive hardening ofposition of the factions supporting the Saigon government. At theti me of th i s writ ing, tw o concomitant evolutions are a t work: abroadening trend of gover nment extending toward the re l a t ive ly moremoderate ele ments of the Vietnamese p ol i t ica l scene, and a hardeningof these elements under communist thre a ts . I t is not yet c lear whichone of these t rends w ill be domin ant.

In my opinion, i f the end re sul t should be an honest but int ra ns i -gent governmen t leaning to the r ight , i t s pol i t i ca l support might besuff icient to s tabi l iz e it against im mediate communist th rea t s . Butin the lo ng run i t s popular appeal would be l imi ted , because by i t snature it could not undertake necessary socia l reforms and becausemili ta ry control of the government would be bound to asser t i t s e l fagain. In fac t , the re lat iv e "weight" of Premier H uang and PresidentThieu depends on the support of the moderate fact ions. The more thebase of government evolves to war d the r igh t, the less indispensableHuong (or for that matter an y c iv i l ian government) wi l l become toThieu and the mili tary .

One must rea lize tha t because of his tor ical circumstances an t i -co mmunism in Vietnam i s closely assoc iated with the conservation ofacquired priv i leges. P o w er and socia l pre-emin ence in the government,in the army, and in business belong almost exclusively to one group ofpeople: those who during the strugg le for independence ei ther cont r ibuted act ively to the perpetuat ion of Fre nc h rule , or a t l eas t accepted the French presence as a fact of l i f e in order to obtain


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privi leged treatment - - in e i ther case cutting themselves off fromthe mainstream of Vietnamese aspira t ions . Only fear for the i r ownsurvival might make the present establishment agree to rel inquishpower to more moderate groups unhampered by vested in te res t s in undertaking socia l reforms to make the government more popular with thepopulation. Such leadership would have the wil l an d abi l i ty to seek abroad-based government, dropping the usual tact ics of "divide and ru le . "

Fo r the majority of the population, although they are pol i t ica l lyuncrystal l ized and leader less , three broad aspirations have, in myopinion, strong appeal:

1. The desire for peace. Vietnam has been marked by waran d violence for a quar ter of a century, except for theperiod from 1956 to 1959. One notices everywhere in SouthVietnam among the poor a nosta lg ia for the peaceful characterof this period (even i f it i s often associated with a dis tas te for the Diem administrat ion) .2. The desire for socia l jus t ice . The popular demandsduring the period of massive demonstrations (1963-1967) werefocused on ending outrageous privi leges and corruption an destablishing socia l jus t ice . These demands, however, havenever been formulated into specif ic measures for reducingincome dispar i t i es and increasing equal opportunit ies.3. The desire for a postwar regime nei ther ruthless l ikethe communists (or to a lesser degree the Diem regime) norarrogant , arb i t r a ry , an d corrupt l ike the recent administ rat ions in Saigon. As I have already s tated, this i s ther esu l t of an allergy developed through painful di rec texperimentation with exis t ing author i t ies .During the period of negotiat ions, on e might expect the posi t ion

of the communists, an d par t icular ly of the NLF, toward non-communistsoutside the GVN to sof ten . Their policy might lean more an d more tonat ional is t ic object ives an d might softpedal communist objec t ives ,while making concessions in Paris . On the other hand, i f the present


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Saigon re gim e do es not change, the prospect of an arrogant, unmotivatedm ilita ry clique becoming, th rough the negotiat ions, pe rmanen t ru lers ofSouth Vietnam might decrease the re ticence of genuine no n-comm unists toenter in to a broader coal it ion with the com munists . This danger couldbecom e part icu la rly real i f tensions be tween Chin a and the Vietn amesecom mun ists m ateria l ize as the negotiations progress. For in th is casethe s inceri ty of the NLF's na tiona lis t ic motivationw ill not be dou btedby the majority of the non-co mmunist s of South Vie tnam.

I f th is happens, U.S. a lte rnatives for Vietnam will be narr ow edto either maintaining a t any price a Saig on gov ernmen t with a narro wfac tional base of privilege and extreme anticommu nism, or accepting abroad coa lit ion already contro lled by communists (with the consolationtha t Vie tn ames e commu nists w ill be independent from Chinese communists ,unless a signif ican t po li t ic a l victo ry improve s Sino-Vietnamese re la -t ions) .

In fac t, the key to a compromise settlement l ie s in our ab i l i ty to win over to our s ide a sizable segment of Vietnamese moderat eopinion early in the negotia tions. In my view, th i s could be achievedonly i f the U.S. go vernmen t system atically pressures the Saigonm ilita ry establishm ent for a fu rther broadening of the go vernmen t andmakes credible to them i t s w illingness to nego tiate for withdrawal ofAmerican troops i f ce rta in necessary reforms are not undertaken. In a f i r s t step , the image of the present go vernment could more convincelyre f lec t national unity i f the Huong cabinet wer e enlarged to includediverse personalit ies .

In a second s tep , th is new governmen t would have to end the policyof "divide and ru le ," which constitu ted the basic tac t ic for po lit ic a lcontrol of a l l non-commun is t gover nm ent s from the French, the Bao Dai, and the Diem regimes to the present one. I t must seek to ease d is tru s ts and enmities among Buddhist, Catholic , Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai factions;help th em to broaden the ir popular following; and t ry to work out acertain degree of understanding am ong them on a common program ofaction. A pa ra l le l e ffo rt sh ould be made to strengthen certain socialgroupings, such as the students ' organizations, the labor unions, and the l ike .


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If these steps toward unif ica t ion of the non-communist factionsof the Vietnamese population were implemented, the credib i l i ty of thegovernment's motivation for a policy of peace with freedom and socia ljus t i ce would be great ly enhanced. Even for a broad-based government,making the mili tary accept some to lera t ion of neut ra l i s t t rends wouldnot be easy. Nevertheless, this might be done by demonstrating thatit i s to the government's advantage to l e t these trends develop independently and as par t of the po l i t i ca l fabric of free South Vietnamra ther than to repress them for future communist exploi ta t ion. We havestressed tha t communist exploi ta t ion of neut ra l i s t feel ings during thephase of negotiat ions could be dangerous indeed. In the past , the"neut ra l i s t clause" has always provided a convenient excuse for s i l en-cing effect ive cr i t ic ism. There wil l be no r ea l freedom of expressionunless this clause is narrowed to forbid only those who conspire tooverthrow the government by force or other unconsti tut ional means.

Inclusion into the government's base of support of a nonalignedtrend of opinion (one recognizing the need for deterr ing the communistsfrom an aggressive s tra tegy, and the danger of Chinese dominant inf lu-ence over Vietnam) would great ly enhance the government's abi l i ty tomobilize the nat ional is t ic fervor of the Vietnamese people. In ef fec t ,for Viet Cong followers and sympathizers as well as for non-communists,the s incer i ty of a government of such composition would not be in doubtin i t s search for peace with coexistence. I t would receive broadsupport for a policy of union an d tolerance with the object ive of preserving the South from communist ru le while helping the North to moreindependence from China. I t would in this manner preserve the nat ionalident i ty of the whole of Vietnam while reestablishing peace anddecreasing tensions.


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I I I . STRATEGIES FOR ENDING THE WAR

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES AND THE LONG-TERM OUTCOME

Establishing grea te r s tab i l i ty in Vietnam and, more generally , in Southeast Asia is essential ly a long-range problem. An appraisal ofany short-term ch ange should consider long-term e ffec ts . I f one admit sthat (1) the United States cannot stay in Vie tnam forever, and (2 ) tha tthe communis t regim e in North Vietnam can not be destroyed, th en thelong-term perspective admit s of only tw o alte rna tives : e ithe r withdrawing, or else su ff ic ien tly strengthening South Vie tn am's socio-economicst ructure to render the countr y immune to communist subversion. Even acommunis t fade-out or a settlement tantamount to a truce must be considered as tac tica l an d incidental changes from the lo ng-range vie wpoints . So lon g as the non-communists in South Vietnam remainpo li t ica l ly weak, the communists w ill be able and moti vate d to mainta in a f lexib le level of subversive ac t iv i t i es : they w ill l ie low when our m ilitary pressure is high, and raise the ir pressure as soo n as were duce ours.

Th us, a t issue is how strengthening the non-communist struc tu reof South Vietnam can best be achieved through a stra tegy of f ightingand negotiating . The la t te r strategy could aim a t stim ulating favorable po li t ica l devel opmen t, and a t a settlement specifica l ly encouragin g coexistence be tween communists and non- communists (despite ther isk of a po ten tia l peaceful communist take-over i f the no n- commu nistsfa i l to strengthen themselves).

Anoth er aspect of the issue is wheth er the communis t appeal w illfa de with increased war weariness, or whether the continuation of thewar (with i ts effec ts on the evolu tion of the Saig on regime) w ill mainta in a conti nuous source of recruitment for the communists am on g thepopulation as well as harden th e ir determination. This study ha s in dicated tha t the war has resu lted in a po larization to ward the tw o extr emes of Vietnamese opinion, communist an d anti-communist, whil e increasing the middle 's aversion to both extremes. I have also stressed tha t so long as an end to th e war remain s re mote , (1 ) the Saig on regimew ill be controlled by the m ilita ry and the extreme anti -communist


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fac tions of the Vie tn amese establishment, (2 ) these groups will rem ainessen tial ly co ncern ed with conserving the ir acquired priv ileges and the ir contro l over the power s truc ture , and (3) American leverage onthe evolution of the Saig on reg ime will be eff ic ien t only insofar asAmericans are willing to r isk losing South Vietnam ra ther than supportthe present s ta te of in terna l Sout h Vietnamese a ffa irs . Th us, I fee ltha t so long as the end of the war rem ain s a remote perspective , thecommunists will increasingly appeal to a sizable minority of the Vietnamese population, while the Sai gon regime's base of support will re -main a faction of privileged people (unless a popular uprising destroysthe GVN; the consequenc es of these are unpredictable).

This study has also indicated tha t in terna tional and national unity among the communis ts w ill re main strong where they face v i ta l challenge (war) or are v ic torious (for example, American withdra wal).Chances of develo pin g contradictory in te re s ts and divergence of opinions within the communist world would be increased i f the a ll ied side ,and part icu larly So uth Vietnam, ad opte d a mode ra te posture toward the communist s and mad e a v is ib le effo r t to achieve these mode ra te goals.

I t is not in our power to coerce the communis ts to make a partic -u lar concession or to accept a part icu lar settlement. What we can do is to adopt a stra tegy that wo uld make a l l alte rnatives unfavorable tothe communist s in the lo ng run. Only in th is way do we improve the chan cetha t th ey w ill ch oo se an a lternative economica l to both sides in the longrun, one tha t leaves the door pa rt ia lly ope n for the peaceful pursuit offurther long-term objectives. The settlement should cover a wide rangeof diverse in te re s ts , encouragin g th e pursuit of as many overlapping andcompatib le in te re s ts as possible while discouraging incompatible in te res ts .Such a divers if ica tion of in te re s ts would increase the chances of progress ively emasculating aggressive communist designs in Southeast As

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